The Zapatista Movement and Mexico’s

Democratic Transition: Mobilization,

Success, and Survival Maria Inclan
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-zapatista-movement-and-mexicos-democratic-tra
nsition-mobilization-success-and-survival-maria-inclan/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Private Politics and Peasant Mobilization: Mining in

Peru 1st Edition Maria-Therese Gustafsson (Auth.)

https://ebookmass.com/product/private-politics-and-peasant-
mobilization-mining-in-peru-1st-edition-maria-therese-gustafsson-
auth/

Storying Social Movement/s: Remaking Meaning in the

Mobilization of Identity 1st Edition Louise Gwenneth
Phillips

https://ebookmass.com/product/storying-social-movement-s-
remaking-meaning-in-the-mobilization-of-identity-1st-edition-
louise-gwenneth-phillips/

Hezbollah: Mobilization and Power Aurelie Daher

https://ebookmass.com/product/hezbollah-mobilization-and-power-
aurelie-daher/

Corruption and Democratic Transition in Eastern Europe:

The Role of Political Scandals in Post-Miloševi■ Serbia
1st Edition Marija Zurni■

https://ebookmass.com/product/corruption-and-democratic-
transition-in-eastern-europe-the-role-of-political-scandals-in-
post-milosevic-serbia-1st-edition-marija-zurnic/
Single Payer Healthcare Reform: Grassroots Mobilization
and the Turn Against Establishment Politics in the
Medicare for All Movement 1st ed. Edition Lindy S.F.
Hern
https://ebookmass.com/product/single-payer-healthcare-reform-
grassroots-mobilization-and-the-turn-against-establishment-
politics-in-the-medicare-for-all-movement-1st-ed-edition-lindy-s-
f-hern/

The Survival Nexus: Science, Technology, and World

Affairs Charles Weiss

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-survival-nexus-science-
technology-and-world-affairs-charles-weiss/

The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion: Transition

Experience and Beyond Jan Hornat

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-visegrad-group-and-democracy-
promotion-transition-experience-and-beyond-jan-hornat/

Origins of the Mass Party: dispossession and the party-

form in Mexico and Bolivia Ackerman

https://ebookmass.com/product/origins-of-the-mass-party-
dispossession-and-the-party-form-in-mexico-and-bolivia-ackerman/

Joint Mobilization/Manipulation u2013 E-Book: Extremity

and Spinal Techniques

https://ebookmass.com/product/joint-mobilization-manipulation-e-
book-extremity-and-spinal-techniques/
 THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT AND
MEXICO’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
 THE ZA PAT ISTA
M OVEMENT AN D
MEXICO’S D EMOCRAT I C
T RA NS IT ION

Mobilization, Success, and Survival

María Inclán

1
 1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–​0–​19–​086946–​5

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
 A Inés, Santiago, Cosmo y Mateo,
a quienes espero poder enseñar algo.
Y a mi madre, Silvia Oseguera Goytortúa,
a quien le debía este libro desde hace rato ☺.
 CONTENTS

List of Figures, Tables, and Map ix

Acknowledgments xi

1. Introduction 1
2. Democratic Transitions and Political Opportunities 22
3. Opportunities for Mobilization: Openings, Elites,
Allies, and Threats 45
4. Opportunities for Success: Negotiations, Elites,
and Allies 79
5. Opportunities for Survival: Transnational Solidarity
Networks and Discourse Framing 96
6. Zapatistas between Sliding Doors of Opportunity 131

References 145
Index 159
 LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES, AND MAP

Figures
1.1 Repertoire of Protests, 1994–​2003 9
3.1 Zapatista Cycle of Protests, 1994–​2003 51
3.2 Protests in PRI-​and PRD-​Ruled Municipalities 52
3.3 Protest Activity during Peace Dialogues, 1994–​1996 55
3.4 Military Checkpoints and Positions in Chiapas,
1994–​2003 63
5.1 “Que van a meter democracia en Iraq . . .” 109
5.2 National and International Media Attention on the
Chiapas Conflict, 1994–​2003 111

Tables
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 71
3.2 Expected Counts of Monthly Zapatista Protests for a
Unit Change in Predictors 77
5.1 Indigenous Peoples and Housing Conditions across
Chiapas, 1990–​2010 113
5.2 Illiteracy Rates and Education Infrastructure across
Chiapas, 1990–​2010 121

Map
1.1 Geographic Distribution of Protests across Chiapas,
1994–​2003 8

ix
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Just like any other Mexican unfamiliar with the repressive conditions
under which indigenous peasants in Chiapas had been fighting for
land and basic human rights since the 1970s, the Ejército Zapatista
de Liberación Nacional uprising caught me by surprise. Most of us
were made to believe that 1994 would be the year in which Mexico
joined the First World. The North American Free Trade Agreement
had been negotiated in the previous two years, and it came into
force on January 1, 1994. Additionally, Mexico was about to join
the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development in
May after overhauling its economy through extensive neoliberal ec-
onomic policies, and there were rumors that President Carlos Salinas
de Gortari was being considered as one of the candidates to lead the
World Trade Organization after his term as president. In the official
discourse, there was no room for a guerrilla movement launched by
impoverished indigenous peasants in Chiapas, but the Zapatistas
crashed the party and opened our eyes.
In 1994 I was an undergraduate in Mexico who was only able
to follow the development of the conflict through news media cov-
erage. I had to wait until I had the privilege of the time and funding
that academia provides to be able to go to Chiapas to learn why a so-
cial movement that was poised for success failed to achieve political

xi
 A cknowledgments

autonomy for Mexico’s indigenous peoples, yet has survived and still
stands as an icon to other alter-​mundista movements around the
world. The most important puzzle to me was why the Zapatistas had
failed to achieve their political goals when the EZLN uprising had in-
directly pushed forward the country’s efforts at democratization.
Through the years I have been fortunate enough to have the
guidance of Lee Ann Banaszak, Michael Bernhard, Gretchen Casper,
and John McCarthy. The initial research for this book was conducted
between 2002 and 2003 thanks to grants from the Department of
Political Science and the College of Liberal Arts at The Pennsylvania
State University, including the John Martz Award for Research in
Comparative Politics and the Dissertation Support Grant, and a
fellowship for graduate studies from Mexico’s National Council of
Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología,
CONACYT).
Special thanks go to all who guided my fieldwork: Manuel Aguilar,
Luis H. Álvarez, Miguel Álvarez Gándara, Andrés Aubry, Amado
Avendaño, Marco Antonio Bernal, Luis Felipe Bravo Mena, Araceli
Burguete, Luisa María Calderón, Manuel Camacho Solís, Ricardo
Castellanos, José Ramón Cossío, Rutilio Cruz Escandón, Francisco
Gallardo, Alejandro Gómez, Dolores González, Gerardo González,
Rogelio Hernández, José Herrera, Onécimo Hidalgo, Gustavo Hirales,
María del Carmen Legorreta, Gilberto López y Rivas, Manuel López,
Daniel Luna, Blanca Martínez, Joel Padrón, Marina Pagés, Fernando
Pérez, Miguel Ángel Romero, Margarito Ruiz, Bishop Samuel Ruiz
García, Juan Sánchez, Jorge Santiago, Raymundo Sánchez Barraza,
and Oscar Torrens.
During my time in Chiapas I enjoyed the support of Araceli
Burguete and the Centro de Investigación y Estudios Superiores en
Antropología Social (CIESAS) in San Cristóbal de Las Casas. Without
Araceli’s help and the invaluable generosity of the late bishop Samuel
Ruiz, none of the interviews would have been possible. It was
through the accounts of more than forty-​five interviewees, which
included activists, journalists, politicians, academics, and members
of the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas, that I better grasped

xii
 A cknowledgments

how social movements emerge and develop amid hostile polit-

ical conditions. I also want to thank Roberto Bautista for spending
countless hours in the CIESAS library with me collecting newspaper
accounts of Zapatista-​related events to later construct an archive of
protest activity in Chiapas from 1994 through 2003. From 2008 to
2012, with the support from the Centro de Investigación y Docencia
Económicas (CIDE), I conducted further interviews with crucial
actors involved in the peace dialogues and democratizing reforms.
Many students have helped me along the way as well. María
Fernanda Madrid and Samantha Casas at Universidad de las Américas
in Puebla worked with me transcribing interviews. At CIDE, former
undergraduate students Alejandra Díaz de León, Esteban González,
Luis Palerm, and Cécile Sánchez helped me recreate my protest event
archive after it perished in an unfortunate fire, while Esteban, Anna
Cristina Báez, Guillermo Gómez, Carlos Monroy, Perla Pérez, and
Alberto Villaseñor assisted me with other research endeavors related
to this project.
Colleagues and friends have been kind enough to read pre-
vious drafts of the chapters that compose this book and have
offered insightful suggestions: Paul Almeida, Rosario Aguilar, Lee
Ann Banaszak, Allyson Benton, Todd Eisenstadt, Carolina Garriga,
Ezequiel González-​Ocantos, Hank Johnston, Joy Langston, John
McCarthy, Brian Phillips, James Ron, and Kathryn Sikkink. Of
course the comments from the two Oxford anonymous reviewers
and the editorial work of Angela Chnapko significantly improved
this manuscript, and without them it would have never seen the
light of day. I also want to thank Alexcee Bechthold for her always
guidance in producing the integral materials of this book, and
Sharon Langworthy and Tharani Ramachandran for their patient
and detailed copy-​editing. The last stretch of writing, reviewing, and
editing would not have been possible without the coaching of Alex
Samaniego, who kept me physically fit and mentally sane.
I also want to acknowledge the unconditional support of my
family, my mother Silvia, Carlos and Erin, Silvia and Juan, Cosmo,
Inés, Santiago, and Mateo. In particular, I thank Juan’s mentorship

xiii
 A cknowledgments

and Silvia’s enthusiasm and willingness to read and reread drafts of

chapters time and again. Last but never least are all of those with
whom I have learned and continue to learn to be a better teacher, re-
searcher, and person: Abby Bigham, Jason de León, Sharon DeWitte
and Eric Jones, Erick and Sarah Rochette, Kirk French and Laurel
Pearson, Holly Dunsworth and Kevin Stacey, Johanna and Jade
Bissat, “Jefe” Geoff Vasile, Ellen Quillen, Halla Olafsdottir, Magda
Giraldo, Kim Jordan, Blanca Maldonado, Chris Reenock, Alex
Braithwaite, Pete Doerschler, Chris and Danielle Housenick, Matt
Ruppert, Jake Frederick, Gretchen Brandt, Susi Colín, Andrés Catzín,
Valeska von Schirmeister, Chuy Bernhardt, Erik Feldhaus, Eugenio
Mañón, Marina Michaelidou-​ Kadi, André Portela Souza, Héctor
Castillo, Javier Aparicio, Kim Nolan, Sandra Ley, Giovanni Mantilla,
Céline González, Gerardo Maldonado, Álvaro Morcillo, and Noelle
Brigden. This life’s journey would not be the same without you.

xiv
 THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT AND
MEXICO’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
 [1]
INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation

(Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) declared war on
the Mexican government and took over the municipal offices of seven
towns in Chiapas: Altamirano, Chanal, Huixtán, Las Margaritas,
Ocosingo, Oxchuc, and San Cristóbal de Las Casas. Through the voice
of the EZLN spokesman Subcomandante Marcos, the Zapatista cry
¡Ya Basta! was heard almost immediately on national and interna-
tional news networks, giving the group great salience. The dramatic
public appearance of the EZLN marked the beginning of the Zapatista
movement outside its clandestine guerrilla organization, which had
started in the early 1980s.1 Although the Zapatista movement has
not reached the political strength of other indigenous movements in
Ecuador or Bolivia,2 its national and international salience has made
it a model for indigenous and antiglobalization struggles, as well
as for democratization efforts inside and outside of Mexico. More
recently the Zapatista banner has become emblematic of anarcho-​
libertarian movements around the world, such as the indignados in
Spain and squatters in Germany.3 Nevertheless domestically the po-
litical force of the Zapatistas is currently marginal despite their most
recent announcement about getting into the electoral politics of the

1. Collier and Quaratiello (1994); Harvey (1998); Legorreta Díaz (1998);

Tello Díaz (1995).
2. Yashar (2005).
3. Aranda Andrade (2014).

1
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

country by putting forward an independent indigenous female candi-

date for the 2018 presidential elections.4 While planning on entering
electoral politics in 2018 may be considered an opportunity for the
Zapatistas to articulate and aggregate the rights and interests of in-
digenous peoples, electoral support that independent indigenous
candidates could gain outside their support bases is rather slim.
The emergence and first stages of the Zapatista movement
(1994–​1996) coincided with the most intense phase of the Mexican
democratic transition. Some have even suggested that the emer-
gence of the Zapatistas was an important catalyst for the transition5
and the revival of the indigenous movement in Mexico.6 However,
as Deborah Yashar (1998) pointed out, the indigenous movement
in Mexico and the Zapatistas were not able to take full advantage
of this process, given their failure to make the Mexican government
respond to their concrete demands. The unexpected failure of the
Zapatista movement forces us to wonder why an indigenous insur-
gent movement that was poised to succeed, given the timing of its
emergence during Mexico’s democratic transition and its domestic
and transnational salience, failed to become an influential political
player and achieve its political goals.
One could argue that taking over power has never been one of
the Zapatistas’ political goals, and that therefore we should not be
surprised by its fate or even ask that question.7 Nevertheless, I be-
lieve we need to ask this question and seek to answer it, given that
the EZLN rose up in arms to fight for the political inclusion of the
impoverished indigenous peoples of Mexico. I also believe that the

4. “Plantea el EZLN una candidata independiente indígena en 2018,” La Jornada,

October 14, 2016 (http://​www.jornada.unam.mx/​ultimas/​2016/​10/​14/​ezln-​estudiara-
​candidatura-​indigena-​a-​presidencia-​de-​mexico), last accessed on February 24, 2018.
5. Stephen (1995); Veltmeyer (2000). Interview with Manuel Camacho Solis, first
Commissioner for Peace and Reconciliation during 1994 in Mexico City, November
2009.
6. See Rus, Hernández Castillo, and Mattiace (2003); Velasco (2003); Higgins
(2004).
7. Holloway (2010).

2
 I ntroduction

answer to this question lies in the changing political conditions

in which the Zapatista movement emerged and developed, which
resulted in their not seeking political power. This argument can be
illustrated with a sliding doors analogy, as I argue that the Zapatista
movement developed within almost simultaneous openings and
closings of political opportunities for its mobilization, success, and
survival.
Automatic sliding doors usually come in sets of two, parallel to
each other. The second set of doors is automatically programmed to
open as the first set closes. If the automated mechanism fails and
the second set of doors does not open, adjacent mechanical doors
may be there to prevent getting people trapped between doors. As
I explain in this book, I envision the development of the Zapatista
movement as one for which the first set of doors of mobilizing oppor-
tunity opened after the EZLN’s uprising, but for which the second set
of doors of opportunity for success failed to open. Nevertheless, the
initial mobilization opened adjacent survival opportunities for the
movement and local communities to survive up to this day despite
the obstacles they have faced.
Because the EZLN uprising directly pointed at the exclusionary
and exploitative practices of the Mexican socioeconomic and po-
litical systems, it contributed to the weakening of the one-​party
regime during the latter’s last years. It also contributed to the
weakening of the prosperous façade that the regime had tried to
create by implementing economic reforms that allowed the country
to become a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-​oper-
ation and Development (OECD) and of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). By pioneering the use of the Internet
to broadcast local social movement campaigns, the Zapatista
movement soon reached global audiences. Additionally, the co-
incidence of the Zapatista uprising with the implementation of
NAFTA and Mexico’s inclusion in the OECD gained the guerrilla
group the attention of the public, the media, the Mexican gov-
ernment, and transnational nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). All this attention worked as a shield for the poorly armed,

3
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

indigenous insurgents against a repressive response from the

Mexican state. As a consequence, doors for mobilizing opportunity
opened up and demonstrations flourished.
Demonstrations in support of the Zapatistas also put enough
public opinion pressure on the Mexican federal government to force it
to negotiate with the rebels. Because Zapatista rebels were successful
in triggering negotiations only three weeks after their initial uprising,
it seemed as though doors of opportunity for success were opening
up. In addition, peace negotiations between the rebels and the fed-
eral government coincided with democratizing negotiations among
legislative elites seeking to achieve more transparent and competi-
tive electoral processes. Hence, the scenario appeared to be ripe for
the movement to achieve political autonomy for indigenous peoples.
I argue, however, that precisely because peace and democratizing
negotiations developed almost simultaneously but independently
from each other, opportunity doors for the success of the movement
closed. Hence, what looked like parallel openings for the movement’s
achievement ended up trapping the Zapatistas between opening
opportunities for mobilization but closing opportunities for success.
However, mobilizing opportunities during the early 1990s opened
new opportunities for the movement to survive, given the great
transnational solidarity network built around the Zapatista cause,
which enabled Zapatista communities to sustain a resistance cam-
paign against the Mexican state that still exists.
Studying the development of the Zapatista movement within the
Mexican democratic transition under this perspective offers three
main contributions to the democratization and political opportunities
literatures. First, this study shows how a social movement devel-
oping within a protracted transition may benefit from opportunities
to mobilize but also face obstacles to achieving its political goals. As
mentioned previously, the emergence of the EZLN and the Zapatista
movement opened opportunities for mobilization and the formation
of organizations, especially in Chiapas, although the San Cristóbal
Diocese had contributed greatly for this since the 1970s, creating
a longstanding community of local independent NGOs before the

4
 I ntroduction

conflict erupted in 1994.8 These first NGOs functioned as a base

network for those that came after the EZLN’s uprising. The national
and transnational social movement organizations created around
the Zapatistas allowed the movement to sustain a ten-​year cycle
of protests and to survive. However, their demands failed to be ar-
ticulated and represented by incoming political elites that emerged
during the first stages of the Mexican protracted transition, and they
did not achieve state-​building or policy-​influencing opportunities. As
a consequence the Zapatistas, as social movement actors, failed to be-
come influential political actors within the country’s democratizing
negotiations.
Second, contrary to the general assumptions in the literature on
social movements,9 democratic transitions do not always bring polit-
ical opportunities to previously neglected dissident groups. As this
study shows, political opportunities may have different effects on
social movements in different political contexts. Protracted demo-
cratic transitions tend to favor electoral elite pacts without opening
spaces to social movement actors or their interests.10 Third, for the
political opportunities literature this study shows which dimensions
within the political process approach11 are better suited to foster so-
cial movements’ mobilization and survival and which factors tend
to provide better opportunities for social movements to succeed in
achieving their goals.
This study also illustrates the effects of an incomplete democratic
transition on interest representation. Mexico’s democratic transition
has been based only on protracted negotiations to regulate elections

8. Interview with a member of the Centro de Capacitación Indígena, CIDECI,

San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas in March 2003. In another interview also in San
Cristóbal de Las Casas, in April 2003, the coordinator of Servicios Internacionales para
la Paz, SIPAZ mentioned that after the conflict more than three hundred civic organi-
zations worked in Chiapas.
9. Kitschelt (1986); Kriesi (1996).
10. Casper and Taylor (1996); Eisenstadt (2000).
11. McAdam (1982).

5
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

and electoral campaigns.12 As a consequence, Mexico’s democratiza-

tion process has fallen short of deepening those institutional and
socialization changes necessary to consolidate a liberal democratic
regime. Transitional changes stopped at the electoral level, without
introducing new institutional channels for interest articulation and
representation beyond political parties—​not to mention necessary
measures to ensure accountability and fight impunity and corruption.
Moreover, clientelistic practices that prevailed during the one-​party
regime have permeated other political parties and civic organizations
due to the lack of accountability mechanisms. The 1995 judicial re-
form fell short of providing guarantees to all members of the polity,
despite having significantly increased the independence of federal
judges and judicial review power of the Supreme Court.13 More re-
cently, a constitutional reform for human rights in 201114 and a
legal reform to the habeas corpus (amparo) suit in 201315 opened
new paths for the protection of collective rights. Nevertheless, these
last efforts have also proven unclear and largely ineffective for so-
cial movement actors to achieve significant social benefits regarding
those rights. Finally, a more comprehensive political reform that will
incorporate minorities into the political process is still pending.
In recent years national opinion surveys, journalists, and
academics alike have highlighted the crisis of representation that
prevails in the Mexican political system.16 The Zapatista movement
and the incipient institutionalization of its demands are only one ex-
ample of those interests that have been left behind within the new
political system in the country. With this book, it is my intention to

12. Eisenstadt (2000).

13.  “Decreto mediante el cual se declaran reformados los artículos 21, 55,73,
76, 79, 89, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,
110, 111, 116, 122, y 123 de la Constitución Política Mexicana.” Diario Oficial de la
Federación, México, Diciembre 31, 1994.
14.  http://​www.dof.gob.mx/​nota_​detalle.php?codigo=5194486&fecha=10/​06/​
2011 (last accessed on July 4, 2017).
15.  http://​dof.gob.mx/​nota_​detalle.php?codigo=5294184&fecha=02/​04/​2013
(last accessed on July 4, 2017).
16. Azis and Alonso (2009); ENCUP (2009); Elizondo (2011).

6
 I ntroduction

provide a clearer understanding of why seemingly influential social

movements can end up being isolated or neglected during democra-
tization processes.

THE ZAPATISTA MOBILIZATION CYCLE

FROM 1994 TO 2003

A cycle of protest emerged right after the EZLN and the Mexican
army agreed to a ceasefire, declared by the Mexican government
on January 12, 1994. The images of hostilities between two unbal-
anced military forces—​the Mexican army and the poorly armed
EZLN—​portrayed on television and the Internet outraged viewers
inside and outside Mexico. As a consequence, sympathizers started
demonstrating across Chiapas despite the strong military cordon
around Zapatista headquarters and strongholds (see map 1.1).
Figure 1.1 shows how the Zapatistas changed their repertoire of
protests over time. The ensuing protests ranged from land invasions
in 1994 and 1995; to meetings and marches supporting indige-
nous rights during peace negotiations between the EZLN and the
Mexican government in 1996; to sit-​ins, roadblocks, and the seizure
of buildings and towns during and after the 1997 and 2000 elections.
Most of the land invasions took place in the aftermath of the up-
rising. These overtaken lands later became the Zapatista-​controlled
municipios. More than 1,700 land occupations laid claim to 148,000
hectares inside and outside the region of conflict. To quell land
invasions the Mexican government, landowners, and peasants signed
an agreement promising to resolve land invasions that had occurred
prior to April 14, 1994. Peasants were allowed to keep the land but
had to commit to stop invading parcels and ranches, while the gov-
ernment compensated landowners for their loses.17 Land invasions
decreased, but demonstrations continued. Protestors changed

17. Villafuerte et al. (1999).

7
 Tabasco

Veracruz

Ocosingo
Oxchuc
Oaxaca Huixtan
Chansi
San Cristobal

Margaritas

Sites of Protests
PROTESTS
1–15
16–68
69–168
N Guatemala
W E
S

Kilometers
0 30 60 120 160 240

Map 1.1 Geographic Distribution of Protests across Chiapas, 1994–​2003

Inclán (2008).
 80

70

60
Number of Protests

50

40

30

20

10

0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year

Blockings Invasions
Marches Meetings
Seizures Sit-ins/strikes

Figure 1.1 Repertoire of Protests, 1994–​2003

Inclán (2009a).
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

mobilizing tactics to meetings and sit-​ins around negotiating periods

between the EZLN and Mexican federal representatives and in light of
the major achievement of the initial period of talks in 1994: the cre-
ation of Zapatista-​controlled territories, the so-​called zonas francas,
in San Miguel, Ocosingo, and Guadalupe Tepeyac, Las Margaritas,
where the Zapatistas maintained their headquarters.
The Zapatista uprising had taken everybody by surprise. Up until
then Mexico had praised itself for being “immune” to the powerful
guerrilla movements that had plagued other Latin American coun-
tries, despite the fact that there had been other rural guerrillas,
during the 1970s in Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Michoacán, as well as a
few urban insurgents in the 1980s in Monterrey and Mexico City.18
Still, up until the Zapatista uprising, the Mexican state had been able
to control them through either repression or co-​optation.
With the implementation of NAFTA and Mexico’s joining the
OECD, the country’s international image was of a land of economic
opportunity. An guerrilla group demanding basic human rights for
the most impoverished sectors of the Mexican population—​ in-
digenous peasants—​ put in question the responsive capacity of
the Mexican state and the legitimacy of newly implemented eco-
nomic policies. The EZLN uprising put the prevailing socioeconomic
inequalities in the country in the spotlight while the political elite was
trying to portray the country as a developing nation taking its first
steps into a globalized free-​market economy. In addition, through his
savvy use of the Internet at the time, Subcomandante Marcos’s char-
ismatic and witty communiqués kept the national and international
communities informed and mobilized around the movement. It was
not long before the Zapatistas became known as a peaceful guerrilla
organization, and their “war” with the Mexican government became
one of “ink and the Internet.”19 This led to a large presence of local

18. Tello Díaz (1995); Trevizo (2011).

19. Fuentes, cited in Bruhn (1999). Moreover, it is difficult to consider the EZLN
a full-​blown guerrilla organization when its weak military capacity was exposed after
pictures of the uprising showed guerrilla militias carrying rifle-​shaped wooden sticks.
Even Subcomandante Marcos mentioned that the EZLN was a guerrilla in a quest for

10
 I ntroduction

and transnational NGOs in the region of conflict, which protected

the rebels against possible repressive measures and strengthened the
movement outside Chiapas as well.
The first round of negotiations began on January 21, 1994, and
lasted until March 2, 1994. Its main achievement was the recogni-
tion of the Zapatista-​controlled area formed by the land seized by
the indigenous rebels during the uprising. However, soon afterward
negotiations broke down. The Zapatistas announced that the first
gains were not nearly enough to resolve the conflict. Instead the
EZLN proposed a direct dialogue with domestic NGOs and called for
a National Democratic Convention to be held in order to peacefully
transition to democracy.20 Thousands of people representing national
human rights and indigenous organizations attended. International
observers and the press were also invited.21 Meanwhile, on August
21, 1994 elections were held, and the hegemonic Party of the
Institutional Revolution (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI)
won both the presidential and Chiapas gubernatorial races. However,
it faced significant loses at the local level. The military presence in the
region increased dramatically.
On December 19, 1994, the EZLN launched a new, peaceful attack,
occupying 38 of the 111 municipalities in Chiapas and declaring
them to be rebel territory: Altamirano, Amatenango del Valle, Bochil,
El Bosque, Cancuc, Chamula, Chanal, Chenalhó, Chilón, Comitán,
Huitiupán, Huixtán, La Independencia, Ixtapa, Jitotol, Larráinzar,
Las Margaritas, Mitontic, Nicolás Ruiz, Ocosingo, Oxchuc, Palenque
Pantelhó, Las Rosas, Sabanilla, Salto de Agua, San Cristóbal de Las

peace (hence the white handkerchiefs wrapped around their weapons during peace
negotiations) and that its struggle was not going to be fought with bullets but with
words, although its members never surrendered their weapons (Subcomandante
Marcos, “Ponecia a 7 voces,” July 31, 1996.)
20. CCRI-​EZLN, “Segunda Declaración de la Selva Lacandona,” June 12, 1994.
21. http://​palabra.ezln.org.mx/​comunicados/​1994/​1994_​07_​01.htm (last accessed
September 4, 2017); Centro de Documentación sobre Zapatismo (CEDOZ), Cronología
1994–​2013, http://​www.cedoz.org (last accessed on September 4, 2017); and http://​
www.bibliotecas.tv/​chiapas/​jul94/​09jul94a.html (last accessed on October 14, 2017).

11
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

Casas, Simojovel, Sitalá, Socoltenango, Teopisca, Tila, Totolapa, La

Trinitaria, Tumbalá, Venustiano Carranza, Yajalón, Zinacantán.22
The Mexican army was sent to re-​ establish the constitutional
order, the identities of the ski-​masked Zapatista leaders were re-
vealed, and arrest warrants were issued for them. The Ministry of
the Interior identified Subcomandante Marcos as Rafael Sebastián
Guillén Vicente, Comandante Germán as Fernando Yáñez Muñoz,
Comandante Vicente as Javier Elorreaga Berdegué, Comandanta
Elisa as María Gloria Benavides Guevara, Comandanta Gabriela as
Silvia Fernández Hernández, and Comandanta Sofía as Mercedes
García López.23 However, when the army arrived the insurgents
had already retreated to their controlled territories, except for San
Andrés Larráinzar, a locality Zapatistas still hold to this day. To re-
duce tension and increase his legitimacy, the incoming president,
Ernesto Zedillo, proposed the creation of a legislative mediating
commission, the Commission of Concord and Pacification (Comisión
de Concordia y Pacificación, COCOPA). The EZLN responded by calling
for an end to military hostilities against its supporting communities.
Demonstrations increased again, demanding the resumption of
negotiations and gaining great national and international attention
and support for the movement.
In March President Zedillo signed the Law for Dialogue,
Reconciliation and Just Peace in Chiapas. It guaranteed the sus-
pension of military operations and the arrest warrants against
EZLN leaders as long as negotiations lasted.24 Soon thereafter the
negotiating parties and members of the newly formed COCOPA met
in San Miguel, Ocosingo, to discuss the logistics and the agenda for
the upcoming peace talks. A new negotiating opportunity opened up.

22. La Jornada, December 20, 1994.

23. Other names were released without being associated with any of the Zapatista
leaders. Arrest warrants were also in place for them. La Jornada, February 10, 2005.
24. http://​zedillo.presidencia.gob.mx/​pages/​chiapas/​docs/​ley-​dialogo.html (last
accessed on September 4, 2017); and Centro de Documentación sobre Zapatismo
(CEDOZ), Cronología 1994–​2013.

12
 I ntroduction

Peace talks resumed on April 22, 1995, in San Andrés Larráinzar

or San Andrés Sacamch’en de los Pobres for the Zapatistas.25 Again,
this was a major mobilizing event. The EZLN invited a large group
of activists and intellectuals as advisers to take part in the various
negotiating meetings. Indigenous communities were mobilized to
form cordons around the negotiating site as security shields for as
long as negotiations lasted. Both sides presented their proposals.
The EZLN took this opportunity to call on domestic and foreign
NGOs and activists to launch a National Consultation for Peace and
Democracy to decide the future of the EZLN. Negotiations resumed
again in July. However, they did not reach any agreement.
The consultation called by the EZLN was held on August 15,
1995.26 The results indicated that the general public wanted a peaceful
solution to the conflict in Chiapas and that the EZLN should pursue
having an affiliated political organization.27
Meanwhile, the Mexican president, through the COCOPA, invited
the EZLN to take part in the political reform round tables organized
by the political parties.28 Because of its long-​lasting distrust of polit-
ical parties and institutional politics, the EZLN decided not to par-
ticipate and proposed a dialogue with local and transnational activist
organizations instead. So as not to cut off dialogue with the govern-
ment, the EZLN invited the COCOPA to take part.29 The COCOPA
agreed to participate under the condition that the EZLN would return
to the negotiating table. The EZLN consented and met again with

25. The Zapatistas renamed it after it became the only municipality the EZLN was
able to retain as a main rebel locality after the December 19, 1994 occupation.
26. La Jornada, August 16, 1995. Bernal Gutiérrez y Romero Miranda (1999); and
Centro de Documentación sobre Zapatismo (CEDOZ), Cronología 1994–​2013.
27. The discussion included questions about whether: (1) the public was in favor
of a peaceful agreement between both sides; (2) the EZLN should become a polit-
ical force; (3) there was a need for a Zapatista Front of National Liberation; and (4)
a major political reform was needed (http://​enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/​1996/​02/​
14/​resultados-​de-​la-​consulta-​a-​las-​bases-​zapatistas-​sobre-​la-​mesa-​1-​de-​derechos-​y-​
cultura-​indigena/​, last accessed October 14, 2017).
28. La Jornada, September 6, 1995.
29. Centro de Documentación sobre Zapatismo (CEDOZ), Cronología 1994–​2013.

13
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

the federal government negotiating team in San Andrés Larráinzar

in September 1995. This time they settled on six negotiating themes,
which were to be addressed in a progressive order as agreements for
each of them were reached: (1) indigenous rights and culture, (2) de-
mocracy and justice, (3) wealth and development, (4) reconciliation
in Chiapas, (5) women’s rights in Chiapas, and (6) the cessation of
hostilities. So the first issue on which they were to negotiate was in-
digenous rights and culture. Zapatista mobilization activity resurged.
On the second anniversary of the uprising, in its “Fourth
Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle,” the EZLN called for the for-
mation of a broad opposition front that would serve to launch
the Movement of National Liberation (Movimiento de Liberación
Nacional, MLN): Zapatista Front of National Liberation (Frente
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, FZLN).30 This new political
force was intended to be independent from the EZLN but to ag-
gregate and articulate the Zapatista principles and demands. It
was supposed to be nonpartisan and autonomous and not to seek
political power.
In February 1996 the EZLN met again with the governmental del-
egation in San Andrés Larráinzar and signed the first set of accords
on indigenous rights and culture. These came to be known as the San
Andrés Accords. They were the only agreements ever reached. They
were composed by four documents that granted the recognition of
autonomy to the indigenous peoples and communities. This first doc-
ument established a new pact between the indigenous groups and the
state. The second suggested specific policy proposals supported by
the government and the EZLN. The third document established spe-
cific reforms for the Chiapas case, and the fourth consisted of some
amendments to the previous three documents.31 Again, Zapatistas
and their sympathizers and supporters guarded the San Andrés
meetings, holding security belt sittings around the meeting place.

30. CCRI-​EZLN, “Cuarta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona,” January 1, 1996.

31. Hernández Navarro and Vera Herrera (1998).

14
 I ntroduction

In the following month the two sides were supposed to begin

negotiating the second round, on issues of democracy and justice.
The EZLN intended to use this second round of talks to broaden the
scope of its demands to the national level. However, the national gov-
ernment had other plans. Its negotiating team had the intention to
keep negotiations on issues at the local and state levels.32 The clear
difference between the two perspectives soon brought negotiations
to gridlock, and then to an end, when the federal government refused
to recognize the previously signed accords on indigenous rights and
culture. Protests erupted again in favor of the Zapatista cause.
In April 1996 the EZLN held the First Continental Encounter for
Humanity and against Neoliberalism in the Zapatista community La
Realidad.33 For the first time the EZLN was advocating causes out-
side its own struggle. It portrayed the Zapatista demands as part of
a worldwide cause against neoliberalism and used the globalization
process to its advantage to cross borders and join forces with other
antiglobalization movements.
In July the EZLN and the COCOPA organized the Special Forum
on the Reform of the State in San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Chiapas.34
The forum was organized in a similar fashion to the National
Indigenous Forum held by the EZLN in January. The two groups
wanted to use this forum to press for the opening of negotiations
on democracy and justice to other different civic organizations. Just
after this meeting, the EZLN organized the First Intercontinental
Encounter for Humanity and against Neoliberalism in the Zapatista
community Oventic.35 Round tables were also held in the other four
Zapatista centers of authority. This was the second time the EZLN

32. Interview with Miguel Angel Romero Miranda (member of the Peace
Negotiation Delegation 1995–​1997), Mexico City October 2002.
33. Centro de Documentación sobre Zapatismo (CEDOZ), Cronología 1994–​2013.
34. http:// ​ e nlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/ ​ 1 996/ ​ 0 6/ ​ 1 4/ ​ c onvocatoria- ​ a l- ​ foro-​
especial-​para-​la-​reforma-​del-​estado/​ (last accessed on September 4, 2017).
35. http://​enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/​1996/​07/​27/​ccri-​cg-​inicio-​del-​primer-​
encuentro-​intercontinental-​p or-​l a-​humanidad- ​y - ​contra-​el-​neoliberalismo/​   (last
accessed on September 4, 2017).

15
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

had organized an event on an international scale calling for a fight

against globalizing economic policies. This time the meetings lasted
for two weeks, and ended just before the EZLN met again with the
government in San Andrés Larráinzar.
In September the dialogue between the EZLN and the federal
delegation hit its final impasse after President Zedillo failed to rec-
ognize the San Andrés Accords signed in February and therefore
prevented indigenous people from gaining political autonomy. In
response, the EZLN began a resistance campaign, using a variety
of tactics. Subcomandante Marcos went silent. From 1997 until
2000 he refrained from publishing major communiqués. Zapatista
communities rejected any state social programs, as they were
perceived as counterinsurgent tactics to weaken the movement in
the region. Zapatista communities and supporters also stopped
paying for public services like electricity. The Zapatista leaders’
vow of silence reduced the cycle of protest to its lowest point in
1997. At the same time, the military presence in Chiapas grew
significantly,36 and tensions between pro-​and anti-​ Zapatista
communities heightened over land and communal projects. Local
authorities harassed and isolated dissident communities to prevent
the movement from growing. Local party bosses took advantage of
these disputes to arm non-​Zapatista communities. Ill feelings and
hostilities mounted in both the northern and highlands regions
until, on December 22, 1997, an anti-​Zapatista group massacred
forty-​five persons in the town of Acteal, Chenalhó, enabled by
the inaction or under the auspices of the authorities.37 President
Zedillo responded by sending more troops to the region to pre-
serve order and contain violence and protests. Although the mil-
itary presence helped to quell violence, protests flared up again,
now demanding the recognition of the San Andrés Accords and the
withdrawal of the army from the region.

36. Global Exchange and CIEPAC (1999).

37. Agudo Sanchiz (2005); Estrada Saavedra (2007); Hirales (1998).

16
 I ntroduction

Roadblocks, marches, and seizures of buildings arose out of

conflicts following local and national elections in 1994, 1997, 2000,
and 2003. These protests targeted local and state authorities, accusing
them of committing fraud or not fulfilling their campaign promises
once in office. A new wave of protest arose after the 2000 presidential
elections, in which for the first time in more than seventy years, the
PRI lost the presidency to Vicente Fox, the candidate of the rightist
National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN). Initially, Fox’s
victory brought new hope to the Zapatistas. During his presidential
campaign Fox had promised to honor the San Andrés Accords and
send the Indigenous Rights Bill (Ley COCOPA)—​drafted after the
accords in 1996—​to the Mexican Congress. The EZLN responded
positively to Fox’s proposal to resume the interrupted dialogue but
set forth two new conditions: the withdrawal of seven of the military
encampments surrounding the Zapatista territory and the liberation
of all Zapatista prisoners.38 Protest activity increased again, now in
support of the Indigenous Rights Bill.
Fox partially kept his promise. He removed the army from the
region of conflict, sent the Indigenous Rights Bill to Congress, and
liberated most of the political prisoners. However, the dialogue never
resumed, and because Fox never rallied his political party in favor of
the bill’s approval, the bill that ended up being approved was only a
diluted version of the San Andrés Accords and the COCOPA Law.39
Despite the increase in protest activity in 2000, the Zapatista cycle
of protest lost momentum in 2001. Feeling betrayed once more,
Zapatistas abandoned their protest activities for good. Instead they
turned their efforts to setting up their Juntas de Buen Gobierno in
their five regional authority centers.
Since 2001 the Zapatistas have only held demonstrations on the
anniversary of the EZLN uprising. Subcomandante Marcos, now

38. Subcomandante Marcos, “Carta a Vicente Fox como nuevo presidente,”

December 2, 2000.
39.  http:// ​ w ww.jornada.unam.mx/​ 2 001/​ 0 8/​ 1 5/​ l ey.html  (last  accessed  on
September 4, 2017).

17
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

Comandante Galeano, publishes sporadic communiqués in support of

major domestic conflicts, such as the dissident teachers’ movement,
the disappearance of the Ayotzinapa students, or the nomination of
the Zapatista candidate to the 2018 presidential elections (María de
Jesús Patricio or Marichuy, a nahua woman from Tuxpan, Jalisco).40
His communiqués are now jointly signed with the new Zapatista
spokesman, Subcomandante Moises. With this it seems as though
indigenous politics is making a comeback in public opinion and the
political agenda, but that remains to be seen, as Marichuy has al-
ready pledged not to seek political power but only to spoil the polit-
ical parties’ party.41 The Zapatistas and their supporters are currently
focused on sustaining the autonomy of their resisting communities,
despite lacking legal recognition.

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical arguments of the book. I base my

hypotheses on the literatures on political opportunities and demo-
cratic transitions. In particular, I discuss the political opportunities
that a protracted democratic transition may open to social
movements generated by democratic transitions from below. The
chapter is organized in three sections. In the first part I review the lit-
erature on political opportunities and democratic transitions to offer
a few hypotheses about the type of mobilization opportunities pro-
tracted democratic transitions may open to a social movement. More
specifically, I analyze the four dimensions of political opportunities
that the literature has traditionally considered crucial factors in the
development of a social movement, to determine to what extent
they functioned as mobilization opportunities for the Zapatistas.42

40. http://​ w ww.proceso.com.mx/ ​ 4 88450/ ​ e zln- ​ e lige-​ a -​ i ndigena-​ n ahua-​

candidata-​2018 (last accessed on July 1, 2017).
41.  http://​www.animalpolitico.com/​2017/​06/​siete- ​frases- ​conocer-​marichuy/​
(last accessed on July 1, 2017).
42. McAdam (1996).

18
 I ntroduction

In my sliding doors analogy, these initial mobilization opportunities

represent the first set of sliding openings for the emergence and de-
velopment of a social movement. These factors are (1) negotiating
periods as well as changes in power as signs of openings in the polit-
ical system at the local and national levels; (2) the timing and com-
petitiveness of elections as a measure of the relative vulnerability of
political elites; (3) the presence of a potential political ally in power;
and (4) the Mexican’s state capacity for repression, measured by
numbers of military positions in the region of conflict. I compare the
explanatory power of these political opportunity theory dimensions
to another factor that the literature has highlighted as a crucial var-
iable for mobilization, namely the availability of a network of preex-
isting organizations.43
To assess the opportunities that the Zapatista movement had
to succeed in achieving its political goals, in the second section of
chapter 2 I incorporate arguments from the literature of dem-
­
ocratic transitions from below. I compare some of the political
conditions faced by insurgents in El Salvador and South Africa
during their paths to democracy and contrast them to the ones that
the Zapatistas encountered during Mexico’s electoral democratiza-
tion. I focus on three factors. First, I consider the extent to which
parallel but separate peace and democratizing negotiations can
open ​or close opportunities for success to the achievement of social
movements’ political demands. Second, I question the vulnerability
of elites to insurgent demands during a democratic transition when
democratizing negotiations are held parallel with but separated from
peace dialogues. Third, I speculate that lacking alliances with political
elites in power may hinder opportunities for a social movement to
attain its political goals.
In the final section of the theory chapter I review the arguments
in the literature on social movements, resource mobilization,
and framing processes to hypothesize about the role of local and

43. McCarthy and Zald (2002).

19
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

transnational solidarity networks in allowing a social movement to

survive, given the changing political conditions stated previously.
I argue that as sliding doors of political opportunity for success
closed, opportunities for the survival of the movement opened up
through solidarity networks and discourse framing.
In ­chapter 3 I empirically test the political opportunity hypotheses
drawn in the preceding chapter to explain the Zapatista mobilization
cycle from 1994 through 2003. The results of the analysis show that
contrary to what was expected, changes in rule helped to decrease
the Zapatista mobilization cycle. These results suggest that while
democratizing openings diminished contestation in those more dem-
ocratic political settings, they provided opportunities to insurgent
social movement actors to refocus their contentious activity against
the remaining closed and repressive local political environments. At
the national level, peace negotiations encouraged protest mobiliza-
tion only temporarily.
Chapter 4 analyzes the causes of the relative failure of Zapatista
insurgents to achieve their political goals. Comparing the results
of Mexico’s democratization and the relative failure of EZLN
insurgents to become influential political actors to the outcomes
of other democratic transitions from below allows me to define
under which conditions different dimensions of the political pro-
cess approach open or close opportunities for social movements to
succeed.44
In ­chapter 5 I contrast the assumptions about the role that
mobilizing networks and discourse framing play in sustaining a so-
cial movement’s objectives to the development of the Zapatista
movement. Using illustrations from Zapatismo, I show how despite
lacking opportunities for success the initial openings that provide
mobilizing opportunities may be enough for a movement to con-
struct a transnational network of support to maintain its campaign.45

44. McAdam (1982).

45. Tilly and Wood (2009).

20
 I ntroduction

In doing so, I also highlight the long-​term effects of transnational or-

ganizations in shaping a local movement’s discourse over time, which
in turn may contribute to its survival.46 This analysis also permits
the identification of some of the unintended consequences of trans-
national solidarity. In the case of Zapatismo, as the movement grew
closer to transnational struggles it became estranged from the do-
mestic public eye and political agenda.
The concluding chapter presents the arguments about why the
Zapatista movement had such a unique development and outcomes.
Through a brief comparison of the Zapatista movement to other in-
surgent movements within democratic transitions, as well as to other
indigenous movements in the region, I present the conditions that
allowed Zapatistas to flourish and survive while failing to achieve
their political goals. In doing so, I summarize the main arguments,
methods, and evidence employed in this book and offer some new
hope for the incorporation of the movement’s interests given the re-
cent political reforms in Mexico, which seem to gradually be opening
political participation channels to independent and dissident actors.

46. Hirsch (1986); Diani (2003); McAdam (2003).

21
 [2]
D E M O C R AT I C T R A N S I T I O N S
AND POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITIES

INTRODUCTION

Almost immediately after the Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994,

a transnational movement emerged advocating indigenous rights, de-
mocracy, and antiglobalization economic policies. Zapatista spokesman
Subcomandante Marcos spread the movement’s communiqués rapidly
through national and international media, pioneering the use of the
Internet to mobilize local and transnational social movement solidarity
networks of sympathizers, activists, and supporters. Support for the
Zapatistas’ cause grew rapidly inside and outside the region, due in part
to the legitimacy of the Zapatistas’ claims of impoverishment in rural
Mexico, but also to national and international media portrayals of the
armed conflict as a David and Goliath fight between the poorly armed
EZLN and the dominant Mexican federal army.
The relevance of the Zapatista movement goes well beyond
reawakening the indigenous movement in Mexico.1 It also empowered
human rights and pro-​democracy groups and organizations in the

1. Interviews with members of the National Indigenous Congress (Congreso

Nacional Indígena, CNI) and the Zapatista Front of National Liberation (Frente
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, FZLN), Mexico City, November 2002. I trace the
beginning of the Zapatista movement back to the late 1960s, when the National

22
 D emocratic T ransitions and P olitical O pportunities

country.2 It appeared as though the Zapatista movement within

Mexico’s democratic transition would be another example of an
insurgent social movement triggering democratic change from
below. Parallel to the development of the Zapatista movement and
peace dialogues between EZLN leaders and representatives of the
Mexican federal government, political elites negotiated the reforms
that allowed the country to become an electoral democracy. In mo-
bilization terms, and using Elisabeth Wood’s (2000) concept, the
Zapatistas seemed to be on the path to becoming an influential po-
litical counter-​elite movement, as they were able to sustain a cycle
of protests from 1994 until 2003, along with at least ten years of
clandestine organization prior to the EZLN uprising, and through
their insurgent mobilization they made regime elites negotiate
peace agreements with them at the same time that political elites
were negotiating democratizing reforms. However, as we know now,
the Zapatista demand for autonomous political power for indige-
nous peoples still remains unaddressed, despite the passage of the
Indigenous Rights Bill in 2001.
Why did such an influential insurgent movement that developed
within a democratic transition fail to have its demands fully met? As
previously stated, I believe the answer to this puzzle can be illustrated
by an analogy of parallel sliding doors of opportunity in which, as an
insurgent social movement develops within a democratic transition,
it goes through opening and closing doors of opportunity for mo-
bilization, success, and survival. As mobilizing opportunities open
up, opportunities for success may close down, and social movement
actors may get “caught” between sliding doors of opportunity; failing

Confederation of Indigenous Communities (Confederación Nacional de Comunidades

Indígenas, CNCI) was established (Inclán and Almeida 2013) and not only state-​
controlled indigenous organizations began mobilizing, but also independent groups,
with the help of the progressive sector of the Catholic Church, (Washbrook 2005).
2. Interviews with members of the local branch of Alianza Cívica in San Cristóbal
de Las Casas, Chiapas, March 2003, and of Amnesty International and Servicios y
Asesoría para la Paz (SERAPAZ), Mexico City, October 2002.

23
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

to accomplish their political goals, they are yet able to survive given
the initial mobilizing openings.
The rationale behind this analogy is based on the idea that not all
democratic transitions open opportunities for social movements to
develop and succeed. Depending on the type of transition, different
political opportunities become available for the mobilization, success,
and survival of social movements. I argue that while in some cases
insurgents in oligarchic societies have been able to forge a path to de-
mocracy from below through their sustained mobilization,3 insurgent
movements emerging during protracted democratic transitions may
encounter opportunities for mobilization but may also face obstacles
or closing opportunities to achieve their political goals. Nevertheless,
the initial mobilizing opportunities may open survival opportunities
for them, especially if there is a solidarity network that supports the
movement’s cause and helps to keep the movement discourse frame
relevant over time.
This idea is further developed in the next sections of this chapter.
To identify the general political opportunities available to insurgent
movements within a democratic transition, I review some of the
arguments of the literatures on democratic transitions from below4
and protracted democratic transitions.5 In particular, I compare the
characteristics of the Mexican protracted transition,6 which was
“catalyzed” by the Zapatista insurgency, with some of the features of
other insurgent paths to democracy experienced in El Salvador and
South Africa, as described by Elisabeth Wood (2000). Then I differen-
tiate the opportunities for mobilization and success that a protracted
transition may open for insurgent social movements from those
opened by insurgent paths to democracy. Based on the literature,
I propose that political opportunities functioned as such for the mo-
bilization, but not for the success, of the Zapatista movement within

3. Wood (2000).
4. Bratton and van der Walle (1992).
5. Casper and Taylor (1996).
6. Eisenstadt (2004).

24
 D emocratic T ransitions and P olitical O pportunities

Mexico’s democratic transition. Finally, I discuss the factors that

allowed the Zapatistas to survive given their lack of opportunities
for success.

INSURGENT PATHS TO DEMOCRACY

VERSUS PROTRACTED DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITIONS

According to Elisabeth Wood (2000), democratic transitions from

below in oligarchic societies may only lead to stable democratic
regimes when sustained insurgent mobilization turns insurgent
leaders into influential political actors, whom economic and polit-
ical elites can no longer ignore and repress, and must include in their
democratizing pacts. This has been the case in democratic transitions
in El Salvador and South Africa, where although insurgents could
have been contained easily by the military, their extended and sus-
tained mobilization activity forced economic and political elites to
compromise their interests with those of insurgent leaders in order
to achieve a more democratic and stable political regime. Only in
these two cases, Wood argues, can insurgents be considered neces-
sary counter-​elites, because without them the countries’ ongoing
political crises could not have been solved. The insurgent leaders
not only represented their own interests at the negotiating tables,
but they also stood for other excluded sectors in their respective ol-
igarchic societies. They were able to do so by making the achieved
accords hold up despite the infighting generated by those reached
agreements among insurgent factions. Hence, including insurgent
leaders in democratizing negotiations became a priority in these
two oligarchic societies because the costs of their sustained insur-
gent mobilization posed a real threat to the pursuit of the economic
elites’ interests under continued recalcitrant authoritarianism. The
interests of insurgents and economic elites became intertwined as
the insurgency was sustained and the costs to repress and coerce it

25
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

grew to the point that political negotiations were necessary to re-

solve the conflict. Eventually, both sides began to see a peaceful so-
lution as in their best interests, if not their only option. As a result,
economic elites in El Salvador and South Africa convinced regime
elites about the benefits of negotiating democratizing pacts with
insurgent leaders in order to re-​establish political stability and eco-
nomic activity.
For insurgent leaders, more democratic institutions of interest
representation guaranteed the political inclusion of previously
marginalized sectors of the population. For economic elites, they
guaranteed the constitutional protection of the status quo distri-
bution of wealth. In turn, regime elites in these oligarchic societies7
realized they no longer had to rely on extra-​economic coercive con-
trol of labor to prevent the loss of income due to insurgent mobiliza-
tion.8 Economic elites ensured a commitment to neoliberal economic
policies, and insurgent counter-​elites achieved positions of power
and status, as well as political participation for the marginalized and
disenfranchised. Hence, through sustained popular mobilization, in-
surgent social movements opened an insurgent path to democracy, as
they not only responded to changing political opportunities during a
democratic transition, but through their mobilization opened their
own opportunities for success.
The duration and level of violence of the Zapatista insurgency
are not comparable to the violence sustained by insurgents in El
Salvador and South Africa. Hostilities between the EZLN and the
Mexican federal army lasted only twelve days—​although the clan-
destine mobilization of the Zapatistas before the uprising had been
going on for at least a decade9—​while the Salvadoran violent conflict

7. Oligarchic societies are those “in which economic elites rely on extra-​economic
coercion of labor by the state for the realization of incomes superior to those possible
under more liberal, market-​based arrangements” (Wood 2000, 6–​7).
8. Extra-​economic coercion is intended to control labor through “gross violations
of fundamental liberal rights of association, speech, free movement, self-​ownership,
due process, and equality before the law” (Wood 2000, 7).
9. Tello Díaz (1995).

26
 D emocratic T ransitions and P olitical O pportunities

lasted for over twelve years, and in South Africa popular mobiliza-
tion against apartheid went on for over forty years. The ten-​year
Zapatista cycle of protests could be considered a long-​lasting pop-
ular mobilization initially triggered by insurgency, but the Zapatista
cycle of protest was not what triggered peace negotiations. It was the
timing of the EZLN uprising, together with the great national and
international attention that Zapatistas gained during the first twelve
days of hostilities, that helped them to rapidly become salient insur-
gent social movement actors—​potential counter-​elites in Wood’s
words—​with whom regime elites had to promptly negotiate peace
accords to ensure a smooth transition to an electoral democracy and
to a more market-​oriented economy. Protracted democratization
reforms were negotiated among incumbent and opposition political
elites separately, but at the same time that Zapatistas were holding
peace negotiations with representatives of the Mexican federal gov-
ernment. Given these conditions, I argue that Zapatistas were poised
to become influential counter-​elites, but the parallel scenario in
which peace and democratizing negotiations took place prevented
them from doing so. In the next sections of this chapter I present
hypotheses to explain this seemingly unexpected result.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
IN PROTRACTED TRANSITIONS

A protracted democratization process is defined in the literature as

a long transition from either military rule or a one-​party regime
that involves a lengthy period of negotiations among political elite
actors leading to incremental reforms that regulate electoral com-
petition but do not necessarily liberalize the political system be-
yond guaranteeing free and fair elections.10 According to Todd
Eisenstadt (2000), these incremental reforms allow incumbents to

10. Casper and Taylor (1996); Eisenstadt (2004).

27
T H E Z A PAT I S TA M O V E M E N T A N D M E X I C O ’ S D emocratic T ransition

reach their optimal outcome by granting minimal concessions to en-

sure continued opposition participation in negotiations and in elec-
toral competitions, while at the same time gathering information
about the opposition electoral popularity. Such a protracted path
to transition helps authoritarian incumbents channel potential
mobilizing actors against the regime—​strikers, students, peasants,
and insurgents—​ into the electoral process, because opposition
parties are forced to remain loyal to the quest for regime change be-
fore they can begin articulating social movements’ interests during
democratizing pacts and electoral campaigns.
Protracted democratic transitions allow authoritarian
incumbents to prolong their control of the political system. They
allow incumbents to hold onto their strongholds of power, while op-
position parties seek to gain power gradually at the local level first,
before toppling authoritarian incumbents at the state and national
levels.11 As a result, pro-​democratization social mobilization and po-
tential insurgency remain at the margins of the transition and their
leaders stay outside the negotiating tables. Nevertheless, I argue that
the unevenness of such a democratization process may provide in-
surgent social movements with different opportunities for mobiliza-
tion, success, and survival at different levels.
A protracted democratic transition prolongs the liberalization
process before the first more free and fair competitive elections take
place. Gradually more liberties are granted to dissident actors, and
incumbent regime elites begin refraining from using harsh repressive
measures to maintain their legitimacy. This way regime elites con-
trol possible insurgencies at the same time that they conduct pro-
tracted negotiations with political elites in the opposition. Insurgent
social movement actors might suffer from their exclusion from the
negotiating tables; however, given the liberalizing conditions, they
have more room to organize and mobilize despite the efforts of in-
cumbent and opposition elites to channel their interests through the

11. Cornelius (2000).

28
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Sabbath day, that is, the day of rest, is to be kept holy. In two
ways it should differ from other days; it is to be a day of rest and also
a holy day. We keep it as a day of rest by not doing on it any kind of
work; we keep it as a holy day by devoting the greater part of it,
since we are free from our ordinary occupation, to prayer and to
reading the Bible.

We are thankful to God for having commanded us to keep the

Sabbath, and give expression to our feeling of gratitude in our
prayers, especially at the beginning and the end of the Sabbath;
thus, on Friday evening, before the meal, we praise God for
sanctifying the Sabbath by a prayer called Kiddush, “sanctification,”
and on Sabbath evening, after the close of the Sabbath, we recite
the Habhdalah, in which God is praised for the distinction made
between Sabbath and the six week-days. [255]

The Israelites were told to remember the Sabbath day; that is, the
well-known day of rest, the same day which was instituted as a day
of rest in connection with the manna. On five days they collected one
omer of the manna, on the sixth day two omers for each person; on
the seventh day no manna was collected nor was any found, and the
Israelites were commanded to bake and to cook on the sixth day not
only for the sixth day, but also for the seventh, on which day baking
and cooking was not to be done. This same seventh day we are told
in the fourth commandment to remember to keep holy, that we
should not forget it, or choose another day instead of it. It is the
same seventh day on which God rested after the six days of the
Creation, and which “he blessed and sanctified.”

It is to be a day of rest not only for ourselves; we must not have work
done for us by our children, or by our servants, or by strangers; even
our cattle must rest. After six days of work we enjoy the blessing of
one day’s rest, and are rendered more fit to work another six days.
The harder we work on six days, the more welcome is the rest of the
seventh day to us. When Moses repeated the commandments, he
laid special stress on the rest of the servants, reminding the
Israelites that they themselves had once been slaves, and must
therefore recognise the necessity of granting a day of rest to their
servants.

It is not to be a day of mere idleness. Complete idleness leads to evil

thoughts and evil deeds. Whilst our body rests our mind should be
occupied with holy [256]thoughts; we should commune with God,
reflect on His works, learn from them the power, wisdom, and
goodness of God, study the Word of God, listen to the instruction of
our teachers and preachers, and altogether try to raise ourselves
into a loftier sphere.

On the day of rest we reflect on the works of God, on the work of

Creation which He completed in six days, and thus by keeping the
Sabbath we testify to our belief in God as the Creator of the
Universe. On this account it is that the Creation is referred to in this
commandment as the reason why rest was enjoined for the seventh
day. “For in six days,” &c.

“Therefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day;” the rest on the
seventh day is a blessing to those who have worked hard during the
preceding six days; it is a blessing to those who spend the Sabbath
in a proper manner. “And he hallowed it” by giving man an
opportunity to sanctify himself by more frequent communion with the
Most Holy.

The fourth commandment tells us—

To remember
(1.) to keep the same day as Sabbath which
has been set apart as such from the beginning.
To abstain
(2.) on that day from all kind of work.
 To devote
(3.) part of the day to our sanctification.

Fifth Commandment.

“Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon
the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.”

The strongest desire that animates a father and a mother is to see

their children good and happy. [257]From the first day of their
existence children are guarded by the watchful eyes of their parents
that no evil may befall them. How delighted are father and mother
when they notice the progress of their child in health and strength, in
heart and soul! What an amount of trouble and anxiety parents
undergo when they see their child suffering! No sacrifice is too great
for them so long as it ensures the child’s well-being. It is painful to
them to be compelled to deny their child anything, or to rebuke or to
punish it. To this they are impelled only by the anxiety for the welfare
of the child. The mutual affection between parent and child is one
which nature has implanted. Without it the home would be the
dwelling of misery and misfortune; with it comfort and happiness
flourish therein. The loving parents have pleasure in whatever they
do for the benefit of the child, and the affectionate child is delighted
with the goodness of its parents.

“Honour thy father and thy mother,” says the Almighty to us. How
does a child honour father and mother? In the eyes of the child
father and mother must be the king and the queen of the house,
however small that may be. Every word that comes from their mouth,
every desire that they express, must be regarded as of the greatest
importance, and be well remembered by the child. When the king or
the queen speaks, all present stand and listen respectfully; their
words are read by every one with the greatest interest. So it must be
with the words of our parents. Whenever they tell us to do or not to
do a thing, obedience is a blessing to us; disobedience is the chief
cause of all misery and trouble. We feel pleasure and honour in
[258]being able to do something that gratifies our parents, and we like
to give them at times some material token of our affection. The best
present we can give them is a good heart, sincere love that prompts
us to avoid everything that would grieve them, and to do everything
we can to give them pleasure and to make them happy.

This is one of the few laws the reward of which is distinctly stated,
“That thy days may be long upon the land, which the Lord thy God
giveth thee.” We can easily understand the good effect of keeping
the fifth commandment. Pleasure and contentment contribute a good
deal to the health and well-being of man, whilst anger, trouble, and
dissatisfaction produce ill-health and weakness. The mutual affection
between parent and child is therefore the cause that the days of both
the parents and the children are prolonged, and the harmony and
happiness of the house firmly established. The blessing attending
children’s obedience and love towards their parents does not end
here. The whole State consists of small homes and families, and the
greater the well-being of the individual homes, the greater is the well-
being of the whole country. Thus the child by acting in accordance
with this Divine commandment contributes its share towards the
prosperity of the whole country.

When our parents are not present, we should, out of love towards
them, obey those who take their place, as, e.g., our elder brothers or
sisters, our guardians, and our teachers, since all these only do what
the parents would themselves like to do were the opportunity granted
them.
We are bound to honour our parents not only so [259]long as we are
under their care and live in their house, but also when we have left
our parents’ home, and have become independent. Even when they
have become old, weak, and poor, and we support them, we must
not forget the natural relation between parent and child, and the
honour due to parents from their children must still be shown to
them. When they have departed from this life, and we are no longer
able to show our feeling of love and respect in the usual way, we
must honour their name and memory, and hold in respect the wishes
and commands which they expressed when still alive. Death is no
bar to true love and sincere affection.

Thus we obey the fifth commandment—

By listening
(1.) respectfully to the words of our parents and
obeying what they say.
By doing
(2.) that which pleases them, and avoiding that
which would displease them.
By supporting
(3.) them when they are weak and poor by all
our best exertion and with genuine pleasure.
By honouring
(4.) their name and memory after their death.
By being
(5.) obedient to our elder brothers or sisters, to our
guardians, and to our teachers.

Sixth Commandment.

“Thou shalt not murder.”

Murder is a most terrible thing; we shudder at the sound of the word,

even at the mere idea of it. We wonder how it is possible that a
person should be so wicked, so cruel, and so unnatural as to take
the [260]life of another human being! One who can do such a thing
must have lost all human feeling, and is rather a brute than a being
created in the image of God. But, unfortunately, there have been and
there are such wicked people. We read in the Bible that a dispute
arose between the two sons of Adam, and the one, Cain, slew the
other, Abel. He repented it, but he could not restore to his brother the
life which he had taken. The severest punishment is therefore
inflicted on those who have committed this crime.

This commandment and those which follow it have their root in the
principle, “Love thy fellow-man as thyself,” applied to the life (sixth
commandment), the home (seventh commandment), the property
(eighth commandment), and the honour of our fellow-man (ninth
commandment). We wish to enjoy life as long as possible; it must
therefore be our desire to see our fellow-man enjoy the longest
possible life. But we must not rest satisfied with the mere desire. An
earnest desire is followed by acts dictated by it. We must try our
utmost, even as we do with regard to ourselves, to preserve the life
of our fellow-man. We have, e.g., seen before how by obeying the
fifth commandment we lengthen not only our own life, but also that of
our parents, whilst by breaking this law we shorten their life as well
as our own.

By supporting the poor and nursing the sick we may be the means of
increasing a human life by many days or even years, whilst by
neglecting the duty of charity we neglect to save the life of our fellow-
man when it is in our power to do so.—Another instance of criminal
neglect it would be if a person saw another [261]in actual danger of
life, and did not try everything in his power to save him.

Without having directly broken the sixth commandment, without

having taken the life of our neighbour by violence, we may still be
guilty of having shortened his life and caused his untimely death.
Talebearers and slanderers, e.g., often undermine the peace and
happiness of an individual, and even of a whole family, and sow the
seed of misery and ruin where well-being and prosperity seemed
well established.

The sixth commandment enjoins that we should respect the life of

our fellow-man, and forbids us therefore—

To take
(1.) it by violent means.
To do
(2.)anything by which the peace and well-being of our
fellow-man might be undermined.
To neglect
(3.) anything in our power to save our neighbour
from direct or indirect danger of life.

Seventh Commandment.

“Thou shalt not commit adultery.”

The institution of marriage is of very ancient date. When Eve had

been formed out of the rib of Adam, and was brought to him, he
exclaimed, “She is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh,” and the
account of the first marriage concludes thus: “Therefore man shall
leave his father and his mother and cleave unto his wife, and they
shall be one flesh” (Gen. ii. 24). Every married couple, husband and
wife, bind themselves by a solemn promise to be true and faithful to
each other, to remain throughout life united in love [262]and affection,
and to establish a home founded on purity and sanctity. Adultery is
the breaking of this promise. That love and affection which unites
man and wife cannot be shared by a third person without involving a
breach of the seventh commandment.

Jewish homes have always been distinguished by sanctity and

purity. In order to retain this distinction it is necessary that we should
be trained in this virtue from our childhood. Our language must be
pure and holy; unclean and indecent expressions must never be
uttered in our homes, either by the old or by the young. The purer
our speech is, the more sanctified will our heart be. Bad society often
corrupts the heart of the young through bad example in words and
conduct. It is therefore essential that immoral persons should not
come in contact with our children; that everything that is contrary to
the virtue of modesty (‫‏צניעות‬‎) should be rigorously excluded from
Jewish homes.

The seventh commandment forbids:—

Faithlessness
(1.) of a man to his wife, or a woman to her
husband.
The(2.)
use of improper and indecent language.
Immodest
(3.) conduct.
Associating
(4.) with immoral persons.

Eighth Commandment.

“Thou shalt not steal.”

We do not like that any one should take a part of our property
without our knowledge or consent. An old saying of the Rabbis
teaches: “Let the property [263]of thy neighbour be as dear in thy
eyes as thine own” (Aboth ii. 12); that is to say, as you do not wish a
diminution or destruction of what is yours, so you must not cause a
diminution or destruction of what belongs to your neighbour.

By secretly taking anything for ourselves that does not belong to us,
we steal, and break the eighth commandment.
This commandment has also a wider sense, and forbids every illegal
acquisition of property, whether it be directly by theft or robbery, or by
cheating, by embezzlement or forgery. Property acquired by any of
these or similar means may be considered as stolen property, and is
by no means a blessing to him who possesses it. Even if human
justice does not reach the evil-doer, he is watched by an All-seeing
Eye, and will in due time receive his full punishment.

This commandment prohibits:—

Theft
(1.)and robbery.
All kinds
(2.) of fraud and dishonesty.

Ninth Commandment.

“Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.”

It gives us pain to hear that others speak ill of us. “Let the honour of
thy neighbour be as dear to thee as thine own” (Aboth ii. 10). We
must therefore not speak ill of our neighbour. But it is not only the
speaking ill of others that this commandment forbids; we must not
say of our fellow-man anything that is not true. If we are called as a
witness in a [264]court of justice, we must be most careful that every
word we utter be perfectly true. We must weigh our words well and
guard ourselves against stating as facts things about which we are
not quite certain. If we are careless we may become false witnesses,
and may even be guilty of perjury.

The consequences of false evidence are of a very grave nature; it

misleads the judge, perverts justice, ruins innocent people; and the
false witness himself—whether he sinned with intention or by
carelessness—will not escape punishment.
God declared through the mouth of the prophet Zechariah (v. 4): “I
will bring forth the curse, saith the Lord of hosts, and it shall enter
into the house of the thief and into the house of him that sweareth
falsely by my name; and it shall remain in the midst of his house, and
shall consume it, with the timber thereof and the stones thereof.”

In order to guard ourselves against the possibility of such a crime,

we must train ourselves in speaking the exact truth in everything,
however trifling it may appear to us. Even in their play children must
be careful in what they utter. Idle talk, gossip, frequently leads us to
speak of our neighbours what is not in harmony with facts. Though
we may believe it to be harmless and to have no evil consequence, it
has in reality very pernicious results; for we get into the habit of
being careless about our words, and of ignoring the line that parts
truth from falsehood, and when we have then to speak on more
important things, or even in a court of justice, we may prove
ourselves equally careless. There is a proverb (Prov. xix. 5): [265]“A
faithful witness is he who doth not lie, but he who uttereth lies will be
a false witness;” i.e., the conduct of a witness with regard to truth in
ordinary and less important utterances is a test of his trustworthiness
in more important matters.

The ninth commandment—

Forbids
(1.) us to give false evidence; and
To utter
(2.) an untruth of any kind whatever.
It commands
(3.) us to be careful in our utterances.

Tenth Commandment.

“Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours house; thou shalt not covet thy
neighbour’s wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his
ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbour’s.”

The coveting which the tenth commandment forbids is the root from
which the crimes forbidden in the four preceding commandments
spring. Coveting is a desire to possess what we cannot get in an
honest and legal manner. An instance of such coveting is the desire
of Ahab to possess the vineyard of Naboth. It must have been more
than an ordinary desire, for it led him to most wicked acts (1 Kings
xxi.).

It is not every desire that is prohibited. If we see a thing that pleases

us, we begin to feel a desire for its possession. Our reason must
then step in and tell us whether we can obtain it in an honest way or
not. In the latter case we must conquer our desire and suppress it,
lest it obtain the mastery over us.

We must work and try to make progress. We cannot be blamed if we

are not quite content with our [266]present condition, and wish to
improve it. Without such a desire all industry and progress would
disappear. But we must consider that the improvement of our
material condition, the increase of our property, is not the whole
mission of man. We must not forget that we have a higher mission:
to improve our heart and our moral conduct, and to make ourselves
worthy of being called “the children of God.” The increase of our
property must not impede the progress of the purity and goodness of
our heart.

The tenth commandment—

Forbids
(1.) us to covet that which does not belong to us; and
Commands
(2.) us to suppress any such desire when it rises
in our heart.
Note 1.—There is another way of enumerating the Ten Commandments, namely,
to combine the first and the second into one, and to divide the tenth into two. The
Masoretic text seems to point in this direction; for there is no pause between the
first and the second commandments, while there is one in the middle of the tenth.
The inference from the Masoretic text, however, is not quite certain. It is possible
that the first two commandments were joined closely together in order to separate
more pointedly those commandments in which God speaks of Himself in the first
person from those in which He speaks of Himself in the third person; or, to use the
words of the Midrash, to separate the first two, which the Israelites heard directly
from God, from the rest, which they heard through Moses. The last commandment
was, on account of its great importance, given in two different forms. In the first the
general term “house” is employed; in the second the various elements constituting
the “house” are enumerated instead. The two forms of the commandment are
separated by the [267]sign of a pause, because each of them is complete in itself.
Tradition supports our division of the Decalogue. “I am” (‫‏אנכי‬‎) and “Thou shalt not
have” (‫‏לא יהיה לך‬‎) are mentioned in Talmud and Midrash, also in Targum, as two
distinct commandments. According to Philo (On the Ten Comm.) and Josephus
(Antiq. III. v. 5), the verse, “Thou shalt have … before me” belongs to the first
commandment.

The text of the Decalogue, as repeated by Moses in the plain of Moab (Deut. v. 6–
8), differs from the original (Exod. xx. 2–14). One of the differences, the first word
of the fourth commandment—‫‏זכור‬‎, “Remember,” in Exodus, and ‫‏שמור‬‎, “Observe,”
in Deuteronomy—is pointed out in Midrash and Talmud, and also in the hymn for
the Eve of Sabbath, beginning, “Come, my friend” (‫‏לכה דודי‬‎). Tradition explains the
first expression as referring to affirmative commandments, and the second to
prohibitions; it further teaches that “both expressions were spoken by God
simultaneously;” that is to say, the fourth commandment in Deuteronomy, though
different in form, does not imply anything that has not been revealed by God on
Mount Sinai. The same applies to all points of difference.

Why did Moses introduce the alterations? Ibn Ezra, in his Commentary on the
Decalogue, is of opinion that the question need not be asked, or answered if
asked, because in the repetition of a Divine message the original words may be
changed so long as the sense remains intact. But the addition of the phrase, “as
the Lord thy God commandeth thee” in two cases, and the reference to the
deliverance from Egyptian servitude, substituted (in Deut.) in the fourth
commandment for the reference to the Creation (in Exod.), lead us to think that the
changes were not introduced unintentionally or without any purpose. The repeated
Decalogue is a portion of an address in which Moses exhorted a new generation in
the plains of Moab to obey the Divine Law. It is, therefore, not unlikely that he
made additions [268]and alterations for the sake of emphasis, where he noticed a
certain laxity among those whom he addressed. Having come in contact with
heathen nations and observed their rites in connection with their sacred days, the
Israelites may have been inclined to imitate them; they were therefore exhorted to
sanctify the Sabbath in the way God commanded; hence also the more emphatic
“Observe,” ‫‏שמור‬‎.—A similar reason may have caused the addition of the same
phrase, “as the Lord, &c.,” to the fifth commandment. The participation of a portion
of the Israelites in the licentious feasts of the Moabites and Midianites disturbed
the peace of their homes and loosened the sacred family tie. Moses therefore
points to the Divine origin of the law commanding obedience to parents, and also
emphasises the blessings which it will yield by adding the words, “and in order that
it may be well with thee.”—The change of circumstances has also caused another
alteration in the fourth commandment. During the forty years which the Israelites
were compelled to spend in the wilderness, they almost forgot the condition of their
former servitude; the new generation did not know it at all, and they grudged their
slaves the one day of rest in the week. They were therefore reminded of their
servitude in Egypt, and were asked to remember it in order that they might, out of
gratitude to the Almighty, keep the Sabbath as He commanded them.

Another indication that changed circumstances caused the alterations is noticed in

the tenth commandment. Having arrived at the border of Palestine, the Israelites
were about to take possession of houses and fields, and two and a half tribes were
already in possession of landed property. The term “house” (‫‏בית‬‎), which at first
denoted “the home” or “the household,” including the wife, was now in the minds of
the people chiefly “a permanent building.” “The wife,” the centre and the chief
element in the home, was therefore substituted for “the house” in the first part of
[269]the commandment, and vice versâ, “the house” for “the wife” in the second
part, where appropriately “nor his field” has been added.—The substitution of
“Thou shalt not desire” (‫‏לא תתאוה‬‎) for the original “Thou shalt not covet” (‫‏לא תחמוד‬‎)
may have been intended to teach the Israelites that all kinds and degrees of desire
were forbidden, and to remind them of the consequences of desire which they had
experienced at “the graves of the desire” (‫‏קברות התאוה‬‎Num. xi.).—One more
important alteration is to be noticed, the conjunctive “and” (‫ְו‬‎)‫ ‏‬before the seventh
and the following commandments, which served to create in the minds of the
hearers the idea that the crimes forbidden in the second part of the Decalogue are
to some extent connected, and that he who broke one of these commandments
was likely to break the others also. We are thus bidden to be on our guard, and to
take good care that none of them be violated by us.
Note 2.—Ibn Ezra, in his Commentary on Exodus xx. 9, says: “Rabbi Jehudah ha-
levi asked me why it is said in the Decalogue, ‘who brought thee out of the land of
Egypt, out of the house of bondage,’ and not ‘who created heaven and earth.’ My
answer was as follows: Know that those who believe in God have not all the same
kind of faith. Some believe because they were told of His existence by others;
those who believe in God because the holy Torah teaches this belief possess a
higher degree of faith. If an unbeliever argues with either of these, they are not
able to refute his argument. Those, however, who study sciences—Astronomy,
Botany, Zoology, and Anthropology—learn to understand the works and the ways
of God, and from these the Creator Himself. The words ‘I am the Lord thy God’ can
only be understood by the wise and intelligent of all nations. For they all see that
God has made heaven and earth. But there is this difference: the Israelites believe
that the Creation has taken place five thousand years ago: non-Israelites assume
that God has been continually creating [270]from eternity. Now, God wrought signs
and wonders in Egypt by which He delivered the Israelites out of Egypt, and thus
showed them His Divine justice and goodness. In reference to these miracles it is
said, ‘Thou hast been shown to know that the Lord is God;’ all Israelites, wise and
simple, equally witnessed His miracles. The beginning of the Decalogue, therefore,
‘I am the Lord thy God,’ is well understood by the wise; but for the rest of the
nation the words ‘who brought thee out,’ &c., have been added, in order that all
without exception should understand it.”

Note 3.—Don Isaac Abarbanel, in his Commentary on Exodus xx., says: “The Ten
Commandments are distinguished from the other Divine precepts in three things:
they were directly communicated by God to the Israelites, not through a prophet;
they were revealed to a whole nation at once; and they were written on the two
tables of stone by the finger of God. Such distinction necessarily indicates a
greater intrinsic value of the Ten Commandments. My opinion is therefore that they
are laws of a general character, and principles including all the 613 precepts which
the Holy One, blessed be He, gave to His people. E.g., love and worship of God.
sanctification of His Name, submission to His judgment, fear of God, reverence of
His sanctuary, and other duties towards God; Passover, Tabernacles, Tefillin,
Mezuzah, and such other precepts as are ‘a memorial of the departure from
Egypt;’ the separation of the first-born, tithes, &c.—all these duties are implied in
the first commandment. Also Rabbi Levi ben Gershon and the Gaon Saadiah
assume that all the 613 precepts are implicitly contained in the Decalogue.
Although all precepts involving practice (‫‏מצוות מעשיות‬‎) are implied in the
Decalogue, and even allusions to each one of the thirteen principles of faith may
be discovered in it, there is no precept concerning our faith. It has already been
proved by Rabbi Chisdai that by the Divine commands we are either [271]told to do
a certain thing, or told not to do a certain thing; but what we have to believe or not
to believe the Almighty taught us through signs, wonders, and revelation. The
words ‘I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the
house of bondage,’ teach a certain truth, a principle from which many of the 613
precepts may be derived, but which is in itself no commandment.—The Decalogue
(‫‏עשרת הדברים‬‎) must therefore not be understood as designating ten
commandments, but ‘ten words’ or ‘ten paragraphs’ indicated in the Hebrew text
by the pauses, or spaces left between two paragraphs.

“The ‘ten words’ were written on two tables, five on each. The first five, containing
positive and negative precepts, with the announcement of reward and punishment,
were exclusively addressed to the Israelites. The latter five are simple prohibitions
without any mention of punishment; because they were addressed to man as man,
and include only such laws as are also suggested to him by human reason,
without direct revelation.”

Rabbi R. S. Hirsch, in his Commentary on Exodus xx., says in reference to the first
commandment: “As this verse is not understood as a mere declaration, but as a
commandment (‫‏מצוה‬‎), it does not say ‘I am thy God,’ but ‘I, the Lord, shall be thy
God,’ and thus contains as the foundation of all our duties towards God an
exhortation to acknowledge the sovereignty of God, ‫‏קבלת עול מלכות שמים‬‎.

“The so-called ‘belief in the existence of God,’ as ancient and modern theologians
generally express this idea, differs widely from that which underlies this
fundamental doctrine of Judaism. The truth which affords me the foundation of a
Jewish life is not the belief that there is a God, or that there is only one God, but
the conviction that this One, Only, and true God is my God; that He has created
and formed me, has placed me here, and given me certain duties; that He
constantly makes and forms me, preserves, protects, [272]directs, and guides me;
not the belief that I, an accidental product of the Universe whose First Cause He
was millions of years ago, am through a chain of thousands of intervening beings
related to Him, but the belief that every moment of my existence is a direct
personal gift from the Almighty and All-good, and that every moment of my life
ought to be spent in His service; not the knowledge that there is a God, but the
recognition of God as my God, as the sole Cause of my fate, and my sole Guide in
all that I do, gives me the foundation for my religious life. The response to the
exhortation, ‘I shall be thy God,’ is ‘Thou art my God.’ ”

Note 4.—The importance attached to the Decalogue may be gathered from the
various attempts made, on the one hand, to classify the Divine laws according to
the Ten Commandments, showing that the latter contain all the 613 precepts; and,
on the other hand, to find in such important passages as the Shema and Leviticus
xix. a parallel for each of the Ten Commandments. (Jerus. Talm. Ber., chap. i.;
Rabboth, Vayyikra ad locum.)
[Contents]

II. General Moral Principles.

The Ten Commandments, flowing as it were from the one source, “I

am the Lord thy God,” branch off in all directions, and penetrate all
man’s relations, guide him in his conduct towards God, towards his
fellow-men and towards himself, and teach him how to rule his
thought, his speech, and his actions. When the Almighty proclaims to
us, “I am the Lord thy God,” we willingly respond, “Thou art my God.”
But this declaration involves also duties on our part, the fulfilment of
which is the natural consequence and the verification of our
response. If our words, “Thou [273]art my God,” come from our
hearts, and are not empty sounds, uttered merely by the lips, we
must be conscious of the duties they impose on us. These are:—

Duties
A. towards God, as our Master, Creator, and Father.
Duties
B. towards our fellow-men, as children of one God.
Duties
C. towards ourselves, as the object of God’s
Providence.

A. Duties towards God.

(a.) Duties of the Heart.

1. Fear of God. ‫‏יראת השם‬‎—The true knowledge of God, of His
Wisdom and Greatness, as visible in His works, leads us to fear
God; that is, to fear doing anything that might displease Him and
make us unworthy of His love. It is not a fear that terrifies us and
drives us away from His presence; on the contrary, it draws us
nearer to Him, and causes us to try to become more and more
worthy of His love.

“And now, O Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee but to
fear the Lord thy God?” (Deut. x. 12).

“If thou wilt not observe to do all the words of this law that are written
in this book, that thou mayest fear this name which is to be honoured
and revered, the Lord thy God; then the Lord will make thy plagues
wonderful” (Deut. xxviii. 58).

“The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge” (Prov. i. 7). [274]

“The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord” (Ps. cxi. 10).

“The fear of the Lord is to hate evil” (Prov. viii. 13).

“The fear of the Lord prolongeth days” (Prov. x. 27).

“Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty
of man” (Eccles. xii. 13).

“He who possesses learning but is without fear of God, resembles a

treasurer who has the key for the inner door, but not for the outer
one” (Babyl. Talm. Sabb. 31b).

“Everything is in the hand of God except the fear of God” (Babyl.

Talm. Ber. 33b). 3
2. Love of God. ‫‏אהבת השם‬‎—The true fear of God is associated with
the love of God. The latter means the constant longing for
communion with Him, feeling happy and joyful when with Him, but
unhappy and miserable when without Him. Love of God creates in us
an anxiety to do everything in our power that might please the
Almighty. He who is filled with love of God is ‫‏חסיד‬‎, pious; he does not
rest content with doing what he is commanded, but anxiously seeks
the opportunity of fulfilling a Divine command; he is ‫‏רודף אחר המצות‬‎,
“eager in the pursuit of Mitsvoth.” The fear of God is the beginning of
knowledge, but love of God is the aim and end of all our religious
thinking and striving.

“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy
soul, and with all thy might” (Deut. vi. 5). [275]

“The Lord preserveth all those who love him (Ps. cxlv. 20).

“Thou wilt show me the path of life. In thy presence is fulness of joy;
in thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore” (Ps. xvi. 11).

“As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after
thee, O God” (Ps. xlii. 2).

“Blessed are they who dwell in thy house: they will be still praising
thee” (Ps. lxxxiv. 5).

“The desire of our soul is to thy name, and to the remembrance of

thee” (Isa. xxvi. 8).

“I will rejoice in the Lord; I will joy in the God of my salvation” (Hab.
iii. 18).

3. Gratitude towards God.—All that we possess, the very breath we

breathe, is a present received at the hands of the Almighty.
Whatever success we desire to achieve, whatever undertaking we
desire to accomplish, we must ourselves first strive for it to the
utmost of our power, and this done, we may hope for the Divine
blessing. When we have attained what we sought, we are warned
against believing that “our power and the strength of our hand hath
gotten us this wealth.” We are to “remember the Lord our God, for it
is he that giveth us power to get wealth” (Deut. viii. 17–18).

“For all things come of thee, and of thine own hand have we given
thee” (1 Chron. xxix. 14).

“Whoso offereth the sacrifice of thanksgiving glorifieth me” (Ps. l.

23).

“Though all sacrifices should cease, the sacrifice of thanksgiving will

never cease” (Vayyikra Rabba ix.).

4. Reverence for His Name.—The more we fear and love God, the
deeper and the more intense is our feeling [276]of reverence for
everything which is connected in our thoughts with the name of the
Almighty. Whenever we enter a place dedicated to His worship, or
open the Book that bears His name, or celebrate the days set apart
as “seasons of the Lord,” this feeling of reverence overcomes us,
and finds expression in our conduct. The reverence for the name of
God impels us also to respect ministers and teachers who spend
their life in spreading the knowledge of God and His Will.

“How awful is this place! this is none other but the house of God”
(Gen. xxviii. 17).

“I will come into thy house in the multitude of thy mercy: and in thy
fear will I worship toward thy holy temple” (Ps. v. 8).

“When I will publish the name of the Lord, ascribe ye greatness unto
our God” (Deut. xxxii. 3).