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The Syrian
Information and
Propaganda War
The Role of Cognitive Bias
Ben Cole
The Syrian Information and Propaganda War
Ben Cole
The Syrian
Information and
Propaganda War
The Role of Cognitive Bias
Ben Cole
University of Liverpool
Liverpool, UK
ISBN 978-3-030-93281-7 ISBN 978-3-030-93282-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93282-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
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Preface
Between 2015 and 2018 I worked as a researcher on a number of projects

relating to Syria. I was based in the UK as part of a team mining social
media to provide a daily information feed of developments inside Syria, for
our analytical teams to assess. Social media proved to be an incredibly use-
ful resource because of its ability to provide information from a wide vari-
ety and number of sources in near real time. It was precisely because of
those features that social media had served as a vital vehicle for disseminat-
ing eyewitness reporting of the Syrian uprising during 2011, and which
led to the war in Syria being defined in some quarters as “the first social
media war”.1 However, it was immediately apparent to our team that
social media platforms were also an information warfare space in which all
parties to the conflict and their supporters were working to shape the pub-
lic and political discourse on the war.
One of the supposedly significant features of social media is that it is
unmediated by the mainstream media (MSM), which traditionally acts as
a “gatekeeper” of the news by determining what is reported and how it is
reported.2 It is argued that this makes social media a more authentic and
reliable source of information, but it was apparent to us that both social
media and alt-media reports from inside Syria were being mediated from
the very outset of the uprising by both the activists who produced them
and organisations such as Avaaz and the RFS Media Office which were
funded by the US and UK governments to perform that very role.
The problem of the information emerging from Syria being manipu-
lated has been openly acknowledged by some of the international observ-
ers operating on the ground in Syria. This included Major-General Robert
v
vi PREFACE
Mood, the head of the UN observer mission to Syria in 2012, who com-
mented that “whatever I learned on the ground in Syria … is that I should
not jump to conclusions”.3 This was in turn acknowledged by some
Western MSM journalists including Janine Di Giovanni who described the
war for Newsweek as being “the most complex, challenging and cynical
conflict I have covered”.4 Three years into the war, the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, observed that because of these
issues “there is no unified, reliable, evidence-based narrative of the con-
flict”.5 It all left British journalist and broadcaster James Harkin, to pon-
der on the challenge of “searching for facts in the fog of Syria’s propaganda
war”.6 We therefore had to assume that everything we were reading about
the war may have been manipulated in some way, which raised the funda-
mental question of whether it was possible to ascertain the reality of events
on the ground in any absolute sense from open source reporting.
The International Crisis Group (ICG), which is one of the few second-
ary sources to fully comprehend the complexity of the situation inside
Syria, explained how the dynamics of the violence during 2011 were
clouded by unreliable claims and counterclaims. It cited one observer who
described the situation on the ground as being “very chaotic on both
sides. On the street, there is the youth and other genuine protesters, but
in some cases you also have foreign agents, fundamentalists, criminals and
the like. On the regime’s side, the various security services don’t necessar-
ily coordinate among each other, and some appear to have armed civilians.
To make matters worse, both sides lie about what is happening on the
ground, each one depicting the other as being solely to blame”.7 We
encountered a similarly confusing situation when we started our work,
with the often mixed and uncorroborated messaging that we provided in
our daily reports posing significant challenges for our analytical colleagues.
Nevertheless, through the process of gathering information we were able
to identify the dynamics of the propaganda war, which in turn enabled us
to understand how best to assess the information we were seeing.
Yet the understanding of the war that our team acquired was often very
different to the reporting that we read and watched from Western govern-
ments and MSM outlets during that period. The root cause of this discon-
nect was their propensity to frame the war in binary terms, as a war of
good revolutionaries fighting for freedom against an evil government,
which was seemingly shaped by a strong pro-opposition or anti-Assad bias.
In actuality, research shows that both the origins of the uprising and the
war itself were far too complex to shoe horn into such a crude binary
PREFACE vii
framework. Other observers of the war also noted this disconnect between
the public discourse on Syria in the West and their personal perceptions of
the reality on the ground. Among them was Stephen Kinzer from the
Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University who took
an anti-interventionist position on the conflict, who suggested that “cov-
erage of the Syrian war will be remembered as one of the most shameful
episodes in the history of the American press”.8
One potential explanation for that disconnect was that a wide range of
opinion formers including academics, journalists, and think tank staff who
should have been striving to produce objective reportage and analysis of
the war allowed themselves, either wittingly or unwittingly, to be drawn
into the propaganda war. Indeed, many secondary sources seemed to
enthusiastically embrace the chance to become players in the war, and
given the tone of some of their rhetoric seemed to became emotionally
invested in the outcome. That underlying bias underpinned what we per-
ceived to be the analytical shortcomings of many primary and secondary
sources.
Those shortcomings led the ICG to conclude in 2011 that “the main-
stream foreign media’s coverage has not clarified the picture. The crude
propaganda and disinformation broadcast and published by official and
semi-official outlets have wholly undermined their credibility”.9 This situ-
ation persisted into the latter years of the war, which prompted British
journalist Patrick Cockburn to suggest in 2017 that “Nearly everything
you have read about Syria and Iraq could be wrong”.10 He argued that “…
in the Syrian case fabricated news and one-sided reporting have taken over
the news agenda … it’s hardly surprising that in a civil war each side will
use whatever means are available to publicise and exaggerate the crimes of
the other, while denying or concealing similar actions by their own
forces”.11
It was therefore unsurprising that these same shortcomings were also
evident amongst the other teams engaged on our projects, among whom
we witnessed an almost routine dismissal of reports which challenged
opposition narratives on the grounds that those reports were simply Syrian
government, Russian or Iranian propaganda. Yet it was apparent that sim-
ply accepting the reporting of pro-opposition sources at face value and
casually dismissing reporting which supported Syrian government narra-
tives, was a deeply flawed approach because activist and pro-opposition
sources had frequently been proven to manipulate their reporting in much
the same ways as Syrian government sources did.
viii PREFACE
Their failure to comprehend the dynamics of the propaganda war was

apparent from their preference for dealing with information from sources
that they considered to be “reliable” or “trusted”. Whenever we reported
something they found challenging they would invariably ask us whether
the source was reliable, seemingly oblivious to the fact that in a propa-
ganda war in which sources all sources are biased, and sources on each side
were routinely manipulating their reporting, no source should be consid-
ered sufficiently reliable that their reports could be unquestioningly
accepted. Their approach also had the result of narrowing down the num-
ber of sources that might be considered useable. Our experience was that
any source was sometimes right and sometimes wrong, so it was necessary
to collect reporting from as diverse a range of sources as possible in order
that an assessment of the situation could be made through consideration
of the full spectrum of reporting available.
The inherent risks in unquestioning reliance on trusted sources were
apparent from the very earliest days on the uprising. This will be explored
further in the later chapters of this book, but in just one instance from
May 2011, Reuters circulated a video which it had obtained from social
media that purported to show Syrian troops abusing civilian detainees.
Reuters quickly discovered that the footage had actually been shot in
Lebanon during 2008 and withdrew it, but not before it had been used by
ABC and SBS in Australia. The incident prompted ABC to broadcast a
subsequent report under the headline “beware the ‘trusted’ source”. In
this instance social media had created the problem, but it also provided the
answer, because numerous Twitter sources were quick to confirm the true
origins of the video.12 The process of deciding who and what was reliable
goes to the heart of the shortcomings in reporting and analysis of the war
by Western governments, MSM outlets and others, because it was appar-
ent to us that for many of those involved, their judgement was shaped by
cognitive bias.
This raises broader questions about what impacts the propaganda war
has had on the course of the war itself. The majority of recent reporting
and analysis on propaganda and fake news is premised on the assumption
that it has a major effect on target audiences, but evidence from the Syrian
propaganda war suggests that it actually had relatively limited effects. The
constant stream of conflicting reporting contributed towards an extremely
confusing information environment that observers only made sense of by
mediating the information they received through a number of filters.
PREFACE ix
For Western journalists, think tank staff and others who are unable to
independently report from inside Syria, their primary mediating filters
include their pre-existing attitudes towards Syria and the Arab Spring, the
institutional biases of their employer, together with the paradigms and
narratives that frame the dominant discourse on the war. It was a similar
situation within Syria, where testimony from both opposition and govern-
ment supporters indicates that the impact of propaganda was mitigated by
a number of mediating factors that included social group membership,
personal knowledge or strongly held attitudes, personal experiences of liv-
ing in Syria both before and during the uprising, and the messaging that
people were receiving from interpersonal contacts with friends and family.
The ICG reported that messaging from interpersonal contacts often
resulted in people hearing contradictory accounts of events, but other
Syrians reported that what they were hearing was consistent with their
own experiences.13 Once they had taken sides in the uprising, people then
became vulnerable to cognitive bias effects in deciding what information
to believe and what to disbelieve. This raises the important question of
whether propaganda has had a major impact in shaping attitudes towards
the war, or whether these mediating factors have largely limited its effect.
Combined, these factors raise question marks over just how accurate
our understanding of the war in Syria actually is, and what impact the
propaganda war has had on it. To understand the war between the Syrian
government and the opposition, it is therefore first necessary to under-
stand the dynamics of the propaganda war. This includes identifying the
various reporting manipulations that are routinely employed by both pri-
mary and secondary sources on both sides of the war, along with how the
dominant paradigms and narratives that frame the dominant public and
political discourse on the war were established and maintained. The start-
ing point for reaching that understanding is an examination of the under-
lying structure and drivers of the propaganda war.
Liverpool, UK Ben Cole
Notes
1. Teresa Salvadoretti, The role of social media in the Syrian Crisis, Asfar,
http://www.asfar.org.uk/the-role-of-social-media-in-the-syrian-crisis/.
2. Tuman, J.S. (2003) Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of
Terrorism, London: Sage, 116 & 135.
x Preface
3. In Syria, this is no plan for peace, Patrick Seale, the Guardian, 27 May
2012, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/27/
syria-no-plans-peace.
4. Inside Syria’s Propaganda Wars, Janine di Giovanni, Newsweek, 24
December 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/syria-propaganda-
aleppo-assad-536003.
5. Measuring conflict incidence in Syria, Sipri Yearbook 2015, https://www.
sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198712596/sipri-9 780198712596-
chapter-2-div1-2.xml.
6. James Harkin, What Happened in Douma? Searching for facts in the fog of
Syria’s Propaganda War, the Intercept, 9 February 2018, https://theinter-
cept.com/2019/02/09/douma-chemical-attack-evidence-syria/.
7. Popular Protest In North Africa And The Middle East (VII): The Syrian
Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide, International Crisis Group, Middle East/
North Africa Report N°109, 13 July 2011, https://www.crisisgroup.org/
middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/popular-protest-
north-africa-and-middle-east-vii-syrian-regime-s-slow-motion-suicide.
8. The media are misleading the public on Syria, Boston Globe, 18 February
2016, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/02/18/the-
media-a re-m isleading-p ublic-s yria/8YB75otYirPzUCnlwaVtcK/
story.html.
North Africa Report N°109—13 July 2011.
10. This is why Everything You’ve Read About The Wars In Syria and Iraq
Could be Wrong, the Independent, 2 December 2016, https://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/voices/syria-aleppo-iraq-mosul-isis-middle-east-conflict-
assad-war-everything-youve-read-could-be-wrong-a7451656.html.
11. Patrick Cockburn, Who supplies the news?, London Review of Books, Vol.
39, No. 3, 2 February 2017, https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n03/patrick-
cockburn/who-supplies-the-news.
12. Beware the ‘trusted’ source, ABC (Australia), 16 May 2011, https://www.
abc.net.au/mediawatch/episodes/beware-the-trusted-source/9974294.
North Africa Report N°109—13 July 2011; personal communication with
@WithinSyriaBlog. 27 December 2020; Personal communication from @
iadtawil, 11 January 2020.
Acknowledgements
I would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of my brother

Professor Jon Cole of Liverpool University, who both collaborated with
me on my Syria research, and taught me the basics of cognitive bias.
xi
Contents
1 Propaganda: Power and Bias 1
2 The Pre-uprising Propaganda War 37
3 Establishing the Dominant Discourse 77
4 Assad Is Sectarian119
5 Assad Is Killing His Own People157
6 Assad Is Using Chemical Weapons191
7 Assad Protector of the Nation229
8 Syria Is Secular267
9 The Rebels Are Extremists299
10 Business as Usual339
xiii
xiv Contents
11 Limited Effects361
12 Decoding the Propaganda War399
Index409
Abbreviations
Alt-media Alternative media

CW Chemical weapons
FFM Fact finding Mission
FSA Free Syrian Army
GSN Global Strategy Network
HRW Human Rights Watch
HTS Hay’at Tahrir alSham
ICG International Crisis Group
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP Internally displaced people
InCoStrat Innovative Communication and Strategies
IS Islamic State
JaI Jaysh al-Islam
JFS Jabhat Fath al Sham
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee
JN Jabhat al-Nusra
LCC Local Coordination Committees
MEPI Middle East Partnership Initiative
MSF Medicines Sans Fontieres
MSM Mainstream media
NFZ No fly zone
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
RuAF Russian Airforce
SAA Syrian Arab Army
SAMS Syrian American Medical Society
SANA Syrian Arab News Agency
SARC Syrian Arab Red Crescent
xv
xvi ABBREVIATIONS
SCD Syrian Civil Defence

SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
SETF Syrian Emergency Task Force
SIGINT Signals intelligence
SNA Syrian National Army
SNC Syrian National Coalition
SNHR Syrian Network for Human Rights
SOHR Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
SyAAF Syrian Arab Airforce
UOSSM Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations
VDC Violations Documentation Centre
WGSPM Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media
YPG People’s Protection Units
YPJ Women’s Protection Units
CHAPTER 1
Propaganda: Power and Bias
In November 2014, a video was uploaded to YouTube showing a Syrian

boy running through sniper fire to save a little girl in Aleppo. The video
went viral and was picked up by the pro-opposition alt-media news outlet
Sham Times and many Western mainstream media (MSM) outlets. It
made for compelling viewing, but the only problem was that it was fake.
It had actually been shot in Malta as an experiment by Norwegian film
producer Lars Klevberg. Once the experiment had run its course, Klevberg
made the truth public.
Analysis by the pro-Syrian government actor Maram Susli,1 found that
the experiment highlighted two major shortcomings in the work of MSM
journalists. The first was the obvious failure to identify the video as a fake.
Klevberg had included big hints that it was, including showing the chil-
dren being shot several times before calmly walking away at the end, but
they were not picked up on. A number of MSM outlets consulted so-
called “experts” to review the video, and even they concluded that there
was no reason to believe that it was not genuine. Yet many other observers
flooded Twitter and YouTube calling it out as a fake.
The second shortcoming was the way that journalists constructed a
narrative to explain the video that was consistent with the dominant para-
digms and narratives that shaped Western discourse on the war. The origi-
nal upload did not identify the snipers, yet MSM outlets reported that it
was the Syrian army (SAA) that was responsible. The Guardian’s headline
was “Syrian boy ‘saves girl from army sniper’”. The IB Times also
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
B. Cole, The Syrian Information and Propaganda War,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93282-4_1
2 B. COLE
confidently asserted that “the incident certainly is not the first time that
pro-Assad gunmen have targeted children”. Journalists also used Twitter
to make similar claims. Vinnie O’Dowd who has worked for Channel 4
and Al Jazeera tweeted “Syrian Regime Targets kids”, while Liz Sly of the
Washington Post tweeted that “boy rescues girl from shooting in Syria.
And the soldiers keep shooting”. Those tweets were consistent with a
now-deleted tweet from an official State Department Twitter account
which also blamed the SAA.
It could be argued that the experiment highlighted the difficulty of
identifying genuine war videos from fake ones, yet the BBC was sceptical
enough to report that its authenticity was being questioned.2 Instead, the
real issue was that the video became part of the propaganda war, which
generated powerful cognitive bias effects amongst those who viewed it.
Western journalists believed that the video was genuine because it had
gone viral, it had been uploaded by what they considered to be a reliable
Syrian source, it was consistent with the paradigms and narratives that
framed the dominant discourse on the war, and it was consistent with their
personal beliefs about the war. They then sought verification from “inde-
pendent experts” who they considered to be reliable, but who actually
shared the same anti-Syrian government bias as they did, which then led
them to ignore those actors who correctly identified it as a fake.
The fact that it proved so easy to deceive MSM journalists, “indepen-
dent experts”, and activists should have given pause for thought, but those
concerned reacted by de-legitimising the experiment itself. In an open
letter they condemned Klevberg for deliberately deceiving them,3 eventu-
ally forcing him to apologise. In doing so they effectively deflected atten-
tion away from the journalistic failings the experiment had exposed,
enabling those concerned to carry on working in exactly the same way as
they had before. Yet the fact remained that the experiment had highlighted
legitimate issues concerning faked videos, cognitive bias, and the robust-
ness of journalistic practices in handling primary source material, which
are central to both the conduct, outcome and impacts of the propa-
ganda war.
Power and Propaganda

The aim of any propaganda war is to exercise power over target audiences
in order to engineer consent for a specific point of view or policy. The
primary means of doing this is by setting the paradigms and supporting
1 PROPAGANDA: POWER AND BIAS 3
narratives which frame the dominant discourse on that issue. Those para-
digms and narratives are essentially stories that explain the issue in crude
and often emotive terms, and serve as a framework to interpret and analyse
events. The principal actors in the propaganda war then use their influence
to build social networks around those paradigms and narratives as a means
to engage more minor actors with the issue.
Within each state, the dominant discourse on any given issue is estab-
lished by the principal actors of the dominant power structure that has
formed to fight the propaganda battle on that particular issue. These
power structures consist of three broad layers: an inner core, an outer
core, and a periphery. The inner core consists of governments, the infor-
mation resources they directly control, and the other actors they fund.
This core constitutes a homogeneous network which acts in a unified fash-
ion to promote the dominant discourse. The outer core consists of actors
who are typically true believers in the dominant discourse, some of whom
have close connections with actors in the inner core but generally act inde-
pendently of it. The periphery consists of networks of actors who believe
in and propagate the dominant discourse but have no direct connections
to the inner core. Some of these actors may also have cross membership
with the dominant power structures in other states, making them incred-
ibly useful for governments seeking to influence audiences in other
countries.
In Western states, these structures are not homogeneous. Only govern-
ments can be considered permanent members, whilst actors in the outer
core and periphery have the freedom to reject a dominant discourse and
leave the structure. Belief in the dominant discourse is naturally strongest
amongst the actors in the inner and outer cores, but there will always be
actors in both the outer core and periphery whose belief in the dominant
discourse is potentially frangible, and are therefore capable of being influ-
enced by propaganda. This means that the inner core is unable to directly
control the outputs of all the other actors within their respective power
structures. Instead, they have to use their influence to set the rules and
behavioural norms which dictate the way that the other actors engage with
the dominant discourse.
Within each state, the dominant discourse on any subject is generally
challenged by a similar but weaker countervailing power structure pro-
moting an alternative discourse. In respect of Western states and the Syrian
propaganda war, these countervailing power structures comprise loose
networks of actors which can be crudely described as being
4 B. COLE
“anti-intervention” in outlook. They are motivated by a range of anti-

imperialist and anti-interventionist attitudes, and view Western policy in
Syria through a paradigm of imperialism and aggression. The majority of
them operate in the alt-media and on social media, but they also include a
relatively small number of Western MSM journalists. These countervailing
power structures intersect with the dominant power structures of both
Syria and Russia on account of some actors being members of multiple
power structures. The clearest example of this are those anti-intervention
journalists who primarily operate through social and alt-media channels
but also have an outlet through Syrian or Russian MSM outlets.
This means that at a macro level the Syrian propaganda war in Western
states was fought out between two diametrically opposed sets of para-
digms and narratives to determine which would frame the dominant dis-
course. The underlying dynamic of those macro level battles within each
state was of key actors in the dominant power structure promoting the
dominant discourse and aggressively enforcing conformity amongst those
actors whose belief in the discourse was frangible, whilst their domestic
countervailing power structures and the dominant power structures of
Syria, Russia and Iran constantly sought to fracture the dominant power
structure in order to build support for their alternative discourse.
There will be dispute over where some actors sit in respect of the con-
flicting power structures within each state, but any actor engaged in a
propaganda war will be part of one or another. For example, the Syrian
opposition movement constitutes the countervailing power structure of
Syria, but significant elements of it intersect with the dominant power
structures of Western states. Those elements of the movement which are
either funded by or directly co-operate with foreign governments, also sit
within the inner and outer cores of the dominant power structures of
those states, whilst other pro-opposition actors sit on the periphery. Many
actors will dispute where they sit within these power structures, or indeed
that they sit within a power structure at all, but as will be shown through-
out this book virtually every actor in the propaganda war is playing a role
which makes them part of either a dominant or countervailing power
structure.
Bias and Discourse Structure

The Klevberg experiment highlighted the role that cognitive bias can play
in misinterpreting primary source material. This is of enormous signifi-
cance in the Syrian propaganda war because the vast majority, if not all,
primary sources are not disinterested observers, they are actors in the pro-
paganda war and so must be considered vulnerable to the effects of cogni-
tive bias. Some expressions of bias can be subtle, such as the way that
reports are framed or the use of wording that conveys an emotional bias,
but it can also be expressed through a range of more significant manipula-
tions including outright fabrication. Bias can also be expressed through a
range of behaviours including conformity, negative labelling of opponents
(commonly referred to as trolling), and a refusal to acknowledge or objec-
tively engage with evidence that does not fit one’s own beliefs.
In the same vein, most, if not all of the secondary sources which report
on the war are also actors in the propaganda war, so they too must be
considered vulnerable to the effects of cognitive bias. Amongst these
actors, the strongest expression of cognitive bias has been a tendency to
over-rely on primary sources of information who share their own bias and
either ignore or downplay those that do not. This was apparent in Channel
4 News’s treatment of its interviewees in a series of reports about the
battle for east Aleppo in late 2016. The pro-opposition film maker Wa’ad
al-Khatib was subjected to sympathetic questioning which never chal-
lenged either the content of her films from Aleppo or the narrative that
she was promoting. In contrast, pro-government actor Fares Shehabi was
subjected to a confrontational interrogation during which he was repeat-
edly challenged with the opposition narrative, and the interview was fol-
lowed by an emotive statement from al-Khatib claiming that she feared for
her life.4 There are particularly strong question marks over whether those
secondary sources who have direct access to important actors on either
side of the conflict deliberately self-censor their work in order to ensure
continued access to those sources. As a result, some secondary sources
have been guilty of some of the same reporting manipulations as primary
sources.
This bias is reflected in the propensity of secondary sources to view the
warring parties and the primary sources who support them, through the
prism of halo and horns effects. The halo effect is where a person allows a
favourable perception of something or somebody to positively influence
their evaluation of everything related to that subject or person. In terms of
6 B. COLE
a propaganda war, this leads to messaging from any person, group or

political entity subject to a halo effect tending to be believed, whilst nega-
tive reports about them tend to be ignored or doubted.
This effect is particularly apparent in respect of the humanitarian organ-
isations operating inside Syria, which are generally considered to be trusted
and reliable sources by Western MSM journalists and politicians because
of the nature of the work they do. In practice though, the halo effect sur-
rounding these organisations obscures a more complex reality. Some of
these groups and individuals working for some have direct links to the
opposition and the dominant power structures of Western states.
The most influential of these groups has been the Syrian Civil Defence,
otherwise known as the White Helmets, which was founded and funded
by the US and UK in 2014 to provide civil defence functions in rebel held
areas.5 They provided a constant stream of images and reports of their
lifesaving work which proved extremely influential among Western audi-
ences. The effectiveness of its reporting was amplified by a UK-government
funded PR company called ARK which ran its social media accounts and
developed an internationally-focused communications campaign to pro-
mote it.6 The impact of the White Helmet’s work was acknowledged by
the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) which noted that it
provides an “invaluable” reporting and advocacy role, with Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International both identifying it as their most rou-
tinely reliable source of information.7 Yet its links to Western governments
and the role of ARK in managing its communications, indicates that it is
also a significant actor in the dominant power structures of the US and
UK, which raises legitimate questions about its impartiality.8
A similar bias can be observed amongst some of the humanitarian
INGOs and individual clinicians who have worked in Syria. Among them
was Hand in Hand for Syria, which actively campaigned for foreign mili-
tary intervention.9 One of its leading figures, Dr Rola Hallam is linked to
the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) through her father Dr Mousa al-
Kurdi, whilst the Facebook banner of its co-founder, Faddy Sahloul, at
one time read “we will bring Assad to justice, no matter what lives it takes,
no matter how much catastrophe it makes”.10 Similarly, the Syrian
American Medical Society (SAMS) is allegedly controlled by the Muslim
Brotherhood.11 Some individual clinicians compromised themselves even
further by posting images on social media of themselves posing with rebel
fighters or weapons.12 Among them was Dr Hamza Al-Khatib, the former
Director of the al-Quds hospital in east Aleppo and husband of Wa’ad
Al-Khatib, who was linked with the rebel group Noureddine al-Zinki.13 So
despite the halo effect generated by their humanitarian work, these actors
need to be treated as having a bias.
The horns effect is the exact opposite of the halo effect, and occurs
when people allow an undesirable trait of something or somebody to neg-
atively influence their evaluation of everything related to that subject or
person. This is particularly apparent in respect of the portrayal of the
Syrian Government and those that support it, in the dominant discourse
of Western states. Actors in the dominant power structures of Western
states consider the Syrian government to be a brutal dictatorship and
therefore routinely treat information provided by it and its supporters as
fabricated propaganda.14
Halo and horns effects were apparent in the MSM reporting of the
Klevberg experiment. The widespread pro-opposition bias amongst
Western journalists meant that the rebels routinely benefitted from a halo
effect due to their depiction as heroic freedom fighters, whilst the Syrian
army routinely suffered from a horns effect due to its depiction as the
agent of a brutal dictatorship. Consequently, when journalists viewed the
video, they considered that it was most likely to have been Syrian army
snipers who were shooting at the children. This bias was then perpetuated
by them seeking corroboration of the video from individuals or organisa-
tions who shared the same pro-opposition bias as they did, and excluding
the views of the pro-Syrian government social media sources who cor-
rectly identified it as a fake. This tendency to search for, interpret, or
favour information that support one’s pre-existing beliefs or values is
known as confirmation bias, and the corresponding tendency to reject
information which does not support one’s pre-existing beliefs or values is
known as belief perseverance.
These cognitive biases are strengthened by the internal dynamics of the
groups that the actors in the propaganda war belong to. Networks of
actors act as loosely affiliated groups and exhibit many of the same dynam-
ics as more tightly-knit groups, including expectations about how mem-
bers should and should not act. The very fact of belonging to a group
leads people to consciously adjust their behaviour and attitudes to those
exhibited by the other members of the group, partly as a result of observ-
ing the negative consequences when someone deviates from those norms.15
So when an individual adopts a role in one of these networks, they will to
some extent conform to the behaviour and opinions presented by other
group members. Individuals conform to group norms in two ways. The
first is through informational influence processes, by which the individual
8 B. COLE
wants to be correct in what they do or say, and to understand the right way
to think or act. The second is normative influence processes, by which the
individual wants to be liked, approved of, and accepted by others in the
group.16
The most prominent example of conformity bias in the Syrian propa-
ganda war is groupthink, which is the tendency for a group to filter out
undesirable input so that a consensus may be reached and then main-
tained. Groups are vulnerable to groupthink when they embrace a collec-
tive desire to maintain a shared viewpoint or discourse. This is exactly what
the networks of actors on both sides of the Syrian propaganda war seek to
promote, and as a result they exhibit a number of symptoms of group-
think. The first is collective rationalisation, whereby group members dis-
credit information that does not fit their collective bias and fail to
reconsider their position when confronted with information that contra-
dicts their bias. The second is a belief in the inherent morality of their
position, and the dismissal of evidence that does not fit their collective bias
on those grounds. The third is the adoption of stereotyped views of out-
groups, negatively labelling them in order to avoid having to address spe-
cific challenges they present. The fourth is the application of social pressure
on dissenters within the group to support the collective viewpoint. The
fifth is self-censorship, whereby members of the group do not voice doubts
or share information that contradicts the groupthink. The sixth is the role
of self-appointed “mind guards” who are key members of the group who
protect or insulate the group from contradictory information.17 Once a
groupthink mentality is established it is extremely difficult to break down
because individuals experience strong pressures to conform in order to
ensure their continued membership of the group.
This effect can be argued to exert a particularly powerful influence on
MSM journalists whose jobs and reputations might be at stake if their
reporting challenges the groupthink within their respective outlets.18
Groupthink has been particularly apparent in respect of CNN, whose
reporting has been framed entirely within the dominant discourse on the
war. However, the level of bias and groupthink exhibited by CNN is rare.
Other Western MSM outlets have tended to frame the majority of their
reporting within the dominant discourse, but still publish or broadcast at
least some reports which challenge it. Even then though, the effects of
groupthink are apparent in the widespread unwillingness of individual
journalists to really champion an alternative discourse. Amongst UK MSM
outlets it is noticeable that the most persistent critics of the dominant
discourse are almost exclusively senior journalists such as Robert Fisk,

Patrick Cockburn and Peter Hitchens, whose jobs and reputations are
secure. A wide range of other journalists have written reports which were
inconsistent with the dominant discourse, but they only reported on Syria
sporadically and never sought to directly challenge the dominant discourse.
The Syrian propaganda war can therefore also be categorised a struggle
between dominant power structures seeking to maintain the groupthink
that sustains the dominant discourse in their respective states, and coun-
tervailing power structures that are seeking to replace it with their own
discourse. Minority groups seeking to break the domination of a majority
view have relatively little normative influence, but they do have informa-
tional influence in terms of their ability to present information which
encourages members of dominant groups to examine issues from an alter-
native perspective and question the dominant discourse or paradigm.19 So
if a countervailing power structure is able to build up a sufficiently com-
pelling body of information that is inconsistent with the dominant para-
digms and narratives, and can persuade a critical mass of actors in the
dominant power structure to acknowledge that body of evidence, it might
be able to engineer a shift in the dominant discourse.
However, shifts in the dominant discourses of propaganda wars are
extremely difficult to engineer because they tend to be fought out between
two diametrically opposed sets of paradigms and narratives. Cognitive bias
effects mean that opinion changes typically occur when there is only a
moderate degree of difference between a dissenting message and the exist-
ing beliefs held by the target audience. If the difference between the two
is too great then the target audience will likely resist the new message.20
This suggests that the critical phase in any propaganda war is the initial
battle to establish the dominant paradigm(s) and narratives.
Government Influence Over the Dominant

Power Structures
A number of governments have significant geo-political interests in Syria
and use their position within the dominant power structures of their
respective countries to shape and set the dominant discourse on the war.
Governments are super-influencers in any propaganda war due to their
direct and indirect control over some of the other actors in the dominant
power structures of their respective countries, coupled with their
10 B. COLE
institutional influence in respect of the remainder. The fact that govern-

ment messaging is routinely and frequently reported by the MSM gives
them enormous influence in terms of establishing the dominant discourse
on any given issue, but not necessarily a decisive influence. Much depends
on how the other actors in the dominant power structure interact with
that messaging.
The role of MSM journalists in Western states is not just to report gov-
ernment messaging, but to critically assess it. In respect of Syria however,
the majority of Western journalists failed to do so, either because of direct
government influence or because they simply shared a common view of
the war with their respective governments. It has been argued by one anti-
intervention actor that government influence over the MSM is particularly
strong in the US, where most outlets have drastically reduced their corps
of foreign correspondents. As a result, a lot of the international news
reported in the US comes from reporters based in Washington, where
access to official sources of information and professional credibility depend
on reporting the official paradigms, and standard practice is to seek com-
ment from government sources and think tanks.21 Only in respect of the
debate over the policy responses to the war can the Western MSM be
argued to have engaged in an objective reportage of the available options,
but as will be seen in Chap. 11 even that can be seen to have been in the
interests of their respective governments.
A number of governments engaged in the Syrian propaganda war
extended their influence even further by working collaboratively with a
range of other actors including think tanks, civil society organisations and
other opinion formers, in order to strengthen the dominant discourse. As
a result, those actors were drawn into the inner and outer cores of the
dominant power structures of the states engaged in the propaganda war.
Qatar for example, which has been heavily involved in supporting the
Syrian opposition, funds the Brookings Institution as well as a number of
pro-opposition Syrian civil society organisations such as the Syrian
Network for Human Rights (SNHR) which is connected to the opposi-
tion Syrian National Coalition and has openly lobbied for foreign inter-
vention in the war.22 It also stands accused of using Al Jazeera to promote
its discourse on Syria, after a number of its journalists were either sacked
or resigned over editorial interference in their reporting of the conflict.23
Think tanks claim that government funding never compromises the
integrity of their work and it is only a coincidence when the views of their
staff overlap with those of their donors.24 Yet think tanks often employ
former government officials in senior positions, which has prompted accu-

sations that those individuals use their new roles to continue promoting
the views of their former organisations.25 Those accusations are given
added weight by the admission of some former think tank staff that their
work was compromised by these connections. For Brookings, the sensi-
tivities are particularly significant in respect of Qatar, which is its single
biggest foreign donor. A former Qatari Prime Minister sits on the
Brookings Doha Centre’s advisory board, and Brookings officials regu-
larly meet with Qatari officials to discuss the Centre’s activities and bud-
get.26 Evidence of the Centre’s support for the Qatari government
discourse on Syria can be seen in the outputs of its staff. Salman Shaikh, a
former Qatari official who was the Director of the Centre during the early
years of the war, publicly called for President Assad to be replaced in April
2011, and in subsequent years published a series of articles critical of US
Syria policy and calling for foreign intervention.27 Whilst the issue of
whether government funding compromises the integrity of an organisa-
tion is a contentious one, it is naïve to believe that governments fund these
organisations for purely altruistic reasons, so their work must be critically
assessed as having potentially been influenced by bias.
At a deeper level, Governments also stand accused of attempting to
shape and maintain the dominant discourse through more covert means.
In 2016, the US Government established a new Global Engagement
Center to counter foreign state and non-state propaganda. Part of its
remit is to fund civil society groups, media outlets and other actors to
identify and investigate sources of news that are deemed to be distributing
“disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda directed at the United
States and its allies and partners”.28 Similarly in the UK, anti-intervention
actors have reported revelations concerning the government-funded
Institute for Statecraft and its subsidiary the Integrity Initiative, which are
described by some actors as an international information warfare pro-
gramme run by British military intelligence specialists which had disrupted
the domestic politics of several countries.29
One of the most high-profile examples of this activity occurred when
Qatar worked directly with the Syrian opposition on the release of the so-
called the “Caesar” photographs to the international MSM. Caesar was
the codename given to an alleged Syrian army photographer who had
been based at a military hospital. He defected to the opposition, bringing
with him 55,000 photographs showing the bodies of 11,000 dead people
who he claimed had been tortured and killed by the Syrian security
12 B. COLE
establishment. Qatar arranged through the US Carter-Ruck law firm for a

team of lawyers and other experts to meet Caesar and review the photo-
graphs. After conducting a brief review, the team concluded that the pho-
tographs constituted evidence of “industrial scale killing” by the Syrian
security forces. The story was hurriedly broken to the international MSM
just two days before the January 2014 peace talks in Geneva, in an appar-
ent attempt to increase political pressure on the Syrian government.30 But
whilst the story successfully re-enforced the narrative that the Syrian gov-
ernment was guilty of serious human rights abuses and war crimes, it failed
to have any impact on the Geneva talks, which quickly broke down.
However, subsequent analysis showed that over 46% of the photo-
graphs were actually of Syrian soldiers and civilian victims of the war. Of
the remainder, the causes and circumstances of their deaths are unclear.
There is strong evidence that some were killed in the war and others died
in the hospital. An equally, if not more plausible explanation, is that they
are routine mortuary photos of people who had either died following
treatment at the hospital or who had died elsewhere and their bodies were
received at the hospital. Some of the bodies may indeed have come from
government prisons, but the allegation that they all died of torture or in
Syrian government custody is demonstrably false, and just how many of
them might have been deaths in custody has never been determined by
truly independent researchers.31
The Caesar allegations are a prime example of what has become known
as “atrocity propaganda”, which has been a significant feature of the Syrian
propaganda war, particularly at politically sensitive points in time. The
power of “atrocity propaganda” lies in the fact that it is extremely difficult
to rebut at the point it becomes public, and once the narrative on a par-
ticular incident becomes firmly established as part of the dominant dis-
course it becomes extremely difficult to challenge due to the influence of
cognitive bias effects amongst those actors that endorse the dominant
discourse.
The Russian and Iranian governments extend their influence in much
the same way through various actors within their own domestic power
structures, particularly their national MSM outlets. Russia ranked 149th
and Iran ranked 173rd (out of 180) in the Reporters Without Borders
2020 Index of Press Freedom,32 so their respective MSM outlets follow
pro-government editorial policies. As a result, actors in the dominant
power structures of Western states use their influence to de-legitimise the
Russian and Iranian MSM as propaganda outlets for their respective
governments, but are unable to prevent those outlets reaching Western

audiences in the digital media space.
All of the governments engaged in the propaganda war also project
their influence into the digital media space. The best documented of these
operations is the Russian propaganda machine, which disseminates huge
volumes of messaging through multiple digital channels.33 By interfacing
with a network of writers and activists who support its agenda, giving
them a platform on Russian MSM outlets, and using bots to amplify their
work through social media, it seeks to create a “manufactured consensus”
that legitimises the Syrian government’s discourse on the war.34
In contrast, the US and UK governments adopted a more qualitative
strategy in which they fund PR companies and non-governmental organ-
isations to co-opt and mediate the reporting of opposition actors to ensure
that it supports the dominant discourse in their respective countries. In
2011, the US funded the online campaigning group Avaaz to act as a co-
ordinating hub and logistical supply route for the opposition movement.
One of its most significant roles was to manage the interface between the
opposition and the Western MSM by channelling reports from Avaaz-
trained activists inside Syria through its communications hub, which
would then “verify” the information for Western journalists.35 The very
fact that Avaaz was acting as a clearing house for reports from inside Syria
meant that it was mediating the information flow. Whether through
naïveté or bias, many MSM journalists were content to accept the integrity
of Avaaz’s work, despite the fact that it was playing an active role in sup-
porting the uprising on behalf of the US government.
In a similar fashion, from 2013 onwards the UK sought to manage
opposition messaging regarding the military conduct of the war through
funding the Revolutionary Forces of Syria (RFS) Media Office and other
opposition media outlets which portrayed the rebels as protectors of the
people and promoted secular democratic ideals.36 Under this programme
contractors ran a press office for the rebels, producing and disseminating
videos, images, military reports, radio broadcasts, and social media posts,
as part of a broader Western effort to promote “the moderate values of the
revolution”. It was hoped that this would influence the overall direction of
the war by moulding a sense of Syrian national identity that would reject
both President Assad and Islamic State (IS), and also shape Western per-
ceptions of the rebels themselves.37 In respect of that latter objective, the
programme proved extremely successful, with RFS videos and hashtags
being regularly picked up by Western MSM outlets.38
14 B. COLE
The Syrian Government Propaganda Machine

The relationship between dominant power structures and the dominant
discourse structure is clear cut within Syria, where government messaging
is routinely disseminated through the state-controlled education system
and media. The pervasiveness of government propaganda is evident from
the fact that Syria ranked 174 (out of 180) on the Reporters Without
Borders 2020 Index of Press freedom.39 It also restricted access by foreign
journalists in an attempt to control the information flow from inside Syria
to the international media. The extent of the Syria government’s manipu-
lation of the media was laid bare by defectors including a former member
of President Assad’s press office who claimed that his role was to “fabri-
cate, make deceptions and cover up,” and that TV interviews sometimes
use government supporters disguised as locals to claim that killings of
civilians were perpetrated by rebel fighters when in fact they had been
killed by government forces. A Syrian TV reporter who also defected to
the rebels even reported that his interviews were regularly scripted by gov-
ernment officials.40
The government also integrated the establishments of all of Syria’s reli-
gious communities into its power structure in an attempt to cloak its mes-
saging in theological legitimacy. It achieved this by making all senior
clerical appointments and granting significant concessions to the various
religious establishments in order to ensure their loyalty. The extent of
government influence was such that there were allegations of religious
sermons being scripted by the government.41 Mainstream religious figures
generally benefit from a halo effect which gives their pronouncements a
significant degree of authority and influence, so this provided the Syrian
government with a means to counteract the horns effects which mitigated
the influence of so much of its messaging. At the same time, dissenting
viewpoints were supressed, particularly through a ban on YouTube and
Facebook.
Taken together, these measures enabled the Syrian government to sub-
ject its citizens to a constant stream of propaganda throughout their lives.
Some observers have suggested that this was extremely effective in shaping
loyalist attitudes amongst the people.42 That observation is supported by
a body of anecdotal reporting which suggested that President Assad com-
manded a significant, albeit unquantifiable, measure of popular support
prior to 2011.43 However, there is a risk of exaggerating the efficiency of
the Syrian government’s propaganda machine and of over estimating its

influence in shaping attitudes amongst ordinary Syrians.
Dissenting viewpoints did percolate into the public sphere, where they
found a receptive audience. People were able to access Salafi and Islamist
preaching through satellite television programming from the Gulf as well
as from domestic preachers who refused to submit to government con-
trol.44 A range of secular political ideologies and ideas which challenged
Ba’athism are also firmly rooted in Syrian society. Besides being dissemi-
nated through grass roots activism, these dissident ideas and the networks
that advocate them, could also be accessed through Internet cafes which
used web proxies to bypass the ban on YouTube and Facebook. So, when
the government unexpectedly lifted the social media ban in early 2011, a
Facebook page entitled “The Syrian Revolution 2011” quickly emerged as
a focus for dissidents.45
Once the uprising began the government significantly expanded its
information operations both domestically and internationally. It con-
ducted a multifaceted online propaganda operation that targeted key
international audiences and opinion leaders across multiple social media
platforms, and which interfaced with the international MSM by way of
official interviews and alt media outlets.46 Domestically, the national media
continued to churn out a constant stream of pro-government messaging.
It also exposed examples of the international MSM reporting fake or
manipulated news regarding the uprising, which fed into a narrative that
the uprising was being stirred up by foreign powers and the international
media.47 Yet there was a degree of amateurishness about these operations,
with social media messaging initially being restricted to office hours only.
It was not until 2015 that pro-government propaganda became more pro-
fessional, when Russia deployed its propaganda machine to support and
amplify government messaging.48
Bias and Primary Sources of Information: Citizen

Journalists or Activists
Besides being a multi-polar space in which governments compete with one
another to establish the dominant discourse on Syria, social media is a
space in which individual Syrians can make their own personal contribu-
tions to the propaganda war. The Syrian government’s decision to unblock
YouTube and Facebook enabled a host of Syrians to begin messaging
16 B. COLE
about the events that were unfolding around them, some of which sup-
ported the Syrian government’s discourse and some of which supported
the opposition’s discourse. In an act of confirmation bias, the dominant
power structures of the states involved in the propaganda war then began
amplifying the messaging of those actors that supported their favoured
discourse on Syria. Yet the fact that Syrians themselves were reporting dif-
ferent versions of the same events raises significant question marks about
bias, which is encapsulated in the debate over whether they are citizen
journalists or activists.
The Arab Spring established the cult of the citizen journalist, of ordi-
nary men and women impartially informing the world of events through
social media. It was no different in Syria, where apparent citizen journal-
ism seemed to play a similar role during 2011 and 2012. Yet the distinc-
tion between citizen journalist and opposition activist is blurred at best.
The term citizen journalist implies an impartial observer of events, but
anyone who is reporting on an event that they are participating in, or who
supports one party or the other, is an activist rather than an impartial
observer and so must be considered to have a bias.
In the West, this bias is readily acknowledged in respect of pro-Syrian
government activists, thousands of whom formed a so-called “electronic
army” to flood social media with pro-government messaging.49 The
majority of those actors were initially engaged in the domestic propaganda
battle and so posted mainly in Arabic. It was not until 2013 that signifi-
cant numbers of them began to engage in the international propaganda
battle by posting in English. Even then though, Western journalists and
other observers continued to view them through the same horns effects as
they applied to the Syrian government itself, so their messaging was de-
legitimised as government propaganda.
Conversely, the equivalent bias was not acknowledged in respect of pro-
opposition actors who were viewed through a halo effect and considered
to be citizen journalists, even though many of them were activists who
typically provided a one-sided reportage of events. In 2011, the
International Crisis Group (ICG) warned that foreign journalists were
basing their reports on unreliable material produced by the protesters and
circulated on the internet, and recruiting local correspondents to serve as
unvetted “eye-witnesses”.50 One example of this tendency is Wa’ad
Al-Khatib who was primarily identified by the Western MSM as a film
maker, despite the fact that her social media accounts clearly show that she
and her husband Hamza, were opposition activists.51 Her work was
accorded a high degree of credibility by UK Channel 4 News and others,
despite the fact that actors in the dominant power structure of Syria and
the countervailing power structures of Western states accused her of selec-
tively reporting the facts.52
Some opposition activists deliberately posed as ordinary civilians in
order to create an impression of impartiality. The most successful and con-
troversial of these actors was the Twitter feed of Bana Alabed, a seven
year-old girl living in east Aleppo, which was set up in late 2016 to coin-
cide with the start of the final government assault on the rebel-held
enclave. It quickly accumulated over 300,000 followers and became one
of the international MSM’s most widely used sources of information on
the battle. The New York Times and New York Post both described Bana
as the Anne Frank of Syria.53 On 13th December 2016, during the closing
stages of the battle, the feed dramatically tweeted, “I am talking to the
world now live from East #Aleppo. This is my last moment to either live
or die”.54 Bana survived the battle and after being evacuated to Turkey
continued to play a prominent role in the propaganda war, meeting
President Erdogan and writing an open letter to President Trump plead-
ing “you must do something for the children of Syria because they are like
your children and deserve peace like you”.55
However, there are strong indications that the account was actually a
rebel propaganda construct. The very fact that it was set up to coincide
with the battle for east Aleppo raised question marks about its authentic-
ity. Pro-Syrian government actors argued that Bana had extremely good
written English for a seven year-old, and despite intermittent Wifi connec-
tion in the city was always able to tweet. They also discovered that her
father had been a rebel fighter, and an image of her in what was alleged to
be the Turkish city of Gaziantep prompted a flurry of speculation that the
account was actually being operated from Turkey.56 These suspicions were
seemingly corroborated by media interviews conducted in English, during
which she seemed to be either reading from cue cards or repeating lines
she had learnt.57 These concerns were eventually acknowledged by the
New York Times,58 and the BBC stopped using the feed altogether after
acknowledging that Bana’s mother “helped” her with it.59 However, very
few other MSM outlets questioned the feed, and it remained a major
source for CNN whose anchor Jake Tapper tweeted that anyone interested
in learning more about Syria should follow it.60
Even though pro-opposition actors reporting from inside Syria during
the early days of the uprising were activists, many of them were neverthe-
less independent, but as the war progressed the number of genuinely
18 B. COLE
independent actors dwindled as both the Syrian Government and armed

opposition routinely detained and harassed activists in an effort to control
the flow of information from the territory they controlled. In 2017,
Patrick Cockburn echoed the observations previously made by the ICG in
2011, when he reported that since 2013 rebel forces had made it impos-
sible for foreign journalists to operate independently in rebel-held areas,
and had then filled the resultant information vacuum with partisan “local
activists” alongside their own sophisticated propaganda machines.61
Cockburn’s observations were supported by an Amnesty International
report which cited a young Syrian media activist called “Issa”, who admit-
ted that Jabhat al-Nusra controlled everything they reported. The report
found that civilians in rebel-controlled areas of Aleppo and Idlib had been
subjected to abduction, torture and summary execution for criticising
armed groups on social media or failing to abide by the strict rules that
they imposed.62 It was a similar situation in east Ghouta, where Jaysh al-
Islam imprisoned and murdered a number of opposition activists. The
most high-profile of these individuals was Rezan Zaitouneh, a human
rights activist and founder of the Violations Documentation Centre
(VDC), who along with her husband Wael Hamada, and two other activ-
ists, Samira al-Khalili and Nazem al-Hamadi, were detained in December
2013 and later executed.63 Alongside the suppression of independent
activists, rebel groups sought to impose even stricter control over the
information flow by establishing their own media offices and social media
accounts, and cultivating direct links with Western think tanks and
journalists.64
The very fact that the only information coming out of rebel-held areas
was from actors who were either sympathetic to, or at the mercy of the
very people who were responsible for making it impossible for foreign
journalists to operate independently in rebel held areas should have given
pause for thought about bias.65 Amnesty International concluded that the
MSM allowed, either through naïveté or self-interest, people who could
only operate with the permission of the rebels to dominate the news
agenda.66 Cockburn made a similar point when he argued that the Western
MSM had allowed itself to become a conduit for rebel propaganda pro-
duced by people living under the authority of armed groups that torture
or kill their critics.67 In 2020, these views were corroborated by a number
of Syrian opposition journalists who had begun to reflect negatively on
their role in the propaganda war. Some claimed to have been dismayed
when they discovered that their work was being funded by Western states,
and that those states had set their agenda. Others argued that media activ-
ism had fuelled the conflict by encouraging people to post material on
social media without checking its accuracy, and by providing a platform
for sectarian and divisive views. One journalist from Sweida went so far as
to claim that “citizen journalism is one of the biggest calamities that has
hit the country”.68
Whether one considers actors operating in rebel-held areas of Syria to
be citizen journalists, revolutionary activists, or rebel propagandists,
largely depends upon one’s personal bias. Many MSM journalists and
other observers generally considered actors who were not overtly linked to
an armed group as being independent citizen journalists or activists rather
than rebel propagandists, and considered their reports to have a high
degree of credibility. Among those who champion this view is Charles
Lister, who has worked for a number of US think tanks during the war.
With extensive contacts amongst MSM journalists and over 100,000
Twitter followers, he is a super-influencer in the propaganda war.69 He
argues that the West has merely supported civilian journalism to protect
“moderate” values in Syria, and dismissed the reflections made by the dis-
illusioned Syrian opposition journalists as “conspiratorial drivel”.70
However, evidence suggests that Western governments knowingly used
and amplified the biased reporting of opposition activists in order to sup-
port the dominant discourse that they had established prior to the uprising.
Bias and Secondary Sources of Information

Secondary sources of information are key players in the dominant power
structures of Western states due to their role as both targets of messaging
from other actors in the propaganda war, and as mediators between those
actors and wider audiences. However, the secondary sources involved in
the Syrian propaganda war can be seen to have either personal or institu-
tional attitudes regarding the war which impact upon their role as media-
tors. Those attitudes generate bias effects which influence their views on
the credibility of the various primary sources reporting on the war and
their interpretation of the information they provide.
The most important of these actors are MSM outlets due to their access
to a wide range of different target audiences. The majority of Western
MSM journalists reporting on Syria have a strong pro-opposition bias,
which is apparent from the prominence they accord to pro-opposition
actors and their unwillingness to challenge the dominant discourse on the
20 B. COLE
uprising itself and the subsequent war. They, in turn are connected to a
diverse range of other actors from whom they obtain information and
“expert” opinion. However, the Klevberg experiment highlighted how
this leaves journalists vulnerable to the effects of confirmation bias, par-
ticularly in terms of seeking information and opinion from other actors
with whom they share similar views.
The most high-profile example of this practice is the MSM’s use of
former government officials as pundits or sources, which is one of the
main ways in which MSM outlets are integrated into the dominant power
structures of their respective countries. The views of these individuals are
presented as being impartial and expert, yet it is alleged by those who hold
dissident views that they simply promote the views of their former employ-
ers. In 2019, one experienced national security reporter in the US even
resigned from NBC and MSNBC, complaining in part that the large num-
ber of former CIA, FBI and Pentagon officials employed as “analysts” had
turned the two outlets into propaganda outlets for their former agencies.71
Further evidence regarding this confirmation bias effect, can be found
in the MSM’s engagement with a range of other actors in the propaganda
war. It is particularly apparent in respect of the MSM’s use of information
provided by the monitoring and human rights groups which collate infor-
mation from primary sources inside Syria. These groups include the Syrian
Observatory for Human rights (SOHR), the VDC, Raqqa is Being
Slaughtered Silently, and the Syrian Network for Human rights (SNHR).
Of these, the UK-based SOHR, which was founded in 2006 by Rami
Abdulrahman and maintains its own network of sources inside Syria, is the
most influential after it firmly established itself as a go-to source for
Western journalists during the early months of the uprising.72 Many jour-
nalists consider these actors to be reliable and trusted sources, yet all of
them have a very obvious pro-opposition bias.
The same is true in respect of think tanks, the majority of whom have a
clear pro-opposition bias. There is even a strong interface between ele-
ments of the opposition and some Western think tanks. In 2013 for exam-
ple, the Brookings Doha Centre launched the Syria Track II Dialogue
Initiative with the aim of building consensus amongst the disparate ele-
ments of the Syrian opposition and helping them develop actionable pro-
posals for a Syrian-led political process to end the war.73 The initiative
involved the Centre liaising with the leaderships of over 100 rebel groups,
but the lack of support for the initiative among pro-Syrian government
actors on social media is indicative of its perceived pro-opposition bias.
The other significant group of independent “experts” used by journal-

ists are the open-source investigators who rose to prominence during the
war, amongst whom Bellingcat established a powerful reputation for
impartiality. As the pre-eminent open-source investigation group in the
West, Bellingcat became another super-influencer in the propaganda war.
Yet evidence of a pro-opposition bias can be discerned from the anti-Assad
labelling occasionally employed by its leading figures,74 its connections
with pro-opposition activists,75 as well as the behaviours of its key figures
(which will all be explored further in later chapters). Pro-Syrian govern-
ment and anti-intervention actors attempted to undermine its credibility
with allegations that it is funded by the US and UK governments, and by
publicising a confidential UK FCO report which noted that “Bellingcat
was somewhat discredited, both by spreading disinformation itself, and by
being willing to produce reports for anyone willing to pay”,76 but none of
these allegations has damaged Bellingcat’s reputation among the consum-
ers of its products.
Part of the problem of dealing with open-source investigators is that
they can sometimes interpret the same evidence in very different ways,
which raises difficult questions about which of them is correct and how
disputed evidence should be reported. The Klevberg experiment sug-
gested that many journalists resolve this problem by simply consulting
those actors who share their viewpoint and ignoring those that do not.
Those who monitor and report on the war may well dispute whether a
particular actor has a bias, or that they themselves have a bias, but a key
feature of cognitive bias is that people are often unaware that their think-
ing and behaviour is being influenced by it.77 Some actors are indisputably
more objective in their reporting than others who share the same bias, but
they nevertheless still have an underlying bias which can to some degree
influence their outputs. This makes it extremely difficult to identify any
actors in the Syrian propaganda war as being reliably or totally impartial.
Building and Maintaining Conformity

Once a dominant power structure succeeded in establishing the dominant
discourse on Syria, its most influential actors then assumed the role of
“mind guards” to establish a groupthink mentality to ensure that all of the
other actors within the structure continue to support the discourse. One
of the main indicators of groupthink is the application of social pressure
on dissenters to support the collective position of the group and not accept
22 B. COLE
or propose opposing viewpoints. The potential damage that such public

pressure might inflict on the reputations of those who challenge the
groupthink serves to both shut down those who do dare to speak out and
intimidate others into silence. The importance of this behaviour to the
maintenance of the groupthink means that it is one of the most significant
roles assumed by the “mind guards”, and engaging in this behaviour is
therefore a key indicator of the underlying bias of an actor.
The most common form of pressure applied to those who challenge the
dominant discourse is the use of ad hominem attacks that are designed to
influence other actors in the dominant power structure to cancel dissi-
dents. This most commonly takes the form of labelling anyone who chal-
lenges the dominant discourse as an Assadist, Assad apologist, conspiracy
theorist, war crimes denier, or simply a Russian or Syrian government
agent, in an attempt to discredit both them and their messaging.78 Charles
Lister for example has previously labelled former US Congresswoman
Tulsi Gabbard an “Assad apologist”, and in another tweet pronounced
that “Assad apologists are so intellectually & morally bankrupt”.79 Other
forms of pressure include attacking the very character of dissidents. As part
of the campaign targeting Robert Fisk, Charles Lister tweeted “that the
Independent continues to publish Robert Fisk’s nonsense—ranging from
racism and Islamophobia, to regime apologism and praising vicious war-
lords and covering for Russia’s crimes is beyond me”.80
A lot of this trolling is unstructured, but there have also been co-
ordinated campaigns targeting prominent anti-intervention actors.81 Most
of it takes place online but it does occasionally creep into MSM reporting.
The Times once branded the anti-intervention Working Group on Syria,
Propaganda and Media, as “apologists for Assad”,82 and described a dele-
gation of British parliamentarians and clerics who visited Syria as “Assad’s
Apologists” who were “complicit in evil”.83 Russia Today parodied this
behaviour in an article headlined “How to become ‘an Assad apologist’?
Just question MSM rhetoric & welcome to the club”.84
One Syrian actor who was a particular focus of trolling in the early years
of the war was Mother Agnes-Mariam al-Saleeb, the mother superior of a
Christian monastery in Homs province, whose critical reporting of the
rebels during 2011 and 2012 posed a significant challenge to the domi-
nant discourse. Her status as a religious figure potentially made her a cred-
ible source among Western audiences, so in a sustained campaign to
discredit her, she was labelled by online pro-opposition actors as an “Assad
apologist”, or “Assad’s favourite nun”, and “the Syrian equivalent of one
of Hitler’s brown priests”.85 Amongst Western MSM outlets, one report

in the Guardian cited claims that she must have been in regular contact
with the Syrian state security services, and accusations made by the wife of
French journalist Gilles Jacquier that she had been complicit in the death
of her husband in Syria.86 Buzzfeed simply labelled her an “Assad Apologist
Nun”.87 The behaviour of journalists in using this sort of negative label-
ling to justify their refusal to objectively engage with her messaging, is
indicative of their pro-opposition bias.
The routine use of trolling is backed up by campaigns to de-platform
dissidents. On Twitter, actors simply block people they don’t agree with,
or issue complaints to the platform’s administrators in an attempt to get a
particular feed closed down. In the real world this has led to a number of
protests and boycotts to deny prominent pro-Syrian government and anti-
intervention actors a public platform.88 The impact that collective pressure
to cancel opponents can have is evident from an internet campaign target-
ing journalists Jeremy Scahill and Owen Jones who were due to attend a
Stop the War event in London at which Mother Agnes was scheduled to
speak. They chose to conform with the pressure, threatening to boycott
the event unless Mother Agnes was de-platformed. The pressure was such
that Mother Agnes herself eventually made the decision to withdraw
from it.89
Exactly the same behaviours can be observed amongst actors within
countervailing power structures of Western states who label prominent
pro-opposition actors as “warmongers”, mouthpieces for regime change
agendas, or terrorist apologists. As part of this trolling, 21st Century Wire
labelled Charles Lister a “terrorist apologist”,90 Medium.com labelled him
an “al Qaeda apologist”,91 and social media actors have routinely referred
to him as “Jihadi Lister”.92 Bild journalist Julian Roepcke is similarly
labelled “Jihadi Julian”.93 Pro-government Syrians also routinely label
pro-opposition actors and Western governments as “Zionist puppets”,94
which has particular resonance among Syrian nationalists but is less influ-
ential among Western audiences outside of the hard left.
These actors focused particular attention on discrediting the White
Helmets, as part of a campaign orchestrated by the Russian propaganda
machine to portray the group as being part of al Qaeda.95 This campaign
is rooted in a small body of hard evidence that includes images of White
Helmet volunteers co-operating with al Qaeda linked fighters and evi-
dence that a small number of White Helmet volunteers had formerly been
rebel fighters,96 which was used to support wider allegations that they
24 B. COLE
faked evidence of Syrian government war crimes.97 Allegations that the

organisation is part of al Qaeda do not bear scrutiny, but the fact that pro-
government and anti-intervention actors had to develop that narrative was
due to the fact that the pro-opposition bias of the White Helmets is readily
apparent to anyone who observes the war, yet it had no impact whatsoever
on its credibility amongst Western audiences.
At the same time as de-legitimising their opponents, actors on both
sides of the propaganda war also work to maintain the groupthink and
conformity within their respective power structures by legitimising actors
with whom they share common views. Russia for example, uses its propa-
ganda machine to elevate the standing of key anti-intervention actors such
as Vanessa Beeley.98 On social media this is done by re-tweeting or liking
posts, or tweeting links to MSM or alt-media reports, that one approves
of. The more the work of an actor or a particular report is re-circulated the
more it acquires an appearance of credibility because it is seen to be
endorsed by a large number of people, but in reality this practice is little
more than an expression of confirmation bias since what it primarily
reflects is the bias of those doing the re-tweeting.
Another tactic that dominant power structures have at their disposal to
legitimise actors within their networks is to nominate them for interna-
tional awards. The prominent opposition journalist Hadi al Abdullah
received a number of international media awards, despite his obvious
bias.99 Likewise, Wa’ad al-Khatib’s documentary, “For Sama”, won a
number of awards including the Oscar for best documentary in 2020,100
even though she openly admitted that “this film is the only weapon I have
against the regime”,101 which effectively undermined any suggestion that
it might be impartial. The White Helmets were also nominated for the
Nobel Nobel Peace Prize, but despite failing to make it past the shortlist
did receive the Right Livelihood Award in 2016.102 These awards served
to strengthen the halo effect surrounding these actors within the domi-
nant power structures of Western states and their wider audiences.
Both sides of the propaganda war expend considerable effort on these
activities but their impact is difficult to determine. At one level, high pro-
file and well-established actors such as Fisk, Hitchens, Beeley, Lister and
Roepcke were totally undeterred by the enormous volumes of trolling
they received. The more difficult question to answer is whether it gener-
ated conformity bias effects amongst less robust or more junior actors
whose jobs and reputations were not so secure. Evidence to support that
contention can be seen at the Guardian, where the journalists who
reported regularly on Syria were all supportive of the dominant discourse.

The Guardian published significantly fewer reports which challenged the
dominant discourse, and they were written by a wider range of other jour-
nalists who only wrote sporadically on Syria.
Power, Bias and the Dynamics of the Propaganda War

This analysis highlights the role that cognitive bias effects play in maintain-
ing both the cohesion of the power structures in Western states and the
dominant discourse on the war. The following chapters will explore how
the dominant power structures of the various states involved in the con-
flict used their power to set the parameters of the propaganda war as a
battle between two diametrically opposed discourses.103 The main rule, or
behavioural norm, that the “mind guards” then demand of the other
actors within their respective power structures is to strictly adhere to the
relevant discourse, and in doing so maintain the binary, dichotomous
nature of the propaganda war. This in turn generates significant pressures
on individual actors to downplay or dismiss inconvenient facts, and even
manipulate reporting in order to protect their favoured paradigms and
narratives. As a result, the diversity of the voices from inside Syria has often
been lost under the weight of the pressure on the actors in the dominant
power structures of Western states to conform to the dominant discourse.
This means that acknowledging the bias of individual actors, and under-
standing how cognitive bias effects generated by the power structures that
they are part of influence their reporting and analysis, is critical for under-
standing the dynamics of the propaganda war both internationally and
within Syria. Even though an individual actor might have a bias does not
necessarily mean that everything they report is in some way untrue or
manipulated, but it does mean that they can only be trusted to report
objectively if it supports their bias to do so, and must be considered likely
to manipulate their reporting in some way if it does not. So, one of the key
issues in studying the propaganda war is assessing the extent to which
cognitive bias and reporting manipulations may have contributed towards
establishing and maintaining the paradigms and narratives that framed the
dominant discourse in Western states. The starting point on this journey
is understanding the context within which the paradigms and narratives
that framed the propaganda war and the mediating factors which miti-
gated their impacts, are rooted.
26 B. COLE
Notes
1. Maram Susli, What the Fake Syria Sniper Boy Video Tell Us About Media
Experts, New Eastern Outlook, 27 November 2014, https://journal-
neo.org/2014/11/27/what-t he-f ake-s yria-s niper-b oy-v ideo-
tell-us-about-media-experts/.
2. #BBCtrending: Is video of Syrian ‘hero boy’ authentic?, BBC Newsonline,
14 November 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-
30043574/bbctrending-is-video-of-syrian-hero-boy-authentic.
3. An open letter to Lars Klevberg, the Norwegian Film institute and Arts
Council Norway, Bellingcat, 17 November 2014, https://www.belling-
cat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/11/17/an-open-letter-to-lars-
klevberg-the-norwegian-film-institute-and-arts-council-norway/.
4. Jon Snow interviews Aleppo MP Fares Shehabi, Channel 4 News, 30
November 2016, https://www.channel4.com/news/aleppo-syrian-mp-
fares-shehabi; Fake News Week: Why Channel 4 “News” Owes an
Apology to Syria, 21st Century Wire, February 6, 2017,
https://21stcenturywire.com/2017/02/06/fake-n ews-w eek-w hy-
channel-4-news-owes-an-apology-to-syria-and-the-world/.
5. Barbara McKenzie, The British Foreign Office and the Propaganda War
on Syria, Global Research, December 23, 2016, http://www.globalre-
search.ca/the-b ritish-f oreign-o f fice-a nd-t he-p ropaganda-w ar-
on-syria/5564467.
6. Ben Norton, Leaked docs expose massive Syria propaganda operation
waged by Western govt contractors and media, the Grayzone,
23·September 2020, https://thegrayzone.com/2020/09/23/syria-
leaks-uk-contractors-opposition-media/.
7. Gareth Porter, How a Syrian White Helmets Leader Played Western
Media, AlterNet, 28 November 2016, http://www.alternet.org/
grayzone-p roject/how-s yrian-w hite-h elmets-p layed-w estern-m edia;
Press release, Foreign Secretary meets leader of the Syrian White Helmets,
Gov.UK, 1 November 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
foreign-secretary-meets-leader-of-the-syrian-white-helmets.
8. Max Blumenthal, How the White Helmets Became International Heroes
While Pushing U.S. Military Intervention and Regime Change in Syria,
AlterNet, October 2, 2016, https://www.alternet.org/2016/10/how-
white-helmets-became-international-heroes-while-pushing-us-military/;
Syria’s White Helmets: “We need a no-fly zone and humanitarian corri-
dors”, Europarl, 6 December 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/en/headlines/priorities/syria/20161202STO54435/
syria-s -w hite-h elmets-w e-n eed-a -n o-f ly-z one-a nd-h umanitarian-
corridors.
9. Syria Crisis: Doctor Criticises Miliband Over MPs’ Vote, BBC Newsonline,
31 August 2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23909554.
10. A screenshot can be found at: https://bbcpanoramasavingsyriaschildren.
files.wordpress.com/2014/07/picture1.png; Medicine as a weapon
of war in Syria, Saleyha Ahsan, OpenDemocracy, 6 February 2013,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opensecurity/medicine-a s-
weapon-of-war-in-syria/.
11. Dr Rola, Wikispooks, undated, https://wikispooks.com/wiki/Dr_
Rola; Three years into this terrible conflict, Syria’s everyday heroes
are still saving lives Doctors and volunteers work for 18 hours a day,
often with bombs falling around them, Rola Hallam, the Independent,
14 March 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/
three-years-into-this-terrible-conflict-syrias-everyday-heroes-are-still-
saving-lives-9192567.html; One Man’s Quest to Expose ‘Absolutely
Historic’ BBC Panorama ‘Fakery’, Sputnik News, 29 December 2017,
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201712291060412907-s yria-
documentary-fakery-bbc/; Max Blumenthal, “Al Qaeda’s MASH
Unit”: How the Syrian American Medical Society Is Selling Regime
Change and Driving the US to War, the Grayzone, 12 April 2018,
https://grayzoneproject.com/2018/04/12/al-q aedas-m ash-u nit-
how-t he-s yrian-a merican-m edical-s ociety-i s-s elling-r egime-c hange-
and-driving-the-us-to-war/.
12. Fabrication in BBC Panorama ‘Saving Syria’s Children’, undated,
https://bbcpanoramasavingsyriaschildren.wordpress.com/.
13. @walid970721, 25 July 2019; @2ndNewMoon, 27 July 2019, @
MichaelNo2War, 27 July 2019.
14. The view from inside Syria’s propaganda machine, James Reynolds, BBC
Newsonline, 5 July 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-18717647.
15. Psychology and Life, Richard J. Gerrig, Philip G. Zimbardo,
FrodeSvartdal, Tim Brennan, Roger Donaldson, Trevor Archer. (Pearson,
London, 2012), pp. 618–623.
16. Psychology and Life, Richard J. Gerrig, Philip G. Zimbardo,
FrodeSvartdal, Tim Brennan, Roger Donaldson, Trevor Archer. (Pearson,
London, 2012), pp. 618–623.
17. Richard J. Gerrig, Philip G. Zimbardo, FrodeSvartdal, Tim Brennan,
Roger Donaldson & Trevor Archer, Psychology and Life, (Pearson,
London, 2012), pp. 618–623; Joseph Scaglione, Why do we Conform?,
Psychcenterarticles, 2 February 2018, https://psychcentralarticles.word-
press.com/2018/02/02/why-do-we-conform/.
28 B. COLE
18. Joseph Scaglione, Why do we Conform?, Psychcenterarticles, 2 February

2018, https://psychcentralarticles.wordpress.com/2018/02/02/why-
do-we-conform/.
19. Richard J. Gerrig, Philip G. Zimbardo, FrodeSvartdal, Tim Brennan,
Roger Donaldson & Trevor Archer, Psychology and Life, (Pearson,
London, 2012), pp. 618–623.
20. Michael Hogg and Graham Vaughan, Social Psychology (London:
Pearson, 2005), p. 201.
21. The media are misleading the public on Syria, Stephen Kinzer,
Boston Globe, February 18, 2016, https://www.bostonglobe.
com/opinion/2016/02/18/the-m edia-a re-m isleading-p ublic-
syria/8YB75otYirPzUCnlwaVtcK/story.html.
22. Max Blumenthal, “Behind the Syrian Network for Human Rights: How
an opposition front group became Western media’s go-to monitor”,
the Greyzone, June 14, 2019, https://mronline.org/2019/06/18/
behind-the-syrian-network-for-human-rights-how-an-opposition-front-
group-became-western-medias-go-to-monitor/; How Qatar seized con-
trol of the Syrian revolution, Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith,
Financial Times, 17 May 2013, www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f2d9bbc8-
bdbc-11e2-890a-00144feab7de.html.
23. Al-Jazeera Gets Rap as Qatar Mouthpiece, Bloomberg, 9 April 2012,
retrieved 8 April 2017, available at https://syriatruthblog.word-
press.com/2012/04/10/al-j azeera-g ets-r ap-a s-q atar-m outhpiece/;
An exclusive interview with a news editor of Al-Jazeera Channel,
AxisOfLogic, 6 January 2013, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/
Article_65277.shtml.
24. Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks, Stephen Crowley, Eric
Lipton, Brooke Williams and Nicholas Confessore, New York Times, 6
September 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/poli-
tics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think-tanks.html.
25. The Syrian opposition: who’s doing the talking?, Charlie Skelton, the
Guardian, 12 July 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2012/jul/12/syrian-opposition-doing-the-talking.
26. Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks, Stephen Crowley, Eric
Lipton, Brooke Williams and Nicholas Confessore, The New York Times,
6 September 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/poli-
tics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think-tanks.html.
27. @BrookingsInst, 28 April 2011; Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh, Arm
the Syrian Rebels. Now, Foreign Policy, 8 February 2013, https://for-
eignpolicy.com/2013/02/08/arm-the-syrian-rebels-now/; Salman
Shaikh, Annan’s Mission Impossible, Foreign Policy, 8 May 2012,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/08/annans-mission-impossible/;
Syria’s Assad should be an international pariah, Salman Shaikh, CNN, 5

August 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/08/04/
shaikh.syria.assad/index.html?eref=edition.
28. Rick Sterling, The War Against Alternative Information, Consortium
News, 1 January 2017, https://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/2017/
01/02/information-war/.
29. Integrity Initiative: Foreign Office Funded, Staffed by Spies, Housed
by MI5?, Sputnik News, Kit Klarenberg,13 December, https://sput-
niknews.com/military/201812131070655802-i ntegrity-i nitiative-
intelligence-disinformation/.
30. The Caesar Photo Fraud that Undermined Syrian Negotiations, Rick
Sterling, Counterpunch, March 4, 2016, https://www.counterpunch.
org/2016/03/04/the-c aesar-p hoto-f raud-t hat-u ndermined-s yrian-
negotiations/; If the Dead Could Speak, Human Rights Watch,
December 16, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/16/if-
dead-could-speak/mass-deaths-and-torture-syrias-detention-facilities.
31. The Caesar Photo Fraud that Undermined Syrian Negotiations, Rick
Sterling, Counterpunch, March 4, 2016, https://www.counterpunch.
org/2016/03/04/the-c aesar-p hoto-f raud-t hat-u ndermined-s yrian-
negotiations/; If the Dead Could Speak, Human rights Watch, December
16, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/16/if-dead-could-
speak/mass-deaths-and-torture-syrias-detention-facilities.
32. Reporters Without Borders, 2020 World Press Freedom Index, https://
rsf.org/en/ranking.
33. Report Of The Select Committee On Intelligence, United States Senate,
On Russian Active Measures, Campaigns and Interference In The 2016
U.S. Election, Volume 2: Russia’s Use Of Social Media, 116th Congress,
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report-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-r ussian-active-
measures.
34. How Syria’s White Helmets became victims of an online propaganda
machine, the Guardian, Olivia Solon, 18 December 2017, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/syria-w hite-h elmets-
conspiracy-theories; Russian Trolls Increased ‘2,000 Percent’ After
Syria Attack, Pentagon Says, Jessica Kwong, Newsweek, 14 April 2018,
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after-syria-attack-pentagon-says-886248.
35. Avaaz faces questions over role at centre of Syrian protest movement, Ed
Pilkington, the Guardian, 2 March 2012, https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2012/mar/02/avaaz-activist-group-syria.
36. Rania Khalek, British Government Funded Outlet Offered Journalist
$17,000 a Month to Produce Propaganda for Syrian Rebels, Global
30 B. COLE
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government-f unded-o utlet-o ffered-j ournalist-1 7000-a -m onth-t o-
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com/en/2016/11/15/fsa-eyes-syrians/#.WEas5qJ96fQ.
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Alice Ross, Rob Evans & Mona Mahmood, the Guardian 3 May 2016,
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$17,000 a Month to Produce Propaganda for Syrian Rebels, Global
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world/2011/jul/20/syria-propaganda-protests-assad.
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People’s Slow Motion Revolution, Middle East/North Africa Report
N°108, International Crisis Group, 6 July 2011, p. 2, https://www.cri-
sisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/
popular-protest-north-africa-and-middle-east-vi-syrian-people-s-slow-
motion-revolution.
44. A conversation with Grand Mufti Hassoun, Nir Rosen, al
Jazeera, 3 October 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/fea-
tures/2011/10/201110312588957185.html; Omar Hossino, Syria’s
Secular Revolution Lives On, Foreign Policy, 4 February 2013, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/04/syrias-secular-r evolution-lives-on/;
Syria’s symphony of scorn, Criticism of the Assad regime spreads wider,
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charging with a loose rein from behind their infantry, fell some on the
Portuguese and some on the thirteenth dragoons. So fiercely did
these last on both sides come together, that many men were
dismounted by the shock, and both parties pierced clear through to
the opposite side, then re-formed, and passed again in the same
fearful manner to their own ground: but Head’s troopers rallied
quicker than the French, and riding a third time closely in upon them,
overthrew horse and man, receiving at the same time the fire of the
infantry squares. Nevertheless, without flinching, they galloped upon
the battering train, hewed down the gunners, and, drawing up
beyond the French line of march, barred the way, in expectation that
the heavy cavalry would also fall on; but Beresford would not suffer
the latter to charge, and the French infantry returned for their guns
and resumed their march. The thirteenth and the Portuguese,
however, continued the pursuit, in a rash and disorderly manner,
even to the bridge of Badajos, and being repulsed by the guns of
that fortress, were followed by Mortier in person, and lost some
prisoners. Of the allies one hundred men were killed or hurt, and
above seventy taken. Of the enemy about three hundred suffered,
one howitzer was captured, and the French colonel Chamorin was
slain in single combat by a trooper of the thirteenth.
To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly
with his advanced guard in an offensive movement. When this
combat commenced, Beresford was with the main body, and baron
Trip, a staff-officer, deceived by appearances, informed him, that the
thirteenth had been cut off. Hence the marshal, anxious to save his
cavalry, which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up
the first blow, truly observing that the loss of one regiment was
enough. But the regiment was not lost, and, the country being open
and plain, the enemy’s force and the exact posture of affairs were
easy to be discerned. The thirteenth were reprimanded, perhaps
justly, for having pursued so eagerly without orders, yet the
unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them.
Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, that the French
left eight hundred rations of bread in the magazines; and they also
evacuated Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, being infinitely
dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south:
indeed, so secretly and promptly had lord Wellington assembled it,
that its existence was only known to the French general by the blow
at Campo Mayor. But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was
necessary to be as rapid in execution, giving the enemy no time to
recover from his first surprise; and this was the more essential,
because the breach in Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches
obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished.
Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, four
hundred men were thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into
Badajos; thus, with the losses sustained during the operations,
Mortier’s numbers were reduced to less than ten thousand men: he
could not therefore have maintained the line of the Guadiana and
collected provisions also, and Beresford should have instantly
marched upon Merida, driven back the fifth corps, and opened a
fresh communication by Jerumenha with Elvas; the fall of Badajos
would then have been inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the
sudden appearance of the army at Campo Mayor and the charge of
the thirteenth dragoons guaranteed the success of this march; the
English general might even have passed the river at Merida before
Mortier could have ascertained his object.
Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, put his troops into
quarters round Elvas, induced thereto by the fatigue and wants of
the soldiers; especially those of the fourth division, who had been
marching incessantly since the 6th of the month, and were bare-
footed and exhausted.
He had been instructed, by lord Wellington, to throw a bridge over
the Guadiana at Jerumenha; to push back the fifth corps; and to
invest Olivenza and Badajos. The Portuguese government had
undertaken not only to provide the means for these operations, but
had actually reported that they were collected at Elvas and
Jerumenha; that is to say, that provisions, shoes, battering guns,
ammunition, and transport were there; that the Guadiana abounded
in serviceable craft; that twenty large boats, formerly belonging to
Cuesta, which had been brought away from Badajos before the
siege, were at Elvas; and that all other necessaries would be sent
from Lisbon. It now appeared that no magazines of provisions or
stores had been formed; that very little transport was provided; that
only five of Cuesta’s boats had been brought from Badajos; that
there was no serviceable craft on the river, and that some small
pontoons, sent from Lisbon, were unfit to bear the force of the
current, or to sustain the passage of guns. The country, also, was so
deficient in provisions, that the garrison-stores of Elvas were taken to
feed the army.
All these circumstances combined to point out Merida as the true
line of operations; moreover, plenty of food was to be had on the left
bank of the Guadiana, and the measures necessary to remedy the
evil state of affairs on the right bank, did not require the presence of
an army to protect them. The great distress of the fourth division for
shoes, alone offered any serious obstacle; but, under the
circumstances, it would not have been too much to expect a
momentary effort from such an excellent division, or, it might without
danger even have been left behind.
Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he could procure the
means of passing at Jerumenha; an error which may be considered
as the first and principal cause of those long and bloody operations
which afterwards detained lord Wellington nearly two years on the
frontiers of Portugal. For, during Beresford’s delay, general Phillipon,
one of the ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, levelled
the trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped the breach;
meanwhile Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in
command of the troops, covered the country with foraging parties
and filled the magazines.
Captain Squires, of the engineers, now undertook to bridge the
Guadiana under Jerumenha, by fixing trestle-piers on each side in
the shallows, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats;
wherefore, a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over, by a
ford, to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3d of April, the
bridge being finished, the troops assembled during the night in the
woods near Jerumenha, being to cross at daylight; but the river
suddenly swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered the ford
impassable, and stopped the operations. No more materials could be
immediately procured, and the Spanish boats were converted into
flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, while Squires constructed
a slight narrow bridge for infantry with the pontoons and with casks
taken from the neighbouring villages. To cover this operation a
battalion was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and
the army commenced passing the 5th of April; but it was late in the
night of the 6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their
position, which was on a strong range of hills, covered by a swampy
rivulet.
During this time, Latour Maubourg was so entirely occupied in
securing and provisioning Badajos, that his foragers were extended
fifty miles to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of Beresford’s
proceedings; an error savouring rather of the Spanish than of the
French method of making war: for it is evident that a moveable
column of five thousand infantry, with guns and cavalry, could have
easily cut off the small detachment of the British on the left bank, and
thus have completely frustrated the operations. The allied troops,
being most numerous, should have been carried over in the boats,
and entrenched on the other side in sufficient force to resist any
attack before the construction of the bridge was attempted: it is not
easy to say which general acted with most imprudence; Latour
Maubourg in neglecting, or Beresford in unnecessarily tempting
fortune.
When the British were in possession of the left bank, the French
general awaking, collected three thousand infantry, five hundred
cavalry, and four guns at Olivenza, whence he marched, at daylight
on the 7th, to oppose a passage which had been completed the day
before. He, however, surprised a squadron of the thirteenth, which
was in front, and then came so close up to the main body as to
exchange shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested, in the
face of more than twenty thousand men!
During these proceedings, the fifth Spanish army re-occupied
Valencia d’Alcantara and Albuquerque; having cavalry posts at La
Rocca and Montijo. Ballasteros also entered Fregenal, and
Castaños, who was appointed to command in Gallicia as well as
Estremadura, arrived at Elvas. This general was in friendly
intercourse with Beresford, but had a grudge against Blake. At first,
he pretended to the chief command, as the elder captain-general;
but Blake demanded a like authority over Beresford, who was not
disposed to admit the claim. Now Castaños, having little liking for a
command under such difficult circumstances, and being desirous to
thwart Blake, and fearful lest Beresford should, under these
circumstances, refuse to pass the Guadiana, arranged, that he who
brought the greatest force in the field should be generalissimo. Thus
the youngest officer commanded in chief.
Beresford, being joined by Madden’s cavalry, and having traced
out entrenchments capable of covering several thousand men,
ordered his bridges to be reconstructed in a more substantial
manner; brought up a Portuguese regiment of militia to labour at the
works; left a strong detachment of British infantry and some
Portuguese horse for their protection, and advanced with the
remainder of the army. Hereupon Latour Maubourg retired upon
Albuera, and Beresford summoned Olivenza on the 9th, apparently
expecting no defence; but the governor having rejected the
summons, the army encamped round the place, and major A.
Dickson was despatched to Elvas to prepare battering-guns for the
siege. The communication was now opened with Ballasteros at
Fregenal, and Castaños having carried Morillo’s division of infantry
and Penne Villamur’s cavalry from Montijo to Merida, pushed a part
on to Almendralejos. Latour Maubourg then retired to Llerena; and,
on the 11th, Beresford, leaving general Cole with the fourth division,
Madden’s cavalry, and a brigade of nine pounders to besiege
Olivenza, took post himself at Albuera; communicating, by his left,
with Almendralejos, and spreading his cavalry in front, so as to cut
off all communication with Badajos. The army now lived on the
resources of the country; and a brigade was sent to Talavera Real to
collect supplies.
The 14th, six twenty-four pounders reached Olivenza, and, being
placed in a battery constructed on the abandoned horn-work
formerly noticed, played with such success that the breach became
practicable before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen posted in
the vineyards kept down the fire of the place, and the garrison,
consisting of three hundred and eighty men, with fifteen guns,
surrendered at discretion. Cole was immediately directed upon Zafra
by the road of Almendral; and Beresford, who had recalled the
brigade from Talavera, was already in movement for the same place
by the royal causeway. This movement was to drive Latour
Maubourg over the Morena, and cut off general Maransin. The latter
general had been in pursuit of Ballasteros ever since the retreat of
Zayas, and having defeated him at Fregenal on the 12th, was
following up his victory towards Salvatierra: an alcalde, however,
gave him notice of the allies approach, and he retreated in safety.
Meanwhile two French regiments of cavalry, advancing from Llerena
to collect contributions, had reached Usagre, where meeting with the
British cavalry, they were suddenly charged by the thirteenth
dragoons, and followed for six miles so vigorously that three hundred
were killed or taken, without the loss of a man on the part of the
pursuers.
On the 16th general Cole arrived from Olivenza, and the whole
army being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired
on the 18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied
Llerena, and the resources of Estremadura were wholly at the
service of the allies. During these operations, general Charles Alten,
coming from Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, reached
Olivenza, and lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, where Beresford,
after drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The
presence of the general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops;
they had seen, with surprise, great masses put in motion without any
adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow, without
being prudent. The whole army was over the Guadiana on the 7th,
and, including the Spaniards from Montijo, Beresford commanded at
least twenty-five thousand men, whereas Latour Maubourg never
had more than ten thousand, many of whom were dispersed
foraging, far and wide: yet the French general had maintained
himself in Estremadura for ten days; and during this time, no corps
being employed to constrain the garrison of Badajos, the governor
continued to bring in timber and other materials for the defence, at
his pleasure.
Lord Wellington arrived the 21st. The 22d, he forded the Guadiana
just below the mouth of the Caya with Madden’s cavalry and Alten’s
Germans, pushing close up to Badajos. A convoy, escorted by some
infantry and cavalry, was coming in from the country, and an effort
was made to cut it off; but the governor sallied, the allies lost a
hundred men, and the convoy reached the town.
Lord Wellington, now considering that Soult would certainly
endeavour to disturb the siege with a considerable force, demanded
the assent of the Spanish generals to the following plan of combined
operations, before he would commence the investment of the place.
1º. That Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, should take post at
Xeres de los Cavalleros. 2º. That Ballasteros should occupy
Burquillo on his left. 3º. That the cavalry of the fifth army, stationed at
Llerena, should observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate
through Zafra, by the right, with Ballasteros. These dispositions were
to watch the passes of the Morena. 4º. That Castaños should furnish
three battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at
Merida, to support the Spanish cavalry. 5º. That the British army
should be in second line, and, in the event of a battle, Albuera,
centrically situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia
to Badajos, should be the point of concentration for all the allied
forces.
In consequence of the neglect of the Portuguese government, the
whole of the battering-train and stores for the siege were necessarily
taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas; the utmost
prudence was therefore required to secure the safety of these guns,
lest that fortress, half dismantled, should be exposed to a siege.
Hence, as the Guadiana, by rising ten feet, had again carried away
the bridge at Jerumenha on the 24th, lord Wellington directed the
line of communication with Portugal to be re-established by Merida,
until settled weather would admit of fresh arrangements.
Howbeit, political difficulties intervening obliged him to delay the
siege. The troops under Mendizabel had committed many excesses
in Portugal; the disputes between them and the inhabitants were
pushed so far, that the Spanish general pillaged the town of
Fernando; while the Portuguese government, in reprisal, meant to
seize Olivenza, which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish
Regency publicly disavowed Mendizabel’s conduct, and Mr. Stuart’s
strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging
the two countries into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural
slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented both Castaños
and Blake from giving an immediate assent to the English general’s
plans: meanwhile, intelligence reached the latter that Massena was
again in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly directing
Beresford to postpone the siege until the Spanish generals should
give in their assent, or until the fall of Almeida should Appendix, No. II.
enable a British reinforcement to arrive, he repaired Section 10.
with the utmost speed to the Agueda.
O P E R AT I O N S I N T H E N O RT H .
During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely

pressed, while the army was so disposed as to cut off all
communication. The allied forces were, however, distressed for
provisions, and great part of their corn came from the side of
Ledesma; being smuggled by the peasants through the French
posts, and passed over the Agueda by ropes, which were easily
hidden amongst the deep chasms of that river, near its confluence
with the Douro.
Massena was, however, intent upon relieving the place. His retreat
upon Salamanca had been to restore the organization and
equipments of his army, which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo,
without consuming the stores of that fortress. His cantonments
extended from San Felices by Ledesma to Toro, his cavalry was in
bad condition, his artillery nearly unhorsed: but from Bessieres he
expected, with reason, aid, both of men and provisions, and in that
expectation was prepared to renew the campaign immediately.
Discord, that bane of military operations, interfered. Bessieres had
neglected and continued to neglect the army of Portugal; symptoms
of hostilities with Russia were so apparent, even at this period, that
he looked rather to that quarter than to what was passing before him;
his opinion that a war in the north was inevitable was so openly
expressed as to reach the English army; and meanwhile, Massena
vainly demanded the aid, which was necessary to save the only
acquisition of his campaign.
A convoy of provisions had entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the 13th of
April; on the 16th a reinforcement and a second convoy also
succeeded in gaining that fortress, although general Spencer
crossed the Agueda, with eight thousand men, to intercept them; a
rear-guard of two hundred men was indeed, overtaken; but, although
surrounded by the cavalry in an open plain, they made their way into
the place.
Towards the end of the month, the new organization, decreed by
Napoleon, was put in execution. Two divisions of the ninth corps
joined Massena; and Drouet was preparing to march with the
remaining eleven thousand infantry and cavalry, to reinforce and
take the command of the fifth corps; when Massena, having
collected all his own detachments, and received a promise of
assistance from Bessieres, prevailed upon him to defer his march
until an effort had been made to relieve Almeida. With this view the
French army was put in motion towards the frontier of Portugal. The
light division immediately resumed its former positions, the left at
Gallegos and Marialva, the right at Espeja; the cavalry were
dispersed, partly towards the sources of the Azava, and partly
behind Gallegos, and, while in this situation, colonel O’Meara and
eighty men of the Irish brigade were taken by Julian Sanchez; the
affair having been, it was said, preconcerted, to enable the former to
quit the French service.
On the 23d, two thousand French infantry and a squadron of
cavalry marching out of Ciudad Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to
seize the bridge of Marialva; but the passage was bravely
maintained by captain Dobbs, with only a company of the fifty-
second and some riflemen.
On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo; and the 27th, his
advanced guards felt all the line of the light division from Espeja to
Marialva. Lord Wellington arrived on the 28th, and immediately
concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Dos Casas river.
The Azava being swollen and difficult to ford, the enemy continued to
feel the line of the outposts; but, on the 2d of May, the waters having
subsided, the whole French army was observed coming out of
Ciudad Rodrigo, wherefore, the light division, after a slight skirmish
of horse at Gallegos, commenced a retrograde movement, from that
place and from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country
immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Dos
Casas, but an open plain between the two lines of march offered the
enemy’s powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat. As
the French appeared regardless of this advantage, the division
remained in the woods bordering the right and left of the plain until
the middle of the night, when the march was renewed, and the Dos
Casas was crossed at Fuentes Onoro. This beautiful village had
escaped all injury during the previous warfare, although occupied
alternately, for above a year, by both sides. Every family in it was
well known to the light division, it was therefore a subject of deep
regret to find that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving only
the shells of houses where, three days before, a friendly population
had been living in comfort. This wanton act, was so warmly felt by
the whole army, that eight thousand dollars were afterwards
collected by general subscription for the poor inhabitants; yet the
injury sunk deeper than the atonement.
Lord Wellington had determined not to risk much to maintain his
blockade, and he was well aware that Massena, reinforced by the
army of the north and by the ninth corps, could bring down superior
numbers. Nevertheless, when the moment arrived, trusting to the
valour of his troops and the ascendancy which they had acquired
over the enemy during the pursuit from Santarem, he resolved to
abide a battle; but not to seek one, because his force, reduced to
thirty-two thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition,
and forty-two guns, was unable, seeing the superiority of the French
horse, to oppose the enemy’s march.
The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between the Turones
and the Dos Casas, the left at Fort Conception; the centre opposite
to the village of Alameda; the right at Fuentes Onoro; the whole
distance being five miles. The Dos Casas, flowing in a deep ravine,
protected the front of this line, and the French general could not, with
any prudence, venture to march, by his own right, against Almeida,
lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of Alameda and
Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank, and drive him into the
Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained by
Pack’s brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave the
fifth division near Fort Conception, and the sixth division opposite
Alameda. The first and third were then concentrated on a gentle rise,
about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the steppe of
land which the army occupied turned back, and ended on the
Turones, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river.
F I R S T C O M B AT O F F U E N T E S O N O R O .
The French came up in three columns abreast, the cavalry, the

sixth corps, and Drouet’s division against Fuentes Onoro; but the
eighth and second corps against Alameda and Fort Conception,
seeming to menace the left of the position; wherefore, the light
division, after passing the Dos Casas, reinforced the sixth division.
General Loison however, without waiting for Massena’s orders, fell
upon Fuentes Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions of
chosen troops, detached from the first and third divisions.
Most of the houses of this village were quite in the bottom of the
ravine, but an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy eminence,
overhung one end. The low parts were vigorously defended; yet the
violence of the attack was so great, and the cannonade so heavy,
that the British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely maintain
the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the
commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was becoming
very dangerous, when the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the
seventy-ninth regiments, coming down from the main position,
charged so roughly, that the French were forced back, and, after a
severe contest, finally driven over the stream of the Dos Casas.
During the night the detachments were withdrawn; but the twenty-
fourth, the seventy-first, and seventy-ninth regiments were left in the
village, where two hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat
more of the French had fallen.
On the 4th Massena arrived, and, being joined by Bessieres with
twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard,
examined all the line, and made dispositions for the next day. His
design was to hold the left of the allies in check with the second
corps, but to turn the right with the remainder of the army.
Forty thousand infantry, and five thousand horse, with thirty pieces
of artillery, were under arms, and they had shewn in the action of the
3d that their courage was not abated; it was, therefore, a very
audacious resolution in the English general to receive battle on such
dangerous ground. His position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was
indeed strong and free for the use of all arms, and it covered his
communication by the bridge of Castello Bom; but, on his right flank,
the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d’Aver, where a
considerable hill overlooking all the country, commanded the roads
leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. The enemy could,
therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army at
once in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack
them while entangled between the Dos Casas, the Turones, the
Coa, and the fortress of Almeida; and the bridge of Castello Bom
only would have been open for retreat. To prevent this stroke, and to
cover his communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, lord
Wellington, yielding to general Spencer’s earnest suggestions,
stretched his right wing out to Nava d’Aver, the hill of which he
caused Julian Sanchez to occupy, supporting him by the seventh
division, under general Houston. Thus the line of battle was above
seven miles in length, besides the circuit of blockade. The Dos
Casas, indeed, still covered the front; but above Fuentes Onoro, the
ravine became gradually obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy
wood, which extended to Poço Velho, a village half way between
Fuentes and Nava d’Aver. The left wing of the seventh division
occupied this wood and the village of Poço Velho, but the right wing
was refused.
B AT T L E O F F U E N T E S O N O R O .
It was Massena’s intention to have made his dispositions in the

night, in such a manner as to commence the attack at day-break on
the 5th; but a delay of two hours occurring, the whole of his
movements were plainly descried. The eighth corps withdrawn from
Alameda, and supported by all the French cavalry, was seen
marching above the village of Poço Velho, and at the same time the
sixth corps and Drouet’s division took ground to their own left, but
still keeping a division in front of Fuentes. At this sight the light
division and the English horse hastened to the support of general
Houston; while the first and third divisions made a movement parallel
to that of the sixth corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of
the seventh division, consisting of Portuguese and British, from the
village of Poço Velho with loss, and was gaining ground in the wood
also, when the riflemen of the light division arriving at that point,
restored the fight. The French cavalry, then passing Poço Velho,
commenced forming in order of battle on the plain, between the
wood and the hill of Nava d’Aver. Julian Sanchez immediately retired
across the Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger, at the death of
his lieutenant, who, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy,
making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer,
and shot by a soldier of the guards, before the action commenced.
Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida for an hour; but
when the Guerilla chief had fallen back, the French general turned
the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry,
which had moved up to its support. The combat was unequal; for, by
an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the
ranks as orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that
not more than a thousand troopers were in the field. After one shock,
in which the enemy were partially checked and the French colonel
Lamotte taken fighting hand to hand, by general Charles Stewart, the
cavalry withdrew behind the light division. Houston’s people, being
thus entirely exposed, were charged strongly, and captain Ramsay’s
horse-artillery was cut off and surrounded. The light division instantly
threw itself into squares, but the main body of the French horsemen
were upon the seventh division, ere a like formation could be
effected: nevertheless the troops stood firm, and, although some
were cut down, the chasseurs Brittaniques, taking advantage of a
loose wall, received the attack with such a fire that the enemy
recoiled. Immediately after this, a great commotion was observed
amongst the French squadrons; men and officers closed in
confusion towards one point where a thick dust was rising, and
where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols,
indicated some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude
was violently agitated, an English shout arose, the mass was rent
asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth at the head of his battery,
his horses breathing fire and stretching like greyhounds along the
plain, his guns bounding like things of no weight, and the mounted
gunners in close and compact order protecting the rear. But while
this brilliant action was passing in one part, the enemy were making
progress in the wood, and the English divisions being separated and
the right wing turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would
soon be lost, if the original position was not immediately regained.
In this posture of affairs lord Wellington directed the seventh
division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to
Frenada, the light division to retire over the plain, the cavalry to
cover the rear. He also withdrew the first and third divisions, placing
them and the Portuguese in line on the steppe, before described as
running perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro.
General Crawfurd, who had resumed the command of the light
division, first covered the passage of the seventh division over the
Turones, and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having
the British cavalry principally on his right flank. He was followed by
the enemy’s horse, which continually outflanked him, and near the
wood surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards, making
colonel Hill and fourteen men prisoners, but then continuing their
charge against the forty-second regiment, the French were repulsed.
Many times Montbrun made as if he would storm the light division
squares, but the latter were too formidable to be meddled with; yet,
in all this war, there was not a more dangerous hour for England.
The whole of that vast plain as far as the Turones was covered with
a confused multitude, amidst which the squares appeared but as
specks, for there was a great concourse, composed of commissariat
followers of the camp, servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants
attracted by curiosity, and finally, the broken piquets and parties
coming out of the woods. The seventh division was separated from
the army by the Turones, five thousand French cavalry, with fifteen
pieces of artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge; the
infantry of the eighth corps was in order of battle behind the
horsemen; the wood was filled with the skirmishers of the sixth
corps, and if the latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued forth,
while Drouet’s divisions fell on that village, while the eighth corps
attacked the light division, and while the whole of the cavalry made a
general charge; the loose multitude encumbering the plain would
have been driven violently in upon the first division, in such a manner
as to have intercepted the latter’s fire and broken their ranks.
No such effort was made; Montbrun’s horsemen merely hovered
about Crawfurd’s squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry
took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve
to the right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the
rocks to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at
Frenada and was there joined by Julian Sanchez.
At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French
stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great
execution from the closeness of the allied masses; but twelve British
guns replied with vigour and the violence of the enemy’s fire abated;
their cavalry then drew out of range, and a body of French infantry
attempting to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed by
the riflemen and the light companies of the guards. But all this time a
fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena had directed
Drouet to carry this village at the very moment when Montbrun’s
cavalry should turn the right wing; it was, however, two hours later
ere the attack commenced. The three British regiments made a
desperate resistance, but overmatched in number, and little
accustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, they were
pierced and divided; two companies of the seventy-ninth were taken,
colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the
town was carried; the upper part was, however, stiffly held, and the
rolling of the musketry was incessant.
Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole of Drouet’s
division thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps moving
through the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have
been forced and the left of the new position outflanked; but now lord
Wellington having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable
masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes. The French
continued also to reinforce their troops until the whole of the sixth
corps and a part of Drouet’s division were engaged, when several
turns of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was on the banks
of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another upon the
rugged heights and round the chapel, and some of the enemy’s
skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the main
position; but the village was never entirely abandoned by the
defenders, and, in a charge of the seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and
eighty-eighth regiments, led by colonel M’Kinnon against a heavy
mass which had gained the chapel eminence, a great number of the
French fell. In this manner the fight lasted until evening, when the
lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties, the British
maintaining the chapel and crags, and the French retiring a cannon
shot from the stream.
Vol. 3. Plate 11.
Battle of FUENTES ONORO

5TH MAY, 1811.
London Published by T. & W. Boone Novr 1830.
When the action ceased, a brigade of the light division relieved the
regiments in the village; and a slight demonstration by the second
corps near Fort Conception, having been repulsed by a battalion of
the Lusitanian legion, both armies remained in observation. Fifteen
hundred men and officers, of which three hundred were prisoners,
constituted the loss of the allies; that of the enemy was estimated at
the time to be near five thousand, but this exaggerated calculation
was founded upon the erroneous supposition that four hundred dead
were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash estimates on
such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcasses at that
point, I can affirm that, immediately about the village, not more than
one hundred and thirty bodies were to be found, one-third of which
were British.
During the battle, the French convoy for the supply of Almeida,
being held at Gallegos, in readiness to move, lord Wellington sent
Julian Sanchez from Frenada, to menace it, and to disturb the
communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This produced no effect, and a
more decisive battle being expected on the 6th, the light division
made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes Onoro, while lord
Wellington entrenched that part of the position, which was
immediately behind this village, so that the carrying of it would have
scarcely benefitted the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, strictly speaking, was
not tenable; there was a wooded tongue of land on the British right,
that overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as well as the
lower part of the village both in flank and rear, yet was too distant
from the position to be occupied by the allies: had Ney been at the
head of the sixth corps, he would have quickly crowned this ridge,
and then Fuentes could only have been maintained by submitting to
a butchery.
On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, making no
demonstration of attack, and as the 7th passed in a like inaction, the
British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th Massena withdrew
his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but
still maintained posts at Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without
being in any manner molested, he retired across the Agueda; the
sixth and eight corps, and the cavalry, at Ciudad Rodrigo, the second
corps by the bridge of Barba del Puerco. Bessieres also carried off
the imperial guards, for Massena had been recalled to France, and
Marmont assumed the command of the army of Portugal.
Both sides claimed the victory; the French, because they won the
passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank,
obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced lord Wellington to relinquish
three miles of ground, and to change his front. The English, because
the village of Fuentes so often attacked, was successfully defended,
and because the principal object (the covering the blockade of
Almeida) was attained.
Certain it is, that Massena at first gained great advantages.
Napoleon would have made them fatal! but it is also certain that, with
an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to that arm,
the prince of Esling having, as it were, indicated all the errors of the
English general’s position, stopped short at the very moment when
he should have sprung forward. By some this has been attributed to
negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont;
but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his army had arisen
to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would not charge at
his order; Junot did not second him cordially; Loison neglected his
instructions; Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight;
and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of
battle being shaken, would not work.
General Pelet censures lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry
against Reynier after the second position was taken up; asserting
that any danger, on that side, would have forced the French to
retreat; but the criticism is unsustainable, being based on the notion
that the allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas, including
Sanchez’ Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It may be with
more justice objected to Massena that he did not Appendix, No. I.
launch some of his numerous horsemen, by the bridge Section 8.
of Seceiras, or Sabugal, against Guarda and Celerico, to destroy the
magazines, cut the communication, and capture the mules and other
means of transport belonging to the allied army. The vice of the
English general’s position would then have been clearly exposed,
for, although the second regiment of German hussars was on the
march from Lisbon, it had not passed Coimbra at this period, and
could not have protected the depôts. But it can never be too often
repeated that war, however adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is
commonly a series of errors and accidents. All the operations, on
both sides, for six weeks, furnished illustration of this truth.
Ney’s opposition had prevented Massena’s march upon Coria,
which would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor, and,
probably, added Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg’s tardiness had like
to have cost Mortier a rear guard and a battering-train. By refusing
the line of Merida, Beresford enabled the French to secure Badajos.
At Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable
combination, and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet’s
negligence placed Almeida at the mercy of the allies, and a mistaken
notion of Massena’s sufferings during the retreat, induced lord
Wellington to undertake two great operations at the same time,
which were above his strength. In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more
errors than skill were observable on both sides, and the train of
accidents did not stop there. The prize contended for presented
another example of the uncertainty of war.
E VA C U AT I O N O F A L M E I D A .
General Brennier, a prisoner at Vimiero, and afterwards

exchanged, was governor of this fortress. During the battle of
Fuentes Onoro, his garrison, consisting of fifteen hundred men,
skirmished boldly with the blockading force, and loud explosions,
supposed to be signals of communication with the relieving army,
were frequent in the place. When all hopes of succour vanished, a
soldier, named Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and
presence of mind, to penetrate, although in uniform, through the
posts of blockade, carrying Brennier orders to evacuate the fortress.
The French general had, however, by crossing the Agueda, left
Almeida to its fate; the British general placed the light division in its
old position on the Azava with cavalry posts on the Lower Agueda,
and desired sir William Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba
del Puerco, while general Alexander Campbell continued the
blockade with the sixth division and with general Pack’s brigade.
Campbell’s dispositions were either negligently made, or
negligently executed. Erskine never transmitted the orders to the

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The Syrian Information and Propaganda

War: The Role of Cognitive Bias Ben

Syrian Armenians and the Turkish Factor: Kessab, Aleppo

The Birth of Psychological War: Propaganda, Espionage,

Between the Ottomans and the Entente: The First World

AI Applications to Communications and Information

Cognitive Psychology In and Out of the Laboratory

Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of

Beyond Bias: Conservative Media, Documentary Form, and

Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China

ISBN 978-3-030-93281-7 ISBN 978-3-030-93282-4 (eBook)

Between 2015 and 2018 I worked as a researcher on a number of projects

Their failure to comprehend the dynamics of the propaganda war was

Liverpool, UK Ben Cole

I would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of my brother

1 Propaganda: Power and Bias 1

2 The Pre-uprising Propaganda War 37

3 Establishing the Dominant Discourse 77

5 Assad Is Killing His Own People157

6 Assad Is Using Chemical Weapons191

7 Assad Protector of the Nation229

9 The Rebels Are Extremists299

12 Decoding the Propaganda War399

Alt-media Alternative media

SCD Syrian Civil Defence

Propaganda: Power and Bias

In November 2014, a video was uploaded to YouTube showing a Syrian

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Power and Propaganda

“anti-­intervention” in outlook. They are motivated by a range of anti-

Bias and Discourse Structure

a propaganda war, this leads to messaging from any person, group or

discourse are almost exclusively senior journalists such as Robert Fisk,

Government Influence Over the Dominant

institutional influence in respect of the remainder. The fact that govern-

former government officials in senior positions, which has prompted accu-

establishment. Qatar arranged through the US Carter-Ruck law firm for a

governments, but are unable to prevent those outlets reaching Western

The Syrian Government Propaganda Machine

the Syrian government’s propaganda machine and of over estimating its

Bias and Primary Sources of Information: Citizen

independent actors dwindled as both the Syrian Government and armed

Bias and Secondary Sources of Information

The other significant group of independent “experts” used by journal-

Building and Maintaining Conformity

or propose opposing viewpoints. The potential damage that such public

of Hitler’s brown priests”.85 Amongst Western MSM outlets, one report

faked evidence of Syrian government war crimes.97 Allegations that the

reported regularly on Syria were all supportive of the dominant discourse.

Power, Bias and the Dynamics of the Propaganda War

18. Joseph Scaglione, Why do we Conform?, Psychcenterarticles, 2 February

Syria’s Assad should be an international pariah, Salman Shaikh, CNN, 5

Research, December 10, 2016, http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-­

During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely

The French came up in three columns abreast, the cavalry, the

It was Massena’s intention to have made his dispositions in the

Battle of FUENTES ONORO

General Brennier, a prisoner at Vimiero, and afterwards

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Liverpool, UK Ben Cole

1 Propaganda: Power and Bias 1

2 The Pre-uprising Propaganda War 37

3 Establishing the Dominant Discourse 77

5 Assad Is Killing His Own People157

6 Assad Is Using Chemical Weapons191

7 Assad Protector of the Nation229

9 The Rebels Are Extremists299

12 Decoding the Propaganda War399

“anti-intervention” in outlook. They are motivated by a range of anti-

Research, December 10, 2016, http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-