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PHILOSOPHY DF MIND SERIES
OM E M ENTAL STATES seem to be “of" or “about" things or to "say" something.

For example, a thought might represent that grass is green. and a visual
vwuusurim:-i.im=wi=iriri:r-11r1:r=a=i:ir
experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book
is to explain this phenomenon.
It has been long assumed that the best way to explain intentionality is in terms
of tracking and informational relations, functional roles, and similar ingredients.
Mendelovici breaks from this tradition, arguing that the only empirically adequate
and in principle viable theory of intentionality is one in terms of phenomenal
consciousness. the felt. subjective, or qualitative feature of mental life. According
to her phenomenal intentronafily theory. there is a central kind of intentionality.
phenomenal intentionality, that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone, and
any other kind of intentionality derives from it.
The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting

for the rich and sophisticated contents of thoughts. broad and object-involving
contents. and unconscious states. Mendelovici proposes a novel and particularly
strong version of the theory that can meet these challenges. The end result is a
radically internalistic picture of the mind. on which all phenomenally represented
\BASlSOF
contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some
INTENTIONALIT
sense represent are expressly singled out by us.
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PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
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Contents
Prcfacc xi
Overvicw xv
PART ONE} INTRODUCTION

r. Fu-mg Rrfémm» im Immlmrm/i!_v 5
.... Ab.......c.s and Dircctcdncss .

.... The Ostcmwc W... 0fFixiug R:f:rencc ;
.3. om. way. of Fixing ucre.c..cc 9
.4. Wbrrics mu. .5.» 0..=..~.v.- 1)efi......... .4

.5. Conclusion .9
1. <;....1. and Me//wdulugy u
2..x. M... is . Theory of 1....-.........i..,v2 1.
1.2.. Thcorylndcptndeiit Acctss m lntemizmaliry :3

2.3. Cunclusion 22%
PART TW’U I ALTERNATIVE THIURIES 0} INTENYIONALITY
3. r/.. Itlrmuxrb p.-mm./ix Tr.u/amg 17...... 3,
1... Tra(kingTheor|cs ..
3.1. om...-..» uflhu Mm....ci. Problem +2.. T..ck...g Ti.......< .5
3.1. Background and .\.......p..m.. 36
5-4- A M.,.....ci. C...-. P:‘rc:prua1Coior Rcprusciumriom .3

3.3. 0.}... M........ci. Cats .4
;.5. Obj:cmms 46
3-7- Rniiabi: Misrcprcxcntannn and me Significance nFTmck1ng .7

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viii (fantzrm Cuntz'n!.< ix
;.8. Conclusion 39 .9, iVarm;Imtun.rXMIr: mo

App:-ndix A: Obiccrions to I11: Mifimarch Probltm 59 8.1. '1'hc Pmbiciii Wltll Nonconscious Smcs 161
8.2. Dcnvazivisr Srraccgim is;

4. F1mrtiunaIRu/2 Tlie..r.e:.m.1 Tmkmg Ihm-.‘::.»1g..m 70 3,3, sanding 5...“; .59
+-I- Th: Functional Rule Theory 7x 5.4. Allcgcdly Nnncnnscious Occiirmirszaics I34,
4... Worricswirh sho...A.... F....c.io..a1 RolcTli:orics 7. .,§_ CW1...-..... .9.
4... Worries with LongAArm Functional Rel: Thmrics 75
4,4. The Real Problnuivirh Both TrackingTlicorics and Functional Min p1vi:,| THE As;-gcr VIEW
Kolc TllC0|’lk'!~ 79 9. I; In/zn/inrialiry a Rel.m/m I0 .. Carimit? 195
4... Conclusion 80 9... The Rclariun Viuwand .h: Aspcc[Vicw .96
9... Two Worries \\’i(l1 uh: Relimiii View we

PART THREE | THE PHENOMENAL INTENTXONALITY THEORY 9,, The Allggcd Vim.‘-5 ofthc R.~1;.;iun Vicw ma
;. The PhenomenalImz-mmmzligz Than} 83 9+ Cm,c[u5;o“ 119
sa. The Phenonicml b-renrionaliav Thwry 8. Apptndix F: Th. Aspcct Vicw and A.iv=.h..1.s... 130
5.2. Argumenrs for PIT 86 AppcndixG: c....m.;. ax Firsr- or s¢m..d.o.dc. sum orl7mp€r(ics .3.
54;. ldcnnry PIT 93 Appendix H; An i...c....J Thmy orT....h and Rcfcrcncc .3;
5.4. Challenging Casts 97
5-3. Conclusion ioo PART SIX | CONCLUSION
Appendix B: The Extent oFPl\cnomena1 Inrcnrmml-ry :01 m. CD7lL’lMSI07A: ltllirlilomllily and Ozlm Kzl.1Ira'P/aznammzt 24;
Appendix C: The Multiplt Arisablliry oflmrntional Sm-ts I04 io.i. Return (0 Olhcl’ Ways of Fixing Rcfcrcncc on lnrcnrionality 144
io.z. Radical Inrcrnalism 2.47
.1. P! 1'’; Static: .15 .4 Thmy .5/‘1nm.z.mmlizy [O9
9... Is l’ITaThcory on.......i......1i.y in Terms orphcnom.-hai Consciousness? 109 6.055.... .49
6.2. lsPITTrivial? ..4 5[B]_[Q(]RA[IH\'1§§
4... [si’IT 1....-....i..g.> ..; ,,..,E,. .67
6.4. Is PIT Naturalistic? us
6.5. Cunclusion H9
PART FOURI CHALLENGING cuts

7. Iinmglat ix;
7... The Challenge 6... PIT rm... Though. ....
7... Thoughts‘ i>hc..o....-mi Contents ..7
Sclf-Ascripuvism about Th....,;h.s' Allcgcd Comcnrs .;9
.4
7.4. Is Dcrivcd Mental Rtprcscnmtion a Typ: nfInrcnrionality2 is:

7.5. Conclusion: PIT about Thought .5.
App:ndiX D: Di.-rived Mclilal Rcprcsunmrion in 1>.-.ccp...i.. I54
Apptndlx E: A..i...d.»s .55
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Preface
THIS PROJECT BEGAN 15 years ago when. as an undergraduate at McGill, I set

out to write my undergraduate thesis on phenomenal consciousness. After reading
David Chalmers’ The Curm.’iau.r 1‘l/find. I decided that there wasn’t much more for
me to sayon phenomenal consciousness and resolved to steer clear ofthe topic. So I
turned to the problem of intentionality. But I soon came to realize that attempts to
understand ' ' " y‘ ‘ I ’ ‘y of‘ L ' ' " ‘I
fail. What's more, I came to believe that intentionality is in fact one and the same
thing as phenomenal consciousness. I wrote my undergraduate thesis on precisely

this topic (and the idealist consequences I took to ensue), and then my PhD thesis
on this same topic again (minus the idealism). This book is the culrnimtion ofthese
eilorts.
The ideas presented here have benefited from practically every philosophical inter-
action I have ever had with friends. colleagues, students. and mentors at McGill
University, Princeton University, the Australian National University, the University
ofW/estern Ontario, and elsewhere. I was especially lucky to benefit from the cxccp-
tionally rich intellectual environment at the n alinn National University, where I
spent time as a postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Consciousness and as a visitor.
Many of the ideas in this book have been presented in talks I have given at the
Australasian A of Philosophy Conference (2.008 and mu), the European
' '
Congress oFAnalytic Philosophy (wit), the 21rd World Congress of Philosophy at

)(|
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xii Pr: Em Pflfm xiii
the University of Athens, the Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting (zor;, . defended in Chapter 7. and to David Ch’-I1mers.who suggested that my ideas might
2.ot4.. and zol7), the Pacific American Association of Philosophy Meeting (2013), “’°il‘ W5“ “5 1b°°k~
Princeton University, the Australian National University, the University ofToronro, I owe special gratitude to my parents, Lina and Marius, for exemplifying both
the University of Melbourne, the University of Western Australia. the Central Eu— insight and rigor in éicadfimic Work and {Of Ili¢ii'l0V€a 5i1PP°“- ind C0nfid=n¢< in Int»
ropean University, the University ofCrete, Oakland University, Victoria University I 3"‘ ‘5P‘d3llY $’3“f“l ”‘°‘h" and "W lama)’ I“ G'°°‘°—‘5P°°l““Y Glaglai
‘O ml’
at Wellington, Tulane University, the University of Texas at Austin, the University M3733» and Ti')’Ph°“—f°i’ mating 1 nfai’ \1‘0Pi3“ ‘Vmk €iiVii0i'iii'i¢"[ for me at 0'"
of Waterloo, Cornell University, the University of Washington at St. Louis, ['1']: summer house. Most of this book (as well as the theses it is based on) was written
University of Minnesota, CUNY, the University of V€’isconsin—Madison, Yeshiva Elitfci
University, Wellesley College, W’aync State University, Charles Sturt University, Tl” “dim” and P’°d“‘3‘l°“ "am 3‘ OUP hm" b‘°" "‘m¢“d°“5lY h°lPf‘-‘I
Ru)“-.u,,;v¢,5i,§r Bo;-hum‘ and the ungversgty of western on,“-;o_ 1 thank [hg throughout the publication process. Thanks especially to Peter Ohlin, David
audiences a. rim talks. and especially my commentators Mike Collins, rm. chaimm. Isia Ng, Raj suchan. Thomas Mccarthy. and sangeuha vishwanti-an.
Janette Dinishak, Mark I-lerr, David Ivy, Charles Siewcrt, and Brad Thompson for My greatest d=bt by far is to David Boiiigflr "W Partner» Frcil-icnr co-and-on
their helpful and incisive colnlnentaries and our subsequent discussions. and (near) doppeigingcri When I firsr mcr David in 2008. 1 was surprised to find
lam c5P5cial1yindcb[Cd [0 [ha phmcmcnal Imgmionaljry Reading GmuP._ Tim someone with almost exactly the same philosophical views as me. This book has been
Bayne, David Eourget, Rob Stainton, and Chris VigerAfor reading an early version heavily influenced by all our discussions throughout the years, due to which our views
of this manuscript and providing valuable criticisms and concrete suggestions on have almost entirely converged (some residual disagreements remain concerning the
both content and presentations The final version grew out oliour many discussions. m3(€i‘i31 0fCl'|3PWi 9)- D3Vid liai Rid ¢V¢l’)’ Chi|Pf€|‘ °f‘l1i5 b00k m||liiPl€ fimfis and
1 am also extremely thankful to Charles Sicwert, Dcclan Smithies, Laura Cow, and diswsscd every single idea in it with m=- providing iicilvfiii criticisms and Mn morc
Adam Pautz for reading this manuscript in its entirety and providing extremely help- l"9lPf“l °°"5“”“C‘lV¢ 5“EEC5Ti°"5v and in man)’ 535“ 5P€“di“E l|°ui’5 and d3Y5 l'|3lPiiiS
ful and incisive feedback. Thanks ANU Philosophy
also to Daniel Stoljar and the ‘"5 Work ‘l“'°“§l" key ld°“5- I “m l”"“‘“5°lY ‘l"3"k[“l f°‘ 3” his l"‘]Pv 35 WE” 35 Fm’
ofMind Work—invProgress Group for reading and discussing several chapters ofthis his ““""3""l“S "‘°”‘1 5“PP°” ‘md "“3°““‘E°m°m-
work and providing extremely helpful feedback. I am also thankful to those who
read and provided helpful comments on ancestors of various chapters, especially
Frankjackson, Gilbert I-larman.]ack\l(/oods, Adam Pautz, Uriah Kriegel, David Pitt,
Philipp Koralus, Jimmy Martin, Paul Benacerraf, Anthony Appiah, Gideon Rosen,
Jeff Speaks, and David Davies.
This book has also benefited from numerous discussions that have helped me see
many issues in a new light. Thank you to Derek Baker, Sam Baker, John Bengson,
Mark Budolfson, David Chalmers, Tim Crane, Kati Farkas, Bill Fish, Tamar
Gendler, Terry Hotgan,]osh Knobe, Dan Korman, Uriah Kriegel,_lohn Maier, Carla
Merino, Matthew Moss, Daniel Nolan, Gurpreet Rattan, Susanna Schellenberg,
Vanessa Schouten, Daniel Stoljanjackie Sullivan, and Bas van Fraassen.
I am especially grateful to my dissertation supervisors, Frank Jackson and Gil
Harman, for encouraging me to write the dissertation I wanted to write, which
formed the basis of this book. and to my undergraduate |’.l'|CSlS supervisor, David
Davies, for encouraging me to write the undergraduate thesis I wanted to write,
which formed the basis ofmy dissertation. I owe special thanks to Jeffspeaks, who
raised an objection to my undergraduate thesis in zoo4 that inspired the views
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Overview
rm: AIM or this book is to defend a radically internalist theory ofintentionality,

the aboutness or directedness of mental states, on which intenrionality is simply
identical to phenomenal consciousness, which is an intrinsic, non-relational feature
ofmental life. This View has been described to me as obviously false, unfashionable.
and flying in the face ofeveryday intuition and cognitive science. It has also been
described to me as trivially true and uninteresting. I aim to defend a version of this
view that is true but not trivial, interesting but not false, and surprisingly conciliatory
with our intuitive and scientific understanding ofthe mind.
My target, inrenrionality, can be understood as the observed "aboutness" or
"directedness" ofrnental states. We inrrospectively notice that many mental states in
some way or other seem to “present,” “represent,” or be “about” things. For example,
you might notice that your current visual experiences represent a page before you,
some marks olivarious shapes and colors, and perhaps the words that these marks
form. You might also notice that your current thoughts represent that there is a page
with marks and words before you, something to do with your own mental states, or
a need for a cup ofcoffee. lnrentionaliry, roughly, is this phenomenon ofaboutncss
or directedness that \ve notice in these and other everyday cases.
My aim is to offer a theory of intentionality, a theory that describes the deep

nature ofintentionality, or, in other words, that tells us what intentionality really
1:, meraphysically speaking. Examples oftheories ofintentionality include tracking
xvi Ouerwzw 01/tri/mu xvii
tn€01'i¢5- On which Ch‘? "‘°5t I335“? kind °f l“["”l°“““‘Y I5 3 “"531 °" °‘h°‘ kmd the functional role theory are false, it does not pinpoint the precise reasons for their
Of tracking relation b€tW“n intetnal t¢Pi'€5°nt3ti°n5 find it5i'n5 in ti“ W°‘ld (5“v failure. Chapter 4 further argues that the fundamental problem with these theories
L"g'YDtctsltfi I935 and F0d0t 1937)» and i11nCti°n3l t01¢ th=0ti¢5- 0n which the i'n°5t ' isthat tracking relations and functional roles simply do not have what it takes to give
basic kind of intentionality is a matter of internal states’ functional dispositions ‘ rig: to in(en(ionali(y_
with respect to other internal states and perhaps also with respect to items in the Part III turns to my favored approach to intentionality, the phenomenal inten_
€nVlt°ntn¢nt (5¢5- c-g-. Harman 1937 and Blfidt 1939- tionality theory (PIT), on which the most basic kind of intentionality arises from
This book proposescivery different kind oftheory ofintentionality. the phcnoint ‘ phenomenal consciousness. Chapter 5 of Part III presents and motivates PIT. I
3'13‘ ln"“‘l°n3ll‘Y ‘h9°i'Y (PIT): “'l‘i5}‘ Gk“ tn? ni05t 535“ kind °fin“n‘l‘7n3ll'Y 1 argue that, unlike tracking theories and functional role theories, PIT provides the
to arise from a conceptually distinct mental feature. phenomenal consciousness. right kinds of ingredients to account for intentionality and is not clearly empirically
the felt. subjective. or “what it’s like" (Nagcl I974) aspect of mental life- This and inadequate. I distinguish between diitetcnt versions of PIT, focusing especially on
related views have recently been defended by various authors, including Horgan rny favored vtrsion, strong idgnflty PIT, which, roughly, takes every intentional
and ncnson (mi), tear (zoos). rarkas (mosh, mesa). stnwson (zoos), srewm property .0 be .a....rca .0 some phenomenal property. Chapter 5 of i»... 111
(1993) Montague IZOIO)» l3°“tg¢t (7—°1°1)- M€nd€l0ViCi (1010), Kriegel (2-On) considers and responds to some theoretical worries with PIT, such as that it is not
Pitt (1004, won), Pautz (zoxga), and Mendelovici and Bourget (2.014), and have naturalistic,
hiSt0tiC3l F003 intn‘ ‘Votks Of Bi'¢nt3n0 (1874) and H“55¢t[ (1900) This 5°01‘ Part IV furthersupports I’ITbyconsideringcertain challengingcasesfor the view.
proposesaversion ofPIT that is notonly motivated on in-principle grounds but also in doing so, it Hgshgs out my favored version of strong identity PIT and shows
°’“Pl'l‘31lY3d“l“3‘€ in that it 53" “CC°‘T"n°d3t9 3“ C3555 °fint°ntl°n31l‘Yv ln51"dl“E that it is both interesting and tenable. Chapter 7 of Part IV considers the challenge
those that are commonly thought to pose problems for PIT. raised by the case of thoughts, which appear to be rich in intentional content but
Iproceed as follows: Chapter ofI’art I fixes reference on our target, intentional»
1 Poor in Phgngn-.¢na1 ch3[ac[ef_ 1 afguc that thought; l1av¢ a kind of content that
“Y I “'5'” that While ‘M “°(l°"3 °f3b°“"‘“55 md dl"‘°“d“¢55 B°5“-“’° ‘°“’“d [hi5 does indeed arise from their fairly impoverished phenomenal characters, though this
target» they are too fully to P‘'°Vld‘ "5 with a firm grip on it- propose to replace 1 content is correspondingly impoverished. i further argue that. although thoughts do
these notions with an ostensive reference-fixing definition, which can be contrasted not phcnonicnally reprcsent many of their alleged contents, they do the next best
with other candidate definitions that take intentiomlity to be whatever plays certain thing; tlnty dgyiygtiygly {gPfg5gn( than.‘ Ipfoposg sglf-ascriptivism, 3 view on which
roles. suchas rules in Folk psychological or scientific theories of behavior. roles in we clerivatively represent various contents by ascribing them to ourselves, which is a
securing truth and reference, or simply roles in explaining how we get around in matter of being disposed to have thoughts accepting ourselves or our phenomenal
the Worldt On my approach. li1t€ntl0n3llty' l5 1| ph€n0i'n¢n0n WC 0h5€i'V€ and Want contents as representing these further contents. Although, as I argue, the resulting
to explain, rather than a posit in a theory primarily aimed at explaining something kind of derived mental representation does not qualify as a kind of imemnmalizy, it
else. qualifies as a kind of representation on a broad sense of the term.
ChapterofPart I specifies the kind oftheory ofintentionaliry we are after and
2. Anotl-int important chalkngg for PIT is that of accounting for i-ngntal states
describes two theory-independent ways of knowing about our intentional states: that W; taltt to ha in(gn[ignal but that appaar to havg no phenomenal character,
introspection and consideration of psychological role. Such states include standing states, like beliefs and desires that we are not currently
Part II considers and argues against what I take to be the two main competitors entertaining, as well as occurrent states that we are not aware of, such as noncon-
to my Favored approach to intentionality. tracking and Functional role theories. scious stares involved in language processing, blindsight, and early visual processing.
Cn1Pt¢F 5 Of Pitt H “EH55 thiit tracking tn°°i'l€5 (355
ii tni$tn3t€h Pt0bl5tn= tl'|3i'° Chapter 8 of Part IV addresses these challenges. I argue that standing states are not
are C3595 in Which Ffipfcifint 3 C0nt€nt that d0€S n0t Fnfitch anything WE Can
We genuinely intentional states. However, I also suggest that self-ascriptivism can be
plausibly be said to track, The tracking theory. then, is empirically inadequate, since extended to accommodate standing state contents and perhaps even standing states
it cannot accommodate all the required cases. Chapter 4 of Part II argues that the in their gn(ir([y_
mismatch problem also afllicts the best versions of the functional role theory. Now,
while the mismatch problem shows 1/94! the tracking theory and the best versions of
xviii Overview
Chapter 8 also argues that many nonconscious occurrent states. such as states
involved in early visual processing. are neither intentional not derivatively repv
resentational. While this position might seem fairly extreme, even “flying in the
face of cognitive science," it is arguably very much in line with the standard View
on the matter. It agrees with the standard view that such occuirent states track
or carry information about various items in the environment and play various
functional roles, and it also agrees that they represent various items, if all we mean
by “representation” is something that boils down to tracking, carrying information,
or having a functional role. The key disagreement with the standard view does not
concern nonconscious occurrent states, but rather amseiaus occurrent stares.
Part V, which consists in only one chapter, Chapter 9, turns to the question of
whether intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing entities that play the role of
intentionality is simply an aspect of intentional states
I
content or whether, instead,
or subjects, I argue in favor ofthe latter aspect view ofintentionality. \Vhile it might Intro duction
be thought that the alternative relation View has various virtues that the aspect View
lacks, such as according with common sense, allowing for public contents, helping us
make sense of structured intentional states, and accounting for conditions of truth
and reference, I argue that the aspect view fares no worse than the relation view when
it comes to these alleged virtues.
The main goal of this book is to offer, flesh our, and defend theory of
a MY AIM is to provide a theory ofintentionality. Before comparing com-
intentionality, but it also has a secondary aim. As I mentioned above, Chapter i pmng (hectic: ofimmdonahlyy it is important to fix firmly on our target
will argue that it is possible to get agood grip on the phenomenon ofintentionality and m g“ den on what kind of [hwry W: an art“ Charm‘ I Proposes
without defining it in terms of truth and reference, our abilities to get around in an osmnsivc way Op fixing rcfmmcc on imendomlky whik Chapter I
the world, folk psychology, or the scientific study of the mind. Throughout this Spcdfies what kind of meaty we want and overviews two sources up
book, I return to these alleged roles ofmrcntionality and argue that it turns out that theory-independent knowledge ofintentionality that we can use to test our
most of them are not in fact played by intenrionality itself but by various closely theories: introspection and considerations ofpsychological wk‘
related phenomena: The relevant ability to get around in the world is explained by a
combination offactors, including intentionality and tracking relations; the notions
of representation implicit in folk psychology don't correspond to intentionality but
to some combination of intentionality and derived representation; conditions of
truth and reference might end up requiring something more than merely having
intentional states, like a primitive correspondence relation or our specifications of
how we'd like to be interpreted; and the notions of representation invoked in the
mind-brain sciences are often a matter of tracking relations and functional roles.
The concluding chapter, Chapter io, returns to the alleged roles of intentionality
and summarizes these findings. The end result is a picture on which intentionalitv,
aspicked out ostensively, is a matter of phenomenal consciousness, and the various
other roles intenrionality is sometimes thought to play are in fact often played by
distinct, although sometimes closely related, phenomena.
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1 Fixing Reference on Intentionaiity
THE AIM or this book is to provide a theory ofintentiomlity. The aim of this
chapter is to clarifyjust what a theory ofintentionality is a [h:O|'yMl[ is important to
get clear on this before we start. A theory ofintentionality is a theory that tells us that
intenrionality has a particular nature, but if it is unclear just what "intentionality"
refers to, then it is unclear what it is that such a theory says has that nature.
it ostensively using introspectively
I propose to get clear on our target by defining
accessible paradigm cases. My ostensive definition can be contrasted with alternative
definitions that may or may not end up picking out the same thing. I will suggest
that the ostensive definition does a better job ofcapturing the core notion we are
interested in. But first, I will say something about why common characterizations
ofintentionality in terms offiboutness" and “direcredness,” though they succeed
in gesturing toward our target, do not provide a satisfactory way of fixing firmly
upon it.
1.1 Aboutness and Directedness
lntentionality is sometimes characterized, at least as a first pass, as the "aboutness" or

"directedness" ofmental states (and perhaps other items) to things that may or may
3
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6 Part I: lnrradumon Chopin 1: I~‘ixmg Refmnre an Inrennpndttry 7
diey are “about" our experiences, that they “say” that I am pointing out the obvious. The ostensive definition arguably both does justice to the intuition behind
etc.’ the characterization of intentionality in terms of "aboutness" and “directedness"
The above examples show that we have mental states that have a certain feature and is an improvement over a definition of "intentionality" in terms of this
that we at least sometimes introspeetively notice and are tempted to describe characterization. If I am right, “aboutness" talk aims to characterize a phenomenon
using representational terms, such as “about," “of? “represent,” “present." and “saying that we have an antecedent grasp My ostensive definition picks out precisely
on.
something." T/mt feature, whatever it is, is intentionality. that phenomenon. so it does justice to the intuition behind characterizations of
We can put things more precisely as follows: Call the mundane, everyday cases intentionality in terms of "abourness" and “directedness." lt offers an improvement
such as those described above our paradigm cases of intentionality. These are the over a definition of “intentionality” in terms of such characterizations, since it fixes
cases that will fon-n our initial sample of cases of intentionality for the purposes of firmly on our target. Unlike a definition of“intentionality" simply as aboutness or
our ostensive definition. Then we can fix reference on our target as follows: directedness, it avoids being fuzzy or metaphorical, since it merely moztiam our fuzzy
and metaphorical representational terms rather than use them. (Ofcourse, it uses the
intentionality The feature that in paradigm cases we sometimes both (i) notice term “representational term." but this is a term picltingout a class ofterms rather than
introspectively in ourselves and (ii) are tempted to describe using representa- a representational term itself.)’
tional terms, such as “about.” “of? “represent," “present,” or "saying something." We can use this ostensive definition of “intentionality” to define some related
notions: Intentional properties are ways things are or might be with respect to their
It is important to emphasize that the feature picked out by my definition is intentionality, or intentional ways things are or might be, and intentional states are
the feature of paradigm cases that we at least sometimes bath introspectively insrantiations of intentional properties. As I am using the terms. intentional states
notice and are tempted to describe representarionally. This allows that there are are not the same thing as intentional mental states, which are mental states that
features of paradigm
that we either introspectively notice ar are tempted to
cases include, but may not be exhausted by. the instantiation of intentional properties.
describe representationally, but not both, and that do not qualify as intentional. For For example, a judgment that grass is green might involve the instantiation of the
example. die definition does not by itselfrule out the view that paradigm cases have intentional property of representing that grass is green together with a particular
introspectively accessible phenomenal features that are distinct from intentionality. non-intentional ‘judgment’ component. So, it is an intentional mental state but not
It is also important to emphasize that, although we are using introspection to fix an intentional state,‘
reference on intentionality, the ostensive definition does not rule out the possibility What intentional properties and intentional stares “say” or are “directed at" are
of instances of intentionality that are not inrtospectively accessible, or even instances their intentional contents. More precisely. we can think of intentional content as
of intentionality that are not mental. Such cases would not be paradigm cases of
intentionality, but they would nonetheless be cases of intentionality so long as
they had the relevant feature exemplified by paradigm cases, For example. as far
One might object that “abo|Itness" taut gestures at ttrattntt rather than at the ostensively defined
as my definition is concerned, it could turn out that nonconscious beliefs and ‘
phenomenon (but set can: 1oi;.pp.l-9.{or I convincing argument against this), arm all. one might
the nonconscious states posited by cognitive science, which. presumably. are not a.rgI|e,we sometimes say that mental Stiles that fail to Rftr, like I thought that santa Claus exists. lire
introspectively accessible, are instances of intentionality. For the same reasons, the not teany about anything at all.
Now, We might agree that "aboiItness" taut is sometimes used to pick out reference but disagree that
ostensive definition does not rule out the possibility of instances oi intentionality
this means that 'abontness' taut, when uted to rhnrnererize intentionality. gostutos at reference. since
that we are not tempted to describe representationally. For example, it does not rule whatever "aboutrIexs" taut .5 supposed to gesture at is normally taiten to include mental States in which
out the possibility of moods and afterimages being instances ofintentionality. even (her! is a failure ofreference. suth as the thought that santo Claus exists. in any cost. il"‘aboIIzness"
taut X5 notmauy used to pick out reference, this only rntthet tuppont my claim that Chzlactetilauons of
though we (arguably) are not tempted to describe them representationally,
intentionality in terms of"-’Ibt)u!|'iess" would not provide an adequate definition t1fintcntionalil'y.Spenlt§
(zoiob) makes a sinular point, arguing (hill rot xucll reasons the "cluractenlat ion or intentionality is
aboiltness is only true to a rim approximation” (p. nu).
’ I take the category or thoughts ta intiud: fittuflent beliefs. aecurrent desirel. and othot oteuttent The term "Intentional state" is often used [0 mean what 1 mean by "intentional mental stator i dovtatt
“cognmve" states but not standing beliefs, standing desires. 0|’ othtt standing lta(¢$. set 9.4.1. from that usage because my discussion focuses on instanrianons ormtontionai properties. to it is useful
‘ Definitions ofkey tttms can he found in the glossary on p. :49. rot me to reserve the term nnttntionai stator rot them.
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8 Pan l.- lnrradiimnri Chap!!!‘ 1: Fixing Reference an lflltllliflfldlilj 9
follows: When we introspe ' notice intentional states, we notice the general 1 3 Other Ways of Fixing Reference
phenomenon that we are tempted to describe as “directedness" or “saying some-
thing.‘ But we also notice something we are tempted to describe as what our mental I have recommended an osrensive way of fixing firmly upon the phenomenon that
states are "directed at" or what they “say"- this is their (intentional) content.’ When the fuzzy and metaphoric ' notions of aboutness and directedness merely gesture
a state. property, or other item has a certain intentional content. we can say that it toward. This section considers some alternative ways of defining “intentionality”
(intentionally) represents that content.‘ For example. the judgment that grass is and shows that they might not pick out the same thing as the ostensive ‘
green represents the content <grass is green>.' (§§i.;.t— 1.3.4). It then argues that ifwhat we are interested in is the , ‘ enon that
It
worth emphasizing that my starting point is fairly iiuncommittal in that
is ‘aboutness" talk gestures at, the ostensive ‘ ‘ is preferable to these alternatives
my definition of "intentionality" and the introspective observations it is based (§L3ts)-

on do not ptejudge questions concerning the nature of intentionality. As far as
they are concerned, inrentionality might end up being a causal or other tracking
relation, a matter of the functional roles of internal states. or a matter of phenomenal l.].| FOLK PSVCHOLUGY
consciousness. My starting point is neutral on these and other possible views of
One approach to intentionality defines it in terms of its role in
third-personal folk a
intentionality. Likewise. my starting point does not preiudge questions concerning
psychological. or common sense. theory of mind and behavior. We attribute beliefs.
the nature of contents. Contents might turn out to be ordinary objects and proper-
desires. and other mental states to each other, and we take these states to be related
ties, propositions. facts. sense data, ideas in a world of forms. ways of representing,
to one another in various ways and to have various other features. A definition of
properties of intentional states, or even intentional states or properties themselves.
“intentionality" in terms of folk psychology taltes intentionali to be whatever plays
Relatedly, my starting point does not prejudge any issues regarding the vehicles
a particular role in such a folk psychological theory."
of intentionalit . which are the bearers of intentional properties. The vehicles of Such a definition might not piclt out the salne thing as the ostensive ’ ' ' .
inrentionality could turn out to be. for example. subjects, symbols in a language of
For instance. it could turn out that what the ostensive definition picks out lacks
thought. brain states, internal states, or immaterial souls.
some of the extra features attributed to it by folk psychology. If these features are
For simplicity, however, I will assume that the vehicles of intentionality are
considered crucial by folk psychology, then the folk psychological notion will not
internal items that I will call (mental) representations. Since different intentional
pick out the ostensively defined phenomenon. For example. it could turn out that
states involve different vehicles of representation. this way of speaking allows us to
the ostensivel defined phenomenon does not play certain causal roles considered
talk about inten ‘states while remaining nonconimittal on their contents. which
crucial by folk psychology.
'
is useful when the content of a particular intentional state is under dispute.“

The folk psychological ’ and the ostensive ’ ’ might also pick
out different things if the folk p y ‘ ‘ definition fails to pick out anything
at all. Suppose that folk , ' fly is hopelessly false. Then its theoretical terms,
whcn we inttospcctivcly notice intcntionality. we do so at least in patt by inttotptctivcly noticing out
" in “' 5 those putatively referring to intentional states. will fail to refer, and it will
iiidctd. it ought be that thttc is nothing inotc to notice when wt notice inttntionality than
sonttiitt.
thcsc intcntioiial coiitcnts
turn out that what it calls “inrentionality" does not exist." But the ostensively defined
' l toititni-iics utc wcptttcnt" nioit broadly to describe tcptcscntation-liltc phciaoiaiena that an not
instantts ofinlcnrionality, but contttt should disainbiguatc. The altttnativc would be to use a special
tttni. like "intcnd: rot having an Intentional conttnt. but this would be too swltwatd.
‘ coiittnts niightintludc propositionalconrenmlilte tgtass Isgreen), but niight alsoinelude ptoptictal tional capacities via tlicit alleged vehicles.
However. this assumption. along with tlic assumption that
ot obyecnlal tontciits. like (green) and (George) (St! Montaguc 2007, otunkowslti ton, and bt discharged by replacing tlll( otnicntal tcpttscntations
vehicles ait iiitsnial iitins. tan the niott
Mendelovicl aois. Ms). (1-ht notions of obyecrual and piopnctal contcnts stt something like ctanc‘s awkward talk nrinitntional capatititt and amending my discussion apprnpnzrely. See Ryder too; to.
(son) notions orconttnts and objects. tcsptcnvtlv. though not cquivaltnt.) a uscrul overview ordiltticni views nrthc icpisscntations.
"‘ in what rollowt. I will also Wm es assunic sonitt ng like a languagc orthouglit View (rodot I975). stt Sellnts l9§5. Lewis im. ataddonmitclicll and iacltion K996. and Fodor I937 tot this way offixing
on which thcit at. subptopotitional vehicles Ofrepresenratian, like IE1: and CAT. which come togcthct ttrtttntc on intcntionality.
to tonstinitt con-iplct vthiclts ortcpicscntaiion ttptcstnting coitiplct contcnts. Apart rtont I thinlt. " Paul and ratticia Chnreliland argue that folk psychology is false and hence that its posits rail to tcrtt
btiiig latgcly cottcct. this assumption provides a uscrul way ortallting about out patticulai icpttscnta. (ice. t.g.. Churchland iosi). lrthcy atc tight. and irwc takc intentionality to be inctcly a posit in rout
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to Part I: Inmzdurziim Chapter 1: I-'ixz‘ngRgfermc: an Irltmtiolmlitj ll
phenomenon might still exist. 50, the folk psychological notion might fail to pick It could also turn out that the two ways of defining “intentionality" do not pick out
out the same thing as the ostensive definition. the same thing because the definition based on the mind~brain sciences does not pick
out anything at all. Perhaps the best understanding of talk of representation in the
mind-brain sciences takes representational notions to be merely a dispensable fiction
ma. THE MlNl)»BRAlN SCIENCES (see Egan zoro). Then the mincl«btain sciences do not really posit representational
states after all. Another possibility is that they do posit representational states, but
Another approach to intentionality takes it to be a posit in scientific approaches
nothing plays the roles they are defined in terms of, so the notions of intentionality
to the mind and brain. For instance, some approaches in cognitive science aim to
based on the mind~brain sciences fail to refel: Again, this shows that this way of
explain mental processes and behavior in terms of operations over internal states that
defining “intentionality" might not pick out the same thing as the ostensive way.
ate described as carrying information or “representing” various contents, and it is
not uncommon for neuroscientific theories to speak of neural structures as carrying

information about or "representing" their causes. A suggestion for an alternative way i.;.5 GETTING AROUND IN THE WORLD
ofpicking out our target, then, takes intentionality to be a posit in the l'nind—brain
For the most part, we manage to acquire the things we need, avoid the things that
sciences."
are harmful to us, perform sophisticated actions involving multiple steps, and, more
There are interesting questions in die philosophy of science surrounding the
generally, get around in the world fairly successfully. It is quite plausible that we
notions of representation operative in various disciplines and research programs.
do this by means of internal representations of the world. Inspired by this way of
What are these notions of representation? What roles do they play? Do different
thinking. we might take intentionality to be whatever explains successful behavior
research programs use the same notion of representation? Sotne philosophers
in the relevant way,“
explicitly claim to be trying to answer these types of questions and not the types
Behavioral phenomena such as those listed above call out for explanation, and it
ofqtlestions I'm concerned with.“
may very well be that the phenomenon we fixed on with our ostensive definition is a
It could turn out that this approach picks out the same thing as the phenomenon of this explanation. What is less clear is exactly what role the ostensively
crucial part
we noticed introspectively in ourselves. But it also might turn out that the best
defined phenomenon plays. Vehicles of intentionality might have properties apart
elucidation: of the notions implicit in the mind-brain sciences pick out different
from intentional properties, such as syntactic, neural, or other broadly physical or
features of internal states than the one we ostensively picked out through introspec-
functional properties.“ It could turn out, then, that intentionality itself is causally
tive observation. One prima facie reason to think this might be the case is that it
impotent and it's these other properties of vehicles of intentionality—say, their
makes sense to ascribe at least some of the kinds of representational states operative syntactic properties—that are responsible for their usefulness in helping us get
in the mind—brain sciences to artifacts that we might not really believe to have
around in the world. If this (unhappy) situation were the case, an explanation of
genuine intentional powers, such as calculators and computers. This suggests that, at
successful behavior might not involve the ostensively defined phenomenon, and so
best. the ostensively defined phenomenon is a species ofwhatever representational
the approach to defining ‘intentionality" based on getting around in the world might
phenomenon is picked out by the mind-brain sciences. At worst, it is something else
fix reference on something other than what the ostensive definition picks out.
entirely.
The two definitions might also fail to pick out the same thing in skeptical scenarios
in which we do not in fact lnanage to acquire the things we need, avoid the things
that are harmful to us, or generally manage to get around in the world successfully,
psychology. then it will turn out that thereis no Intentionality. (Note that the Churchlands do not think perhaps because we are brains in vats or dreaming, disembodied souls. In such
theta 2!! intentional states ofany sort: set: Churehland 1939b.)
no
“ Sec. c.g.. Fodor i957. Millikan wk. and Cumtnlns i994. Note that Fodor takes intlzntionallty to be a
posit In computational cognitive science, as well is n posit in folk psychology; on i115 view, cognitive
science and folk psychology paint to the same thing. " Versionsoftllis approach might also be versions of the approaches based on folk psychology or thc
“ Cummlns (too... pp. 2.7Ev-2.79), for instance. specifically claims (0 be describing a nation or rcpt!‘- mind-brzln scicnccsassciihca earlier.
sentatlon that IS useful for computational theories ofcognltlon but not necessarily (oi the kinds of “ See also Dretske's distinction between representational facts and more facts about representations
representation implicit in folk psychology. (-995. p- 3)-
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I: Part I: lnmulurlmn Chapter 1: I-bung Rcfmm: wt Inzmtumaluy I;
scenarios, the definition based on getting around in the world would fail to For of truth and reference in terms of causation (or other relations). it could turn out
reference on anything. since nothing in fact helps us get by in the world in the way that the second part of the story is secured by the fitst part. that the nature of sense
required. but the ostensive definition would not fail to refer. data and our relation to them makes it the case that intentional states refer to certain
items in certain conditions. But it could also turn out that the first part ofthe story
leaves open whether and how sense data. and hence intentionality, is c nected to
t.;.+ TRUTH AND R£rER£Nct—:
the world through reference. On such a theory, perceptual intentionality alone might
If mental states “say something.‘ then it seems to follow that what they say can not automatic " give rise to condi ons of ’ .
be either true or false. and if mental states are "of" or “about” something. then it Something similar might be trueof other pictures of intentionality. Consider a
seems to follow that they can either refer or fail to refer to whatever they’re “of” or Frege—inspired picture on which intentionality is a matter of being appropriately
“about.” So. perhaps we can use the notions of truth and reference to fix on our target. related to abstract senses, while tmth and reference are a matter of how senses
One such approach takes intentionality to be the having of conditions of truth or connect with the world, Depending on how we characterize senses, their connecting
reference, while another takes intentionality to be that which gives rise to the having with the world might not occur automatically but might instead require an extra in—
of conditions of truth and reference.“ gredient, a “satisfaction” relation or some such. So, if truth and reference require the
This approach is certainly attractive. It promises to provide a substantive charac- ' defined _ " in ' with “' Delse.a ‘
' '
terization ofintentionality, defining it in terms of one of its apparently key features, of"inrentionality" in ren'ns ofconditions of truth and reference or what gives rise to
and it does justice to the intuitive idea that intentionality serves to connect us to the them will pick out this combined phenomenon rather than the ostensively defined
external world, the world outside the mind. It also does justice to the idea that, at phenomenon alone.
least when they are successful. there is some existing thing that intentional states are Relatedly. the definition in tenns of truth and reference would fail to pick out
in some sense directed at or about. The approach also seems fairly unobjectionable. the ostensively defined phenomenon if it fails to refer because having conditions
It certainly seems that intentional states have conditions oftruth and reference, that of truth and reference requires something in addition to the ostensively defined
what we think can be true or false, and that an object we represent can exist or fail phenomenon and our mental states exhibit the ostensively defined phenomenon
to exist. The claim that intentional states have dirions of truth and reference is but lack the additional ingredients. In such a case, there would be no such things
quite uncontroversial. as conditions of truth and reference, and so there would be nothing answering to the
But. like the other ' ' e definitions of “intentionalit ” considered above, definition of “' "ty" in temts of truth and reference. But there would still
definitions in terms of truth and reference might fail to pick out the phenomenon be something answering to the ostensive definition.
picked out by the ostensive definition. They would fail to pick out the ostensively
defined phenomenon if intentionality did not atically connect us to the world
1.3.; WHY WE SHOULD PREFER THE OSTENSIVE DEFINITION
without the help of additional ingredients, Consider. for the sake of illustration.
a sense data theory of perceptual intentionality (a view, of course. which has few I have outlined various alternatives to the ostensive definition of ‘intentionality’
contemporary adherents"). On one way of characterizing such a theory, it can and argued that these ' ‘ e definitions might pick out something other than
be divided into two main claims: First, perceptual intentionality is a relation of the ostensively defined phenomenon. Now. of course. there is no arguing over
awareness to sense data. Second, sense data refer to whatever external items cause de ‘ ’ . Different definitions of "intentionality" might pick out different things.
them (or bear some other special relation to them). The first claim olfets a story of and we are free to theorize about any of them. However. I want to suggest that if we
perceptual intentionality in terms of sense data. while the second claim offers a story are ' ’ in the A L gestured at by " ‘ " and " “ ’ ess" talk,
we should prefer my fairly minimal ostensive definition. As we've seen. alternative
de ' ‘ of “intentionality” build in assumptions about their target that are not
See. e.g.. Siewert -992.Chalmers :oo4. Siegel zoto. and Byrne 2.009 for understandings ofintenrionah
‘
present in the ostensive definition. This leaves someone who adopts these alternative
my based on mm. reference. or are closely related notion ofaceuracy.
in the aoog PhilPapers Surveys, only we ofrespondenrs at leading English-speaking universities definitions vulnerable to eliminativist threats: If there is nothing that satisfies
reported holding . sense am theory (Bouxget and Chalmers XOI4). the additional assumptions. then there is no intentionality, in their sense. But, I
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[4 Part I: Irmndumnn Chapter 1: F1xirlgRefirtn£e lm Irizmtramzltty 15
want to suggest, the phenomenon gestured at by “aboutness" and “directedness” the nature of the ostensively defined I henomenon to be M. The two theorists take
talk is not vulnerable to eliminativism in the same way. which suggests that the diiferent phenomena to have different natures.
extra assumptions that are built into the alternative definitions are substantive However, it seems to me that in the case of many debates on intentionality,
claims about, rather than defining features of, the phenomen we gesture at with there ofien is a real disagreement between L peting theories that employ dif—
“aboutness” and “directedness" talk. Ifthis is right, then there is reason to prefer my ferent definitions of “intentionality." Many theorists who define “intentionality“
fairly ’ ' ostensive ‘ ' ‘ .
in alternative ways still intend their theories to account for the phenomenon
Here is thought experiment that supports this poin Suppose that folk psy-
a .
that we introspectively observe and are tempted to describe representationally, the
chology is horribly mistaken, the mind—brain sciences have no need for a notion phenomenon gestured at by "aboutness" talk. For example, although Dretske (1995)
of content at all, and, relatedly, our best account of ho\v we successfully get by in does not employ an ostensive definition of his target, he states that his tracking
the world doesn't either. Suppose further that there is no determinate fact about theory covers anything answering to the term “intentionality":
how mental states are supposed to correspond to the world, and so there are
no such things as truth and reference, On this scenario, none of the alternative Brentano (I874) conjectured that a mark ofthe mental was intentional-
ways of defining “inrentionality” manage to pick out anything at all. Still. on this ity. Whatever, exactly, Brentano meant by intentionality, and whether
scenario, we might introspect and notice paradigm cases ofintentionality. We might or not he was right about its being a feature of all, and only, mental
notice perceptual experiences and thoughts that seem to be “about” or “directed” events, most philosophers take intentional characteristics (variously
at something or that seem to “say something.” And we might want to know how understood) to be distinctive ofa great many mental phenomena. What
this “aboutness” arises. This curiosity would not be misdirected. a mere result ofour follows is brief catalog of those aspects of intentionality that have
a
ignorance that the alternative definitions fail to refer, Even if we knew that nothing, figured most prominently in the recent literature. In each case we
not even paradigm cases, had the features invoked by the alternative definitions. find that a representational account of the mind provides a satisfying
we would still be left with the question of how thoughts and experiences get to explanation ofintentionality. (Dretske r995, p. 2.8)
have the features we are tempted to describe using representational vocabulary like
The aspects of intentionality that Dretske claims to accommodate are the power to
“aboutness" and “directedness." What this shows is that observation of paradigm
misrepresent, aboutness. aspectual shape (roughly, our ability to represent things in
cases by itself gives rise to curiosity about “aboutness” and “directedness," which
different ways), and directedness (pp. 28-34). In effect, Dretske claims that all there
suggests that my ostensive definition best captures the notion of intentionality that
is to anykind ofintention-ality—like phenomenon we have any reason to believe in is
such talk gestures at.
captured by his account. So, even though he does not define “intentionality” in my
ostensive way, at least part of what he aims to account for is the ostensively defined
phenomenon, the phenomenon gestured at by "aboutness" talk.”
1.4 Worries with the Ostensive Definition Further reason to think that many theorists who define “intentionality" in
one of the ways I reject aim to be targeting a phenomenon that at least includes
1 now turn to some potential worries one might have with the ostensive ‘ ’
die ostensively defined phenomenon is that they often use what appear to be
of intentionality. introspectively accessible paradigm cases to illustrate their claims, such as judgments
concerning barnyard animals and hallucinations of pink rats and daggers. Although
there could be intentional states that are not introspectively accessible with such
1.4.1 ARE WE TALKING PAST EACH OTHER?
contents, the examples are usually nosed to be of the kinds of states that are or at
When different theorists pick out their topic ofinterest in different ways. there is a least could be introspectively accessible.” This appeal to introspectible cases suggests
danger that they end up talking past one another. Suppose that the folk psycholog-
ically defined phenomenon is distinct from the ostensively defined phenomenon,
" Similarly, Fodor (($90) explicitly mm that his theory Solvls “fitenianols prolileiii" (pp. is7—iii).
It seems that there is no real disagreement to be had between someone who takes
"’ This is especially Clear iii discussions ofthe disiiiiicriaii ptflblcm, wliicli partly rely on iririiiriciis about
the nature of the folk psychological phenomenon to be N and someone who takes what is represented iii possible cases (e Baker I989 and Fador X990). If rliisc iiiriiiripiis arcirr
16 Part I: Inrrnduttnm (ilmprzr 1: Fixing Rrfrrtm 2 an Irilermnmz/II)’ t7
that whatever else theorists who fix reference on their target in ways other than my my ostensive definition that it keeps the clearly intentional inttospectivcly accessible
own are trying to do, they are also often trying to explain intentionality in my sense. feature of mental states separate from whatever it is that the proposed additional
paradigms have, In any case, the terminological difference between me and someone
L41 STANDING STATES who adopts an ostensive definition ' luding standing states as paradigms does not
make a substantive difference in what follows: Although my target is intentionality,
One might agree with my suggestion of defining “' ' y” ostensively but in mysense, I also offer an account ofstanding states, as well as other alleged instances
find my choice of paradigms overly restrictive. All my paradigm cases are current of intentionality (see Part IV). The overall story offered would be the same whether
states, mental states that are used. entertained, or otherwise active at the time at or not we include standing states in out paradigm cases, though it would be stated
which they are had, such as judgments and perceptual states. But we might also want diiferentli/i
to include in our stock of paradigms some standing states, mental states that need
not be used. entertained, or otherwise active at the time at which they are had, such
t..¢..; PERCEPTION Am.) THOUGHT
as beliefs and desires that one is not currently entertaining. For example, the belief
you had five minutes ago that the Acropolis is in Athens is a standing state, and one The ostensive definition fixes on our target by pointing to several of its instances,
might suggest that it is a prime example ofintentionality." including instances in perception and instances in thought‘ But one might worry
My reason for not including standing states in my stock of paradigm cases is that these instances do not belong to a unified natural kind. Perhaps we end up
that we do not have the same kind of introspective access to them as we do picking out a disjunctive kind, consisting of two distinct natural kinds. This might
to introspectivcly accessible occurrcnt states. While we can simply observe the be the case if perceptual states are importantly different from "cognitive" states such
intentionality ofmy r f “ paradigm cases, we cannot observe our standing states as thoughts, and so what we might call “perceptual intentionality" is not the same
or their features. Instead. we infer that we have standing states, perhaps on the basis kind of thing as what we might call “cognitive intentionality." ifthis is the case. then
of our noticing that we sometimes have corresponding occurrent states or on the my paradigm cases are actually instances of two different kinds of phenomena, which
basis ofa folk psychological theory of mind and behavior. These ways of knowing i am mistakenly lumping together.
about standing states are relatively indirect compared to our ways of accessing my Of course, when we use multiple examples in an ostensive definition, there is
preferred paradigm cases, and, relatedly. their existence is less certain for us than that always a risk that they are very different in their natures and we end up picking
of my inrrospectively accessible paradigm cases. In short, then, we have an especially out a disjunctive kind. One response to this sort of worry is that this scenario is
secure epistemi access to introspectively accessible cases of intentionality, one that unlikely. While it remains a possibility that I've picked out a disjunctive kind, it at
we do not have to standing states, which is why I do not include standing states in least initially seems that the observations concerning thought and those concerning
my paradigm cases. perception are similar in important ways. Both thought and perception are readily
Notice also that if, as the objector is likely to hold, the proposed additional described as “saying something" or being “directed at” something. And both in»
paradigms have the feature that we notice in my paradigm cases, then my choice to tentionality in , and intentionality in thought seem fairly distant from
not include them has no EECCI: My ostensive definition will cover them as well, and other kinds of phenomena, such as reflexive behaviors and the automatic control of
including them in our initial stock is unnecessary. We end up picking out the same vital functions. Their similarity to one another and distance from other phenomena
thing either way. suggest that there is an interesting natural kind that they both belong to.“
Excluding standing states only has an effect on what we end up picking out if A second response [0 this worry is that even if it turns out that perceptual
the proposed additional paradigms either do not exist or do not have the feature intentionality and cognitive intentionality are very diiferent phenomena that do
picked out by my osrensive definition. But, in such cases, it is arguably a virtue of
Ofcoutse. even tfintentionzlity ts n Ilnlfild natural kind. perceptual teptesentstton and teprtszntatlon
supposed to be inlultlflns about the kintb otcantents that a subytcl might notice tn herself, then its in '
, ‘ 5| t. ’
natural kinds. 1-» A myclzims
not clear where they at: supposed to cutnt rtont and why Wt sllollld put any Wtlgllt on them. hm. Since the tssut ts om Wl\eKl1ct intentionality ts . unified natural kind, not whether it has various
“ Thanks (0 David Eaurgtt and Tim Bayne tot pressing tn: on this Worry. dISKllItt5ubl(iI1d$.
https://wvvw.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
is P/I7‘! I: lrltradurrilm C/mpltr 1: Flxlrlg Rrfmmr nn Intcrtmmdllly 19
not form a unified natural kind, this is not a problem, since my starting point includes both raw matter and interpretations, whereas we should only include
will not steer us too far in the wrong direction. Assuming our target is whatever interpretations.“
“aboutncss" and “directedness” talk gesture toward, the problem with approaches However, if the above view is correct. then it is not in fact the case that my
to fixing reference on our target that I want to reject is that they risk missing our approach is too permissive. My observations pick out intentional states, states that
target entirely. For example, defining our target as an explanatory posit in a theory “say” something, not non-' ' components or contributors to those states.
of behavior rislts missing our target if intentionality does not play the requisite role And so, my way of picking out the phenomenon of intentionality isn't meant to
in generating behavior. If nothing plays the requisite role (say, because the relevant and wouldn't in fact pick out unintcrpreted raw matter. if there were such a thing.
parts of the theory are false). then it will turn out that there is no intentionality. If Instead, my method would pick out interpreted raw matter. or interpretations. It
something plays this role. but it is not whatever "aboutness" and “ " ‘ ess” talk might then turn out that sotne of our allegedly perceptual paradigm states are not
gesture toward, then will turn out that there is intentionality, but that it‘s not the mere perceptual states but instead thoughts or combinations of perceptual states
same thing as our targeted phenomenon. In Contrast, picking out a disjunctive kind and thoughts. If the above view is in fact correct, then, ultimately, a complete
does not carrywith it the risk of missing our target. Perhaps perceptual intentionality theory of intentionality should isolate the components of interpreted raw matter and
and cognitive intentionality are two entirely different kinds of things. Then we distinguish their contributions to intentionaliry. Note that nothing in my ostensive
would need two distinct, and perhaps unrelated. theories to explain them, and if definition rules out such a view from the get-go.
we start of? thinking of perceptual intentionality and cognitive intentionality as
relevantly similar. then it might take longer to reach such a conclusion. However.
such a conclusion has not been ruled out from the start because nothing in the way 1.5 Conclusion
we fixed on intentionality requires that it be a unified phenomenon.“

The central aim ofthis book is to offer a theory of’ , the phenomenon
we at least sometilncs notice ' pectively in ourselves and are tempted to
[.44 PERCEPTUAL STATES l)0N.T HAVE CONTENTS describe using representational terms, and which, I've suggested, is the phenomenon
One might object that perceptual states don’t have contents, at least not prior to
that “aboutness" talk gestures at. This book develops a theory of this ostcnsively
defined phenomenon in terms ofa eptually distinct mental feature, phenomenal
an act of “interpretation.” For example, one might argue that the visual experience
one enjoys when one views ti red ball is neutral between multiple external-world
consciousness, the “what it’s like" of mental states.
possibilities, such as that there is a red ball in normal lighting conditions, that there is
This book also has a secondary aim. This chapter considered and rejected
alternative ways of fixing reference on intentionali via some of its alleged additional
a white ball lit by red light, etc. The experience does not by itself“say" which ofrhese
possibilities is the case, so it does not represent the ball as being any particular color
roles. Thus far, I have arguedthat intentionality might not play these roles. A
secondary line of argument in this book argues that intentionality alone in fact
at all. Instead, a further state, such as a judgment, '
I’
the perceptual state and
commits us to one or another possibi ty. On this view, there is a distinction between
due: no: play many of these of them are played by something else. In
roles. Many
Chapter 3, I argue that a crucial part of a story of how representations contribute to
-intentional mental features of some , , ' experien , which ght
we m
successful behavior must invoke non-i ‘ features of representation namely,
call their “raw matter,” and further states that interpret them.
,
or “interpretations."
their tracking relations to external items. In Chapter 8. I argue that folk psychological
Interpretations are intentional, but mere raw matter is not. One might object
notions of content most closely c to a combination of intentional content
that if this view is correct, then my ostensive ’ ‘ is too permissive: it J
and derived mental representational content. In Chapter 8, I also argue that

the kinds of representation implicit in the mind-brain sciences are distinct from
" Ofcourle. whatever mm apparent I perceptual and cognitive

- -
" y and that nonconscious occurrent states might satisfy these notions of
also seem qllflt diflerenr in certain respects. For instance. perceptual intentlonallty I! more vivid.
detailed. and closely related to phenomenology than mag... veintentlonality.I-1venrually.Iwlllofl’et a
3: ... ~ ‘ ...... . .' ppm .. t A ' ' -
in perception ml in thought (see especially Chapter 7). “ 'I'\tavis(;oo4)pre1ents (I View along time lines.
https:l/www.qoppa.comIpdfstudio
2.0 Part I: Intmduzrmn
representation but lack ' tionality, Chapter 9 argues that it is not even clear that
intentionality gives us conditions of truth and reference without the help of further
ingredients.
On the resulting picture, then, intcntionality is a matter of phenomenal conscious-
ness. and many of the other roles that are sometimes used to pick it out are in fact
played by something else.
y 2 Goals and Methodology
THE PREVIOUS cHAi='n-:RfixerI on our target, intentionality. This chapter consid-

ers what exactly we want to know about intentionality and some methods that can
it would take to provide a theory

help us come to know it. In §2..t, I consider what
ofintentionality and the goals around which I will structure most of my discussion.
In §1..2, I suggest two theory-independent ways in which we can know about our
intentional states, which can be used to test competing theories ofintcntionality:
introspection and considerations ofpsychological role.
2.1 What is a Theory of Intentionality?
A theory of intentionality is a theory that describes the deep nature of inten-

tionality. where intentIon:iIity's (deep) nature is what it really is, metaphysically
speaking. For example, a theory ofintentionality might tell us that intentionality is a
tracking relation, a relation ofisomorphism between a Functionally defined system of
representations and abstract propositions. a primitive relation to properties. objects.
and facts, or an adverbial modification ofsubjectsi
My aim is to provide a theory ofintentionality that specifies the nature ofnll actual
and possible intentional states. But I will structure much of my discussion around a
zt
11 P47! I: Immiurrzun Chapter 2: Gaul: and Mzrbndalogy 2;
less ambitious goal. that of providing a theory that specifies what give: rise to actual intentionality, or derivatively intentional ways things are or might be. A derivarively
instances oforigirml intentionality. Let me explain these three italicized terms: intentional state is an instantiation ofa derivatively intentional property, and we
can say that something derivatively (intentionally) represents a content when it

Arising
instantiates a derivatively intentional property representing that content.
A gives rise to B (or, equivalently, B arises from A) when E is nothing over and
Note that although it is often thought that the line between original and
above A, e.g., because B is identical to, fully grounded in, constituted by, or realized
derived intentionality is to be drawn between mental instances ofintenrionality and
by A. A theory that tells us what gives rise to intentionality tells us what exactly
non»mental instances, there can also be mental cases of derived intentionality. Bour-
intentionality amounts to, though it might remain neutral on how exactly that ger (zoioa) oflers important early development of this idea, providing a wide
one
thing gets to amount to intentionality. For example, a theory ofintentionality might range of examples of derived mental intentionality. We will soon see that derived
claim that intentionality arises from tracking relations obtaining between internal
mental intentionality plays a role in most versions of the phenomenal intentionality
states and items in the environment, though it might remain neutral on whether
theory, the view diat l will eventually defend. But it is also true of many alternative
intentionality is identical to this tracking relation, grounded in it, or arises from it in
views that accept a language of thought-like picture on which internally unstructured
some other way
representation representations that do not contain other representation
, as proper
parts, come together to form internally structured representations whose contents
Actual and Pnsrilzle Instances tIfIr1IenIirIr1a1it_y
are determined by their representation and the ways they are combined.
Actual, as opposed to merely possible, intentional states are intentional states
As Bourget (zoroa) notes. one natural way of understanding this idea taltes the
existing in the actual world. A theory ofintentionality might account for all actual
intentionality of internally structured representations to be derived from their
intentional states while allowing for the possibility of intentional states that it cannot
constituent internally unstructured representations and their mode of combination.
account for. For example, a theory of intentionality in terms of tracking might
allow that there are non»actual possible worlds in which intentionality is a primitive
Although I will eventually propose a theory of intentionality that specifies the
phenomenon.’
nature of all actual and possible intentional states, I will structure much of my
discussion around the more modest goal of providing a theory of ntionality '
Original and Derived Intmtiwzaiity

that specifies what gives rise to actual instances of original intentionality. My
Original intentionality is intentionality that does not derive from other instances
reason for this is that it allows us to classify theories of intentionality in terms
of intentionality. Original intentionality can be contrasted with derived intention-
of their most general common factors: what they take actual-world instances of
ality, which is intentionality that derives from other instances ofintentionality For
original intentionality to amount to, or, in other words, what they take to be the
example, one might think that linguistic expressions have derived intentionality that
actual-world “source” (Kricgel zou, zotab) of intentionality. As we will see, this
is derived from the original intentionality of mental states, e.g.. from our thoughts,
method of classifying theories ends up classifying them along familiar lines. Once
beliefs. interpretations, or communicative intentions (Grice 1989).
we have settled on the source of actual»world instances of intentionality. we will then
A few more definitions are in order: Originally intentional properties are ways
turn to providing a more complete theory of intentionality, one that settles other
things are or might be with respect to their original intentionality, or originally
questions about intentionality, including those of how exactly intentionality arises
intentional ways things are or might be, and an intentional state is
from whatever it arises from, how it might arise in other possible worlds, and whether
an instantiation of an originally intentional property. We can say that something
and how original intentionality can yield derived intentionality.
'9' " (intentionally) represents a content when it instanriates an "
intentional property representing that content. Cotrespondingly, derivatively in-

2:2 Theory«I 4 4 Access to intentionality
tentional , rries are ways things are or might be with respect to their derived
As we will see in Chapters 3-5, many theories of intentionality make predictions as

‘ Compare: A physicallst theory ofmental states can be neutral on the question ofwhether nonphysieal to the contents of particular mental states. So, in order to assess these theories, it
mental states are possible. is useful to have a theory~indcpendent way of testing these predictions, i.c., a way
2.4 Part]: Inn-adur/mi Cbrzprerz:Gzml:rmdMrr/mdrzlugy 1,
that is independent of our theories of intentionality. Ifwe cannot test a theory’s which contents are concrete combinations of worldly objects and properties, sets of
predictions in a theoryvindependent way, then (except in cases where theories make possible worlds, or properties of intentional states.
inconsistent predictions), we cannot use a theory's predictions to help us decide The superficial character of an ' ntional state or content is the set of superficial
whether or not to accept it. features that characterize it as the intentional state or content that it is. Claims about
This section describes two theory—independent ways of finding out which con‘ the particular contents of particular intentional states are usually best interpreted as
tents we represent: introspection and considerations of psychological roles. Impor- claims about their superficial characters. For example, the claim that Justin Trudeau
tantly, my claim only that these methods allow us to discern which contents
is is currently thinking that grass is green is a claim about the superficial character of
we represent, not that they can fully reveal to us the nature of our intentional his present intentional states, not their deep natures. Similarly, the claim that Put-
states and contents. As I will put it, they can tell us about an intentional state nam's (1975) Oscar and his Twin Earth duplicate, Toscar, have warery»stuff-related
or content's “superficial character," but not its deep nature. Before describing our thoughts with different contents is best understood as a claim about the superficial
theory—independcnt ways of knowing about intentional states and contents, then, it characters of Oscar and Toscar’s int ' states. Some generalization about
is helpful to first clarify the distinction between deep nature and superficial character. intentional states are also best understood as claims about their superficial characters.
For example, the claims that most people can visually represent to million colors.
that perceptual states have more fine-grained contents than thoughts, and that
1..L.l DEEP NATURE AND SUPERFICIAL CHARACTER
nonconscious intentional states have vague or indeterminate contents are all best
Let us first consider an analogy: There is adistinction between two different kinds of understood as claims about the superficial characters of the relevant states,‘
questions we might ask about furniture. We might ask deep, metaphysical questions Theories of intentionality can make predictions about both the deep natures and
about the nature of furniture. For example. we might ask if being a piece of furniture the superficial characters of the contents we represent. For example, a theory of
is a physical or functional state, ifan item's status as a piece offurniture is dependent intentionality that predicts that the content of the concept CAT is the universal mt
on minds or societies, if being a piece offurniture is an intrinsic or extrinsic property, makes predictions about both this conrent’s deep nature and its superficial character.
and how pieces of furniture are related to the matter that constitutes them. These With respect to its deep nature, it predicts that the content of CAT is, at bottom, a
questions are questions about the “deep nature” of furniture, about what furniture universal. With respect to its superficial character, it predicts that the content has a
really is, metaphysically speaking. cat-ish, rather daan dog—ish or octopus-ish. superficial character, ie, that CAT has the
There is a different set of questions we lnight ask about furniture: We might ask content <cat>, rather than <dog> or <oetopus>.‘
what kind offurniture some piece offurniture belongs to, e.g., whether it is a couch, While I think it is possible to assess a theory's predictions about both the
a chair, or a futon. We might ask questions about the shapes, colors, material, or superficial characters and the deep natures of intentional states or contents, many
textures ofvarious pieces offurniturc, such as whether a particular table has a square of my central arguments will focus specifically on predictions about superficial
or a rectangular top or whether a particular couch is made of leather or pleathet. And characters. This is because, as we will soon see, it is quite plausible that we can know
we might ask questions about the uses or functions of certain kinds offurniture, such
as whether futons are used for sleeping, sitting, orboth. These are all questions about
what we might call the "superficial” features of furniture.

i introduce the distinction between the deep nature and the superficial character of contents in
I want to suggest that we can draw a parallel distinction between the “deep” and zol8, whcrcl l 5 best A VIEW:
"superficial" features ofintentionality. We have already defined the deep nature of about the superficial characters ofintentlonal states.
use angle brackets to ham: contents in a way that roughly refiecrs our intuitive way ofnaming them,
intentionality as what it really is, metaphysically speaking (§)..i). We can similarly 1
which is K, ; superficialcharacters. For example. thecontent (grass lr green-l> is the content we would
take the (deep) nature of intentional states and contens to be what they really express with “that grass is green." whrch ls a content with u grass~ls~greenAIsh superficial character.
are, mctapllyslcaliy speaking. Views ofthc deep nature of intentional states include I take a C-ish superficial character to be a superficial character that at least includes C-lsh—ness as 2
views on which they are states of bearing tracking relations to worldly objects and pzrtoraspeet.Thiswayof -1- - k H -- L 'in' I
or contents superficial character without fully specifying it. For example, we can say that a perceptual
properties, states of bearing primitive relations to abstract sets of possible worlds. or state representing a red square has a red-squate~ls|\ superficial character, but also that it has . red-lsh
intrinsic states of subjects. Views of the deep nature of contents include views on superficial character and that it has a square-ish superficial character.
:6 Par! 1: Imrrzdumlzrl Chapter 2: Goal: rlfllll‘/lt!170t1D/agy 27
about the superficial characters of our intentional states and contents prior to having In short, introspection can, at least sometimes and at least to a certain extent,
a theory ofintentionality and, indeed, prior to doing much philosophy at all, The inform us as to the superficial characters of our intentional states, though it does
next two subsections outline two ways in which we can do this. not reveal to us their deep natures. Before moving on, let me make two clarifications.
First. my claim that introspection can at least sometimes provide at least partial
access to the superficial characters ofour intentional states and contents is compari-
1 INTRDSPECTION
ble with the claim that there are intentional states and contents to which we have no
One theory-independent way in which know the superficial character ofour
we can introspective access or only partial introspective access. For example, we presumably
intentional states and contents is through introspection. have no introspective access to the superficial characters of intentional
In §l.2, we saw that we can inrrospectively notice that we have intentional states. I states, and we arguably have no or only partial introspective access to the superficial
want to suggest that introspection can tell us a bit more than that. At least sometimes characters of with broad contents, contents the representation of which
states
and at least to a certain extent, introspection informs us as to which intentional depends on relations to the environment. However, it is natural to suppose that we
states we have. For example, introspection can tell me that I am presently thinking have at least partial access to the superficial characters of the contents we represent in
<a car is in my lap>, rather than, say, <an octopus is wrapped around my arm>. paradigm cases of intentionality (sec §l.z), since these are cases we notice introspec-
Further, the way that introspection tells me that I am thinking <a cat is in my lap> tively in ourselves. This is all I will need in order to make many of my arguments.
is not by providing with a number, symbol, or other market that I have come
me The second caveat is that the claim that introspection does not reveal to us
to associate with my thinking this content. Instead, introspection provides me with the nature of intentionality does not imply that what we are presented with in
some sort of access to some oi‘ the features of the content that characterize it as the introspection is not our contents in their entirety. It could be that introspection
particular content that it is and that distinguish it from other contents. In other presents us with our contents in their entirety but does not specifically tell us the deep
words, introspection provides me with some access to its superficial character. More natures of those contents, LC») what they are at bottom, lrletaphysically speaking‘ For
generally, introspection, at least sometimes and at least to a certain extent, can inform example, introspection might present us with structured propositions consisting of
us as to the superficial characters of our intentional states and contents. instantiated properties and existing objects but might not be able to tease apart and
l.n contrast, introspection does not reveal to us the deep natures of intentional identify those components. for whatever reason, What is meant by the claim that
states and contents. In the above example, introspection tells me that I represent introspection does not reveal the nature of intentionality is simply that we cannot
<a cat is in my lap>, but it arguably‘ does not tell me whether this content is a simply tell. from introspection alone, what is the nature of intentionality.‘
set of possible worlds, a structured proposition, a way of ‘resenting, or an idea
in the mind ofGod. Similarly, introspection does not reveal to me the nature of my
z.2..; PSYCHOLOGICAL ROLES
intentional state; it does not tell me that my intentional state is a tracking relation to
cats and other things in the world, a complex set of fimctional roles. or a primitive A second theory—independent way of finding out about the superficial characters
relation to sets of possible worlds. Since a theory of intentionality is a theory that of our intentional states and contents is through their psychological roles. Out
specifies the deep nature ofintcntionality, this means that, as suggested in Chapter I, intentional states generally play various psychological roles, and these psychological
introspection does not reveal to us the correct theory ofintentionality. Of course, roles are appropriate to which contents they represent. These roles mi§1t be roles in
this is not to say that introspective evidence cannot form the basis ofargurnents for the inferences we are disposed to make, the behaviors we are disposed to engage in.
claims about the deep nature ofinrentionality, but only that introspection does not
simply tell us what it is.‘
experience of: ripe mironnansn phenomenal character, evell rrrr does not reveal to us
tomato has a
whether Its ofbtlngahram var r
L .1. a» » ‘order
thought, or a primitive mental state. This is to deny what is sometimes ca|lel*l"rev/elation" (rte, e.g.. cart
‘ See §y.3.r roran argument. xol7).
‘ Similarly, much of the debate on the hard problem ofconsciousness presupposes that W: ran at least ‘ 59¢ Mendelovlel 20:8 for discussion along tht lines otrlrlr section ofwh-at introspection can and cannot
sometimes introspeetively tell which phenomenal srarrs we have, even lflntrospection does not reveal tell us about intentionality. 5:: also Bayne and Sptner zero for a congenial discussion oftlie limits or
to us the nature or phenomenal states. For example, might tell us that a
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18 Rm 1: lntraduuion ctmpmztt;o.t/tm1.i1o;mdt1ogy 2.9
or the higher—order thoughts or ' , ' : judgments about our intentional states ambi ous. I will structure much of my initial discussion around the question of what
we are able or likely to have. These roles might also be roles in contributing to our gives rise to all actual instances of original intentionality. As we will see, by providing
overall phenomenology, which might include our phenomenal , es or our' us with theory-independent access to the contents uF at least some intentional states.
“grasped” representational , r on the world. introspection and considerations of psychological involvement can help us settle this
While it might be an open question precisely which roles any given intentional question.
state plays, I will assume that intentional states play a , ' D‘cal role appropriate With these preliminari under our belt. it's time to begin our search for a true
to their contents. In some way or other. intentional states behave as if they‘re there. I theory of intentionality! Part [1 considers approaches to intentionality that take it
will also assume that these psychological roles can often be detected by us. either from tracking or functional roles and argues that they fail. Part III turns to my
to arise
through introspection or through third—person observation. If this is right. then favored approach. the phenomenal intentionality theory. and together with Part IV.
intentional states often leave some detectable traces in our minds or behaviors. and argues that it succeeds.
these traces can be used to help us find out which intentional states we have.’
Like introspective evidence. evidence from psychological role most clearly tells us
about an intentional state's superficial character. not its deep nature. For example,
Marias bringing an umbrella to work is evidence that she believes it might rain and
desires to stay dry. but it is not clearly evidence for or against the view that her
intentional state is a primitive relation to a set of possible worlds. Of course. this
is not to say that facts about psychological roles cannot form the basis of arguments
for claims about the deep nature of intentionality, but only that an intentional state’s
psychological roles do not clearly reveal this nature to us. Accordingly, I will say that
an i ’' state is psychologically involved when it plays a psychological role
appropriate to its superficial character.

Importanrly, the claim that considerations of psychological involvement most
clearly tell us about an intentional state's superficial character does not imply that
it is not intentional states in their entirety that play the relevant psychological roles.
It might be that it is intentional states in their entirety that play various roles. but
which specific roles they play most clearly and uneontroversially tells us about their
superficial characters. not their deep natures.
2.3 Conclusion
In summary, a theory of intentionality is a theory that describes the deep nature of

intentionality. Though the theory of intentionaliry that I will propose is much more
‘ Even tr lllilnliflnal mm eattttny impotent, our thremtm and behaviors should Sllll mpm their
ll:
(Dn(tn(S. so Considerations or psychological toh (In snll provide magnet 15 [0 What they rtprextnl.
rot Exlmpll. someone who believes (ha! ll is raining and desires to stay dry mu display appropriate
lzIlI~aV0lding behavior, mt tr the (‘OHRIIKS or her beliefs ttto desires do ttot play I msti role In
gtncrzting this bellz‘/iolt
II Alternative Theories of Intentionality
T H E T RACKING THE 0 RY and the Functional role theory are arguably the
two main competitors to my preferred theory of intcntionality. This part
argues that both theories face unforgivable problems: Chapter 5 argues that
tracking theories make false predictions about certain paradigm cases of
intentionality, while Chapter 4 argues that this problem also afllicts the
best versions of the functional role theory. I return to the tracking theory
again at the end of Chapter 4, where I argue that the underlying reason
that both tracking and functional role theories fail is that tracking relations
and functional roles are simply not the kinds ofthings that can give rise to
intentionality.
Part lll develops my preferred theory nfintentionality, the phenomenal
intentionality theory, which, we will see, succeeds precisely where tracking
and functional role theories fail.
3 The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories
TRACKING Tl-IEORIES TAKE intenrionality to arise from tracking relations that

internal states bear to items in the environment. This chapter argues that while
tracking theories have various attractions, including that of providing an account of
intentionality in terms ofperfecrly respectable natural phenomena, they are unable
to account for certain paradigm cases of intentionality. In these cases, there is :1
mismatch between the contents attributed by tracking theories and the contents
we have theory-independent reason to think we represent. This chapter overviews
tracking theories (§3. 1) and presents this mismatch problem (§§;.2.—;.5), arguing that
it cannot be avoided usingsophisticated maneuver involving modes ofpresentation,
nonconceptual contents. and other devices (§3.6). I close with a discussion of the
significance ofrracking (§;.7).
311 Tracking Theories
According to the tracking theory, original intentionality arises from tracking,

where tracking is detecting, carrying information about or having the function of
carrying information about, or otherwise appropriately corresponding to items in
L1;
;.t Par! I1.‘/ii]i’tY7ii1i’il/I Tlacaricr oflrrmmlmizluy Chapter 3.‘ T/:I(1Wi1mAi’th Prob/errlfir Datfiirlg Uaenrier it
the environment, such as particular objects, properties, or states of affairs, We can fimdan-iental physical items lacking mentality or items arising from them. Dretske,
state the core commitment of the tracking theory as follows: for example, describes his project as “an exercise in naturalism—or, if you prefer.
i metaphysics. Can you bake a mental cake using only physical yeast and
The tracking dieory All actual originally intentional states arise from tracking.
Hour?” (Dretske 1981, p. xi). Millikan (1984) similarly expresses a firm commitment
Recall that B arises from A when Bis nothing over and above A, perhaps because Bis to naturalism: “That our theory of the world has to be a totally naturalist theory I
identical to. fully grounded in, constituted by, or realized by A (§z,1). Recall also that am not prepared to argue” (p. 87).‘
original intenrionality is inrentionality that does not derive from other instances of
intentionality (§2..l). According to the tracking theory, then, tracking relations give
_3.2 Overview of the Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories
rise to the most basic kind ofintentionality. and all other kinds ofintentionality (if
there are any) are derived from ir.’
When combined with information about what particular mental representations
There are difirerent versions of the tracking theory. Optimal-functioning track-
track, tracking theories make predictions as to what they repre In the remainder
ing theories take the relevant tracking relation to be the causal relation that
.
holds between a mental representation and some item in conditions in which the
of this chapter, I argue that there is a certain class of cases, which I call “mismatch
cases," in which tracking theories make the wrong predictions about whit/J contents
representation helps its bearer survive, flourish, or otherwise Function appropriately
we represent, The existence of mismatch cases means that the tracking theory is
(see Tye 2.000).‘ Teleological tracking theories take the relevant tracking relation
empirically inadequate and hence false,
to be at least partly determin ’ by an organism’s L‘ ‘ 0' ‘ 5 tions, which might
My main example ofa mismatch case is that of perceptual color representations,
be a matter ofits evolutionary history (Millikan 1984, 1989, Papineau 1987, Dretske
the representa ion of colors involved in perceptual color states, though I briefly
1995, andNealldcr 2.ol3).‘ Another approach is the asymmetric dependenc track-
consider other mismatch cases in §;.5. In a nutshell, my argument For the claim
ing theory. on which, simplifying signi‘ ‘_, a mental representation originally
diat perceptual color representations are a mismatch case for tracking theories goes
represents whatever causes it via a causal relation that does not depend on any other
like this: I’ ' color K it iii track " 5 like surface "
causal relations (Fodor 1987, 1990).‘
profiles, molecular properties of objects, or dispositions to cause certain internal
One alleged virtue of the tracking theory is that it is a naturalistic theory
states in us. But this is not what they represent; instead, they something
of intentionality, a theory that appeals only to naturalistic items, which are
like primitive colors. These claims about what perceptual color representations
do and do not represent are prima facie obvious, but they are also supported by
‘ Nott that no particular toltcn intntal rtprtscntation nccd ht causcd by, carry information about, or
licar any other such relation to any conctttt existing thing in order for it to rcprcstiit. what is gtncrally
rtquitco for n toltcn incntal rcptcstntation r orrypc Rm ttprcstnt i content c is, roughly, rot tokens ’ While orctsltc takes iiarurslisin ahout iiircntionality to tcqiiirc that a theory only appcal to non-mental
or R occurring in particular circumstances to be Caused hy, carry information about, correspond to, or ingredients, Fodor's ofivcited passage expressing his coniniitnicnt to namlzlism only taltcs niturilisrn
bear some other such relation to c (or instsnccs o(C). to require that s thtory only appeal to non-lnftnflbnfll ingredients. He writes:
‘ Tye (iooo) liolds Something liltt an optimal functioning thtoty, though he also involtcs teleological
I supposc that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling
clcnicnts.
nfrhe iilriniatc and irrcdiicililc ptopcrtics or things. When thry do. tht liltcs or spin, rhitmi.
‘ Milliltan's view stutcs. roughly, that a representation Roriginally rcprcscnts contcnt C just in case the
and charge, will ptrliaps appcar upon tlicir list. not l1b0IAf7llIS surely won't; lntentionallty simply
systcnis that inaltt usc ofk (R's "consiirncrs") need the occui-rcncc ortoltcns of)! to corrcspond to c in
doesn't go tlist deep. its hard to see, in tact orthis consideration, how one can be a Realist shout
otdcr to pctrotni tht functions thry wcrt natunlly selected for erformirlg (their “proper functions").
intcniioiinlity without also being, to some tirtcnt or oriicr, a Reductmnist. lrthc stinaiitic and
Slightly more precisely. and slightly more in llne with Fodor's own nharzrcterilatinn, the asyniinttric
the intentional str rcsl properties ofthings, it must bl: in virtue orthtir identity with (or maybe
dependence theory ststts that an internally unstructured rcprcscntation R rcprcscnts Content C irc
ortlitir supcrvenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional 7107 strnanric. If
(or instancts of c) catisc Iolttrls ofI'l(1n a law-liltc way) and for anything clsc, 1), thst causes tokens
alioiitncss is real, it niusthc ttnllysoincrhingclsc. (Fodor 1987, p. on cinphasir in original)
of R, tlit D-to-R conncction is asymmetrically dependent on the C-to»R conncction. The Dcto-R
conncction is asymmetrically dependent on the C-to-R conricction put in cost tht Dela-R conntction EvenIhough.forFnrlnr n PM i ii. Rem
v -
is olcpcndcnt on the C-to—R connection and tht C-to-R connection is not dcptndcnt on thc D-to-R that a nanitalistic ptoicct can appeal to are primarily uncontrovetsially physical and runcrional
’ r‘ is cashed out The D-to-R
. is dependent on the ingredients. since hc does not considtr possible yirws that inyohc ingredients whose status as physical
C—to—R connection yust in cast irtht C-tn-R connection wcrc to hrtalt, tlicn thc D~to-R connection is I loch as L so. in ptncticc, his I0 nrlturallsm
would hrtalt as well. amounts (0 much the Sim! as ortrtltas.

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36 Part II: AI/email:/2 flzmics nflmmlrarur/II] (Juprn ;: The Mlsmaxrrb Pmblemfur Tmrlzmg Ihanzr ;7
theory-independent considerations from int A’

’ n and observed psychological while its superficial character is the set of superficial features that characterize it as
role: First, we can introspect on perceptual color states. and when we do. we [he particular content that it is. In the above example. the tracking theory in question
discover something like primirive colors rather than any of the items perceptual color is naturally understood as making I dictions about both the deep nature and the
representations can be said to track. Second. the psychological roles of perceptual superficial character ofthe content of HORSE. It tells us that the content of HORSE
color reprcsentat' also suggest that they represent primitive colors rather than has the deep nature of being a particular property, rather than an object. state of
anything they happen to track. For instance. they are inferentially related to beliefs affairs. or other item, though it remains neutral on what exactly properties are. It also
about primitive colors rather than beliefs about surface reflectance profiles or the tells us that the content of HORSE has a horse-ish superficial character, by which I
lik:4Ifall this is right, then the tracking theory makes the wrong predictions in the mean a superficial character that at least includes horse-ish-ness as a part or aspect.
case of percept ' color representations, and we have a mismatch case. More simply, that the tracking theory predicts that HORSE represents
we can say
The argument is simple and obvious: Perceptual color representations track one <hotse>, where <horse> is a content with a horse-ish superficial character.‘
thing but represent another, so the tracking theory delivers the wrong answer. But In §z.2.. we saw that it is possible to test a theory of intentionality's predictions
there are many methodological ‘ tions working in the background of this using two theory-independent methods. methods that do not presuppose any
argument, and it is open to various sophisticated replies. The next few sections particular theory ofintentionality: int r ’ and consideration of psychological
unpack the argument, clarify some of the assumptions at work. and overview the role. These methods most clearly tell us about a content’: superficial character, not
most compelling lines of response (Appendix A considers more) .‘ its deep nature. They most clearly tell us ml/irkv contents we represent without telling
us what those contents really are. at bottom. Accordingly. the predictions of the
tracking theory that I am concerned with are its ptedic ns about the superficial
3.3 Background and Assumptions
characters of represented contents, not its predictions about their deep natures.
Let us consider these two theory-independent methods of testing a theory of
When combined with information about what a reprt-sentati tracks, tracking
intentionality's predictions in more detail. In §z..z..2., we saw that introspection can
theories yield predictions as to what it represents. For example, suppose that. help tell us which intentional contents we represent by at least partially revealing
on a given tracking relation, the representation HORSE tracks the property of their superficial characters. For example. we can introspectively tell that we are
being a horse. Then a tracking theory taking this tracking relation to give rise to
representing <grass is green>, rather than <snow is white> or <there is an elephant
intentionality predicts that HORSE represents the property /Mme. sullting in the corner>. While introspection may not filly reveal the superficial
Section z.z.t distinguished between the deep nature and the superficial character characters of It” contents, it arguably provides some access to paradigm cases of
of contents. where the deep nature of a content is what it is, metaphysically speaking, intentionality. the introspectively accessible cases that we used to fix reference on
intentionality in §t.z..
Since at least some intentional states involving the representation HORSE are
‘ Paurz (zoos. zoub), Hardin (tyfiil), Aklns (X996). and others have argued that there is a "structural"
mismatch between the contents of representations and what they rraelr: There is a mismatch in
paradigm cases of ' ' nality, introspection can speak to the question of which
the relations of similarity and rlrlrerenee between what a set of representatlons represent and the content HORSE represents. introspection arguably suggests that it represents
relations of similarity and arlterenee between the Items that they track. For example, the contents (horse). a content with a horse-ish superficial character. in this way, introspection
of color representations have a certain structure leg. <red.> is more similar to <purpl¢.r> than
confirms the tracking theory's predict‘ that HORSE represents <horse>.
it u to <green,,>). which fails to match the structure of me rurraee reflectance profiles that color
representations tra . (e.g.. what Iain, tracks u not more similar to what mu-ra,. tracks than to what The second way of finding out about
intentional state's superficial character
an
curtain, tracks). ifrhis at right. rlren what color representations truck is not what they represent. see is by considering its psychological role. As suggested in §z..z.3. intentional states are
lvanowich mg for a lucid overview and defense ofthls line of argument.
My argument based on mismatch cases is more committal on some eonrraverslal lssuesAit invokes
' ~ rather '
involving less controversial claims about the relations between those rontents—but the problem it
points to u more blatant: we aunt need to examine the structural relarlnnr between what we track and ' Recall that a C-ish superficial character u a superficial character that ar learr includes Gish-nest as a
what we represent to see that they are different when, as 1 will argue, we can enneluae they are arrterenr parr or arpeer. and angle bracket notation names contents in a way that is reflective oftheir superficial
,,oM__,t ,-. a. ..D L 'IL characters. See n. ; orclraprer x.
‘I
38 Part II: /1/tentative ‘Means: rlflntmrmna/rly Chapter 1: The Illxirrlulr/7 Pnzblemfizr Tmtlzing Theories 39
psychologically involved. where an intentional state is psychologically involved when colored, such as a visual state representing a blue mug.’ Section 3.; considers other
it plays a psychological role that is appropriate to its content's superficial character. candidate mismatch cases.
Psychological involvement might involve playing a role in the drawing of inferences When combined with information about what perceptual color representations
and the generation of behavior, being available to introspection, or simply being track, the tracking theory makes predictions about what they represent. Perceptual
part ofa subject’s representational phenomenology. such as the ‘ henomenology of color representations arguably track physical properties of objects such as their
“grasping” a content. We lnight not always be able to discern an intentional state's surface reflectance profiles (dispositions to reflect, transmit, or emit such-and-such
psychological roles, but when we are, this can help inform us ofits content. proportions of such-and~such wavelengths of light), the categorical bases of surface
lnt ' ' states involving the concept HORSE arguably play psychological roles reflectance profiles, or the disposition to cause certain physical or functional states
appropriate to having the content <horse>. They are appropriately connected to in organisms like us.’ For ease of exposition, I will focus on the view that, on the
intentional states representing horse-related activities, perceptual states representing relevant tracking relations, perceptual color representations track surface reflectance
the perceptual features of horses, higherrorder thoughts about representing profiles, though the general form of argument applies with few modifications to
horses, horse— pp p iate behaviors, and an experienced “grasp” of horses. In alternative views."""
short, intentional states involving the concept HORSE play a psychological role
that is appropriate to representing the content <horse>, which suggests that
HORSE represents <horse>, a content with a horse-ish superficial character. 50. ' lzssllmt, as is p1aIAslble,that perceptual color representations are ruhpi-oporltlonnl rgpmenmioi-is.
considerations of psychological role confirm the tracking theory's prediction that representations with Contents that do not have a piopotirionnl form but thnr sometimes rorin pnrtt
of proposluunal contents, and that they originally represent thc relevant color contents. These
HORSE represents <horse>.
congcninl to vicws on which there is a language ofthought: tcc §i.i. Alternative views
ISS|XlT\plI0l‘lS are
As we've seen, our theory-independent ways of finding out about the contents rnight deny that thctc are i l Vat - - to-
of intentional states arguably confirm the tracking theory’s predictions about the u .. i ‘ emsfromthepropositionalrepresentationsDfwhichlhcyform parts(sI.'e.e.gi,Milllkan
|yK4 rot this lnrttr view). For thotc who hold thctc alternative views, my examples ofsubpmposrtional
content of HORSE. Another “good case‘ for the tracking theory is that of perceptual reprtsentatlonl representing colort run he Substtnlted with examples orpropositionnl representations
representations of shapes. The tracking theory might predict that perceptual shape representing contents involving colors, such as reprererltations rcprctcnting that a particular object has
a particular color, and the discussion can ht amended accordingly. See also n. IO or Chapter |. For
representations track particular shape properties and hence that they represent
those rctitrant to the idea that pcrccprunl states are intentional. sclme nonpetceptual niisinntch cases
particular shape contents, Our theoryrindependent onsideratioii arguably support ntc dctcriotd in sin.
such content attributions and thus confirm the tracking theory's predictions. ’ Tiles! options rot Wllat perceptual color representations track map onto well-known views of Will!
I will say that two contents match when they are exactly alike in superficial they relmss-at: Dmske (ms). Ty: (mesh. 1.000), and Byrne and Hilhcrt (zoos) lake pticcptnnl
L lot representations to represent surface rrlltcrnncc profiles: Armstrong ([963). Jackson and Pargetter
character. In the case of HORSE and perceptual shape representations, the contents (X937). Jackson (1993:), Lewis (rm). and smart (tg7§) take them to itprcscnt the categorical him
ascribed by the tracking theory arguably match the contents those representations ofsurface reflectance prohltt; and Cohen (2009) and Averill (I991) take thcni to represent relations
in fact represent. In what follows, i argue that there are cases in which the between putatlvtlycclored ohycrri and subjects. sot Gow 1014 rot In excellent overview.
‘" However, see Hardin 1938 for extensive discussion orthc dilacnltict involved in isolating the precise
contents ascribed by the tracking theory do not match the contents that are in fact external causes orcolor Experience.
represented. Such cases are mismatch cases for the tracking theory. cases in which Another option is to lake perceptual color representations to track qualia or dispositions to cause
it makes false predictions about a represented content's superficial character. The quail: in subjects, where qunlia nrc felt. Subyecnve. sensational. qualllnnve. or phenomenal mental
itcrns that are not inttntionnl Contents (See Peacock: tori, Levin zooo. nnd Shoemaker 1.00; for thc
tracking theory, then, has a mismatch problem. view tllal perceptual color rcprtsrnrations represent disposition: to cause qunlin). i set views on which
perceptual eolor representations rrnclt tonicthing involving quzlla aside rot two reasons: rirtt. thc view
that there are qunlii IS largely, Ind i think correctly, rejected. One reason to reject quzlla is the so-called
transparencyofexperience: lnttospectlon simply does not reveal Sucll rlon- tent mental qualities (sci
3.4 A Mismatch Case: Perceptual Color , aiiiiti l-lninun 1990, Dretskt I995. Ty: zooo. and Menclelovlcl tom). Second. it IS unlikely rhatthe tracking
theorist will be attracted to such a view, since nppcnl to qualia X5 in tension with I corniriitrricnt to
namrallsmt Either qualiz are naturalistic IICXIIS or they are not. lfthey nrt, then the view that pcrccptunl
In this section, I focus on what I take to be one of the most obvious mismatch
color representations track quail: or disposition: to misc qnzliz boils down to one orthc physicalist
cases for the tracking theory, that of perceptual color representations, which are nltcrnnrivct listcd in the main text or something rirnilnr. irthty are not, tlicn appealing to quzlia IS
representations of color involved in visual states representing surfaces or objects as Incompatible with a commitment to natumlism.
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40 Part II: A/Inmzrir/e Theories oj'lm:nximm/1/_v (film/zm 3: The Mmmm/1 Pmb/nnflzr Yhmiuig Tlmms 4:
Combined. then. with the view that perceptual color representations track states’ psychological roles in no way suggest that SKY-BLUE's content has a SRPvish
surface reflectance profiles, the tracking theory predicts that perceptual color superficial L . So. considerations ofpsychological role also fail to support the
representations represent surface nce profiles. This prediction is a prediction tracking theory's predictions.
about the deep nature of the contents of , ' color representations. i.e., that So far. I have argued that our theoty—independent ways of knowing about
they are properties of a certain type. It is also a prediction about which contents the contents of intentional states do not support the tracking theory's content
perceptual color representat' , . with
i.e., that they represent contents attributions. Ofcourse. absence of evidence does not imply evidence of absence.
surface-reflectance-profile-ish superficial characters. For example. it might predict However. when combined with some further facts about the case. it does: While
that a particular perceptual color representation, SKY-BLUE, has as its content a some representations might only be involved in intentional states that are not
particular surface reflectance profile, SR1’ (pronounced "surp’"). This is not only .\ introspectively accessible and whose psychological roles we cannot discern. it turns
prediction about the deep nature of SKY-BLU as content. but also a prediction about out that many ' ' ' states ' ' ' D r , ' color , are
which content SKY-BLUE represents. i.e.. that it represents <SRP>. which is a content introspectively accessible and have psychological roles that we can discern. Indeed,
that has a SRP-ish superficial character. ‘ ‘ states ' ' ' gr , ‘color I ' are arguably amongst
The problem is that our theory-independent methods of finding out which the intentional states to which we have the best theory-independent access. We
contents we represent suggest against the tracking theory's predictions and in favor of are constantly confronted with them, we can easily notice them introspectively.
alternative content attributions that the tracking theory cannot accommodate. Let and we are often in a position to notice them play a role in guiding our reasoning
us first see how our two theory-independent methods suggest against the tracking and behavior. forming the targets of higher-order thoughts. and affecting out
L
theory's content attributions. overall r
I
r ‘ D So. if r K ' color
t
At least some perceptual states involving perceptual color representations are represented surface “ tance profiles. we should expect this to be supported
.i
paradigm cases of‘ ality. so they are introspectively accessible. But when by our theory-independent tions. Indeed. if any of the tracking theory’s
we introspect on these states, we notice nothing to do with specific surface re- content attributions can be supported by theory-independen considerat’ . these
Hectance profiles. For example. when we introspect upon intenti ‘ states involving ones should. Since they are not. this means not only that theory-independent
SKY-BLUE, we do not notice <SRI’> or any aspect or component ofsuch a content. considerations fail to support the tracking theory’s predictions but also that they
\Vhatever content we do notice does not have a SRP-ish superficial character. So. positively suggest against them. ‘
introspection fails to support the tracking theoty's predictions.“ The tracking dieory. then. wrongly predicts that perceptu ' color representations
Consideratio of pay L logical role also fail to support the tracking thcory's represent contents with surface-reflectance-profile-ish superficial characters. For
predictions. Our perceptual ' ' states representing colors do not behave as example. it wrongly predicts that with a
SKY-BLUE represents <SRP>, a content
if they represented surface flectance profiles. They are not causally. inferentially. SRP—ish superficial character. We can call this kind oferror an error ofcornmission,
or otherwise interestingly related to beliefs about surface reflectance profiles or since it includes unwanted material in the superficial character of sitv-nLUr-:’s
higher-order thoughts stating that we perceptually represent surface reflectance content. Similar claims hold for other perceptual color representations. Since the
profiles. And they in no sense allow us to “grasp” such contents or have any other tracking theory makes false predictions about the superficial character of the con—
related phenomenological effects. These states’ psychological roles in no way suggest tents of perceptual color representatio , the case ofperceptua‘ color representations
that they represent surface reflectance properties. For example. intentional states is a mismatch case for the tracking theory. and the tracking theory faces the mismatch
involving §KY—BLUE do not behave as if they represented <SRP>: They do not problem. It is " inadequate and hence false.
allow us to draw inferences about SR1’ or to have higher-order thoughts saying We can sum ' this line ofreasoning in the case of SKY-BLUE in the following
that we represent <SRP>. and they do not have a SRP-ish phenomenology. These argument from commission:
(Cr) Ifthe tracking theory is true. then SKY-BLUE has the content <SRP>.
“ The related claim that colors don't look disposirxonal is a well-known complaint against views ortitt (Ca) SKY-BLUE does not have the content <SRP>.
content of perceptual color representations on which they represent dispositions to meet subjects H1
(C;) Therefore. the tracking theory is false.
various ways: see Boghossian and Velleman 1919 and MeGinn I996.
4;. Part II: Aliemalil/2 Themes nflnrmtllznttlzry Chapter, The Mtxmaxrly Pmblemjbr Tmkmg 'I‘beme.t 4;
In other words, the tracking theory predicts that SKY»BLUE represents a content absent countervailing theoretical beliefs, a perceptual intentional stare representing
with a SRP»ish superficial character, but in fact, it does not, so the tracking theory is that an object is sky-blue might lead to the judgment that the object is some shade of
false.(Cl), which expresses the tracking theory's (false) prediction, follows from the edenic blue, i.e., that it has a sui generis, primitive, non-dispositional, non-relational,
specification of the t.racking theory together with facts about what SKY-BLUE tracks, and non—mental property of blueness. So, considerations of psychological role also
while (C1) is supported by our theory-independent considerations that inform us as suggest that perceptual color representations represent edenic colors.
to which contents we represent. The problem is that it is quite implausible that perceptual color representations
So far, I have argued that theory-independent considerations suggest against the track edenic colors. Edenic colors are qualitative, simple, primitive. sui generis.
tracking theory’s predictions about the superficial characters of perceptual color non—dispositional, and non-relational color-like features. But neither surface re»
representations. This gives us the argument from commission. I will now argue that flectarlce profiles not their categorical bases not other properties ofobjects involve
theory-independent considerations support alternative content attributions, which any such features. If there are no instantiated edenic color properties, then it is
cannot be accommodated by the tracking theory. This will lead to another argument hard to see how any tracking relation can single them out. What tracking relations
against the tracking theory, the argument from omission. relate us to are surface reflectance profiles, their categorical bases, and other related
We've noted that perceptual color representations are involved in intentional properties of objects, none of which are or involve edenic colors. Perceptual color
states that are introspectively accessible and have discernible psychological roles. So, representations do not track edenic colors, and so the tracking theory cannot say
our theory—independent ways of finding out about intentional states give us some that they represent them.
hint as to what they represent. Which content attributions, then, do they support? In short, the tracking theory falsely predicts that $KY~BLUE’s content is not
Introspection suggests that perceptual color representations represent qualitative. <edenic sky—blue>, a content with an edenic»sky»blue—ish superficial character. The
simple (not having constituent parts), primitive (not made up of other items), tracking theory, tlltn, of omission, since it wrongly omits certain
makes an error
sui generis (in a category all of their own), non-dispositional, non-relational, and material from the superficial character of SKY-BLUE’s content. The same holds for
non»lnental color properties. In short, introspection suggests that perceptual color other perceptual color representations. From this, we can conclude that the case of
representations represent contents that are, or at least involve, what Chalmers perceptual color representations is a for the tracking theory, that the
mismatch case
(zoos) calls edenic colors. For example, introspection upon intentional states tracking theory faces the mismatch problem, and that it is empirically inadequate
involving sKY—BLUE reveals a content with a qualitative, simple, primitive, sui and hence false.
generis, non-dispositional, non—rclational edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character. We can summarize this line of reasoning in the case of $1-tY»Bx.UE in the following
i.e., <edenic sky-blue>. In sum, introspective considerations suggest that SKY—BI.UE argument from omission:
and other perceptual color representations represent edenic colors.“"‘
Considerations of psychological involvement also suggest that perceptual color (Oi) If the tracking theory is true, then SKY-BLUE does not have the content
representations represent edenic colors. Intentional states involving perceptual color <edenic sky~blue>,
representations are inferentially related to beliefs about edenic colors, they are avail- (Oz) SKY-BLUE has the content <edenic sky-blue).
able to form the basis ofhighcr-order thoughts about representing edenic colors, and (03) Therefore, the tracking theory is false.
they allow us to in some sense “grasp" contents involving edenic colors. For example,
In other words, the tracking theory predicts that SKY-BLUE does not represent
a content with an edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character, but in fact it does
" Chalmers (zoos) describes tdcnlc color properties using the allegory ufthe garden orrdtn. “In the represent such a content. So, the tracking theory is false. Again, (Cr) expresses the
Garden ofEd.en. We had unmediated contact with tn: world. We wait dittttly acquainted with oblecls
tracking theorysprediction and follows froln the specification ofthe trackingtheory
in thc world and with tntit ptopattitt. osyttti watt simply prlienied to IIS WIIl'IDi|K causal mediatlun.
and propertlcswert revealcdto II: in Kllell’ tttit mtllnslcglolyn (p. .9). In Eden. an appatantly red apple Kogctlicr with facts about what sl-zvalawr tracks, while (Oz) is supported by our
was “glotitnitly. perfectly, and ptitnitiytly tad" (p. 49). theory-independent considerations.
" Contemporary defenders of siitn a View include Mackie (.975), Holman (aim), Marina (1995).
Chalmers (zoos), Czmpbell (I993), Pzutta (MS), and Gov! (mt). Historically. Such a Vltw was notably
As we've seen, our form the basis of two
theory-independent considerations can
held by Democritus. Descartes. Galileo. and Others. different arguments against the tracking theory, the argument from commission and
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44 Par: 11: /lltemimw Tlzearm zflmeritinnalxty Chapter 3: The Ilrflsmatr/9 Pmlzlmfir Trarkmg Theories 45
the argument from omission. I think both arguments are effective, though, as we will and other sugars but represent edenic sweetness, while gustatory representations of
soon see, the argument from mission is stronger. bitterness might track a variety of toxins but represent edenic bitterness. Perceptual
I have focused on tracking theories that take perceptual color representations to [gr ’ of heaviness might also be a mismatch case, tracking relational
track surface reflectance profiles on the relevant tracking relations, but it should properties ofobjects but representing intrinsic properties."""
be clear that similar arguments apply to tracking theories taking perceptual color For every perceptual mismatch case, we might also find a toiresponding mi llIdlLll
representations to track the categorical bases of these surface reflectance profiles case involving concepts, the subpropositional representations involved primarily in
or disposi ons to cause certain physical or functional states. Theory-independent thoughts. For of us, the contents ofour color concepts might be determined
some
considerations suggest against such content attributions and in favor of content by the contents of our perceptual color representations in a way that makes them
attributions the tracking theory cannot commodate. mismatch cases. For instance, someone’s concept BLUE might represent a range of
perceptually representable shades of blue. Such color concepts track something other
3.5 Other Mismatch Cases than what they represent: They track something like ranges of surface reflectance
profiles, but they represent something like ranges of edenic colors. If color concepts
The above arguments invite many sophisticated replies, but before considering some originally represent these contents, then this is a mismatch case.
ofthem, let us consider the scope ofthe alleged problem. There might also be conceptual mismatch cases that do not have perceptual
lwant to suggest that there are additional mismatch cases for the tracking theory, analogues. Moral concepts are good candidates. If}. L. Mackie (1977) is right, our
both in perception and in thought. Another perceptual case is that ofthe hot and moral concepts represent properties that are prescriptive, in that they offer subjects
cold representation involved in our tactile perceptual states representing ourselves reasons to act in certain ways, and objective, in that, when instantiated, they exist out
or other items as being hot, cold, warm, etc. Perceptual hot and cold representations there, in the world, independently of subjects and their preferences. But our moral
might be said to track mind-independent physical features, like temperature or heat, concepts arguably don’: track any such properties. Rather, they track harm, disre-
or dispositions to cause certain states or reactions in us." But theory—independent spect, unfairness, societal norms, disgust, personal aversions, and the like. If moral
considerations suggest that hot and cold representations do not represent such concepts originally represent these contents, then they are another mismatch case.
contents. We don't notice such contents upon introspection. and hot and cold Our concept of it self is another potential mismatch case. One intuitive view
representations simply don't behave as if they represented them (we are not disposed is that selves are simple enduring substances (see, c. Lowe 1996). Perhaps, then,
to form beliefs with related contents, we do not form higher—order states about our we represent ourselves and others as simple self substances. If there are in fact no
representation of such contents, etct). Instead, theory-independent considerations simple self substances, then it is quite likely that all we track are human animals,
suggest that perceptual hot and cold representations somethinglike simple, Parfitian relations ofpsychological connectedness and continuity (Parfit I984), or
r
primitive, non-relational, sui generis edenic hotness and coldness. If this is right, simply peoples gaits and faces. In such cases, our concept ofthe selftracks something
then perceptual representations of hotness and coldness are mismatch cases for the
tracking theory.
Perceptual representations of smells might be another mismatch case for the
" See Mendelovici toiih. See
also Mendelovlci tom and 1.014 for a rcptcsentationalist view or moods
tracking theory. Such olfactory representations arguably track something like molec-
aha emotions oii which moods aria emotinrls tutti out to be mismatch cases rot rht tracking theory.
ular properties of volatile molecules but represent edenic olfactory properties." " An extreme View IS that an perceptual rcprlsrntanoni rzplesent something other that. what they track.
Gustatory representations ofsweetness similarly might track the presence of glucose (A Snmcwhal less extreme View IS that in tht case ofall "secondary" qualities. we represent romrthitig
other than what we track.) i-\lthnugh i am sympathetic to the rtrrrihr view. my arguments hridrrr
coihmii us to it. For instance, one might reasonably hold that perceptual teprtscrltanons ofspatial,
ttturrutai, or functional properties, such as representations oishapes and tables. manage to r.l0 a good
" Akms (ippo) argues that the best-candidate physical properties rot what perceptual hot aria told job oftracking What they represent.
track are hot and heat but rather 5 , propotrus, such as rhr SC: tho Chalmers (2006). who suggests that many representations represent edenic properties
rtlilions that hold between a sum|||us' temperature, the body part to which the stimulus is applied. the analogous to edenic redness, and aytui atui Hilbert (1006), who suggest that the arguments rot
body part‘: initial temperature. and the body parts tar: oftempetature change. tliminztlvism about culnrs ihoiiio also apply to other cases, such at those oriouuiii auii tastes (though
“’ See Mendelovici forthcoming-a aria MS. they take this to be a rraiotr to report the arguments).
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46 Part II: Alzrmuliue Tim/mt aflnrmrlanriliry C/mpter}: T/7: Mrsmattl; Problem/hr Tracking Theme; 47
other than what it represents. if it originally represents its content, we have another A defender of this strategy might concede that it prima facie implausible that
is
mismatch case."'“ <SRP> is <edenic sky-blue> but maintain that it is already part ofher position that
Ofcourse, different people lnight have different concepts corresponding roughly the tracking theory’s predictions can be surprising, that the contents we observe from
to the same thing. For instance. some people might be dispositionalists about color a theory—independent perspective can seem distinct from the contents predicted by
or have Parfitian concepts of personal identity. Some of us might have reconstructed the theory. We should not be too worried about that, she might add, since there
our concepts ofhotness and coldness to represent temperature or heat‘ This means are ready explanations for why we lnight fail to recognize true identities. These
that, while some people’s concepts of colors, personal identity, or hotness and explanations center on the idea that we can represent one thing in two different
coldness might be mismatch cases, other people's might not be, But the existence of ways. eg, under two different modes ofptesentation, conceptually in one case but
a single mismatch case is enough to make trouble for the tracking theory. IfMaeltie’s nonconceptually in the other, or by using '. demonstrative, or other
concept of moral goodness is one of objective prescriptivity, Lowes concept ofthe special concepts in one case but not in the other. So, she might maintain, we, as
selfis one ofa simple substance, or some childs concept ofhomess represents edenic theorists. might represent <SRP> and <edenic sky-blue> in two different ways,
hotness, then, assuming these concepts are supposed to originally represent their which makes their identity non-obvious to us. Such moves are familiar from the
contents, the tracking theory faces the mismatch problem, debates on the mind-body problem, where 2 common strategy is to assert that
mental states are identical to physical states and then to attempt to explain away
appearances to the contrary. Indeed, one might claim that there is an “epistemic gap"
3.6 Obiections
between our concepts of the contents <SRP> and <edenic sky-blue> preventing
us from seeing that they are identical, similar to the alleged epistemic gap between
The arguments from omission and commission are fairly simple, but they invite
mental states and physical states, but that this epistemic gap needn’t correspond to a
various sophisticated replies. This section considers a few of the most interesting
metaphysical gap."
replies. while Appendix A siders a few more replies.
Let us grant that true identities might not always be obvious to us, that this might
be explained by appeal to dilferent ways ofrepresenting the same thing, and that all
z.6.t DEFENSE BY IDENTITY

this might apply to the case of<SRP> and <edenic sky-blue>.“ However, all this
is irrelevant. since my arguments already allow us to conclude that <SRP> is not
One might attempt to defend the tracking theory by claiming that <SRP>, the identical to <edenic skyrblue>. To see this, note that we can rearrange my premises
content predicted by the tracking theory, just is <edenic sky-blue>, the content to argue directly for the non—identity of<SRP> and <edenic sky—blue>:
SKY-BLUE in fact represents. The tracking theory predicts that SKY-BLUE repre—
sents <SRP>, and theory-independent considerations suggest it represents <edenic
sky-blue>, but this is not a problem because <SRP>just it <edenic sky-blue>. This
strategy, in effect, denies (C2), the claim that SKY-BLUE does not have the content “ Thanks to Rob stainton rot insisting on objections ofthis iiayor.
“ There are two notahlc ways in which <slz.l>> might end up being identical to <edenic sky»blue>,
<SRP>, and (O1), the claim that ifthe tracking theory is true, then SKY—Bl.U£ does actpitc appciring not to be. -rht nrst is that there is a single content with both a SRP-ish and an
not have the content <edenic sky-blue>. Call this the defense by identity strategy. edenic-sky-blue-lsh suprrhcial character. This it pottihlc just as it is possible rot there to be a single
ohyctr that is both red and round. (Recall that a C-ish superficial charactcr is a superficial character that
incliidts Crlslivnessz Set it. , orchaptrr 2.)
There IS another, rat iiiorc radical. proposal rot how <SRP> niight end up being identical to <edenic
" A useful hciitistic rot finding mismatch cases tor the tracking thcory is to look rot rcprcscnrations or sky—blue>, one that ainis to truly harness the (siipposcd) power oridcntity. This proposal maintains
irrins that resist rccluction. rhc reason thcy resist Kedllcllon itiiglit iust be that thelrcon(ents' superficial not only that <SRP> is identical to <edenic Sky-blue) but, hirthcr, that having a SRP-ish siiprrhcial
characters are entirely iinlilrc thc (presumably physical) items that they track and that are assumed character IS the sanic thing as having an edenlc-sky-blue-ish superficial rharacrcr. Recall that stiprrhcial
to form suitable candidates for their reduction base. Other possible cases include representations of characters arc rritiirrs or prope ofconrenrs, ways that contents art. so. this option would be
responsibility, iiisricc, agency, and niinihcrs. analogous to claiming that redness is identical to roundness. I don't think this proposal is cplsxemlcally
“’ in Chapter 7. i will argue that practically all concepts have original contents that cannot be accommo- possible, but nothing hangs on [ills right now. We will consider a VIEW like this in goons.
dated by rhr traclring theory. Establishing this, however, tcqtiircs too tntich atgiinicnr to be dialcctically (Returning to the mind-body prohlcrn, thr iirsr proposal is analogous to siihstancc nionisni. which is
iiscrul at this point. compatible witll property dualism, while the stcond proposal is analogous to property inonisni.)
48 Part II: Alternative Tlmzner /_if'lnmirmmli:y C/mpterj: The A/lumaxtly Prablemfir Tracking Ihmizt 49
(C2,) SK\'~EI.UE does not have the content <SRP>. The upshot of this discussion is that the tracking theorist who wants to insist
(Oz) SKY—BLUE has the content <edenic sky-blue). that <SRP> is simply identical to <edenic sky—blue> cannot defuse my arguments
(Nil) Therefore, <SRP> is not identical to <edenic sky-blue>. i with this claim alone. She must directly engage with the arguments for my premises.
l For example, she might take issue with (C2) by arguing that my theory-independent
This argument does not beg any questions against the <SRP>/<edenic sky-blue) considerations do not in fact support it, or she might take issue with (Or) by arguing
identity theorist, since the arguments for (C2) and (02,) do not presuppose that that the tracking theory does in fact predict that perceptual color representations
<SRP> is not identical to <edenic sl(y»blue>: (C2) and (02) are supported by represent edenic colors. In what follows, I consider some such replies, including ones
introspection and considerations ofpsychological role, which suggest that SKY-BLUE that make further use of ways of representing (see Appendix A for a few more). I then
does not represent <SRP> and that it does represent <edenic sky-blue>. return to the defense by identity strategy.
My arguments also give us the resources to argue that if the tracking theory is true,
then <SRP> is not identical to <edenie sky-blue>:
3.6.2. WAYS or REPRESENTING
(Ct) Ifthe tracking theory is true, then SKY-BLUE has the content <SRP>.
One might argue that perceptual color representations represent contents in special
(Or) If the tracking theory is true, then SKY-BLUE does not have the content
ways that occlude them from my theory—independent methods, so my methods
<edenic sky»blue>.
cannot be used to find out about these contents. For example, perceptual color
(N12) Therefore, if the tracking theory is true. then <SRP> is not identical to
representations might represent their contents under special modes of presentation,
<edenic sky-blue).
nonconceptually. or in some other special way, which occludes them from our
Again, (Cl) and (Or) are justified without assuming that <SRP> is not identical to theory»independent methods. Ifso. this would undercut my arguments for (C1,) and
<edenic sky—blue>, so the argument does not beg any questions against the tracking (02,), which rely on stlch methods.
theorist who wants to identify them. We previously saw that ways of representing might play a role in the defense by
What these two arguments show is that even though, p|‘C~(l'1COK‘C(lCall_V, it is a live identity strategy by explaining why we, as theorists, are not always able to recognize
possibility that <SRP> is identical to <edenic sky-blue>, once we either accept the true identities between the contents we theorize about. In other words, according
tracking theory or consult our theorydndepenclent methods for finding out about to the defense by identity strategy, we, as theorists, represent the same content
contents, this possibility gets ruled out. in two different ways (e.g.. under two different modes of presentation), and the
What of ways of representing and epistemic gaps? C.-in‘t they be used to show that difference in ways of representing prevents us from noticing true identity claims.
somehow I am mistaken here? Ways of representing and the alleged possibility of On the present strategy, ways of representing play a different role: Representing
epistemic gaps without metaphysical gaps can be used to show that a claim that two subjects represent perceptual color contents in a special way that blocks our access
things are not identical might be mistaken, but not that it is mistaken. (After all, to them through theory-independent methods. Our theory-independent methods
there is an epistemic gap between lots of things that are in fact not identical, like might instead tell us about me relevant ways of representing or about nothing
the Moon and the pile ofungraded papers on my desk.) Appealing to epistemic gaps at all.
and ways of representing to defend the claim that <SRP> is identical to <edenic There are several problems with this strategy. First. there is a general methodolog—
sky-blue> is dialectically ineffective, since I don’t merely assert that the two are not ical worry: Any strategy that claims that neither introspection nor psychological
identical, but offer a non-questionsbegging argument for the claim. A dialectically
effective response would have to take issue with my premises and the arguments I
use to support them.“ by dispelling my atgiiiiiotits, but by lttiiigiiig IIS [0 a staiidoir, with algumtnls on both Sides. nowmt.
liatd to sit how and ooiild possibly motivate Such an idtiitity claim iiidtpaiidtiitly ortsiiimiiig Ill!
it is
tracltlllg theory or a nearby view. See also §1.6i4.
(Notice tliat aii analogous strategy ln [ht case or the mindvbody ptoliitm is (uguably a bit iiiott
“ The ttactiiig llleonst might also imptovt llfl dialectical Situation by sliowiiig tliat [lit view that <SlU’> alluctlve, SIIICC at least Illtrc ill’: Indtptndcllt itgtimstitt against diialitm, siitii as (ht zrgufllcnt rtom
is idtiitital to <cdtniC Sky-bl|lE> tat. be lllflfpflldtnrly motivated, This would lmprollt lit! smiatioii iiot mental causation.)
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so Par! 11; A/temtttive T/Mont: iiflnimiiotiii/icy cltiiytiow T’?! Miimnolt Pruflemfbr mti/ting mono 5]
of intentional states risks denying that we have

roles can tell us about the contents there.“"‘ More generally, one might worry that it is not clear why the relevant ways
any theory-independent access to the contents of particular intentional states. If ofrepresenting should result in the kind ofocclusion required in order to deny (C2).
we do not have theory—indepcndent access to the contents of particular intentional The fourth, and I think biggest, problem for this strategy is that even if per-
states, then there is no way to test competing theories’ predictions about which ceptual color representations have some contents that are occluded from our
contents we ICPYCSCDI. This leaves us to decide between theories largely on a priori theory-independent methods, the claim that no perceptual color contents remain
or metaphysical grounds, even when the theories under consideration make specific unoccluded is implausible. We can at least sometimes introspectively notice our per-
predictions.“ This is quite an unfortunate consequence for a defender of the tracking ceptual color states, and when we do, we notice them presenting represented objects
theory. particularly given that the tracking theory is supposed to stem from a as having various colors. Since we notice them introspectively and we are tempted
naturalistic mindset, a mindset that is supposed to in some way align with science to describe them representationally, they qualify as instances of intentionality (§l.z).
and empirical ways offinding things out.“ Moreover, these states that we introspectively notice play various psychological roles:
A second, and related. problem with this strategy is that if the intentional They are related to the beliefs \ve form about the objects they represent (eg., that
states predicted by the tracking theory are introspectively inaccessible and play they are blue, brown. or green), our higher-order thoughts about our perceptual
no psychological roles that we can discern, if they leave no detectable trace in states (e.g., that we visually represent blue cups, brown chairs, or green trees). and
our minds or behaviors, daen they risk becoming idly spinning wheels. It is not our overall phenomenology of representing (eg, the phenomenology of things
clear why we should posit, or even care about, such contents. If the tracking “striking" us a certain way. namely, as involvinga blue cup, a brown chair, a green tree.
theol-y’s contents are in fact explanatotily inert idly spinning wheels, this too is an etc.). All this suggests that even if perceptual color representations represent contents
unfortunate consequence for a theory that is supposed to stem from a naturalistic that are occluded from us, they (also) represent contents that are not occluded.
mindset.“ Further, theory—independent considerations concerning these contents suggest that
A third problem with this strategy is that it is not clear that it can work in the they are edenic color contents, which the tracking theory cannot account for. (O1)
first place because it is not clear why representing contents in certain ways should is still true and the argument from omission still stands.
make them inaccessible to our theory~independent methods. For example, suppose One might suggest that our theory-independent methods latch onto modes of
we say that SKYrBLUE3 content is represented nonconceptually, that is, in a way presentation, qualia, or something else other than contents. Perhaps, for example, it
that does not involve or otherwise tcquire having the concepts that we, as theorists. is modes ofpresentation that we notice introspectively and that play psychological
would use to describe it. The problem is that it is not clear why representinga content roles such as those described in the previous paragraph. Thats all well and good. but
nonconceptually should prevent it from playinga psychological role characteristic of then modes of presentation \vould turn out to be what we introspectively observe and
the content that it is. Even ifnonconceptual contents are represented in a special way, are tempted to describe representationally, so they would turn out to be contents.
they are still represented, and they should still in some way or other behave as iftheylte
“jatltton (2004) argues along such lines that the issue otnontonctptual content is a too htttitlg in the
' l do ihinli that that relevant metaphysical considerations that can help ut decide littwttn
at: debates on ttpteientztltmalism. Jaclttons wotty, roughly. is that nonconceptual contcnt is still Laurent,
competing theories (see§4.4and§§.z.z), butldo not think thtyait theonly tonsidttationt. and so it should othayt at S|X(l|.
" One might suggest that intuition can be used to test competing thtotitn predictions in a " Another wotty or this tott with the nonconcepmzl content strategy is that it it not cltat why
theory-independent way, but it it not clear why intuition would be a reliable inathod hctc unless it was nontonttptiial contents should no hidden rtoni inttotptction in the relevant way. Presumably. the
Itspanslvt to tho evidence rtotn lnttvspeclmn oi psychological tolt. citplanation is supposed to go ionitthing like this: in otdct to introspeetively notitt that wt tcptcitnt
"out I'mgl\K suggest that thc ttaiiting thcotys contents can still play i tolt in determining ttuth <SRP>, we need a concept representing <SRP>, and it needs to be appropriately connected to out
conditions. 1-ht problem with this suggestion IS that theta would not be tht ttuth conditions we catt pctctptuax tepttttntation or <SRP>. sinct sitwntuc represents its content nonconceptually. we can
aoout ot have any teasoti to think exist. This it otcautt the relevant ttuth conditions would he uttcily tcpttttnt it Without having a concept representing <SRP>. to its content octdnlt ht Inttuspecllvely
divnrctd rioin out Intentional ctpttitnct. lt would be cold cotnroii to tonitont who is worried about I(c:sslble. The ptohlcni with thit ttoty is that it does not explain why ti-an if we have thc tooiiittd
whether Kilt‘ world is as she takes it to be to tell hat thatsht hasrlo access to how she taltts tht world to he concepts and tht ttniiittd conntttions, we still cannot rzcognile anything to do with pattitulat tutracc
lint it ttally is that way. The ttiitli conditions we catt about and hayt any mEu|(xV: taaton to believe exist ttiitctantc profiles in out perceptual ttattt tcptcttnting colott. One way to put the iinpott of this
at: those connected [0 out intentional experience. so, positing the ttaclting ihtotye predicted contents ptohltni is that thc tcltyant occlusion mechanism cannot in tact ttndtt perceptual colot conttntt
cannot be hittihtd oy i need to Explzm ttuth conditions. tumcitntly itmcclssible (Cl theoryaindependent methods to allow us to toictt (C2).
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But if modes of presentation are contents, then they are within the scope of the in the case of the strategy presently under consideration, the reason is that the
tracking theory. and it needs to offer an account of them. The same goes for anything tracking theory doesn't even make any predictions about such facts in the first
else we might say our theory-independent considerations latch onto in lieu of place. The idea is that the tracking theory is only concerned with the deep natures,
content.” not the superficial characters. of intentional Contcnts, so it is not in conflict with
In short, the problem is that it is quite implausible to flat—out deny that our any discoveries our theory-independent methods might lead us to concerning their
theory—independent considerations are evidence for something answering to the no— superficial characters.
tion ofcontent. And, whatever this thing is, our theory-independent considerations If this strategy succeeds in preventing the tracking theory from making any
suggest that it includes edenic color contents, like <edenic sky-blue>. So, (0).) is predictions about superficial character, then this would lead to a quite undesirable
still true, and the argument from omission still goes through. At best, the ways of position for the tracking theorist. The tracking theory would only provide a
representing strategy brings us back to where we started: We are back at having (presumably partial) theory of the deep nature of contents, and not an answer to the
to account for contents of perceptual color representations that don't appear to be question of u//rich contents a particular representation represents, despite providinga
identical to anything that they can be said to track. And we gain nothing with this i‘ mapping from representations to contents when combined with information about
epicycle. It arguably worsens the situation because now we’re additionallycommitted ” what the representations [l'3Cl(.‘° In any case, as we will soon see, the strategy does
to introspecrively inaccessible and psychologically uninvolved, or“hidden," contents not in fact succeed in preventing the tracking theory from making any predictions
that arguably don’t do any explanatory work. about superficial character.
The main problem with this strategy is that, even if it can provide a response to the
\ argument from commission. it does nothing to address the argument from omission,
5.6.; THE TRACKING THEORY DOESN T MAKE PREDICTIONS ABOUT
The strategy involves accepting that if the tracking theory is true, then sltYAlaLt11=.'s
SUPERFICI.-\L CHARACTER
content is identical to the property XRP. Now, since superficial characters are
one might object [0 my claim that ([1: nmckjng fhgory fnakgs P1-gdicfions about features ofcontents, in order for SKY-BLUE’s content to have an edenic-sky-blue-ish
[1-m supgffidal cha[a([¢[5 of fgpfcsgnred comcmsy claiming (113; it only mak“ superficial character, it would have to have some edenil:»sky—bluevish feature. But
predictions about their deep natures. For instance, the tracking theory might SR1’ does not have any edenicvsky»blue»ish feature, and so SKI’ does not have an
Pfcdicr that 5xy.1;Lug's con[5n[ is [hg Pf()Pg[[y 51{p_ but no( that this cQn[¢n[ cdenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character. So, if the tracking theory is true. then
has ;. 3R1>.i5h sup“-ficial chamcm-, If[I1g mocking djgory dQg5nl[ [nakg Pmjictions SKY-BLUE does not have :1 content with an edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character,
about the superficial character of SKY»BLU£3 content, then perhaps we can reject Ind (01) 55 mic» 1‘ (“ms °“‘- ihflh that the tracking '5h€°|‘Y “Wk” P”dlC‘l°"5 3'30"‘
(Cl) and (Oi). superficial characters after all, and they are still false.
Likn (in strategy gppcaling no way; of mpmcnnjng that we have already mnsid, Put otherwise, the crux of the argument from omission is that the tracking theory
god, this stratggy ends up dmymg (hat the (mckjng [1-“,0,-y‘; pmdimons can 1,; cannot accommodate the central feature of sl(Y»lsl.U£’s content that we can isolate
Ecslccl using our thcor ndcpendent methods. However, in the case of the strategy using our rheoryindcpcndcnt methods. the edenicvskyblus-ish-ncssa It docs not
appealing to ways of representing, the reason for this is that our theory-independent matter whether we call this feature a superficial character or something else, and it
methods are not privy to the facts about our contents’ superficial characters, while does not matter how exactly the tracking theory ends up predicting that SKY-BLUE’s
content doesn't have it. indeed, we can drop the talk of superficial character
entirely and run the argument from omission in terms of this edcnic-sky-blue~isl'l
”’ McGinn (ms) raises 3 Similar objection to the use ofa mode ofpresentation strategy to defend the feature:
View that colors :1’! dispositions [0 cause color experiences:
Nor IS I! possible to maintain that colorsvas-dispositions ZIC the de re objects ofvlslon, without
themselves corresponding to the de dicta content of color perception. since some rnnlici
P’°P'"‘“ will n==d N In mnoducsd in order to capture Ills dc dim conm-rofprrccpr-on—and ’° This is analogous to Boutget's (ronncoininga) point (l’|1Cpl’|yS|C3llSIfl about mental states does not tell
these w-ll lmsent essentially the same pmblema--V in 538) us which physical Stat: any given mental Star: Is identical to.
ll.
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54 Part II: Alzzma/iur Wyearitr a/‘lmennnrmliiy C/mptrrj: T11: Mxmmlr/I Pnzlzlzmfor Triméing Tlmrirr 55
(0i') If the tracking theory is true. then sxv-awe does not have acontentwith reiterated identities strategy, since it proceeds by reiterating the defense by identity
an edenic-sky-blue—ish feature. srraregys basic move. that of asserting an identity claim,
(O7/) with an edenic—sky-blue-ish feature.
sKY—BLU1-: has a content Suppose I reply that edcnic-sky-blueeish-ness is not identical to SRP-ish-ness
(O3') Therefore. the tracking theory is false. because edenic-sky-blue-ish-ness has some property—say, that of being qualitative-
that SRI’»ish—ness lacks. The objector might reply that SRP-ish-ness does in fact have
sxr-1aLU£’s content has a certain edenic—sky-blue-ish feature, a certain qualitative,
that property, because SRl"vish—ness has some further property, P, which is identical
sui generis, primitive, non—dispositional, and non-relational feature. Even if some
to it. The reiterated identities strategy, in effect, reiterates the initial response that.
features of SKY-BLUES contents are not accessible to our rheoryindependent
in making a non-identity claim, I am making a mistake. My argument is implicitly
methods. this feature is, and so it needs to be accommodated by the tracking theory.
committed to multiple non-identity claims, each of which might be called into
The tracking theory predicts that sitv~BLU£’s content is SR1’, which is a property
question. On this response, it’s mistaken non—identity claims all the way up.
with various features. Ifedenioskyvblue»ish»ness is not among them, then the theory
One hint that something has gone wrong is that the response strategy greatly
cannot accommodate the case of SKYABLUE. It isn't, so it can’t."
overgenerates, allowing us to defend any identity claim by simply positing more
identities. Consider the following L D at the customer service desk:
§.6.4 REITERATED IDENTITIES
Customer service representative (Rep): Hello! How can I help you?
The first response strategy we onsidered was the defense by identity strategy, which Customer: I have a complaint about my order. I ordered a six»ton African
fairly flatfootedly claimed that <SRI’> just is <edenic sky~blue>. Since <SRP> is
elephant from your website, and what I received is a red brick.
<edenic sky»blue>, SKY—Bl.UE doe: represent <SRP>, and the tracking theory dues Rep: Yes! I hope you’re enjoying your elephant.
predict that SKY-BLUE represents <edenic sky-blue>, This allows us to reject (C2) Customer: I didn’t receive an elephant. I received a red brick.
and (Or). I argued that this response is dialectically ineifective because it ignores the Rep: Yes! The red brick is the elephant.
argument against the identity claim that I can provide by rearranging the premises Customer: No, it's not. The elephant depicted on your website has a big trunk.
of the arguments from commission and omission. The brick has no trunk.
However, there is a more radical version of the defense by identity strategy, one Rep: Yes, it does! There it is. (paints ta smfice afbrick)
that truly aims to harness the (supposed) power of identity by simply reiterating Customer: That is the surface of the brick.
the defense by identity strategy’: basic will argue that this strategy also fails,
move, I Rep: The surface ofthe brick is a trunk.
and that the reason it fails illuminates the problem with the bare defense by identity Customer: An elephant trunk is made of flesh. The surface of the brick is made
strategy. ofbrick.
Let us focus on how this strategy can be used to argue against (Or), since Rep: Yes.’ Being made offleshjtm‘ it being made ofbriclt.
the argument from omission is the more powerful of the two arguments. Recall Customer: Let me try again, This brick is six pounds, But the elephant was
that I argued for (Or) by arguing that there is nothing edenic-sky—blue-ish about supposed to be six tons.
the property SR1’ (or anything else SKY—BLUE might be said to track). But, Rep: Yes, ofcourse! The brick is six tons. Six pounds is six tons.
the <SRP>/<edenic sky-blue> identity theorist might suggest, I've neglected Customer: Look, just refund my three easy payments of$i9.99.
a further identity claim, the claim that edenic-sky-blue-ish—ncss is identical to Rep: Ofcourse! I have already issued you a refund.
some feature of SRP; perhaps it is identical to, say, SRI’»ish»ness. Since SR1’ has Customer: No, I right here that you just charged me again,
can see
SRP-ish-ness, and edcnic-sky-blue-ish—ness is identical to SRI’»ish-ness, SR1’ does Rep: Being charged again is getting a refund.
have eclenic—sky-blue-ish-ness after all, and we can reject (Or). We can call this the Customer: Can I speak with your supervisor?
Rep: Ofcoursc! I am my supervisor.
In order to defend a prima facie false identity claim, the customer service rep wheels
" Interestingly, this edenic-sky-blueush-ness mi be found in qualia and dispositions to cause quite. so
Ihlsklnd . mi 5 ' A I A against some t 4 Ve|leman's in more prima facie false identity claims, effectively denying any common ground
(I989) objections (see n. is). with her interlocutor. If her goal is simply to defend her position, this is a winning
L
36 Pim ll: A/tmwive Theme; oflmmrinnilliry Chapter ;: T/7: Immmztlr Prublemfir Tmtlmtg T/ream: 57
strategy; with no common ground to stand on. her interlocutor cannot lodge an 3 7 jeliable ' , inn and the Significance of Tracking
argument against her. The customer service reps strategy is. in effect. a skeptical
strategy. a strategy that works because justification has to end somewhere. Ihave argued that the tracking theory faces the mismatch problem. This means that
Indeed, since it is possible to turn any dispute into a dispute about identities, the intentionality is not a matter of tracking. However, it does not mean that tracking
reitented identities strategy can be used to defend any claim. For example. suppose is not important for reasoning and behavior. We can appreciate its importance
that I claim that the Moon is made of cheese. You investigate the Moon. find no by considering the usefulness of a certain kind of misrepresentation, reliable
cheese. and tell me that I'm wrong. I reply by saying that cheese is identical to rocks. misrepresenta '
and there are rocks on the Moon. so there is cheese on the moon. I have turned our An intentio ‘ state or representaci can be said to reliably misrepresent when
dispute into a dispute about identities. and now I can employ the reiterated identities it gets things wrong in the same way all the time. Assuming that objects never have
strategy. (At any point, I can also assert that you cannot see the truth of my claims edenic colors, perceptual color states are examples of reliable misrepresentation.
because you represent the items I want to identify in different ways, giving rise to an They reliably misrepresent in that they are always false. and they reliably misrepresent
epistemic gap that need not correspond to a metaphysical gap.) in that they occur in similar circumstances on multiple occasions, presumably
The moral of the story is that positing gratuitous identity claims does nothing to because theydo a fairly good job of tracking various environmental . Many
advance one’s position. Since the reiterated identities strategy is a winning strategy. other mismatch cases are also arguably cases of reliable misrepresentation."
it can always be used to defend an identity claim. so the fact that it can be employed The reliability of reliable misrepresentation makes it quite useful to us, despite the
in the case of a given identity claim is no reason whatsoever to think that the identity misrepresenta ‘ . For example, the fact that per: , ‘ color representa ' track
claim is true. In the case of the alleged identity between <SRP> and <edenic surface reflectance profiles is part of what makes them useful in helping us navigate
sky-blue>, the fact that we can defend this identity by identifying the features the world. Despite misrepresenting, they allow us to re—identify objects over time
of <SRP> with the features of <edenic sky-blue> does nothing to show that the and discriminate between objects of different types. For example, even though an
identity holds. apparently ted car doesn't really have the property of edenic redness that it appears
This points to the basic problem with both the defense by identity and the to have. our , " representing it as edenic red allows us to quickly identify it
reiterated "' strategies. If the tracking theorist's defense is to be convincing, it in the parking lot. Likewise, even though ripe tomatoes and unripe toes don‘t
is not enough for her to simply take on whatever identity claims suit her theory. Any really have the edenic properties of redness and greenness they , , lly appear
identity claims she takes on would have l\l be adequately motivated and defended. So, to have, we can use our perceptual color states to tell them apart. Other reliably
it is not enough to simply assert that, on her view. <SRI’>jusI 13 <edenic sky-blue> misrepresenti E states also track items that are significant to us. like temperatures.
or that, on her view, edenic-sky-blue-ish-nessjusi is some property ofSRP. These odors. sugars, and toxins, so they are also likely to be useful in similar ways. We can
identities would need to be m " and defended on independent grounds. But use them to avoid items that are likely to be harmful to us and seek out items that are
it is difficult to see how this can be done. The Fundamental problem remains: There likely to be beneficial. even though they misrepresent.
is absolutely no reason arising from the examination of the surfaces of objects, the
properties of light, or the relations between the two to think that SR1’ involves
anything like edenic—sky»bluevish-ness."
gaps. that idtntitiei att ntithtt titplanatoty not in need or titplanation. and that all this yams idtntity
claim a ttttain immunity rtom ttitititm. In tonttaat. mott stiaightrotwatd ways of timply denying
premises do not have tht same appeal. so thty don't ltqurlc tht taint attention. In any case, I tnntidtt
“ what I've described IS a “putt' ttitttattd ldtntititt strategy. a sttattgy that defends tht tlaiin that such revision Strategies in §A.a.a ompptndit A.
(SR?) I5 <edenic sky~blue> using tht (supposed) power oridtntity alone. ortouttt. this sttattgy “ Describing intentional states as reliably misttpttstnttng itnphts Khzl thty hayt tonditiont of ttuth
might be tomhtntd with othtt sttattgitt. such as that or Simply dtnying that SKY-ll.UE's tonttnt has ot ttrtttntt, which I‘ve tuggttttd is not something wt can taltt rot gtanttd (§t.t.t). I will eventually
a timplt, non-dlsposillonzl, and n-relational supttritial tnatatttt. -rhtt would be analogous to the suggest that inttntional stattt do have conditions ortnith and ttttttnte (§9.t.t), and it would not ht
tuatomtt sat-nta teplestlltztive dtn,' ,, Ittttittd tltphant was tit tont, whith might be mot. ttutationditgging to appeal to thott atgutntntt httt. In any case. not much KESKS on my claim that many
plausible than identifying hting tit tons with being Six pounds. 1 have totuttd on the putt ttitttatad mismatch tattt inisttpttttnt. Someone denying that intentional ttattt hattt conditions or tnith and
idtntitttt tttattgy httt hcczuk, it sttmt to int, many att talttn by tht idea that idtntity tlaimt tan tettttnct might dtny thit claim. while tttaining tht claim that many mitmatth (ISQS ate relidblt and
ht tompltttly opaque to ut. giving US: to epistemic gaps that need not totttipond lo ntttaphytital agttting with much orwhat follows.
1
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58 Part II: Altemalll/e Tlmzm: nfln1m1irmali'1_~y ts/iipm 3; The /Wivrmlt/I pm/i/rm/ir rm/ring rbeioii so
In some cases. reliable misrepresentation might be more useful than veridical 3._B Conclusion
representation of the properties we track. Our perc ,. ' color representations
track a complex property but represent something simpler, which might be easier I have argued that the tracking theory faces the mismatch problem and. so. that we
to represent and manipulate than the more complex alternative. and the neglected should reject it.
information might not be particularly useful to us. Knowledge of surface " ance One might suggest that this is not a decisive reason to reject the tracking theory
profiles per se is not important for survival, but being able to re-identify objects Every theory has its virtues and vices. and we should consider all the virtues and viccs
over time, discriminate between objects of the same luminance, and pick out the of all competing theories before deciding between them. But this problem with the
ripe fruit and poi frogs is. If representing colors can guide our behavior trackingtheory is. I think, unforgivable. We set out observinga phenomenon that we
toward the environment just as well as representing surface “ ce profiles, and if wanted to explain. intentionality. There are at least some cases of this phenomenon
representing colors is cheaper or more efficient, then reliably misrepresenting edenic to which we have some kind of theory-independent access. The tracking theory fails
colors might be more advantageous than veridicaily representing surface reflectance to accommodate many of them. which makes it empirically inadequate. W/hile the
profiles. tracking theory may have many other virtues. whatever they are, they cannot make
Rejecting the tracking theory helps us properly appreciate the role that tracking up for empirical inadequa y.“
relations play in producing successful behavior: While cases of reliable misrep- We will return to the tracking theory in the next chapter. which also discusses
resentation most clearly illustrate just how useful mete tracking can be, tracking another theory ofintentionaliry. the f nctional role theory. We will see that versions
can play similar roles in cases of veridical representation, and in cases of
even of the functional role theory that take tracking relations to be part of the relevant
internal states that are not intentional at all. In §i.3.3. we considered the possibility functional roles inherit the tracking theory‘s mismatch problem. We will also see
that intentionality has ‘ring to do with how we generate behavior that that there is a deeper problem facing both the functional role theory and the tracking
helps us get around in the world. While everything I've said is compatible with theory: Tracking relations and functional roles are simply not the kinds ofthings that
intentionality playing a special role in our successful interactions with the world, can give rise to intentionality.
we can now see that tracking is an important but distinct part of the picture.
We are able to successfully get around in the world not only because we have Appendix A: Objections to the Mismatch Problem
representations that represent certain contents that are useful for us to represent
but also because we are able to track certain features of our environment that I considered some replies to the mismatch problem in §;.6. This (optional) appendix
are important for us to keep track of, regardless of whether we also represent considers a few more.
them.“ The replies are divided into two kinds: Track‘ _-revising strategies take issue
with my claims about the tracking theory‘s predictions, i.e., with (Cl) and (01),
while e strategies take issue with my claims about what SKY-BLUE
‘ '
“ sonic oriliese poinrs are made in Mendelovici zor;b and rorrhcoiiiinga. Hardin (ins) and wrighr
represents, i.e.. with (C2) and (02).
(eons; make similar claims abour the userulness ornomvsridical color vision. and iacrmiidei (rm)
and Viger (2.006) also diseuss me usernlness oreerrain lrinds oimisrepresentation more generally,
The usefulness or reliable misrepresentation is illuirrarcd nicely by Msrurana and Varela's (r992) 11.1 Tracking-Revising Strateoies
allegory orrlic person in rhe submarine:
imagine a person who has always lived in a submarine. He has never left ir and has been rraincd Tracking-revising strategies take issue with my claims about the tracking theoty's
how to handle ir. Now, we are sranding on the shore and ice rhe submarine gracefully surfacing.
predictions. denying (Ci) or (Or). The reply discussed in §;.6.; that tracking theories
We rlicn geron the radio and tell the navigaror inside: “congrarularionsl You avoided the reefs
and surfaced beautifully. You really know how to handle a submarine. The navigaror in she
subiriirinc, howcvcr. is perplexed: “What's rhis abour reefs and surfacing? All l did was push
some lcvcrs and turn knobs and make certain relarionships between iiidicarors as l operared rlie ii
See .4 aroirhe I in
levers and knobs. it was all done in a prescribed sequence which l'm used to. l didn't do any
' V '
problem and certain other similar tailures cannot be made up ror by alleged theoretical virtues such as
special maneuver, and on rop orrhas. you talk ro inc abour i submarine. You must be kidding!"
being naiuralirric. See also§6.4 tor a related discussion orrhe relative inerirsorernpirical adequacy over
(pp. as-n7)
rhcorerical virtues. like rhar orbeing nariiralisric.
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do not make predictions about superficial characters is one such reply. This section mismatch cases. This would require realism about a primitive and causally potent
considers two more. version of a plethora of questionable items. as well as an appropriately selective
tracking relation—quite a tall order.“
A.l.l REALISM ABOUT EUENIC COLORS
A.r,7. TRACKING L.'NlNsT/iNTlA'rt-:D EDENIC COLOR PROPERTIES

One might suggest that edenic color properties are actually instantiated. .e.. that
realism is true of them.“ If edenic color properties are instantiated. perhaps our Another kind of tracking 5 strategy maintains that r
' , ' color rcp-
perceptual color representations track and represent them, and (Cr) and (Or) are resentations traclt and represent edenic color properties, which happen to be
false. uninstantiated. If so, we can reject (Cl) and (01). Indeed, perhaps it is possible for
In order for this strategy to work. these edenic colors must be causally potent. the tracking theory to say that , ' color representations reliably misrepresent,
since tracking theories require that represented properties either cause tokens of our which might seem independently plausible (see §3.7).
representations or make or have made some causal difference to our well-beingor that This is not immediately out of the question, since some tracking theories can
of our ancestors. The problem is that it is quite implausible that objects have causally allow for the tracking and representation of uninstantiared properties. For example,
potent edenic color properties. These properties would have to be something over the ' dependen theory allows us to track and represent uninstantiated
and above the ordinary physical properties that perceptual color representations can properties when there is a law-like causal connection between a representation and
uncontroversially be said to track. If there are such causally potent properties, it is the relevant uninstantiate ‘ property, and all other causal connections between the
surprising we have not discovered them yet by other means.” representation and other properties. including instantiated properties, are asymmet-
An additional worry is that even if there were causally potent edenic color rically dcpendent on it. Fodor (1990, pp. roo—rol) suggests this kind ofstrategy for
properties, in order for this strategy to be successful, a tracking theory would have dealing with the concept UNICORN: There is a causal connection between unicorns
to predict that it is these properties, and not surface reflectance profiles or other and UNICORN. and the causal connection between other items (eg., pictures of
properties percept ‘ color representation track. that are singled out by its favored unicorns) and UNICORN is asymmetrically dependent on it."
tracking relation. For example, for the optimal functioning theory to successfully However. it is implausible that the tracking theory can tell such a story about the
employ the strategy, it will have to fall out of the theory that perceptual color representationof edenic colors. Consider again the asymmetric dependence theory.
representations , edenic color properties rather than surface reflectance ln order to employ such a strategy, it has to say that the SRP-to-SKY-BLUE connec-
profiles. which would require that it is edenic color properties, and not surface tion is , iinllu ‘ r J on the edenic ‘, bl 'v-31.175 ' .
reflectance profiles, that contribute to wellrfunctioning in the relevant way. But this which is implausible given the strength of the former connection and the fact that
is implausible, since tracking surface refiectance profiles is arguably quite useful, and the latter ‘ is uninstantiared. Indeed, it is doubtful that there even is an
it is not clear that tracking colors would likewise be useful. edenic l", "~' Y-BLUE ‘ .Ourr , 'color , ' are
In any case, even if the strategy can be made to work for a given putative mismatch specifically rigged up to respond to properties like surface reflectance profiles. not
case—that is. even if in a given case what is represented can be found in the uninstantiated edenic properties.
actual world and is causally potent. and the tracking theory under consideration The prospects for this kind of strategy are no more promising for the optimal
successfully singles it out rather than other items the representation in question functioning tracking theory. On this theory. representation I whatever
might be said to track—it is unlikely that this strategy will work in all putative u/014/11 cause them in optimal conditions, where optimal conditions are onditions
“ Campbell (ly9)), Cornmarl (lfl7l. I973), and Hacker (ism propose such pnmlnvlsl realist views or " Mendelovlcl zoub relatedly argues that tracking theories make it too easy to argue for rsalisiri about
color. See Hilbert and Byrne 1oo7. Pautz MS, Hardin fly“, and Gow mi. tor erltleal discussion. represented piopsrriss.
N
‘" Hardin (1933) argues agarnsr cornrnans (ms) rulisrn along these liner, arguing that ilpri ve eolor rodisr also suggests rliar UNICORH niiglir be an internally structured representation and so might not
properties are causally eifieaeious, rlirri we should be able to test for them by physical means. See also get its content directly from tracking (I990. p. iul. (See also Dretslre lyll tor this suggestion.) aur this
Byme and Hilbert mos fordiseussion. is not an Opllollt representations ofcolors. wliirli are unlikely to be lnremally srrurrurrd.
P’
6;. Par! 11: /Ilm-native 7'hearm oflntenrumaluy Clmprerg: TheAlism.trtb Prnbltmfér Tmrlrmg Tlmzries 6;
that promote survival. flourishing, or odrer kinds of appropriate functioning. To conditions that are of a different type than design conditions. and asymmetric
maintain that our perceptual color representations represent ' ' ‘ prop- ‘r 4 r'~‘ ‘al.lowfor'r incaseswherea r '
erties, the optimal functioning theorist would have to maintain that our perceptual is tokened as a result of a comparatively non-robust causal relation.
color representatio never occur in optimal conditions. Further, she would have The fact that the tracking theory only allows for misrepresentation in cases where
to maintain that were we to be in optimal conditions, edenic color properties, there is some kind of nonsemantic defect that it cannot take perceptual
means
properties that never actually cause tokens of our per ' color representations,
color representations to uninstantiated properties, since perceptual color
would at least sometimes cause such tokens. But our perceptual color represent representation are as well behaved as any other representations in all the ways
help us survive, reproduce, and fulfill our goals, and so there is no basis on which to that might matter to it: they occur in each version of the tracking theory's favored
maintain that the onditions in which they occur are never optimal nor any reason nonsemantica" successful conditions, conditions in which there is no nonsemantic
to think that were they to occur in the presence of edenic colors, this would better defect. As a result, these occurrences cannot be deemed misrepresentations, and
help us survive, flourish. function appropriately.
or the tracking theorist cannot allow perceptual color , ' to represent
The teleological tracking theory fares no better. On at least some versions of uninstantiated edenic colors.“
the theory, representations represent whatever properties our ancestors interacted
with that aided in the survival and reprod of the representations’ consuming
systems in specific ways. in order for such a View to allow for perceptual color 5.2 Content-Revising Strateaies
representations to r instantiated properties, these properties would have
to have been ‘ ' " in our cur r "' with
5 our Content-revising strategies take issue with my claims about what SKY—Bl.UE rep—
ancestors’ perceptual states as required. but they must not be instantiated in our resents, i .. with premises (C2) and (Oz), which are supposed to be supported
current environment. In the case of perceptual representations of color, the claim by our theory—independent methods. The reply appealing to ways of ‘ resenting
would be that our ancestors lived in an edenically colored world, while we don’t. discussed in §3.6.z is an example ofsuch a response strategy, since it appeals to ways
But the claim that our ancestors lived in an edenically colored world but we don‘t of representing to argue against my reasons for claiming that SKY-BLUE represents
is ad hoc and implausible. Another problem with this suggestion is that it is quite <edenic sky-blue>. Let us consider some more content-revising strategies.
plausible thatjust as our perceptual color representations are useful to us, they were
similarly useful to our ancestors, which explains why we have them now. So. by the A.2..i THE RELIABILITY OF INTROSPECTION
lights of the theory, they should represent whatever it is useful for them to co-occur
with in our ancestors, which is the same thing that it is useful for them to co-occur One might object to my use ofintrospection to argue for (Oz) and (C2). my claims
with in us: surface reflectance profiles or the like, not edenic colors. 50. tum our about what SKY-BLUE does and does not represent. lntrospection, one might claim, is
ancestors lived in an edenically colored world. the theory would likely still predict not a reliable guide to represented contents, so it needn't trouble the tracking theorist
that our perceptual color representations , the likes of surface reflectance that it suggests against her predictions.
profiles rather titan edenic colors. While some uses of introspection are indeed problematic. my use is fairly innocu-
The problem can be put more 5 ", . It is a consequence of all tracking theories ous. I only need introspection to have a fairly limited access to intentional states: It
that there are certain - " ' in which a _ ’ cannot ,

need only partially reveal the superficial character of the contents of paradigm cases
Tracking theories only allow for misrepresentation in cases where there is a certain
nonsemantic defect, a defect apart from being inaccurate or non-veridical. In the
case of optimal functioning theories, misrepresentation can only occur when a
"srr also Mendelovici zoiyh and zoté, where I argue that cracking theonea cannot allow for clean
easexoheliable ' casesofteliable where nothing
' ' has '
representation doesn't help its bearer survive and flourish. This is because what causes gone wrong, and that this is a problem for them even rt there are no nrrur clean cases of reliable
or corresponds to the tokening of a representation in conditions in which it helps misrepresentation. While Mendelovici zouh and xoI6 argue against tracking theories on me basis or
. . . . H .
its bearer survive and Hourishjusl Lt its intentional content. Similarly, teleological
can be roughly rnmryn of as arguing against tracking theories on the basis ofurul eaier ofteliable
tracking theories only allow a representation to misrepresent when it occurs in misrepresentation.
P
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64 Part II: Altematm fimzrm oflnleniinna/ily Chapter}: Tin Alismdlr/J ml/mifii iiatiiig r/iaims as
of intentionality, cases that we can notice introspectively and use to fix reference particular surface reflectance profiles an object has from our perceptual experiences
on intentionality (see §z.2..z). This limited introspective access is compatible with ofits having a certain color or our belief that it has a certain color.
our having little or no access to the deep nature of intentional states and contents. Another suggestion is that intentional states involving SKY-BLUE play a role in
our mental processes." nonconscious intentional states. past intentional states,“ or discriminating between objects that are SR1’ and those that are not, so SKY-BLUE
intentional states we are not attending to.“ The introspective judgments I make does play a psychological role appropriate to representing <SRP>.
use of are not affected by these limitations because they pertain to the superficial The problem with this suggestion is that mere discriminatory abilities, that is.
characters of contents that are currently being entertained and attended to.“ the mere ability to group and tell apart items having certain features, are at best
In any case, my arguments for (C2) and (Oz) should be effective for even weak evidence that we represent the properties they have in common. This is
those who are suspicious of introspective evidence of any kind, since they do not because mere tracking. tracking that does not give rise to intentionality, is sufficient
rely on introspection alone. They also make use of considerations of psycholog- for discrimination." Note that this is something that even the tracking theorist
ical role, which are unaffected by this objection and independently support my should accept. A tracking theorist who claims diat, on her favored tracking relation,
conclusions. perceptual color representations track and represent surface reflectance profiles
should agree that on other tracking relations they also track other properties, such
as the categorical bases of surface reflectance profiles, And so, she should agree
A.2..z. l)0 WI: REPRESENT <sRP> lN A PSYCHOLOGICALLV INVOLVED WAY?
that perceptual color representations can be used to discriminate between different
One might argue that, contrary to what I've said. SKY-BLUE plays a psychological role properties of these types, too. So even the tracking theorist should agree that
that suggests it represents <SRI’>. Ifthis is right, then perhaps the tracking theory's discrimination is more closely tied to tracking than to intentionality and so that it
content attributions are correct afi'er all. is at best weak evidence for the claim that a certain content is represented. What we
Let us consider some suggestions as to what the relevant psychological roles sug- need in order to use discriminatory responses to show that a putative represented
gesting that SKYvBLUE represents <SRP> might be. One suggestion is that perceptual content is psychologically involved is some hint that the discriminatory responses
states involving sltvvntulz cause or otherwise connect with beliefs representing are in some sense based on this content, not iust that they happen to correspond to
surface reflectance profiles. This might be because the contents of our color-related the content in some way.
beliefs are inherited partly from the contents of our perceptual color representations. A related suggestion is that our best processing story about color perception takes
and so color—related beliefs. as well as perceptual color representations. represent it to process information about surface reflectance profiles. Cones detect incoming
objects as having surface reflectance profiles. light of various wavelengths, and this information is processed and transformed by
The problem with this suggestion is that it merely allows the psychologically other retinal cells and then other parts of the visual system to result in color experi—
uninvolved contents posited by the tracking theory to permeate throughout the ences that also carry information about objects’ surface reflectance profiles, All stages
cognitive economy. The fact remains that neither our perceptual representations of of color processing carry information relating to surface rcflectance profiles, which
color nor our beliefs about colors behave as if they represented surface reflectance suggests that they, and the perceptual color states they sometimes result in. represent
profiles, For instance, absent the relevant scientific knowledge, we cannot infer which surface reflectance profiles in a psychologically involved way. Now, there might be
a sense in which it is correct to say that cones, ganglion cells. and other cells and
areas involved in color processing, including the perceptual color states we've been
" Thar wt have llllle at no access to out mental pnxtssti has httn dsi-ntinsttated in many ituditt. rot concerned with, carry information about wavelengths oflight and surface reflectance
exalnplt. suhittts asked [0 iiitinotiu a list ofword paits including "0c¢alI~M0oI1' watt inoit lilttly to
profiles. After all, we are granting that perceptual color states track surface reflectance
pitrtt Tide to otiiti laiands ofdetergrnt. but they did not ttahit that this pttrsitntt was at lelsl‘ paitly
caused by tlitit EXPOSIIIE to -ottanamoon" (Nisbfl! and Wilson .977). profiles, and carrying information about something is one way to track it But, as we
" casts of change blindness (Se: Rensink ti’ al. I997) might ht taken to suggest that us have littlt tit no have seen, mere tracking is at best weak evidence for intentionality. We can make
access (0 past inttntitinal stattt.
"cases tirinatttntiunal blindness (Ste Mack and Rock -99!) suggest wt liavt littlt or no atttss tn
intantional states we att not attending (9.
“stt also aaynt and Spent! (Zola) rtii a congenial discussion urtht litiuts ofilltrospcctmn. “ SEC Mtndtluviti 2013b. mils. MS, l-latdin I991. and wtight too; rot sn-nilat ptnntt.
V
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66 Part II: Altrrrmlwt T/mints aflnrmrtan.zl:t_v Chapter}: mrtrtmttb Pmbltmfnr rm/tmg U/rant: 67
good sense of the role ofsurface reflectance profiles in color processing by appeal to Another. potentially more conciliatory, response is to say that in Oscar and
tracking and carrying information, without requiring that the resulting perceptual Toscar's case, broad contents are in fact at least partially discernible using my
color stares intentionally represent the properties they carry information about. theory-independent methods but the contents of perceptual color representations
In any case, even if it can be argued that considerations of psychological role that are predicted by the tracking theory are not discernible at all. While my
support taking SKY-BLUE to represent <SRP>, this only provides a response to the theory—independent methods do not allow us to fully discern the contents of Oscar
argument from commission. It only allows us to say that SKY-BLUE represents a con- and Toscar's concepts, they do narrow down the options by providing partial access
tent with a SRP—ish superficial character, and hence that (C2) is false, which provides to these contents‘ superficial characters. They do not tell us that Oscar. for example.
a response to the argument from commission. But it does nothing to allow us to reject represents a content with an H,O-ish superficial character, but they tell us that he
(01). the claim that SKVPELUE represents a content with an edenic-sky-blue-ish represents a content with a water»ish superficial character, where <H,O> is one
superficial character, and so the argument from omission is '1'
J
such content and <XYZ> is another. For instance. while Oscar and Toscar cannot
introspectively tell the difference between <H,O> and <XYZ>, they can both
tell that they represent a content that has a water-ish superficial character, rather
A.7..; EXTERNALISM AND THE THEORY-INDEPENDENT METHODS than an elephantvish superficial character. Similarly, Oscar and Toscars water-related
One might argue that perceptual color representatio have broad contents. con- concepts play various psychological roles in relation to their drinking and swimming
tents the representation of which depends on environmental Factors. and that my behavior, the inferences they make about taps. oceans, streams. the requirements for
theory-independent methods for finding out about our intentional states and their life, etc,. and they have an overall ‘water-ish" phenomenology. All this suggests that
contents are ineffective at telling us about broad contents. This would give us Oscar and Toscar’s concepts represent contents with water»ish superficial characters.
grounds to reject (C2) and (0).). So, one might suggest, theoIy»indepent:lent considerations do tell us something
To see why one might think that my theory-independent considerations do not about Oscar and Toscar's concepts: They tell us that they represent contents with
tell us about broad contents, consider the Twin Earth thought experiment: Oscar, water-ish superficial characters, rather than contents with elephant-ish superficial
who lives on Earth, has a water ‘ 4 concept that represents <H,0>. Toscar, his characters or other superficial characters that would be completely ' " to any
intrinsic duplicate. lives on Twin Earth, where the clear watery stuff is XYZ, and introspective appearances or psychological roles.
as a result, has a water-related concept that represents <XYZ>.“ One might argue
In contrast, in the case of perceptual color representation , theoty—independent
that Oscar and Toscar's water-related intentional states play the same psychological considerations provide no hint whatsoever as to the representation of contents with
roles and are not introspectively discernible. After all. Oscar and Toscar engage in
surface- “ -profile-ish I E ' ‘ ch Theory ' " , ‘ consid-
all the same behaviors, and they cannot tell from introspection alone whether their erations suggest that SKY-BLUE represents a content with an eclenic-slty—blue—ish
superficial character, but it is not platmible to maintain that <SRP> has an

concepts represent <H,0> or <XYZ>.
There are several responses to this worry. One is that it is commonly thought to edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character in the way that it might be plausible to
be an vlzjectinn to externalism. the View that there are broad contents, that broad
say that <H,O> has a water-ish superficial ch . Our theory-independent
considerations suggest against taking SKY—Bl.UE to represent <SRP> in the same
contents are not introspectively accessible or psychologically involved (e. , Stich
way that they suggest against taking Oscar's water—related concept to represent
r983, Boghossian 1997. Sosa zoo7). This is why externalists often try to argue that
<elephant>.
they are introspectively accessible (e.g.. Burge i988) and psychologically involved
(e.g., Dretske 1995, Williamson zooo). lfthis attitude is correct. then if there is an A final response that can be offered to this objection echoes the responses given
incompatibility between the assumptions underlying my methods and extemalism, earlier to some of the other c ‘ color rep-
6 strategies. Even if, '
represent broad contents and broad contents are entirely shielded from
it is externalism that should be rejected.
our theor,‘ ‘ I ‘ " 0l.Il’Ki|C0|“ ' J I “ ” ' do
reveal " very c "‘ . something ' ‘ ' D edenic L‘ H ' L
This thing. whatever it is, arguably answers to our notion of content and so needs
“ This is, oreotttst. I common Variant or i>ttttttm's(tm)wtii»1tnowtt thought Cxpenlnull In Support or
txtflnilxsln abmtt lil'Ig|l|SK|t nteututg. to be accommodated by the tracking theory. So, even if the tracking theory‘s
1
68 Pan II: Almmtrwe Tlimrier qfiln/mrionalizy C/lap/er}: The zirimiho-b Ilrfiblfrrljo?’ I'm/mtg zhtorm so
prediction that SKY-BLUE represents <SRP> cannot be disconfirmed using our is that <edenic' sky blue> involves edenic' blue-ish-ness, which is a qualitative
theory-independent methods, this does not affect my claims that these methods color-like feature, and nothing like that is found in SR1’. Surface reflectance profiles
reveal a content that the tracking theory cannot accommodate. So, even if this are dispositions to reflect certain proportions ofdifferent wavelengths oflight, but
strategy can help us reject (C2,) and provide a response to the argument from neither light, particular wavelengths of light, not dispositions to reflect, transmit,
commission, it cannot help us reject (Oz), so the argument from omission still or emit light are literally qualitatively blue—i.rh. This is simply not part of our best
stands." understanding oflight or the surfaces ofobjects. There is no qualitative blue-ish-ness.
and hence no edenic' blue-ish-ness, to be found in SR1’. So, a revised version ofthe
argument from omission still goes through, one that replaces (02,) with (O2.'), and
A.z.d REVISING (02,)
(OI) with (Or'):
I have suggested that SKY-BLUE represents a content with 3 qunlitatlvci simple, prim-
itive, sui generis, non-dispositional, non—relational edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial (or) If the trackjngtheoryistrue, then SKY—BLUE does not represent <edenic‘
character, i.e., <edenic sky-blue>. But, one might suggest, perhaps our introspective sky-blue>.
t ’ I| and n " inn of psy " ' 0' " do not get us all
the way to this claim. Perhaps introspection does not really support the claim that There are two ways the objector might insist that surface rcfiectance profiles
color contents have certain structural features like being primitive or sui generis, involve edenic' blue-ish-ness. First, she might simplybuild a qualitative blue-ish—ness
and perhaps the psychological role of perceptual color states is also silent on these into SR1’. On the resulting view, we are mistaken as to the true nature of surface
features. If so, might knock those features off of our characterization of
then we reflectance prof-iles—rhey do involve a qualitative blue-ish-ness, perhaps even as an
SKY-BLUEYS content, What we are left with is the claim that SKY~BLUE represents extra nonphysical component.
a content with a qualitative sky»blue—ish feature; let us call this content <edenic' This response importantly modifies our understanding of surface reflectance
sky-blue). lfso, then we might reject (Oz) in favor of(O2‘): profiles, building in a qualitative blue-ish—ness that cannot be understood in terms
of surface reflectance profiles’ other features (otherwise, we would not have had to
(O73) SKY—BLUI-1 represents <edenic' sky-blue>. build it in). This strategy results in somethingvery much like primitive color realism,
and everything we said about realist strategies in §A.IJ applies here, too.
By rejecting (Oz), this response blocks the argument from omission." The other way to insist that surface relicctance profiles involve edenic'
Now, I don't think the reasons for rejecting (Oz) in favor of (023) are right: sky-blue-ish-ness is by identifying the problematic qualitative blue-ish-ness with
Arguably, what we notice upon introspection of perceptual color states are deter» some property ofSRI’: SR1’ due: involve a qualitative blue-ish-ness, not because it is
minately primitive, simple, etc., color features, and, arguably, our perceptual color tacked onto it, as on the previous suggestion, but rather because some other feature
states behave as if color contents have those features. of SRP, feature F,ju5t it this qualitative blue-ish-ness.
in any case, even if we grant that out theory—independent consideration only This strategy leads us straight back to the reiterated identities strategy, discussed
support (Of), this is enough to make an argument from omission. The problem in §;,6,4, which involves defending prima facie false identity claim by wheeling
a
in more prima facie false identity claims, effectively denying any relevant common
ground with one’s opponent. While this strategy makes for a possible defense, it
” Another tttpohtt to the objection would be to train. that We do not lnltnrionally ttpttstht broad does so because it is effectively a skeptical strategy, taking advantage of the fact that
Culfltnts ind. 50, that the riot that my Khcoryflndzpendtnt do iiot ttu HS about them
justification has to end somewhere. The fact remains: There is absolutely no reason
IS not a pmblem. iii Chapter 7, I algue rot a view On which We do not iiitttitiotitiiy l’€pl’¢S€I1( braid
Contents. thiiiigh we dttivstivtiy Kepfestnt them. Where derived menizl ttpttstiititioii is tiot I Species
arising from the physical examination ofthe surfaces ofobjects alone to think that
flfIl|(cn[|Dn1li(y, oiit p|fl.i|lH’Ig that line oritgiiiimit here woiiid take [15 too rat afield. they involve anything like edenic' bluishness.
4‘ lfwe Jddirlclnilly idtiitiry (edCl’Ii(' sky-blue) with <$RP>, thth wt also hm a iitw way ofemplnylng
(ll: dtrtiitt by |dEl1[l[y Sxratcgy described iti §3.6i| to rcjtcr (C2) iiid mid the argumtnt riom
commission. in whit follows, i roeiis oii tht argument rtoiti omission, Slntt this is the part of the
ttspoiise that is new.
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Chaplet‘ 4; Fumrinrml Roz; Thmritrand Tracking Tlmmzx Again 7;
1 The Functional Role Theory
According to the functional role theory, original intentionality arises from represen-
tations’ functional roles. We can put the core view as follows:
The functional role theory All (actual) originally intentional states arise from
mental representations‘ functional roles.
Recall that B arises from A when E is nothing over and above A. perhaps because
5 is identical to, fully grounded in. constituted by, or realized by A, and that
original intentionality intentionality that does not derive from other instances of
is
intentionality (§z.r). According to the functional role theory, then, the functional
roles of mental representations give rise to the most basic kind of intentionality. and
any other kinds ofintentionality are derived from it.‘
4 Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again

Harman (1987) distinguishes between two different kinds of functional role
dleories: Short—arm functional role theories restrict the relevant functional roles
to internal functional roles, functional roles that representations have in relation to
or other internal items. such as roles in inference. In contrast,
other representations
long-arm functional role theories take the relevant roles to include both internal
functional roles and long-arm functional roles, functional roles with respect to items
in the external environment. such as roles in tracking or directing behavior toward
various items.‘
THE PREVXOUS CHAPTER discussed the tracking theory, which states that all
Shortvarm functional role theories generally restrict the relevant kinds of internal
actual of original intentionality arise from trackingt This chapter considers
cases
roles to roles in ' ‘ and reasoning. For example. a short-arm functional role
anothct theory of intentionality, the functional role theory, which takes original
theory might claim that the representation AND represents <conjunction> in virtue
intentionality to arise from representations functional dispositions with respect
of playing the following role in inference. where A and B are representations with
to one another and perhaps other items in the world—in short, their functional
propositional contents:
roles,
I will argue that one version of the functional role theory, the short-arm version, (Al) From judging A AND B. one is likely to judge A.
which takes the relevant functional roles to be roles that representations have in (A2) From judgingA AND B, one is likely to judge B.
relation to other representations or other internal items, faces challenges in securing (Ag) From judging A and judging B, one is likely to judge A AND B.
determinate content and explaining why such functional roles should give rise to
intentionality in the first place (§4.z). These problems motivate the alternative According to short-arm functional role theories, all it takes for AND to represent
long«arm version of the theory, which takes the relevant functional roles to include <conjunction> is for it to have this sort of functional role. The short—arm functional
tracking or other relations to the environment. Unfortunately, as we will see. the role theory claims that other representations have their contents fixed in this way,
longaarm functional role theory inherits the tracking theory's mismatch problem
(§4.3). Finallyv §4.4 argues that the deep diificulty with both the tracking theory
The l'...mlm..l ml: theory is also sometimes known as “conceptual role semantics" or “inferential role
and the functional role theory is that tracking relations and functional roles simply
semantics,"Defendersofthe view include Harman (tofiz. X957). Block (lgas). Fie|d(i977a, 1977b). and
do not have what it takes to give rise to intentionality. Peacocke ((992,).
The tracking theory is . limit cm of the Iong~arm functional role theory, utmg the only relevant
nlmloml roles to be speeifie kinds oflong-arm functional roles.
7o
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72 Part II: Al/z T/Imrit: oflmm/i’armlit_y Clmpm 4: Furrztialtdl Ralr 77/sane: and Tmt-kmg Thmie: Again 7;
too. For example, the concept BACHELOR might have its content fixed by its role in Bonjour (1998) puts this kind ofworry as follows: We can think ofthe short—arm
the following inferences: functional role theory as claiming that there is an isomorphism between the network
of inferential relations between representations and the network of enrailment
(Br) From judging 0 is A BACHELOR, one is likely to judge 015 A MAN.
and perhaps other relations between contents. Representation then present the
(B2) From judging 0 IS A BACHELOR, one is likely tojudge 0 IS UNMARRIED.
contents that they are associated with by virtue of this isomorphism. But, Bonjour
(B5) From judging o is A MAN and o is UNMARRIED, one is likely to judge 0
claims. it is not clear why the existence of such an isomorphism between the
IS A BACHELOR.
inferential network between representations and the network of relations between
According to short-arm functional role theories. what it takes for BACHELOR to contents should make the representations represent the contents.
represent <bachelor> is for it to play a functional role like the one specified above. Why couldn't there be a set of items standing in [an inferential] structure
MAN and UNMARRIED likewise get their contents from the functional roles they exactly isomorphic to the [network of relations between contents] while still
play, including their roles involving the representation BACHELOR.‘ having no content at all? [T]herc is no reason at all to take the obtaining of
According to long-arm functional role theories. the functional roles that give rise such an isomorphism to be aruficient condition for having a specific content....
to original intentionality include not only internal roles, such as those mentioned
(honjour 1998, p. 177: emphasis in original)
above, but also long-arm roles, such as roles in tracking external world properties and
generating behavior. For example. on a long-arm functional role theory, the content In other words, there is no reason to think that internal functional roles should give
of BACHELOR might be determined not only by its role in inferences involving rise to intentionality.
UNMARRIED and MAN, but also by tracking relations it bears to the environment
It is possible to understand Searle's (1980) Chinese room argument as making
(c.g., to the property of being a bachelor) or tracking relations that UNMARRIED, a similar point. According to Searle, no amount of syntactic manipulation suiiices
MAN, or other related concepts bear to the environment. for having conrent—mere syntax doesn't get you semantics. Searle argues for this
claim using a thought experiment in which a monolingual English»spealting subject
4.2 Worries with Short-Arm Functional Role Theories is placed in a room with a rule book relating Chinese characters to other Chinese
characters. The subject receives strings of Chinese characters through an input slot,
The long»arm version ofthe functional role theory is arguably more promising than looks up those characters in the rule book, and returns the specified characters
the short-arm version (sec, c. Harman r987), but it is instructive to consider some through an output slot. In doing so, he might be simulating one side ofa conversation
of the shortcomings of the short-arm version in order to appreciate some of the in Chinese, but neither he nor the room understands Chinese. If this is right, then
possible merits of the long-arm version. merely having internal states that play particular internal functional roles does not
One worry with short»arm functional role theories has to do with how give rise to inrcntionality.
inrentionality can arise from functional roles in the first place. Short-arm functional This is also a way ofthinking ofHarnads (r99o) symbol groundingproblcm. Har-
role theories claim that having internal states playing various internal functional nad argues that representations can't get their contents from their functional roles
roles gives rise to intentionality, presumably in that it either is, constitutes, realizes, with respect to one another because the representa that any given representation
’
or grounds intentionality. But, we might wonder, why should playing an internal is functionally related to are contentless prior to such content determination. He
functional role give rise to intcnrionaliry at all? Once we have a state that plays some likens the possibility ofrepresentations getting their contents from their functional
internal role, why isn’t that the end of the story? Why is there a further bit of the story roles with respect to one another to learning Chinese from a Chinese-Chinese
on which, because of their internal roles, internal states get to have contents? it seems dictionary: To someone who does not know any Chinese, a Chinese»Chinese
that there shouldn't be, that mere internal roles are not sufficient for intentionaliry. dictionary merely relates one meaningless symbol to another. Analogously, content
can't transfer from ouc representation to another, because there's no content in the
system of representations to begin with. The problem, we might say, is that having
’ As before, i assume that many of the vehicles of original intcntionaliry are subpmpositional
internal states playing internal functional roles simply doesn't automatically give rise
representations. but the discussion can be amended accordingly for those who disagree. See n. in of
to intentionaliry.
Chapter and cm.
x
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in fashion, which quickly fell under the lash of satirist and caricaturist.
It was first exhibited in the robes rather than in the head-dress.
These Anglo-Norman ladies are understood to have first introduced
stays, in order to give an artificial appearance of slenderness to their
waists; but the greatest extravagance appeared in the forms of their
sleeves. The robe, or gown, instead of being loose, as among the
Anglo-Saxons, was laced close around the body, and the sleeves,
which fitted the arm tightly till they reached the elbows, or sometimes
nearly to the wrist, then suddenly became larger, and hung down to
an extravagant length, often trailing on the ground, and sometimes
shortened by means of a knot. The gown, also, was itself worn very
long. The clergy preached against these extravagances in fashion,
and at times, it is said, with effect; and they fell under the vigorous
lash of the satirist. In a class of satires which became extremely
popular in the twelfth century, and which produced in the thirteenth
the immortal poem of Dante—the visions of purgatory and of hell—
these contemporary extravagances in fashion are held up to public
detestation, and are made the subject of severe punishment. They
were looked upon as among the outward forms of pride. It arose, no
doubt, from this taste—from the darker shade which spread over
men’s minds in the twelfth century—that demons, instead of animals,
were introduced to personify the evil-doers of the time. Such is the
figure, seen in a very interesting manuscript in the British Museum
(MS. Cotton. Nero, C iv.). The demon is here dressed in the
fashionable gown with its long sleeves, of which one appears to
have been usually much longer than the other. Both the gown and
sleeve are shortened by means of knots, while the former is brought
close round the waist by tight lacing. It is a picture of the use of stays
made at the time of their first introduction.
This superfluity of length in the different parts of the dress was a
subject of complaint and satire at various and very distant periods,
and contemporary illuminations of a perfectly serious character show
that these complaints were not without foundation.
The professional entertainers of the Middle Ages performed in the
streets and public places, or in the theatres, and especially at
festivals, and they were often employed at private parties, to
entertain the guests at a supper.
We trace the existence of this class of performers during the
earlier period of the middle ages by the expressions of hostility
towards them used from time to time by the ecclesiastical writers,
and the denunciations of synods and councils. Nevertheless, it is
evident from many allusions to them, that they found their way into
the monastic houses, and were in great favour not only among the
monks, but among the nuns also; that they were introduced into the
religious festivals; and that they were tolerated even in the churches.
It is probable that they long continued to be known in Italy and the
countries near the centre of Roman influence, and where the Latin
language was continued, by their old name of mimus. The Anglo-
Saxon vocabularies interpret the Latin mimus by glig-mon, a
gleeman. In Anglo-Saxon, glig or gliu meant mirth and game of every
description, and as the Anglo-Saxon teachers who compiled the
vocabularies give, as synonyms of mimus, the words scurra, jocifta,
and pantomimus, it is evident that all these were included in the
character of the gleeman, and that the latter was quite identical with
his Roman type. It was the Roman mimus introduced into Saxon
England. We have no traces of the existence of such a class of
performers among the Teutonic race before they became acquainted
with the civilisation of imperial Rome. We know from drawings in
contemporary illuminated manuscripts that the performances of the
gleeman did include music, singing, and dancing, and also the tricks
of mountebanks and jugglers, such as throwing up and catching
knives and balls, and performing with tamed bears, etc.
But even among the peoples who preserved the Latin language,
the word mimus was gradually exchanged for others employed to
signify the same thing. The word jocus had been used in the
signification of a jest, playfulness, jocari signified to jest, and
joculator was a word for a jester; but, in the debasement of the
language, jocus was taken in the signification of everything which
created mirth. It became, in the course of time the French verb jeu,
and the Italian gioco, or giuoco. People introduced a form of the verb
jocare, which became the French juer, to play or perform. Joculator
was then used in the sense of mimus. In French the word became
jogléor, or jougléor, and in its later form jougleur. I may remark that,
in mediæval manuscripts, it is almost impossible to distinguish
between the u and the n, and that modern writers have misread this
last word as jongleur, and thus introduced into the language a word
which never existed, and which ought to be abandoned. In old
English, as we see in Chaucer, the usual form was jogelere. The
mediæval joculator, or jougleur, embraced all the attributes of the
Roman mimus, and perhaps more. In the first place he was very
often a poet himself, and composed the pieces which it was one of
his duties to sing or recite. These were chiefly songs, or stories, the
latter usually told in verse, and so many of them are preserved in
manuscripts that they form a very numerous and important class of
mediæval literature. The songs were commonly satirical and
abusive, and they were made use of for purposes of general or
personal vituperation. Out of them, indeed, grew the political songs
of a later period. They carried about with them for exhibition tame
bears, monkeys, and other animals, taught to perform the actions of
men. As early as the thirteenth century, we find them including
among their other accomplishments that of dancing upon the tight-
rope. Finally, the jougleurs performed tricks of sleight of hand, and
were often conjurers and magicians. As, in modern times, the
jougleurs of the middle ages gradually passed away, sleight of hand
appears to have become their principal accomplishment, and the
name only was left in the modern word juggler. The jougleurs of the
middle ages, like the mimi of antiquity, wandered about from place to
place, and often from country to country, sometimes singly and at
others in companies, exhibited their performances in the roads and
streets, repaired to all great festivals, and were employed especially
in the baronial hall, where, by their songs, stories, and other
performances, they created mirth after dinner.
This class of society had become known by another name, the
origin of which is not so easily explained. The primary meaning of
the Latin word minister was a servant, one who ministers to another,
either in his wants or in his pleasures and amusements. It was
applied particularly to the cupbearer. In low Latinity, a diminutive of
this word was formed, minestellus, or ministrellus, a petty servant, or
minister. When we first meet with this word, which is not at a very
early date, it is used as perfectly synonymous with joculator, and, as
the word is certainly of Latin derivation, it is clear that it was from it
the middle ages derived the French word menestrel (the modern
menetrier), and the English minstrel. The mimi or jougleurs were
perhaps considered as the petty ministers to the amusements of
their lord, or of him who for the time employed them. Until the close
of the middle ages, the minstrel and the jougleur were absolutely
identical. Possibly the former may have been considered the more
courtly of the two names. But in England, as the middle ages
disappeared, and lost their influence on society sooner than in
France, the word minstrel remained attached only to the musical part
of the functions of the old mimus, while, as just observed, the juggler
took the sleight of hand and the mountebank tricks. In modern
French, except where employed technically by the antiquity, the word
menetrier means a fiddler.
The jougleurs, or minstrels, formed a very numerous and
important, though a low and despised, class of mediæval society.
The dulness of every-day life in a feudal castle or mansion required
something more than ordinary excitement in the way of amusement,
and the old family bard, who continually repeated to the Teutonic
chief the praises of himself and his ancestors, was soon felt to be a
wearisome companion. The mediæval knights and their ladies
wanted to laugh, and to make them laugh sufficiently it required that
the jokes, or tales, or comic performances, should be broad, coarse,
and racy, with a good spicing of violence and of the wonderful.
Hence the jougleur was always welcome to the feudal mansion, and
he seldom went away dissatisfied. But the subject of the present
chapter is rather the literature of the jougleur than his personal
history, and, having traced his origin to the Roman mimus, we will
now proceed to one class of his performances.
It has been stated that the mimus and the jougleurs told stories.
Of those of the former, unfortunately, none are preserved, except,
perhaps, in a few anecdotes scattered in the pages of such writers
as Apuleius and Lucian, and we are obliged to guess at their
character, but of the stories of the jougleurs a considerable number
has been preserved. It becomes an interesting question how far
these stories have been derived from the mimi, handed down
traditionally from mimus to jougleur, how far they are native in our
race, or how far they were derived at a later date from other sources.
And in considering this question, we must not forget that the
mediæval jougleurs were not the only representatives of the mimi,
for among the Arabs of the East also there had originated from them,
modified under different circumstances, a very important class of
minstrels and story-tellers, and with these the jougleurs of the west
were brought into communication at the commencement of the
crusades. There can be no doubt that a very large number of the
stories of the jougleurs were borrowed from the East, for the
evidence is furnished by the stories themselves; and there can be
little doubt also that the jougleurs improved themselves, and
underwent some modification, by their intercourse with Eastern
performers of the same class.
The people of the middle ages, who took their word fable from the
Latin fabula, which they appear to have understood as a mere term
for any short narration, included under it the stories told by the mimi
and jougleurs; but, in the fondness of the middle ages for
diminutives, by which they intended to express familiarity and
attachment, applied to them more particularly the Latin fabella, which
in the old French became fablel, or, more usually, fabliau. The
fabliaux of the jougleurs form a most important class of the comic
literature of the middle ages. They must have been wonderfully
numerous, for a very large quantity of them still remain, and these
are only the small portion of what once existed, which have escaped
perishing like the others by the accident of being written in
manuscripts which have had the fortune to survive; while
manuscripts containing others have no doubt perished, and it is
probable that many were only preserved orally, and never written
down at all. The recital of these fabliaux appears to have been the
favourite employment of the jougleurs, and they became so popular
that the mediæval preachers turned them into short stories in Latin
prose, and made use of them as illustrations in their sermons. Many
collections of these short Latin stories are found in manuscripts
which had served as note-books to the preachers, and out of them
was originally compiled that celebrated mediæval book called the
“Gesta Romanorum.”
The Trouvères, or poets, who wrote the Fabliaux flourished chiefly
from the close of the twelfth century to the earlier part of the
fourteenth. They all composed in French, which was a language then
common to England and France, but some of their compositions
bear internal evidence of having been composed in England. No
objection appears to have been entertained to the recital of these
licentious stories before the ladies of the castle or of the domestic
circle, and their general popularity was so great, that the more pious
clergy seem to have thought necessary to find something to take
their place in the post-prandial society of the monastery, and
especially of the nunnery; and religious stories were written in the
same form and metre as the fabliaux. Some of these have been
published under the title of Contes Devots, and, from their general
dulness, it may be doubted if they answered their purpose of
furnishing amusement so well as the others.
Troubadour was the Provençal name for the Trouvères, and in the
twelfth century these poets flourished so luxuriantly that their
influence is still felt in the poetic sentiment of today.
Yet they were in no sense humorous writers, unless their satire on
the foibles and follies of the times may be so construed. They were
Boudoir poets and their airs and graces were romantic rather than
mirthful.
Much of their production was of the languishing, sighing order, but
the Fabliaux, of a ruder narrative type were also popular.
These Fabliaux, now usually given out in expurgated editions,
were extremely plain spoken, and, as so often occurred, were
adopted and adapted by the monks for the real or pretended
furtherance of their religious teachings.
The Troubadours did much for lyric art by their conscientious
attention to form, but the humor of their productions is almost a
negligible quantity. Their songs were invariably sung, and usually to
the accompaniment of the blue-ribboned guitar, but oftenest the
burden was of sorrowful intent.
And it was, perhaps, owing to the want of a humorous sense, that
the Troubadours could carry on their lackadaisical and lovesick
careers.
Yet there were some of the Troubadours’ songs which showed a
departure from the usual romantic wailings and a few are here given.
Doubtless the very free translation adds to their humor, but the
motive is clear.
Rambaud d’Orange thus declares his policy in treatment to the
fair sex.
I.
My boy, if you’d wish to make constant your Venus,
Attend to the plan I disclose.
Her first naughty word you must meet with a menace,
Her next—drop your fist on her nose.
When she’s bad, be you worse,
When she scolds, do you curse,
When she scratches, just treat her to blows.
II.
Defame and lampoon her, be rude and uncivil,
Then you’ll vanquish the haughtiest dame.
Be proud and presumptuous, deceive like the ——
And aught that you wish you may claim.
All the beautiful slight,
To the plain be polite,
That’s the way the proud hussies to tame.
Bernard de Ventadour is thus unromantic.

You say the moon is all aglow,
The nightingale a-singing.
I’d rather watch the red wine flow
And hear the goblets ringing.
You say ’tis sweet to hear the gale

Creep sighing through the willows.
I’d rather hear a merry tale
’Mid a group of jolly fellows.
You say ’tis sweet the stars to view

Upon the waters gleaming.
I’d rather see (’twixt me and you
And the post) my supper steaming.
While the Monk of Montaudon, an incorrigible satirist, thus

descants on the ladies.
I am a saint of good repute, by mortals called St. Julian;
Being wanted much on earth I go not oft to realms cerulean.
Yet once of late I made a call, which you may term a high call—
I went aloft to have a chat along with good St. Michael.
But soon the saint was called away, which closed our conversation,
To judge between some dames and monks engaged in disputation.
Paint was the subject of their strife, the rock on which they split;
Each party wanted to monopolise the use of it.
The monks declared, with many tears, that they were ruined quite,
For not an ounce of it was left to keep their pictures bright.
The ladies laid it on so thick, as you can understand,
That the compounders could not quite keep pace with their demand.
And so, unless the former were restrained by stringent law,
Each shrine they swore would quickly cease its worshippers to draw.
Then stepped an ancient beauty forth, and thus to Mike descanted:

“Our sex was painted long before paint was for pictures wanted;
As for myself, how can it hurt a clergyman or saint,
If the crows’-feet beneath my eyes I cover up with paint?
In keeping up my beauteous looks I cannot see a crime;
In spite of them I’ll still repair the ravages of time.”
St. Michael scratched his pate awhile, then, looking very wise,
Said: “Dames and monks, let me suggest, I pray, a compromise.
The soul as well as body, dames, requires both paint and padding.
You should not wholly spend your years in love-making and gadding.
And you, my monks, be less severe, nor bend the bow to breaking;
All dames should have a moderate time allowed to them for raking.
Then let them paint till forty-five”—at this the dames looked glum—
“Or fifty,” cried the saint in haste. “Agree, my monks, now come.”
“No,” said the monks, “that cannot be, the time is far too long;
But, though we feel within our souls the compromise is wrong,
Yet, in our deep respect for you, our scruples we will drop,
And let the dames, till thirty-five, frequent the painter’s shop;
But only on condition that thereafter they shall cease
To daub, and let us monks enjoy our privilege in peace.”
Before the ladies could rejoin, two other saints appeared—

Peter and Lawrence—by the dames no less than monks revered.
They reasoned with the parties, and so well employed their wit,
That they persuaded them at length the difference to split.
The monks agreed to yield five years; the ladies condescended
Up to their fortieth year to paint, and there the trial ended.
And the same merry Monk of Montaudon voices his sentiments

thus:
I like those sports the world calls folly,
Banquets that know no melancholy;
I love a girl whose talk is jolly,
Not silent like a painted dolly.
A rich man of my love is winner,

His foe I feel must be a sinner;
And I adore, or I’d be thinner,
A fine fat salmon-trout for dinner.
I hold among my chief of blisses,

Basking beside a stream with misses;
Love sunshine, flowers; but O than this is
A joy more deep—I do like kisses.
I hate a husband who’s uxorious;

A grocer’s son, whose dress is glorious;
Hate men in drink who get uproarious
And maids whose conduct is censorious.
I hate young folks who are precocious,

Hate parsons with a beard ferocious;
Of wine too much can no one broach us;
But too much water is atrocious!
The Court of Love, a gay and whimsical institution, doubtless

originated in the contests of the Troubadours, when the poets recited
for a prize the particular style of an ode called the Tenson.
Though a fascinating subject, we may not dwell on it further than
to quote the thirty-one articles of the Code of Love, this being the
most available bit of humor.
1. Marriage is no legitimate excuse against love.
2. Whoever cannot conceal cannot love.
3. No one must have two lovers at the same time.
4. Love must always be increasing or diminishing.
5. Favours unwillingly granted have no charm.
6. No male must love until of full age.
7. Whoever of two lovers survives the other must observe a widowhood of
two years.
8. None should be deprived of love except they lose their reason.
9. None can love except when compelled by the stress of love.
10. Love is an exile from the homes of avarice.
11. She who is scrupulous of the marriage tie should not love.
12. A true lover desires no embraces save those of his lady-love.
13. Love divulged rarely lasts.
14. Easy winning makes love contemptible; difficulty renders it dear.
15. Every lover grows pale at the sight of his lady-love.
16. The heart of a lover trembles at the sudden sight of his lady-love.
17. A new love makes an old one depart.
18. Probity alone makes a man worthy to be loved.
19. If love diminishes it soon fails, and rarely recovers its strength.
20. The lover is always timid.
21. From true jealousy love always increases.
22. When suspicion is aroused about a lover, jealousy and love increase.
23. Filled with thoughts of love, the lover eats and drinks less [than usual].
24. Every act of a lover is determined by thoughts of the beloved.
25. A true lover thinks naught happy save what would please his beloved.
26. Love can deny nothing to love.
27. A lover cannot be satiated with the charms of the beloved.
28. A slight prejudice makes a lover think ill of the beloved.
29. He is not wont to love who is oppressed by too great abundance of
pleasure.
30. A true lover is always without intermission filled with the image of his
lady-love.
31. Nothing hinders one woman being loved by two men, or one man by two
women.
On these rules—some nonsensical, many contradictory, and all
abominable—the following decisions, among many others, were
based.
The first is that of the Countess of Champagne already quoted,
with its approval by Queen Eleanor. In its original verbiage it runs
thus:
Question. Can true love exist between married persons?

Judgment, by the Countess of Champagne: “We say and
establish, by the tenor of these presents, that love cannot extend its
rights to married persons. In fact, lovers accord everything to each
other mutually and gratuitously, without being constrained by motives
of necessity; while married people are bound by the duty of mutually
sacrificing their wills and refusing nothing the one to the other.
“Let this judgment, which we have given with extreme care, and
after taking counsel of a large number of ladies, be to you a constant
and irrefragable truth. Thus determined in the year 1174, the third
day before the kalends of May.”
Question. Do the greater affection and livelier attachment exist
between lovers or married people? [It having been already decided,
let us remember, that married people could not love one another.]
Judgment, by Ermengarde, Viscountess of Narbonne: “The
attachment of married people and the tender affection of lovers are
sentiments of a nature and custom altogether different. There can
consequently be no just comparison established between objects
which have no resemblance or connection the one with the other.”
Question. A lady attached to a gentleman in an honorable love
marries another. Has she the right to repel her former lover and
refuse him his accustomed favours?
Judgment, by Ermengarde, Viscountess of Narbonne: “The
supervenience of the marriage bond does not bar the right of the
prior attachment, unless the lady utterly renounces love, and
declares that she does so for ever.”
The Gesta Romanorum, one of the most important collections of
moral tales, was put together during the thirteenth century by a
learned Frenchman named Pierre Bercheure, who was a
Benedictine Prior. He chose to lay the scenes of the stories in Rome,
though this was not historically true. Gesta means merely acts or
exploits, and many of the tales are descended from Oriental Folk
Lore.
Not all students of ancient literature agree as to the authorship of
the Gesta as it appears in its present form, but the consensus of
opinion seems to point to the aforesaid Frenchman.
However, the collector’s name matters little; the work itself, while it
harks back to the Fables of Æsop and Pilpay and to the Talmud, is of
interest as a veritable storehouse of Mediæval stories.
Each of these has its religious application, but it is easy to think
that the readers were oftener intrigued by the story than by the
appended moral.
OF SLOTH
The emperor Pliny had three sons, to whom he was extremely

indulgent. He wished to dispose of his kingdom, and calling the three
into his presence, spoke thus—“The most slothful of you shall reign
after my decease.” “Then,” answered the elder, “the kingdom must
be mine; for I am so lazy, that sitting once by the fire, I burnt my legs,
because I was too indolent to withdraw them.” The second son
observed, “The kingdom should properly be mine, for if I had a rope
round my neck, and held a sword in my hand, my idleness is such,
that I should not put forth my hand to cut the rope.” “But I,” said the
third son, “ought to be preferred to you both; for I outdo both in
indolence. While I lay upon my bed, water dropped from above upon
my eyes; and though, from the nature of the water, I was in danger of
becoming blind, I neither could nor would turn my head ever so little
to the right hand or to the left.” The emperor, hearing this,
bequeathed the kingdom to him, thinking him the laziest of the three.
Application
My beloved, the king is the devil; and the three sons, different
classes of corrupt men.
OF THE GOOD, WHO ALONE WILL ENTER THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN
There was a wise and rich king who possessed a beloved, but not
a loving wife. She had three illegitimate sons who proved ungrateful
and rebellious to their reputed parent. In due time she brought forth
another son, whose legitimacy was undisputed; and after arriving at
a good old age, he died, and was buried in the royal sepulchre of his
fathers. But the death of the old king caused great strife amongst his
surviving sons, about the right of succession. All of them advanced a
claim, and none would relinquish it to the other; the three first,
presuming upon their priority in birth, and the last upon his
legitimacy. In this strait, they agreed to refer the absolute decision of
their cause to a certain honourable soldier of the late king. When this
person, therefore, heard their difference, he said, “Follow my advice,
and it will greatly benefit you. Draw from its sepulchre the body of the
deceased monarch; prepare, each of you, a bow and single shaft,
and whosoever transfixes the heart of his father, shall obtain the
kingdom.” The counsel was approved, the body was taken from its
repository and bound naked to a tree. The arrow of the first son
wounded the king’s right hand—on which, as if the contest were
determined, they proclaimed him heir to the throne. But the second
arrow went nearer, and entered the mouth; so that he too considered
himself the undoubted lord of the kingdom. However, the third
perforated the heart itself, and consequently imagined that his claim
was fully decided, and his succession sure. It now came to the turn
of the fourth and last son to shoot; but instead of fixing his shaft to
the bow-string, and preparing for the trial, he broke forth into a
lamentable cry, and with eyes swimming in tears, said, “Oh! my poor
father; have I then lived to see you the victim of an impious contest?
Thine own offspring lacerate thy unconscious clay?—Far, oh! far be
it from me to strike thy venerated form, whether living or dead.” No
sooner had he uttered these words, than the nobles of the realm,
together with the whole people, unanimously elected him to the
throne; and depriving the three barbarous wretches of their rank and
wealth, expelled them for ever from the kingdom.
Application
My beloved, that wise and rich king is the King of kings, and Lord
of lords, who joined himself to our flesh, as to a beloved wife. But
going after other gods, it forgot the love due to him in return, and
brought forth by an illicit connection, three sons, viz., Pagans, Jews,
and Heretics. The first wounded the right hand—that is, the doctrine
of Christ by persecutions. The second, the mouth—when they gave
Christ vinegar and gall to drink; and the third, wounded, and continue
to wound the heart,—while they strive, by every sophistical objection,
to deceive the faithful. The fourth son is any good Christian.
OF THE INCARNATION OF OUR LORD
A certain king was remarkable for three qualities. Firstly, he was

braver than all men; secondly, he was wiser; and lastly, more
beautiful. He lived a long time unmarried; and his counsellors would
persuade him to take a wife. “My friends,” said he, “it is clear to you
that I am rich and powerful enough; and therefore want not wealth.
Go, then, through town and country, and seek me out a beautiful and
wise virgin; and if ye can find such a one, however poor she may be,
I will marry her.” The command was obeyed; they proceeded on their
search, until at last they discovered a lady of royal extraction with the
qualifications desired. But the king was not so easily satisfied, and
determined to put her wisdom to the test. He sent to the lady by a
herald a piece of linen cloth, three inches square; and bade her
contrive to make for him a shirt exactly fitted to his body. “Then,”
added he, “she shall be my wife.” The messenger, thus
commissioned, departed on his errand, and respectfully presented
the cloth, with the request of the king. “How can I comply with it,”
exclaimed the lady, “when the cloth is but three inches square? It is
impossible to make a shirt of that; but bring me a vessel in which I
may work, and I promise to make the shirt long enough for the body.”
The messenger returned with the reply of the virgin, and the king
immediately sent a sumptuous vessel, by means of which she
extended the cloth to the required size, and completed the shirt.
Whereupon the wise king married her.
Application
My beloved, the king is God; the virgin, the mother of Christ; who
was also the chosen vessel. By the messenger, is meant Gabriel.
The cloth, is the Grace of God, which, by proper care and labour, is
made sufficient for man’s salvation.
OF THE DECEITS OF THE DEVIL
There were once three friends, who agreed to make a pilgrimage

together. It happened that their provisions fell short, and having but
one loaf between them, they were nearly famished. “Should this
loaf,” they said to each other, “be divided amongst us, there will not
be enough for any one. Let us then take counsel together, and
consider how the bread is to be disposed of.” “Suppose we sleep
upon the way,” replied one of them; “and whosoever hath the most
wonderful dream, shall possess the loaf.” The other two acquiesced,
and settled themselves to sleep. But he who gave the advice, arose
while they were sleeping, and eat up the bread, not leaving a single
crumb for his companions. When he had finished he awoke them.
“Get up quickly,” said he, “and tell us your dreams.” “My friends,”
answered the first, “I have had a very marvellous vision. A golden
ladder reached up to heaven, by which angels ascended and
descended. They took my soul from my body, and conveyed it to that
blessed place where I beheld the Holy Trinity; and where I
experienced such an overflow of joy, as eye hath not seen, nor ear
heard. This is my dream.” “And I,” said the second, “beheld the
devils with iron instruments, by which they dragged my soul from the
body, and plunging it into hell flames, most grievously tormented me;
saying, ‘As long as God reigns in heaven this will be your portion.’”
“Now then,” said the third, who had eaten the bread, “hear my
dream. It appeared as if an angel came and addressed me in the
following manner, ‘My friend, would you see what is become of your
companions?’ I answered, ‘Yes, Lord. We have but one loaf between
us, and I fear that they have run off with it.’ ‘You are mistaken,’ he
rejoined, ‘it lies beside us: follow me.’ He immediately led me to the
gate of heaven, and by his command I put in my head and saw you;
and I thought that you were snatched up into heaven and sat upon a
throne of gold, while rich wines and delicate meats stood around
you. Then said the angel, ‘Your companion, you see, has an
abundance of good things, and dwells in all pleasures. There he will
remain for ever; for he has entered a celestial kingdom and cannot
return. Come now where your other associate is placed.’ I followed,
and he led me to hell-gates, where I beheld you in torment, as you
just now said. Yet they furnished you, even there, with bread and
wine in abundance. I expressed my sorrow at seeing you in misery,
and you replied, ‘As long as God reigns in heaven here I must
remain, for I have merited it. Do you then rise up quickly, and eat all
the bread, since you will see neither me nor my companion again.’ I
complied with your wishes; arose, and eat the bread.”
Application
My beloved, the Saracens and Jews; the rich and powerful; and
finally, the perfect among men, are typified by the three companions.
The bread, represents the kingdom of heaven.
OF VIGILANCE IN OUR CALLING
A thief went one night to the house of a rich man, and scaling the
roof, peeped through a hole to examine if any part of the family were
yet stirring. The master of the house, suspecting something, said
secretly to his wife, “Ask me in a loud voice how I acquired the
property I possess; and do not desist until I bid you.” The woman
complied, and began to vociferate, “My dear husband, pray tell me,
since you never were a merchant, how you obtained all the wealth
which you have now collected.” “My love,” answered her husband,
“do not ask such foolish questions.” But she persisted in her
enquiries; and at length, as if overcome by her urgency, he said,
“Keep what I am going to tell you a secret, and your curiosity shall be
gratified.”
“Oh, trust me.”
“Well, then, you must know that I was a thief, and obtained what I
now enjoy by nightly depredations.” “It is strange,” said the wife, “that
you were never taken.” “Why,” replied he, “my master, who was a
skilful clerk, taught me a particular word, which, when I ascended the
tops of people’s houses, I pronounced, and thus escaped detection.”
“Tell me, I conjure you,” returned the lady, “what that powerful word
was.” “Hear, then; but never mention it again, or we shall lose all our
property.” “Be sure of that;” said the lady, “it shall never be repeated.”
“It was—is there no one within hearing?—the mighty word was
‘False.’”
The lady, apparently quite satisfied, fell asleep; and her husband
feigned it. He snored lustily, and the thief above, who had heard their
conversation with much pleasure, aided by the light of the moon,
descended, repeating seven times the cabalistic sound. But being
too much occupied with the charm to mind his footing, he stepped
through the window into the house; and in the fall dislocated his leg
and arm, and lay half dead upon the floor. The owner of the
mansion, hearing the noise, and well knowing the reason, though he
pretended ignorance, asked, “What was the matter?” “Oh!” groaned
the suffering thief, “False words have deceived me.” In the morning
he was taken before the judge, and afterwards suspended on a
cross.
Application
My beloved, the thief is the devil; the house is the human heart.
The man is a good prelate, and his wife is the church.
To sum up, then, it would appear that the humorous muse in the
Middle Ages concerned herself chiefly with scattering and
disseminating moral lessons, which, because of the superiority of the
teachers to the taught, showed up an ignorance that was laughable.
The fables and maxims that had been passed from mouth to
mouth were put into writing and translated into various tongues.
The Sanscrit or Hindoo stories were undoubtedly the oldest and
from them were taken the Arabic and Persian tales. These drifted
into Europe and took a proper place among the literatures of the
world.
Coleridge says that humor took its rise in the Middle Ages, while a
present day writer contradictingly asserts that nobody smiled from
the second century until the fifteenth.
It is true, that as the advent of Christianity put a full stop to all
progress in the arts and sciences so it impeded the advance of
learning and delayed the development of humor.
And yet, though men may not have smiled during the dark ages,
they now and then laughed, at a humor that was far from subtle, but
which was the foundation of the world’s merriment.
The monks and ecclesiastics who formulated the moral precepts
for the people found that the lessons were better conveyed by funny
stories than by serious ones, and the preachers came to use the
hammer of amusement to drive home their good advices.
MODERN HUMOR
With the readiness of the essayists to ascribe literary paternity,

Chaucer is called the Father of English Poetry.
Coleridge observes that he is the best representative in English of
the Norman-French Trouvères, but even more than by the French,
Chaucer was influenced by the great Italians, Dante, Petrarch and
Boccaccio, as well as by Ovid and Virgil.
Father of Modern Poetry more correctly describes Chaucer, and
as he was the first notable English poet who was a layman, so also,
was he the first connected with the court.
Though his time, the Fourteenth Century, is practically in the
Middle Ages, Chaucer is distinctly modern in viewpoint and
philosophy.
Born in London, he lived his life in the company of the men and
women of the circles he knew and loved. Mankind was his study and
his theme.
The average reader is hampered by the difficulties of the early
English diction, and the modern mind is shocked by the freedom of
speech then in vogue.
But we append such bits of Chaucer’s verse as space allows.
The story of the Cock and the Fox, in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, is
allowed by judges to be the most admirable fable (in the narration)
that ever was written. The description of the birds, the delightful
gravity with which they are invested with intellectual endowments,
are conceived in the highest taste of true poetry and natural humour.
THE COCK AND THE FOX
Now every wise man, let him hearken me:
This story is all so true, I undertake,
As is the book of Lancelot du Lake,

The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality 1St Edition Angela Mendelovici Full Chapter PDF

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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

1st Edition Angela Mendelovici

The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality 1st Edition

Perceptions of Medieval Manuscripts: The Phenomenal

Protein Interactions: The Molecular Basis of

Rights As Security: The Theoretical Basis Of Security

Goodman and Gilman’s The Pharmacological Basis of

Geographies of Transport and Ageing 1st ed. Edition

Non-Propositional Intentionality First Edition. Edition

Goodman and Gilmanu2019s The Pharmacological Basis of

OM E M ENTAL STATES seem to be “of" or “about" things or to "say" something.

The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting

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5-3. Conclusion ioo PART SIX | CONCLUSION

PART FOURI CHALLENGING cuts

7.4. Is Dcrivcd Mental Rtprcscnmtion a Typ: nfInrcnrionality2 is:

THIS PROJECT BEGAN 15 years ago when. as an undergraduate at McGill, I set

thing as phenomenal consciousness. I wrote my undergraduate thesis on precisely

Congress oFAnalytic Philosophy (wit), the 21rd World Congress of Philosophy at

rm: AIM or this book is to defend a radically internalist theory ofintentionality,

or directedness that \ve notice in these and other everyday cases.

My aim is to offer a theory of intentionality, a theory that describes the deep

1 Fixing Reference on Intentionaiity

1.1 Aboutness and Directedness

lntentionality is sometimes characterized, at least as a first pass, as the "aboutness" or

my definition of "intentionality" and the introspective observations it is based (§L3ts)-

is useful when the content of a particular intentional state is under dispute.“

not uncommon for neuroscientific theories to speak of neural structures as carrying

we fixed on intentionality requires that it be a unified phenomenon.“

and derived mental representational content. In Chapter 8, I also argue that

" Ofcourle. whatever mm apparent I perceptual and cognitive

y 2 Goals and Methodology

THE PREVIOUS cHAi='n-:RfixerI on our target, intentionality. This chapter consid-

it would take to provide a theory

2.1 What is a Theory of Intentionality?

A theory of intentionality is a theory that describes the deep nature of inten-

can say that something derivatively (intentionally) represents a content when it

Original and Derived Intmtiwzaiity

intentional property representing that content. Cotrespondingly, derivatively in-