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The Regional Order in
the Gulf Region and
the Middle East
Regional Rivalries and Security
Alliances

Edited by
Philipp O. Amour
The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East
 Philipp O. Amour
Editor

The Regional Order

in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East
Regional Rivalries and Security Alliances
Editor
Philipp O. Amour
Department of International Relations
Sakarya University
Sakarya, Turkey

ISBN 978-3-030-45464-7 ISBN 978-3-030-45465-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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To my beloved children Adam and Ilias. Your growth provides
me a constant source of fulfillment, joy, and pride.
I love you to the moon and back.
 Preface

The contemporary politics of the Gulf Region and the Middle East has been
one of uprisings and counter-uprisings; of civil wars and proxy wars; and of
deliberate and destabilizing ideational and strategic crises. This ever-growing
and complex set of regional dynamics since the first Arab Spring movement
is not routine politics; rather, it is a formative condition for an altered or a
novel regional order.
This book thematically provides a detailed analysis of this ­unfolding
regional order. The analysis takes place in relation to the regional level
of analysis at the interplay of a combination of a cluster of factors that
include the distribution of power dynamics, ideational factors, and
domestic influences. This cluster of factors involves internal and e­ xternal
dimensions that have shaped and continue to shape current regional
responsive dynamics. The book explores the following topics:

• Major security alliances in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East
• Regional great powers such as the KSA, the UAE, Iran, Turkey,
Qatar, and Israel
• The most vigorous non-state militant players on the ground, such
as the Islamic State, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, Hezbollah,
and the Houthi movement
• Global powers, such as Russia
• National narratives and transnational causes that shape regional
polarization

vii
viii PREFACE

• Ecological factors (climate, water, etc.) and their roles in regional

dynamics
• Power rivalry in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East
• Ideational polarization across the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East
• Middle East competition in the Horn of Africa
• Sunni-Shi’ security and competition

The aim of the book is to contribute to a fuller and more encom-

passing understanding of regional dynamics and interactive politics in
the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East. The book is intended
to serve as a text for university-level classes on Middle East Studies and
International Relations in the Middle East; and as a general reference text
for practitioners interested in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East. It highlights recent developments in regional context.

Sakarya, Turkey Philipp O. Amour

 Contents

1 Introduction: The Regional Order in the Gulf

Region and the Middle East 1
Philipp O. Amour

Part I Security Alliances in the Gulf Region

and the Middle East

2 Political Islam as an Ordering Factor?

The Reconfiguration of the Regional Order
in the Middle East Since the “Arab Spring” 29
Julius Dihstelhoff and Alexander Lohse

3 Gulfization of the Middle East Security Complex:

The Arab Spring’s Systemic Change 61
Amr Yossef

4 The Conservative-Resistance Camp: The Axis

of Resistance 95
Ana Belén Soage

ix
x CONTENTS

5 Emergence of the Turkish/Qatari Alliance

in the Middle East: Making of the Moderate
Resistance Bloc 131
Nuri Yeşilyurt and Mustafa Yetim

Part II State Actors and Non–state Militant Actors

in the Regional System

6 Expanding the Turkish Bid for Regional Control

in the Somali Regional Security Complexes 167
Stephanie Carver

7 Qatar’s Calculated Gamble on the Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood 195
Hanlie Booysen

8 (Un)Limited Force: Regional Realignments,

Israeli Operations, and the Security of Gaza 217
Colter Louwerse

9 The Evolution of Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi

(Popular Mobilization Forces) 259
Zana Gulmohamad

10 Between the PYD and the Islamic State:

The Complex Role of Non-state Actors in Syria 303
Naomí Ramírez Díaz

Part III External Actors and Ecological Factors

in the Regional System

11 Domestic and External Factors in the Syrian

Conflict: Toward a Multi-causal Explanation 331
Efe Can Gürcan
 CONTENTS xi

12 Lending an “Old Friend” a Hand: Why Does

Russia Back Syria? 351
Umut Bekcan and Pınar Uz Hançarlı

13 Contribution of Water Scarcity and Sustainability

Failures to Disintegration and Conflict in the Arab
Region—The Case of Syria and Yemen 375
Mohammad Al-Saidi

14 Regional Rivalries and Security Alliances

in the Gulf Region and the Middle East 407
Philipp O. Amour

Index 435
 Notes on Contributors

Mohammad Al-Saidi is a Research Assistant Professor for Natural

Resources Governance at Qatar University, Qatar. He holds two Master’s
degrees and a Ph.D. in Economics from Heidelberg University, Germany.
His research focuses on international development and environmental
policies, particularly in the context of the Middle East.
Philipp O. Amour is an Associate Professor of International Relations at
Sakarya University and a frequent Visiting Professor at Boğaziçi University,
Turkey. Dr. Amour’s theoretically driven yet empirically rich research is sit-
uated in the intersection of the International Relations and Middle East
Studies fields and focuses on foreign policy analysis, security, and alliance
studies of the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, including the Arab
States, Iran, Israel, Palestine, and Turkey. Dr. Amour’s scholarly articles
and book chapters have appeared in international peer-reviewed journals
(e.g., International Journal of Middle East Studies, British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies) and with highly regarded press. Dr. Amour also serves as
an analyst and independent consultant of international affairs, political con-
sulting, as well as academic research and publishing.
Umut Bekcan graduated from the Department of International
Relations, Gazi University in 2002. He studied the Russian language
at the Moscow State Pedagogical University between 2009 and 2010.
In 2012, Dr. Bekcan received his Ph.D. degree in Diplomatic History
from Ankara University, and his thesis was on Russia–China relations in

xiii
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

the post-Cold War era. His major fields of study include Foreign Policy
in the Soviet Union and Russia. He has been published in various jour-
nals and edited books and teaches Diplomatic History, International
Relations, and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Department of Political
Science, Pamukkale University.
Hanlie Booysen is a Lecturer in Religious Studies at Victoria University
of Wellington, New Zealand. Dr. Booysen’s main research interest is the
relationship between Islam and politics. Her Ph.D. thesis explained the
moderate platform of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB). In her
former career, Dr. Booysen served as a diplomat to Jordan (1993–1997),
acted as Chargé d’affaires to Palestine (2000–2003), and was Deputy
Head of Mission in Syria (2009–2012).
Stephanie Carver is a Ph.D. candidate and researcher at Monash
University, Australia. She is researching armed non-state actors in the
Horn of Africa. Her Ph.D. topic considers the role of maritime pirates in
state formation within Somalia. Ms. Carver has worked with the United
Nations in Nairobi and Kenya. She holds a B.A. (Hons) and a Master of
International Relations from Monash University.
Julius Dihstelhoff (Dr. des.) is a Research Fellow in the Department
of Near and Middle Eastern Politics at the Center for Near and Middle
Eastern Studies (CNMS) at Philipps-University Marburg, Germany.
He is an Academic Coordinator for the international joint project
“Merian Centre for Advanced Studies in the Maghreb (MECAM)”,
funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF),
based in Tunis (Tunisia). His research consisted of projects supported by
the German Foreign Ministry between 2012 and 2015 that analyzed the
role of various Islamist parties in the ongoing transformation processes
in the MENA region. His areas of research interest include the interre-
lated transformational processes in the MENA region since 2010/2011
(especially Tunisia), the role of Political Islam in these processes, and
German–Arab relations.
Zana Gulmohamad has a Ph.D. in International Politics from the
University of Sheffield, UK. He is a Teaching Associate in the Politics
and International Relations Department at the University of Sheffield.
Dr. Zana has published in think tank and research institute journals, such
as Combating Terrorism Center/CTC Sentinel at West Point. Dr. Zana’s
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv

forthcoming monograph, which will be published in January 2021 by

I.B. Tauris (an imprint of Bloomsbury), is titled “The Making of Foreign
Policy in Iraq: Political Factions and the Ruling Elite since 2003”.
Efe Can Gürcan is Associate Dean of Research and Development
for the Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences at
İstinye University. He is also a faculty member in the Department of
International Relations, İstinye University and Research Associate at the
University of Manitoba’s Geopolitical Economy Research Group. He
completed his undergraduate education in International Relations at
Koç University. He received his Master’s degree in International Studies
from the University of Montréal and earned his Ph.D. in Sociology
from Simon Fraser University. He speaks English, French, Spanish, and
Turkish. His publications include three books as well as more than 30
articles and book chapters on international development, international
conflict, and international institutions, with a geographical focus on
Latin America and the Middle East. His latest book is Multipolarization,
South–South Cooperation, and the Rise of Post-Hegemonic Governance.
Alexander Lohse is a research fellow in the Department of Near and
Middle Eastern Studies at the Center for Near and Middle Eastern
Studies (CNMS) at Philipps-University Marburg, Germany. Between
2012 and 2015, he was a research assistant at the CNMS as part of the
German Foreign Ministry’s “Transformation partnerships with the Arab
world,” for which he analyzed the role of moderate Islamist parties in
the regional transformation processes. He is currently working on his
Ph.D. project, which deals with status-seeking strategies of the United
Arab Emirates. His research interests include Political Islam and Islamist
movements in the Arab world and their role in regional politics, as well
as the foreign policies of the Arab Gulf states.
Colter Louwerse is a Ph.D. Researcher in Palestine Studies at the
University of Exeter, United Kingdom. His current work focuses on
self-determination, the United Nations, and the Palestine Question.
Naomí Ramírez Díaz holds a Ph.D. in Arabic and Islamic Studies from
the Autónoma University of Madrid. Her research focuses on political
Islam in Syria in particular and the Middle East in general, and she has
published various articles, papers, and reports in addition to her book,
The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: The Democratic Option of Islamism
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

(Routledge, 2017). She has translated articles and books related to Syria
from Arabic to Spanish, the most recent of which is Yassin Al-Haj Saleh’s
The Impossible Revolution.
Ana Belén Soage holds a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern Studies. She has
studied and worked in several Western European and Arab countries and
is fluent in Spanish, English, Arabic, and French. She is currently based
in Madrid, where she teaches at the EAE Business School. Dr. Soage has
published articles, book reviews, and book chapters on issues related to
Political Islam, both in the Muslim world and in the West, and to inter-
national relations with a focus on the Middle East. In addition, she is a
member of the editorial board of the academic journals Politics, Religion
& Ideology, and Religion Compass.
Pınar Uz Hançarlı received her Ph.D. from the Department of Political
Science, Pamukkale University, where she works as a Research Assistant.
She graduated from the Middle East Technical University in the
Department of International Relations. She was awarded a Jean Monnet
Scholarship for 2009–2010 term at the University of Nottingham, where
she completed her M.A. degree in the School of Politics.
Nuri Yeşilyurt is an Assistant Professor at the Department of
International Relations of Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science.
He received his B.A. degree from Ankara University in 2004 and M.Phil.
degree from the University of Cambridge in 2005. He completed
his Ph.D. in 2013 at Ankara University with the thesis titled “Regime
Security and Small State in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan.” Dr.
Yeşilyurt’s publications are mainly focused on Turkish–Arab relations,
and Middle Eastern politics.
Mustafa Yetim is an Assistant Professor at Eskişehir Osmangazi
University. He finished his undergraduate studies in 2009 at Karadeniz
Technical University and then received his Master’s degree in 2011 from
Sakarya University. His Master’s thesis was about “Turkey’s Middle East
Policy between 2002 and 2010: Turkey’s changing perception in the
Middle East”. He completed his Ph.D. in 2016 at Ankara University
with the thesis entitled “Hezbollah Within the Middle East and
Lebanon: Neo-Weberian Perspective”. He has published book chapters,
articles, commentaries, and analysis on topics related to Turkish foreign
policy in the Middle East.
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xvii

Amr Yossef is an independent scholar based in Cairo, Egypt. His

research focuses on Middle East politics and security. He coauthored
the book The Arab Spring and the Geopolitics of the Middle East, wrote
contributions in the edited volumes of Egypt’s Tahrir Revolution
(Lynne Rienner, 2013) and Military Exercises (NATO Defense College,
2018) and published articles that appeared in Foreign Affairs, Journal
of Strategic Studies, and Digest of Middle East Studies. Amr Yossef holds
a Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of Trento and has
taught at NYU and the American University in Cairo.
 Abbreviations

AAH Asaib Ahl al-Haq

AFAD Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
AKP Turkish Justice and Development Party
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Arab League League of Arab States
AU African Union
Daesh The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
EAC East African Community
EMB Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
FAQ Al-Abbas Fighting Division (Furqat al-Abbaas al-Qitaliya)
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FI Fadaiyun Islam
FJP Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt
FSA Free Syrian Army
FV Fighting Vanguard
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
HAF Haftar Armed Forces
Hamas Islamic Resistance Movement
HBJ Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani
HDI Human Development Index
Houthi movement Supporters of God (Ansar Allah)
IA Iraqi Army
ICR Iraqi Council of Representatives
IDF Israeli Defense Force
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

xix
xx ABBREVIATIONS

IGOs Intergovernmental Organizations

IIP The Iraqi Islamic Party
IR International Relations
IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRGC-QF Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force
IRP Islamic Republic Party
IS Islamic State
ISCI The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
ISF Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
Islah Party The Yemeni Congregation for Reform
IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management
JAM Army of the Mahdi (Jaish al-Mahdi)
JCP Justice and Construction Party in Libya
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KH Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq
KNC Kurdish National Council
KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LNA Libyan National Army
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MB Muslim Brotherhood
MbS KSA Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman
MbZ Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince and de facto Ruler
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MNF Multinational Force in Lebanon
n.a. Not Available
NC National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition
Forces
NCB National Coordination Body for Democratic Change
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NSMA Non-State Militant Actors
NTC National Transitional Council in Libya
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PJD Moroccan Party of Justice and Development
PKK Kurdistan Worker Party
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PM Prime Minister
 ABBREVIATIONS xxi

PMB Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood

PMC People’s Mobilization Committee
PMF Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces
PNA Palestinian National Authority
PYD Kurdish Democratic Union Party
QIA Qatar Investment Authority
QMB Qatari Muslim Brotherhood
RSC Regional Security Complex
SA State Actors
SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
SMB Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
SNA Somali National Army
SNC Syrian National Council
SS Saraya al-Salam
TIKA Turkish Corporation and Development Agency
TSR Tacit Security Regime
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF Unified Task Force
UNLU United National Leadership of the Uprising
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USA United States of America
USSR The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, commonly known
as the Soviet Union
WSI Water Stress Index
YPG People’s Protection Units
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Statistical data on sources of power for countries

in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East 13
Table 8.1 Palestinian casualties and destruction during Pillar
of Defense versus Protective Edge 223
Table 14.1 Regional subsystems in the Gulf Region and broader
Middle East 408
Table 14.2 Military expenditure in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East in US$ billion 417

xxiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Regional Order

in the Gulf Region and the Middle East

Philipp O. Amour  

Contemporaries face a daunting task when trying to understand the

complex and fluid dynamics in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East, which has been witnessing turbulences since 2010. This period has
been one of uprisings and counter-uprisings, of civil wars and proxy wars,
and of deliberate and destabilizing ideological and strategic crises. This
ever-growing and complex set of regional dynamics since the first Arab
Spring movement is not routine politics; rather, it is a formative condi-
tion for an altered or a novel regional system across the broader Middle
East.
While these formative regional dynamics evolved during the t­ wenty-first
century, they are actually a prolongation of long-standing issues, affairs,
and narratives across the region, as well as domestic and foreign leanings
and behaviors of state actors and non-state militant actors dating back to
the early stages of the formation of the interstate system in the twentieth
century. Different authors in this book take account of this continuation
of regional dynamics in their respective chapters.

P. O. Amour (*)
Department of International Relations, Sakarya University, Sakarya, Turkey
e-mail: dr@philipp-amour.ch
URL: http://www.philipp-amour.ch

© The Author(s) 2020 1

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_1
2 P. O. AMOUR

This book thematically explores this unfolding regional system, which is

also referred to as a regional order, make-up, or security complex. Written
by scholars from diverse disciplines, it addresses the major security alliances
(i.e., subsystems) and the most vigorous regional great powers and non-
state militant actors in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, in
addition to the role of external actors and ecological factors in regional
dynamics. The analysis takes place at the regional level and considers the
interplay of a combination of a cluster of factors, including the distribution
of material power dynamics, ideational factors, and domestic influences.1
The intent of the book is to contribute to a greater understanding
of interactive politics in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East
from the interrelated vantage points of different systemic units and clus-
ters of factors at the regional level of analysis. At the risk of oversim-
plifying a vastly varied and rich body of literature on the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East, I argue that major studies typically have
used material power-based explanations and political explanations with a
major focus on the foreign policy of states in the region or the deter-
minant role of global great powers in regional dynamics. This line of
inquiries draws, openly or indirectly, on insights from the realist theories
of International Relations (IR) and, to a lesser degree, is informed by lib-
eral- or c­ onstructivist-inspired approaches.
However, this research design also has shortcomings once a certain
level of knowledge and a disciplinary canon of literature have been estab-
lished, as it hinders a fuller and wide-ranging explanation of the topic
under exploration, and has a tendency to produce repetitive or unimagi-
native outputs.
The literature on regional interactive politics in the broader Middle
East reveals an apparent focus largely on the state level and/or the inter-
national level of analysis. The region, in itself and by itself, as a level
of analysis on its own has attracted the attention of fewer scholars.2

1 This outline draws on Elias Götz and Neil MacFarlane, “Russia’s Role in World Politics:

Power, Ideas, and Domestic Influences,” International Politics 56, no. 6 (December
2019): 713–25, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0162-0.
2 To mention some exceptions: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security:

A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013); Barry Buzan and
Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003). However, the theoretical framework used in this book
is (aside from one exception, Chapter 6) independent from these references.
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 3

Moreover, few scholars have examined the regional system in terms of the
interplay between material power dynamics, immaterial power dynamics
(ideas, narratives, and causes), and domestic influences.
Indeed, the state level and the international level are interconnected
with one another and with the regional dynamics, so they deliver valu-
able insights for understanding regional dynamics. Regional powers and
global powers still have a dominant say in the broader Middle East, as
different chapters in this book demonstrate. Yet, a major aim of the book
is to demonstrate that combining different clusters of factors in rela-
tion to the regional level of analysis delivers a more encompassing and
comprehensive explanation for regional politics and dynamics. These are
intertwined, and so their separation into one or a subset of clusters/fac-
tors does not deliver an adequate and reasonable explanation.
As a contribution to the profusion of excellent scholarship on the
Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, a factorial approach is
taken that includes material clusters and immaterial clusters of factors,
while paying attention to the region as a level of analysis in itself and by
itself. Note that this approach engages internal and external dynamics,
as illustrated below. As the final section in this chapter will demonstrate,
the respective authors accord distinct weights to the various systemic
units and clusters of factors and combine them in different ways in their
chapters.
The book is intended to serve as a text for university-level classes on
Middle East Studies and IR in the broader Middle East and as a general ref-
erence text for practitioners interested in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East. It highlights recent developments in a regional context.
Notably, regional dynamics across the broader Middle East provide
students of IR and Middle East Studies, as well as practitioners, with
cases and topics covering fascinating lines of inquiry of regional dynamics
and international politics in both their empirical and theoretical dimen-
sions. These lines of inquiry include regional combinations of state and
non-state actors, and forms of regional relations; regional powers and the
scope and extent of foreign and security policy behavior; the increasing
significance of non-state militant actors and ecological factors; and the
involvement of global great powers; in addition to what the author calls
“ideational balancing” (ideological jostling for power). The various chap-
ters of the book are also useful for social scientists who are interested in
hypotheses and gathering knowledge for theory building of regional sys-
tems, as well as alliance formation and deformation. The objective of this
4 P. O. AMOUR

book is not, however, to deliver a definitive account of the regional sys-

tem in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East or to serve as an ency-
clopedia of all state actors and non-state militant actors (i.e., systemic
units) considered part of the regional system.
The rest of this introduction is divided into three main sections.
The first section deals with the terminology of the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East. Because this book focuses on related geographic
entities, it is appropriate to define them and to explain why there are so
many conflicting understandings of what exactly the region is. The sec-
ond section is a broad overview of the concept of the regional system
and the relationship between the different systemic units. In relation
to the first, the second section theoretically demonstrates how the Gulf
Region and the broader Middle East encompasses a distinct regional sys-
tem. These insights are demonstrated in more depth throughout the var-
ious chapters. The final section delivers an outline of, and a reflection on,
the different chapters included in the book.

Terminology of the Region

In order to understand material and immaterial regional interactions
between and among systemic units (state actors and non-state mili-
tant actors), it is essential to define the commonly used terms, such as
“Middle East.” The term Middle East is used in this book to include
all member countries of the League of Arab States, founded in 1945,
in addition to the non-Arab countries of Iran, Israel, and Turkey (all of
which have Arab minorities). Thus, the Middle East does not represent
a geographical entity with static borders; rather, it is a transcontinen-
tal entity encompassing three different subregions, which are described
below.3
The first subregion is the Fertile Crescent, also called the Levant,
which spans Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Turkey. The
Levant had been the power center (where the intensity of interactive
dynamics is at the highest level) of the regional system in the broader
Middle East from its inception to the first Arab Spring movement. The
second subregion is the Gulf Region and Arabian Peninsula and includes
countries that border the Arabian/Persian Gulf, namely Bahrain, Iraq,

3 Jillian Schwedler and Deborah J. Gerner, Understanding the Contemporary Middle East

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 2.

 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 5

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, and Iran (a non-Arab country). Six of
these countries (excluding Iran, Iraq, and Yemen) form the Cooperation
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC). Since 2014/2015, the
Gulf Region has become the power center of regional dynamics, as
explored in different parts of this book. The third subregion is North
Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) and the Horn of
Africa countries of Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, and
the republic of Sudan, also known as sub-Saharan countries.4
While this list contains exclusively countries, the book explicitly
acknowledges the significance (for regional dynamics) of non-state mili-
tant actors that operate within and across national boundaries.
While bearing in mind that the term is contested, in this book, we
consider the term Middle East to contain the part of the world in which
Islam emerged (Gulf Region) and spread to neighboring subregions in
which the great Islamic empires came to the fore. Contemporary regional
events have proven once more the connectivity of the different subregions
in the broader Middle East. I include North Africa and the sub-Saharan
countries listed above in the Middle East, due to their impact within the
region, despite their geographic distance from its initial power center.
During the first Arab Spring movement (2010–2013) the Jasmine revolu-
tion in Tunisia spread to other subregions and initiated a redistribution of
power on the broader regional level. This movement demonstrates how
a national demand for revolutionary change in Tunisia spread to other
countries to become a transnational cause with region-wide implications.
The second Arab Spring movement (2018–2020) in Sudan and Algeria
demonstrated how changes in domestic leaderships can affect regional
alliances and rivalry in the Horn of Africa (see Chapters 6 and 14).
It is worth mentioning that the revolutionary drive currently brewing in
Iraq and Lebanon is part of the second Arab Spring movement. The rev-
olutionary spread of ideas is also evident in this second wave of the Arab
Spring.
While we employ this definition of the Middle East in the various
chapters in this book, the authors of the respective chapters are aware that
not all countries are involved at the same level and to the same extent in

4 Schwedler and Gerner, 2. At the time of writing this chapter, South Sudan was not

among the member states of the Arab League.

6 P. O. AMOUR

the regional system across the broader Middle East. The authors are also
aware of the different existing definitions of the term Middle East.
Definitions of the term Middle East vary depending on the political,
strategic, and geographic standpoint of the scholars and politicians con-
cerned. For instance, not all scholars include North Africa or all of the
sub-Saharan countries mentioned above in their definition of “Middle
East.”5 This geographic ambiguity leads some scholars to use the term
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), to mark North Africa as a
distinct area.6
Middle East scholars tend to agree on the inclusion of most Arab
countries as part of the broader Middle East due to their sociocultural
and political commonalities; they also include Iran, Israel, and Turkey in
their definition, for particular reasons. Iran and Turkey, states linked by
trade and regional events, are politically and economically interdepend-
ent with other states in the region.7 Most of the states mentioned are
included in a regional system with Israel, with various forms of mutual
cooperation (e.g., specific Arab States having peace treaties with Israel,
Iran–Israel relations before 1979, or Israeli–Turkish relations); growing
rapprochement of Arab states toward Israel since the first Arab Spring
movement; or mutual rivalry, enmity, and violent conflict, bearing in
mind the Arab–Israeli wars.
The term Middle East is a relic of the colonial period. It was origi-
nally used in elite circles, by military planners, scholars, and the media
in the early twentieth century, before it circulated and spread from the
West (i.e., it is a term conjuring up part of the world in which the ­culture
of western Europe is outweighed) to the rest of the world, including
the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East itself.8 The term became
widely circulated after WWI, and conjures up a strategic region; a part

5 Michele Penner Angrist, ed., Politics & Society in the Contemporary Middle East

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 1, for instance, includes North Africa in his defini-
tion but not all Sub-Saharan countries.
6 For instance: David E. Long, Bernard Reich, and Mark J. Gasiorowski, eds., The

Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, 6th ed. (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2011).
7 Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System (Chicago: Rand

McNally, 1967), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR05652.v1.

8 Nikki Keddie, “Is There a Middle East?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 4,

no. 3 (July 1973): 255–71.

 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 7

of the world with a distinctly different culture from western Europe.

But the name posed the questions: middle and east of where? For those
living in western Europe, the Middle East is situated between the Near
East and Far East, so the term makes sense. This geographic proximity
is, however, distinctive to western Europe; hence, the so-called Middle
East has different proximity to other states, e.g., it is the Middle West for
China or the South of Russia.9 In this sense, the term is Eurocentric.
Unlike other terms with an imperialist derivation the term “Middle
East” persists in common use, despite its imperialist connotations. For
instance, the term “Far East” was substituted by “East Asia.” However,
since its introduction the term has taken root in various languages and is
widely used among various peoples in the region and beyond.10
Since the creation of the regional system in the broader Middle East,
the Levant subregion has constituted the power center of the regional
system because of the seriousness and wider implications of some of the
conflicts that have taken place there (e.g., Arab–Israeli wars) and the
concentration of transnational causes (e.g., Palestine Cause, Arabism,
and Pan-Arabism). The center of gravity of regional dynamics has shifted
to the Gulf Region since the second decade of this twenty-first century,
because of the increase in conflicts there (as illustrated in Chapters 3
and 14). What does it mean, then, to study the regional system in the
Gulf Region and the broader Middle East?

Theoretical Framework of the Regional System

The aim of this section is to define the regional system so this definition
can be used as a theoretical tool to explore the design and dynamics in
the broader Middle East. Later, the section provides reflections on power
projection capabilities.
A regional system is defined as a frequent and intense configura-
tion resulting from the existence of, and interactions between and
among, state actors and non-state actors. This type of security and ide-
ational configuration is typically acknowledged inwardly from within
the regional system itself and outwardly by global great powers,

9 Eliezer Chammou, “Near or Middle East? Choice of Name,” MELA Notes, no. 37

(Winter 1986): 6–8.

10 Bruce Borthwick, Comparative Politics of the Middle East: An Introduction

(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 14–16.

8 P. O. AMOUR

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and multinational corporations

(MNCs), as a distinctive regional system of international politics.11
A regional system is a theoretical construct used as an analytical tool to
help observers and practitioners investigate regional dynamics and exter-
nal behavior in and of themselves.12 So, what variables designate a regional
system? Geographic proximity among the interactive systemic units of the
regional system is one major variable. This geography proximity can be
divided into three subcategories: the power center of the regional system,
with implications for the conduct of regional affairs; the fringe areas (or
periphery) of the regional system, where the significance of regional dynam-
ics appears to be lower than elsewhere in the region; and the third category
originated from the international system: an external category.13 Global
great powers are actively involved in the power centers and less so in the
fringe areas. The subregion with the assumed highest level of strategic grav-
ity is the power center of the regional system. Regional shake-ups appear to
reallocate these power centers and the regional dynamics then grow assertive
and bellicose in nature.
Further variables to describe a regional system involve points of
commonality and divergence. Systemic state actors and non-state mil-
itant actors usually share a resemblance in terms of ideas and national
narratives, in addition to domestic political and ecological attitudes and
economic-politico interrelation, so they influence each other in their
external ideational and foreign behavior.14 Together, these variables
demonstrate the distinctive character of a regional system in terms of the
regularities and irregularities of interactive relations.
Empirically, the following question emerges regarding the broader
Middle East: Do we recognize a regional system in the Gulf Region and
the broader Middle East? The answer to this question is yes. Witnessing
regional dynamics across the broader region, it becomes apparent that the

11 This definition draws on William R. Thompson, “Delineating Regional Subsystems:

Visit Networks and the Middle Eastern Case,” International Journal of Middle East Studies
13, no. 2 (May 1981): 213–35, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800055306.
12 See e.g., F. Gregory Gause, “Systemic Approaches to Middle East International

Relations,” International Studies Review 1, no. 1 (June 1999): 11–31, https://doi.

org/10.1111/1521-9488.00139.
13 Louise J. Cantore and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A

Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

14 Russett, International Regions and the International System.
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 9

patterns of interstate and non-state militant actors form a regional system

in and of itself. Events such as the Jasmine Spring in Tunisia, the Syrian
and Yemeni civil wars, and the uprisings in Sudan and Algeria show com-
monalities between countries from different subregions of the Middle
East and have wider implications not just for domestic politics but also for
the wider region beyond the individual countries directly involved.
How can we analyze a regional system? A regional system can be
studied (1) in term of its order (i.e., its distribution of power), which
contains a set of systemic alliances (i.e., subsystems); (2) in terms of its
patterns of regional dynamics and political processes (its security and
foreign response options and behaviors); and (3) in terms of its trans-
national causes.15 Note that ideas, ideologies, and normative beliefs, as
well as national narratives, are foundational for transnational causes. As
suggested above, these clusters of factors reflect an explanation of the
regional system that combines the interplay between material power
and the immaterial power of ideas and causes, in addition to domestic
influences. These clusters of factors also inform the internal/external
dynamics of the regional system. The following paragraphs attempt to
explain these three mentioned dimensions.
The first dimension is the regional order (structure) that may corre-
spond to the whole region (unipolar/hegemon), to two alliance subsys-
tems (bipolar), to three power blocs (tripolar), or to four and more power
subsystems (multipolar). The regional order of a regional system is made
up of its systemic units: state and non-state militant actors, and the inter-
active relations they conduct within and between each other (e.g., secu-
rity cooperation and engagement, alienation, polarization, rivalry, conflict,
and war, as well as ideational balancing) in the context of alignments,
arrangements, or webs of partnerships. These types of regional relations
include both collaborative and non-collaborative interactions, and irregu-
larities as well as regularities in interactive patterns between actors.16
The second explanatory dimension of the regional level of anal-
ysis tackles the patterns of regional dynamics and political processes in

15 Tareq Y. Ismael, International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in

World Politics, Contemporary Issues in the Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press, 1986), 41–42.
16 James Piscatori and R. K. Ramazani, “The Middle East,” in Comparative Regional

Systems: West and East Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Developing Countries,
ed. Werner J. Feld (New York; Oxford: Pergamon, 1980), 296.
10 P. O. AMOUR

a regional system. These depend largely on the characteristics of the

regional order (e.g., the dominant political cultures, the set of ideas
and narratives in the region, and the degree of its regionalization),
the regime type of the principal state actors (e.g., authoritarian politi-
cal structures likely result in proactive and assertive actions), the ideas
and normative beliefs of the decision-makers, and the policy attitudes
and responses of international great powers toward regional dynamics.
A regional system can be impermanent and deceptive in outward appear-
ance; it changes either through regional integration or due to regional
eruption.
The third explanatory dimension of the regional level of analysis
includes ideas, ideologies, national narratives, and transnational causes.
By ideas, I refer to the abstract concepts (e.g., identity, anarchy) or
mental imagery of how things stand (e.g., Iran or the KSA as a regional
hegemon). By ideology, I mean a set of ideas (e.g., democracy, com-
munism) and normative beliefs (e.g., preferences, in the form of looked-
for and good or objectionable and bad). By narratives, I refer to a state’s
distinctive perception, understanding, and representation of the national
self and of other states, domestically as well as externally. By causes, I
refer to affairs of transnational importance with mobilization effects
internally and across borders. Transnational causes with r­egion-wide
implications influence and shape regional events and, as a result, the for-
mation or deformation of alliances and power centers, as well as shifts
across the regional system as a whole. Transnational causes, such as the
Arab–Israeli conflict, the Arab–Arab Cold War, the KSA–Iran rivalry,
the Sunni–Shi’ polarization, and the first and second Arab Spring move-
ments, have impacted the formation of regional subsystems and altered
the regional system in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East in
the aftermath of regional developments.
Power dynamics in the form of alliances, regional rivalry, and politi-
cal processes, as well as the ideas and ideologies of involved individuals,
deeply influence and shape national narratives and transnational causes.
Relatedly, the three-dimensional relationships present in the regional sys-
tem engage both internal and external aspects in their wake.
As mentioned above, systemic units include state actors and ­non-state
militant actors. A regional system consists of at least two or more
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 11

systemic units.17 State actors and non-state militant actors create and
form a regional system or a subsystem; however, this creation oscillates
back and forth and molds systemic units as well.
There are costs and benefits to having bigness (i.e., power in its natu-
ral, tangible, and intangible forms described in the next subsection) and
there is a strong temptation to gather still more power. In an author-
itarian regional system, such as the broader Middle East, even with
power one cannot be completely secure; therefore, regional great pow-
ers attempt to build alliances (i.e., subsystems) with other states and
­non-state militant actors in order to balance other regional great powers.
Regional great powers learn to manage their authority within their pole,
and they expect less powerful actors to submit across their subsystem.
Less powerful states and non-state militant actors are usually bullied into
submission in one way or another. The distribution of power within a
subsystem encourages a less powerful systemic actor to follow the more
powerful actor or to balance vis-à-vis (e.g., to get on the bandwagon
with) a regional great power, to protect itself from the arbitrariness of a
higher power.
The next section reflects on the concept of power projection capabil-
ities that shape the way state and non-state militant actors can translate
their influence in and across the regional system.

Power Projection Capabilities

As suggested above, the regional system involves state and non-state
militant actors, which exist and interact (or not) with one another in dif-
ferent forms. The structure of the regional system may show ­different
forms of polarity: a hegemon or a number of regional great powers in
a power alliance. In an authoritarian regional system, among other sys-
tems, the value of power prevails; hence, the might of a state or n ­ on-
state militant actor is basic to its endurance, survival, and consolidation
of power or bid for further power, as well as in providing assurances to
its allies. In their different forms, as described below, power projection
capabilities enable a systemic unit to influence and shape the regional sys-
tem, to tackle other coexisting rival subsystems within the same regional

17 Ismael, International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East, 41–42.

12 P. O. AMOUR

system, and to impose national narratives and similar-minded causes in

and across the regional system.
There are distinctive aspects to the awareness and measurement of
power: the natural, tangible, and intangible aspects.18 The natural source
of power arises from a country’s location, its geography, and its popula-
tion size. Large population and territorial sizes are generally translated
into a larger army and a many-sided economy in times of peace and war.
These resources empower related state and non-state militant actors to
counter, assert, or exercise real or potential force with respect to other
systemic actors.19 The sources of power for the Middle East countries are
listed in Table 1.1, which shows the wide variations in sources of both
natural and tangible power among the countries. These variations and
their implications are discussed further in Chapter 14.
The notion of the tangible source of power pays more attention to
human agency than to population size, and to military technology and
arsenal advancements rather than to the size of military sector. It also
emphasizes industrial progress and economic strength as crucial elements
of this power measurement. Hence, the stronger a state or ­non-state
actor’s economy and the more developed its industry, the more the
state or non-state actor can sustain and expand its domestic progress
and regional position vis-à-vis its rivals in times of peace and conflict.
According to this approach, power comes from the knowhow to translate
a power source into capability to control strategic events and outcomes.
If the natural source of power is largely predetermined (e.g., the geo-
graphical location) the tangible source of power needs work to acquire
and thus it can take a long time to do so.
To understand the scope of power, we need to consider the intangi-
ble source of power, which captures further forms of power, such as soft
power and public diplomacy.20 While the former two sources of power
(natural and tangible power) involve material aspects (e.g., troops, tanks,
aircraft, missiles, and nuclear weapons), intangible sources of power
underline immaterial capabilities, such as ideas, ideologies, information,

18 Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, Essentials of International Relations, 6th

ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), 140–46.

19 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 5th ed. (Boston:

Longman, 2012).
20 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public

Affairs, 2004).
Table 1.1 Statistical data on sources of power for countries in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East

Country Land area Total population Urban popula- GDP per capita Literacy rate, Armed forces Military
(km2) 2018 2018 tion (% of total) current US$ adult total (% personnel, total expenditure
2018 2018 of people ages 15 2017 (current USD)
and above)

Algeria 2,381,740.0 42,228,429 73 4278.9 75 317,000 9,583,724.29

1

Bahrain 778.0 1,569,439 89 24,050.8 95 19,000 1,396,808.51

Egypt 995,450.0 98,423,595 43 2549.1 75 836,000 3,109,997.89
Iran 1,628,760.0 81,800,269 75 5627.7 86 563,000 13,194,151.14
Iraq 434,128.0 38,433,600 70 5878.0 44 209,000 6,317,977.15
Israel 21,640.0 8,883,800 92 41,614.0 92 178,000 15,946,788.60
Kuwait 17,820.0 4,137,309 100 34,244.0 96 25,000 7,296,266.53
KSA 2,149,690.0 33,699,947 84 23,219.1 94 252,000 67,554,666.67
Qatar 11,610.0 2,781,677 99 69,026.5 93 22,000 1,876,758.24
Libya 1,759,540.0 6,678,567 80 7235.0 86 n.a. 3,755,658.60
Morocco 446,300.0 36,029,138 62 3237.9 69 246,000 3,696,856.94
Syria 183,630.0 16,906,283 54 2032.6 81 239,000 2,494,887.48
Turkey 769,630.0 82,319,724 75 9311.4 96 512,000 18,967,113.03
UAE 71,020.0 9,630,959 87 43,004.9 90 63,000 22,755,071.48
Yemen 527,970.0 28,498,687 37 944.4 54 40,000 1,714,830.84

Source World Bank.org; World Development Indicators. Data for literacy rate and military expenditure are from different years
INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …
13
14 P. O. AMOUR

images, intellectual property, entertainment, and media. One major aim

of soft power is to polish the state actor’s or non-state actor’s brand
(i.e., reputation) abroad, as well as to place the nation/community in a
good position politically, diplomatically, economically, and ecologically.
Therefore, other systemic actors will cooperate, engage, and eventually
enter alliances, or refrain from confrontation, with the actor, while for-
eign constituencies and elites will show understanding or even support
for the actor’s regional course.
Systemic actors with power projection capabilities promote their com-
munications technology and informational infrastructure in order to
reach and target foreign audiences, including elites. A systemic actor with
immaterial projection capabilities could translate its communications and
information infrastructure into political and ideational power across the
region in order to support its normative principles (i.e., national narra-
tives and causes) and foreign policies. It could do this, for example, by
transforming national narratives and like-minded pan-causes across the
region, by manipulating existing ones, or by altering the importance
of competitive and rival narratives and regional causes. Regional great
powers in the Gulf Region and the broad Middle East dominate infor-
mation and communications infrastructure; they target their foreign con-
stituencies intentionally.
The tangible source of power is much easier to quantify and meas-
ure than the other two sources of power. It is better suited to present,
defend, and guarantee a state’s national objectives across the regional sys-
tem. Intangible power has been gaining importance and growing in use
by state and non-state actors since the turn of the twenty-first century.
Natural source of power has lost importance since WWII; hence, states
with little natural source power have demonstrated the ability and kno-
whow to develop power capabilities beyond or despite their modest nat-
ural resources. Israel is the classical example, in the broader Middle East.
When soft and material power approaches are married, a “smart
power” strategy develops through the connection of military force (or
the threat of it) with the soft power of persuasion, seduction, attrac-
tion, or manipulation. The level and scope of employment of a specific
source of power or a mix of them depends on domestic influences, the
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 15

leadership in charge, and the set of ideas and ideologies concerned, as

well as the given balance of power.21
Power projection capabilities are understood in this book to repre-
sent the ability of a state or non-state actor to exercise all or some of its
sources of power (e.g., military, economic, diplomatic, and ideational/
informational) across the regional system in order to keep its regional
influence in its material and immaterial forms, to retain the confidence of
allies, to contribute to the prevention and containment of rivals, and to
have the might to react to regional dynamics. Chapter 14 gives further
theoretical and empirical insights into the concept of the regional system
and power projection capabilities.

The Organization of the Book

The aim of this book is to explain the regional system in the Gulf Region
and broader Middle East in terms of its order (the major interstate alli-
ances involved, the proactive state actors and non-state militant actors);
its political processes (e.g., security cooperation and engagement, rivalry,
and conflict) in the form of alliance building, persistence, and disinte-
gration; and the underlying ideas and transnational causes. While several
chapters focus on the aftermath of the Arab Spring movement, some
chapters go back in history to the twentieth century to reflect on earlier
stages in order to clarify their focus.
My objective as the editor of this book was not to solicit contribu-
tions according to a circumscribed conceptual design. Instead, I asked
the contributors to consider a combination of the above-mentioned clus-
ters of factors in relation to the regional level of analysis, while still giv-
ing them flexibility regarding the conceptual structure of their chapter.
In doing this my aim was to encourage thematic coherency, while still
allowing innovative analysis. The outcome is a collection of conceptually
similar chapters, rich in empirical inclusion, that visualize the regional
system, which is otherwise a theoretical construct of a complicated real-
ity. The respective chapters offer supplementary and complementary
analyses of the regional system across the broader Middle East from
different perspectives.

21 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2012).
16 P. O. AMOUR

The following outline shows that not all contributors deliver the same
level of intertwined interpretation of the interrelation of material power
factors, ideational factors, and domestic influences. Thus, this book is
best seen as a contribution to the interplay of a combination of a clus-
ter of factors on the regional system in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East rather than a definitive analysis. We hope it will kindle fruit-
ful research into the interplay of factorial clusters at the regional level of
analysis that shape and form regional dynamics.
Part I of this book deals with the regional system in general; it exam-
ines the evolution and policies of the major subsystems in the broader
Middle East, in addition to their ideational set and transnational affairs.
It starts with Dihstelhoff and Lohse’s chapter (Political Islam as an
Ordering Factor? The Reconfiguration of the Regional Order in the
Middle East Since the Arab Spring). The authors analyze two oppos-
ing regional alliances in terms of their ideational positions and norma-
tive beliefs toward the movements of Political Islam since 2010. They
demonstrate that regional great powers in the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East have colliding normative beliefs regarding the rise
of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as either a systemic opportunity (e.g.,
Turkey and Qatar) or a security threat (e.g., the KSA and the UAE).
The pro-Muslim-Brotherhood bloc is ideationally similar to the Arab
Spring revolutionary forces and thus regarded the first Arab Spring
movement and the rise of the MB to states’ leadership as a systemic
opportunity. Qatar understood the emergence of Political Islam as a stra-
tegic possibility to gain different allies in the region in order to become
independent from neighboring powers. Turkey, too, saw in the regional
dynamics an opportunity to ally itself with Tunisia, Egypt, and other
revolutionary leaderships promoted by the first Arab Spring movement.
Neither Turkey nor Qatar regard the MB as a threat. The MB branch in
Qatar officially dissolved itself in the 1990s and still lacks a branch there
despite the political mobilization of the Arab Spring. Turkey, a ­non-Arab
state with a long tradition of political activism, saw no threat in the
emergence of the MB. Surviving under authoritarian rule, the MB across
the broader region felt ideologically and empirically somewhat attracted
to the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) that had won legis-
lative elections and was regarded as a ruling model for good governance
and for the conformity of Islam and democracy in the region.
This pro-Muslim-Brotherhood bloc has stood in opposition to the
anti-Muslim-Brotherhood bloc led by the KSA and UAE, as well as
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 17

Egypt, since the 2013 Egyptian coup d’état. The KSA/UAE-led power
bloc regards the MB and its ideological affiliates as a threat to their
domestic hold on power and to their regional might. They were likely
also concerned that the new unfolding subsystem (i.e., the pro-MB bloc)
in the region would result in an integration of Iran or a closer connec-
tion with the Iran-led conservative-resistance subsystem (explored in
Chapter 4). For the anti-Muslim-Brotherhood bloc, the similar ideologi-
cal roots of Sunni Political Islam represented in the MB and Shi’ Political
Islam in the Islamic revolution would make alliance building of both
power blocs more likely.
Besides ideological explanations, the authors in Chapter 2 point to
geopolitical pressures and domestic influences regarding threat percep-
tions within the anti-MB bloc. Dihstelhoff and Lohse argue that not
all principal states have the same threat perception urgency toward the
MB, Iran, and the Islamic State (IS). According to the authors, the KSA
appears to prioritize the threat of Iran and IS, while UAE and Egypt
seem to have set their security priorities on the MB. The authors explain
that this difference in prioritization is due to the geostrategic threats
of Iran and IS against the KSA, while domestic influences appear to be
more prevalent in the case of Egypt and UAE. The pro-MB bloc wit-
nessed setbacks after the military coup in Egypt in July 2013 and in
Sudan in April 2019. Tunisia also reestablished its ties with the anti-MB
bloc. So far, Turkey and Qatar have stuck to their commitment to back
up movements of Political Islam.
Chapter 3 (Gulfization of the Middle East Security Complex) is written
by Amr Yossef, who underlines the distribution of power dynamics, inter-
nal/external pressures, and subregional ideational preferences. Amr Yossef
marks in his chapter a systemic shift of the regional system in terms of its
power center. The Levant had been the heart of the regional system in the
broader Middle East due to its politicizing and mobilizing transnational
cross-border causes; however, subregional concerns and actions in and ema-
nating from the Gulf Region outward since 2014 have shifted the center of
the regional system to the Gulf. While the Arab–Israeli conflict dominated
regional affairs after 1948, Gulf affairs have gained increasing importance
since 2011. Moreover, a perceived US abandonment of Gulf affairs during
the Obama administration has pushed the KSA/UAE-led subsystem to pur-
sue a proactive and assertive foreign policy and project its power capabilities
through the region (e.g., in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, among others).
18 P. O. AMOUR

This new policy approach has been underlined by volatile security and
ideational threats from the IS, MB, and Iran. The rise of the novel power
bloc led by Turkey and Qatar (discussed in Chapter 5) has most likely
contributed to a shift in the policy attitudes and actions of the KSA and
UAE. The ascension of King Salman to the throne of Saudi Arabia, as
an example of domestic influences, along with his current crown prince,
have most likely contributed to this alteration in regional policy.
Chapter 4 (The Conservative-Resistance Camp: The Axis of
Resistance) by Ana Belén Soage pays attention to the Iran-led subsys-
tem encompassing Syria, Hezbollah, and non-state militant actors (such
as the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas], the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad [PIJ], the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and, likely, the
Houthi movement in Yemen). Like the authors of previous chapters
in this book, Soage argues that strategic calculations (e.g., a common
enemy), and specific ideational/ideological underpinnings bind these
state and non-state militant actors together. The Iran–Iraq Gulf War, civil
war in Lebanon, and the Palestinian Intifadas are examples of binding
and unifying events among principal actors in this subsystem. Note that
these regional events correspond to transnational causes, so they increase
the public support and legitimacy of these subsystemic actors among
foreign audiences and elites across the Gulf Region and broader Middle
East. Soage demonstrates how the Syrian Civil War has altered this trans-
national brand of the long-seated regional subsystems and how it has
provided different systemic actors with opportunities to improve their
guerrilla and militant capabilities. Moreover, the chapter delivers com-
plementary insights to previous chapters regarding ideological/doctrinal
roots of Shiite Political Islam and Sunni Political Islam.
Chapter 5 (Emergence of the Turkish/Qatari Alliance in the Middle
East: Making of the Moderate-Resistance Bloc) introduces the rise of
the most recent regional subsystem led by Turkey and Qatar, including
transition countries that are or have been run by political parties with
Islamist inheritance that entered government because of the changes
brought about by the first Arab Spring movement.22 Nuri Yeşilyurt

22 See more in this regard Philipp O. Amour, “Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics,

and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring: An Introduction,” in The Middle East
Reloaded: Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab
Spring, ed. Philipp O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington, DC:
Academica Press, 2018), 1–21.
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 19

and Mustafa Yetim argue that while this Turkish–Qatari alliance has
suffered setbacks since 2013/2014, it still stands and conducts dif-
ferent regional policies in comparison to the other long-established
KSA/UAE-led and Iran-led subsystems. Yeşilyurt and Yetim call the
third subsystem a “moderate-resistance” bloc; hence, they believe it fea-
tures a set of ideas and normative beliefs, as well as foreign policy orien-
tations and behaviors that intersect both these ­long-settled subsystems
at various points. This is likely one reason, among others, why the long-
established subsystems are cautious toward the new Turkey/Qatar led
alliance. The various security alliances in the broader Middle East are
listed in Table 14.1 in Chapter 14.
Part II of this book covers specific state actors (Turkey, Qatar, and
Israel) and non-state militant actors (Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces
[PMF], Syria’s Democratic Union Party [PYD], and the Islamic State).
The respective chapters illuminate how these state and non-state actors
have attempted to assert their regional position and to counter rivals
with the help of hard power and soft power strategies that included
military actions, military base expansion, developmental and organiza-
tional actions, and ideological projection. The cases here are illustrative
for state and non-state militant actors in the region, but are not exhaus-
tive. While the ideational position, policy attitudes, and systemic place
of important countries (e.g., the KSA) and non-state militant actors
(e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi movement) are explored in
Part I of this book, some countries, like Egypt and UAE, require further
attention.23
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with Turkey and Qatar, respectively. Both
chapters demonstrate how complex regional dynamics since 2011 have
moved both countries to abandon their foreign policies of zero problems
with neighbors and strategic policy hedging.
Chapter 6 (Expanding the Turkish Bid for Regional Control in the
Somali Regional Security Complexes) explores Turkey’s humanitarian

23 The role of Egypt in the interstate system in the Middle East is largely explored. See

e.g., Mustafa El-Labbad, “Egypt: A ‘Regional Reference’ in the Middle East,” in Regional
Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations after the Arab Revolts, ed. Henner Fürtig,
2014, 81–99; For UAE see e.g., Rosa Vane, “Employing Militarization as a Means of
Maintaining the ‘Ruling Bargain’: The Case of the United Arab Emirates,” in The Middle
East Reloaded: Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the
Arab Spring, ed. Philipp O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington, DC:
Academica Press, 2018), 225–83.
20 P. O. AMOUR

and soft power engagement with the Federal Republic of Somalia.

Stephanie Carver demonstrates how soft power empowered Ankara to
brand a transnational humanist identity for Turkey across the broader
Middle East. One rationale of this foreign policy was the diversifica-
tion of Turkey’s economy, the ability to project power and influence in
the Horn of Africa (i.e., with a military base), and the extension of its
security terrain on the edge of the broader Middle East. The chapter
explicitly or implicitly underlines domestic influences and ideational pref-
erences of the leadership, in addition to status ambitions as explanations
for Turkish foreign policy in the Horn of Africa.
Chapter 7 (Qatar’s Calculated Gamble on the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood) examines Qatar’s regional policy and its positioning
toward the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (SMB). Hanlie Booysen con-
cludes that Doha’s support of the MB in Syria and Egypt is not rooted
solely in doctrinal/ideological motivations, but also has the strategic
aim of enhancing Qatar’s regional position across the broader Middle
East through alliance building. By doing so, Qatar can leverage its type
of power and gain foreign policy independence vis-à-vis neighboring
higher powers in the Gulf Region. Chapter 7 also gives hints regarding
the roots of suspicion and points of conflict between Qatar ­vis-à-vis the
KSA and Bahrain.
In Chapter 8 ((Un)Limited Force: Regional Realignments, Israeli
Operations, and the Security of Gaza), Colter Louwerse exam-
ines Tel Aviv’s policy and its use of force against Gaza in the context
of Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge
(2014). Louwerse demonstrates that regional dynamics since 2013 have
brought about strategic advantages for Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians
in both the regional and international contexts. He demonstrates how
the most important constraints on Israel’s overuse of power against the
Palestinians have declined since then. The conservative-resistance bloc,
known for its support of non-state militant actors (Hamas and Islamic
Jihad, among others) and for the Palestinian cause, has been busy with
domestic uprisings, civil/proxy wars, and national crises. Israel’s rap-
prochement with the conservative-moderate bloc, in addition to having
the unprecedented support of the Trump administration, have decreased
deterrence of Israel’s over-actions. The author uses developments since
the first Arab Spring movements to explain the extent and scope of the
Israeli military operations against Gaza. While the international system
matters, it becomes apparent in this chapter that it is the regional shift
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 21

in transnational affairs and overhauls of priorities that have enabled Tel

Aviv’s excessive use of force against Gaza.
Part II of this book includes two chapters dealing with non-state
militant actors—Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Syria’s
Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the Islamic State. To fully under-
stand the range of regional politics unfolding across the Gulf Region
and broader Middle East since 2011, an examination of non-state mil-
itant actors is essential. Non-state militant actors are not a novelty in
the region. However, these systemic units have recently become major
players in regional politics operating across state boundaries and are now
challenging the foundations of the regional system in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East. These non-state militant actors (in addi-
tion to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi movement, which are
explored in Part I of this book) are the most vigorous players on the
ground and their regional importance is increasing.
Chapter 9 (The Evolution of Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi) surveys Iraq’s
PMF, a Shi’ militia supported by Iran and primarily operating in Iraq
and Syria. Zana Gulmohamad divides groups within the PMF accord-
ing to their ideational affiliation and benefactors. Like Hezbollah, the
PMF is part of the conservative-resistance subsystem (see Table 14.1 in
Chapter 14). The PMF is an umbrella of different (Shi’) groups, so Zana
Gulmohamad examines the group’s ideological roots and their domes-
tic and regional objectives. He demonstrates how the pro-Iranian militias
within the PMF contributed to the power projection capabilities of Iran,
not just in Iraq but in other areas of the region.
Chapter 10 (Between the PYD and the Islamic State: The Complex
Role of Non-state Actors in Syria) explores the Kurdish Democratic
Union Party and IS as non-state violent actors that had ambitions for
autonomy at different levels. The Islamic State attempted to set up an
actual state, while the PYD was allegedly pursuing an autonomous
region. Both examples indicate the increasing role of non-state militant
actors in Syria and in the broader Middle East, whose actions in consol-
idating territories under their control and establishing quasi-state enti-
ties with a considerable organizational capacity go beyond the scope and
extent of a conventional non-state militant actor.
Part I and Part II of this book demonstrate, collectively, that the
regional system in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East rests on
the interrelation of power dynamics and ideational and transnational
cause-based aspects, in addition to domestic influences. All of these
­
22 P. O. AMOUR

factors interweave to influence and form the policies of the relevant sys-
temic state actors and non-state militant actors.
Part III of the book deals with Russia and ecological factors. Great
powers (e.g., France, the UK, Soviet Union/Russia, and the USA) have
intimately influenced and continue to influence the development of the
regional system and its actors’ sets of ideas, ideologies, and normative
beliefs, as well as policy choices and strategic behaviors for factors relat-
ing to their dependence on natural resources (e.g., gas, oil), interests in
geopolitics (of the Middle East as a major junction of trade routes such
as the Bab Al-Mandeb, Gulf of Aqaba, the Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz,
and Suez Canal) and balance of power politics. As industrial states con-
tinue their development (and preeminence in related affairs), energy
resources are one of their most crucial assets.
Controlling the supply of energy resources and guaranteeing this sup-
ply at affordable prices are elementary for the continuity of these states’
supreme power and wealth. The external presence of major global pow-
ers in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East finds its articulation in
the form of soft power projective programs and cooperative monetary
relief, security, intelligence, economic cooperation, and engagement, in
addition to military intervention.
This part of the book includes chapters on Russia and on environ-
mental factors. Various chapters in this book address the impact of the
USA on regional politics; however, no chapter focuses exclusively on the
USA’s role in the region.24
Efe Can Gürcan’s analysis in Chapter 11 (Domestic and External
Factors in the Syrian Conflict: Toward a Multicausal Explanation)
explores the underlying issues of the Syrian uprising and the subsequent
civil war. Gürcan demonstrates how failed political-economic policies and
inadequate environmental policies contributed to the Syrian uprising and
how these domestic factors made the Syrian regime more vulnerable to
external interference motivated by geopolitical energy security and the

24 For the USA see e.g., Shahram Akbarzadeh and Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and

International Relations: Crisis Zone (London; New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis
Group, 2018), 117–64; Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle
East, 2nd ed. (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2015), 225–71; and Flynt
Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, “The United States, Iran and the Middle East’s New
‘Cold War,’” The International Spectator 45, no. 1 (March 2010): 75–87, https://doi.
org/10.1080/03932721003661624.
 1 INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 23

politics of balance of power. The author examines energy policies of spe-

cific (regional) great powers to explain their foreign policies in Syria.
Chapter 12 (Lending an “Old Friend” a Hand: Why Does Russia
Back Syria?) attempts to explain Russia’s involvement in Syria as arising
power from a combination of different factors. Umut Bekcan and Pınar
Uz Hançarli conclude that Russia’s policy behavior in the Syrian conflict
and its backing of the Syrian regime overlaps with its self-perception as
a reemerging global superpower. With this perception, Russia has been
unwilling to watch US/Western interventionism in the region in silence.
Moreover, Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict harmonized with
domestic influences, including the mindset and normative beliefs of
Vladimir Putin, as well as Russia’s economic and political objectives
of upholding a long-established ally and maintaining its naval base in
Tartus, which gives Russia access to the Mediterranean for commercial
and strategic purposes.
In Chapter 13 (Contribution of Water Scarcity and Sustainability
Failures to Disintegration and Conflict in the Arab Region) Mohammad
Al-Saidi looks at of the issues of water scarcity and sustainability failures
(in Syria and Yemen) and shows how these environmental factors con-
tribute to domestic disintegration and regional conflicts.
The chapters in Part III deliver two particular insights: one is that
regional powers are also driven by energy and natural resources motives
while pursuing their security and foreign policy in Syria and across the
region. The second is that ecological factors and natural resources con-
tribute to explain regional politics and interstate affairs. While the effects
appear at the state level, their implications extend beyond state borders
and are thus relevant to neighboring countries. Readers may wonder
if, and to what level, political leaderships are fully aware of the eco-
logical factors and their importance for domestic stability and regime
survival.
The final chapter (Regional Rivalries and Security Alliances in the
Gulf Region and the Middle East) by Philipp O. Amour synthesizes
the major arguments in this book, while delivering further theoretical
and empirical insights. Chapter 14 also discusses potential future devel-
opments in the regional system in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East.
24 P. O. AMOUR

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 PART I

Security Alliances in the Gulf Region

and the Middle East
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 But, we ask, where is the lightning for this wild outburst of the aforesaid
Nature.
“Oh, that’s easy!” laughs the director. “We put that in afterward with the
scratch of a pin.”
“But how are you going to make it look like night?”
“Easier still—we’ll tint the film blue. Got to have sunlight to take any
kind of pictures, anyway.”
So, when you see this thrill, remember that the lightning is a pin scratch,
and the night effect is blue aniline dye and not by the gloom of night. As for
Jupiter Pluvius, the men with the cans of water can wet down the place with
equal skill.
Have you ever witnessed an exciting scene about a big building—a
home or a factory—and then, in the next reel, watched it go up in smoke
and flame? Yes? Some expense? Not so very much, for you haven’t seen
the real building burn down at all, but only a little model of it after the
scene has been acted out in front of the real building.
“The best fire effects are made in the studios, anyway,” the movie expert
will tell you.
It was in a studio that the eruption of Mount Etna was manufactured.
The promoters had tried taking real moving pictures of the volcano in
eruption, but they were not nearly as good as the studio-made variety. These
had the verisimilitude of real life, with fleeing thousands, men, women,
children, and animals, pouring down its red-hot sides. The films of the
fleeing people were merely super-imposed on the film of the fake volcano,
studio made.
You have seen your favorite heroine jump unhesitatingly off a tall cliff?
Or swim an ice-choked river? You never knew she could swim. Nor does
she. Another movie trick is what you have seen. Movie stars seldom do
such things. Professionals, dressed exactly as they are, and made up to
resemble them, do this part of the stunt for the real actors. Jumping from a
burning building is another movie feat which is only a trick. The real people
get only as far as the windows. Dummies do the jumping and the falling.
So! But how do they make inanimate objects move about as if they were
endowed with life? How does a catsup bottle jump up from the table and
climb down to the floor on the rungs of a chair? Or how can grandpa’s
clock walk up the stairs, turning around solemnly the while to look you
straight in the eye and give you warning of the flight of the hours?
Perhaps you have seen horses running full tilt at you and never seemed
to catch up. So simple! Right in front of the horses is a high-powered
automobile, in which the movie camera is set up. The horses follow the car,
and the camera man grinds out his film, always keeping a few feet ahead of
his charging subjects.

Prehistoric Man Now Seen in Wax.

The three great links in the chain of human ancestry in America,
beginning nearly twenty thousand years back, have just been represented
for the first time in scientifically reconstructed wax faces at the College of
Medicine, University of Nebraska, in Omaha. This is the first reconstruction
work of the kind that has been done on prehistoric skulls of America.
Scientists are enthusiastic over the three great types it has brought out on
the skulls of modern Indian, the cave-dwelling cannibal of three thousand
years ago, and the Nebraska “Loess man,” fragments of whose skull were
deposited with the glacial drift when the Missouri River bluffs were made,
between ten thousand and twenty thousand years ago.
For eight years the skulls of the low-browed Loess man, found by the
archeologist, Robert F. Gilder, of Omaha, have remained in the museums in
Omaha, Lincoln, and at Harvard University, while science has hopelessly
longed to know what a face this preglacial man must have worn.
Finally German scientists worked out an accurate system of facial
measurements compiled into an elaborate table, by the use of which faces
can be faithfully reconstructed over skulls. To date little has been done
along this line in Europe. In America the first work in building up faces of
prehistoric man has just been completed by Miss Myra Warner, clay-model
artist, who has made a specialized study of this German system in the art
schools of the East.
Miss Warner was handed the three skulls by Doctor Charles W. M.
Poynter, professor of anatomy of the University of Nebraska. She was told
nothing about the origin of the skulls. She worked faithfully for months,
and, with the aid of the table of measurements, built up the three wonderful
faces. It was not until she had nearly finished that she discovered one of the
three to be a modern Indian type. Yet, without knowing she was working on
a modern Indian skull, by applying only her table of measurements
faithfully to the skull as she built the clay upon it, she produced so
characteristic an American Indian type that Doctor Poynter declared the
accuracy of her work on the other two skulls, equally unknown to her, could
by no means be called into question.
The cannibal cave-dweller type is that of which Mr. Gilder found
remains in sunken cave homes along the Missouri River. He has uncovered
some forty of these caves, and has established the fact that the inhabitants
belong to what is known as the “round-headed” branch of the human race.
Geologists believe the inhabitants of these caves thrived some three
thousand years ago.
But the chief interest in the reconstruction work at the University of
Nebraska attaches to the face that has been built over the skull of the Loess
man. In all, the fragments of but six skulls belonging to this type are in
existence to-day.
This extreme primitive type of man is believed to have stalked over the
wastes of North America before the glaciers plowed their great gorges and
before they deposited the Kansan drift and the Loess clay to build the bluffs
at the Missouri River. This man, low-browed and of little brain capacity,
lived contemporaneously with the mammoth or mastodon, which he
probably slew for food, if indeed he could wield a stone weapon sharp
enough and strong enough to pierce the thick hide.
And yet, now that the faces have been reconstructed, we find no close
resemblance to the ape type, as many of the most excitable scientists have
expected. “The truth is,” says Doctor Poynter, “if man sprang from the same
original stem as the ape, the ape branch sprang off so far back in antiquity
that none of the skulls of the missing links could possibly be expected to
withstand the weathering to the present day. No one will ever find a skull
that will carry man back even anywhere near the ape days, and the remotest
skull we can find is already very much a man’s.”
This Loess man then belongs to an age perhaps hundreds of thousands of
years later than the time man and ape parted company and began to develop
along different lines.
Yet this Loess skull has, by competent geologists and ethnologists been
placed next in age to the famous Neanderthal skull found in 1856 in a cave
in the valley of Neander near Dusseldorf, Germany. The Neanderthal skull
is known the world over as representing the great antiquity and low order of
the human race. In brain capacity the Loess skull boasts little, if any,
advantage over the Neanderthal.
The prominence of the supraorbital ridges or bony brows is, next to the
receding character of the forehead, the most notable feature of this primitive
type.
“Neither the projections of the supraorbital ridges, nor the receding
forehead, is an Indian characteristic,” says Henry F. Osborn, professor of
zoölogy in Columbia University and curator in the American Museum of
Natural History. Doctor Osborn was one of the first to go to Omaha and
study this remarkable skull when it was found eight years ago.
The age of this skull is established by its association with the layer of
clay drift in which it was found. Doctor E. H. Barbour, head professor of
geology of the University of Nebraska, went over the ground thoroughly
and helped to excavate many of the fragments of the Loess man some ten
miles north of Omaha.
“From the geologist’s standpoint,” says Doctor Barbour, “these bone
fragments were not buried. Instead, the bones were doubtless deposited
with the Loess, the age of which may be safely reckoned at ten to twenty
thousand years or more, and the bones are at least as ancient as this
formation.”
Somewhere in its mighty course the glacier picked up these fragments of
skulls and a few arm and leg bones and rolled them along with the rest of
the drift, to be deposited solidly in the Loess clay when the bluff was built.

Old Paymaster Says Farewell.

Amos Hershey has just retired as postmaster of Gordonville, Pa., ending
a period of fifty-five years of service for the United States postal
department.
In 1860, before the Civil War, Mr. Hershey, then sixteen years of age,
entered the employ of John K. Smoker, in a general merchandise store. At
the same time he became one of the clerks in the post office. Five years
later Hershey purchased the store business from Smoker and was himself
appointed postmaster. He received his commission from William Dennison,
postmaster general under President Lincoln.
The efficiency of the post-office department in that day was very crude
toward what it has become in later years. When Mr. Hershey first entered
the service, there were no railway mail cars. In fact, it was only in 1860 that
an arrangement was made with the railroads to run a mail train between
New York and Washington, the only advantage of which was the quick
transfer of mail matter from one large place to another. The traveling post
office, where mails are assorted when going at fifty miles an hour, had not
yet come.
It was several years later that a Mr. Davis, of the St. Joseph, Mo., post-
office force, broached the thought that considerable valuable time would be
saved if the overland mail could be sorted on the cars, and made up for
offices at the end of and along the routes. The department allowed him to
carry out this idea, which, starting in such a humble way, is now one of the
most important branches of the department.
Before the “catcher” on the mail cars and the “crane” at small stations
came into use, twenty years later, the process of catching and delivering the
pouches was indeed strenuous, both for the mail clerk and the local
postmaster. Shortly before train time, Mr. Hershey mounted a platform
immediately alongside the track, and, propping his feet securely, would
suspend the mail pouch in front of him at arms’ length, the right hand at the
top and the left hand at the bottom. When the train neared this human crane,
the mail clerk appeared at the door of his car, and, securing himself firmly,
would extend his right arm in the form of a crook or an acute angle, and
catch the pouch as the train rushed by. The mail clerk had his arm well
padded to prevent serious injury; but, notwithstanding, the risk was
exceedingly great—in more ways than one. Mr. Hershey states that the mail
trains were running at the rate of fifty miles an hour, and it is hard for the
uninitiated to comprehend the alertness and strenuosity connected with the
delivering and catching of the pouch, aside from the constant danger.
They had a very complex system in making up letter packages in those
days. Mr. Hershey had to sort the letters for each office separately, no
matter whether there would be only one letter for an individual office. The
letters for each office had to be placed in a paper jacket of Mr. Hershey’s
own making, completely inclosing the letters, and the name of the office
address written plainly on the wrapper, with a waybill attached to each
package.
In the early sixties the postmasters enjoyed the franking privilege, being
allowed to send all their private mail without the use of postage stamps.
This privilege was rescinded in 1864.
Mr. Hershey recalls a story of one of the railway mail clerks, who were
known in the early days as the “paper jerkers,” and how he increased his
salary: “On a side lot near the Forepaugh circus grounds in Philadelphia,
there was a faker, whose outfit consisted of the stake-and-ring game. The
simple and enticing amusement was played as follows: The stake was
placed in the ground at a certain angle, which led the uninitiated to believe
that it was easy to throw the five-inch rings over it. The feat was almost
impossible. The faker had a crowd around him, and was raking in the dimes
—three ‘tries’ for ten cents—when a black-mustached, middle-sized man
walked up and said he’d bet a dollar he could put three rings out of five
over the stake.
“The faker winked at the crowd, and took the man up. The black-
mustached stranger threw five rings rapidly, one after another, and, as three
of them went over the stake, the thrower was in eighty cents. Then they bet
ten dollars even that nine out of the first ten thrown could not be put over
the stake. The whole ten settled safely, and the faker, as he handed over ten
dollars in silver, said:
“I’m broke; what’s your business?”
“I’m a paper jerker on a postal car. I don’t do anything but fling papers
all day long into the mouths of fifty sacks.”
The village of Gordonville in those early days of Mr. Hershey’s
postmastership had two names. The section lying north of the railroad was
called Concord, and that section lying south of the railroad was named
Gordonville. The railroad station was Concord, but the post office has
always gone by the name of Gordonville. The village was named after
Daniel Gordon, who was the first citizen and who built the first houses in
the town.

Child Labor Bill is Signed.

 Governor Brumbaugh, of Harrisburg, Pa., signed the Cox child-labor
bill. The new act will become effective on January 1, 1916. Under its
provisions, children under fourteen years of age, with the exception of
newsboys, will be barred from working at any occupation.
Messengers employed between eight p.m. and six a.m. must be at least
twenty-one years old, and children under sixteen will be prohibited from
working unless they attend schools at least eight hours a week. Domestic
servants and farm laborers are exempt.

Sheds Her Artificial Legs.

Removing both of her artificial legs and pulling herself up to the railings
of the Ohio River bridge, Anna Wartenbaker, thirty-five years old, of
Parkersburg, W. Va., plunged ninety feet into the river here.
People on both sides of the river saw her plunge, and hastened to her in
boats. Her right arm was broken in the fall. The woman was despondent
over her crippled condition, and came here with the express purpose of
leaping to death from the bridge.

The Nick Carter Stories

ISSUED EVERY SATURDAY BEAUTIFUL COLORED COVERS
When it comes to detective stories worth while, the Nick Carter Stories
contain the only ones that should be considered. They are not overdrawn
tales of bloodshed. They rather show the working of one of the finest minds
ever conceived by a writer. The name of Nick Carter is familiar all over the
world, for the stories of his adventures may be read in twenty languages. No
other stories have withstood the severe test of time so well as those
contained in the Nick Carter Stories. It proves conclusively that they are
the best. We give herewith a list of some of the back numbers in print. You
can have your news dealer order them, or they will be sent direct by the
publishers to any address upon receipt of the price in money or postage
stamps.
714—The Taxicab Riddle.
717—The Master Rogue’s Alibi.
719—The Dead Letter.
720—The Allerton Millions.
728—The Mummy’s Head.
729—The Statue Clue.
730—The Torn Card.
731—Under Desperation’s Spur.
732—The Connecting Link.
733—The Abduction Syndicate.
736—The Toils of a Siren.
738—A Plot Within a Plot.
739—The Dead Accomplice.
741—The Green Scarab.
746—The Secret Entrance.
747—The Cavern Mystery.
748—The Disappearing Fortune.
749—A Voice from the Past.
752—The Spider’s Web.
753—The Man With a Crutch.
754—The Rajah’s Regalia.
755—Saved from Death.
756—The Man Inside.
757—Out for Vengeance.
758—The Poisons of Exili.
759—The Antique Vial.
760—The House of Slumber.
761—A Double Identity.
762—“The Mocker’s” Stratagem.
763—The Man that Came Back.
764—The Tracks in the Snow.
765—The Babbington Case.
766—The Masters of Millions.
767—The Blue Stain.
768—The Lost Clew.
770—The Turn of a Card.
771—A Message in the Dust.
772—A Royal Flush.
774—The Great Buddha Beryl.
775—The Vanishing Heiress.
776—The Unfinished Letter.
777—A Difficult Trail.
782—A Woman’s Stratagem.
783—The Cliff Castle Affair.
784—A Prisoner of the Tomb.
785—A Resourceful Foe.
789—The Great Hotel Tragedies.
795—Zanoni, the Transfigured.
796—The Lure of Gold.
797—The Man With a Chest.
798—A Shadowed Life.
799—The Secret Agent.
800—A Plot for a Crown.
801—The Red Button.
802—Up Against It.
803—The Gold Certificate.
804—Jack Wise’s Hurry Call.
805—Nick Carter’s Ocean Chase.
807—Nick Carter’s Advertisement.
808—The Kregoff Necklace.
811—Nick Carter and the Nihilists.
812—Nick Carter and the Convict Gang.
813—Nick Carter and the Guilty Governor.
814—The Triangled Coin.
815—Ninety-nine—and One.
816—Coin Number 77.
NEW SERIES
NICK CARTER STORIES
1—The Man from Nowhere.
2—The Face at the Window.
3—A Fight for a Million.
4—Nick Carter’s Land Office.
5—Nick Carter and the Professor.
6—Nick Carter as a Mill Hand.
7—A Single Clew.
8—The Emerald Snake.
9—The Currie Outfit.
10—Nick Carter and the Kidnapped Heiress.
11—Nick Carter Strikes Oil.
12—Nick Carter’s Hunt for a Treasure.
13—A Mystery of the Highway.
14—The Silent Passenger.
15—Jack Dreen’s Secret.
16—Nick Carter’s Pipe Line Case.
17—Nick Carter and the Gold Thieves.
18—Nick Carter’s Auto Chase.
19—The Corrigan Inheritance.
20—The Keen Eye of Denton.
21—The Spider’s Parlor.
22—Nick Carter’s Quick Guess.
23—Nick Carter and the Murderess.
24—Nick Carter and the Pay Car.
25—The Stolen Antique.
26—The Crook League.
27—An English Cracksman.
28—Nick Carter’s Still Hunt.
29—Nick Carter’s Electric Shock.
30—Nick Carter and the Stolen Duchess.
31—The Purple Spot.
32—The Stolen Groom.
33—The Inverted Cross.
34—Nick Carter and Keno McCall.
35—Nick Carter’s Death Trap.
36—Nick Carter’s Siamese Puzzle.
37—The Man Outside.
38—The Death Chamber.
39—The Wind and the Wire.
40—Nick Carter’s Three Cornered Chase.
41—Dazaar, the Arch-Fiend.
42—The Queen of the Seven.
43—Crossed Wires.
44—A Crimson Clew.
45—The Third Man.
46—The Sign of the Dagger.
47—The Devil Worshipers.
48—The Cross of Daggers.
49—At Risk of Life.
50—The Deeper Game.
51—The Code Message.
52—The Last of the Seven.
53—Ten-Ichi, the Wonderful.
54—The Secret Order of Associated Crooks.
55—The Golden Hair Clew.
56—Back From the Dead.
57—Through Dark Ways.
58—When Aces Were Trumps.
59—The Gambler’s Last Hand.
60—The Murder at Linden Fells.
61—A Game for Millions.
62—Under Cover.
63—The Last Call.
64—Mercedes Danton’s Double.
65—The Millionaire’s Nemesis.
66—A Princess of the Underworld.
67—The Crook’s Blind.
68—The Fatal Hour.
69—Blood Money.
70—A Queen of Her Kind.
71—Isabel Benton’s Trump Card.
72—A Princess of Hades.
73—A Prince of Plotters.
74—The Crook’s Double.
75—For Life and Honor.
76—A Compact With Dazaar.
77—In the Shadow of Dazaar.
78—The Crime of a Money King.
79—Birds of Prey.
80—The Unknown Dead.
81—The Severed Hand.
82—The Terrible Game of Millions.
83—A Dead Man’s Power.
84—The Secrets of an Old House.
85—The Wolf Within.
86—The Yellow Coupon.
87—In the Toils.
88—The Stolen Radium.
89—A Crime in Paradise.
90—Behind Prison Bars.
91—The Blind Man’s Daughter.
92—On the Brink of Ruin.
93—Letter of Fire.
94—The $100,000 Kiss.
95—Outlaws of the Militia.
96—The Opium-Runners.
97—In Record Time.
98—The Wag-Nuk Clew.
99—The Middle Link.
100—The Crystal Maze.
101—A New Serpent in Eden.
102—The Auburn Sensation.
103—A Dying Chance.
104—The Gargoni Girdle.
105—Twice in Jeopardy.
106—The Ghost Launch.
107—Up in the Air.
108—The Girl Prisoner.
109—The Red Plague.
110—The Arson Trust.
111—The King of the Firebugs.
112—“Lifter’s” of the Lofts.
113—French Jimmie and His Forty Thieves.
114—The Death Plot.
115—The Evil Formula.
116—The Blue Button.
117—The Deadly Parallel.
118—The Vivisectionists.
119—The Stolen Brain.
120—An Uncanny Revenge.
121—The Call of Death.
122—The Suicide.
123—Half a Million Ransom.
124—The Girl Kidnapper.
125—The Pirate Yacht.
126—The Crime of the White Hand.
127—Found in the Jungle.
128—Six Men in a Loop.
129—The Jewels of Wat Chang.
130—The Crime in the Tower.
131—The Fatal Message.
132—Broken Bars.
133—Won by Magic.
134—The Secret of Shangore.
135—Straight to the Goal.
136—The Man They Held Back.
137—The Seal of Gijon.
138—The Traitors of the Tropics.
139—The Pressing Peril.
140—The Melting-Pot.
141—The Duplicate Night.
142—The Edge of a Crime.
143—The Sultan’s Pearls.
144—The Clew of the White Collar.
Dated June 19th, 1915.
145—An Unsolved Mystery.
Dated June 26th, 1915.
146—Paying the Price.
Dated July 3d, 1915.
147—On Death’s Trail.
Dated July 10th, 1915.
148—The Mark of Cain.
Price, Five Cents Per Copy. If you want any back numbers of our weeklies
and cannot procure them from your news dealer, they can be obtained direct
from this office. Postage stamps taken the same as money.
STREET & SMITH, Publishers, 79-89 Seventh Ave., NEW YORK CITY
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NICK CARTER
STORIES NO. 149, JULY 17, 1915: A NETWORK OF CRIME; OR,
NICK CARTER'S TANGLED SKEIN ***

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