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The Political Economy
of Sanctions: Resilience
and Transformation in
Russia and Iran
Ksenia Kirkham
International Political Economy Series
Series Editor
Timothy M. Shaw , University of Massachusetts Boston, Boston, USA;
Emeritus Professor, University of London, London, UK
The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises
impacts its organization and governance. The IPE series has tracked its
development in both analysis and structure over the last three decades.
It has always had a concentration on the global South. Now the South
increasingly challenges the North as the centre of development, also
reflected in a growing number of submissions and publications on
indebted Eurozone economies in Southern Europe. An indispensable
resource for scholars and researchers, the series examines a variety of capi-
talisms and connections by focusing on emerging economies, companies
and sectors, debates and policies. It informs diverse policy communities
as the established trans-Atlantic North declines and ’the rest’, especially
the BRICS, rise.
NOW INDEXED ON SCOPUS!
Ksenia Kirkham
The Political
Economy
of Sanctions:
Resilience
and Transformation
in Russia and Iran
Ksenia Kirkham
Department of War Studies
King’s College London
London, UK
ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

International Political Economy Series
ISBN 978-3-031-04054-2 ISBN 978-3-031-04055-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04055-9
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
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tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Welfare State Theories and IPE 5
1.2 The Political Economy of Sanctions 7
1.3 The Political Economy of Russia and Iran 10
1.4 Book Outline 13
References 17
Part I Theoretical Identification of the Mechanisms of

Sanctions
2 The Welfare State Regime as a Theoretical Account:
From Welfare State to Gramsci 33
2.1 First Theoretical Adaptation: From Functional
Representation of the Welfare State to ‘Regime’
Approach 33
2.2 Second and Third Theoretical Adaptations: Global
Dimension and Structural Power Relations 37
References 46
3 The Welfare State Regime as an Analytical Tool: From
Gramsci to Welfare 49
3.1 Contextual Settings: Capitalism and ‘Integral’ State 49
3.2 Hegemonic Rivalry and Counter-Hegemonic
Mechanisms 61
v
vi CONTENTS
3.3 Conclusion to Part I: Completing Theoretical Merger 67

References 70
Part II Institutional Design

4 Russia: Institutional Design 89
4.1 De-commodifying WSR Function 89
4.2 Redistributive WSR Function 98
4.3 Connecting WSR Function 110
References 120
5 Iran (Institutional Design) 127
5.4 Summing Up… 153
References 159
Part III Material Capabilities

6 Russia (Material Capabilities) 177
References 212
7 Iran (Material Capabilities) 217
References 248
Part IV Cultural Leadership

8 Russia (Cultural Leadership) 271
References 302
CONTENTS vii
9 Iran (Cultural Leadership) 309

References 338
Part V Welfare State Regime Reproduction

10 WSR Reproduction 345
10.1 Introduction 345
10.2 Counter-Hegemonic Trends 354
References 382
11 Concluding Remarks 387
11.1 Hobbesian Contender States? 387
11.2 Lockean ‘Heartland’? 391
11.3 Some Thoughts for Future Research 394
References 398
Appendices 401
Bibliography 419
Index 455
List of Figures
Fig. 3.1 Self-protection of society (Source Author’s diagram) 67

Fig. 3.2 Matrix of regime reproduction (Source Author’s diagram) 69
Fig. 4.1 Federal Budget Tax Structure, 2020, % of total =P 21
trillion ($274 billion) (Sources Ministry of Finance, 2021) 104
Fig. 4.2 Federal budget Expenditures, % of total: =P 13,343 bn.
in 2013, =P 16,709 bn. in 2018, =P 22,822 in 2020 (Source
Ministry of Finance 2021, https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/sta
tistics/fedbud/execute/) 107
Fig. 4.3 National Projects financing in 2020 (% of total) (Source
Ministry of Finance 2021) 109
Fig. 4.4 Foreign currencies and gold of the CBR (% of market
value) (Source Authors calculations, the Bank of Russia,
2015, 2019) 109
Fig. 5.1 The share of taxes and oil revenues in general budget
revenues, % (Source Statistical Centre of Iran, 2019) 142
Fig. 5.2 Tax structure, % (Source Statistical Centre of Iran, 2019) 143
Fig. 5.3 The share of social welfare in total budget expenditure, %
(Source Statistical Centre of Iran, 2019) 146
Fig. III.1 Top 100 TNCs by countries, $ of total profit (Source
Author’s Calculations, Data from Forbes) 166
Fig. III.2 Percentage of world millionaire by country, % (Source
Credit Swiss 2018) 169
Fig. 6.1 Most common breaches of open-ended contracts, %
of respondents (Source Author’s Interview with a HR
manager, 2017) 179
ix
x LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 6.2 The structure of a household income (Sources GKS

2018, 2021) 183
Fig. 6.3 GDP structure in 2020, % (Source GKS, 2021) 191
Fig. 6.4 FDI flows into Russia and out of Russia: 1997–2019, US
$million (Source CBR [2022]) 206
Fig. 6.5 The average wages in science and education in Russia
and the United States, in US$ (Sources The US Bureau
of Labour Statistics, Ria Rating, GKS) 207
Fig. 6.6 Migration to Russia from selected states, number
of people (Source GKS 2021 https://rosstat.gov.ru/sto
rage/mediabank/dem21.pdf) 211
Fig. 7.1 GDP by sectors, % (Source Statistical Centre of Iran) 229
Fig. 7.2 The structure of household expenditures. Urban vs
Rural, % (Source Statistical Centre of Iran) 234
Fig. 7.3 FDI flows into Iran and out of Iran, selected years, US$
million (Source UNCTAD [2020]) 236
Fig. 7.4 Major trade partners with Iran, 2018–2019 (Source
UNCTAD [2020]) 241
Fig. 10.1 Power centralisation (Source Author’s diagram) 355
Fig. 10.2 Modernisation and optimisation (Source Author’s
diagram) 361
Fig. 10.3 Strategic partnership and diversification (Source Author’s
diagram) 367
Fig. 10.4 Para-constitutional reform (Source Author’s diagram) 372
Fig. 10.5 Cadre formation (Source Author’s diagram) 377
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Welfare state regime—theoretical development 44

Table 4.1 Taxes 104
Table 6.1 Dynamics of income, wages and pension in 2013–2020, % 182
Table 6.2 Sample household budgets for a pensioner, single parents
and families with 3 + children in Moscow, Tambov
and Omsk, 2017–2018 186
Table 6.3 Income disparities across regions 193
Table 6.4 IS in selected industries, the share of import in total
consumption, % 195
Table 9.1 Political factions in Iran 317
xi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Sanctions in IPE
The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long,

and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them.
—Thomas Hobbes
The use of sanctions in international political economy has increased

Please confirm the section headings are correctly identified throughout
the chapters dramatically in recent years. Sanctions are now arguably the
most important instruments of US foreign policy towards ‘contender’
states such as Russia, Iran, China, Venezuela, and Cuba, to name a few.
Indeed, more sanctions were enacted during the first three years of the
Trump administration than under all previous ones. The Biden adminis-
tration does not seem to be willing to reverse this course of action any
time soon. Tightening, not easing, of sanctions policies is a more likely
scenario. This is especially true in the case of sanctions against Russia and
Iran. IN September 2021, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the US Department of State in
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
K. Kirkham, The Political Economy of Sanctions: Resilience
and Transformation in Russia and Iran, International Political
Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04055-9_1
2 K. KIRKHAM
cooperation with the UK Government announced a new round of sanc-

tions against Russia in response to the poisoning and then imprisonment
of opposition leader Alexei Navalny by Russian security services. In the
case of Iran, according to the Treasury Department, the recent de-listing
of Iranian entities (Mammut Industrial Group and Mammut Diesel)
by OFAC, ‘have nothing to do’ with JCPOA—2015, the Iran Nuclear
deal, abandoned by the Trump administration in 2018; the Department
spokesperson stressed that the United States ‘will continue to counter
Iran’s destabilising activities’ through sanctions (Al-Monitor 2021).
This book draws on a comparative analysis of Russia and Iran under
sanctions to back up a famous argument that the very emergence and
existence of contender states has been a result of counter-hegemonic
struggles, which have prompted the adoption of ‘Hobbesian’ regimes
(van der Pijl 1998). Notwithstanding the relentless enactment of sanc-
tions, target states have become more self-reliant, less democratic and
have taken a more aggressive posture towards the West. This research
addresses a crucial puzzle: why, even as sanctions have taken their toll
on targeted states and induced economic problems and trade disruptions,
have they been largely ineffective in terms of their stated objectives, such
as political deterrence, foreign policy change, public mobilisation against
contender governments, or a regime change. Despite initial economic
grievances in the short run, in the longer run, the effects of sanctions
have been paradoxical: the target states have managed to adjust to external
pressures, to develop internal self-protection mechanisms, and to mobilise
domestic resources and remodel income and wealth distribution.
The aim of this comparative study is to make an original contribution
to the understanding of the welfare state as a phenomenon, at the national
and transnational levels. The analysis of human welfare is central to a
holistic understanding of the contradictions inherent in the modern capi-
talist system that manifest themselves at times of crises. The development
of welfare states should be understood not only as an element of deindus-
trialisation (Iversen and Iversen 2010), social power resources (Baldwin
1996; Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 1983) or economic competitive-
ness (Rieger and Leibfried 2003), but also as the consequence of Cold
War confrontation, the post-9/11 new world order (Cerami 2009),
and more broadly the long-term geopolitical competition between ‘con-
tender’ states and the ‘Lockean heartland’ (van der Pijl 2012). This is
not the first historical materialist account of the welfare state (Gough
1 INTRODUCTION 3
2016; Jessop 2016; Offe 1985). However, it is the first attempt to inte-
grate welfare state research with structural analyses of counter-hegemonic
evolution in the international system and with global power dynamics.
This book closes this gap by developing a theoretical framework for
analysing counter-hegemonic mechanisms of the welfare state, and by
applying this framework to the cases of Russia and Iran under sanctions.
The contrast between Lockean heartland and Hobbesian contender states
provides a contextual ground for assessing the following questions:
– What are the mechanisms by which sanctions operate?

– What are the counter-mechanisms that make target states resilient to
sanctions?
In pursuit of these research questions, this book focuses primarily on

the ‘moment’ of sanctions and relates these to the Russian and Iranian
welfare state regime dynamics within the context of the longue durée of
state formation and geopolitical rivalry (Braudel 1958). The contribu-
tion to such a pursuit departs from the Amsterdam School conception
of a historical dialectic between a ‘Lockean heartland’ of the capitalist
global political economy emanating from the ‘Anglosphere’ and ‘Hobbe-
sian’ contender states (Gamble 2009). Power in the ‘Lockean heartland’
is based on the ability of a property-owning class to govern itself
(Macpherson 1954). However, this ‘self-government’ is subjugated to
the grand strategy of ‘opening up the contender state–society complexes,
dispossessing the state classes and replacing them by a governing class
submitting to liberal global governance’ (van der Pijl 2012). Economic
sanctions have become an important instrument of this grand strategy,
so the current period of sanctions provides a promising contextual
background for analysing contender states.
The analysis will be structured upon a novel Welfare State Regime
approach (hereafter WSR) that combines welfare state functionality with
neo-Gramscian institutional, economic and cultural structural dimen-
sions to capture the long-term social power dynamics in Russia and
Iran. WSR distinguishes such mechanisms by tracing socio-economic and
cultural processes that evolve in Russia and Iran under sanctions, and by
comparing a recent case of Russia to a relatively long-standing experi-
ence of Iran. Interestingly, despite cultural differences, Russia and Iran
reveal important structural, political and economic commonalities. To
4 K. KIRKHAM
confront the Lockean ‘heartland’, Russia and Iran increasingly inter-

nalise the features of a Hobbesian-type of governance, such as power
centralisation, para-constitutional reformation, economic diversification
and optimisation, human resource development and cadre formation.
Although the Russian and Iranian WSRs have been strengthened in
response to sanctions, the contradictory nature of counter-hegemonic
settings might significantly constrain further consolidation.
What are these contradictions? The book guides the reader through
counter-hegemonic mechanisms (hereafter CHM), assesses their strengths
and weaknesses and provides an effective summary table. The contradic-
tions reside in institutional instruments of social control (assessed in Part
II), in material capabilities of the state and the market (Part III), in strate-
gies for human resource development and social engineering when the
regime attempts to harmonise religion, democracy and private property
(Part IV). The apparent coincidence in the usage of the term ‘mech-
anism’ for both sanctions and counter-hegemony is not accidental: the
‘mechanisms’ of sanctions are only workable if they manage to rupture
the counter-hegemonic settings of the regime, therefore, both sanctions
and counter-hegemony will be analysed using the same operational vari-
ables. Also, it is important to distinguish between counter-hegemony
against the US-controlled Western institutions (neoliberal at present) and
counter-hegemony against neoliberalism per se,1 as these are not the
same things; current research is focused on the former rather than on
the latter. Overall, by telling a critical story of late modernity where non-
Western countries, such as Russia and Iran, cease to be ‘silent spectators,
marginal both historically and analytically’ (Pasha 2005), the analysis of
their welfare regimes contributes to welfare state theory in particular and
critical theory in general.
The book aspires to contribute to the current literature in three ways:
1 Neoliberalism is ‘an economic policy regime whose objective is to secure monetary

and fiscal stability and that is legitimised by an ideology that holds markets are best treated
as self-regulating. This has allowed the restoration of class power’ (Harvey 2014), and also
a dramatic redistribution of wealth and income in favour of the rich’ (Callinicos 2012:
67). Neoliberalism is ‘pro-supply-side’ state intervention’ by means of financialisation,
privatisation, and ‘new forms of authoritarianism from above, such as strict budgetary
discipline and regimes of permanent austerity’ (Fouskas and Gökay 2019: 151).
1 INTRODUCTION 5
1.1 Welfare State Theories and IPE

The WSR approach expands the comparative predominantly Western-
centric welfare state literature, by adding the cases of Russia and Iran, and
by addressing the shortcomings of the mainstream welfare state accounts,
as defined by Ian Gough—functionalist, economic and pluralist. Although
there are some valuable insights that are borrowed from these theo-
ries (especially from functionalists), WSR approach suggests three ways
of how to transcend them: first, by providing a holistic understanding
of human history to reduce the risk of siding with either subjective or
objective representations of welfare states as most mainstream theories do,
second, by examining the mechanisms of societal transformation, omitted
in most papers and third, by conceptualising welfare states within the
configuration of transnational forces.
The first direction implies borrowing Wood and Gough’s ‘middle
paths’ theory for analysing welfare states (Wood and Gough 2006) that
conceptualises the notion of power not only as the objectivity of capitalist
structures of social inequality but also as a subjectivity of ideologically
articulated political struggle over hegemony that has been successfully
applied by neo-Gramscian scholars to the study of European integration
(Cafruny and Ryner 2003). The second limitation is addressed by incor-
porating useful insights offered by functionalists (Wilensky 1975) that
were further developed by power resource theorists (Esping-Andersen
1990; Korpi 1983) by employing functional parameters of redistribution,
commodification and stratification as important mechanisms of social
transformation. Finally, the third theoretical shortcoming is overpassed
by placing the analysis of the WSR under sanctions, or a ‘target’ state,
into a neo-Gramscian framework that enables a broader conceptualisation
of transnational forces within the welfare–sanctions nexus, with a partic-
ular focus on contradictions inherent to global capitalism as a point for
theoretical departure, and on the contradictions of the WSR counter-
hegemonic mechanisms as a final point of theoretical inquiry. In other
words, a ‘welfare state’ theory is no longer just a static analysis of socio-
economic policies and practices, but also a holistic and dynamic portrait
of a society within a specific historical and geopolitical context that shapes
its further evolution.
The WSR approach contributes to the current IPE literature by refo-
cusing the long-standing debate over the effects of globalisation on
the changing role of the state (Althusser 1969; Burnham 2001; Cox
6 K. KIRKHAM
1981; Jessop 1982; Poulantzas 1974, and many more) to the notion
of welfare, which becomes a central binding category of the state as an
‘integral’ entity. The WSR approach reconciles the views concerning the
contentious concept of the state in contemporary IPE thought, where
‘many Gramscis are on offer’ (Germain and Kenny 1998: 8). WSR does
not position itself as an overwhelming substitution for the theory of
the state and rejects the possibility of the development of a general,
‘fully determinate’ theory, as a reductionism of one kind or another is
inevitable’ (Jessop 1982: 211). It rather proposes the ‘method of articu-
lation’, according to which the analysis of the state is set in a particular
historical conjuncture (such as economic sanctions) to understand the
conditions under which specific causal chains and contradictions (the
mechanisms of sanctions) might produce ‘contingently necessary effects’,
the welfare state regime outcomes (the counter-hegemonic mechanisms).
Moreover, it helps to integrate and to further develop the most valu-
able functionalist and power resource insights into the neo-Gramscian
dimension, which parallels with Robert Cox’s concept of a ‘historic
bloc’ that presents structural power as a blend of three categories of
‘potentials’—material capabilities, ideas and institutions (Cox 1981: 136).
The theoretical merger proceeds through a multidimensional concept
of ‘Self-protection of society’ (in Part I), which conflates power struc-
tures (institutional, material and cultural) with welfare state functions
(de-commodifying, redistributive and connecting) to arrive at the final
point of theoretical inquiry—counter-hegemonic mechanisms of the WSR
that constitute welfare state regime reproduction. Van der Pijl’s afore-
mentioned conception of a geopolitical dialectic between a ‘Lockean
heartland’ and ‘Hobbesian contender states’ offers the most propitious
point of departure for this, but WSR amplifies and extends the concep-
tion of the welfare state implied therein. Although van der Pijl advances
in capturing the main dynamics of the internal evolution of states, some-
times this happens at the expense of overlooking the countertendencies.
This book covers this, first, by viewing the heartland as heterogeneous
and internally variegated, which at times of crises perhaps has become
more Hobbesian, and second, by suggesting that the nature of contender
states might vary a lot owing to the particularities of their state–society
configurations.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
1.2 The Political Economy of Sanctions

Second, the book aspires to add to the literature on the political economy
of sanctions. Despite sustained debate about the adverse effects of sanc-
tions on social stability, there has been little evidence of their effectiveness:
sanctioned states maintained their foreign policy course and became
economically more self-reliant (Jerin 2015). Lee Jones in ‘Societies under
Siege’ maintains that the analysis of sanctions should go beyond the main-
stream theories, classified as the liberal, public choice, institutionalist and
neo-Weberian accounts, because they ignore the mechanisms by which
sanctions are ‘supposed to operate’ (for a detailed analysis, see Jones
2015). ‘Mainstream’ are ‘problem-solving’ theories grounded in founda-
tional ontology and positivist epistemology: by separating fact and values,
and claiming to avoid normative judgements and interpretive character-
isations, mainstream theories develop the notion of empirical causation
that aims at ‘establishing laws and certainties like those established in
the natural sciences’ (Savigny and Marsden 2011: 24–6). The application
of the neo-Gramscian concept of the state to the study of the mecha-
nisms of sanctions by Lee Jones has been a productive move away from
the mainstream accounts: the social conflict analysis (SCA) succeeded
in identifying the socio-political coalitions contesting state power, the
distribution of the economic impact across social groups, and the polit-
ical consequence of the response of the main social formations to the
economic impact of sanctions (Jones 2015: 39).
Jones conceptualises state capacities and functions as not ‘possessed’
by the state but as emerged historically and contingently, ‘reshaped and
constrained by societal power relations’ (Jones 2015: 36). Not only classes
and class fractions but also ethnic, religious and state-based groups are
crucial for social conflict analysis. The assessment of socio-economic and
political reactions of leading social groups to the economic impact of
sanctions has been a very informative and valuable contribution to the
understanding of the mechanisms of sanctions. However, these mech-
anisms in Jones’ analysis continue to be defined at a high level of
abstraction: further analysis of the ‘effectiveness’ of sanctions requires a
specification (definition) of mechanisms and an assessment of their contra-
dictory nature. With this aim, this book replaces the SCA with the welfare
state regime as the central focus of the investigation, considering it to
be a more powerful analytical tool in distinguishing the ‘mechanisms’ of
8 K. KIRKHAM
sanctions being the same operational variables as the counter-hegemonic

settings of the regime.
There are several reasons why the welfare state regime rather than
the SCA is a more suitable framework for analysing the ‘mechanisms’
of sanctions in Russia and Iran. First, the focus on the labour/capital
contradictions, embedded in welfare, reveals the institutional dynamism
of contender states. Jones maintained that by following Jessop’s and
Poulantzas’ historical reasoning (Jessop 2012; Poulantzas 1974) he
could move beyond the scope of structural power mechanisms into the
complexities of societal power relations. However, Jessop and Poulantzas
had different visions on the theory of the state (Jessop 1982: 181), and
it would have been more precise had Jones specified which account he
prioritised. For instance, in the case of Iraq, Poulantzas-like conceptualisa-
tion of the state at the structural level (Burnham 1994: 229) results in the
author’s focusing on the external linkages between sanctions and national
social groups, rather than on the dynamics of class conflict within the
global flow of capitalist social relations. In the case of South Africa, Jones’s
assessment of class struggle bears features of Structural Marxism, as social
formations obtain quite a static character and the future of the sanctioned
states is already contained in the dynamics of the present class struggle
(Booth 1985: 773). Jones rightfully suggests that through ‘conditioning
ruling groups’ strategies, sanctions can indirectly alter the coalitional basis
of the state, its institutional arrangements, its economic and ideolog-
ical programmes and its wider policies’ (Jones 2015: 39–43). However,
there is a potential problem that an abstract coalitional ‘ruling block’
will predetermine the institutional, economic and ideological programs
of the state. Technically, this makes the assessment of the static appa-
ratus of ‘state managers’ problematic, as it does not take into account the
dynamism of its members’ interests, ideas and strategies in response to
sanctions. Moreover, Jones believes that state institutions play a secondary
role in Gramscian theory, and that this is what fundamentally distinguishes
Gramscians and neo-Weberians (ibid.). However, referring to the analysis
of Risorgimento, it seems difficult to prioritise and delineate the insti-
tutional power of state apparatus from the Gramscian understanding of
state formation as the institution of political form of a ‘bourgeois’ state,
‘suitable to the expansion of capitalism’, that gained popular support
across Europe (Morton 2007: 65). With the aim of exploring the institu-
tional dynamism of contender state development, Jones’s analysis could
be complemented by considering the ‘shifting sands’ behind the process
1 INTRODUCTION 9
of state and class formation that lie in the labour/capital contradictions

(Burnham 1994), embedded in welfare (Gough 1979).
Second, Jones fairly stresses the importance of consideration of the
impact of transnational capitalist development on the composition of
social forces (Jones 2015: 41). However, his analysis of the effect of sanc-
tions upon various social groups seems to be taken out of neo-Gramscian
geopolitical contextual settings of hegemonic rivalry. It was a massive
social conflict within the state in South Africa that predetermined the
regime formation and domestic unrest that ‘drove the imposition of sanc-
tions’ (ibid.: 66). Interestingly, the Anglo-American heartland abstained
from the process: in 1985, Britain did not join the Commonwealth’s deci-
sion to adopt trade, investment and tourism embargoes, and again, in
1987, the US and British governments resisted the pressure from some
European states to impose anti-South Africa sanctions unilaterally (ibid.).
Therefore, sanctions played a supplementary rather than a leading role
in the internal process of the regime’s transformation, as sanctions were
the product of internal mass mobilisation, aided by anti-apartheid forces
driven abroad. Alternatively, the WSR approach will examine sanctions
within a broader geopolitical concept of capitalist rivalry.
Third, the SCA could be complemented by elaborating the counter-
hegemonic mechanisms for the formation of public ‘consent’. It remains
unspecified how the ideological orientation might make some social
groups ‘resign itself passively to its losses’ (Jones 2015: 43), especially
in a situation when the local responses to sanctions are ‘structurally
constrained by pre-existing social power relations and conflicts’. And
lastly, it is difficult to identify ‘the immediate economic impact of sanc-
tions on the target society’, the second step of the SCA, and almost
impossible to distinguish it from the effect of other factors (business
cycle, situation in the global markets, macroeconomic situation, etc.).
Jones outlines, that the intensity of the effectiveness of sanctions is iden-
tified via its influence on society’s basic compositions (giving rise to some
social groups while marginalising others) and on resources available to
ruling groups for ‘coercing, co-opting, or gaining consent from subor-
dinate groups’ (Jones 2015: 45). However, it would be interesting to
see how these two things correlate, as they are mutually dependent: the
resources that the ruling class requires depend on the composition of
society, while the way the society is ‘composed’, depends not only on the
effect of sanctions, but also on many other factors that this research is
planning to include into the welfare state regime settings. Therefore, the
impact of sanctions on various social groups would depend on the welfare
state regime layout.
10 K. KIRKHAM
1.3 The Political Economy of Russia and Iran

Third, the WSR approach contributes to the literature on the political
economy of Russia and Iran. Current accounts on Russia under sanctions,
due to its recency mainly address the effects of sanctions on Russia’s polit-
ical economy (Golikova and Kuznetsov 2017; Mau and Leonard 2017),
suggesting that Russia has been quite successful in adapting to the effects
of sanctions (Connolly 2018). However, the mechanisms through which
sanctions operate and the spectrum of transnational relations are under-
explored. Although some papers succeed in bringing global component
into analysis (Connolly 2018), the target country and the ‘wider global
economy’ remain separate entities where the domain of ‘international’
is external to domestic social power relations. The inclusion of an anal-
ysis of geopolitical forces in relation to counter-hegemonic mechanisms,
along with a supranational dimension into the concept of the welfare state
regime, shall complement the analysis. Also, there have been few, if any,
publications related to a holistic analysis of the Iranian’s and Russia’s
welfare state under sanctions, as non-Western accounts fall outside the
theoretical categorisations of the welfare states. Comparative welfare state
literature mainly focuses on Western capitalist states: most papers are
either narrowly focused on particular issues, such as health care, educa-
tion, poverty, inequality, etc., or are too extensive and assess welfare
policies in a macroeconomic context.
The Iranian case is far older and longer term (imposed since 1995 by
the US, and since 2006 by the UN) than the Russian case (imposed since
2014 by the US, the EU and some other states). Therefore, while the
impact of sanctions on Russian socio-economic development is still under
research, the amount of literature concerning Iran is substantial. All the
blame for Iran’s vulnerability to sanctions is laid on economic mismanage-
ment: over-reliance on oil revenues, insufficient economic diversification,
uncompetitive subsidised industries, a regressive tax regime, the lack
of foreign investment, unemployment, the brain drain, the marginal-
isation of the private sector, the prioritisation of Shia ideology over
national economic interests, corruption and the expansion of the black
market (Ghadar and Sobhani 2011: 23; Karshenas and Hakimian 2005:
90). Furthermore, sanctions are seen as the primary trigger for the
dramatic growth of the informal economy with the aid of the foreign
exchange market. There are opposing opinions regarding the effects of
the black market on Iranian welfare. Some authors admit that the black
1 INTRODUCTION 11
market has negatively impacted economic growth by contributing to the

budget deficit. However, a ‘moderately sized’ informal economy may
have improved political stability by providing job opportunities for young
people, thus reducing income inequality (Farzanegan 2013: 32). For
some, however, sanctions have not only failed to achieve their goals,
i.e. regime change and ‘democratisation’, but have instead contributed
to the regime’s empowerment, which might contribute to a contender
geopolitical posture and to the consolidation of the regime (Hakimian
2012; Naghavi and Pignataro 2015: 3). This view is supported by the
mainstream literature: it is believed that sanctions cause a more destabil-
ising effect on democratic rather than on non-democratic governments
(Lektzian and Souva 2007). Some authors (Escribà-Folch and Wright
2010), however, warn that ‘the extent to which sanctions destabilise a
non-democratic government depends on the type of authoritarian rule’
(Oechslin 2014: 25).
Russia’s role as a ‘contender’ has exemplified after the imposition of
sanctions in 2014. The impact of sanctions on Russian socio-economic
development is dynamic and still under research. If we consider the
literature on the causes of the anti-Russian sanctions, most authors
acknowledge that the imposition of sanctions was a ‘culmination of the
long-term crisis’ (Haukkala 2015: 25) that could be either blamed on
Russian aggression (McFaul et al. 2014), or on Western institutional
expansion, accompanied by the EU’s failure to establish a new framework
for military and security cooperation with Russia (Mearsheimer 2014), or
by the push by the United States to isolate Russia from Europe (Sakwa
2015). There is no debate in Western academia that the EU sanctions
were the ‘result of the illegal annexation of Crimea’, as recorded by the
UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 (Milano 2014). Some authors
see Vladimir Putin as a ‘gambler’, who has become more ‘willing in
recent years to take major strategic risks to counter seemingly limited
and manageable threats to Russian interests’ (Treisman 2016). Others, by
contrast, justify Russia’s ‘aggressive regionalism’ by making historical eval-
uations and questioning the legitimacy of Nikita Khrushchev’s decision in
1954 to transfer Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR, the lead-
er’s first steps after acquiring power (Müllerson 2014). Müllerson refers
to the fact that Crimea had been part of Russia since 1783, as the result of
the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Queen Catherine the Great. Since
then, the port of Sevastopol has become Russia’s military base on the
Black Sea and remained so through a lease agreement between Russia and
12 K. KIRKHAM
Ukraine after the break-up of the Soviet Union. These historical evidences
made the author call Ukraine the ‘victim of geopolitics’ (ibid.: 141).
There is no agreement on the effects of sanctions on Russia, either.
As in the literature on Iran, some authors attribute the negative impacts
of the sanctions to government economic regulation flaws: (1) over-
reliance on oil revenues amid technological retardation of some upstream
and downstream oil and gas companies, highly dependent on the export
of pumping equipment, catalysts and applied software (import share of
50–80%) (Nureev and Busygin 2017), (2) insufficient economic diver-
sification, corruption, uncompetitive subsidised industries, a regressive
tax regime, the lack of foreign investment, financial and technological
shortcomings and the brain drain (Golikova and Kuznetsov 2017), (3)
growing budget financing of non-productive operating expenses (i.e. on
state administration, defence, law and order) that diverts resources away
from industrial modernisation and innovation (Mau and Leonard 2017).
However, a growing number of papers underline positive effects of sanc-
tions and counter-sanctions on the Russian economy. As observed by
Roger Munnings, the chairman of the Board of Russo-British Chamber
of Commerce (RBCC), sanctions ‘initially had the effect of depressing
economic growth in Russia, particularly as a result of limiting liquidity in
the economy through restricted availability of short and long term credits
for companies’, but later ‘the Russian corporate sector and banking system
has largely worked through this issue’, and ‘there has been the positive
effect of localisation of manufacture of goods and provision of services
provoking a more diversified and balanced economy than hitherto and
one in which small and medium sized enterprises have the opportunity to
prosper’.2 In fact, in the agricultural sector, as in some other sectors of
economy, import substitution policies have been successful in ensuring
the country’s security of food supplies (Polyanin and Moiseev 2016).
Richard Connolly believes that the adaptation to sanctions in Russia was
quite effective, because it was ‘overwhelmingly state-led’—permitting the
country’s leader to promptly utilise institutional, financial and diplomatic
tools and reallocate resources to minimise the negative impact of sanctions
(Connolly 2018: 189). The author rightfully points to ‘modification’ and
diversification of Russia’s foreign policy, import substitution and ‘Russifi-
cation’ of the military and the energy sectors, as well as to ‘sanitisation’
2 Author’s interview with the chairman of the Board of RBCC.

1 INTRODUCTION 13
and ‘securitisation’ of the financial sector and other adaptive fiscal and
monetary measures that permitted the country to evade a ‘full-blown
credit crunch’ (ibid.) For some, due to Russia’s ‘economic resilience’
sanctions have not only failed to achieve their goals, i.e. regime change
and ‘democratisation’, but have instead lead to the regime’s empower-
ment, which might contribute to a contender geopolitical posture and to
the consolidation of the regime (Littlejohn 2018; Volodin 2018).
Overall, there are three main flaws in the current accounts analysing the
‘effects’ of sanctions on the Russian and Iranian political economy that
explain why the mechanisms of sanctions, as well as CHMs that repro-
duce and protect the systems from collapse, remain underexplored. First,
current accounts aim to solve a problem of ‘if sanctions work’, not to
understand in what sense they might transform current socio-economic
arrangements. Second, they do not explicitly recognise the contradictory
nature of the impact of sanctions on the Russian and Iranian political
economy, which explains why the views concerning the effects of sanc-
tions appear so polarised. Third, Russia and Iran are analysed as entities,
separate from the processes that evolve in the global political economy.
Therefore, to better define the mechanisms, the theoretical scope of the
accounts on the effects of sanctions should be widened with reference to
the contradictory nature of the welfare state development and to geopo-
litical forces other than the sanctions themselves. The inclusion of an
analysis of geopolitical forces in relation to counter-hegemonic mecha-
nisms, along with a supranational dimension in the concept of the welfare
state regime, shall complement the analysis.
1.4 Book Outline

Part I indicates the theoretical background for the analysis and explains
why the notion of welfare has become central to the understanding of
Russia’s and Iran’s counter-hegemony under sanctions and why the neo-
Gramscian perspective will be applied for analysing the welfare state.
The contender state’s self-protection constitutes the core of counter-
hegemony and is exercised through the regime’s reproduction alongside
its structural and functional terrains. Functional modes evolve through
its de-commodifying, redistributive and connecting capabilities, while
structural modes are secured by strengthening the institutional mecha-
nisms of social control (institutional), by securing the future potential
14 K. KIRKHAM
of the socio-economic base (material) and by transforming the modali-

ties of social behaviour and attitudes (cultural—ideological). As the WSR
approach is considered both a theoretical framework and a powerful tool
for analysing counter-hegemonic mechanisms, Chapter 2 examines the
welfare state regime as a theoretical account, following the consistent path
from functionalists, structuralist accounts, from Wood and Gough’s Insti-
tutional responsibility matrix (IRM) and the authors’ conceptualisation
of the interrelation between transnational forces to the neo-Gramscian
analysis of counter-hegemony (Wood and Gough 2006). Chapter 3 intro-
duces a reverse logical sequence, from Gramsci to welfare, to justify
the centrality of the concept of welfare state regime when assessing
CHMs within the moment of sanctions as a ‘situation’ in the Grams-
cian sense (Gramsci 1971). This self-reinforcing trajectory will complete
the theoretical consolidation between the Gramscian and welfare state
accounts arriving at the merger point, located in the notion of counter-
hegemonic mechanisms, to initiate the exploration of the main theoretical
research question: ‘What are the counter-hegemonic mechanisms embedded
in welfare state regimes that make ‘contender’ states resilient to sanc-
tions?’ This theoretical adaptation will be followed by operationalisation
of analysis through the concept of the Self-protection of society, gradually
developed and applied throughout core empirical Parts.
Part II assessed how the counter-hegemonic structural mode of WSR
reproduction has been secured in Russia and Iran via strengthening
the institutional mechanisms of social control. The part demonstrates
how centralisation of state and civil institutions, monopolisation of the
strategic sectors of the economy and para-constitutional settings in Russia
and Iran have become counter-hegemonic mechanisms that, on one side,
enabled the accumulation of resources necessary to restore decommodi-
fying capabilities of the pension system and to reverse the monetisation
reforms, while on another side, intensified institutional dualism and its
stratifying effect on social formations. The institutional power struc-
ture of the welfare state regime that is responsible for the dynamism
of contender state development. The analysis will be focused on the
institutional arrangements: (a) the role of the country’s legislation and
state institutions in overall welfare coverage (decommodification); (b) the
institutionally grounded shifts in class and status disparities (wealth redis-
tribution); and (c) legislative and institutional WSR arrangements that
restored or impeded the formation of social solidarity (connection). All
1 INTRODUCTION 15
three (a, b, c) are the variables that constitute the institutional mecha-
nisms of social control, in an attempt to harmonise religion, democracy
and private property.
Part III considers how the counter-hegemonic structural mode of
Russia and Iran has been secured via enhancing the material capacity
and future potential of the socio-economic base, in the face of uneven
development of global capitalism and the country’s dependence on global
markets. In both Russia and Iran, financial consolidation, the course of
technological modernisation, economic diversification and active region-
alism have been productive steps in building up the material capacity of
the regime. However, the reliance of large businesses on state support and
‘patron–client’ relationships ultimately limits business efficiency, induces
corruption and in some cases disrupts incentives for creativity and inno-
vation. The WSR material capabilities are determined by: (a) households’
dependence on the market in overall welfare coverage (decommodifi-
cation); (b) wealth creation and wealth distribution: the poverty and
inequality dynamics (primary and secondary wealth distribution); and (c)
formal and inf ormal channels for cooperation and investment opportuni-
ties (connection). All three (a, b, c) constitute material capabilities of the
WSR. The processes, generated from the material power structure of the
WSR triggered the following counter-hegemonic mechanisms, to name
a few: modernisation of the economy, import substitution programs,
counter-sanctions, the optimisation of socio-economic policies, including
some austerity measures, further consolidation of the budgetary system
(intra-budgetary redistribution), enhanced state control over capital flows,
tax reforms, with the aim of creating fiscal stimuli for technological
modernisation and domestic demand formation.
Part IV examines the cultural power structure of the welfare state
regime that corresponds to the ability of contender states to transform
the modalities of social behaviour, practices, personal orientation and
attitudes. The ideology of statecraft in Russia, with its discourse of ‘oth-
erness’ and new cadre formation, and Shia political system in Iran, with
its communitarian postulates, partially helped to consolidate society at
the macro-level and to obtain public support for economic centralisa-
tion. However, civil society hierarchy, familialism and other forms of
informal relationships in both states disrupt labour bargaining power
and cohesion, while further centralisation of control over civil society
institutions might make state–civil society dialogue excessively bureau-
cratised and inflexible. The analysis is focused on the following cultural
16 K. KIRKHAM
arrangements: (a) people’s perception of their dependence on markets

(decommodification); (b) interpersonal tolerance to income, class and
status disparities (wealth redistribution); and (c) social interactions based
on shared values that form national identity (connection). All three (a,
b, c) are the variables that constitute the cultural mechanisms of social
control, based on ideology, strategies for human resource development
and social engineering.
Part V is an integral chapter of the current research: Russia’s and
Iran’s welfare state regime reproduction is a synthesis of the processes
that unfolded within these societies during the period of economic
sanctions, previously identified in the main empirical chapters. This is
a comparative analysis that discloses, clarifies, defines the character of
the counter-hegemonic mechanisms in Russia and Iran and assesses the
strengths and weaknesses of the counter-hegemonic settings. This part
is accompanied by an effective summary of CHM and its contradictions
(in Appendices I and II ). The answer to the question of ‘what are the
counter-hegemonic mechanisms embedded in welfare state regimes (WSR)
that make ‘contender’ states resilient to sanctions?’ distinguished counter-
hegemonic mechanisms for Russia and Iran. The answer to the question
of ‘how strong are the counter-hegemonic settings of the Russian welfare
state regime?’ implied further analysis of the contradictory nature of
CHMs that unveiled five common trends in the Russian and Iranian WSR
evolution: power centralisation; economic modernisation and optimisation;
strategic partnership and diversification; para-constitutional reformation;
human resource development. Both the Russian and the Iranian welfare
state regime under sanctions have become more Hobbesian in nature, to
render collective self-protection of their sovereignty against the ‘evils’ of
the state of nature and geopolitical pressures.
Overall, the book reinstates the relevance of the Hobbesian/Lockean
dichotomy for analysing societies in transition, as it touches upon the
grounds of political philosophy that might produce valuable arguments
to challenge the status of the dominant ideological paradigm of the
modern global political economy. It also concludes that the Russian
and the Iranian WSRs have been strengthened in response to sanc-
tions, however, the contradictory nature of CHMs significantly constrains
further consolidation.
1 INTRODUCTION 17
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PART I
Theoretical Identification of the Mechanisms

of Sanctions
Abstract Part I develops the ground for the theoretical merger and
shows how it is correlated to the structure of the empirical Parts II, III
and IV, devoted to institutional, material and cultural capabilities of the
WSR, consequently. The welfare state regime approach (WSR) is consid-
ered both a theoretical framework and a powerful tool for analysing
counter-hegemonic mechanisms. Chapter 2 examines the welfare state
regime as a theoretical account, following the consistent path from func-
tionalists, structuralist accounts, from Wood and Gough’s Institutional
responsibility matrix to the neo-Gramscian analysis of counter-hegemony.
Chapter 3 introduces a reverse logical sequence, from Gramsci to welfare,
to justify the centrality of the concept of WSR within the moment of
sanctions as a ‘situation’ in the Gramscian sense. This self-reinforcing
trajectory completes the theoretical consolidation between the Gramscian
and welfare state accounts arriving at the merger point—the concept of
the Self-protection of society,1 gradually developed and applied throughout
core empirical chapters.
1 The contender state’s self-protection constitutes the core of counter-hegemony

and is exercised through the regime’s reproduction alongside its structural and func-
tional terrains. Functional modes evolve through its de-commodifying, redistributive and
connecting capabilities, while structural modes are secured by strengthening the institu-
tional mechanisms of social control (institutional), by securing the future potential of the
socio-economic base (material), and by transforming the modalities of social behaviour
and attitudes (cultural—ideological).
22 PART I: THEORETICAL IDENTIFICATION …
Keywords Welfare state regime, Counter-hegemony
Introduction to Part I
Theoretical identification departs from existing mainstream and critical
welfare state theories, to consider what insights could be helpful for
defining the mechanisms of sanctions, and consequently, the counter-
hegemonic settings of Russia and Iran. The most consistent subdivision of
welfare theories was offered by Ian Gough, who divided them into ‘eco-
nomic theories of government policy’, ‘pluralist theories of policymaking’
and ‘functionalist theories of the welfare state’ by simply following the
logic of their scientific genesis—economics (classical liberals), political
science and sociology, respectively. As the capitalist system has expanded,
‘globalised’ and became more complex, so have the theories, and these
boundaries have become blurred.
Classical liberals (‘economic theorists’) are located further away than
other welfare state theories from the effective conceptualisation of the
counter-hegemonic mechanisms, as the analysis of economic develop-
ment is isolated from ‘social relations and from specific social structures’
(Gough 1979: 6). Also, transnational forces are ignored, even when
some authors refer to a global dimension when analysing integration and
Europeanisation (Kvist and Saari 2007), or globalisation (Deacon 2007;
Swank 2005), the interrelation between transnational forces and welfare
state regimes (global dimension) remained unformulated. This is because
liberal accounts tend to subjectify the evolution of capitalism. For them,
the alteration of attitudes in the wake of technological progress is the main
driving force behind welfare state evolution rather than increasing needs
of the global capitalist system to sustain social reproduction as the result
of its expanded exploitative powers. Richard Titmuss, who examined the
principle of universalism as an outcome of the horrifying experience of
more of a century of ‘turmoil, revolution, war and change’ believed that
the changing philosophy of welfare in the minds of people, the fear of the
risk of military conflict and mass destruction, rather the changing forces
of production lead to the emergence of the welfare state, as the base for
prevention of ‘the vicious descending spiral of poverty, disease, neglect,
illiteracy and destitution’ (Titmuss 1958). As a result, when analysing the
welfare state, classical liberals mainly focus on the change in public senti-
ment towards poverty, the development of welfare philosophies, and the
PART I: THEORETICAL IDENTIFICATION … 23
transformation in tastes and expanding needs of the working class as the

main factors that affect welfare legislation (Briggs 1961).
Pluralists contribute to the understanding of the welfare state with their
subjective interpretation of what might constitute general principles of
action in light of human values, therefore recognising the creative role
of individuals in human history. The comparative analysis of capitalism
and the welfare state-centred on the micro-level of the private sector. For
instance, Hall and Soskice bring the action-oriented individuals, firms,
trade unions, and other ‘business associations’ back into their analysis,
to discover relationships among these actors in the political economy
(Hall and Soskice 2001: 4). Pluralists share the individualistic method-
ology expressed by classical economists (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1944),
according to which capitalism in its pure sense was an inherently stable
social system based on individual freedom and private ownership, and
therefore is a self-regulating system, as objective psychological human
factors were the natural driving force towards economic equilibrium,
while governmental intervention is blocking the action of these natural
regulators. Pluralists adopt the liberal definition of the welfare state that
would generally refer to the forms, procedures, rules and instruments,
but not to state functions (Offe 1985a: 88). Welfare state is seen as
an undemocratic and inefficient development of modern capitalism that
needs to be forgone, as it is inconsistent with the liberal conceptualisa-
tion of human freedom (Hayek 1944). This neo-classical visualisation of
capitalism as a ‘free to choose’ nation of individuals, where everything
obeys the will of man (Friedman and Friedman 1980), and the under-
explored functionality of the welfare state, evades going deep into the
objective laws of hegemonic (and counter-hegemonic) mechanisms that
predetermine not only the functioning but also the evolution of capi-
talism. In other words, pluralists are mired in actor-based definitions and
conflict case studies, which subjectify social reality and downplay the role
of institutions and other material structures.
This pluralist insistence on the subjective element in understanding
human history had been successfully overcome by functionalists in their
search for the technological, industrial or modernising backgrounds of the
welfare policy in response to meet the emerging needs of society (Flora
and Heidenheimer 1981; Marshall 1950; O’Connor 1973; Wilensky
1975). An example of such objectification is the revelation of a central
paradox of capitalism by T.H. Marshall: the rights of citizenship are ‘the
foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality could be
built’ (Marshall 1950). Another positive result of this objectification is the

observation of Harold Wilensky (1975) that the welfare state is a struc-
tural tendency of different modern societies that could be explained by
economic and bureaucratic factors, with a warning that ‘public bureaucra-
cies are by nature self-expanding, self-aggrandising, and thus impossible
to phase out when they have outlived their usefulness’ (Wilensky 1975:
114). However, some critics maintain, functionalists tend to omit the role
of human beings and see policy developments ‘as a passive response’ to
social forces: as a result, they distinguish only one side, the objective, of
the contradiction of capital—the forces of production, leaving no room
for humans as active interest groups (Gough 1979: 8). At the same time,
despite the recognition of a visible convergence of bureaucratic practices
among various advanced societies, functionalists, nevertheless, pointed
out ‘many indications that things are not the same everywhere’ (ibid.:
113), which, however, are underexplored due to the ‘lack of compara-
tive data’ (Wilensky 1975: 107). Costa Esping-Andersen replenished this
gap in comparative analysis of the welfare state by creating a genuine
framework in ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ and expanding the
welfare state functionality by relevant variables of economic liberalisation
and ‘working-class mobilisation’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 19). Overall,
however, despite all the useful insights, functionalist vision of welfare
suffers from ‘technological determinism’: by bypassing the role of class
conflict as a ‘revolutionary rupture in human history’, it ignores the role
of the welfare state ‘as a controlling, repressive agency’ (Gough 1979:
8). Nevertheless, functionalist accounts provided important insights for
the development of the concept of the welfare state as a product of
contradictions and shifts in industrial development, complemented by an
institutionalised ‘powerful societal mechanism which divisively shaped the
future’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 221).
Another important step forward by functionalist and structuralist
welfare state theories, be they industrialisation (Kerr et al. 1960; Myles
and Quadagno 2002; Rimlinger 1971; Wilensky 1975), globalisation,
deindustrialisation (Iversen and Cusack 2000), modernisation (Marshall
1950, Wilensky 1975) or integration (Cary 1974), is the recognition and
the explanation of some important aspects of the welfare state’s evolu-
tion. The problem with these theories, however, lies in their underlying
logics that is not capable of separating internal and external mecha-
nisms for change and differentiation. For instance, the ‘industrialisation’
thesis that attributes the welfare state’s expansion to sustainable economic
growth (Kerr et al. 1960) fails to explain the diversities within the welfare
state regimes of similar economically developed states, and most impor-
tantly, do not investigate the mechanisms of transformation, central to
the understanding of the CHMs and the mechanisms of sanctions, aimed
at breaking these counter-hegemonic settings. Furthermore, the ‘mod-
ernisation’ thesis, the most prominent of its time, maintains that the
transformation of the population from ‘subjects’ to ‘citizens’ with the
assistance of the welfare state was necessary for the formation of a system
of social equality based on civil rights (Marshall 1950). The mechanisms
of change—the development of social rights—however, were invalidated
by the effects of market-generated inequalities. A smooth transition to a
socially just society, which the modernisation theory proposes, is further
challenged by the Korpi’s power resource model, which places the welfare
state in the battlefield of social classes, mobilised through distributive
processes within society (Korpi 1983, 1989). Despite being criticised for
downplaying the role of the middle class in its analysis of social democra-
cies (Baldwin 1996), power resource theory introduced useful analytical
insights insofar as it stresses the importance of considering the balance
of class power as a determinative for social reforms. Esping-Andersen
made a considerable step forward in the conceptualisation of the welfare
state by introducing the parameters of commodification and stratifica-
tion into Korpi’s power resource model. These key indicators are central
to his genuine typological division of Western capitalist societies into
conservative, liberal and social democratic (Esping-Andersen 1990).
To sum up, functionalist theories and power resource accounts provide
us with important functional dimensions that would be incorporated in
the welfare state regime approach. However, there are three reasons why
the capacity of mainstream theories to identify counter-hegemonic mecha-
nisms of welfare state regimes is limited. First, such theoretical approaches
suffer from narrowness, ‘fatally weakened by the insistence on either
the objective or the subjective element in understanding human history’
(Gough 1979: 10). Second, the underlying logics of most functionalist,
structuralist or classical economic welfare state theories, can explain some
aspects of the welfare state’s evolution, but have not been capable of sepa-
rating internal and external mechanisms for change and differentiation,
an ‘immense diversity of social policies which any comparative survey
will reveal’ (Gough 1979: 9). Third, mainstream welfare state theories
consider transnational forces as an isolated parameter that might affect
the formation of the welfare state, but they never see global dimension as
integral to the concept of welfare state regime. Overall, the visualisation

of the processes outlined by mainstream authors, such as industrialisation,
modernisation, urbanisation and technological change, lacks structural
identification that is essential for discovering a historical-materialistic
ground for the welfare state, and for understanding the CHMs. As Göran
Therborn once suggested, ‘lots of theories have been used to try to
explain the rise of welfare states, but little theoretical effort has been used
to capture the various meanings and structural implications of welfare
states’ that are central to the formation of the counter-hegemonic mech-
anisms (Therborn 1987: 238). The following passages will consider how
these three limitations have been overcome by alternative welfare state
theories.
Alternative Welfare State Theories or How to

Overcome Existing Limitations
The investigation of the counter-hegemonic processes that evolve in
Russia and Iran requires an alternative interpretation of the welfare
state that sees the emergence and transformation of the welfare state
as a constituent of capitalist spatial and worldwide temporal reach. This
section addresses the puzzle of how existing critical accounts might help
to elaborate the ‘structural implications’, mentioned by Therborn, for
the analysis of counter-hegemonic mechanisms, with respect to three
previously outlined theoretical drawbacks (objective/subjective duality,
mechanisms of transformation and global dimension).
The first step in capturing CHM of the welfare state is to address the
first critical remark against the mainstream theories concerning the insis-
tence on either the objective or the subjective element in understanding
human history. Departure from this deadlock has been successfully estab-
lished by neo-Gramscian scholars (van Apeldoorn and Hager 2010;
Cafruny and Ryner 2003; Wood and Gough 2006). Drawing upon the
existing literature on the welfare state, this departure will proceed in
two stages. To begin with, the research will follow Wood and Gough’s
‘middle path’ theory, a mediator between teleological functionalist and
post-modern stances, as the authors themselves have suggested (Wood
and Gough 2006: 1697). The ‘middle’ ground means the use of methods
of historical materialism by applying the analysis of the capitalist mode
of production to the object of the study—the welfare state; Ian Gough
suggested that the ‘only satisfactory resolution to this dilemma’ is encap-

sulated in Marx’s dictum: ‘Men make their history… but not under
circumstances of their own choosing’ (Marx, cited in Gough 1979: 10).
The next step will be to apply Gramscian reasoning to surpass the subjec-
tive–objective duality by uncovering ‘the social power relations that shape
the socio-economic content’ of the welfare state regime (van Apeldoorn
and Hager 2010: 213).
An example of a successful conceptualisation of power, not only as
the objectivity of capitalist structures of social inequality but also as the
subjectivity of ideologically articulated political struggle over hegemony,
can be found in Cafruny and Ryner’s study of European integration
(Cafruny and Ryner 2003). Their analysis of the European Union encap-
sulates both the highest level of abstraction that identifies the interests
of distinct capitalist class forces, ‘which constitute the structural basis for
hegemonic projects’, but also moves to a more concrete empirical level,
where these structural interests are transformed, ‘changing the balance of
class forces within any historical conjuncture’ (van Apeldoorn and Hager
2010: 213). This objective-subjective synergy came as a crucial departure
from the functionalist conceptualisation of the European welfare state as
the outcome of the EU’s institutional dynamics.
The second step to identify the CHM is to respond to the crit-
ical remark concerning the inability of mainstream accounts to delineate
internal and external mechanisms for change when analysing the welfare
state’s evolution. Once again, neo-Marxist and neo-Gramscian accounts
provide us with a solution: counter-hegemonic mechanisms are located in
the conflictual area of social power relations (internal), and the contra-
dictory nature of global capitalist development (external)—they are ‘laws
of social transformation’ that are to be understood as tendencies and
probabilities rather than ‘iron laws of history’ (Marx 1973 ed., cited in
Hartwick and Peet 2009: 157). Therefore, the analysis of the welfare
state should begin with the study of the contradictions inherent to capi-
talism, as shifts in social power relations generate internal and external
mechanisms for change. The welfare state in itself is such a ‘shift’,
or development that evolves in response to the paradoxes of capital.
However, as observed by James O’Connor (1973), Ian Gough (1979),
Claus Offe (1985), instead of resolving the tensions inherent in capi-
talism, the welfare state develops contradictions of its own, ‘trying to
fulfil two basic and often mutually contradictory functions – accumu-
lation and legitimisation’ (O’Connor 1973: 6). Moreover, ‘subsidiary
contradictions’, hidden in the planning failures in the fiscal and in

mass loyalty problems, systematically restrict the effectiveness and the
legitimacy of the welfare state (Offe 1985a). The analysis of the basic
contradictions at the heart of the capital relation worked very well in
understanding and predicting the crisis in contemporary Europe. On
the threshold of the crisis, a group of scholars expressed their concern
with accumulation strategies, state projects and hegemonic visions and
their social bases as ‘their particular forms of appearances’ questioned
the legitimacy of the finance-led neoliberal mode of European gover-
nance ‘from Lisbon to Lisbon’ (van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil, and Horn
2009). Internal and external mechanisms for change in Europe are guided
by post-industrial ‘new Malthusian re-articulation’ that substituted the
credible political project with structural–functional objectivity that pres-
sures for retrenchment of the ’mature’ welfare states (Ryner 2009: 45).
As such, as the welfare states change and modify over time, a contin-
uous study of the contradictions is vital not only for understanding how
sanctions affect the target sates, such as Russia and Iran, but also for
assessing the dynamics of modern social policies in various societies,
as it enables the policymakers to see why these arrangements some-
times fail to meet public expectations (Kirkham 2017). The third move
to capture the CHM of welfare states is to formulate the interrelation
between transnational forces and welfare state regimes. In the desire
to include non-Western societies in their research, Wood and Gough
(2006: 1697) extended four domestic domains (state, market, house-
hold and community) to their supranational equivalents (international
governmental organisations, global markets, NGOs and internationalised
households), which constitute the Institutional Responsibility Matrix.
What are Wood and Gough’s contributions to the comparative study
of non-Western social policy experience? First, as previously mentioned,
Wood and Gough extended the concept of the welfare state regime by
introducing the global dimension that links four domestic domains (state,
market, household and community) to their supranational equivalents.
Second, Wood and Gough developed a ‘new conceptual framework within
which to consider a wider range of institutions than is normally acknowl-
edged in social policy discourses’: the authors add an analytical focus on
community to the traditional triad of state, market and household (Wood
and Gough 2006: 1697). Admitting that neither markets, states nor fami-
lies alone can provide sustainable arrangements for meeting human needs,
their intervention is to integrate these three categories, and their interna-

tional equivalents, into a new conceptual framework. This allows them
to broaden the parameters of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime
typology and thus address the welfare dimension of ‘informal security’ as
well as ‘insecurity’ regimes. This step is particularly crucial for analysing
the informal welfare provisions in Russia and Iran, to see whether people
in these countries heavily rely upon communal relationships to meet their
security needs. Third, the authors extended the Esping-Andersen’s func-
tional representation of welfare state. The function of de-commodification
was amplified by a parallel criterion of ‘de-clientelisation’, which embraces
non-state-centred actors, recovering the rights and entitlements from
the ‘informal domains of social relationships and cultural expectations’
(ibid.: 1697). The function of stratification has become a derivative of
the ability of the system to reproduce itself. The welfare state function-
ality is the connecting juncture between theory and research procedure
of the current project.
To summarise, two features of Wood and Gough’s ‘welfare mix’—
the communal and global dimensions—are especially innovative: the first
being the transformative step from the Esping-Andersen’s triad of state–
market–family into a square by adding the ‘community’ domain; the
second being a ‘supranational equivalent of the four domestic compo-
nents’. An attempt by Wood and Gough to conceptualise the interrelation
was a significant achievement, when they broadened the parameters of
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime typology and extrapolated it to
the supranational level. This move, though one of the most remarkable
over the past decade, is not sufficient, since their understanding of the
‘international’ has been reduced to a linear extrapolation of social power
relations into the supranational terrain, without reference to the histor-
ical context. A conceptualisation of the dialectics between transnational
forces and welfare state regimes is required. The novelty of the current
framework is to combine Wood and Gough’s regime approach with
the neo-Gramscian perspective for analysing national and transnational
dimensions of the welfare state regime.
The WSR approach is seen as both a theoretical framework (direction
one) and a powerful tool (direction two) for analysing counter-hegemonic
tendencies in contender states. Thus, the theoretical Part I consists of
two short chapters: Chapter 2 will examine the welfare state regime as
a theoretical account, following the consistent path from functionalists,
structuralist accounts, from Wood and Gough’s Institutional responsi-

bility matrix (IRM) and the authors’ conceptualisation of the interrelation
between transnational forces to the neo-Gramscian analysis of counter-
hegemony. The main goal is to further develop the institutional, func-
tional, structural and global dimensions, departing from functionalist
accounts, and via Wood and Gough’s regime approach—arrive at neo-
Gramscian supranational articulation of the structuring role of geopolit-
ical pressures, including but not limited to sanctions, to understand how
global economic integration (or the lack thereof) affects welfare state
regimes in non-Western social formations. Chapter 3 will introduce a
reverse logical sequence, from Gramsci to welfare, to justify the centrality
of the concept of welfare state regime when assessing counter-hegemonic
mechanisms within the moment of sanctions as a ‘situation’ in the Gram-
scian sense (Gramsci 1971). This self-reinforcing trajectory will complete
the theoretical consolidation between the Gramscian and welfare state
accounts arriving at the counter-hegemonic mechanisms - a merger point
which is located in the notion of ‘consent, backed by coercion’.
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Iversen, Torben, and Thomas. R. Cusack. 2000. “The Causes of Welfare State
Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?” World Politics 52 (3): 313–
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“Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and Management
in Economic Growth.” Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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CHAPTER 2
The Welfare State Regime as a Theoretical

Account: From Welfare State to Gramsci
2.1 First Theoretical Adaptation:

From Functional Representation
of the Welfare State to ‘Regime’ Approach
The welfare state functionality—one of the central components of the
counter-hegemonic mechanisms—has been developed in response to the
contradictions of capital inherent not only to advanced Western soci-
eties but also to states with transitional economies, such as Russia and
Iran. Functionalist theories are at their most valuable in their ability to
specify the mechanisms of transformation of the welfare state regimes,
vital for the assessment of the dynamism of the counter-hegemonic mech-
anisms. This dynamism partly materialises through the main functions of
the welfare state. The first important function is de-commodification, as
for functionalists, the evolution of the welfare state was a response to
the emerging needs of the ‘Industrial man’, increasingly dependent on
wages in the society that progressed to the ‘stage of total industrialisa-
tion’, in which patrimonial agrarian traditions were in decline (Kerr et al.
1960). De-commodification was playing an important role in ‘ensuring
the smooth functioning of industrial societies’ that became an unques-
tionable ‘weaker’ theoretical version of the evolution of the welfare state
(Myles and Quadagno 2002). This view significantly overlaps not only
with the ‘power resource’ discourse related to the societal need for the
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 33

Switzerland AG 2022
K. Kirkham, The Political Economy of Sanctions: Resilience
and Transformation in Russia and Iran, International Political
Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04055-9_2
34 K. KIRKHAM
tools of de-commodification (Esping-Andersen 1990), but also with the

analysis of the role of the state as the main guarantor of social stability
through reconciliation of rival structural necessities of capitalism, ‘condi-
tioned by the continuous requirements of the accumulation process’ (Offe
1985a: 121). Possibly, this is due to the significance of Karl Polanyi’s
reflection of the Great Transformation of market societies on increas-
ingly commodified labour power (Polanyi 2001/1944). These functional
industrial pressures on the modern capitalist state have been exemplified
by demographic changes, characterised by an ‘increased proportion of old
people in the population, which has become the most powerful root of
welfare spending’ (Wilensky 1975: 47). According to functionalists, these
demographic changes should be analysed alongside other no less impor-
tant factors that affect ‘spacial landscapes’, such as the rate of economic
growth (Wilensky 1975), the nature of class relations and urbanisation as
the product of industrialisation of the capitalist, but also post-socialist and
Islamic societies, such as Russia and Iran, respectively.
The function of redistribution became the second important parameter
of the welfare state. Highly functionalist in their essence, power resource
models institutionalised the balance of class power as a central driver
for social reforms and wealth distribution. Esping-Andersen recognised
class coalitions as vehicles of wealth redistribution in social democratic
states, such as Sweden (Esping-Andersen 1985). Also, the class structure
analysis integrated the role of the middle classes in the development of
social democracies (Baldwin 1996). The third parameter of stratification
was also introduced by Esping-Andersen in his further conceptualisa-
tion of the Korpi’s power resource model. Thus, commodification and
stratification became key indicators for his genuine typological division
of Western capitalist societies into conservative, liberal and social demo-
cratic. The distinctions are drawn from two central questions: how nations
respond to the pressures of commodification via the three most important
social programs, i.e. pension, sickness and unemployment cash benefit
(ibid.: 49), and what effects stratification achieves on the articulation of
social solidarity. In response to commodification, ‘conservative’ regimes
developed ‘corporativist’, ‘etatist’ and ‘pre-capitalist’ arrangements, which
differentiated social insurance according to occupation or status. The
ruling class feared that ‘the onward march of liberalism, democracy
and capitalism would destroy the institutions upon which social power
and privileges were based’. ‘Liberal’ regimes promoted residual means-
testing principles, which limited the effect of decommodification; the
2 THE WELFARE STATE REGIME AS A THEORETICAL … 35
marginal propensity of the stigmatised population to refer to welfare aid

was very low. Social democratic regimes, with their universalist logic,
kept differentials in benefits at the lowest level, maximising the capacity
of the individual by providing the highest standards of social services
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 41–69).
2.1.1 Regime Approach

The welfare state typology, however, remained focused on the national
historical-cultural transformation of advanced capitalist societies. As a
result of typologising, which Peter Baldwin considered the ‘lowest form
of intellectual endeavour’ (Baldwin 1996: 29), power resource approaches
appear to be not extensive enough to analyse the mechanisms through
which transnational forces affect the development of welfare states, as
the delineation for the welfare state regime categories lies at the national
level and is analytically bound to the historic development of the social
formations domestically, without much articulation of international forces
upon this process. At the same time, functionalists do not explore the
contradictory nature of de-commodification, redistribution and stratifica-
tion. The initial theoretical adaptations imply modification of the welfare
state functionality: the WSR overcomes these theoretical limitations, by
modifying the functional representation in two ways. First, the analysis
is placed in a geopolitical context. Second, the regime functionality is
formulated, following a ‘middle path’ theoretical endeavour, balancing
between ‘instrumentalism’, on one side, and ‘hyper-functionalism’, on
another, in a manner, proposed by Ian Gough (1979) in the ‘Political
Economy of the Welfare State’, and advanced by Wood and Gough’s
(2006) in a comparative study of the non-Western welfare state ‘regimes’
(Wood and Gough 2006: 1697). The second theoretical adaptation
implies substitution of ‘stratification’ with the function of connection,
given that counter-hegemony presupposes the welfare state consolidation
through socialisation and mobilisation of different social classes, while
stratification is the constraining force, or in some cases a by-product of
this contradictory process. The connecting function of the WSR will trace
counter-hegemonic mechanisms embedded in new forms of ‘emancipa-
tory struggles’ within civil society that could no longer be reducible to
class conflicts alone (Jean Cohen, quoted in Pierson 1984: 568). These
three functions—de-commodification, redistribution and connection will
become functional modes for the welfare state regime reproduction.
Another random document with
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Face, be Rub’d or Fil’d away: which he knows partly by the alteration
of colour and Fine Furrows made by the Using-File on the Face of
the Punch, and partly by the falling away of the parts of the Face that
are not yet toucht by the Using-File: So that it may be said to be truly
Flat: which he knows, when the whole Face of the Punch touches
upon the Flat of the Using-File, or at least, so much of the Face as is
required in the Letter: For all Counter-Puncht-Letters, as aforesaid,
must have a greater Face of Steel than what the bare Letter
requires: for the reason aforesaid.
Another way I use is thus. After I have Fil’d the Face as true as I can
by guess, with a Rough-Cut-File, I put the Punch into an Hand-Vice,
whose Chaps are exactly Flat, and straight on the upper Face, and
sink the Shank of the Punch so low down in the Chaps of the Hand-
Vice, that the low side of the Face of the Punch may lye in the same
Plain with the Chaps; which I try with the Liner. For the Liner will then
shew if any of the Sides stand higher than the Plain of the Chaps:
Then I Screw the Punch hard up, and File off the rising side of the
Punch, which brings the Face to an exact Level: For the Face of the
Chaps being Hard Steel, a File cannot touch them, but only take off
the aforesaid Rising parts of the Face of the Punch, till the Smooth-
File has wrought it all over exactly into the same Plain with the Face
of the Chaps of the Hand-Vice.
Some Letter-Cutters work them Flat by Hand, which is not only
difficult, but tedious, and at the best, but done by guess.
The inconvenience that this Tool is subject to, is, That with much
using its Face will work out of Flat. Therefore it becomes the
Workman to examine it often, and when he finds it faulty to mend it.
When they File it Flat by Hand, they Screw the Shank of the Punch
perpendicularly upright into the Chaps of the Vice, and with a Flat-
Bastard-Cut-File, of about Four Inches long, or if the Punch be large,
the File larger, according to discretion, and File upon the Face, as
was shewn Numb. I. fol. 15, 16. Then they take it out of the Vice
again, and holding up the Face Horizontally between the Sight and
the Light, examine by nice observing whether none of its Angles or
Sides are too high or too low. And then Screwing it in the Vice again,
as before, with a Smooth-Cut-File, he at once both Files down the
Higher Sides or Angles, and Smoothens the Face of the Punch. But
yet is not this Face so perfectly Flatned, but that perhaps the middle
of it rises more or less, above the Sides: And then he Screws it in his
Hand-Vice, and leans the Shank of the Punch against the Tach,
pretty near upright, and so as he may best command it, and with a
Watch-Makers Half-Round-Sharp-Cut-File, Files upon it with the
Flat-Side of his File; But so that he scarce makes his forward and
backward Stroaks longer than the breadth of the Face of his Punch,
lest in a long Stroak, the hither or farther end of his File should
Mount or Dip, and therefore keeps his File, with the Ball of his Finger
upon it, close to the Face of the Punch. Then with the Liner he
examines how Flat the Face of the Punch is, and if it be not yet Flat,
as perhaps it will not be in several Trials, he again reiterates the last
process with the Small-Half-Round-File, till it be Flat. But he often
Files cross the Furrows of the File, as well because it makes more
riddance, as because he may better discern how the File bears on
the Face of the Punch.
When it is Flat, he takes a Small well-worn Half-Round-File, and
working (as before) with the Sharp-Cut-File, he Smoothens the Face
of the Punch.
Having thus Flatted the Face of the Punch, and brought the Letter to
some appearance of Form, He Screws the Punch in the Hand-Vice,
but not with the Shank perpendicular to the Chaps, but so as the
Side he intends to File upon may stand upwards and aslope too, and
make an Angle with the Chaps of the Hand-Vice. And holding the
Hand-Vice steddy in his left hand, he rests the Shank of the Punch
pretty near its Face upon the Tach: and then with a small Flat-File,
called a Pillar-File, in his right hand, holding the Smooth Thin Side of
it towards the Footing of the Stem, he Files that Stem pretty near its
due Fatness, and so by several reiterated proffers, lest he should
File too much of the Stem away, he brings that Stem at last to its true
Fatness. Then he measures with the Ascending Face-Gage, the
Heighth of the Letter: For though the Counter-Punch was imagin’d
(as aforesaid) to be made to an exact Heighth for the inside of the
Letter; yet with deeper or shallower Sinking it into the Punch, the
inside oft proves higher or lower: Because, as aforesaid, the
Superficies of the Face of the Counter-Punch is less than the true
measure. But as it runs Sholdering into the Shank of the Counter-
Punch the Figure or Form of the inside becomes bigger than the
inside of the Letter ought to be. Therefore the deeper this Sholdering
Shank is sunk into the Face of the Punch, the higher and broader will
the Form of the inside of the Letter be, and the shallower it is Sunk
in, the Shorter and Narrower by the Rule of Contraries.
He measures, as I said, with the Assending Face-Gage, and by it
finds in what good Size the Letter is. If it be too high, as most
commonly it is, because the Footing and Top are yet left Fat, then
with several proffers he Files away the Footing and Top, bringing the
Heighth nearer and nearer still, considering in his Judgment whether
it be properest to File away on the Top or Footing, till at last he fits
the Heighth of the Letter by the Assending Face-Gage.
But though he have fitted the Heighth of the Letter, yet if the
Counter-Punch were made a little too little, or Sunk a little too
shallow, not only the Footing will prove too Fat, but the Triangle
above the Cross-stroke of A will be too small; or if too big, the
Footing and part of the Top will be Filed away, when it is brought to a
due Heighth, and then the Letter is Spoil’d, unless it be so deep
Sunk, that by working away the Face, as aforesaid, he can regain
the Footing and Top through the Slope-sholdering of the Counter-
Punch, and also keep the inside of the Letter deep enough.
But if the Footing be too Fat or the Triangle of the Top too little in the
Inside, he uses the Knife-backt Sculpter, and with one of the edges
or both, that proceeds from the Belly towards the Point of the
Sculpter (which edges we will for distinction sake call Angular edges)
he by degrees and with several proffers Cuts away the Inside of the
Footing, or opens the Triangle at the Top or both, till he hath made
the Footing lean enough, and the Triangle big enough.
But if he works on the Triangle of the Top, he is careful not to Cut
into the Straight of the Inside lines of the Stems, but to keep the
Insides of that Triangle in a perfect straight line with the other part of
the Inside of the Stem.
The small arch of a Circle on the Top of A is Fil’d away with a Sizable
Round-File. And so for all other Letters that have Hollows on their
Outsides; he fits himself with a small File of that shape and Size that
will fit the Hollow that he is to work upon: For thus the Tails of
Swash-Letters in Italick Capitals are Fil’d with half-Round Files
Sizable to the Hollows of them. But I instead of Round or Half-Round
Files, in this Case, bespeak Pillar Files of several Thicknesses, and
cause the File-maker to Round and Hatch the Edges: which renders
the File strong and able to endure hard leaning on, without Breaking,
which Round or Half-Round Files will not Bear.
I need give no more Examples of Letters that are to be Counter-
punched: And for Letters that need neither Counter-punching or
Graving, they are made as the Out-sides of A, with Files proper to
the shapes of their Stroaks.
¶. 4. Of Graving and Sculping the Insides of

Steel Letters.
The Letter-Cutter elects a Steel Punch or Rod, a small matter bigger

than the Size of the Letter he is to Cut; because the Topping or
Footing Stroaks will be stronger when they are a little Bevell’d from
the Face. The Face of these Letters not being to be Counter-
punched are first Flatned and Smoothed, as was shewed, ¶. 3. Then
with the proper Gage, viz. the Long, the Ascending, or else the Short
Face-Gage, according as the Letter is that he intends to Cut, He
measures off the exact Heighth of the Letter, Thus; He first Files one
of the Sides of the Face of the Punch (viz. that Side he intends to
make the Foot of his Letter) exactly straight; which to do, he screws
his Punch pretty near the bottom end, with its intended Foot-side
uppermost, aslope into one end of the Chaps of his Hand-Vice. So
that the Shank of the Punch lies over the Chaps of the Hand-Vice,
and makes an Angle of about 45 Degrees with the Superficies of the
Chaps of it: Then he lays the under-side of the Shank of his Punch
aslope upon his Tache, in one of the Notches of it, that will best fit
the size of his Punch, to keep it steady; and so Files the Foot-Line of
the Punch.
But he Files not athwart the sides of his Punch; for that might make
the Foot-Line Roundish, by a Mounting and Dipping the Hand is
prone to; as I shewed, Vol. I. Fol. 15, 16. But he holds his File so as
the Length of it may hang over the Length of the Shank of the
Punch, and dip upon it at the Face of the Punch, with a Bevel, or
Angle, of about 100 Degrees with the Face of the Punch. This Angle
you may measure with the Beard-Gage, described in Plate 10. Fig.
C. at k. Then Filing with the File in this Position, the Foot-Line will be
made a true straight Line. But yet he examines it too by applying the
Liner to it; and holding the Punch and Liner thus to the Light; If the
Liner touches all the way on the Foot-Line, he concludes it true; if
not, he mends it till it do.
Then he uses his proper Steel-Gage, and places the Sholder of it
against the Shank of the Punch at the Foot-Line; and pressing the
Sholder of the Steel-Gage close against the Foot-Line, he, with the
Tooth of the Gage makes a Mark or Race on the side of the Face,
opposite to the Foot-line: And that Mark or Race shall be from the
Foot-Line, the Bounds of the Heighth of that Letter.
Then on the Face he draws or marks the exact shape of the Letter,
with a Pen and Ink if the Letter be large, or with a smooth blunted
Point of a Needle if it be small: Then with sizable and proper shaped
and Pointed Sculptors and Gravers, digs or Sculps out the Steel
between the Stroaks or Marks he made on the Face of the Punch,
and leaves the Marks standing on the Face.
If the Letter be great he is thus to Sculp out, he then, with a Graver,
Cuts along the Insides of the drawn or marked Stroaks, round about
all the Hollow he is Cutting-in. And having Cut about all the sides of
that Hollow, he Cuts other straight Lines within that Hollow, close to
one another (either parallel or aslope, it matters not) till he have filled
the Hollow with straight Lines; and then again, Cuts in the same
Hollow, athwart those straight Lines, till he fill the Hollow with Thwart
Lines also. Which straight Lines, and the Cuttings athwart them, is
only to break the Body of Steel that lies on the Face of the Punch
where the Hollow must be; that so the Round-Back’d Sculptor may
the easier Cut through the Body of the Steel, in the Hollow, on the
Face of the Punch; even as I told you, Numb. 4. Vol. I. §. 2. the Fore-
Plain makes way for the Fine Plains.
The Letter-Cutter does not expect to perform this Digging or
Sculping at one single Operation; but, having brought the Inside of
his Letter as near as he can at the first Operation, he, with the flat
side of a Well-worn, Small, Fine-Cut, Half-round File, Files off the
Bur that his Sculptors or Gravers made on the Face of the Letter,
that he may the better and nicelier discern how well he has begun.
Then he again falls to work with his Sculptors and Gravers, mending,
as well as he can, the faults he finds; and again Files off the Bur as
before, and mends so oft, till the Inside of his Letter pleases him
pretty well. But before every Mending he Files off the Bur, which
else, as aforesaid, would obscure and hide the true shape of his
Stroaks.
Having well shaped the Inside Stroaks of his Letter, he deepens the
Hollows that he made, as well as he can, with his Sculptors and
Gravers: And the deeper he makes these Hollows, the better the
Letter will prove. For if the Letters be not deep enough, in proportion
to their Width, they will, when the Letter comes to be Printed on,
Print Black, and so that Letter is spoiled.
How deep these Hollows are to be, cannot be well asserted,
because their Widths are so different, both in the same Letter, and in
several Letters: Therefore he deepens them according to his
Judgment and Reason. For Example, O must be deeper than A need
be, because the Hollow of O is wider than the Hollow of A; A having
a Cross Stroak in it; and the wider the Hollow is, the more apt will the
wet Paper be to press deeper towards the bottom in Printing. Yet this
in General for the Depth of Hollows; You may make them, if you can,
so deep as the Counter-Punch is directed to be struck into the Face
of the Punch. See ¶. 3. of this §.
Having with his Gravers and Sculptors deepned them so much as he
thinks convenient, he, with a Steel Punch, pretty near fit to the shape
and size of the Hollow, and Flatted on its Face, Flattens down the
Irregularities that the Gravers or Sculptors made, by striking with a
proper Hammer, upon the Hammer-end of the Punch, with pretty
light blows. But he takes great care, that this Flat-Punch be not at all
too big for the Hollow it is to be struck into, lest it force the sides of
the Stroaks of the Letter out of their shape: And therefore also it is,
that he strikes but easily, though often, upon the end of the Flat-
Punch.
Having finished the Inside, he works the Outsides with proper Files;
as I shewed before, in Letter A; and smoothens and Pollishes the
Outside Stroaks and Face with proper worn-out small Watch-makers
Files.
The Inside and Outside of the Face thus finished, he considers what
Sholdering the Shank of the Punch makes now with the Face, round
about the Letter. For, as the Shank of the Letter stands farther off the
Face of any of the Stroaks, the Sholdering will be the greater when
the Letter is first made; because the Outsides of the Letter, being
only shaped at first with Fine Small Files, which take but little Steel
off, they are Cut Obtusely from the Shank to the Face, and the Steel
of the Shank may with Rougher Files afterwards, be Cut down more
Tapering to the Shank. For the Sholder of the Shank, as was said
before in this ¶, must not make an Angle with the Face, of above 100
Degrees; because else they would be, first, more difficult to Sink into
Copper; And Secondly, The broad Sholders would more or less
(when the Letter is Cast in such Matrices) and comes to the Press,
be subject, and very likely to be-smear the Stroaks of the Letter;
especially, with an Hard Pull, and too wet Paper; which squeezes the
Face of the Letter deep into the Paper, and so some part of the
Broad Sholdering of the Letter, receiving the Ink, and pressing deep
into the Paper, slurs the Printed Paper, and so makes the whole
Work shew very nasty and un-beautiful.
For these Reasons it is, that the Shank of the Punch, about the
Face, must be Filed away (at least, so much as is to be Sunk into
Copper) pretty close to the Face of the Letter; yet not so as to make
a Right Angle with the Face of the Letter, but an Obtuse Angle of
about 100 Degrees: For, should the Shank be Filed away to a Right
Angle, viz. a Square with the Face, if any Footing or Topping be on
the Letter, these fine Stroaks will be more subject to break when the
Punch is Sunk into Copper, than when the Angle of the Face and
Shank is augmented; because then those fine Stroaks stand upon a
stronger Foundation. Therefore he uses the Beard-Gage, and with
that examines round about the Letter, and makes the Face and
Shank comply with that.
Yet Swash-Letters, especially Q, whose Swashes come below the
Foot-Line, and whose Length reaches under the Foot-Line of the
next Letter, or Letters in Composing, ought to have the Upper
Sholder of that Swash Sculped down straight, viz. to a Right Angle,
or Square with the Face; at least, so much of it as is to be Sunk into
Copper: Because the Upper Sholder of the Swash would else be so
broad, that it would ride upon the Face of the next Letter. Therefore
the Swash-Letters being all Long Letters, the lower end of the
Swashes reach as low as the Bottom-Line; which cannot be Filed
Square enough down from the Head-Line, unless the Steel the
Swash stands on, should be Filed from end to end, the length of the
whole Shank of the Punch, which would be very tedious; and
besides, would make that part of the Shank the Swash stands on so
weak, that it would scarce endure Striking into the Copper.
Therefore, as I said before, the Upper Sholder of the Swash ought to
be Sculped down: Yet I never heard of any Letter-Cutters that had
the knack of doing it; but that they only Filed it as straight down as
they could, and left the Letter-Kerner, after the Letter was Cast, to
Kern away the Sholdering. Yet I use a very quick way of doing it;
which is only by Resting the Back of a Graver at first, to make way;
and afterwards a Sculptor, upon the Shank of the Punch, at the end
of the Swash, one while; and another while on the Shank, at the
Head, that the Swash may be Sculped down from end to end: and
Sculping so, Sculp away great Flakes of the Steel at once, till I have
Cut it down deep enough, and to a Right Angle.
Then he Hardens and Tempers the Punch; as was shewed, Numb.
3. Vol. I. Fol. 57, 58.
But though the Punch be Hardned and Temper’d, yet it is not quite
finished: for, in the Hardning, the Punch has contracted a Scurf upon
it; which Scurf must be taken off the Face, and so much of the sides
of the Shank as is to be Sunk into Copper. Some Letter-Cutters take
this Scurf off with small smooth Files, and afterwards with fine
Powder of Emerick. The Emerick they use thus. They provide a Stick
of Wood about two Handful long, and about a Great-Primer, or
Double-Pica thick: Then in an Oyster-shell, or any sleight Concave
thing, they powr a little Sallad-Oyl, and put Powder of Emerick to it,
till it become of the Consistence of Batter made for Pan-cakes. And
stirring this Oyl and Emerick together, spread or smear the aforesaid
Stick with the Oyl and Emerick, and so rub hard upon the Face of the
Punch, and also upon part of the Shank, till they have taken the
Scurf clean off.
Mr. Walberger of Oxford uses another way. He makes such an
Instrument as is described in Plate 10. at H, which we will, for
distinction sake, call the Joynt-Flat-Gage. This Instrument consists of
two Cheeks about nine Inches long, as at b, and are fastned
together at one end, as the Legs of a Carpenter’s Joynt-Rule are in
the Centre, as at c, but with a very strong Joynt; upon which Centre,
or Joynt, the Legs move wider, or closer together, as occasion
requires. Each Leg is about an Inch and a quarter broad, and an
Inch and three quarters deep; viz. so deep as the Shank of the
Punch is long. At the farther end of the Shank b (as at d) is let in an
Iron Pin, with an Head at the farther end, and a square Shank, to
reach almost through a square Hole in the Shank b, that it twists not
about; and at the end of that Square, a round Pin, with a Male-Screw
made on it, long enough to reach through the Shank a, and about
two Inches longer, as at e; upon which Male-Screw is fitted a Nut
with two Ears, which hath a Female-Screw in it, that draws and holds
the Legs together, as occasion requires a bigger or less Punch to be
held in a proper Hole. Through each of the adjoyning Insides of the
Legs are made, from the Upper to the Lower Side, six, seven, or
eight Semi-Circular Holes (or more or less, according to discretion)
exactly Perpendicular to the upper and under-sides of each Leg,
marked a a a a, b b b b. Each of these Semicircular Holes is, when
joyned to its Match, on the other Leg to make a Circular Hole; and
therefore must be made on each Leg, at an equal distance from the
Centre. These Holes are not all of an equal Size, but different Sizes:
Those towards the Centre smallest, viz. so small, that the Punch for
the smallest Bodied Letters may be pinched fast in them; and the
biggest Holes big enough to contain, pinch and hold fast the
Punches for the great Bodied Letters. The upper and under-sides of
this Joynt-Flat-Gage is Faced with an Iron Plate, about the thickness
of an Half Crown, whose outer Superficies are both made exactly
Flat and Smooth.
When he uses it, he chuses an Hole to fit the Size of the Punch; and
putting the Shank of the Punch into that Hole, Sinks it down so low,
till the Face of the Punch, stands just Level, or rather, above the
Face of the Joynt-Flat-Gage: Then with a piece of an Hone, wet in
Water, rubs upon the Face of the Punch, till he have wrought off the
Scurf. At last, with a Stick and Dry Putty, Polishes it.
I like my own way better than either of the former: For, to take off the
Scurf with Small Files spoils the Files; the Face of the Punch being
Hard, and the Scurf yet Harder: And besides, endangers the
wronging the Face of the Punch.
The Joynt-Flat-Gage is very troublesome to use, because it is
difficult to fit the Face of the Punch, to lie in the Plain of the Face of
the Gage; especially, if, in making the Letter, the Shank be Filed
Tapering, as it most times is. For then the Hammer-end of the Punch
being bigger than the Face-end, it will indeed Pinch at the Hammer-
end, whilst the Face-end stands unsteady to Work on. But when the
Punch is fitted in, it is no way more advantagious for Use, than the
Chaps of the _Hand-Vice_ I mentioned in ¶. 3. of this §.
Wherefore, I fit the Punch into the Chaps of the Hand-Vice, as I
shewed in the aforesaid ¶. and with a fine smooth Whet-stone and
Water, take the Scurf lightly off the Face of the Punch; and
afterwards, with a fine smooth Hone and Water, work down to the
bare bright Steel. At last, drying the Punch and Chaps of the Hand-
Vice with a dry Rag, I pollish the Face of the Punch with Powder of
Dry Brick and a Stick, as with Putty.
¶. 5. Some Rules he considers in using the Gravers, Sculptors,

Small Files, &c.
1. When he is Graving on the Inside of the Stroak, either to
make it Finer or Smoother, he takes an especial care that he
place his Graver or Sculptor so, as that neither of its Edges may
wrong another Stroak of the Letter, if they chance (as they often
do) to slip over, or off an extuberant part of the Stroak he is
Graving upon. And therefore, I say, he well considers how he is
to manage the edges of his Graver. For there is no great danger
of the point of his Graver after the inside Stroaks are form’d, and
the Hollows of the Letter somewhat deepned; but in the edges
there is: For the point in working lies always below the Face of
the Letter, and therefore can, at most, but slip below the Face,
against the side of the next Stroak; but the edges lying above
the Face of the Letter, may, in a slip, touch upon the Side and
Face of the next Stroak, and wrong that more or less, according
as the force of the Slip was greater or smaller. And if that Stroak
it jobs against were before wholly finished, by that job the whole
Letter is in danger to be spoiled; at the best, it cannot, without
Filing the Letter lower, be wrought out; which sometimes is a
great part of doing the Letter anew: For he takes special care
that neither any dawk, or the least extuberant bunching out be
upon the inside of the Face of the Stroak, but that the inside of
the Stroak (whether it be Fat or Lean) have its proper Shape
and Proportion, and be purely smooth and clean all the way.
If on the inside of the Stroak the Graver or Sculptor have not run
straight and smooth on the Stroak, but that an Extuberance lies on
the Side, that Extuberance cannot easily be taken off, by beginning
to Cut with the Edge of the Graver or Sculptor just where the
Extuberance begins: Therefore he fixes the Point of his Graver or
Sculptor in the Bottom of the Hollow, just under the Stroak where the
Extuberance is, and leans the Edge of his Graver or Sculptor
upwards; so as in forcing the Point of the Graver or Sculptor
forwards, at the Bottom of the Hollow, the Edge of the Graver or
Sculptor may slide tenderly along, and take along with it a very
small, nay, invisible Chip of the most Prominent Part of the
Extuberance; and so, by this Process reitterated often, he, by small
Degrees, Cuts away the Extuberant part of the Stroak.
2. He is careful to keep his Gravers and Sculptors always
Sharp, by often Sharpning them on the Oyl-Stone, which for that
purpose he keeps ready at hand, standing on the Bench: For if a
Graver or Sculptor be not sharp, it will neither make riddance, or
Cut smooth; but instead of Cutting off a small Extuberancy, it will
rather stick at it, and dig into the Side of the Stroak.
3. He Files very tenderly with the Small Files, especially with the
Knife-Files, as well because they are Thin and Hard, not
Temper’d, and therefore would snap to pieces with small
violence; as also, lest with an heavy hand he should take away
too much at once of that Stroak he is working upon.
§. 14. ¶. 1. Some Rules to be observed by the

Letter-Cutter,
in the Cutting Roman, Italick, and the
Black English Letter.
1. The Stem and other Fat Stroaks of Capital Romans is five
Parts of forty and two (the whole Body:) Or, (which is all one)
one sixth part of the Heighth of an Ascending Letter (as all
Capitals are Ascendents) as has been said before. Albertus
Dürer took his Measure from the Heighth of Capitals, and
assigned but one tenth part for the Stem.
2. The Stem, and other Fat Stroaks of Capitals Italick, is four
parts of forty and two, (the Body.)
3. The Stem, and other Fat Stroaks of Lower-Case Roman, is
three and an half parts of forty and two, (the Body.)
4. The Stem, and other Fat Stroaks of Lower-Case Italick, is
three parts of forty and two, (the Body.)
5. Of English, the Short-Letters stand between nine parts of the
Bottom-Line, and nine parts from the Top-Line; viz. upon three
and thirty parts of forty and two, (the Body.)
6. The Stem of English Capitals is six parts of forty and two, (the
Body.)
7. The Stem of English Lower-Case Letters is four parts of forty
and two, (the Body.)
¶. 2. Of Terms relating to the Face of Letters, and their

Explanation.
The Parts of a Punch are already described in §. 13. ¶. 1. of this

Volumne; and so is the Body: But the several Terms that relate to the
Face of Letters are not yet defined. Now therefore you must note,
that the Body of a Letter hath four principal Lines passing through it
(or at least imagined to pass through it) at Right Angles to the Body;
viz. The Top-Line, The Head-Line, The Foot-Line, and The Bottom-
Line.
Between two of these Lines is contained the Heighth of all Letters.
These are called Lines, because the Tops, the Heads, the Feet and
the Bottoms of all Letters (when Complicated by the Compositor)
stand ranging in these imagin’d Lines, according as the Heighth and
Depth of each respective Letter properly requires.
The Long-Letters are (as I told you in §. 13. ¶. 1. of this Volumne)
contained between the Top and Bottom-Lines, The Ascending
Letters are contained between the Top and Foot-Lines, The
Descending Letters are contained between the Head and Bottom-
Lines, and The Short-Letters are contained between the Head and
Foot-Lines.
Through what Parts of the Body all these Lines pass, you may see
by the Drafts of Letters, and the following Descriptions.
What the Long-Letters, Ascending Letters, and Short-Letters are, I
shewed in the afore-cited ¶. Therefore I shall now proceed to
particular Terms relating to the Face. As,
1. The Topping, is the straight fine Stroak or Stroaks that lie in the
Top-Line of Ascending Letters: In Roman Letters they pass at Right
Angles through the Stems; but in Italicks, at Oblique Angles to the
Stems; as you may see in the Drafts of Letters, B, B, H, H, I, I, &c.
2. The Footing, is the straight fine Stroak or Stroaks that lie in the
Foot-Line of Letters, either Ascending or Descending. In Romans
they pass at Right Angles through the Stem, but in Italicks, at
Oblique Angles; as you may see in B, B, H, H, I, I, &c.
3. The Bottom-Footing, is the straight fine Stroaks that lie in the
Bottom-Line of Descending Letters. In Romans they pass at Right
Angles through the Stem; but in Italicks at Oblique Angles; as you
may see p, p, q, q.
4. The Stem is the straight Fat Stroak of the Letter: as in B, B, the
straight Stroak on the Left-Hand is the Stem; and I, I, is all Stem,
except the Footing and Topping.
5. Fat Stroaks. The Stem or broad Stroak in a Letter is called Fat; as
the Right Hand Stroak in A, and part of the great Arch in B, are Fat
Stroaks.
6. Lean Stroaks, are the narrow fine Stroaks in a Letter; as the Left-
Hand Stroak of A, and the Right Hand Stroak of V are Lean.
7. Beak of Letters, is the fine Stroak or Touch that stands on the Left-
Hand of the Stem, either in the Top-Line, as b d h, &c. or in the
Head-Line, as i, m, n, &c. Yet f, g, [s], f, g, [s] have Beaks on the
Right Hand of the Stem.
8. Tails of Letters, is a Stroak proceeding from the Right-Hand Side
of the Stem, in the Foot-Line; as a d t u: and most Italick Lower-Case
Letters have Tails: As also have most Swash-Letters. But several of
their Tails reach down to the Bottom-Line.
9. Swash-Letters are Italick Capitals; as you see in Plate 15.
Thus much of Letter-Cutting. The next Exercises shall (God willing)
be upon Making Matrices, Making Molds, Casting and Dressing of
Letters, &c.
FINIS.
ADVERTISEMENT.
NUmb. 4. of the Second Volumne of Collections of Letters for
Improvement of Husbandry and Trade, is now extant; being
Enquiries relating to Husbandry and Trade: drawn up by the Learned
Robert Plot, L. L. D. Keeper of the Ashmolean Musæum, and
Professor of Chymistry in the University of Oxford, and Secretary of
the Royal Society of London. An Account of the manner of making
Brunswick-Mum. An Account of a great Improvement of Mossy Land
by Burning and Liming; from Mr. Adam Martindale of Cheshire.
To be had at the Angel in Cornhil, and several other Booksellers.

Plate 11.
Plate 12.
Plate 13.
Plate 14.
Plate 15.

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The Political Economy of Sanctions:

Resilience and Transformation in

How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic

Political Economy of Development and Business: Towards

The Political Economy of Food System Transformation:

The Presidentialization of Political Parties in Russia,

The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies

Russia, the Former Soviet Republics, and Europe Since

Iran and the American Media: Press Coverage of the

Digital Activism in Russia: The Communication Tactics

ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

Cover illustration: © Rob Friedman/iStockphoto.com

Part I Theoretical Identification of the Mechanisms of

3.3 Conclusion to Part I: Completing Theoretical Merger 67

Part II Institutional Design

Part III Material Capabilities

Part IV Cultural Leadership

9 Iran (Cultural Leadership) 309

Part V Welfare State Regime Reproduction

Fig. 3.1 Self-protection of society (Source Author’s diagram) 67

Fig. 6.2 The structure of a household income (Sources GKS

Table 2.1 Welfare state regime—theoretical development 44

The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long,

The use of sanctions in international political economy has increased

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

cooperation with the UK Government announced a new round of sanc-

– What are the mechanisms by which sanctions operate?

In pursuit of these research questions, this book focuses primarily on

confront the Lockean ‘heartland’, Russia and Iran increasingly inter-

1 Neoliberalism is ‘an economic policy regime whose objective is to secure monetary

1.1 Welfare State Theories and IPE

1.2 The Political Economy of Sanctions

sanctions being the same operational variables as the counter-hegemonic

of state and class formation that lie in the labour/capital contradictions

1.3 The Political Economy of Russia and Iran

market has negatively impacted economic growth by contributing to the

2 Author’s interview with the chairman of the Board of RBCC.

1.4 Book Outline

of the socio-economic base (material) and by transforming the modali-

arrangements: (a) people’s perception of their dependence on markets

Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza. 2013. “Effects of International Financial and

Karshenas, Massoud, and Hassan Hakimian. 2005. “Oil, Economic Diversi-

Rieger, Elmar, and Stephan Leibfried. 2003. Limits to Globalization: Welfare

Theoretical Identification of the Mechanisms

1 The contender state’s self-protection constitutes the core of counter-hegemony

Keywords Welfare state regime, Counter-hegemony

transformation in tastes and expanding needs of the working class as the

built’ (Marshall 1950). Another positive result of this objectification is the

integral to the concept of welfare state regime. Overall, the visualisation

Alternative Welfare State Theories or How to

suggested that the ‘only satisfactory resolution to this dilemma’ is encap-

contradictions’, hidden in the planning failures in the fiscal and in

their intervention is to integrate these three categories, and their interna-

structuralist accounts, from Wood and Gough’s Institutional responsi-

The Welfare State Regime as a Theoretical

2.1 First Theoretical Adaptation:

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 33

tools of de-commodification (Esping-Andersen 1990), but also with the

marginal propensity of the stigmatised population to refer to welfare aid

2.1.1 Regime Approach

¶. 4. Of Graving and Sculping the Insides of

The Letter-Cutter elects a Steel Punch or Rod, a small matter bigger

¶. 5. Some Rules he considers in using the Gravers, Sculptors,

§. 14. ¶. 1. Some Rules to be observed by the