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PALGRAVE FRONTIERS IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The Teleological
and Kalam Cosmological
Arguments Revisited
Andrew Loke
Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion
Series Editors
Yujin Nagasawa
Department of Philosophy
University of Birmingham
Birmingham, UK
Erik J. Wielenberg
Department of Philosophy
DePauw University
Greencastle, IN, USA
Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion is a long overdue series
which will provide a unique platform for the advancement of research in
this area. Each book in the series aims to progress a debate in the philoso-
phy of religion by (i) offering a novel argument to establish a strikingly
original thesis, or (ii) approaching an ongoing dispute from a radically
new point of view. Each title in the series contributes to this aim by utilis-
ing recent developments in empirical sciences or cutting-edge research in
foundational areas of philosophy (such as metaphysics, epistemology and
ethics).
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022. This book is an open access publication.
Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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To J.P. Moreland
For teaching me philosophy, and for being such an inspiration and
encouragement over the years
Acknowledgements
The main idea for this book first came when I was studying at Biola
University back in 2007. We were discussing the Teleological Argument
during a philosophy of religion class, and I began to ponder how might
one exclude all the alternative hypotheses to Design. An idea came to me
in the form of a logical syllogism which I develop in this book.
This book is also a follow-up to my previous book God and Ultimate
Origins (Springer Nature 2017). Since its publication I have had the priv-
ilege of debating philosophers Alex Malpass (2019) and Graham Oppy
(2020) on the Kalām Cosmological Argument, and interacting with
many people concerning the debates. My responses to their objections
constitute a significant part of this book. I am grateful to them for the
exchanges and have acknowledged their contributions in the footnotes of
this book.
I have also presented my arguments at the World Congress of
Philosophy (Peking University, 2018), the American Academy of Religion
Annual Conference (2020), and conferences and seminars held at Oxford
University, Birmingham University, National University of Singapore,
Nanyang Technological University, and National Taiwan University, and
I am grateful for the feedback I received.
The topics covered in this book are transdisciplinary in nature, and I
am grateful for the interactions with experts in various disciplines and for
the help I received. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to
vii
viii Acknowledgements
scientists Aron Wall, Luke Barnes, Peter Bussey, Don Page, Chan Man
Ho, mathematician Tung Shi Ping, theologians Mark Harris and Alister
McGrath, and philosophers William Lane Craig, Graham Oppy, Wes
Morriston, Alex Malpass, Josh Rasmussen, Wesley Wildman, Bruce
Reichenbach, Garry DeWeese, Jacobus Erasmus, Andres Luco, Frederick
Choo, Lee Wang Yen, Jonathan Chan, Mark Boone, Kwan Kai Man,
Steve Palmquist, Andrew Brenner, Chan Kai Yan, Brian Wong, Rope
Kojonen, Tim Maness, Phil Goff, and Zhang Jiji for very helpful
correspondence.
I would like to thank Yujin Nagasawa for recommending my book
proposal, the team at Springer Nature/Palgrave—in particular Brendan
George, Rebecca Hinsley, and Md Saif—for their efficient assistance, and
the anonymous reviewer for his/her helpful comments and recommenda-
tions for publication. I would also like to thank my research assistant
Vincent Chan for his help with the bibliography.
The research for this book is funded by the Hong Kong Research
Grants Council Early Career Scheme (ECS): ‘A Reassessment of the
Cosmological and Teleological Arguments for the Existence of God’,
project number 22603119, and partially supported by a grant from the
Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, China (project no. EdUHK 18606721).
31 July 2021
Hong Kong
Contents
ix
x Contents
7 Ultimate Design297
7.1 Introduction 297
7.2 Against the ‘Uncaused’ Hypothesis 297
7.3 In defence of Design 302
7.4 Reply to Hume’s Classic Objections 315
7.5 Addressing an Objection to Argument by Exclusion 316
7.6 Response to Difficulties Concerning Determining the
Prior Probability that God Design the Universe 318
7.7 Reply to Objections Concerning the Range of
Explanatory Latitude 322
7.8 Conclusion 326
Bibliography329
8 Ultimate Designer333
8.1 Summary of Important Conclusions from Previous
Chapters333
8.2 Concerning the God-of-the-Gaps Objection 336
8.3 Limitations of the KCA-TA and responses 340
8.4 Significance of the Conclusion of KCA-TA 347
Bibliography350
xii Contents
Bibliography353
Index383
List of Figures
xiii
1
Introducing the Quest
for an Explanation
1.1 Introduction
Throughout history, many have embarked on the quest to discover the
answers to the fundamental mystery concerning the ultimate origins of
the universe and the purpose of our existence. Some of the most brilliant
thinkers in human history have contributed to this quest by formulating
their answers to these Big Questions in the form of the Cosmological
Argument—which attempts to demonstrate the existence of a Divine
First Cause or Necessary Being—and the Teleological Argument (TA)—
which attempts to demonstrate that our universe is the purposeful cre-
ation of a Divine Designer. Originating in Ancient Greece in the writings
of Plato (e.g. Laws, 893–96) and found in other ancient philosophical
traditions (e.g. the tenth-century Indian philosopher Udayana’s
Nyāyakusumāñjali I, 4), the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments
have also been developed by scholars of the Abrahamic religions, since
the ‘First Cause’ and Designer of the universe may be associated with
Judaism, Christianity, or Islam.
Given that these arguments have been around for thousands of years,
one might wonder what more can be said on behalf of them. Many have
Craig argued that further analyses of the Cause of the universe show
that this Cause possesses various theistic properties, such as being
uncaused, beginningless, initially timeless and changeless, has libertarian
freedom. and is enormously powerful (Craig and Sinclair 2009). Writing
in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, philosopher Quentin Smith
noted that ‘a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that
more articles have been published about Craig’s defence of KCA than
have been published about any other philosopher’s contemporary formu-
lation of an argument for God’s existence’ (Smith 2007, p. 183). While
many articles have argued in support of KCA, others have raised various
objections.
With regard to premise (1), some philosophers have objected that we
only have reason to suppose that the Causal Principle holds within our
universe, but not with respect to the beginning of the universe itself
(Oppy 2010, 2015).
With regard to premise (2) of KCA, Craig has defended two philo-
sophical arguments for time having a beginning: the argument from the
impossibility of concrete actual infinities and the argument from the
impossibility of traversing an actual infinite. The first argument claims
that the absurdities which result from paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel
show that concrete infinities cannot exist, and since an infinite temporal
regress of events is a concrete infinity, it follows that an infinite temporal
regress of events cannot exist. The second argument claims that a collec-
tion formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite, and since
the temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition,
the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite. Others have
raised various objections, such as claiming that actual infinite sequences
are ‘traversed’ all the time in nature (e.g. whenever an object moves from
one location in space to another) (see discussion in Puryear 2014), and
arguing that Craig’s defence of KCA depends on the highly controversial
dynamic theory of time (according to which the members of a series of
events come to be one after another) and begs the question against an
1 Introducing the Quest for an Explanation 5
actual infinite past (Oppy 2006). Stephen Hawking proposed that the
initial state of the universe consisted of a timeless (no boundary) state
(Hartle and Hawking 1983; Hawking 1988). This initial state can be
understood as a beginningless impersonal First Cause from which all
things came, and which avoids the need for a personal Creator.
I have addressed the objections noted above in my previous writings. For
example, with regard to the objections noted above concerning premise 1
of KCA, I have proposed a new philosophical argument in Loke (2012b,
2017, chapter 5) which addresses the objections by Oppy (2010, 2015)
and others, and which demonstrates that, if something (say, the universe)
begins to exist uncaused, then many other kinds of things/events which
begin to exist would also begin to exist uncaused, but the consequent is not
the case; therefore, the antecedent is not the case. In this book (Chaps. 2
and 3), I shall further develop this Modus Tollens argument in response to
more recent objections to the Causal Principle found in the writings of
Rasmussen (2018), Almeida (2018), Linford (2020), and others, and in
Chap. 6, I shall use it to respond to Hawking’s objections to a Creator
(including the objections found in his final book published in 2018).
With respect to the objections noted above concerning premise 2 of
KCA, I have shown in Loke (2012a, 2014b, 2017, chapter 2) that the
argument for a beginning of the universe based on the impossibility of
concrete actual infinities does not beg the question against the existence
of concrete actual infinities, by demonstrating that the argument can be
shown to be based on the independent metaphysical fact that numbers
are causally inert. With respect to the argument based on the impossibil-
ity of traversing an infinite, I have responded to the objection that actual
infinite sequences are ‘traversed’ all the time in nature, by defending the
view that time and space is a continuum with various parts but not hav-
ing an actual infinite number of parts or points (Loke 2016; Loke 2017,
chapter 2). Moreover, I have shown that this argument can be modified
such that it does not need to presuppose the controversial dynamic the-
ory of time (Loke 2014a, 2017, chapter 2; see further, chapter 5 of this
book). Additionally, I have developed a new argument against an infinite
causal regress which demonstrates that, if every prior entity in a causal
chain has a beginning, then given the Causal Principle nothing would
ever begin to exist; therefore, what is required is a beginningless First
6 A. Loke
Cause (Loke 2017, chapter 3). In this book (Chap. 5), I shall develop
these arguments further in engagement with various pre-Big Bang scien-
tific cosmologies and reply to the latest objections to these arguments
(e.g. Almeida 2018; Linford 2020).
With respect to Hawking’s conceptual challenge concerning the nature
of First Cause noted above, I have argued in Loke (2017, chapter 6) that
the First Cause is a libertarian free agent. Against this conclusion, it might
be objected that one should not attribute libertarian freedom to the First
Cause, because libertarian freedom is associated with a mind with the
capacity for decision making, but it has not yet been shown that the First
Cause has other properties of a mind with the capacity for decision mak-
ing. In Chaps. 6 and 7, I shall show that this objection fails, and I shall
also provide evidences that the First Cause has other properties of a mind
with the capacity for decision making. The latter will be accomplished by
developing the Teleological Argument and combine it with the KCA to
demonstrate that the First Cause is an intelligent designer of the universe.
Concerning the Teleological Argument, ‘according to many physicists,
the fact that the universe is able to support life depends delicately on vari-
ous of its fundamental characteristics, notably on the form of the laws of
nature, on the values of some constants of nature, and on aspects of the
universe’s conditions in its very early stages’ (Friederich 2018). Many sci-
entists and philosophers have argued that this ‘fine-tuning’ is evidence for
a Designer (Lewis and Barnes 2016). Others have cited the mathemati-
cally describable order of the universe (Polkinghorne 2011) as evidences
for a Designer. Critics object that there could be alternative hypotheses
which have yet to be considered. This problem beset various forms of
design inference. For example, concerning ‘inference to the best explana-
tion’ (IBE), which involves comparing explanations based on criteria
such as explanatory power, explanatory scope, and so on, Ratzsch and
Koperski (2019) state that substantive comparison between explanations
‘can only involve known alternatives, which at any point represent a van-
ishingly small fraction of the possible alternatives … being the best (as
humans see it) of the (humanly known) restricted group does not warrant
ascription of truth, or anything like it’. Others have mentioned the prob-
lem of assigning prior probability for Design given that our inferences of
intelligent design are based on our empirical knowledge of human
1 Introducing the Quest for an Explanation 7
physicists like Lawrence Krauss are not careful enough about the con-
cepts and words that they use, such as concerning ‘nothing’ (see Krauss
2012, cf. Bussey 2013).
Physicist Carlo Rovelli (2018) observes that philosophy has played an
essential role in the development of science (in particular scientific meth-
odology), and notes that
Philosophers have tools and skills that physics needs, but do not belong to
the physicists training: conceptual analysis, attention to ambiguity, accu-
racy of expression, the ability to detect gaps in standard arguments, to
devise radically new perspectives, to spot conceptual weak points, and to
seek out alternative conceptual explanations.
The physiologist explains that the frog’s leg muscles were stimulated by
impulses from its brain. The biochemist supplements this by pointing out
that the frog jumps because of the properties of fibrous proteins, which
enabled them to slide past each other, once stimulated by ATP. The devel-
opmental biologist locates the frog’s capacity to jump in the first place in
the ontogenetic process which gave rise to its nervous system and muscles.
The animal behaviourist locates the explanation for the frog’s jumping in
its attempt to escape from a lurking predatory snake. The evolutionary
biologist adds that the process of natural selection ensures that only those
ancestors of frogs which could detect and evade snakes would be able to
survive and breed.
1 Introducing the Quest for an Explanation 11
McGrath concludes that ‘all five explanations are part of a bigger pic-
ture. All of them are right; they are, however, different’ (pp. 59–60). Just
as science itself brings together different explanations to help us see the
bigger picture, there is a need to bring together different disciplines that
would complement one other in our attempt to gain a fuller understand-
ing of reality.
Contrary to Hawking, who infamously declared that ‘philosophy is
dead’ (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, pp. 1–2), cosmologist George Ellis
observed that philosophy has an important role to play in scientific cos-
mology. He noted, with respect to the criteria for a good scientific theory
(internal consistency, explanatory power, etc.), that ‘these criteria are
philosophical in nature in that they themselves cannot be proven to be
correct by any experiment. Rather, their choice is based on past experi-
ence combined with philosophical reflection’ (Ellis 2007, section 8.1). In
view of the importance of philosophical considerations, cosmologists
should not merely construct models of the universe without considering
the philosophical problems associated with certain models, such as prob-
lems concerning the traversing of an actual infinite and the violation of
Causal Principle, which have been highlighted by proponents of the
Cosmological Argument. Indeed, scientists who are well-informed about
the importance of philosophy have used philosophical arguments against
an actual infinite number of earlier events to argue against cosmological
models that postulate this. For example, cosmologists Ellis, Kirchner, and
Stoeger write in an article published in the Monthly Notices of the Royal
Astronomical Society: ‘a realized past infinity in time is not considered pos-
sible from this standpoint—because it involves an infinite set of com-
pleted events or moments. There is no way of constructing such a realized
set, or actualising it’ (Ellis et al. 2004, p. 927). The proofs for the impos-
sibility of a realized past infinity which Ellis et al. are referring to are two
of the five philosophical proofs which I mention in Chap. 5, namely, the
Hilbert Hotel Argument and the argument for the impossibility of tra-
versing an actual infinite. This indicates that philosophical arguments are
relevant for modern cosmology. This book will contribute to the discus-
sion by developing some of these arguments in engagement with modern
science.
12 A. Loke
discovery, and for human survival to have been possible in the first place’
(Kojonen 2021, p. 42). Ladyman et al. would agree that scientific theo-
ries—and by implication, deductive reasoning which is assumed by sci-
entific theories—is not ‘merely telling us about how some philosophers,
or perhaps some larger reference class of people, think about and catego-
rize reality’ (p. 16) but helping us understand ‘the deep structure of real-
ity’ (ibid.). They wrote:
if there were no minds to think about them back then. While apparent
contradictions can exist, a true contradiction (e.g. a shapeless square)
cannot. Huemer (2018, p. 20) notes that
If you think there is a situation in which both A and ~A hold, then you’re
confused, because it is just part of the meaning of ‘not’ that not-A fails in
any case where A holds … Now, a contradiction is a statement of the form
(A & ~A). So, by definition, any contradiction is false.
postulating an entity as a cause, face the difficulty that there may be other
underlying causes for these phenomena which have not yet been discov-
ered. While causes are necessary conditions for an event, many of them
are yet unknown to us, and it is quite impossible for us to state all of them
that would be sufficient for an event to obtain. In this way, scientific
theories are underdetermined by the observations that purportedly sup-
ported them, and other theories for these observations remain possible
(for classic discussions see Duhem 1954; Quine 1951; Laudan 1990).
Given that there may be undiscovered causes for the phenomena we
observe, science can never prove that the laws of logic can be violated or
that something began to exist uncaused; on the contrary, as explained
above, the laws of logic cannot be violated, and it will be shown in Chaps.
2 and 3 that the Causal Principle, that is, ‘whatever begins to exist has a
cause’ is true as well. Given the Problem of Underdetermination, we
should adopt an eclectic model of science whereby realist and anti-realist
interpretations of scientific theories are adopted on a case-by-case basis,
and adopt an anti-realist interpretation of a theory if a realist interpreta-
tion conflicts with well-established truths (Moreland and Craig 2003,
pp. 314–318). For example, we should adopt an anti-realist view of a
scientific theory if a realist interpretation would result in conflict with
well-established understanding of the laws of logic (see above) and Causal
Principle (see Chaps. 2 and 3).
While the laws of logic are limited in the sense that—by themselves—
they cannot show us what exist, they can show us what cannot exist (e.g.
a shapeless square cannot exist). Likewise, philosophical arguments (see
Chap. 5) can show that an actual infinite number of prior events cannot
exist, and therefore the universe (which we know does exist based on
observation) cannot have an actual infinite number of prior events.
Indeed, philosophical arguments are particular apt for proving negatives;
just as one can prove that there cannot be shapeless squares, I shall show
that there cannot be an infinite regress of events, and that it is not the case
that something begins to exist uncaused.
In conclusion, I have shown that, contrary to popular misconceptions,
quantum physics, Gödel Incompleteness Theorems, Russell’s paradox,
the liar paradox, and non-classical logics do not violate the laws of logic.
Against the worry that how we think about the world may be very
20 A. Loke
different from what the world itself really is, I have argued that the laws
of logic correspond with what the world itself really is, and we can there-
fore use them to formulate various arguments concerning the world.
The laws of logic imply that the conclusion of a deductively valid argu-
ment from true premises must be true. Physics itself requires deductive
and inductive reasoning the justification of which is philosophical, and
one needs to distinguish between ‘appearing weird’ (e.g. superposition)
from ‘impossible’ (e.g. it is impossible that 0 + 0 + 0 … be anything other
than 0), which is what I shall demonstrate an infinite regress to be in later
chapters. It should also be noted that, while what is mathematically
impossible is metaphysically impossible (e.g. it is impossible that 0 + 0 +
0 … be anything other than 0), what is mathematically possible is not
always metaphysically possible. For example, the quadratic equation
x2−4 = 0 can have two mathematically consistent and possible results for
x: 2 or −2, but if the question is ‘How many people carried the computer
home?’, the answer cannot be ‘−2’, for in the concrete world it is meta-
physically impossible that ‘−2 people’ carried a computer home. Thus, the
conclusion of ‘2 people’ rather than ‘−2 people’ is not derived from math-
ematical equations alone, but also from metaphysical considerations: ‘−2
people’ lack the causal powers to carry a computer home. The metaphysi-
cally impossibility of ‘−2 people carrying the computer’ would override
the mathematical possibility in the quadratic equation. This shows that
metaphysical considerations are more fundamental than mathematical
considerations. The arguments against an infinite regress and against the
violation of the Causal Principle which I discuss in the rest of this book
are based on similar metaphysical considerations which are derived from
understanding the nature of the world. This is not ‘insisting that the
physical world conform to some metaphysical principle’; rather, these
metaphysical principles are based on understanding the nature of the
world. The above conclusion implies that, even if a cosmological model
is mathematically possible, it cannot be a correct model of the cosmos if
it is metaphysically impossible.
It should be noted that the laws of logic would hold even at levels far
beyond our daily experiences, such as at the beginning of time (there can-
not be shapeless squares at such levels too). Likewise, we are able to know
truths concerning relevance which hold even at levels far beyond our
1 Introducing the Quest for an Explanation 21
In their reply to why this would not undermine our scientific knowl-
edge, they wrote ‘even if one granted the tendentious claim that natural
selection cannot explain how natural scientific knowledge is possible, we
have plenty of good reasons for thinking that we do have such
22 A. Loke
sure did on the basis of Causal Principle, even though they have not
specified the conditions or a universal law. Likewise, on the basis of
Causal Principle, the beginning of matter-energy would have a cause
understood as a necessary condition; how to identify the cause is a differ-
ent issue.
With regard to the identification of cause, the specification of regular
connection (‘universal law’) can be understood as one of the ways of iden-
tifying the properties of causes; this way is inductive. However, no proof
has been offered to think that it is the only way. On the other hand, other
than induction, deduction is also a method of inference. A deductive
argument has already been provided previously to show that the neces-
sary condition for the beginning of matter-energy is uncaused, begin-
ningless, possessing libertarian freedom, and enormously powerful, that
is, a transcendent Creator. Given this deductive argument, the inductive
method is not required in this case to identify the properties of the Cause.
Sceptics might object that there is no empirical evidence that the uni-
verse or the singularity is created by God. Ladyman et al. (2007, p. 29)
put it this way:
Suppose that the Big Bang is a singular boundary across which no informa-
tion can be recovered from the other side. Then, if someone were to say
that ‘The Big Bang was caused by Elvis’, this would count, according to our
principle, as a pointless speculation. There is no evidence against it—but
only for the trivial reason that no evidence could bear on it at all.
However, direct empirical evidence is not the only way to find out the
truth. On the contrary, for any evidence x to indicate that something else
y is true, the laws of logic and various forms of reasoning are required to
show how y follows from x or is supported by x. Scientists are able to
conclude that the Big Bang happened, even though none of them have
directly observed the Big Bang, because they are able to reason from the
evidences (e.g. red shift, cosmic microwave background radiation) to the
conclusion. Moreover, even though they do not have direct empirical
evidence concerning how everything within our universe is formed, they
can nevertheless deduce that that these things came from the Big Bang.
Likewise, as I show in the rest of this book, we can conclude that the
1 Introducing the Quest for an Explanation 25
universe has a First Cause because there is evidence that there exists a
series of causes and effects and it can be shown that an infinite regress is
not possible, and it can be deduced that this First Cause has libertarian
freedom, that is, a Creator. Even though we do not have direct empirical
evidence concerning how the Big Bang singularity of the universe is
formed, we can nevertheless conclude that it came from a Creator given
that this Creator is the First Cause of the universe while the singularity
cannot be the first cause because the singularity does not have libertarian
freedom which (as I shall show in Chap. 6) the First Cause must have.
Many people today assume that for someone to claim that God created
the universe would be to pretend to know what we cannot possibly know.
This assumption is related to the Kantian assumption that we can only
know the phenomena and that we cannot know the causes beyond the
phenomena. However, on the one hand, the fact that something cannot
be directly experienced does not imply that we are unable to have any
knowledge of it. Experience is not the only source of knowledge.
Introspection, rational insight, and moral insight are some other sources
of knowledge. On the other hand, Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne
(2005, p.39) notes that the atomic theory of chemistry has shown ‘in
precise detail some of the unobservable causes of phenomena—the atoms
whose combinations give rise to observable chemical phenomena’.
Sudduth (2009, p. 206) likewise observes that the evolution of modern
science and scientific methodology has made the Humean and Kantian
crude empiricism no longer sensible. He elaborates:
Neither Hume nor Kant envisioned the success of scientific reasoning from
observable states of affairs to unobservable entities and causal processes on
the grounds of the explanatory power of the latter. Extra-solar planetary
science infers the existence, estimated mass, size, and orbital paths of unob-
servable planets from observable wobbles in the planet’s parent star …
Boltzmann utilized the atomic model to explain the behavior of gases and
liquids. Eventually, the existence and behavior of atoms was explained in
terms of yet smaller particles—protons, neutrons, and electrons.
the series of causes leading to me cannot be finite and infinite. Thus, the
series either has a first member or it does not, and given the arguments
against an actual infinite regress (see Chap. 5), it can be deduced that the
series has a first member, that is, a first cause. Likewise, by using the laws
of logic I can know that this first cause cannot be caused and uncaused.
Thus, it is either caused or uncaused, and given that it is the first, it can
be deduced that it is uncaused and that it has caused an effect (i.e. it has
started a series of causes and effects resulting in my existence). The rest of
the properties of the First Cause, that is, beginningless, timeless, has lib-
ertarian freedom, enormously powerful, and so on, can likewise be
deduced similarly, as will be explained in Chap. 6.
A Kantian might object that ‘this is just your way of thinking, you are
thinking that that there is an actual object called a First Cause which cor-
responds with your idea’. However, it has been explained previously that
the laws of logic correspond to reality, and that the conclusion of a sound
argument (i.e. a deductively valid argument from true premises) must be
true, it is not just a way of thinking or perspective. My great grandfather
(a prior cause of my existence) is not just an idea; even though I have
never seen him, it can be inferred that he really existed, for otherwise I
would not have existed. Likewise, it will be argued in the rest of this book
that it can be inferred that the First Cause really existed, for otherwise I
would not have existed.
Craig argues that further analyses of the Cause of the universe show
that this Cause possesses various theistic properties.
To make the deduction of the theistic properties explicit, I shall refor-
mulate the KCA and combine it with the TA as follows (KCA-TA):
(1) There exists a series of causes and effects and changes (= events).
(2) The series either has an infinite regress that avoids a First Cause and
a first change, or its members are joined together like a closed loop
that avoids a First Cause and a first change, or its members are not
so joined together and the series has a First Cause and a first change.
(3) It is not the case that the series has an infinite regress.
(4) It is not the case that its members are joined together like a
closed loop.
(5) Therefore, the series has a First Cause and a first change (from 1 to 4).
(6) Since the First Cause is the first, it is uncaused.
(7) Since whatever begins to exist has a cause (Causal Principle), the
First Cause is beginningless.
(8) Since every change is an event which has a beginning as something/
part of a thing gains or loses a property, and since the first change
(= first event) does not begin uncaused (given the Causal Principle),
the first change (= first event) is caused by a First Cause which is
initially changeless (from 5 and 7; here, ‘initial’ refers to the first in
the series of states ordered causally, not first the series of changes/
events/temporal series).
(9) Since the First Cause is initially changeless, it is transcendent and
immaterial (i.e. it is distinct from the material universe and is the
cause of the universe).
(10) In order to cause an event (Big Bang or whatever) from an initial
changeless state, the First Cause must have
30 A. Loke
(2) In order to bring about the entire universe, the First Cause is enor-
mously powerful.
(3) (+ the Teleological Argument) In order to bring about a universe
with its fine-tuning and order, the First Cause is highly intelligent.
(4) A First Cause that is uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless,
transcendent, immaterial, has libertarian freedom, and is highly
intelligent and enormously powerful is a Creator of the Universe.
(5) Therefore, a Creator of the universe exists.
argument from exclusion avoids the problems which beset other design
inferences, such as the difficulty of assigning prior probability for Design.
In the concluding chapter (Chap. 8), I summarize the conclusions and
contributions of my book and explain how science, philosophy, and reli-
gion can continue to work together in our understanding of the Ultimate
Designer.
Notes
1. In this book, ‘ruled out’ does not require ‘perfect’ elimination understood
as demonstrating that other possible hypotheses have zero probability. It
only requires showing that their probability is so low that they can be
eliminated as reasonable alternatives to Design even if we assign them very
generous probability estimates (see Sect. 7.5).
2. I thank Chan Man Ho for clarification of this point.
3. I thank Wesley Wildman for this point.
4. Concerning quantum superposition, see below.
5. While Huemer gives no model to serve as proof of consistency, this does
not invalidate his argument, which is simply intended to show that his
‘solution to the liar paradox holds that the liar sentence fails to express a
proposition due to an inconsistency built into our language’ (p. 29).
6. I thank Jonathan Chan for raising this objection.
Bibliography
Adamson, P. 2007. Al-Kindī. New York: Oxford University Press.
Almeida, Michael. 2018. Cosmological Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bradley, Darren. 2018. Carnap’s Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics.
Synthese 195, 2247–2265.
Bussey, Peter. 2013. God as First Cause – A Review of the Kalām Argument.
Science & Christian Belief 25: 17–35.
Capra, Fritjof. 2010. The Tao of Physics. Boston, MA: Shambhala.
Carroll, Sean. 2010. From Eternity to Here: The Quest for the Ultimate Theory of
Time. New York: Dutton.
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Then up from the darkness beneath the trees came the low,
thrilling laugh of a girl. He lifted his face from his hands and stared,
scarce breathing, into the night, while his ears still held every note of
that low, thrilling laugh, which spoke of youth in love in the
springtime.
The black bulk of the hospital behind him faded into obscurity as
swiftly as a scene struck on a darkened stage. He was no longer on
a little upper porch, but in an old-fashioned summer-house, hidden
from the tactless moon by a mesh of honeysuckle in bloom. He was
no longer on his knees before his Maker, but sitting beside the girl
who had been Ellen McCartney.
She was dressed in white. She was so close he could feel the
warmth of her. Somehow, in that darkness, their hands met and
clung, shoulder touched shoulder—the fragrance of her hair in his
nostrils. The soft, womanly yielding of her body.
Now her palms were resting against his cheeks, drawing his head
down; now, as lightly as a butterfly upon a flower, her lips brushed
his one closed eye and then the other; now she laughed, a low,
thrilling laugh, which spoke of youth in love in the springtime.
Prayer had gone dry at its source, choked by the luxuriant
vegetation of memory. He remembered other kisses and thrilled in
sympathy with the delight of other time....
The distant clock struck nine, but he did not hear it. The shriek of
a woman in pain sliced through the silence but could not penetrate
the walls of his dream. The girl who had been Ellen McCartney lay in
his arms, her lips to his.
Then a hand fell upon his shoulder.
“Come,” said the nurse, and slipped back into the room.
The Reverend Paul Templeton came back with a wrench to
consciousness of the time and place, and horror surged through his
veins like a burning poison. It was over—and he had not prayed! And
worse! When his whole being should have been prostrate in humble
supplication he had allowed it to walk brazenly erect among
memories that at the best were frivolous and at the worst—carnal!
He seemed to hear a voice saying:
“I am the Lord of Vengeance. Heavy is mine hand against them
that slight Me!”
Mastered by despair, he clung to the iron railing. What could he
hope of science when he had failed in his duty to faith? Somehow he
managed to struggle to his feet and gain the room.
The sheeted figure on the bed was very still, the face paler than
the pillow on which it lay. He crumpled down beside her and hid his
face, too sick with shame to weep. He knew with a horrid certainty
that she was dead and that he had killed her.
And then:
“Paul!”
It was the merest wisp of sound, almost too impalpable to be
human utterance. He lifted his head and looked into the face of the
great surgeon.... He was smiling.
“Paul!”
He looked now into the pale face of his wife ... and she was
smiling.
“There, there,” said the great surgeon. “I told you she would come
back. Her constitution——”
“Constitution!” scoffed the nurse. “It was you.”
“Or,” smiled the surgeon, magnanimously, “your prayers, sir.”
But the sick woman made a gesture of dissent.
“No,” she said, “it was none of those things. I came back when I
remembered——”
“Paul,” she whispered, “lean down.”
He obeyed. Her palms fluttered against his cheeks, and, as lightly
as a butterfly on a flower, her lips brushed his one closed eye and
then the other. And then the girl who had been Ellen McCartney
laughed a low, thrilling laugh, which spoke of youth in love in the
springtime.
GREATER LOVE HATH NO MAN
By Selwyn Grattan
He was an orderly in the hospital and had got the job through a
friend in his Grand Army Post. The work was not for a fastidious
man, but John was not fastidious. In his duties he affected the bluff
manner of a veteran, and, peering at the internes with a wise squint,
would say, “Oh, this ain’t nothin’; an old soldier is used to such
things. If y’ want t’ see the real thing, jus’ go to war.” And he would
laugh at them and they would laugh at him.
He wore his G. A. R. emblem conspicuously on all occasions. At
the slightest chance he became a bore with long tales of fighting, of
how he had chased Johnny Reb and how those were the days. The
students, still near enough to the classroom to hold a lingering
repugnance for the text-books’ overemphasis on the Civil War, would
guy him, but John never suspected.
On Decoration Day he marched and attended as many exercises
as he could squeeze into the too short hours. He wore a committee
ribbon like a decoration for valour. Once he carried a flag in a
parade, and for weeks talked about Old Glory, the Stars and Stripes,
and regimental colours that had changed hands in distant frays.
And he had fought only to save his country, he would assert. He
didn’t have no eye on Uncle Sam’s purse, not he; he could take care
of himself, and if not, why, there was them as would. When the
youths accused him of sinking his pension, he turned hotly to remind
them of their lack of beard.
He was ever so ready to defend himself with an ancient vigour
that the students and the nurses were sorry when he fell ill. Perhaps
his campaigning had taken from his vitality, they surmised. The
house surgeon told them he would never get up. After that—and the
afterward was not long—John told his tales to more sober auditors.
He had been in bed a week and had begun to suspect the state of
affairs when he called to him one evening the youth who of all had
shown him the most deference.
“Sit down,” he said, without looking the youngster in the eye; and
for a time there were heard only the noises of the day-weary ward.
Presently John spoke, in an apprehensive tone of confidences.
“I’ve been a soldier now for forty-five years,” he said, “an’ for once
I want to be just myself.... I kind o’ like you, an’ there ain’t nobody
else I can talk to, for I ain’t got any one....
“In ’61 I was on my father’s farm in Pennsylvani’. I was on’y a kid
then—fifteen—but when the war come I wanted the worst way to go.
But my mother, she cried an’ begged me not to, an’ my daddy said
he’d lick me, so I tried t’ forget it.
“But I couldn’t. Lots o’ other boys was goin’ away t’ enlist an’ they
was all treated like heroes. Ye’d ’a’ thought they’d won the war
already by themselves the way folks carried on when they left—the
girls cryin’ about ’em an’ the teacher an’ the minister an’ the circuit
judge speakin’ to ’em an’ all the stay-at-homes mad because they
wasn’t goin’, too.
“It kept gettin’ harder an’ harder to work on the farm, an’ finally I
said, ‘Well, I’ll go anyway.’ I knew pa an’ ma wouldn’t change their
mind, so I didn’t say nothin’ to them. But I went to all the other boys
an’ told them. ‘I’m goin’ away t’ enlist,’ I’d say, an’ when they’d laugh
an’ say, ‘Why, y’r ma won’t let ye,’ I’d look wise an’ tell ’em to watch
me, an’ I’d strut aroun’ an’ wink sly-like.
“They got to talkin’ about it so much I was scairt my dad would
find out, but he didn’t, an’ I held back as long as I could, because all
the other boys was lookin’ up to me. I was a man, all right, then.
None o’ ’em that went away was the mogul I was. The girls got wind
of it, too, an’ I could see ’em out o’ the tail o’ my eye watchin’ me an’
whisperin’ an’ sayin’, girl-like, all the things the boys was tryin’ not to
say. That on’y made the boys talk more, too.
“So after a few days I ran away. The first night I hung roun’ near
the town an’ after dark sneaked back to hear ’em talkin’. ‘He’ll be
back soon,’ one feller said. Another, just to show he knew more,
spoke up, ‘No, he won’ come back ’less in blue or in a coffin.’ An’ the
others laughed.
“I thought that was fine—in blue or a coffin. ‘You bet I won’t; I’m
the man f’r that,’ says I to myself.
“It took me three days to walk to the city. When I told the recruitin’
sergeant I wanted to be high corporal he laughed an’ pounded me
an’ put me through my paces. Then he said I couldn’t be a soldier.
My eyes wasn’t good enough.
“I cried at that; on’y a kid, y’ know—the’ was lots of ’em younger
than me fightin’. But I remembered the feller what said, ‘He won’t
come back ’cept in blue or a coffin,’ so I went where the soldiers was
an’ bummed an’ hobnobbed with ’em till they let me help at peelin’
vegetables and pot-wrastlin’ an’ such things. Then I got to be a sort
o’ water boy. My, I was proud!... But that on’y lasted a month, an’ I
had to get out.
“I jus’ couldn’t go home without the blue, an’ it seemed too soon to
get a coffin yet, so I went to New York an’ stayed all through the war.
Nearly starved, too.
“After it was over I went back home. They didn’t suspicion, o’
course, an’ the first thing I knew I’d told ’em I’d been in the army.
Hadn’t planned to, but some way it just popped out.
“Right away it was hail-fellow-well-met with them that had been at
the front, an’ we were goin’ roun’ givin’ oursel’s airs an’ the girls
seemed to think we was better than all the rest.... Well, sometimes
I....
“I was jus’ a young fellow, y’ know, an’ kep’ gettin’ in deeper an’
deeper an’ never thought it’d mean anything. When a man says,
‘John, you remember that clump o’ trees the Fifty-eighth lay under at
Antietam?’ why, you say, ‘Yes.’ An’ the next time y’r tellin’ about
Antietam you jus’ throw in them trees without thinkin’. That’s the way
it was with me. An’ I read books to get my facks straight an’ no one
never caught me nappin’. I used t’ correct them.... At last I got to
believe it all myself....
“Then the G. A. R. Post was organized in our town.... An’ so it
went.
“Well, it’s been a long time. If I’d ’a’ known in the first place maybe
it’d ’a’ been different.... But it was my right, anyway, wasn’t it, now?
Say, don’t you think it was comin’ to me? It wasn’t my fault. By God, I
wanted to fight! Jus’ one chance an’ so help me——
“They cheated me out o’ it an’ I got even. That’s all it was. I never
took no pension. I’ve had the glory, like ’em.... I’ve paid for it.... I on’y
took my own.
“And the Post will bury me.”
THE AVIATOR
By Hornell Hart
They had been playing “cut-in” Bridge until the Charltons went
home, at midnight. Instead of following them Norris returned to the
library with Steuler and his wife. In the old days Barclay Norris had
asked Barbara to marry him; but Steuler’s impetuous love-making
appealed to her imagination, and Norris had remained their loyal
friend. In the library, Steuler yawned—without apology. Extracting a
suit-case from the coat-closet, he started for the stairs.
“You and Barbara may sit up all night, my friend; but me—I haf
been travelling, I cannot keep my eyes open! Good-night!”
Norris stopped him with a slight motion of the head, nodded to a
chair by the table, lighted a cigar rather deliberately, and sat down.
“There’s a matter I want to discuss with you, Max—now.... Don’t
go away, Bab. It concerns you—rather deeply.” He inspected his
cigar critically during a few moments of silence. “Max, you may have
heard that my law practice brought me occasionally in touch with the
Government, but you didn’t know I was officially connected with the
Secret Service. When we were drawn into this war your probable
sympathies were considered. But you enlisted for the Spanish War,
though you never got farther than Chattanooga. You took the oath of
allegiance. We considered your loyalty had been demonstrated, so
we trusted you. We’ve had a constant fight against treachery,
however, in the most undreamed-of places. You were again
suspected. Is it necessary for me to say more? Lieutenant Schmidt
was arrested ten minutes after you left him this morning. I saw you
receive from him specifications for the Wright Multiplane, the Maxim
Chlorine Shell, and the perfected ‘Lake’ Submarine. I also know you
have a copy of the State Department’s code-book.”
Barbara Steuler had remained standing at the end of the table,
her eyes dilating with an expression of incredulous, outraged
amazement.
“Barclay! Are you insane? Are you accusing Max of these horrible
things? My husband?”
Norris spoke gently but firmly.
“I’m stating facts, Bab—not accusing. Because I’ve been your
friend, and his, I’m giving him this chance to return the papers and
code before it’s too late. At this moment I’m the only one who really
knows. He meant to sail on Grunwald’s yacht for Christiania at
sunrise. There’s still time for him to get aboard and escape. I’m
personally answerable for the unknown man I’ve been following to-
day!”
She whirled upon her husband, saw, with horror, that he was
making no denial, that he was looking at their old friend with a gleam
of hatred in his eyes. Presently he pulled open a drawer in the table,
thrusting one hand into the back part of it.
“So! You efen suspect where I put the codebook? Yess? Well, it
iss the fortune of war, I suppose. You think I will not arrested be, if I
reach the yacht before morning? Nein? You are the only one who
knows—yet? Und suppose I nefer come back? My wife I mus’ leave
with the man who always haf lofed——” There was a flash, a
stunning report. Norris staggered up from his chair and pitched
headlong upon the floor.
“Max! Max! A traitor! A murderer! My God!”
He took a canvas-bound book from the drawer, thrusting it hastily
into the suit-case, then fetched overcoat and hat from the closet. In
his hurry he overlooked the automatic pistol which lay upon the
table. So intent was he upon escaping with what he had that he
seemed to have forgotten her entirely. But a low, gasping voice
made him whirl about at the door.
“Another step—and I’ll—kill you!” The pistol steadily covered his
heart. (He’d seen her shoot.)
“Put that book on the table.” He hesitated, meditating a spring
through the doorway. “When I count three! One!...” With a muttered
curse he took the code from the suit-case.
“Empty your pockets!”
There was no mistaking the expression in her eyes. He emptied
his pockets.
“Now—go! Without the suit-case!”
“Barbara! You would haf me leave you! Like this!” Her face was
colourless, in her eyes a brooding horror, a dazed consciousness of
that motionless body on the floor behind the table.
“My people fought at Lexington and Concord—for principles
dearer than life to them. You swore allegiance to those principles, to
their flag. And you are—this! You’ve murdered our loyal friend—
when he was giving a traitor a chance, at great personal risk! Go!
Quickly!”
As the front door slammed she ran to the window, watched him
down the block. A man who did such things might return later, catch
her unarmed, secure the papers. Her brain worked automatically.
There was no safe place to conceal them. They must be destroyed
at once! Tearing the book to pieces, she piled the leaves upon the
andirons in the fireplace with the other papers, then lighted the heap.
When they were entirely destroyed a patter of footsteps echoed from
the stairs; a little figure in pajamas came peeking around the
portière. (A thrill of passionate thankfulness ran through her that he
resembled her people, with no trace of the alien blood.)
“Mo-ther! What was that big noise?”
“Possibly some one’s automobile, dear—a blowout or a back-fire,
you know.” She forced herself to speak quietly, standing so that he
couldn’t look behind the table.
“Mo-ther, who was down here wiv you?”
“Uncle Barclay, sweetheart. But—oh, God!—he’s gone now.”
(Norris’s love had been the truer, deeper affection; she’d known it for
some time.) “Run along back to beddy, darling. Mother will come up
presently.”
She had a feeling of suffocation as the boy hugged her
impetuously and padded softly upstairs. As she listened to his
careful progress another sound, a faint rustling from behind the table
made her heart stop beating for a second. With trembling limbs she
leaned across the table and looked. The dead man lay in a slightly
different position; there was a barely perceptible movement of the
chest. She reached breathlessly for the telephone.
“Give me Bryant 9702, please!... Yes! Doctor Marvin’s house!
Quickly!”
MOSES COMES TO BURNING BUSH
By W. T. Larned
With such simple lures are the simple enticed. Burning Bush
stopped, looked—and listened to maneuvering Moses. It is the new
thing that catches the eye and fills the ear. Ah Sin had forgotten to
beat his gong. Custom fell off, and found its way to the newcomer. In
a month or so the Celestial hardly held his own.
Ah Sin, losing trade, was troubled. Meeting the cut in prices did
not bring back his customers. With Oriental taste he organized a
novel window display—in vain. Something was the matter. But what?
Ah Sin’s guileless mind could not grasp it. Thrown on his own
mental resources, he grappled as best he could with the problem.
The Bible teachers had taught him that the Jews were a race
dispersed and paying the penalty of their transgressions. Ah Sin
believed this to be literally the truth. Yet he, a Christian, seemed
about to be overcome by the competition of an Israelite.
“Velly funny,” said Ah Sin to himself. “Heblew make good.
Chlistian catchee hell.”
He strolled out into the street, his shop being empty for the time,
and contemplated long and earnestly the place of his competitor
across the way. Something about the sign seemed to puzzle him and
to make him think. He shook his head. Then he backed off and
looked critically at his own shop, with its modest device: “Ah Sin—
General Store.” Presently his impassive face lighted up; and that
night his sleep was shortened by an hour devoted to a search of the
Scriptures. Had not his teachers told him to turn to the Bible in time
of doubt and trial? They were not here to counsel him, but he had a
clew.
He awoke next morning clothed and girded with strength. And all
that day, when business permitted, he laboured on a canvas sign,
which he lettered himself, with brush and India ink, smiling
contentedly the while.
It was Curly Bob, foreman of the Frying Pan outfit on Sun Creek,
who saw it first. Coming into town at a lope, in quest of cut plug, his
roving eye was arrested by the new announcement of Ah Sin. By
temperament and training Curly was unemotional, but, seeing Ah
Sin’s handiwork, he pulled so suddenly on his spade bit that the
cayuse fell back on its haunches. For there, in the eyelids of the
morning, Ah Sin, seeking an everlasting sign, had flung forth a
banner that prevailed against the Jew. In black, bold letters a foot
high, it beckoned to the trade of Burning Bush: