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Transnational Security
Cooperation in
the Mediterranean
Edited by Robert Mason
Transnational Security Cooperation
in the Mediterranean
 Robert Mason
Editor

Transnational Security
Cooperation
in the Mediterranean
Editor
Robert Mason
Middle East Studies Center
The American University in Cairo
Cairo, Egypt

ISBN 978-3-030-54443-0 ISBN 978-3-030-54444-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54444-7

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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 Preface

This book came about from a workshop on enhancing Euro-Med secu-

rity cooperation held at the Middle East Studies Center at The Amer-
ican University in Cairo on May 13, 2018. This was one of the actions
under an EU funded project called “promote dialogue between academic
scholars, policy professionals in Egypt and European policymakers,”
ENI/2017/389-834, alongside a public lecture series, a student confer-
ence, a new MA-level course on Mediterranean politics, as well as other
related events and publications. More information about the project can
be found here: https://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/mesc. The contents
of this volume are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), conceived after the 2004
enlargement of the European Union, was not substantive in the face of
divergences within Europe itself, which have been crystallized by the rise
of populism after the 2007/2008 financial crisis and Brexit. EU rela-
tions with the ten states of the Southern Neighborhood (Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia)
was always going to be problematic due to the latter’s general preoccupa-
tion with regime and national security, domestic politics and addressing
sources of regional instabilty. A lack of convergent political interests,
economic resources and industrial capacity have undermined relations
further. National interests are likely to remain divergent for the foresee-
able future, both within Europe and between the EU and the Southern

v
vi PREFACE

Neighborhood following the public health and economic consequences of

Covid-19. As discussed further in this volume, the EU as a supranational
organization has not dealt with such as threat to unity since its formation.
A decade on from the Arab uprisings of 2010 and following a review
of the ENP in 2015 and the introduction of the EU’s Global Strategy
in 2016, the stability of the wider MENA region remains in peril. The
unique selling points of liberal democracy and multilateralism have not
drawn a pan-Mediterranean consensus on the future of the region or
indeed on a sustainable cooperative formula. Beyond the securitization
of relations apparent on both sides, from the European focus on illegal
migration, to the narrow Middle East and North Africa (MENA) state
focus on authoritarian regime survival and state security, the shift toward
multipolarity in the international environment has raised further questions
on the future of EU–MENA relations. Indeed, while EU external policy
appears to be increasingly impacted by the USA on issues ranging from
Iran, Syria, Israel, and Palestine, its broader mission vis-a-vis the Southern
Neighborhood looks set to be driven by actors as diverse as the Gulf states,
Russia and China.
After the EU–League of Arab States summit in Sharm El-Sheikh from
24 to 25 February 2019, a new official multilateral track has been estab-
lished between the two sides to support the work already undertaken in
the Union for the Mediterranean. But the question remains, what next?
Beyond promises to boost cooperation, reaffirm commitment to defend
multilateralism and a rules based trading system, very little progress has
been made. Certainly there is room for more official and unofficial contact
and brainstorming, especially in light of a new EU leadership team in
Brussels. This volume is one part of that effort to rethink, reframe, and
reconceptualize Euro–Mediterranean relations outside of the dominant
EU academic and policy discourses and platforms in a rapidly shifting
regional, interregional, and global landscape.

Paris, France/Cairo, Egypt Robert Mason

April 2020
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Robert Mason
Evolutions in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 4
EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 6
Conceptual Considerations for Transnational Security
Cooperation in the Mediterranean 7
Structure of the Volume 13
References 14

2 Security Threats from the Southern Mediterranean

as Viewed by Europe: A Comparative Analysis
of the “Long Year” of 1979 and the 2010s 19
Martin Beck
Introduction 19
European Threat Perception of the Mediterranean
in the Long Year of 1979 21
Recent EU Security Challenges Posed by the Southern
Mediterranean 24
Conclusion 34
References 35

vii
viii CONTENTS

3 Governance and Threat Perception in the Southern

Neighborhood 41
Robert Mason
Introduction 41
The Role of the Military in Governmental Affairs 43
Islamists Vying for Political Legitimacy and Influence 45
Economic Forces that Undermine the Status Quo 49
Social Forces and Political Pluralism 51
Disconnects Between the ENP and MENA State Values 53
Conclusion 54
References 55

4 EU CounterTerrorism Cooperation with the MENA:

Optimal or Suboptimal? 59
Annelies Pauwels
Introduction 59
Externalizing the EU’s Counterterrorism Model 60
Injecting Pragmatism into CT Cooperation 62
Enhancing Judicial and Law Enforcement Cooperation 63
Laying the Groundwork for CT Cooperation 66
Revisiting the Need for Change 68
Conclusion 71
References 71

5 Migration and the Mediterranean: The EU’s Response

to the “European Refugee Crisis” 75
Arne Niemann and Julia Blöser
Introduction 75
The Development of the “European Refugee Crisis” 76
The EU’s Response to the Crisis 78
Conclusion 100
References 101

6 Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean Energy

Resources 115
Marco Giuli
Introduction 115
Profiling Euro-Mediterranean Oil and Gas Relations 116
 CONTENTS ix

Eastern Mediterranean Gas: Opportunities and Challenges

for Europe 122
Conclusion 137
References 139

7 Russia in Syria and the Middle East: Tactics Disguised

as a Strategy? 147
Robert Mason and Maxim A. Suchkov
Introduction 147
Domestic Issues 149
Russian Military Costs in Syria 150
Russian Post-Syria Planning 151
Russia and the Kurds 154
Russia and Iran/Israel Relations 155
Russia in Libya 156
Russia and the Arab Gulf States 157
Conclusion 158
References 158

8 Turkey’s Quest for Influence in the Mediterranean

in the Post-Arab Uprisings Era 163
Ismail Numan Telci
Introduction: Turkey’s Reorientation Back to the MENA
Region 163
Turkey–Egypt Relations: From Cooperation to Conflict 167
Turkish Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean Versus
Regional and Global Powers 168
Turkey’s Activism in Libya 171
Turkey and the Maghreb 173
Turkey’s Relations with Tunisia 174
Energy Politics in Eastern Mediterranean 175
Conclusion 177
References 178

9 European-North African Security: The Complexity

of Cooperation 183
Yahia H. Zoubir and Djallil Lounnas
Introduction 183
x CONTENTS

Algeria and the EU: A Difficult yet Unescapable

Partnership 184
Morocco: A Privileged Partner 188
Tunisia: A Strong Partnership with Europe 195
Libya: A Major Migration and Security Concern 197
Conclusion 201
References 202

10 International and Gulf State Influence in the Southern

Mediterranean 209
Robert Mason
Introduction 209
US Policies Toward the Mediterranean 210
China’s Engagement in the Mediterranean 215
India’s Engagement in the Mediterranean 219
Japan’s Engagement in the Mediterranean 221
Gulf State Policies in the Southern Mediterranean 223
Economic Actors 226
Non-state Actors 229
The African Union (AU) 230
Conclusion 231
References 232

11 Rethinking the EU Approach 241

Robert Mason
Introduction 241
Addressing the Autocratic—Democratic Divide on Conflict
and Development 244
Reviewing Efficacy of Decision-Making and Policy
Implementation 252
The EU as a Normative Power 254
A Note on Covid-19 255
Conclusion 257
References 258

Index 265
 Notes on Contributors

Martin Beck holds a chair in Modern Middle East Studies at the

University of Southern Denmark (SDU). He previously worked as an
academic teacher, political advisor, and researcher in Germany (Tübingen,
Hamburg, and Bremen), the Middle East (Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Iraq), and the USA (Denver, Colorado). His research covers inter-
national politics and political economy, in particular regional power rela-
tions, the Arab–Israeli conflict, regional oil politics, and comparative anal-
ysis of rentier states. His most recent publications include “The Aggra-
vated Struggle for Regional Power in the Middle East: American Allies
Saudi Arabia and Israel Versus Iran,” Global Policy 10 (2020), forth-
coming; “On the Continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” in:
Isabel Bramsen, Poul Poder, and Ole Wæver (eds.), Resolving Inter-
national Conflict. Dynamics of Escalation, Continuation, and Trans-
formation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), pp. 200–214; “OPEC+ and
Beyond: How and Why Oil Prices are High,” E-International Rela-
tions (2019), https://www.e-ir.info/2019/01/24/opec-and-beyond-
how-and-why-oil-prices-are-high/; “How to (Not) Walk the Talk: The
Demand for Palestinian Self-determination as a Challenge for the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy,” European Foreign Affairs Review 22
(2017), pp. 59–74; “Israeli Foreign Policy: Securitizing Occupation,” in:
Robert Mason (ed.), Reassessing Order and Disorder in the Middle East.

xi
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Regional Imbalance or Disintegration? (Lanham: Rowman and Little-

field, 2017), pp. 173–193. Website: www.sdu.dk/staff/mbeck. Twitter:
@martinbeck23.
Julia Blöser is a Research Assistant and postgraduate student in Political
Economy and International Relations at Johannes Gutenberg University
Mainz. Having privately engaged with asylum seekers during the evolving
crisis since 2014, she focused her research on migration policy and, in
particular, on EU asylum policy in its internal and external dimensions.
Her Bachelor thesis on the rationales of action behind the EU’s relocation
decisions received the Jean Monnet Award for EU in Global Dialogue
2018.
Marco Giuli is a Researcher at the Institute for European Studies of the
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and an Associate Policy Analyst at the Euro-
pean Policy Centre. He works on the external dimension of the EU
energy policy, the energy security-climate nexus, and the geopolitics of
decarbonization. Prior to this, he coordinated the Climate and Energy
Platform of the EPC, he was a Researcher at the Madariaga-College of
Europe Foundation and a trainee at the Centre for European Policy
Studies. Marco is a regular public speaker, media commentator, and op-ed
contributor on EU energy and climate issues.
Djallil Lounnas is an Assistant Professor of International Relations in Al
Akahwayn University. He is specialized on radicalism and violent extremist
movements in North Africa-Sahel. He has conducted fieldwork on this
topic in the region and published extensively in academic journals. His
latest publication includes his book Le Djihad en Afrique du Nord Sahel:
D’AQMI à Daech (Paris: Les presses de la Fondation pour la Recherche
Strategique/L’Harmattan).
Robert Mason is a Non-Resident Fellow at The Arab Gulf States Insti-
tute in Washington. He was an Associate Professor and Director of
the Middle East Studies Center at The American University in Cairo
2016–2019. He received his D.Phil. from the University of Exeter and
is a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy. His research focuses
on international relations, with a geographical focus on the Gulf, EU,
US, and rising powers. He is author or editor of numerous books,
including New Perspectives on Middle East Politics: Economy, Society and
International Relations (AUC Press, forthcoming), Reassessing Order
and Disorder in the Middle East: Regional Imbalance or Disintegration?
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii

(Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), Egypt and the Gulf: A Renewed Regional
Policy Alliance (Gerlach Press, 2016), Muslim Minority—State Relations:
Violence, Integration and Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), Interna-
tional Politics of the Arab Spring: Popular Unrest and Foreign Policy
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) and Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia:
Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2014). On
Twitter @Dr_Robert_Mason.
Arne Niemann is a Professor of International Politics and a Jean Monnet
Chair of European Integration Studies at the University of Mainz. He
is author of Explaining Decisions in the European Union (Cambridge
University Press 2006) and has published widely on EU topics, including
EU migration policy, in several journals, including the Journal of Common
Market Studies, the Journal of European Public Policy and International
Migration Review. Arne Niemann previously coedited seven special issues,
including “EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis: Theoret-
ical and Empirical Perspectives” (Journal of Common Market Studies 2018,
together with Natascha Zaun).
Annelies Pauwels is a Researcher who specializes in counterterrorism
and radicalization. She has conducted research at prominent EU and
UN research institutes. Her research at the European Union Institute for
Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris covered the external dimension of EU
Justice and Home Affairs. Prior to that she conducted research on crime
prevention and criminal justice at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Insti-
tute (UNICRI). Annelies holds an LLM in International Criminal Law
and an M.A. in Intercultural Mediation with a specialization in Arabic
and Russian.
Maxim A. Suchkov is Editor of Al-Monitor’s Russia-Mideast coverage
and a Senior Research Fellow at the MGIMO-University. Dr. Suchkov
is also an expert of the Russian International Affairs Council and Asso-
ciate Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International and Polit-
ical Studies (ISPI). Previously, he was a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at
Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian and East Euro-
pean Studies and Visiting Fellow at New York University. On Twitter:
@Max_A_Suchkov.
Ismail Numan Telci completed his B.A. from Istanbul University, M.A.
in European Studies at Hochschule Bremen, Germany, and a Ph.D. in
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

International Relations at Sakarya University, Turkey. As part of his Ph.D.

field research he spent 10 months at Cairo University from October
2012 to August 2013. Currently, he works as an Associate Professor at
the Department of International Relations and lectures in the Middle
East Institute (ORMER) at Sakarya University. He is also Vice President
and Gulf Studies Coordinator in the Center for Middle Eastern Studies
(ORSAM) in Ankara. His research focuses on Turkey–Qatar relations,
Gulf politics, Egyptian politics, and Arab revolutions. He is editor of
Middle Eastern Studies, a peer-reviewed journal published by ORSAM.
Telci is the author of three books: Dictionary of Egyptian Revolution
(2014), Egypt: Revolution and Counter-Revolution (2017), and Egyptian
Foreign Policy Since the Revolution: From Search for Change to Quest for
Legitimacy (2019).
Yahia H. Zoubir is a Senior Professor of International Relations and
International Management and Director of Research in Geopolitics at
KEDGE Business School, France. He holds a Ph.D. in International Rela-
tions from The American University, Washington, DC. His publications
include books, such as The Politics of Algeria: Domestic Issues and Inter-
national Relations; North African Politics; Building a New Silk Road:
China & the Middle East; Global Security Watch—The Maghreb; and
North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation, and arti-
cles in scholarly journals, such as Third World Quarterly, Mediterranean
Politics, International Affairs, Journal of North African Studies, Middle
East Journal, Journal of Contemporary China, Maghreb-Machrek, Journal
of Contemporary European Studies. He contributed entries and articles to
several Encyclopedias, such as the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Robert Mason

European Union (EU) relations with its self-defined Southern Neighbor-

hood: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine,
Syria and Tunisia, have become an area of increasing study since the Arab
uprisings began in Tunisia in 2010. The uprisings then quickly affected
Egypt, Libya, and Syria in particular and have even spread to other parts
of the Southern Neighborhood once thought to be immune from protests
due to their recent history, such as Algeria. When charting subsequent
events, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interven-
tion in Libya from March to October 2014, Russia’s intervention in
Syria starting in September 2015, and rising commitments to counterter-
rorism operations in the Sahel, scholars and policymakers are reminded
that insecurity persists around the Mediterranean. Yet insecurity, like
so many other themes explored in this book such as religiopolitical
challenges, mercenaries and militia, and economic engagement through
infrastructure, have been apparent for millennia. The Romans cultivated
client states around the fringes of the Mediterranean (Gambash 2017).

R. Mason (B)
Middle East Studies Center, The American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt
e-mail: robert.mason@aucegypt.edu

© The Author(s) 2021 1

R. Mason (ed.), Transnational Security
Cooperation in the Mediterranean,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54444-7_1
2 R. MASON

Machiavelli argued that mercenaries were necessary to strengthen polit-

ical power, and Lower (2017) concludes this was the case especially where
religious differences meant they never threatened their employer. Where
the Reformation posed challenges to official state engagement, Pirillo
(2017) finds that diplomatic back channels were used instead.
Chronic insecurity has become a feature of North African politics, yet
insecurity has become a feature in Europe as well. In Cyprus, the ethnic
Greek and Turkish communities have been separated since 1974, and in
the Balkans, the breakup of Yugoslavia followed a series of upheavals and
conflicts in the early 1990s. The Mediterranean refugee crisis from 2015
was a period characterized by the high number of people arriving in the
EU from the Mediterranean Sea and overland from Southeast Europe.
With drivers extending as far as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in the East,
down to Eritrea and Somalia in Africa, the crisis has exacerbated social
tensions. European state responses have varied from initial accommoda-
tion and negotiation with important transit countries such as Turkey,
to a populist and xenophobic backlash. Political gains have been made
by some European far right groups, especially in Switzerland, Austria,
and Hungary, who have been able to leverage fears of violent Islamist
(inspired) attacks in Europe. The UK referendum to leave the EU (Brexit)
in 2016 hails a new era for Anglo-European relations. This at a time
when European (including British) hard and soft power influence is under
pressure from illiberal states such as Russia as well as the populist, trans-
actional and unilateral politics of the Trump administration. The Trump
administration’s decision to temporarily bar flights from Europe during
the Covid-19 outbreak in March 2020 without prior consultation with
EU counterparts appears to confirm that the transatlantic relationship
is indeed under threat. This is especially damaging as close transatlantic
relations have been a cornerstone of the post-1945 international order.
Polarization in mainstream politics and growing inequality in economies
have fed populism and fuelled discontent even before allegations of
Russian electoral interference are considered.
Changes in the global economy have also put the Mediterranean at
the forefront of EU responses, including a e289 billion bailout to Greece
(the biggest bailout in global financial history) to tackle its sovereign debt
crisis in 2010, brought on by the global financial crisis in 2007/2008.
The rise of China and the implementation of Beijing’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) is attractive not only to Asian and African states in need
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

of new infrastructure projects and financing, but a whole host of devel-

oped countries, including Israel, Greece, and Italy. The fear here is that
eastern and southern neighbors, as well as EU member states themselves,
will fall prey to an increasingly assertive China that could fundamentally
undermine Europe’s identity that is based on liberal democratic values,
closer cooperation and integration. The EU response to China came in
September 2018 when it launched a “Connectivity Strategy” linking the
EU with Asia that put more emphasis on nations rather than states, would
be rules based, and provide alternative sources of financing. Mobilizing
private and multilateral investors could scale up the budget.
Apart from increasing competition in the Eurasian region between
major powers such as the EU, USA, China, and Russia, there are also
growing energy considerations to take into consideration in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Israel discovered a giant gas field, Leviathan block, in
2010. Lebanon has also found deposits. Further discoveries have been
made in the Israeli and Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), while
Italy’s ENI found a large natural gas field, named Zohr, in Egyptian
waters.
In an age of growing insecurity from non-state and transnational
threats, counterterrorism cooperation is an important dimension in Euro–
Mediterranean relations. But full political cooperation remains an over-
the-horizon objective following the first EU–Arab League summit in
Sharm El-Sheikh in 2019. This should not be a surprise given the persis-
tent mismatch of the political philosophies, systems of government, and
body politik of the states involved. During the Age of Enlightenment in
Europe, Thomas Hobbes referred to the “voice of the people” (1660)
while John Locke (1689) wrote about people-driven government and a
separation of powers which has largely informed modern secular politics
in Europe. In premodern entities in the Middle East, while the notion
of sovereignty existed, so did alternative traditions of diplomacy, more
personalized systems of governance, and a changing external environ-
ment, such as colonial encroachment, that helped give agency to officials
in the public domain more than is perhaps the case today. These points
are overlaid with more contemporary issues arising from complications,
threats, and challenges that can obfuscate advances in bilateral relations
and have undermined a comprehensive Mediterranean security system.
The wider Middle East is currently experiencing an escalating rivalry
and series of proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Rather than
mediate, the Trump administration’s rhetoric and policies continue to
4 R. MASON

make the USA an actor and force for escalation in this dynamic. Israel
remains alert to the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran but also to
patterns of asymmetric warfare from its southern flank in Gaza and
increasingly, from its northern flank in Lebanon, manifest in Hezbollah
which is supported by weapons transfers from Iran. We see many exam-
ples where broadly conceived national security policies include repressive
tendencies against civil society and the retrenchment of the elite into
“bunker states.” While this trend has been evident throughout the region,
it has been most recently apparent in Turkey after the failed military
coup in 2016. The consequences again, are not favorable to transnational
security cooperation.
Finally, the EU leadership itself was in flux in 2019. The new
EU Commission president has been announced as Germany’s Defense
Minister, Ursula von der Leyen. Charles Michel, formerly Prime Minister
of Belgium, will take over as the new Head of the European Council, and
Josep Borrell, a Spanish politician, will be the new Head of External Rela-
tions. Christine Lagarde, former managing director of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, DC, was announced as the new
president of the European Central Bank (ECB) in September 2019.

Evolutions in the European

Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
The Middle East is a contested geographical area, bound up with religious
significance in the holy sites of Mecca and Jerusalem, along with signifi-
cant energy resources in the Gulf region. After the Gulf War in 1991, the
US-sponsored Middle East Peace Process and accompanying diplomatic
activity in the 1990s gave cause for optimism about the prospects for
enhanced regional security. Into this came European efforts, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was a multilateral approach
launched in Barcelona in 1995. As Del Sarto (2006) asserts, the EMP
relied on a regional-building approach to regional security based on
common interests between the EU and southern neighbors. While the
European interest is to remain free from direct military threats, resolve
conflicts, improve cooperation, and prevent south–south conflicts which
could lead to spillover in the Mediterranean, the EMP was not the instru-
ment to achieve this according to Biscop (2003). The Barcelona Process
had a broad, but not military, agenda in promoting cooperation and a
very different DNA to the specific events and processes that generated
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

the institutions of the EU and NATO. A lack of Mediterranean secu-

rity cooperation could thus initially be chalked up to a poor institutional
toolkit and the failure of Arab–Israeli peacemaking, notably in the break-
down of the Camp David Summit and the onset of the second intifada
in 2000. The EU’s inability to resolve existing or potential conflicts has
been a persistent theme. Included in this is the lack of confidence and
security-building measures with southern neighbors.
Following the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the ENP
was conceived in order to promote prosperity, stability and security, and
avoid creating new dividing lines between the enlarged EU, candidate
countries, and immediate neighbors in the east and south. Prior to the
Arab uprisings in 2010, the ENP pro-democratization policies were still
judged to be incoherent and weak, although small-scale programs existed
(Youngs 2006). The EU was mindful of failed democratic elections in
Algeria in 1991 and the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, followed
by the battle of Gaza which brought Hamas to power in the Gaza
strip in 2007. Democracy had its downside. The EU was also probably
aware of the broad range of literature on the nature of democratiza-
tion from notable authors such as Huntingdon (1991). Recent analysis
shows that democratization stems not from political leverage but from
longer-term changes taking place involving socioeconomic conditions and
patterns of governance (Levenex and Schimmelpfenig 2011). While the
EU attempted to balance norms and values with other, notably secu-
rity interests, a laissez faire approach effectively gave (and continues to
give) repressive authoritarian regimes the upper hand and insulation they
require to survive and consolidate.
The Barcelona Process was relaunched as the Union for the Mediter-
ranean (UfM) in 2008, including a range of projects from economy and
environment to migration and social affairs, but still put political and
economic ties (prizing security and stability) ahead of democracy and
human rights. Thus, in the lead up to the Arab uprisings, closer ties
were being sought with Gaddafi’s Libya and Ben Ali’s Tunisia. The elite-
centric focus has fundamentally undermined the UfM and has caused
significant difficulties in generating closer political ties between the EU
and some member states such as France and Southern Neighborhood
states in transition, such as Tunisia (Khalaf and Daneshkhu 2011). In
the words of Behr (2014), the ENP has effectively gone “full circle.”
The European Commission (2011) adjusted the ENP following the Arab
uprisings with A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the
6 R. MASON

Southern Mediterranean. It encouraged more reform efforts with addi-

tional support, including financial. The ENP was revised again in line
with the EU’s new Global Strategy (EUGS) which was adopted in June
2016 and focuses on new aspects such as resilience. The revised ENP
launched on November 18, 2015 (notably after the Arab uprisings refo-
cused attention on the Southern Neighborhood) removed many of the
enlargement related tools and reduced EU focus on democracy promo-
tion, good governance, the rule of law and human rights (Delcour 2017,
1). In other words, it has become de-politicized. Bilateral issues appear to
be related to inconsistent use of conditionality, failure to empower civil
society and other change agents, and an unwillingness to offer substitutes
for political accession (ibid.). Systematic upgrades have helped the policy
survive a rapidly changing Europe and Middle East but still the use of
conditionality grinds. The ENP review also focused on the differentiation
approach which had been a feature of the ENP but was not adequately
implemented. It recognizes the regions do not form a coherent bloc in
geographical, political or economic terms and that state responses to the
ENP also vary widely. Whether the ENP can be considered to be a neigh-
borhood policy at all remains to be seen for these reasons and since shared
values and interests remain unclear.

EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty established the European External Action
Service (EEAS) under the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy. This fundamentally altered the context in
which ENP would operate (Delcour 2017, 285). The CFSP puts the
European Council in the lead for identifying EU strategic interests and
broad objectives but voting on decisions must be unanimous with only
aspects eligible for qualified voting. The Council of the EU votes on the
actions or positions to be taken. Although European roots on common
defense go back to the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, including the Western
European Union (WEU) from 1954 to the late 1990s, and NATO, the
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDF) was only created by the
Treaty of Lisbon. EU countries must make civilian and military capabil-
ities available, and the European Defense Agency (EDA) helps member
states improve their military capabilities, but there is no predetermined
level of EU country commitment. EU defense policy is progressive and
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

deepening in areas such as conflict prevention, crisis management, military

assistance and post-conflict stabilization (EUR-Lex).
For many states, including those in the Southern Neighborhood,
Smith (2017) says that it is Europe’s position as a “power multiplier”
for member states, its collective resources (including promise of enlarge-
ment, large aid budget, and the fact that it is the largest trading bloc in the
world) that are more relevant to its foreign policy impact. There has also
been e15 billion of neighborhood funding available from 2014 to 2020
and unparalleled political support for partners to draw on (Hahn 2017,
xvii). These aspects are relevant in terms of trade, development, sanc-
tions, and energy. However, EU member state vetoes can be an inherent
weakness to EU efficacy, as well as slow policymaking, possibly leading
to decisions being made at the lowest common denominator which can
affect outcomes (Smith 2017). Being 27 member states makes the bloc
inherently influential in world affairs, and as a values-driven supranational
organization, it means that many of the EU states do align, especially
on critical issues. EU enlargement, sanctions on Syria and Russia, and the
UK, France, and Germany (E3) convergence on the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran are just some examples.

Conceptual Considerations for Transnational

Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean
There are a number of international relations (IR) theories and frame-
works which are worth pointing to in our study of Europe, the Middle
East and North Africa region, and their interactions across the Mediter-
ranean. In selecting the most appropriate foreign policy analysis (FPA)
and IR concepts from the toolkits available it is necessary to bear in mind
the region under study is both diverse and multifaceted. The Mediter-
ranean is certainly a historic area of littoral state interaction through
transport, trade, and social exchange, but it is also one which is found
to have been fragmented at various intervals (Wickham 2007). Contem-
porary EU engagement in the Mediterranean draws on state influence as
far north as Finland and as far south as Greece. As we will detail in this
volume, influence from international powers cannot be discounted both
in terms of increasing multipolarity and power differentials in the Mediter-
ranean region. Contentions and alliances also have a role to play through
which proxy struggles and wider regional influences are channelled, most
notably from the Gulf.
8 R. MASON

The Southern Neighborhood being a largely artificial construct also

highlights other more “rational” modes of engagement, most recently
evident in the Eastern Mediterranean where growing energy interests,
EU efforts at stabilization in Libya, and a convergence of subregional
contention, notably focused on the role of political Islam and the Muslim
Brotherhood in particular, is becoming more evident. Energy has often
been at the heart of Euro–Arab relations, as illustrated by the Euro–Arab
Dialogue (EAD) established by the European Economic Community in
1974 to improve relations after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War and
the global energy crisis. Miller (2014) asserts that this was actually a
failure due to the politicization of the framework, internal divisions over
its mandate and goals, and US hostility toward it.
In delving into conceptual models, we should start with the EU and
theories related to actorness, power, and alliances. As for the ENP, it is
rooted in the EU’s enlargement policy (and yet without the prospects of
EU membership) and shared values and so theories related to regional
integration would be relevant here. Rationalist theories of international
relations versus constructivism would account for the possible logic(s) of
action best summarized as “values versus interests” (Gstöhl 2017, 5). By
focusing on conditionality, the EU has been focusing on an “external
incentives model” over empowering domestic change agents (ibid.). The
ENP is also a composite policy, drawing together foreign policy, sectoral
EU policies, and different groups of policymakers together. The ENP
attempts to draw on the EU’s experience of economic and political transi-
tions, economic development, and modernization (Schumacher 2017, 4).
Yet, little in the ENP literature draws on the socioeconomic experiences,
political philosophy, and decision-making apparatus from the Southern
Neighborhood, thus there is often a lacuna in many ENP studies.
The Arab states in the Southern Neighborhood are generally consid-
ered to form part of the developing world. Since President Nasser of
Egypt was a leading proponent and advocate for the Non-Aligned Move-
ment (NAM) which held its first conference in 1961, much emphasis has
been placed on south–south relations, cooperation, and unity. Many of
the EU member states on the other hand have been closely involved
in the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
since its inception in 1949. Only EU members Austria, Cyprus, Finland,
Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are not part of NATO. The EU is firmly
of the mind that a partnership—the EMP—is the vehicle through which
to deliver and enhance cooperation in the Southern Neighborhood. It
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

goes beyond détente which is designed to ease hostility or strained rela-

tions and yet in so doing fails to recognize that significant tensions exist,
especially on human rights. However, it stops short of a formal alliance,
defined as: “formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of mili-
tary force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their
members, against specific other states” (Snyder 1990, 104). However,
NATO has been active since 1994 in initiating a Mediterranean Dialogue
with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.
In 2004 NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to expand
cooperation in the Middle East with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the
UAE, on matters such as countering WMD, counterterrorism, NATO
exercises, interoperability, advice on civil–military relations and border
security (NATO 2019). There is potential for the number of MENA states
involved in this to increase.
The second conceptual framework is the history of engagement, from
the third millennium BCE when sailors were trading across the Mediter-
ranean to the arrival of the Greeks in Egypt in 332 BC through to
the years of Islamic conquests across North Africa, in Egypt in 641,
and into Al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) in 711. This served to shift North
African orientation back to the Arabian Peninsula, the Fertile Crescent
and Mesopotamia. The successive waves of Christian crusades from 1095
to 1492 into the Holy Land, encompassing Jerusalem and the battles
therein, have been etched into the history taught on all sides of the
Mediterranean, in Turkey, Syria and Egypt, to France and Spain, which
only drove out Arabs from their territories in 1492 after a series of wars
known as the Reconquista.
Chinese engagement in the Mediterranean is regarded as a new devel-
opment and yet it rests on a history of Chinese engagement in the wider
Middle East (Hormuz, Aden and East Africa). For example, Admiral
Zheng He, who led China to become a superpower in the Indian Ocean,
embarked on his first voyage in 1405 (Roell 2018, 2). From 1299 until
its slow dissolution from 1792 to 1923, the Ottoman Empire served to
influence the Southeast Europe, Western Asia, and North Africa, inter-
rupting Middle East–European contact and connections despite it being
based in Europe.
The French capture of Algiers in 1830, followed by the Ottoman reoc-
cupation of Tripoli in 1835, interrupted North Africa’s attempts to follow
Muhammad Ali, Pasha of Egypt, in gaining greater independence and
control over their internal affairs. Muhammad Ali is widely credited with
10 R. MASON

being the “Founder of Modern Egypt”, but the economic system based
on expanding trade relations with Europe was already growing based on
Egypt’s strategic location between the Ottoman Empire, Syria, and the
Red Sea. The disparity in volume between commodities from Egypt such
as rice, flax and wool, and finished goods from Europe such as medium
quality cloth, coupled with the Mamluk’s purchase of European arms
to bolster their efforts to control Egypt, made Europe a major trading
partner (al-Sayyid-Marsot 1984). Not only did this make Egypt subject
to European trade pressures and economic directives but also led to the
reintroduction of exceptional taxes which were once used as a means to
fund the civil wars between the Ojakat and Mamluks for control of the
country.
Although Morocco was defeated by France at the Battle of Isly in 1844
and by Spain at Tetuan in 1860, the support of Great Britain gave it
some independence. Immigration from France, Italy and Spain to Algeria
meant that around one sixth of the total population by 1900 were expa-
triates until the Algerian Revolution, led by the National Liberation Front
(FLN), in 1954. A French protectorate was imposed on Tunisia in 1881–
1883 after the British withdrew their objections on French expansion in
North Africa at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The Morocco protec-
torate was established in 1912 which the French divided with Spain. Spain
took control of the Rif Mountains in the North and the borderlands with
the Sahara in the south. Libya was invaded by Italy in 1911 but resistance
was put up by the Sennusiya Muslim Sufi sect who delayed Italian control
of the whole country until 1931.
Only after the Second World War were national liberation movements
able to get a foothold, supported by the Arab League, but sometimes at
a heavy cost from a protracted civil war as in the case of Algeria. Colo-
nialism has thus sowed another layer of mistrust and antipathy across the
Mediterranean, often within living memory. From this to effective and
efficient EU relations with the Southern Neighborhood seems quite a
leap, especially considering that the EU’s institutional history dates back
only to 1950.
The EU’s security response (e.g., from conditionality to taking the
path of least resistance in cooperation agreements) and in follow-through
(e.g., state-building after NATO intervention in Libya) has been insuffi-
cient to meet security challenges. Constructivism, that is the significance
of historical and social aspects in international relations, would gener-
ally appear to hold here. Realism is also significant given the regional
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

disorder currently being experienced and the high threat perception.

Foucauld’s understanding of power might also prove appropriate in
dissecting the ENP and contributing to our understanding of how knowl-
edge and leading by example can shape power and norms in the Southern
Neighborhood. Identity (including religious ties), experience and national
independence will continue to trump new EU incentives. History has also
left behind non-state actors still in search of a state, whether the Tuareg
in the Sahara region or the Kurds living in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
They seek to enhance their nation-building activities which, their political
legitimacy aside, have become an added complication in contemporary
measures aimed at stabilization.
The third conceptual issue to consider is socioeconomics, domestic
politics, and regime security. Given the popular demand for “bread,
freedom and social justice” during the Arab uprisings it is clear that
popular political and economic concerns persist. As Morganthau (1974)
found, all political action has moral consequences—there is no way
to keep social and political life separate and therefore the onus is on
moral judgment to chart the least evil course of action. In authoritarian
regimes this might be hard to do as many economies remain state-led
and open to accusations of crony capitalism and the marginalization of
youth. Poverty, corruption, a bloated public sector, legislative and bureau-
cratic insufficiencies, dependence on foreign remittances from oil and
gas exporters, and a limited number of industries such as tourism, keeps
many Middle East and North African (MENA) economies rentier or semi-
rentier, unstable and vulnerable to external shocks. A multilevel approach
advanced by David and Nonneman (2005) helps to deal with the plethora
of broad policy inputs at the domestic, regional, and international levels,
and how their boundaries are often blurred.
Linked to socioeconomic concerns are notions of governance, national
security, and conflict. The lack of security sector reform (SSR), political
contestation over the plethora of socioeconomic issues raised above, and
authoritarian upgrading measures to ensure regime security and survival,
all continue to pose threats to human security. This is clearly demon-
strated by Dagher (2019) who explains the political calculations that
President Assad made at the onset of the Arab Uprising which engulfed
Syria. Again, elite politics gives credence to constructivist interpretations
of political decision-making and policy outcomes.
The fourth set of conceptual considerations includes the concepts of
regionalism, inter-regionalism and borderlands. As Buzan (2007) notes,
12 R. MASON

the scope of security should be broadened to include regional security,

societal and environmental factors, and indeed any areas where the state
feels threatened or vulnerable or has a major security interest. While
structural realists such as Walt would assert that states look out for their
own security interests first in an anarchic environment (and certainly the
Middle East lacks the regional security institutions and capacities avail-
able in some other parts of the world), this creates a “security dilemma”
due to the actions they take leading other states to take countermea-
sures (Lawson 2009). Arms races and antagonisms don’t often lead to
war, but disagreements over the regional and international balance of
power can. Balancing and alliance formation is key, but there remain many
questions of how balancing will occur in an international environment
undergoing rapid changes toward multipolarity. Meanwhile, Democratic
Peace Theory, which dates back to at least the eighteenth century and
enlightenment thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, suggests that the spread
of democracies, including the strength of their domestic political institu-
tions, political norms, and constructed identities, substantially mitigates
against the risk of conflict (Reiter 2012).
One of the main criticisms of the ENP is that it does not take into full
consideration drivers of instability in the Mediterranean because many
emanate from outside the Mediterranean (Heijl 2007; Browning and
Joenniemi 2008). Significantly, Gulf and Levant politics have become
well connected through Saudi–Iranian competition, proxy conflicts, and
directed regional economic interventions. Enhanced economic integra-
tion between the EU and Gulf, through the renegotiation of a Free Trade
Agreement (negotiations collapsed in 2009) and de-escalation measures,
starting with dialogue as advanced by Sager and Mousavian (2019), could
be a good place to start. Many controversies remain, including Germany
blocking arms sales to Saudi Arabia due to the Yemen conflict, concerns
over human rights, and European states such as France trying to keep
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on track with Iran
(BBC News 2019). Some of the states contributing to the Mediter-
ranean refugee crisis are located in Central Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa.
EU-MENA borderlands as researched by Del Sarto (2011–2017) shows
that the EU has been trading access to the internal market for security
and stability, without offering political participation to MENA states, and
has therefore maintained an uneven balance of power. She also found
that the EU co-opted MENA states in the EU’s management of migra-
tion, counterterrorism, and border controls. Because the ENP has been
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

applied inconsistently, it challenges assumptions about the EU’s norma-

tive approach but also challenges any universal assertions of EU policy
successes or failures.
This study argues that there are a number of policy disconnects
between the EU and Southern Neighborhood, especially as the shifting
domestic, regional, and international landscape does not favor enhanced
Mediterranean security cooperation. It points to the changing interna-
tional environment and prospects for the maintenance of a loose federa-
tion of states in the regional system that favors maximum control over the
domestic sphere as well as mistrust of other states, notably between Saudi
Arabia and Iran. However, this volume identifies issues and areas which
could impact favorably on EU-Southern Neighborhood (Mediterranean)
security cooperation. Should the overarching and ambitious objective of
Mediterranean security continue to falter, such measures could at least
foster greater human security, contrary to Bull’s assertion that human
rights principles risk undermining the international order (Dunne 2011).
During a period of MENA state weakness and collapse, coupled with cases
of emerging alliances with illiberal international powers, this volume also
calls into question the existing states system (sovereignty and regional
order) and any regional security construct based upon it.

Structure of the Volume

In Chapter 2, Beck outlines the security threats as viewed by Europe
and the key events, dynamics and complexities in the EU’s perceptions
and relations with pivotal actors. In Chapter 3, Mason focuses on the
mode of governance and perceptions in the MENA region and its impact
on threat perception as well as EU–MENA cooperation. In Chapter 4,
Pauwels zeros in on EU counterterrorism cooperation in the MENA
region and discusses reasons why there have been successes and fail-
ures in this form of cooperation. Niemann and Blöser discuss migration
in the Mediterranean and the “European refugee crisis” in Chapter 5,
charting its development and impact. In Chapter 6, Giuli analyzes Euro-
pean energy security and subregional political dynamics with reference to
oil and gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. In Chapter 7, Mason
and Suchkov assess Russia’s participation in the Syria conflict and its rela-
tions with major regional actors to determine whether it has a Middle
East strategy and what it might be, with ramifications for both the EU
14 R. MASON

and NATO. In Chapter 8, Telci delves into the complexities of Turkey–

EU relations over the last decade, noting the reorientation of Turkish
foreign policy back to the Middle East following obstacles in the EU
accession process and the realization of new geopolitical realities closer
to home. In Chapter 9, Zoubir and Lounnas discuss the difficulty of
merging the European and North African security complexes but also the
necessity in doing so along the lines of counterterrorism, tackling illegal
migration, and securing borders from the instability in the Sahel. They
include specific reference to EU relations with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Libya. In Chapter 10, Mason broadens out the geographical focus to
assess the policies and actions of the USA, China, India, Japan, and the
Gulf States in the Mediterranean. He also assesses the roles played in the
region by the International Monetary Fund, the African Union and non-
state actors. All with the objective of contextualizing shifting and often
strengthening interactions in the Southern Neighborhood which may
challenge our assumptions about the EU’s current and possibly future
role in the region. In Chapter 11, Mason sets about rethinking the current
EU approach, followed by some concluding remarks about the state of
the Euro-Mediterranean relationship.

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 CHAPTER 2

Security Threats from the Southern

Mediterranean as Viewed by Europe:
A Comparative Analysis of the “Long Year”
of 1979 and the 2010s

Martin Beck

Introduction
It is now common wisdom that significant parts of the Southern Mediter-
ranean experienced turmoil after the Arab uprisings. This assertion may
hold particularly true of the Levant, where a brutal civil war has been
ongoing in Syria since 2011 and a new sort of militant Islamist actor—
the Islamic State—temporarily controlled Syrian and Iraqi territories as
big as the territory of the UK (Beck et al. 2015). Moreover, conflicts that
existed long before the Arab uprisings have recently witnessed increased
violence, particularly in the form of striking down Gazan resistance against
Israeli occupation (Osborne 2018). Yet, as the virtual breakdown of the
central state in Libya as a result of the NATO intervention to bring down

M. Beck (B)
University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
e-mail: mbeck@sdu.dk

© The Author(s) 2021 19

R. Mason (ed.), Transnational Security
Cooperation in the Mediterranean,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54444-7_2
20 M. BECK

the rule of Muammar Gaddafi shows (Western and Goldstein 2011), the
turmoil does not stop short of the borders of the Levant but reaches out
to other areas of the Southern Mediterranean.
Although there are no “classic” immediate threats to European secu-
rity, developments on the southern shore of the Mediterranean are to
be considered relevant for the study of European security. Due to the
omission of the overlying global East–West conflict, regional affairs and
conflicts gained much closer attention and studies of regional security
complexes rose in significance (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Hurrell 2007).
In the light of the increased relevance of regional security complexes and
their interlinkages, the European Union (EU) is not inclined to turn a
blind eye to a war in its “backyard,” even less so as American engagement
in the ongoing Syrian civil war has been much lower than previously,
when Iraq had been the security hotspot of the Levant. Although most
of the 5.6 million Syrians who fled the country stayed in the Levan-
tine countries of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, UNHCR (2018) shows a
significant number of Syrians made it to territories of the EU. The count
of Syrians submitting initial applications for asylum to countries of the
EU (plus Norway and Switzerland) increased significantly in 2015 and
exceeded the level of 750,000 in May 2016 (Migration Policy Center
2016). The refugee influx from Syria has become a major object of
extreme politicization—or securitization—policies in Europe. Last but
not least, the turmoil in the Levant touches upon security interests of
Israel, which is considered by the political elites of the EU as an inte-
gral member of the “civilized Western world” whose security must be
guaranteed.
In order to identify the European perception on major security threats
from the Southern Mediterranean in the 2010s and their linkages with
one another, section two of this paper sketches a historical analysis whose
pivot is the year 1979: After the Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty brokered
by the USA in Camp David, security threats posed by actors from the
Southern Mediterranean to the West in general and Europe in particular
were lower than at any point before and after in contemporary history.
By what features was this situation characterized in which—contrary to
present times—security threats from the Levant appeared vastly absent?
While attempting to answer this question, we refer to the “long” year
of 1979, i.e., other structural features of significance beyond the Israeli–
Egyptian peace treaty stretched out to the time before 1979 and the
decade to follow.
 2 SECURITY THREATS FROM THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN … 21

The reflections on the European perception of security threats stem-

ming from the Southern Mediterranean in and around the year 1979
are meant to sharpen the analytical view on security threats posed in the
2010s by the Southern Mediterranean as perceived by the Europeans. In
other words, applying the comparative perspective between the situation
then and the 2010s helps to clarify the identification of challenges that the
EU recently has had to cope with. Thus, the third section of this paper
presents an analysis of what security threats Europe views itself as being
exposed to and how it perceives them.
As some but not all the security threats as perceived by the Europeans
can be made sense of by applying a Rationalist logic (with “objec-
tive” threats), this chapter employs a Constructivist approach which,
however, takes Rationalist insights (as derived from Realism and Insti-
tutionalism) seriously. Securitization is a special form of politicization
created by speech acts. A securitizing speech act differs from regular ways
of politicization insofar as the issue is dramatized and presented as a
matter of “supreme priority,” i.e., something “which calls for extraor-
dinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics”
(Williams 2003; Buzan et al. 1998).

European Threat Perception

of the Mediterranean in the Long Year of 1979
European actors were very active in contributing to making the Levant a
“troublesome” region throughout the twentieth century. However, it is
more than fifty years ago that the major imperialist powers of Europe—
the United Kingdom (UK) and France—took the lead among Western
nations in a war south of the Levant: the Suez War of 1956, in which
the European actors in alliance with Israel attacked Egypt without the
consent of Washington. From the last third of the twentieth century on,
Hahn (1991) asserts that it has been the USA that has taken the lead
when the West has directly or indirectly projected military power toward
the Middle East in general and the Southern Mediterranean in particular.
With decolonization and the European retreat from its role as the
leading external military power in the Southern Mediterranean, the Euro-
pean perception has become increasingly shaped by the idea that it is
the Southern Mediterranean that emanates (potential) security threats to
which Europe (or the West) has to respond. At the same time, again from
a European point of view, the year 1979 marked a low point in security
22 M. BECK

threats posed by Levantine actors to the West. Thus, the question arises
as to what features characterized this situation in contrast to the 2010s.
First, in the 1950s, while other world areas such as Europe and major
parts of Asia had long become hotspots of the Cold War, the Arab
Mediterranean remained largely outside of the East–West conflict. At
the same time, the USA created a Western stronghold in the region
with Turkey becoming a member of NATO in 1952. In the 1960s and
1970s, however, the Southern Mediterranean, in particular Egypt and the
Levant, became increasingly caught in the maelstrom of the global Cold
War. In this period, Israel and the leading Arab republics—Egypt and
Syria—took the roles of proxies of the two superpowers. Therefore, the
peace treaty concluded between Israel and Egypt in Camp David in 1979
ended the Cold War in the Middle East ten years before its termination
on a global scale. The then two most powerful Middle Eastern actors in
terms of military capabilities—Israel and Egypt—terminated a war-prone
constellation with the potential of a global spillover, as had become crucial
in the October War 1973 (Rabinovich 2012). The end of the Cold War
in the Southern Mediterranean in 1979 notwithstanding, the Europeans
could rely on a pronounced readiness of the USA to invest in Western
security interests in the whole of the Middle East until the end of the
East–West conflict and beyond under the conditions of unipolarity after
1989.
Second, the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1979 also marked a year
in which the security complex of the Levant was de-linked from North
Africa after Egypt had linked the security complexes of North Africa
and the Levant for more than two decades. From a European perspec-
tive, de-linking the security complexes in the Southern Mediterranean
from one another became particularly beneficial after the end of the
East–West confrontation in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century.
Thus, Camp David 1979 contributed to a long-term reduction of threats
from the Southern Mediterranean toward Europe in the sense that the
EU enjoyed a reduction in complexity in its security relations with the
Southern Mediterranean.
Third, after having achieved a compelling victory in the June War of
1967, Israel also managed to win peace in 1979: The Egyptian attempt
to replace Israel as the major Western ally failed (Telhami 1990). Thus,
occasional criticism of the Israeli occupation policy in Palestine notwith-
standing, the West, under the leadership of the USA and with the support
of the big three powers in Europe (France, Germany, and the UK), chose
 2 SECURITY THREATS FROM THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN … 23

Israel as its only steadfast Middle Eastern ally: The alliance with Israel was
constructed as being based on shared values such as democracy (Barnett
1991). The unconditional European support for Israel and the expressed
value-based obligation to provide it was, however, of low practical rele-
vance, because Israel enjoyed firm military support in the framework of
the US–Israeli “special relationship.” This was a formula that had been
introduced by Jimmy Carter in 1977 and frequently reiterated by his
successors as presidents of the USA (Reich 1996). Thus, the European
commitment to Israel’s security back then was rather unproblematic.
Fourth, in the year 1979, the Arab Mediterranean countries were
governed by authoritarian regimes which, albeit being rather weak in
terms of promoting socioeconomic development, controlled strong coer-
cive capabilities vis-à-vis their societies. Irrespective of never being tired
of paying lip service to promoting democratization in the Middle East,
the EU prioritized stability in the region: Stabilizing the Middle East,
however, actually required the EU not to promote democratization, as
such a process would have destabilized the authoritarian regimes. Thus,
in the frame of different policy initiatives, the most famous of which is the
“Barcelona Process,” the EU established close ties with the authoritarian
regimes of the Southern Mediterranean, inter alia through the appli-
cation of “association agreements”—region-wide, with the exception of
Syria and Libya. Stability-oriented political elites of the EU benefited from
this policy in the form of a rather low migration rate from the Southern
to the Northern Mediterranean. The only significant exception—forced
Palestinian migration primarily from Lebanon to Europe in the 1980s—
was mainly absorbed by the at that time refugee-welcoming Danish and
Swedish societies and thus appeared to be a kind of limited collateral
damage of European support for Israel and their allies in the Lebanese
Civil War (cf. Dorai 2003).
Fifth, although Europe witnessed terrorist attacks from the Southern
Mediterranean in the 1970s and thereafter, they did not appear as a major
threat from the Middle East to Europe. The Munich Massacre (1972)
and the hijacking of the Achille Lauro (1985) by Palestinian terror enti-
ties were without any doubt spectacular. However, the degree to which
they threatened the state order in Europe and provoked massive coun-
termeasures by the affected states paled against European armed groups
such as the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Basque separatist group
ETA in Spain, and the Irish Republican Army in the UK. Moreover,
contrary to some of the European militant groups, at that time those from
24 M. BECK

the Southern Mediterranean enjoyed no social support among European

societies.

Recent EU Security Challenges Posed

by the Southern Mediterranean
The five features of the long year of 1979 as elaborated above are now
revisited with a focus on security challenges posed in the 2010s by the
Southern Mediterranean toward Europe as perceived by the European
political establishment.

New Complexities of Security Threats from the Southern Mediterranean

The immediate aftermath of the terminated East–West confrontation in
the Southern Mediterranean (1979) and on a global scale (1989), respec-
tively, was shaped by the reduced complexity of the regional security
system: US hegemony in the region of the Middle East was uncontested
and thus the overall regional security complex of the Mediterranean was
shaped by a unipolar structure on the global level. The USA was not only
the only superpower left but also the only great “regional” power in the
Middle East: As a result of the implementation of the Carter Doctrine of
1980, the military capabilities which the USA had at its disposal in the
Middle East by far outweighed those of local actors (Juneau 2014). Also,
US political-diplomatic capacities ready to be deployed to the Middle East
were significantly higher than those of any state in the Middle East and
regional organizations such as the Arab League (Beck 2014, 2015).
Not only did the USA control the highest power capabilities, but
America was also fully committed to projecting them toward the Middle
East. Indeed, the USA managed to impress the world in 1991 by an effec-
tive campaign against Iraq in whose course the sovereignty of Kuwait,
which had been annexed by Saddam Hussain in 1990, was fully restored.
After this military success, the USA proved that it is also capable of
launching a major political project: Under the leadership of President Bill
Clinton, the USA hijacked Israeli–Palestinian negotiation channels that
had been facilitated by Norway and converted them into official “peace”
negotiations between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) (Shlaim 2016).
The USA continued to prioritize the Middle East in the frame of its
“war against terrorism” at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Iraq
 2 SECURITY THREATS FROM THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN … 25

was chosen as the major military target in the Middle East: In an exten-
sive campaign, the regime of Saddam Hussain was toppled and replaced
by an occupational regime. Moreover, the Administration of George
W. Bush heavily supported Israel in marginalizing the PLO headed by
Yasser Arafat until 2004, thereby converting the Palestinian organization
under Chairman Mahmud Abbas into a junior partner of Israeli-occupied
Palestine (cf. Purkiss and Nafi 2015).
After the Arab uprisings, the USA, albeit still being capable of acting
as a hegemonic power in the Middle East, appeared to be more selec-
tive in doing so. The Administration headed by Barack Obama welcomed
the “Arab Spring” and through the NATO intervention in Libya 2011,
which was actively supported by France, the UK, and other members of
the EU, even leveraged the downfall of Gaddafi’s regime. Obama also
significantly extended drone warfare in the Middle East, including Syria
(Miller 2015). However, the USA did not take appropriate measures to
prevent the counterrevolution in Egypt; US allies Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) had full leeway to support Field Marshal
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s usurpation of power in Egypt in July 2013, which
terminated (for the time being) the democratization process in Egypt
(Hassan 2015; Cher-Leparrain 2017). The most prominent case of the
recent relative aloofness of the USA in the Southern Mediterranean is
its limited engagement in the Syrian civil war, which made it possible
for other external and regional actors—such as Russia and Hezbollah,
respectively—to interfere with high impact.
The recent relative aloofness of the USA has major repercussions for
Europe, as the Southern Mediterranean security complex which had been
shaped by American hegemony for decades is about to be transformed
into a highly complex multipolar system. Some of the new players that
recently gained significance in the Southern Mediterranean have rather
fierce relations with the EU, in particular Russia and even more so
Hezbollah. Moreover, Iran, whose relative power had increased as a wind-
fall gain of the American war against Iraq in 2003, managed to boost its
influence in Iraq and in Syria, thereby creating what has been labeled a
“Shia corridor” to the Mediterranean: As Hezbollah is a genuine alliance
partner to Iran, it may be argued that Tehran has de facto become a
regional power in the Southern Mediterranean (Chulov 2017).
The increased regional role of Saudi Arabia may at first glance appear
less problematic from a European point of view because the regime in
Riyadh is a European ally. Yet, the offensive regional policies of the Gulf
26 M. BECK

States add to the complexity of security issues in the Southern Mediter-

ranean. Furthermore, the idiosyncrasies of the strongmen in Saudi Arabia
and the UAE—Crown Princes Mohammad bin Salman and Mohammed
bin Zayed, respectively—occasionally jeopardize European interests in
regional stability. For the time being, the most spectacular crisis trig-
gered by the Saudi regime in the Southern Mediterranean was the forced
resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri via a television
statement in Riyadh. If resolute diplomatic action at this time had not
united the Lebanese political elite and diplomatic support from France
had managed to keep Hariri in office, Lebanon and the whole Levant
could have destabilized, with incalculable repercussions for Europe (The
Guardian 2017).

New Linkages of the Mediterranean Security Complex

It has been argued above that the Southern Mediterranean security
complex has become more involved due to the activation of new players.
This section argues that the activation of some security players has become
so dense that the security complex of the Levant has become linked with
that of the Gulf. Partly due to the relative disengagement of the USA, as
described above, a conflict over regional hegemony among regional actors
has emerged, with Iran and Saudi Arabia plus Israel as the protagonists.
The rivalry between Iran and the Gulf monarchies, in particular Saudi
Arabia, has its point of departure in the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
The East–West Conflict in the Gulf had been terminated even long
before it was in the Levant: The Gulf monarchies were allied with the
UK and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, with the USA from 1945, when US
President Franklin D. Roosevelt met King ibn Saud on the USS Quincey.
An intense US–Soviet conflict over Iran during and in the immediate
aftermath of World War Two was determined in favor of America at the
latest with the CIA-backed forced removal of Prime Minister Muhammad
Mossadegh from office and the restoration of the Shah regime at Wash-
ington’s mercy (cf. Gavin 1999). Iraq briefly flirted with the Soviet Union
after the Baathists seized power in 1968. Yet, due to limits in shared
policy perspectives with Moscow and its strong dependence on the Anglo-
Saxon dominated Iraq Oil Company, Iraq remained firmly embedded in
the Western camp (Fukuyama 1980).
Despite the massive escalation of conflicts in the Gulf and the Levant
after 1979—in particular the Iran—Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 and the
 2 SECURITY THREATS FROM THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN … 27

Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the two security complexes remained

to a large extent separated from each other. External intervention from
the superpowers was low, too. As long as global oil distribution was not
affected, Iraq and Iran were not hindered from waging a ravaging war. In
the 1982 Lebanon War, the impact of superpower intervention was largely
confined to enabling the leadership of the militarily devastated PLO to
move into exile to Tunis. Although in the July War of 2006 Israel’s
major objective was to eradicate Iran’s Mediterranean ally, Hezbollah, this
armed conflict also did not spillover into the Gulf security complex.
There are several indicators that the security complexes of the Levant
and the Gulf have recently become entangled with each other through
an anti-Iranian axis in the making, which is composed of Israel and Saudi
Arabia. Three of these indicators deserve closer attention: Saudi Arabia’s
support for the Sisi regime in Egypt, which encompassed the further
marginalization of Hamas in the Gaza Strip due to close Israeli–Egyptian
cooperation; the Arab League’s condemnation of Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization; and the fact that US President Donald Trump’s withdrawal
from the Iran nuclear deal was welcomed by two major states only: Israel
and Saudi Arabia.
Sisi’s seizure of power in Egypt caused a devastating situation for
Hamas. The Egyptian regime banned Hamas in Egypt and stopped
the policy of tolerance concerning tunnels that Hamas had dug toward
the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula (Trager 2014). These tunnels had become
the infrastructural backbone of the private economy and had provided
Hamas—through a bureaucratized customs regime—with a major source
of revenue (Pelham 2012). Therefore, reinforced by a tightening up of
the Israeli blockade policy, the Gaza Strip experienced a severe economic
and humanitarian crisis from which it has not recovered to date. Thus, by
supporting Sisi’s regime, Saudi Arabia also contributed to the weakening
of Palestinian capabilities to cope with the hardships of occupation.
As the outcome of a Saudi Arabian initiative, Basim and Abizeidl
wrote that in March 2016 the Arab League’s foreign ministers’ committee
condemned Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, with only two members
stipulating reservations: Iraq and Lebanon. The then Saudi Ambassador
to Egypt, Ahmad Kattan, added fuel to the flames by elaborating that
“We will deal with Hezbollah as we deal with any terrorist organization.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries have begun preparing measures it
will take against that terrorist party and they will be announced at the
right time” as quoted in Alsharif (2016). Even though Saudi Arabia lacks
28 M. BECK

the military means to walk over Hezbollah, the Arab League’s move is
remarkable in the light of the fact that Hezbollah (still) enjoys the repu-
tation among many segments of Arab societies of being the most effective
and uncorrupted Arab force positioned against Israel.
Ideologically, the Arab League went much further than the EU in its
condemnation of Hezbollah and joined forces with the USA and its allies
Canada and Australia, as well as Israel, whose Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu accordingly praised the Arab League’s decision (Staff, Times of
Israel 2016). The Saudi-initiated Arab League declaration of Hezbollah
as a terrorist group is insofar a stunning novelty in the history of the
organization’s declaratory policy, as it had never before launched a policy
move that to such a high extent courted US-American and Israeli inter-
ests and at the same time contradicted the political attitudes of many
politicized social groups in the Arab world.
When on May 9, 2018 Trump announced the USA’s withdrawal from
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—colloquially known as the Iran
nuclear deal—this provoked a political outcry in large parts of the world,
particularly also among Western allies of the USA. At the same time,
Trump’s move was vehemently applauded in unison by the governments
of Israel and Saudi Arabia. From a Realist standpoint, it may be claimed
that such an alliance, based on the principle that the enemy of my enemy
is my friend, makes sense. However, any Saudi–Israeli collusion appears
remarkable when a Social Constructivist perspective is applied according
to which the idea of politicized sectarianism shapes regional relations in
the Middle East beyond mere instrumentalization of completely nonide-
ological power-oriented elites (cf. Gause 2014; Calculli and Legrenzi
2016).

The Problematique of the EU’s Affinity to Israel

Even though Syria under the Assad regime is an exception and although
relations have not always been stressless in all cases—such as with Egypt
in the 1960s—in general the EU had managed to develop rather good
relations with the southern arbiters of the Mediterranean after the era
of colonialism by the late 1970s and beyond. Yet, European relations
with Israel clearly stand out among all Southern Mediterranean arbiters
in two respects. First and foremost, the steadfastly defined European rela-
tionship with Israel is constructed on shared values such as “democracy”
and the “rule of law.” Contrary to the “otherness” attributed to Arab
 2 SECURITY THREATS FROM THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN … 29

states and societies, Israel has been embraced as being one of them in
terms of political culture and sociocultural affinity. Second, the Euro-
peans have always pointed out that Jewish Israel is a legitimate state in
the Levant and that its security must be maintained. Due to the high US
military engagement in the frame of its special relationship with Israel, the
European security engagement with Israel has become of rather symbolic
value. Nevertheless, the ties are strong, as Israel is framed in the light
of collective commemoration of the Holocaust as indispensable for the
global task of providing the Jewish people with a safe haven protecting it
from militant anti-Semitism.
Until 1989, when regional conflicts were interpreted mainly through
the Realist prism of the global Cold War, Europeans were not alert to
Israel’s security because, as has been outlined above, Israel had won
both war (1967) and peace (1979). There were incidents of anti-Israeli
terrorism such as the attack against the Israeli Olympic team in Munich
1972, yet Israeli territory remained unaffected. The PLO proved to be
incapable of setting foot into Israel within its borders of 1949.
Moreover, although Europe started to build some pressure on Israel
by demanding in its 1980 Venice Declaration that the PLO be integrated
on the diplomatic level, normative pressure to change the occupational
regime over Palestine was still limited: With reference to its Charter, the
PLO was presented by Israel as a terrorist organization with whom to
share power in Palestine was not a reasonable demand. Thus, by 1979
Israel was not under effective pressure to bow to European “normative
power” (cf. Manners 2002).
Several recent developments have made European–Israeli relations
much more problematic for the Europeans. One is marked by Trump’s
decision to move the American embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem in May 2018. This action was as such not much more than a
symbolic act that officially acknowledged facts on the ground. However,
Netanyahu’s ostentatious appraisal of this move makes it difficult for the
EU to maintain the balancing act between its realpolitik of de facto
acknowledging what breaches international law and makes attempts to
reach an accommodation with the PLO appear to be an impossible
mission—Israel’s reign over East Jerusalem and its claim that the city as
a whole is its eternal capital on the one hand and its declaratory policy
of promoting “peace” in the Levant on the other. The issue of Jerusalem
only highlights the structural crisis of the European-sponsored concept
of solving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by promoting a Palestinian state
30 M. BECK

to live in peaceful coexistence with Israel. At the latest since the failure
of the Oslo negotiations in 2000, the EU has vehemently attempted to
convince Israel of freezing the Zionist settlement of East Jerusalem and
the West Bank, whose acceleration has nevertheless been ongoing since
the Oslo process.
The issue from a European perspective is that it becomes increas-
ingly implausible to uphold the normative idea of the Palestinian right
to self-determination in the face of an Israeli policy of creating facts on
the ground that inhibits its implementation. At the same time, the only
actual way out—to put effective pressure on Israel—is not an option for
the EU, as it is both powerless (in the wake of unconditional American
support for Israel) and unwilling to confront Israel (as the Jewish state is
constructed as an integral member of the Western community of values).
In the light of these constraints, the EU does not have any viable alter-
natives other than to continue walking a rather absurd tightrope. Beck
(2017) outlines these options as carrying on with promulgating norma-
tively inspired policies and coming out with “peace” initiatives whose
failure is predetermined.
What is often overlooked in the wake of Trump’s withdrawal from
the Iran nuclear deal is the more fundamental problematique of the
Iran nuclear deal itself, which had been bargained in 2015 with Iran by
global actors of which the EU had been one of the most significant. The
deal failed in two ways to appropriately politicize Middle Eastern nuclear
weaponry. First, it was based on the scenario that Iran, being a military
nuclear power, would be an extraordinary threat to security in the Middle
East and beyond. Thus, the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu vehemently opposed the deal reflected not a conflict over ends
but just means—this is how to prevent Iran from becoming a military
nuclear power. In other words, the Western approach implied the securiti-
zation of Iran potentially becoming a military nuclear power. Rather than
de-securitizing—or re-politicizing—the alleged Iranian military nuclear
program, the Iran nuclear deal upheld the image of Iran going nuclear
as a horror scenario. At the same time, Israel’s actual nuclear weaponry
was not politicized, for instance, no initiative was taken to implement the
idea of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (MENWFZ) (cf. Bahgat
2015). The fact that the EU and its most powerful members contributed
to the securitization of potential Iranian nuclear weaponry and refrained
from politicizing the Israeli potential for the same reflects unconditional
 2 SECURITY THREATS FROM THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN … 31

European support for Israel inhibits a rational foreign policy toward the
Middle East (Beck 2018).
Finally, owing to the weakened regime of Bashar al-Assad in the wake
of the uprisings in Syria, opportunities emerged for local and external
actors such as Hezbollah and Iran to deploy military units on Syrian
territory. Concerned by the scenario that Hezbollah and Iran might use
their presence in Syria to establish a front line with Israel, Israel has
launched hundreds of air strikes since 2017—by its own account two
hundred by September 2018—on Syrian territory (World Israel News).
When in early 2018 an escalation of the conflict loomed, the Interna-
tional Crisis Group demanded from all actors that they exercise restraint
and contribute to de-escalation in order to “prevent Syria from becoming
a theatre for Hizbollah-Israel and Iran-Israel wars” (ICG 2018). In their
foreign policies, instead of supporting such a reasonable approach that
had prospects of de-escalation, European actors were more inclined to
take sides with Israel, as demanded by the German Institute for Interna-
tional and Security Affairs (SWP), which called for action to be taken on
the diplomatic level to “pressure Iran to scale-down its military presence”
in Syria (Murciano 2018).

The European “Refugee Crisis” as a Result of the Demise

of Authoritarian States in the Middle East
The Middle East has been predominantly governed by authoritarian
regimes since World War Two. As Middle Eastern authoritarian states
are rather weak in terms of promoting socioeconomic development but
strong in controlling domestic security and borders, this feature implies
that the states of the Southern Mediterranean control their borders rather
well. Although most authoritarian regimes of the Middle East proved to
be robust when challenged by the Arab upheavals of 2010/2011, some
were removed—with the overthrow of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia as the
case par excellence—and some others lost the capabilities that are typical of
consolidated authoritarian regimes, such as control over domestic security
and borders, in particular Syria.
The loss of authoritarian border control has contributed to an
increased influx of refugees from the Southern Mediterranean toward
Europe. Where old authoritarian regimes stayed in power (e.g., Morocco)
or were replaced by new ones (e.g., Egypt since the military coup
of 2013) or political systems in transition, the EU responded to the
32 M. BECK

challenge of irregular migration by applying their traditional policy instru-

ments such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and launching
new instruments such as “mobility partnership facilities” (Migration
and Home Affairs 2018; The European Delegation to Egypt 2016).
Particular attention from the EU was given to the three countries that
hosted the bulk of Syrian refugees: Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Thus,
the aim of the “Compacts” with Lebanon and Jordan (EU–Lebanon
Partnership 2017; EU–Jordan Partnership 2017, respectively), and the
“EU–Turkey Agreement” with the government in Ankara was to prevent
Syrian refugees from moving on to Europe (Press Release Database
2016; Deutsche Welle 2018). Moreover, the EU took strong unilat-
eral measures supporting border control, particularly by upgrading the
“European Border and Coast Guard Agency” (Frontex).
The above-outlined European policies were to a high degree the result
of pressure from EU member states and societies. Different occurrences
and varying degrees notwithstanding, all European societies and their
governments securitized the refugee influx, particularly from the Southern
Mediterranean, thereby creating a “refugee crisis.” Leverage for this secu-
ritization policy was to a high degree the attributed cultural otherness of
Muslim refugees. Populist parties and movements took the lead and were
able to set the agenda up to a degree that—except for major parts of
Eastern Europe, including Austria and East Germany—by far outweighed
their “objective” political weight when measured by social mobilization
capabilities and voters’ turnout. They succeeded to a high degree because
the whole political spectrum from the moderate left to the moderate right
became prone to securitizing Muslim refugees.
A case study for the thesis that securitizing the influx of refugees to
Europe is propagated not only by right-wing populist parties is the alle-
gation that immigrants drain the resources of European countries. It is
certainly true that right-wing populists are most outspoken in portraying
immigration as a cause for draining the resources of their host countries:
During her campaign for French presidency, President of the National
Front Marine Le Pen portrayed Muslim immigrants from the Southern
Mediterranean as having flooded France and drained French resources
(Cooper 2017). Yet, the basic argument was also launched by centrist
conservative politicians such as Theresa May, who in her then capacity
as Home Secretary argued in a speech delivered in 2011 “… we know
what damage uncontrolled immigration can do. …To our infrastructure,
as our housing stock and transport system become overloaded. And to
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privileges she conceived to be the possession of a “boudoir,” though
what the precise significance of it was to her it was not easy to see,
as she entered it very rarely, while the whole house was not large
enough for her to “sulk” in. But in overlooking this necessity of her
station, Mrs. Denison chose to consider that Olivia had wished to put
upon her a slight of the kind she could least brook, and no pains the
girl had taken in other directions could induce her to overlook the
indignity.
Again Mr. Denison, with unusual rashness, stepped in.
“My dear Susan,” he expostulated, “Olivia must have a room to sleep
in. And there must be a spare room kept for Ernest. Where else
could she stow herself?”
“There are two good rooms in the wing——” began Mrs. Denison.
“But, my dear, they are damp and full of mouldy old things that——”
He was interrupted in his turn by his daughter.
“I haven’t the least objection to sleeping in the wing, papa. I left
those rooms untouched for Mrs. Denison to decide what she would
have done with them. I will take the large room with pleasure,
mouldy old things and all.”
In truth, Olivia was pleased with this arrangement, and she took
possession of the room which had once been Ellen Mitchell’s with
alacrity which she did her best to hide from her step-mother. Nobody
had told Mrs. Denison the story about those two rooms; but their
decayed and desolate appearance had inspired her with a strong
prejudice against them, so that Olivia was allowed to keep not only
the bedroom but the outer room as well for her own use. Mr. Denison
was strongly opposed to the idea of his beautiful daughter sleeping
away from the rest of the household in what he called “a wretched
old rat run.” But as the two feminine wills were both against his, he
could do nothing but stipulate emphatically that fires were to be kept
up in both rooms throughout the winter. His wife demurred at the
expense, but on this point he was firm, and had his own way.
In the jarring family life which the Denison household led under the
presidency of the second wife, Olivia found a great relief in being
able to shut herself up in her wing, away from all discordant
elements, even though the atmosphere of these two rooms remained
to the end heavy with the tragedy of their last occupant. That tragedy
the young girl grew more and more anxious fully to know about; so
she turned over the leaves of the old books, and read again the
inscription in faded ink in the old prayer book: “Ellen Mitchell, from
her affectionate brother Ned.” What had become of “Ned?” Did the
“affectionate brother” know that his sister had been spirited away,
leaving no trace? These were conjectures which often passed
through Olivia’s mind as she sat down for a lazy half hour by her fire
at bedtime.
This half hour was now the only idle time in Olivia’s day. Like many
other idle English girls, she had only wanted something to do to
develop the most dashing energy; and as Mrs. Denison was too
much enervated by long years of laziness to care for the trouble of
housekeeping, Olivia flung herself with ardor into these new duties,
and found in them that necessary outlet for her energies which she
had previously sought in lawn tennis.
The whole family had been settled at Rishton Hall a week, and Mrs.
Denison had begun bitterly to complain that nobody had called upon
her, when one afternoon, while Olivia was busy in the dining-room
with the children’s clothes, and her step-mother was shut up in her
boudoir with a novel, a carriage drove up to the door, and a footman,
descending from the box, gave such a thundering knock as made
the old door creak on its hinges. Olivia could just see from where she
sat that the carriage was very large, that the footman was very tall,
and that the horses were showy animals, their heads held well back
with the bearing rein. That was enough for her. She loved horses,
and the bearing rein was an abomination in her eyes.
“Those parvenus!” she said to herself, haughtily.
And when Lucy came to announce that Mrs. and Miss and Mr.
Frederick Williams were in the drawing-room, she said, briefly, “Tell
Mrs. Denison, Lucy,” without looking up, or pausing in her work.
She knew this was wrong. She knew that she ought to go and
entertain the visitors during the ten minutes which Mrs. Denison
would certainly devote to self-adornment before going down to the
drawing-room. But, besides that she felt, in her new burst of house-
managing fervor, the giving and receiving of visits to be a frivolity,
Olivia was resolved not to cultivate any intimacy with the family of
the odious Frederick. So she worked on, feeling guilty but defiant,
until she heard Mrs. Denison’s heavy and pompous tread upon the
stairs. A few minutes later, the drawing-room door opened again,
and Olivia heard the whole party come out to be shown over the
house.
“You shall see what I have made of the upstairs rooms first,” said
Mrs. Denison’s voice, “and make the acquaintance of my cherubs.”
And to Olivia’s delight, they streamed upstairs towards the room
where the cherubs could be distinctly heard screaming with all their
might. She gave a sigh of relief at this respite, and was turning over
a small stocking on her hand to see what mending it needed, when
there came a little, timid, hesitating knock at the door.
“Come in,” said she, feeling instantly sure the knock was that of a
complete stranger.
The door was opened by the pleasant-looking lady whom Olivia had
noticed in church. She had a diffident blush on her face, and a
deprecating smile, which made her look pleasanter than ever. Olivia
rose, and the lady hurried forward.
“No, don’t get up. Don’t make me feel I’ve disturbed you,” she
entreated. “I know I’ve taken a dreadful liberty, but I caught sight of
you in here as we came in, and I’m so devouringly anxious to know
you that when Mrs. Denison offered to take us all upstairs, I slipped
behind to try to get a peep at you.”
Olivia was disarmed. Miss Williams took a chair beside her, and
looked with interest at the work in her hand.
“I could show you such a much better way of mending that heel if
you’d let me,” she said, almost with eagerness.
“Oh, if you’re what they call ‘clever with your needle’ I musn’t work
before you,” said the girl, smiling, “I’m only a beginner at anything
useful, and I bungle frightfully over everything at present.”
“But you want to learn?” asked the lady quite earnestly.
“Indeed I do. We haven’t enough servants now to do everything; and
unless I learn to give real help in the house—not mere amateurish
dabbling, you know—half the things that ought to be done will be left
undone.”
Miss Williams’ gloves were off, and she was already busy with the
small stocking. Olivia was astonished to notice that the quick, clever
fingers bore distinct traces, both in shape and texture, of former hard
work. The elder lady glanced up, caught the girl’s eyes, and blushed.
“Yes,” she said, smiling, and as if telling a secret, “you would be
astonished if I were to tell you of all the work these hands have done
in their time. Now that my father has got on, and married a lady, all
that has to be forgotten. But, oh! if the servants knew, when I tell
them the hall has not been properly scrubbed, how I long to be down
on my knees doing it myself!”
She was in earnest, but there was such a twinkle of fun in her eyes
that Olivia, who liked her more and more every minute, joined her in
a burst of laughter. Then Olivia remembered that there was a bond
of union between them, and she said, in a confidential tone—
“You have a step-mother too, then?”
“Yes, and no. Mrs. Williams is my father’s second wife, and I am the
child of his first. My own mother was”—she looked round her with
mock mystery—“a factory lass. And—and so was I till I was fourteen.
Then my father made a discovery, and began to grow rich and
ambitious. And my mother died—perhaps luckily for her, poor thing—
and he buried her and the old life together. But he could not bury me,
you know; and if the lady he then married had not had the sweetest
disposition in the world, it might have fared ill with me. But she is a
kind creature, and she made my civilization as little irksome to me as
possible. And that is why step-mother doesn’t seem the right name
for her; and there is all my autobiography.”
All the time her busy fingers were making the needle fly through the
stocking with a deftness absolutely bewildering to Olivia.
“You are luckier than I have been,” said the young girl, in a low voice.
Miss Williams looked up again, her eyes beaming with sympathetic
intelligence.
“Yes, I could see that. My father married up for the second time,
while yours——”
“Married down. Yes, down in every way; that’s the worst of it; temper,
manners, everything. If she had been different, I should not have
minded growing poorer in the least, but it is tiresome to be thrown so
much on her society.”
“Yes, there are absolutely no suitable friends about here for you.”
“Well,” said Olivia, laughing, blushing, and hesitating. “I thought so till
ten minutes ago.”
Miss Williams in her turn flushed with pleasure. But then she shook
her head.
“You might put up with me perhaps, though I am much too old for
you. But my half brother! You have met him, and snubbed him, I
think, because he is always raving about your beauty and spirit. But
if so, you certainly do not want to meet him again.”
“Indeed I don’t,” answered the girl, laughing.
“We might perhaps find a common meeting ground at the Vicarage
after next week, when the vicar comes back. But I don’t know how
you will like Mrs. Brander,” she added, very dubiously.
“Isn’t she nice?” asked Olivia, with great interest.
“Oh, yes, she’s very nice, and very handsome, and—and
straightforward, and—and looked up to. She quite leads the fashions
here, you know, and starts every thing. She is not at all like the
ordinary humdrum vicar’s wife. But——”
“Well?”
“I don’t want to talk scandal, but you must hear all the standing
gossip, and you may as well hear it without venom. People talk
about her and her husband’s brother——”
“Mr. Vernon Brander?”
“Yes.”
“He told me himself he had been in love with her before she
married,” said Olivia, warmly.
Miss Williams gave a quick glance at her face, making the girl blush.
“Yes, but, well, people have seen her going in and out of his house
since, and late, very late in the evening. I should not have told you
these things, only they must make a difference in the way one looks
upon people.”
“From your manner towards Mr. Vernon Brander, I shouldn’t have
thought they made any difference,” said Olivia, who was much
excited.
“Ah, that is the privilege of being an old maid,” answered Miss
Williams, very quietly. “I can do without fear what a young girl cannot
do—make friends with a black sheep.”
Olivia started. “Do you think he is guilty, then?” she asked in a
startled whisper.
Miss Williams, who had risen, looked very grave.
“Of the other charge? I don’t know. I would give my right hand to
know that it was not so. For I am so much interested in him—I may
even say, so fond of him. I know, from what he has told me, that his
inner life is one long storm, one long struggle. But, why doesn’t he
clear himself if he can? To an old friend like me three words would
be enough.”
“Then you believe——”
“Why does he accept the position? Why does he come to me, and
ask me to do what I can to help you in your loneliness?”
Olivia looked up.
“That is what he did last Sunday,” continued Miss Williams. “And he
alluded to ‘his unfortunate position’ as putting a barrier between you
and any wish he might have to assist you. Why should he speak like
that if he knew himself to be innocent of either charge?”
Olivia was silent. She did not care to let the other lady see how
deeply this matter affected her. She was, indeed, surprised at the
keenness of her own feeling. It was a great relief to her that at that
moment voices were heard at the top of the staircase, and Miss
Williams jumped up, saying that she would have to excuse herself
for playing truant. Olivia shook hands with her almost mechanically,
and promised to go to see her without knowing what she said. As
soon as she was left alone, the young girl abandoned her work, and
sat staring before her in most unusual idleness. One sentence was
ringing in her ears:
“Why didn’t he clear himself if he could?”
And to this question it was impossible to suggest an answer.
 CHAPTER X.
Any one who could have seen into the workings of Olivia Denison’s
heart and mind when she was left to herself would probably have
pronounced her to be “in love” with the Reverend Vernon Brander.
This was not quite true. She did indeed feel a very strong interest in
the hermit vicar and his mysterious history; and such interest in a
young girl’s mind cannot exist quite apart from sentiment. But, then,
the sentiments awakened by the overheard interview in the
churchyard and by Miss Williams’ suggestions were so largely
mingled with doubt, disgust, and horror, that on the whole she felt
she would infinitely prefer, in spite of his kindness, never to meet him
again. She felt very thankful, however, as the days went by, that no
story and no rumors about the vicar of St. Cuthbert’s reached Mrs.
Denison’s ears. That lady was too much wrapt up in herself to
trouble herself much about her neighbors; and beyond expressing
great indignation that he had not called upon her, she expressed no
great interest in the vicar’s deputy.
Olivia was taking to the country life with much zest. Besides her
household duties, she found time to occupy herself greatly with the
live stock on the farm, and to take the poultry under her especial
care. Mat Oldshaw used to slip round, on one pretence or another, in
the early morning when she was busy with her poultry, and, leaning
over the fence, used to give her advice about the management of
them, trying to check her extravagance.
“Ye doan’t need to give ’em all that coorn, Miss Denison, now they
aren’t laying,” he said to her one day reproachfully as she distributed
grain with a wildly lavish hand. “What profit will ye be likely to get if
ye feed ’em oop like that? Every egg ye’ll get this year ’ull cost ye
twopence, and ye’ll lose on every chicken ye sell.”
“Well, I can’t starve them just because they’re not bringing in a profit
just now,” said the girl. “If they’ve any sense of gratitude, they’ll grow
beautifully plump and fat, and sell at fancy prices.”
“That there’s regular lady’s farming,” said Mat, shaking his head
dubiously. “And it’s of a piece wi’ t’ way t’ master’s goin’ to work
himself. It’s very pretty, but it ain’t like practical work, and it doan’t
pay.”
Olivia’s bright face clouded.
“But papa’s got a farm bailiff,” said she.
“Oh ay, and gotten a rat to eat oop his coorn,” assented Mat darkly.
“Do you mean to insinuate,” began Olivia with a tragic face, “that
Tom Herrick——”
“All Ah mean, Miss, is that Ah’d like to see ye mak’ a profit on your
hens; for that’s what Ah call success, and Ah’d loike ye to be
successful, that Ah should.”
“Thank you, Mat; it’s very kind of you. And you’re quite right; of
course it’s only by making every department pay that one can make
the farm pay.”
“Ay,” said Mat. “And if ye’ll but follow out what I say, ye’ll be able to
keep twice them lot o’ hens on what ye’re givin’ ’em. Ye’ve got
ground for fifty more, and if Ah was you Ah’d go over to Long Sedge
Bend and buy some of old Widder Lund’s; she’s got ’em to sell. And
doan’t ye go giving her no fancy price, but beat her down; that’s
business, and she’s none so poor but she can afford to let ye have
’em cheap. The bean’t so much to look at, her hens; but they’re good
’uns to lay, and worth a fieldful o’ them fancy soarts.”
Olivia began to play thoughtfully with the grain left in her basket. She
was very anxious for the honor of her poultry yard, and she began
already to be fired with the ambition to make it a successful
commercial enterprise. She had a little pocket money put by; she
could lay that out as she pleased, without consulting anybody.
“How far off is this Long Sedge Bend?”
“A matter o’ twea mile and a half. It’s down by Sedge Bend coal-pit.”
“And where’s that?”
“Ye go along t’ Sheffield road till ye coom to t’ mill. Turn to yer left, as
if ye were goin’ to Sheffield, till ye coom to t’ Blue Boar. Bear to yer
left across t’ fields, and that’s Sedge Bend.”
“Isn’t there a shorter way across the fields? That must be such a
long way round.”
“Ay, but ye maunna go t’ short way. They’re a roough lot down at
Long Sedge, and ye maun keep to t’ road.”
“Well, I shall go this very day and interview Mrs. Lund. I’m afraid,
though, I shall be short of accommodation if I buy many more
chickens.”
“Nea, Ah’ll rig ye oop some nests and a perch in t’ auld toolhouse
yonder. Ah can do ’t in an hour.”
“It’s awfully good of you, but you needn’t hurry with it, for I shan’t
start till after luncheon.”
“But start as early as ye can. It doan’t do to be late, by oneself, in
those parts.”
“Well, I’ll be sure to start in good time, and I’ll take a big basket, to
bring some of the chickens back in.”
“Best let mea fetch ’em for ye to-morrow; Ah can’t get away to-day.
It’s not for t’ loikes o’ you to carry baskets o’ live stock along t’
roads.”
“But I can’t wait—I can’t wait; I must see them to-day,” said this
headstrong young madam, who liked to carry out her plans with the
impetuosity of a whirlwind. “And as for the basket, why, there isn’t
another farmer’s daughter in Yorkshire with stronger arms than
mine.”
Mat looked at her mistrustfully, but he said nothing more on the
subject.
“Ah’ll tak’ t’ measure of t’ toolhouse if Ah may coom in,” was all he
said.
Olivia was running to open the gate for him; but, with a nod of
thanks, he vaulted over the high fence, and set about his work
without another word. The country lad had been fairly bewitched by
the beauty and brightness of this young lady, who seemed to him a
creature of a different mould from any of the womenkind he had
hitherto met—even from handsome Mrs. Meredith Brander. Nothing
gave him so much delight as to be able to render her a small service;
and even while he was taking the measurements of the toolhouse,
he was pondering a way to spare her what he considered the
dangers of the walk she proposed to take that afternoon. The girl
herself, knowing nothing of this plan, and thinking lightly enough of
the enterprise, watched his proceedings with great interest, and
finally overwhelmed him with thanks which sent him home happy.
Olivia started on her walk that afternoon without a word to anybody
concerning the object of her expedition. She had a purse with some
of her savings in her pocket, and a large poultry basket on her arm.
“I shall leave this basket somewhere when I come in sight of the
cottage, and pretend I’ve only come to look at the chickens,” she
said to herself, resolved to be very astute. But the widow Lund was
more astute still, and managed to drive a very good bargain with her
fair young customer. Indeed, Olivia showed such a helpless inability
to distinguish between a young chicken and the hoariest-headed
rooster of the lot, that it would have needed superhuman virtue not to
take advantage of her. It was with a glow of unspeakable delight and
pride that, having paid for a dozen hens, she said she would take
half of them home with her, and, running out of the cottage, picked
up the basket which she had hidden behind the hedge, and brought
it to pack her live stock in.
Poor Olivia! An unknown visitor was such a rare sight at Long Sedge
that the advent of “a grand lady wi’ a big basket” had been reported
all over the village as she drew near the outskirts; and the widow
Lund herself, with two cronies, having watched her approach, basket
and all, from the door of Mrs. Perkin’s washhouse, was able to
appreciate at its full value the poor little ruse.
When her load was ready, Olivia quickly discovered that a basket
containing six live chickens is neither a light nor a convenient
burden, and perceived that to carry them back by the way she had
come would be a more arduous and fatiguing task than she had
imagined. When, therefore, she found there was a path across the
fields which would lead up to the high road, and shorten the way by
at least half a mile, the temptation was too strong for her, and,
disregarding Mat’s warnings, as that young man had expected her to
do, she ventured fearlessly on the short cut. Half a dozen unkempt
children laughed and yelled at her as she passed; a few rough-
looking women whispered to each other at the doors of their dirty
cottages; while a man, who was leaning against a wall smoking a
short black pipe, slunk out of her way, as if conscious that she
belonged to a higher type of civilization. Mat was right; Long Sedge
Bend was a rough place. The inhabitants looked wild and out of
touch with the rest of humanity; the long rows of small brick cottages,
many of which were windowless and deserted, looked squalid and
miserable, while over everything was that black and grimy look which
the neighborhood of a coal-pit produces.
It was Saturday afternoon, and the pits were idle. A great black
wheel, towering over a mound on the right, showed where lay the
entrance to the nearest shaft. Round the door of a beerhouse,
smaller and much more disreputable-looking than the Collier’s Arms,
was a group of men and boys, spending their half holiday in dull and
noisy fashion. They were a rough-looking lot, and Olivia passed
them quickly. Her way lay along a cinder path over the fields, and for
some time she got on very well, meeting no one, and enjoying the
frosty afternoon. Just as she ran through a turnstile and followed the
sudden turn of the path to the left, however, a man started up from
the ground, called out “Hallo, missis!” and attempted to seize one of
her feet. She was startled into uttering a low exclamation, and, rightly
judging that the man was drunk, she ran on as fast as she could,
hoping to get beyond his pursuit before he could get upon his legs.
But a drunken man may be able to run when he cannot walk; and
Olivia’s assailant, who was a stalwart young collier with a blear-eyed
and most unprepossessing face, gave chase in good earnest, and
came up with her just as she came to a barrier between two fields in
the shape of a very high and very primitive stile. Seeing she had no
time to get over it in safety, the girl put down her basket close by the
hedge, turned suddenly, and faced her pursuer.
For the first time in her life she felt thoroughly frightened, for the
young man looked brutal and reckless; but she had plenty of
courage, and the terror she felt showed neither in her face, her
attitude, nor in her resonant voice.
“What do you want?”
He reeled, not having expected her sudden movement.
“Ah want look at tha pretty feace, meh dear,” said he, only just
distinctly enough for her to understand him.
And he gave her a tipsy leer of admiration.
“And now will you be kind enough to pass on?” said she, in a firm
tone. “Or to let me pass on without further hindrance?”
“Ah’m not a-hinderin’ of tha,” said the young man, who was trying to
stand steadily in proximity much too close to be pleasant. “Tha can
goa wheer tha lakkest.”
Olivia looked at him doubtfully, but as he made for the moment no
attempt to molest her, she began to feel reassured.
“Go back, then,” said she, “and let me go on.”
“Nea,” said he, shaking his head with an ugly grin; “Ah’m goin’ to
help tha over t’ stile. Ah’ll carry tha whisket for tha if thr’rt civil.”
“Thank you,” said Olivia, taking the fellow’s offers as if they were
courtesies, “but I want no help, either for myself or my basket. If you
wish to do me a service, you will go back and let me go on.”
“Ah maun see tha over t’ stile first,” said he. “Coom, missis, don’t be
shy.”
He swooped down upon her basket, which she snatched up so
quickly that he lost his balance and fell against the wooden fence.
With a rapid step she got round him, basket and all, and was in the
act of mounting the first step of the stile when the young ruffian,
perceiving her purpose and enraged at a blow he had received in
stumbling, lurched round with unexpected agility, and laid a rough
hand on her arm. She tried to wrench herself free, but the muscular
strength she was so proud of was as a child’s feebleness against the
brute force of this man. It had never before happened to her to feel
powerless like this. With teeth clinched hard, and eyes watching
intently for a moment’s advantage, she wrestled in utter silence with
the man, who tried to force her to mount the stile.
“Tha’d better not give ma so mooch trouble, ma bonny madam,” said
he, roughly. “Tha’ll only have to pay for t’ other side. An’ Ah’ll tak’ a
buss now to goa on wi’.”
He put his arm round her waist and tried to kiss her; Olivia fought
fiercely, still without uttering a word. In the midst of her desperate
struggles her assailant saw the girl’s face change—light up with
hope, with expectancy. Then, with all the force of her lungs, she
suddenly shouted, “Help!” For a moment the collier was surprised
into desisting from his attack, but before she could take advantage of
this he recovered himself, and putting one rough and dirty hand over
her mouth, growled out, sullenly—
“Nea, theer bean’t no help for tha till Ah done with tha.”
Closing his strong fingers on her face, he pulled her head around
with brutal violence, and had his own repulsive face close to hers,
when he suddenly felt one strong hand laid on his shoulder and
another under his chin, and his head being forced back with a jerk,
he found that he was in the vigorous clutches of the vicar of St.
Cuthbert’s.
“Dang tha! It’s t’ feightin’ parson!” cried the rough, in a surly tone.
“Yes, and I’m going to exercise my fists on your ugly face as soon as
ever you’re sober, you hulking vagabond!” said Mr. Brander, with a
conspicuous lack of pastoral meekness.
The man had fallen back, and, half drunk as he was, looked
ashamed of himself.
“Tha maun look out for thaself if tha tries that on,” he said, sullenly.
Then with more assurance he went on, “Dunna think Ah care for tha
bein’ t’ parson. It ain’t mooch of a parson tha’lt be when all’s known.
Ay,” he continued, seeing that these vague words were not without
effect, “theer’s a mon aboot as wants tha, an’ as woan’t rest till e’s
gotten tha, and may be before tha taks oop wi’ another lass e’ll mak’
tha give an account o’ t’ one tha spirited away. Now coom on if tha
loikes.”
And he put himself in a fighting position.
Mr. Brander pushed him on one side so that he staggered, and
picking up Olivia’s basket, signed to her to get over the stile, while he
turned to give a few short and sharp words of farewell to the
discomfited collier. A few seconds later Olivia, who had walked
quickly on in shame, relief, and confusion, heard the vicar’s voice
close behind her.
“And now, Miss Denison, I’ve a sermon ready for you.”
Coming up with her, he saw that the girl, who made no answer, had
tears in her eyes.
“No, I’m not going to have any mercy on you because you choose to
cry,” said he, pitilessly. “It’s no fairer of a girl to use her tears against
a man than it is of a man to use his fists against a woman. If you
don’t instantly leave off, I shall feel at liberty to hit you. You know you
deserve it.”
“How?” asked she, tremulously.
“How! Why, by disregarding the emphatic warnings, not of one
friend, but of two, and by dragging out a poor parson on Saturday,
his sermon day, to protect you from the consequences of your folly.”
“Dragging you out!”
“Yes. This morning comes Mat Oldshaw post-haste to me just before
luncheon to say that you were going off on a wild-goose—no, on a
tame-hen—chase to Long Sedge Bend, and that he was certain you
would come back over the very fields which he had just assured you
were unsafe for a lady.”
“But, Mr. Brander,” put in Olivia, in real distress, “I’ve always been
used to take care of myself; I have never been annoyed before. It’s
an infamous thing that a girl shouldn’t be able to do what her powers
enable her to do just as well as a man!”
“Infamous, perhaps, but indisputable. It is of no use to kick against
custom.”
“But what is going to be the use of me, if I, a great strong creature
who can do lots of work, and shall soon understand farming better
than papa, can’t cross the road without a footman at my heels to
keep off tipsy coal miners? Oh, dear, I wish I weren’t a wretched girl!”
“You couldn’t be anything else, with that illogical mind, and that
extravagant way of looking at things.”
“Illogical!” cried she, now really offended. “Why, papa says I have the
most reasonable head he ever knew!”
“For a woman.”
Olivia was at first too much offended to answer.
“I’m papa’s right hand,” she said, at last, coldly. “I’m just like a son to
him.”
“I think not, Miss Denison,” said the vicar, shaking his head.
“My father would tell you so himself, Mr. Brander.”
“And I should not believe him, Miss Denison.”
Olivia began to see that the vicar was enjoying her indignation, so
she bit her lips and remained silent.
“Just think now, what happens when you find him a little depressed
and irritable. Does he dismiss you with a snub as he would one of
your brothers? Does he not rather submit to a little gentle coaxing,
allow himself to be ‘brought round’ and receive a kiss as a reward?”
“Yes, that is true, certainly,” said she, smiling. “But that has nothing
to do with the real value of the help I give him.”
“Oh, but it has. It has, on the contrary, everything to do with it.
Instead of complaining that you are a ‘wretched girl’ you must learn
to understand that. What the intrinsic value of your services may be I
don’t know; but if you had the abilities of a Senior Wrangler they
would count for nothing compared with your sympathy and love for
him, and your pretty feminine way of showing it. And so, you see, as
your tender womanhood is of more consequence to us—I mean to
him—than all the fine masculine qualities of your intellect, you must
consent to accept the protection we decree that your womanhood
needs.”
“Papa doesn’t decree it. He says girls ought to learn to take care of
themselves.”
“Will he say so after to-day’s adventure, do you think?”
“I shan’t tell him anything about it.”
“Then I shall, unless you give me your word, like a sensible girl,
never to cross these fields alone again.”
“Need you ask that, Mr. Brander?” said the girl, reddening.
“Well, forgive me. I don’t know you well enough to be sure how deep
the headstrong vein runs.”
“I am miserably sorry and ashamed to have brought you so far this
afternoon.”
“Are you? Oh, I have done more irksome things than that in my time,
I assure you,” said he drily. “Besides, I’ve only come from St.
Cuthbert’s. I’m back again in my own parsonage to-day, you know,
for my brother and sister-in-law are expected this afternoon.”
“Are they?” said she. “I am so anxious to see them, especially Mrs.
Brander.”
“Make haste on to the high road then, and we may meet them. The
pony cart has gone to meet them, and they generally come this way
round from Matherham.”
They were within a short distance of the road when Mr. Brander
descried a little way off his sister-in-law’s light wood cart and plump
cob pony. Quickening their pace, Olivia excited and curious, her
companion decidedly nervous, they climbed the last steps of the hill,
and reached the high road a few moments before the cart came up.
They stopped to recover their breath, exchanging a merry word or
two as they waited. As they drove up, Olivia, who had splendid
eyesight, could see what a handsome pair the vicar of Rishton and
his wife were. He was fair, serene, portly, good-humored; she, dark,
erect, and blooming. They were conversing amicably as they came
along, and did not notice the two people waiting by the roadside until
they were close upon them, and Vernon Brander accosted them.
Olivia wondered at the nervous tremor in his voice as he did so.
But she was still more surprised at the effect of the meeting upon the
lady and gentleman in the cart. The serenity of the portly vicar
clouded at sight of his brother; an indescribable change came over
his face, a look which was not exactly disapproval, or doubt, or
suspicion, or mistrust, though it partook of all those qualities, as he
glanced from Mr. Vernon Brander to the beautiful girl at his side. The
expression of the lady spoke more plainly still. Her eyes moved
quickly from the man to the woman and back again, while her lips
tightened and her forehead puckered with evident consternation.
Both lady and gentleman, whatever the cause of their annoyance
might be, were self-possessed enough to give Miss Denison a kind
and courteous greeting, when Mr. Vernon Brander, with evident
nervousness, introduced her. Learning that Olivia had been buying
poultry, Mrs. Brander inspected the purchase with great interest, but
pronounced two of the birds to be very old roosters indeed. She then
told her brother-in-law that they were going straight home to an early
dinner, and told him to make haste to the Vicarage, as they should
expect him to join them.
Then they drove off, leaving Olivia with the uncomfortable
impression that they disapproved of her acquaintance with Mr.
Vernon Brander in the strongest possible manner.
 CHAPTER XI.
Not for some minutes after the little carriage containing the
Reverend Meredith Brander and his wife had driven on did either of
the young people they had left break silence. Olivia watched the
disappearing vehicle with much interest, and Vernon Brander, though
with less openness, watched Olivia.
At last she turned sharply, and met his eyes fixed upon her with a
half-fierce, half-mournful intentness, which struck her with painful
surprise. He at once turned away his head, and asked abruptly—
“Well, what do you think of them? Mind, it is of no use for you to say
you ‘haven’t had time to judge,’ or anything of that sort, for I have
already caught the reflection of very decided opinion in your face.”
“I don’t deny that I have formed decided opinions, though I don’t
pledge myself they are correct.”
“Well?”
“I think I shall like your brother, but I know I shan’t like his wife.”
“Very straightforwardly put. An instinct merely, or something more?”
“Something more, I think. You know, I have seen their portraits; well,
I have thought about them a great deal, and now I have compared
my impressions of the photographs with my impressions of the
originals, and the result is a decided opinion.”
“You know I told you that you would like my brother—that all ladies
do,” said Vernon, with a perceptible shade of jealousy.
“Well, you were right; I admit it. He seems the incarnation of good
humor—to shed a sort of sunshine of cheeriness around him.”
“Yes, yes, he does,” admitted Vernon, rather bitterly, Olivia thought.
She continued: “It was plain that, for some reason or other, neither
he nor Mrs. Brander was glad to see me. It almost seemed as if they
took an instinctive dislike to me. But even that could not sour your
brother; it scarcely made him less genial. On the other hand, it made
all the difference in the world to Mrs. Brander’s manner. She looked
at me just as if I were an enemy, who had done her, or was going to
do her, some severe injury.”
Glancing at her companion, Olivia saw that something she had said
affected him very strongly. She was silent therefore, afraid that she
had already said too much.
“It may be,” said Mr. Brander, after a pause, “that she feels a kind of
most innocent jealousy of you. She has, all through her married life,
been used to look upon me as one of those unattached tame cats
who are only too glad to catch mice for any responsible matron who
is kind to them. My sister-in-law annexed me in that capacity long
ago; sends me to market, sets me to mind the children, to nail up the
fallen picture, or even to lecture the gardener. I don’t suppose she
has seen me speak to another lady—a young lady—for ten years.”
“I should have thought, by her look, she would be equal to lecturing
the gardener herself,” said Olivia, drily.
Mr. Brander laughed. “Well, she is not quite resourceless when it
comes to an affair of the tongue,” he admitted. “But you must not
think she is a shrew, for all that. Then, she has been our beauty, too,
and has been used to set the fashions for the ladies. While now——”
He stopped and smiled as he looked at the blooming, prettily
dressed girl beside him.
Olivia, however, found this no smiling matter, but replied, with deep
scorn—
“Surely, Mrs. Brander can’t be so small-minded as that. I can assure
her I have no wish to entrench upon her privileges; and, with only
eighteen pounds a year for dress and pocket money, I am not likely
to set fashions that there will be a rush to follow.”
“You might set a fashion in faces,” suggested he.
“Oh,” said she, laughing, “if Mrs. Brander envies me the admiration
of Mr. Frederick Williams—or, indeed, of any of the jeunesse doree
of this neighborhood—I can assure her that she will only have to wait