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SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA
UN Governance
Peace and Human Security in
Cambodia and Timor-Leste
Brendan M. Howe · Sorpong Peou ·

Yuji Uesugi
Security, Development and Human
Rights in East Asia
Series Editor
Brendan M. Howe
Graduate School of International Studies
Ewha Womans University, GSIS
Seoul, Korea (Republic of)
This series focuses on the indissoluble links uniting security, development
and human rights as the three pillars of the UN, and the foundation of
global governance. It takes into account how rising Asia has dramati-
cally impacted the three pillars at the national, international and global
levels of governance, but redirects attention, in this most Westphalian of
regions, to human-centered considerations. Projects submitted for inclu-
sion in the series should therefore address the nexus or intersection of
two or more of the pillars at the level of national or international gover-
nance, but with a focus on vulnerable individuals and groups. The series
targets postgraduate students, lecturers, researchers and practitioners of
development studies, international relations, Asian studies, human rights
and international organizations.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14488
Brendan M. Howe · Sorpong Peou ·
Yuji Uesugi
UN Governance
Peace and Human Security in Cambodia
and Timor-Leste
Brendan M. Howe Sorpong Peou
Graduate School of International Department of Politics and Public
Studies Administration
Ewha Womans University, GSIS Ryerson University
Seoul, Korea (Republic of) Toronto, ON, Canada
Yuji Uesugi
Faculty of International Research and
Education
Waseda University
Tokyo, Japan
Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia

ISBN 978-3-030-54571-0 ISBN 978-3-030-54572-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54572-7
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
1 Global Governance Principles and UN Implementation 1
2 A Critical Reflection on UNTAC’s Contributions

to Human Security in Cambodia 33
3 Post-UNTAC UN Peacebuilding and Human Security

in Cambodia 57
4 A Critical Reflection on the UN Mission’s

Contributions to Human Security in Timor-Leste 83
5 Post-UNMIT Peacebuilding and Human Security

in Timor-Leste 111
6 Legacies and Futures 135
Index 151
v
About the Authors
Brendan M. Howe is Professor of International Relations at the Grad-

uate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University, where he
has worked since 2001. He researches on traditional and non-traditional
security policymaking in East Asia; peacebuilding; human security; demo-
cratic governance; middle power diplomacy; and post-crisis development.
Sorpong Peou is Professor of Global Peace and Security in the Depart-

ment of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University, Toronto,
Canada. His fields of expertise and research interest include global gover-
nance, especially in the area of global peace and security, regional security
in the Asia-Pacific, and democratisation in East Asia. He was a survivor of
the Khmer Rouge killing fields and lost many of his family members.
Yuji Uesugi is Professor of Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding at

the School of International Liberal Studies and the Graduate School of
International Culture and Communication Studies, Waseda University,
Tokyo, Japan. His fields of expertise and research interest include hybrid
peacebuilding in Asia, UN peace operations, security sector reform, and
regional security in the Asia-Pacific.
vii
Abbreviations
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AusAID Australian Aid
BCTL Banco Central de Timor-Leste
BPA Banking Payment Authority
C34 Special Committee on Peacekeeping
CAAC Commission for Matters of Former Combatants (Comissão para
os Assuntos dos Antigos Combatentes)
CAQR Commission for Matters of Cadres of the Resistance (Comissão
para os Assuntos dos Quadros da Resistencia)
CAVF Commission for Matters of Veterans of Falintil (Comissão para
os Assuntos dos Veteranos das FALINTIL)
CAVR Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East
Timor (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de
Timor Leste)
CCN National Consultation Council (Conselho Consultivo Nacional)
CGDK Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CGG Commission on Global Governance
CHS Commission on Human Security
CN National Council (Conselho Nacional)
CNRM National Council of Maubere Resistance (Conselho Nacional
da Resistência Maubere)
CNRP Cambodian National Rescue Party
CNRT National Council for Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional
da Resistência Timorense)
CPP Cambodian People’s Party
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ix
x ABBREVIATIONS
DWCP Decent Work Country Programme

EBA Everything But Arms
ECCC Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council
ETTA East Timorese Transitional Administration
EU European Union
FALINTIL Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (Forças
Armadas de Liberatação National de Timor-Leste)
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
F-FDTL FALINTIL-Defence Forces of Timor-Leste (Forças Defesa de
Timor-Leste)
FIB Force Intervention Brigade
FRETILIN Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (Frente
Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente)
FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful,
and Cooperative Cambodia
GNI Gross National Income
GNR National Republican Guard (Guarda Nacional Republicana)
HDI Human Development Index
HSU Human Security Unit
IAB Investment Advisory Board
ICC International Criminal Court
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
INTERFET International Force East Timor
ISF International Stabilisation Force
JIM Jakarta Informal Meeting
KPNLF Khmer National Liberation Front
LoCALL Local Climate Adaption Living Program
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSS Ministry of Social Solidarity
NIC Newly industrialized countries
NRS National Recovery Strategy
ODA Official Development Assistance
ABBREVIATIONS xi
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights

P5 Five Permanent Members
PF Petroleum Fund
PKO Peacekeeping Operations
PMC Private Military Companies
PNTL National Police of Timor-Leste (Policia Nacional de Timor-
Leste)
POC Protection of Civilians
POLRI Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik
Indonesia)
PPAs Pairs Peace Agreements
PRK People’s Republic of Kampuchea
R2P Responsibility to Protect
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SMEs Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SNC Supreme National Council
SOC State of Cambodia
SOFA Status of Forces Agreements
SOMA Status of Missions Agreements
SPSC Special Panels for Serious Crimes
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR Security Sector Reform
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TNI Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional
Indonesia)
TSDA Timor Sea Designated Authority
UN United Nations
UNAIDS United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAKRT United Nations Assistance of the Khmer Rouge Trials
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
xii ABBREVIATIONS
UNOHCFR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human

Rights
UNOTIL United Nations Office in Timor-Leste
UNPKO United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNRC UN Resident Coordinator
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTFHS United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USSC United States Supreme Court
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
CHAPTER 1
Global Governance Principles and UN

Implementation
Abstract This chapter explores the theoretical framework of global

governance and UN implementation of related principles through the
mediums of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Measurements
of the success of such operations introduced in this chapter include
legality, legitimacy, and efficacy/effectiveness. Legality is presented from
the perspective of both ‘positive’ international law, and the prescrip-
tions of customary law. Legitimacy is examined in terms of international
recognition, local ownership, and human-centred good governance. Effi-
cacy is defined with regard to the stated goals of UN operations and
how well they provide for the human security of all, but especially the
most vulnerable. East Asian perspectives and conditions are also counter-
posed to the universal aspirations of the UN and liberal peacekeeping and
peacebuilding. It concludes with a chapter overview.
Keywords United Nations (UN) · Governance · Legality · Legitimacy ·

Efficacy · Human security
© The Author(s) 2021 1

B. M. Howe et al., UN Governance, Security, Development
and Human Rights in East Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54572-7_1
2 B. M. HOWE ET AL.
Introduction
This volume evaluates the performance of the United Nations (UN)
in ensuring good governance from a human-centred perspective, in
Cambodia and Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor), the two most impor-
tant and comprehensive cases of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Both
cases are situated in the Southeast Asian subregion of East Asia (which
also includes Northeast Asia), and East Asian perspectives and condi-
tions are counterposed to the universal aspirations of the UN and
liberal peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The legality, legitimacy, and effi-
cacy/effectiveness of UN operations in the two countries are considered.
These three categories are, however, interrelated rather than exclusionary,
reflecting the complex nature of contemporary governance prescription.
Legality is presented from the perspective of both codified ‘positive’
international law, and the supplementary prescriptions of the “customs
and usages of civilized nations of states” (United States Supreme Court
[USSC] 1900), the “general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations” (ICJ 1945, Article 38(c)), and “the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations” (ICJ 1945, Article 38(d)).
Legitimacy is examined in terms of international recognition, local owner-
ship, and human-centred good governance (Howe 2012). Efficacy is
assessed with regard to the stated goals of UN peacekeeping and state-
building missions in general and these two case studies in particular. As
the stated goals increasingly reflect human-centred governance compo-
nents, how well these UN missions provided for the human security of
all, but especially the most vulnerable, can also be considered in terms of
measurements of efficiency.
The case studies will be assessed at three ‘moments’: the justifiability of
intervening (peacekeeping/peacebuilding/responsibility to protect (R2P)
authorisations); the justifiability of actions and policies implemented
during the intervention (responsibilities while protecting and keeping
the peace); and the justifiability of the situation after the interventions
took place and UN forces were withdrawn (governance responsibilities
after protection or after the initial construction of safe havens/building
enduring and sustainable peace).
We expect those who govern to do so in the interests of the governed,
usefully providing services that can best or perhaps only be achieved
through collective action. According to the Report of the Commission
1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND UN IMPLEMENTATION 3
on Global Governance, “governance is the sum of the many ways indi-

viduals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”
(CGG 1995, p. 2). It is an ongoing and evolutionary process which looks
to reconcile conflicting interests in order to protect the weak, through
the rule of law, from unjust exploitation, and introduce security for all.
Governance is also a process through which collective good and goods
are generated so that all are better off than they would be acting indi-
vidually. Thus, governance implies a concern by those who govern with
both the security and development, or provision of basic human needs,
of those who are governed (Howe 2012, p. 346). This includes steps to
eradicate poverty, particularly in conflict-affected areas, where insecurity
and underdevelopment provide twin, mutually reinforcing threats to lives
and livelihoods. ‘Safe havens’ can therefore be seen as those geograph-
ically bounded areas existing at either the state or substate level, where
those who govern prioritise the interests of the most vulnerable of those
governed, ensuring that they live free from fear and want to the greatest
degree possible (ibid.).
Domestically, governance is carried out primarily by instruments of the
state—that is to say the government and related institutions. Internation-
ally, governance implies not only global attempts to govern in the absence
of world government, dealing with international conflicts of interests and
those issues which transcend national boundaries, but also a concern with
what can be done by international actors when domestic governance
fails to provide safe havens. Peace and security have long constituted
the central objectives of global governance and form an essential dimen-
sion of human well-being. Indeed, peace and security feature heavily in
the preamble to the UN Charter and their maintenance is listed as the
first purpose of the UN, the major manifestation of the global gover-
nance mission. Increasingly, however, the global governance agenda has
evolved to include consideration of peace within states rather than exclu-
sively focusing on the generation of peace between them. In doing so
there has been movement from championing the interests and rights of
states, towards championing those of vulnerable individuals and groups.
Consequently, the new human-centred concerns of good global gover-
nance place the paradigm as much within the contemporary development
agenda, as it was formerly within the peace and political stability agenda.
Chiefly, at the level of academic discourse, as well as increasingly in the
policy sphere, this humanising of measurements of governance success
reflects what has come to be known as ‘human security’. Prescriptions
4 B. M. HOWE ET AL.
made under the dictates of this concept reflect both normative concerns
(that governing in the interests of the most vulnerable is fundamentally
the ‘right’ thing to do) and those of efficacy (that other governance objec-
tives are more achievable if individuals and groups are taken into account).
Hence, of central concern to this volume is the idea that a broad inter-
pretation of human security within governance, including elements of
distributive justice, is necessary from the perspective of legitimacy, but
also for the long-term construction of peace by transforming conflictual
relationships.
Human security is a multidisciplinary paradigm for understanding
global vulnerabilities at the level of individual human beings. It incor-
porates methodologies and analysis from a number of research fields
including strategic and security studies, development studies, human
rights, international relations, and the study of international organisations.
It exists at the point where these disciplines converge on the concept of
protection. The UN Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Devel-
opment Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security is seen as the
prime foundational document for the global governance mission with
regard to human security. It noted that the objective of security has
changed from states to human beings and commented on the importance
of a more human-centric approach to security (UNDP 1994). The Report
also recognised that freedom from want and freedom from fear constitute
important perspectives on poverty and development. Indeed, there is a
close relationship between human security envisioned as the protection of
persons, and human development as the provision of basic human needs.
Human security and human development are both people-centred
(Peou 2014). They challenge the orthodox approach to security and
development (i.e. state security and liberal economic growth, respec-
tively). Both perspectives are multidimensional, and address people’s
dignity as well as their material and physical concerns. Both impose duties
on the wider global community. They can be seen as mutually reinforcing.
A peaceful environment frees individuals and governments to move from
a focus on mere survival to a position where they can consider improve-
ment of their situations. Likewise, as a society develops, it is able to afford
more doctors, hospitals, welfare networks, internal security operations,
schools, and de-mining operations. Conversely, as former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan observed in his UN Report In Larger Freedom, “we
will not enjoy security without development, development without secu-
rity, and neither without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes
are advanced, none will succeed” (Annan 2005, p. 6). Conflict retards
development, and underdevelopment can lead to conflict.
The Roles of the United Nations

From League of Nations Mandates to the UN Trusteeship Council, a
global obligation has been acknowledged that such territories were to
be administered in the best interests of their inhabitants. The mandate
system was established by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, and referred to territories which after the war were no longer
ruled by their previous sovereign (defeated powers in World War I), but
their peoples were not considered “able to stand by themselves under the
strenuous conditions of the modern world”. The article called for such
people’s tutelage to be “entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of
their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best
undertake this responsibility”. League of Nations Mandates were of the
nature of both a treaty and a constitution, and they contained minority
rights clauses that provided for the rights of petition and adjudication by
the Permanent Court of International Justice (Wright 1930). Mandates
were to be administered as a “sacred trust of civilisation” to develop the
territory for the benefit of its native people (Matz 2005). With the disso-
lution of the League of Nations after World War II, it was stipulated at
the Yalta Conference that the remaining Mandates should be placed under
the trusteeship of the UN, under similar governance principles.
Post-independence, in some cases however, promotion of the security
and integrity of the newly independent entities came at the expense of
ignoring the concerns of citizens who sought security in their daily lives.
For these common citizens, security meant “protection from the threat of
disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression
and environmental hazards”, the very things that would grant their daily
survival (UNDP 1994, p. 22). The international community has, there-
fore begun to address threats not only between, but also within states,
and focus on the security of people in addition to that of states. It is in
this context that the concept of human security has come to the fore and,
as detailed below, the UN has taken leadership and coordination positions
on human security in both theory and practice.
This in turn amounts to a dilemma for UN governance and admin-
istration of territories. The organisation is dedicated to maintenance
6 B. M. HOWE ET AL.
of the Westphalian system of states, and the principle of national self-

determination. Such prioritisation is reiterated in a number of statutory
defences of national sovereignty in the constitutive documents of inter-
national organisations under the UN system, in the prohibitions against
intervention, and the prescription that, should it be required, sovereignty
should be restored as soon as possible. Indeed, the organisation has been
instrumental in bringing a number of states into legal existence through
processes of national self-determination. Yet the UN is increasingly also
dedicated to the demands of human-centric good governance, whereby
safe havens are provided for the most vulnerable free from fear, want, and
even indignity, not only during the involvement of the UN but also as
part of its legacy.
This dilemma becomes acute when the UN is forced to intervene
in a ‘failed’ state, and temporarily take over its administration. The
international legal demands of sovereignty require the minimal level of
interference to prevent killings and other mass atrocities, with a swift
withdrawal. The normative demands of good human-centred governance
require a focus on well-being as much as safety, and a long-term commit-
ment to ensure that such governance objectives remain a priority once the
UN leaves. In short, global governance can be seen as a system designed
to ensure effective collective action in addressing challenges to human
security (Peou 2014). The fact that the UN has often conspicuously
failed itself to provide such safe havens speaks to the efficacy evaluation
component of governance.
Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Peacekeeping has been the flagship operation of the UN, and its major
contribution to global governance and the protection of vulnerable
groups (Howe and Kondoch 2016, p. 1). Uniquely universal and legit-
imate, it has been seen as a “strong and effective tool that is protecting
people, saving lives and helping countries to emerge from conflict” (Ban
2014). Since the earliest manifestations of UN peacekeeping operations
(UNPKOs), legal and normative issues have been extensively discussed by
policymakers and also scholars such as Derek W. Bowett (1964), Rosalynn
Higgins (1969, 1970, 1980, 1981), and Finn Seyersted (1966). Tradi-
tionally, international lawyers have addressed the constitutionality of UN
peacekeeping, the rule of law in the peacekeeping context, the legal status
of UN peacekeepers, issues related to command and control, the legal
constraints arising from the application of international humanitarian law,

international human rights law and international criminal law, specific
problems under the domestic law of the sending state, the protection
of UN personnel serving in UNPKOs, as well as the responsibilities and
liabilities of the UN, sending states, and individual peacekeeper under
international law (Howe et al. 2015, p. 3).
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) published
The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,
which is also known as the Capstone Doctrine. In the Capstone Doctrine,
the DPKO (2008, p. 18) outlines key principles and guidelines for
UNPKOs and defines peacekeeping as an “action undertaken to preserve
peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in
implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers”. Another often-
quoted definition can be found in the Agenda for Peace, “peacekeeping
is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto
with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United
Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.
Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the
prevention of conflict and making of peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1992, para.
20). Many authors also prefer the broader term “peace operations”,
which may be defined as “field operations deployed to prevent, manage,
and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence”
(DPKO 2008, p. 98). Peace operations “entail three principal activities:
conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building”
(Brahimi 2000, para. 10, p. 2). Peacekeeping rather than peace opera-
tions is, however, the preferred term at the UN, as the latter “smelled
too Western and interventionist” for member states from the South to
endorse (Kuehne 2009, p. 7).
Nevertheless, UN governance activities have seen a steady expansion
in terms of interventionism, legal and normative competence, and obliga-
tions. New legal issues related to peacekeeping mandates which have been
addressed include detentions by UN peacekeepers, international policing,
the use of new weapons systems such as drones, the use of private mili-
tary companies (PMCs), accountability for violations of human rights
by peacekeepers, peace enforcement and the use of force (Howe et al.
2015, pp. 4–6). New normative areas of discussion and practical growth
include the protection of civilians (POC) (Wills 2009; White 2009), the
R2P (Barber 2009; Francis et al. 2012; Hassler 2010; Hunt and Bellamy
2011), responsibility while protecting (Kenkel and Stefan 2016), the
8 B. M. HOWE ET AL.
responsibility to rebuild (Fleck 2012; Pattison 2015), and, more broadly,

human security (Benedek et al. 2010; Uesugi 2004; Peou 2014).
Legality
In general, the legal framework of UNPKOs can be derived from the UN
Charter; the mandate provided by the UN Security Council (UNSC);
mission-specific legal instruments including agreements with the troop-
contributing States, Participation Agreements and with the host State,
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or Status of Missions Agreements
(SOMAs), rules of engagement, and UN regulations (Howe et al. 2015,
p. 8). The mandate formulated in an enabling resolution by the UNSC
or exceptionally in a UN General Assembly (GA) resolution contains
the legal basis under international law for the deployment of a UNPKO
(ibid.). As Michael Bothe (2003, p. 265) remarks, “(t)he mandate of a
peace operation is the source of its powers and at the same time the limi-
tation of its powers”. At its most fundamental PKOs are tools of conflict
management, including those conflicts which are viewed as intractable,
wherein the worst manifestations of conflict (interstate wars) are reduced
by keeping combatants apart.
Even though the UN Charter does not provide for an explicit autho-
risation of peacekeeping operations, there is agreement that the legal
basis for consensual peacekeeping operations falls between Chapter VI
(peaceful settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (enforcement measures
to maintain or restore international peace and security) (Howe et al.
2015, p. 10). UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld referred to the
mythical “Chapter VI and a half” (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999,
p. xi). Yet there remains considerable debate over which Charter provi-
sions are exactly the legal basis of international peacekeeping and how
to allocate authority among the UNSC, the UNGA, and the Secretariat,
represented by the Secretary-General. Under Article 24(1) of the UN
Charter, the UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security, and in accordance with Article 29,
has the power to create peacekeeping forces as its subsidiary organs.
According to Article 98 of the UN Charter, the Council may entrust
the Secretary-General with certain functions.
A number of articles within Chapter VII have been championed as
serving as the legal foundation, either alone or in conjunction with
each other. These include: Article 39 “The Security Council shall deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to main-
tain or restore international peace and security;” Article 40: “the Security
Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable;”
Article 41: “measures not including the use of armed force;” Article 42:
“such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security;” and Article 48: “action required
to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of
the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may
determine”.
In 1957, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld laid down the three
key principles of classical UNPKOs (as opposed to the more recent
conceptualizations of peace enforcement for humanitarian reasons). First,
they require the consent of the parties to the conflict. Second, they
should be ‘neutral’ (impartial). Third, force should not be used except
in self-defence. Even though these bedrock principles of international
peacekeeping have been confirmed by the UN in policy documents and
by member states in the annual meetings of the Special Committee
on Peacekeeping (C34) ever since, peacekeeping has evolved over time,
and practice has challenged these core principles repeatedly, especially
regarding the use of force for humanitarian protection (see Peou 2003).
From a contemporary legal perspective, one may distinguish between
consensual and non-consensual PKOs based on Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Many contemporary PKOs are established under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter and they do not in a strict sense require the consent of
the parties to the conflict (Howe et al. 2015, p. 9). There are also authori-
sations to use of force for POC, and not just in self-defence. Furthermore,
in 2013, the UNSC established a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within
the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The FIB has a mandate to use force preventively and to carry out offensive
operations against spoilers (ibid.). Thus, in both 2013 and 2014, Russia
warned that “what was once the exception now threatens to become
unacknowledged standard practise” and “in some may even run counter
10 B. M. HOWE ET AL.
to the fundamental principles of peacekeeping” (ibid., p. 10). Concep-

tual confusion and contestation, therefore, brings questions over the roles
of the UN in promoting good international and domestic governance
from the strictly legal into the realm of concepts of legitimacy (addressed
below).
Meanwhile, much of the legal literature emphasises the importance of
peace through justice (Peou 2016). According to M. Cherif Bassiouni
(1999, p. 808), retributive justice “will contribute to the reduction of
social harm and to the preservation or restoration and maintenance of
peace”. Other scholars make claims about the role of international crim-
inal tribunals in ensuring international peace and security. Retributive
justice in particular is regarded as an effective method for armed conflict
or war termination (Shinoda 2002). Peace can be obtained when alleged
criminals are charged, indicted, arrested, detained, tried, and sentenced
to prison terms. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was meant to end a real war—a case of war termina-
tion (Feher 1999). If criminal leaders like Charles Taylor of Liberia could
be put behind bars, the assumption is that peace would prevail, whereas
doing otherwise would jeopardise peace (Lamin 2003, p. 315). Yet in
practice, trying by force to jail a leader, who still possessed significant
violent means and had public support, was unlikely to lead to peace.
Threats of judicial punishment are also assumed to help rational perpe-
trators adopt policy measures that will help deescalate various forms of
direct physical violence against individual humans, such as armed conflict
and mass atrocity crime (Akhavan 2009, p. 636). Judicial punishment
or its threat is effective in terms of ending atrocity crime (Helfer 2014;
Shany 2014a, b; Tochilovsky 2003). The work of international tribunals
can have a positive impact on national/domestic criminal proceedings
(Shany 2014a, b) or judicial and legal institution building (Stromseth
2009), alter politics (Alter 2014), help move forward the political process
of democratisation, and improve human rights situations in post-war soci-
eties (Kim and Sikkink 2012/2013). Thus, retributive justice aims for
conflict resolution, in terms of a judicial settlement of conflicts, but, as
detailed below, it does not necessarily equate to the transformation of
conflictual relationships.
Legitimacy
The concept of legitimacy is a subject of great importance in the litera-
ture of international peace operations and can be regarded as a matter of
degree. The degrees of UN peace operations’ legitimacy can be assessed at
three levels: global, regional, and national/local. Global support for UN
operations can be measured in terms of support given by UN member
states. Most notably, and from a positive legal perspective, this support
should be given by the five Permanent Members (P5) of the UNSC.
Given the UNGA represents almost all recognised sovereign states and
their populations, however, this body is also a good gauge of global
support and legitimacy. Regional support for UN peace operations is
no less important, especially given the constraints the UN has oper-
ated under since the end of the Cold War when faced with significant
growth in demand for international intervention in civil conflicts. This
led to the thinking of ‘sub-contracting;’ with the UN delegating some
responsibilities to regional organisations (Knight 1996; Peou 1998).
The question of legitimacy at the national/local level is raised by UN
officials and peacekeeping practitioners, who find support from local elites
and populations to be most fundamental to the success and failure of UN
peace operations. In the Capstone Doctrine, the DPKO (2008, p. 36)
notes: “The manner in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation
conducts itself may have a profound impact on its perceived legitimacy on
the ground”. On the one hand, the level of legitimacy depends on the
performance of UN peacekeepers, which rests on their firmness and fair-
ness, as well as the way they show respect to local populations. On the
other hand, legitimacy is a matter of perception. The DPKO (2008, p. 36;
italics added) writes: “The firmness and fairness with which a United
Nations peacekeeping operation exercises its mandate, the circumspec-
tion with which it uses force, the discipline it imposes upon its personnel,
the respect it shows to local customs, institutions and laws, and the
decency with which it treats the local people all have a direct effect
upon perceptions of its legitimacy”.
While local perceptions of how UN peacekeeping personnel treat
them are important, a major source of legitimacy often neglected in
the academic literature is how secure local political elites and civilian
populations feel during the peace process. After all, the success of peace
operations depends much on the security interests of those involved in
conflicts. Firmness and fairness are important in that UN peace opera-

tions are likely to enjoy support from warring factions if they do not
come under threat, including the threat of marginalisation or punish-
ment for whatever reason. The idea of fairness embedded in the peace
and electoral process rests on the assumption that UN peacekeepers are
able to create or establish a level playing field, in which no one party
enjoys the upper hand and can take advantage of the political and secu-
rity situation. Much of the academic literature on peace spoilers tends
to take a legalistic approach, however, because not all warring factions
are moral equals (Stedman 1997; Peou 1997). Some committed more
atrocities than others and, thus, tend to feel insecure and unwilling to
comply with peace agreements and cooperate with UN authorities. In
other words, factions whose pasts have been called into question tend
to perceive themselves to be primarily targeted and thus prone to taking
action that makes others view them as ‘spoilers’ (Stedman 1997).
Moreover, the question of UN legitimacy is not only a matter of local
perceptions of UN peace operations but also a matter of how much cred-
ibility they have as perceived by local elites and populations. According to
the UN, “The credibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is a
direct reflection of the international and local communities’ belief in the
mission’s ability to achieve its mandate” (DPKO 2008, p. 38). Getting
local communities to view UN peace operations as credible is, however,
no easy task in a political and security environment where the level of trust
is low, and where former warring factions feel threatened. Once again
the DPKO acknowledges this security challenge: “United Nations peace-
keeping operations are frequently deployed in volatile, highly stressed
environments characterized by the collapse or degradation of state struc-
tures, as well as enmity, violence, polarization and distress”. It goes on
to add that, “Lawlessness and insecurity may still be prevalent at local
levels, and opportunists will be present who are willing to exploit any
political and security vacuum. In such environments, a United Nations
peacekeeping operation is likely to be tested for weakness and division by
those whose interests are threatened by its presence, particularly in the
early stages of deployment” (ibid., p. 37). In short, the DPKO has come
to acknowledge how important the question of perceived UN legitimacy
and credibility when conducting peace operations.
Liberal peacebuilding dynamics have come to dominate, with an
emphasis on impacting international and domestic governance and
conflict through the virtuous triangle of economic interdependence,

international organisations, and the democratic peace, combined with
a focus on the rule of law. Hence policy prescription in terms of
peacebuilding and post-crisis reconstruction has tended to focus on
the (re)establishment of law and order, good governance in terms of
economic efficiency and transparency, and the spread of democracy, all
supported by external agency in the form of UN bodies or authorised
actors. This supposed consensus has, however, come under attack in
both theory and practice. Social constructivists and critical theorists have
critiqued the liberal peacebuilding paradigm on a variety of levels. At
the same time, as addressed in the section below, East Asian actors and
commentators hold differing interpretations of the implications of the
turn towards human security and the R2P in global governance.
Critics have three main issues with the liberal universalist approach.
First, that liberal peacebuilding in practice does not match the universal
principles to which it aspires and from which it claims legitimacy, with
selectivity in selection of peacebuilding activities often dictated by the
interests of intervening state(s) and often illiberal practices carried out
during the intervention (Selby 2013, p. 57). Second, that liberal peace-
building is hegemonic and hierarchical in terms of both actors and
issues, prioritising what Western liberal societies think is good for those
‘benefitted’ (democracy, the organisation of elections, human rights and
the rule of law, neoliberal development and the creation of an open
market economy) rather than considering local circumstances and inter-
ests (Autesserre 2011, p. 4). Third, that liberal peacebuilding is essentially
top-down in nature, rather than bottom-up, and that this is unsuited
to transforming conflictual relationships or building resilient post-crisis
societies (Lederach 1998, 1999).
Instead, contemporary critical perspectives on peacebuilding and post-
crisis reconstruction call for “positive, proactive programs that promote
peace building, rather than negative, reactive programs intended to
reduce violence” and a focus on “promoting harmony, understanding,
and effective problem solving” (Kimmel 1992, p. 125). In other words, a
focus on how to bring people constructively together to build a whole
greater than the sum of the parts, rather than on how to keep them
apart in order to mitigate against the worst manifestations of conflicts
of interests. The logical implications of this broader, deeper, transforma-
tive approach to peacebuilding include a much greater focus on human
security rather than the security of states.
Earl Conteh-Morgan (2005, p. 69) further notes that human security

at the personal, institutional and structural-cultural levels can be more
effectively realised in the process of peacebuilding if “culture and iden-
tity and an interpretive bottom-up approach to peacebuilding are taken
into account when addressing the problems of marginalized individuals,
groups, and communities”; and both material as well as socio-cultural
contexts are considered critical factors. These understandings, there-
fore, have serious implications for the legitimacy and efficacy of UN
governance, intervention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Essentially
good governance can now be reconstructed in terms of the extent to
which UN policies and initiatives promote the human security of the
most vulnerable, providing safe havens free from fear, want, and, (more
controversially) indignity.
This is important not only because, from a normative humanitarian
perspective, the lives and interests of human beings must be foremost in
the minds of those who govern, but also because only by taking these
elements into account will an enduring peace be built. Indeed, there is
something of a virtuous cycle here, with peacekeeping and peacebuilding
constituting the policy tools with which human security can be protected
and promoted, but good governance reflecting the demands of human
security making peace more likely to be built and kept.
Efficacy: Promoting Human Security

Empirical evidence suggests the liberal assumption that international
criminal tribunals and courts contribute to international and human
security is far from conclusive. Neither the ICTY nor the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) did much to end war (Roberts
1998). Gary Bass argues that the ICTY did not stop the massacre
of thousands of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995 (Bass 2000,
pp. 290–295). The worst massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 and the deaths
of 7500 Muslim men and boys go to show that the ICTY had no posi-
tive impact or may have exacerbated the security situation. Until the
end of 1999, more than 230,000 Croatians, Serbians, and Albanians had
perished and nearly four million people had become refugees. The ICTY
did not deter the slaughtering of close to one million Tutsis that took
place in Rwanda between April and July 1994, nor did the ICTR stop
the killing of approximately 100,000 Hutus and the displacement of two
million Hutus after Tutsi military retaliation (Barria and Roper 2005).
Established in 2002, the International Criminal Court looks pathetically

powerless in the midst a brutal and bloody civil war in Syria that has left
almost 500,000 Syrians dead, six million internally displaced refugees, and
five million people seeking refuge abroad (Human Rights Watch 2018).
When still in power, even alleged criminal leaders in institutionally
weak or fragile states have no reason to fear the threat of retributive justice
(Kaye 2011). They refuse to cooperate with international courts (Michaeli
2011), challenge their legitimacy (Madsen 2014; Stephen 2012; Cryer
2005; Broomhall 2003), and limit the courts’ ability to affect local norms
and actors (Koh 1996). Formal trials may even subvert the process of
democratisation or “may run directly counter to the development of a
democratic legal order” (Kritz 1995, p. xxxii). Snyder and Vinjamuri
(2003/2004, p.43) argue that, “Trials…are not highly correlated with
the consolidation of peaceful democracy”. On legal and judicial institu-
tion building, they also argue that “When a country’s political institutions
are weak, when forces of reform have not won a decisive victory, and
when peace spoilers are strong, attempts to put perpetrators of atrocities
on trial are likely to increase the risk of violent conflict and further abuses,
and therefore hinder the institutionalization of the rule of law” (Snyder
and Vinjamuri 2003/2004, p. 15). Conflictual relationships can only be
transformed if there is a shared perception of the legitimacy of governance
structures and policies among all those impacted by them.
When it comes to the promotion of human-centred good governance,
which does aim at a more transformative approach to conflictual rela-
tionships, the UN has acted as a norm entrepreneur in both theory and
practice (Howe and Jang 2013, p. 65). The idea of a human-centred
perspective on security is in fact rooted in the ideals and history of the
UN. In 1945, the US Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius Jr., reported
to his government the conclusions from the San Francisco meeting that
led to the establishment of the UN:
The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security
front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic
and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on
both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace … No provisions
that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to
make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in
their homes and their jobs.
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made the first explicit

policy reference to human security in his Agenda for Peace, wherein the
concept was used in relation to preventative diplomacy, peacemaking,
peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In
essence, the report adopted a narrow definition of human security,
focusing on physical threats to lives and well-being. Thus, the UNDP’s
Human Development Report 1994 which explored both ‘freedom from
fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ is generally seen as the seminal text.
Here, human security means “safety from chronic threats such as hunger,
disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful
disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in
communities” (UNDP 1994, p. 24).
The concept was broadened still further by the Commission on Human
Security (CHS). Established in 2001 under Japanese leadership, the goal
of the CHS was “to promote public understanding of human security”,
to develop the concept “as an operational tool for policy formulation and
implementation”, and “to propose a concrete program of action” (MOFA
Japan 2001). The 2003 final report, Human Security Now, included
related conceptual elements of human dignity, means for financing human
security in post-conflict situations, and linkages between the issues of
human security and fair trade, minimum living standards, access to educa-
tion, and respect for diversity (CHS 2003, p. 4). Secretary-General
Kofi Annan proposed additional policy prioritisation institutional reforms
(2005). Furthermore, at a practical level, the UN has implemented
hundreds of human security projects worldwide (MOFA Japan 2010).
The Peacebuilding Commission, established in 2005, has provided
advice and recommendations on a relatively narrow concept of human
security by focusing on countries emerging from conflict. The Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) has provided a resolution on strength-
ening the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance, urging
members to continue to take the necessary actions to ensure and enhance
the safety and security of humanitarian personnel. Meanwhile, the UN
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) focuses on children’s security, such as child
survival and development, education, protection from violence and abuse,
and the UN World Food Programme (UNWFP) provides food to where
it is needed to secure people’s daily lives.
The Third Committee, one of the main committees of the UNGA, has
worked with agenda items relating to the broad concept of human secu-
rity, such as social, humanitarian, and human rights issues. Although not
legally binding, the Committee’s resolutions and discussions have raised

the profile of human security issues and served their propagation (Howe
and Jang 2013, p. 68). In particular, at the 64th session of the Third
Committee, the member states articulated that “no state is free from
human rights violations” and states should make an effort to improve
the life and security of all (UNGA, 2009). In 2008, for the first time,
the UNGA itself held thematic debates on human security, championing
the paradigm as a ‘useful vehicle’ to achieve the fundamental goals of the
UN—security, development, and human rights (UNGA 2008).
While human security issues are mainly dealt with by subsidiary organ-
isations of the UNGA and Secretariat, the Human Security Unit (HSU)
is the main organisation integrating human security in all UN activ-
ities (Howe and Jang 2013, p. 69). Under the management of the
HSU, the projects cover a wide range of issues including “protection
and reintegration of refugees, post-conflict peacebuilding, prevention of
human trafficking, women’s empowerment, food and health security,
socio-economic security for vulnerable communities as well as activities
to further promote the concept of human security” (UNTFHS 2009,
p. 58).
Thus, the UN has contributed to raising consciousness of human secu-
rity as well as questioning the normative and governance primacy of the
state. By providing a number of agencies for states and non-state actors
to act as fora for debating, articulating, and adopting the new concept of
human security and coordinating foci for humanitarian efforts, the UN
has propagated and embedded the concept in international security norms
and practices (Howe and Jang 2013, p. 69). Championing of the concept
by the world body has also impacted on state practice. The UN acknowl-
edges that states remain the primary actors responsible for the security of
their populations. Yet should national governance bodies prove unable,
through insufficient resources, or unwilling to protect vulnerable individ-
uals or groups, this responsibility can transfer to other members of the
international community.
Meanwhile, although the concept of human security has, over the last
two and a half decades, become widely recognised at the theoretical level,
the twin concepts of freedom from fear and freedom from want that
remain central to human security discourse are at the basis of a schism
within the practitioner community. Proponents of a ‘narrow’ concept
focus on violent threats to individuals, while recognising that these threats
are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity, and various
forms of socio-economic and political inequity. Proponents of the ‘broad’

freedom from want concept of human security such as that articulated
in the UNDP’s Human Development Report 1994, and the CHS’s 2003
report, Human Security Now, argue that the threat agenda should be
broadened to include hunger, disease and natural disasters because these
kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined.
Non-Western practitioners worry that the humanitarian turn taken
by global governance at the UN serves as justification for interven-
tionary practices (whether humanitarian or otherwise) by Western actors,
in particular when linked with the doctrine of R2P. Essentially many
actors and commentators in the ‘West’ appear to adhere to a narrow view
of human security, but an interventionary interpretation of R2P, with
the two being closely linked; whereas in Asia (in particular East Asia)
and other regions of the world, the linkage between the two is often
rejected, and a broad conceptualisation of human security, along with a
non-interventionary understanding of the R2P dominates (Howe 2018,
p. 80). Along with the conceptualisation of individual human beings as
rights bearers, the very idea of human security has been regarded by some
as a Western legacy, stemming from liberalism (Rothschild 1995, pp. 60–
61); and is thereby challenged by claims of cultural specificity (Acharya
2001, p. 1).
Although perhaps no other region on earth is as culturally and
socio-economically diverse, opposition to Western liberal or universal
cosmopolitan values emanating from East Asia has tended to be identified
collectively as the challenge of ‘Asian values’. The East Asian challenge
to universalism can be seen in cultural, economic, and political terms.
Culturally, it asserts that the Western liberal or universalist approach
ignores the specific cultural traditions and historical circumstances of East
Asian societies, whose interpretations of human rights are different from
those in the West. Economically, it maintains that the priority of devel-
oping East Asian societies has to be the eradication of poverty. Politically it
calls into question the motives of the West accusing them of using human
rights merely as an instrument for advancing Western economic or secu-
rity interests—“power politics in disguise” and a shallow pretence for the
use of force against regimes which stand up to Western neo-imperialism
(Thompson 2004, p. 1085).
A broad resistance to encroachment upon state prerogatives is also
reflected in the day-to-day diplomacy of the East Asian region. In
December 1990 when the UN decided to convene a World Conference
on Human rights, several East Asian states questioned the applicability

of universal human rights in different cultural, economic, and social
settings. The Asian regional preparatory meeting which took place in
Bangkok between 29 March and 2 April 1993 provided an opportu-
nity for governments to put forward their definition of human rights
on the global agenda. The ‘Bangkok Declaration’, signed by over forty
Asian governments, did not reject universal human rights, but the decla-
ration suggested that universality should be considered “in the context of
a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in
mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds” (Final Declaration 1993).
East Asian states also sought to link development issues with human rights
questions and emphasise the importance of non-interference (ibid.).
Furthermore, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
the most comprehensive international organisation in the region, adheres
to the ‘ASEAN Way’ by which is meant: “a. Mutual respect for the inde-
pendence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity
of all nations; b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free
from external interference, subversion or coercion; c. Non-interference in
the internal affairs of one another” (TAC 1976). East Asia, therefore, has
been dominated by the national security paradigm, the principles of abso-
lute sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic affairs. In this sense,
countries in the region can regard humanitarian assistance or interven-
tion as, potentially, illegitimate interference (Acharya 2002, p. 377). Yet,
for some Western powers, humanitarian intervention can be seen as the
logical extension of the human security discourse on global governance
as demonstrated by the ‘aid invasion’ interventionary calls by Western
statesmen during the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008,
and other global humanitarian crises in the near two decades since the
emergence of the R2P (Howe 2018, pp. 90–91). This divergence can also
be seen to play out in the evolution of the R2P paradigm, interpretations
of its implications, and perceptions of the relationship (or lack thereof)
with human security.
The Canadian-led International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) included in its final report a willingness “to take
timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the UNSC,
when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are mani-
festly failing to do it” (ICISS 2001). According to Ramesh Thakur
(2019b, p. 95), one of the authors of the report, “R2P was formulated by
ICISS in 2001 as answer to reconciling the neuralgic rejection of ‘human-

itarian intervention’ by the global South with the determination by the
North to end atrocities”. Indeed, one of the objectives of framers of the
paradigm was, apparently, to kill off the objectionable term ‘humanitarian
intervention;’ yet as demonstrated by its ongoing usage by Western policy
elites mentioned above, and its prevalence in the academic literature as
acknowledged by Thakur himself, this objective has yet to be achieved,
even if R2P has garnered more attention in the contemporary discourse
(ibid.).
Those who criticise the final report (Sunga 2006) for not putting
enough clear distance between R2P and the interventionary use of force
have highlighted how it even includes a section (6.28–6.40) on what
can be done “When the Security Council Fails to Act”—although, again
according to Thakur (2019a), this section was written with the under-
standing that multilateral action through the UN was the preferred
course, and that other UN channels were anticipated as being the alter-
native conduits for action beyond the UNSC. As far as Sunga (2006,
p. 77) is concerned, the Commission Report then gave the impression
it had accorded scant regard for the basic principles of state sovereignty
and non-intervention as it “proceeded to classify and characterize various
sorts of deployment of armed force”. Thus, despite the intentions of the
framers, and their extensive subsequent writings attempting to distance
the paradigm from humanitarian intervention, the declaration of an R2P,
from a Western perspective, could still be interpreted it seems as duty to
use force to intervene humanitarianly.
In the intervening years, the R2P paradigm has gained momentum
and garnered further international recognition. At the High-Level Plenary
Meeting for the 2005 World Summit (14–16 September) the world’s
leaders at the UNGA agreed on an R2P which included a “clear and
unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective interna-
tional responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. Resolution 1674, adopted
by the UNSC on 28 April 2006, “Reaffirm[ed] the provisions of
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Docu-
ment regarding the R2P populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity” and commits the UNSC to action
to protect civilians in armed conflict.
Yet despite endorsing the R2P, East Asian actors and commentators
maintain a distinct understanding of what it implies, and its relationship
with human security. The Permanent Representative of South Korea to

the UN, stressed that “the primary responsibility lies in the individual
Government while the international community bears the secondary
responsibility”, that R2P “distinctly different from humanitarian inter-
vention since it is based on collective actions, in accordance with UN
Charter”, and that “not all humanitarian tragedies or human rights viola-
tions can or should activate R2P” (Park 2009). For Japan, “while R2P
recognizes the necessity for enforcement in certain circumstances, human
security rules it out in every occasion”, therefore the focus is one of
prevention reducing the need for intervention (Bellamy and Davies 2009,
p. 552). Nevertheless, the evolution of the R2P doctrine itself is reflec-
tive of increased engagement between East Asian states and the wider
international community.
As discussed above, the initial ICISS report seemed, it has been
claimed, permissive of humanitarian intervention whether or not autho-
rised by the UNSC. This report was drafted by an independent body of
experts serving in an advisory capacity to the UN, and Asia was under-
represented on the panel given that the only members from the region
were former President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines and Ramesh Thakur
of India. The World Summit document was more binding in terms of
both legality and, given the near universal representation at the UNGA, in
terms of legitimacy, but it was more restrictive in terms of the use of force.
Indeed, it appears to reaffirm the traditional pre-eminence of the UNSC,
and the restrictions imposed on the UN and other international actions
by international law. UNSC Resolution 1674 takes a similarly restric-
tive line. As such, the whole paradigm has been made more palatable
to East Asian states. On 14 September 2009, the UNGA adopted resolu-
tion A/63/L80 Rev.1 entitled “The Responsibility to Protect” which had
been co-sponsored by 67 member states from every region in the world,
including a number of states from Asia. Only seven states sought to play
down the importance of the document, stressing that in their opinion
the resolution was strictly procedural, and none of these came from the
region.
Hence East Asia is vital for understanding the dynamics of UN global
governance not only because it has witnessed some of the greatest chal-
lenges and triumphs of the UN, including the two most comprehensive
state-building projects, Cambodia and Timor-Leste; and the Korean War,
the largest enforcement action ever undertaken; but also because of the
alternative governance perspectives emanating from the region. Thus this
volume analyses both cases from the perspectives of legality—whether the

UN was entitled to take control of the administration of each country
to the extent they did; legitimacy—whether the UN administrations
acted in accordance with the dictates of international, regional, and local
norms, fulfilling their own initial good governance objectives, with a
particular emphasis on human security, as well as taking into account
local and regional socio-cultural perspectives while building from the
bottom up; and efficacy or effectiveness—how well the UN administra-
tions performed in terms of ensuring human-centred good governance,
conflict transformation, and positive peacebuilding when addressing the
problems of marginalised individuals, groups, and communities, as well as
the legacies they left in place upon the withdrawal of UN personnel.
Chapter Overview
Chapter 2 assesses the role of the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC) across the first two ‘moments’ described above,
encompassing the decision to intervene, the mandate given to the
UN mission, and the implementation of the state-building endeavours
from the perspective of international and domestic legal endorsement,
multifaceted legitimacy, and the effectiveness of the mission from the
perspective of human-centred governance, peacebuilding, and conflict
resolution. “The Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement
of the Cambodian Conflict” signed in Paris on 23 October 1991, which
became known as the Paris Peace Agreements, invited the UNSC to estab-
lish the UNTAC and provided it with the mandate. In February 1992,
through Resolution 745, the UNSC created the UNTAC, with a mandate
to help this Southeast Asian country undergo a triple transition from war
to peace, from socialist authoritarianism to liberal democracy, and from
poverty to prosperity through market-based economic reconstruction
(Peou 2000).
This chapter shows that despite substantial international backing and
legal support, UNTAC was at best a qualified success with a number
of limitations. In war-torn countries, no amount of legality that peace
operations enjoy is a sufficient condition for success and the questions of
legitimacy and effectiveness are always most critical. Legitimacy depends
on not only international support but more importantly local compli-
ance and cooperation. In spite of the UN-organised national election in
1993 and the subsequent establishment of a coalition government, the
war continued until the end of 1998. Without the ability to gain the trust
of conflictual parties, or to build it between them, the UN administration
fell short of even establishing a limited ‘negative peace’, whereby armed
conflict was ended, as the Khmer Rouge pulled out of the process. Any
hope for securing a more ‘positive peace’ through the transformation of
conflictual relationships was therefore even further from being realised.
Chapter 3 picks up the story of the legacy of UN involvement in
Cambodia. Although the mission ended in July 1993, UN agencies
continued to be heavily engaged in the country. Yet the period from this
date to the present represents the third ‘moment’ of UN governance
evaluation, that of post-intervention consequences of policies carried
out by the world body. There have been considerable successes on the
socio-economic front associated with freedom from want, with the UN
contributing greatly in terms of economic growth, health, education,
and public safety, while more Cambodians have become more socially
and economically secure. Yet political gains and the transformation of
conflictual relationships have been much more limited. The chapter
argues that despite the status of the UN as a major legitimate actor, and
the legality of its operations, the long-term effectiveness of its administra-
tion has been uneven and mostly limited by the politico-security dynamics
that unfolded after the UNTAC departure.
Chapter 4 introduces the second major case study of UN peace-
building, state-building and governance, that of Timor-Leste. This
chapter starts with the UN Administration in East Timor (UNAMET:
June–September 1999). It then considers in detail, the UN Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which had a PKO mandate,
and ran from 1999 until 2002, with the aim of administering the terri-
tory, exercising legislative and executive authority during the transition
period until independence, and supporting capacity-building for self-
government. At the end of this period, with Timor-Leste celebrating the
recovery of its independence not only from Indonesia, but also from the
UN administration which followed, the UN felt able to laud its own
achievements (UN Foundation 2002). On the day when Timor-Leste
restored its independence, UNTAET was replaced by the UN Mission of
Support in East Timor (UNMISET: May 2002–May 2005), which, as the
name suggests, was to play a more supportive role to the national govern-
ment state-building and consolidation processes. The chapter concludes
with an analysis of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMIT
May 2006–December 2012).
UN operations in Timor-Leste in fact, out of necessity, went far beyond

peacekeeping. The UN was blind to existing local structures and mech-
anisms, which were alien to the typical Western model of state-building.
This inability of the UN to identify and work with local mechanisms and
customs has undermined the legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of the local
population. Regardless of the necessity of such far-reaching usurpation of
sovereignty and imposition of governance structures (at least at the level
of national government), it is questionable whether the UN and members
of the international community acting under the auspices of the UN,
were legally empowered to carry them out. But perhaps an even larger
question mark hangs over their efficacy. Despite claims to the contrary,
the evidence of the 2006 upheavals suggested that initial state-building
operations carried out under first UNTAET and then UNMISET were a
failure from the perceptive of transforming conflictual relations.
Chapter 5 focuses on the legacy of the UN administration and missions
in Timor-Leste from the perspective of efficient and long-term provision
for the human security of the inhabitants of the territory, in terms of both
freedom from want and freedom from fear. It would seem that by 2012,
UN operations in Timor-Leste and their indigenous counterparts had at
least overcome the majority of the shortcomings of the earlier PKOs in
terms of providing national stability and physical peace and security. This
had been achieved through a number of initiatives aimed at garnering the
support of key stakeholders who might otherwise have had an interest
in perpetuating instability. And while the UN cannot claim direct credit
for the ‘buying peace’ solution, it can be said that the UN contributed
indirectly to creating a conducive environment for such a solution to be
effective.
Yet the UN operations in Timor-Leste were often at odds with their
indigenous counterparts, failed to come to terms with some aspects of
freedom from want and distributive injustice, and contributed to a culture
of impunity among ruling elites. Thus, despite the peaceful 2012 elec-
tions, and the withdrawal of external mission personnel, the underlying
foundations for long-term peace, stability, and development, may yet to
have been fully laid. Nevertheless, democratic platforms established by
the UN provided an arena for the Timorese political elite to compete in
a legal and peaceful manner including further critical elections in 2017
(presidential) and 2018 (parliament). The UN has planted several key
seeds for promoting human security in Timor-Leste. But there have been
limits on its performance effectiveness and legacy in particular in the areas
of distributive justice (benefit to the least well off) and retributive justice,
with reconciliation preferred to punishment.
Chapter 6 compares the two cases, attempts to draw shared lessons
from these two Southeast Asian UN interventions and administrations,
and also addresses the operational and theoretical implications of the
broader East Asian operating environment. Governance by the UN
administrations in Cambodia and Timor-Leste achieved a great deal but
was not the unqualified success in either case that the organisation itself,
and its chief supporters would have the world believe. Certainly, in
both cases, the immediate threat to life and limb declined dramatically
following the UN’s involvement, thus by at least one narrow definition of
human security (freedom from fear) they could be viewed as governance
success stories. Also, what were essentially failed states were reconstructed
(or in the case of Timor-Leste constructed) through a functionally impres-
sive state-building project leaving a relatively stable domestic governance
apparatus in place when the UN withdrew.
The major difference between the two cases in this area was that the
UN governance-building was grafted upon pre-existing infrastructure in
Cambodia over a relatively short 18-month timeframe, whereas 12 years
of effort were invested in essentially building a new state in Timor-Leste.
That the efforts appear ultimately (despite numerous setbacks) to have
been relatively successful in the latter, whereas the former has reverted
to state authoritarianism, reveals the importance of long-term vision,
commitment, and legacy or just post-intervention.
The period of UN governance, in both cases, incubated other sources
of conflictual relations and insecurity, although perhaps for different
reasons. Likewise, the legacy of the UN administrations in each case leaves
a lot to be desired in terms of broader definitions of human security
(which have tended to emphasise freedom from want). In Cambodia,
efforts by the UN to be as inclusive as possible left conflictual forces
overly empowered, and the UN administration itself under-resourced and
under-equipped to deal with them all. In Timor-Leste, by contrast, failure
to include all the rebel forces stored up resentment and paved the way for
the 2006 crisis. Timor-Leste does appear to have been able to weather the
internal turmoil and consolidate democratic governance to a reasonable
degree, whereas Cambodia has laboured under the authoritarian shadow
of an emerging one-party state since the UN withdrawal. Both coun-
tries have experienced significant economic growth when measured at an
aggregate national level since the UN departed; yet division of the bene-
fits of the growth has not been equitable in either case, often the most
vulnerable groups are no better off and are even endangered by the forces
of development, and in both cases much of the development is a result of
the plundering of natural resources rather than sustainable growth.
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CHAPTER 2
A Critical Reflection on UNTAC’s

Contributions to Human Security
in Cambodia
Abstract UNTAC was a limited success when assessed in terms of

legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness. This operation would not have been
launched had the UN Security Council, especially the five Permanent
Members, not reached an agreement and would not have enjoyed as
much legitimacy as it did if foreign governments (especially the nineteen
foreign signatories) and the Cambodian people, especially the four armed
factions, had objected to the proposed course of action. Comparatively,
however, the degree of legality was far higher than that of legitimacy. The
mission succeeded in organising and holding a national election but fell
short of ensuring a fully free and fair election. The disarmament process
was the greatest failure. Overall, the Cambodians enjoyed more freedom
from fear and freedom from want than any time since the mid-1970s.
Keywords Cambodia · Political factions · Paris Peace Agreements ·

UNTAC · Peacekeeping · Legality · Legitimacy and effectiveness
Introduction
Although the concept of human security was formalised in 1994
by the UN Development Programme, what the UN had done in
Cambodia between 1992 and 1993 can be characterised as an important
© The Author(s) 2021 33

B. M. Howe et al., UN Governance, Security, Development
and Human Rights in East Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54572-7_2
case study for a critical reflection on its contributions to human secu-

rity in this war-torn country. As noted in Chapter 1, human security has
two dimensions: freedom from fear and freedom from want. From this
perspective, the UN mission in the form of UN Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC) provides a useful case study for understanding
and explaining the way in which the UN mission contributed to human
security in Cambodia and the extent to which it succeeded in making its
contributions.
It is worth emphasising that the Cambodian people had suffered much
from a bloody civil war from 1970 to 1975, followed by mass atrocities
committed by the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1978) and the Viet-
namese invasion and occupation in the 1980s. Millions of lives were lost
and most of those who survived were left vulnerable to various forms
of threat such as political violence, landmines, and poverty. UNTAC was
widely known as the UN’s unprecedented multifaceted mission to help
Cambodia undergo a triple transition from war to peace, from socialist
authoritarianism to liberal democracy, and from poverty to prosperity
through market-based economic reconstruction (Peou 1997, 2000). The
mission was deployed after four armed Cambodian factions and nineteen
foreign governments had signed on 23 October 1991 a historic document
known as Paris Peace Agreements (PPAs) (UN 1991).
One of the critical questions raised in this chapter is the extent to
which the UN intervention achieved its objectives in terms of putting
an end to the war, turning the battlefield into a ballot box, and getting
Cambodia back on its path towards peace. This chapter only focuses its
analysis on UNTAC’s role. Analysis of UNTAC legacies will be offered in
the next chapter. Overall, UNTAC was a limited success when assessed in
terms of legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness. This operation would not
have been launched had the UN Security Council (SC), especially the five
Permanent Members (P5), not reached an agreement and would not have
enjoyed as much legitimacy as it did if foreign governments (especially
the nineteen foreign signatories) and the Cambodian people, especially
the four armed factions, had objected to the proposed course of action.
Comparatively, however, the degree of legality was far higher than that of
legitimacy: the four factions did not comply with the PPAs and cooper-
ated with UNTAC to the fullest extent. The Khmer Rouge in particular
refused to disarm, violated the ceasefire and stayed out of the electoral
process, thus leaving the peace process marred by political violence and
Another random document with
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Wheat straw, 40 to 50 Pease and Beans, 3 to 5
Barley straw, 20 to 40 Wheat, 5 to 6
Oat straw, 20 to 40 Barley, 5 to 6
Pea straw, 10 to 15 Oats, 4 to 7
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Old potatoes, 40? Oil-cake, 2 to 4
It is found in practice, as the above table shews, that twenty stones of potatoes
or three of oil-cake will nourish an animal as much as ten stones of hay, and five
stones of oats as much as either. Something, however, will depend upon the quality
of each kind of food, and upon the age and constitution of the animal. The skilful
feeder of stock knows also the value of a change of food, or of a mixture of the
different kinds of vegetable food he may have at his command.
The nutritive value of different kinds of food has also been represented
theoretically, by supposing it to be very nearly in proportion to the quantity of
nitrogen, or of gluten, which vegetables contain. Though this cannot be considered
as a correct principle, yet as the ordinary kind of food on which stock is fed contains
in general an ample supply of carbon for respiration, with a comparatively small
proportion of nitrogen, these theoretical determinations are by no means without
their value, and they approach in many cases very closely to the practical values
above given, as deduced from actual trial. Thus, assuming that 10 lbs. of hay yield a
certain amount of nourishment, then of the other vegetable substances it will be
necessary, according to theory, to give the following quantities, in order to produce
the same effect:
Hay, 10 Turnips, 60
Clover hay, 8 Carrots, 35
Vetch hay,[26] 4 Cabbage, 30 to 40
Wheat straw, 52 Pease and Beans, 2 to 3
Barley straw, 52 Wheat, 5
Oat straw, 55 Barley, 6
Pea straw, 6 Oats, 5
Potatoes, 28 Indian corn, 6
Old potatoes, 40 Oil-cake, 2
If the feeder be careful to supply his stock with a mixture or occasional change
of food, he may very safely regulate the quantity of any one he ought to substitute
for a given weight of any of the others, by the numbers in the above tables—since
the theoretical and practical results do not in general very greatly differ.
As has been already stated, it is not strictly correct that this or that kind of
vegetable is more fitted to sustain animal life, simply because of the larger
proportion of nitrogen it contains; but it is wisely provided, that along with this
nitrogen in all plants, a certain proportion of starch or sugar and of saline and earthy
matter are always associated—so that the quantity of nitrogen may be considered
as a rough practical index of the proportion of some of the important saline and
earthy ingredients also.
An important practical lesson on this subject is taught us by the study of the wise
provisions of Nature. Not only does the milk of the mother contain all the elements
of a nutritive food mixed up together—as the egg does also for the unhatched bird—
but in rich natural pastures the same mixture uniformly occurs. Hence, in cropping
the mixed herbage, the animal introduces into its stomach portions of various plants
—some abounding more in starch or sugar, some more in gluten or albumen, some
naturally richer in saline, others in earthy constituents; and out of these varied
materials the digestive organs select a due proportion of each, and reject the rest.
Wherever a pasture becomes usurped by one or two grasses—either animals
cease to thrive upon it, or they must crop a much larger quantity of food to supply
the natural waste of all the parts of their bodies.
It may indeed be assumed as almost a general principle, that whenever animals
are fed on one kind of vegetable only, there is a waste of one or other of the
necessary elements of animal food, and that the great lesson on this subject taught
us by nature is, that, by a judicious admixture, not only is food economised, but the
labour imposed upon the digestive organs is also materially diminished.
SECTION VIII.—CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

In this little work, now brought to a close, I have presented the reader with a
slight, and I hope plain and familiar, sketch of the various topics connected with
practical agriculture, on which the sciences of chemistry and geology are fitted to
throw the greatest light.
We have studied the general characters of the organic and inorganic elements of
which the parts of plants are made up, and the several compounds of these
elements which are of the greatest importance in the vegetable kingdom. We have
examined the nature of the seed,—seen by what beautiful provision it is fed during
its early germination—in what form the elements by which it is nourished are
introduced into the circulation of the young plant when the functions of the seed are
discharged,—and how earth, air, and water are all made to minister to its after-
growth. We have considered the various chemical changes which take place within
the growing plant, during the formation of its woody stem, the blossoming of its
flower, and the ripening of its seed or fruit,—and have traced the further changes it
undergoes, when, the functions of its short life being discharged, it hastens to serve
other purposes, by mingling with the soil, and supplying food to new races. The soils
themselves in which plants grow, their nature, their origin, the causes of their
diversity in mineral character, and in natural productiveness, have each occupied a
share of our attention—while the various means of improving their agricultural value
by manuring or otherwise, have been practically considered, and theoretically
explained. Lastly, we have glanced at the comparative worth of the various products
of the land, as food for man or other animals, and have briefly illustrated the
principles upon which the feeding of animals and the relative nutritive powers of the
vegetables on which they live are known to depend.
In this short and familiar treatise I have not sought so much to satisfy the
demands of the philosophical agriculturist, as to awaken the curiosity of my less
instructed reader, to shew him how much interesting as well as practically useful
information chemistry and geology are able and willing to impart to him, and thus to
allure him in quest of further knowledge and more accurate details to my larger
work,[27] of which the present exhibits only a brief outline.
J. P. Wright, Printer, 18 New street, N. Y.

Wiley & Putnam’s New Publications.
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With engravings.
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an Attempt to explain the Principal Operations
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Footnotes:
[1] Both potatoes and turnips contain about four-fifths of their
weight of water, or five tons of either of these roots contain nearly
four tons of water.
[2] This is the scale of the common thermometer used in this
country.
[3] For fuller information on this point, see the Author’s “Lectures
on Agricultural Chemistry and Geology,” Part I.
[4] Since carbonic acid, as shewn in the previous chapter,
consists only of carbon and oxygen, they retain the carbon and
reject the oxygen.
[5] In malting barley, it is made to sprout a certain length, and the
growth is then arrested by heating and drying it. Mashed barley,
before sprouting, will not dissolve in water, but when sprouted, the
whole of the starch (the flour) it contains dissolves readily by a
gentle heat. The diastase formed during the germination effects
this. By further heating in the brewer’s wort, this starch is
converted into sugar as it is in the growing plant.
[6] For fuller and more precise explanations on these interesting
topics, see the Author’s Lectures on Agricultural Chemistry and
Geology, Part I.
[7] Potash, soda, lime, and magnesia, are compounds of the
metals here named with oxygen. It is a very striking fact, that the
suffocating gas chlorine, when combined with sodium, a metal
which takes fire when placed upon water, should form the
agreeable and necessary condiment, common salt.
[8] And occasionally do give; for a plump grain, and even a well-
filled ear, are not unfrequently found where the straw is unusually
deficient.
[9] See pages 51 and 52, where these substances are described.
[10] A further portion, it will be recollected, is carried off in the
cattle that are sent to market,—this is here neglected.
[11] Unless the soil happen to contain a large quantity of
magnesia, which is rarely the case.
[12] That is, containing the same general proportions of sand,
clay, lime, &c., or coloured red by similar quantities of oxide of
iron.
[13] See page 94.
[14] The unstratified are often called crystalline rocks, because
they frequently have a glassy appearance, or contain regular
crystals of certain mineral substances; often also igneous rocks,
because they appear all to have been originally in a melted state,
or to have been produced by fire.
[15] The reader is referred for more precise information to the
author’s “Lectures,” pp. 377 to 390.
[16] By locally excellent, I mean those who are the best possible
farmers of their own district and after their own way, but who
would fail in other districts requiring other methods. To the
possessor of agricultural principles the modifications required by
difference of crop, soil, and climate, readily suggest themselves,
where the mere practical man is bewildered, disheartened, and in
despair.
[17] It is owing to this large quantity of saline and other inorganic
matter that fermented leaves form too strong a dressing for flower
borders, and that gardeners therefore generally mix them up into
a compost.
[18] Though I have dwelt as long upon these interesting and, I
believe, novel considerations, as the limits of this little work will
permit, yet I must refer the reader for fuller details, and to perhaps
a clearer exposition of the principles above advanced than I have
here been able to give, to my “Lectures on Agricultural
Chemistry and Geology.”
[19] See the author’s “Suggestions for Experiments in Practical
Agriculture,” Nos. 1 & 2.
[20] The result of trials made on the mica slate and gneiss soils
(see page 100) of the Duke of Atholl.
[21] See pages 240 and 241.
[22] Albumen is the name given by chemists to the white of the
egg. A small quantity of this substance is present in every kind of
grain. It is closely related to gluten.
[23] On this subject the reader will consult with advantage an
excellent practical paper in the Quarterly Journal of Agriculture for
June 1841, by Mr. Hannam of North Deighton, Yorkshire, to whom
I have to express my obligations for information regarding the
results of some further experiments made by him during the last
autumn (1841).
[24] The flour being supposed to contain 15 per cent. of dry
gluten, on which supposition all the above calculations are made.
[25] In warm weather the milk contains more butter, in cold
weather more cheese and sugar.
[26] Both cut in flower.
[27] Lectures on Agricultural Chemistry and Geology.
Transcriber’s Notes:
The cover image was created by the transcriber, and is in the public domain.
Deprecated spellings or ancient words were not corrected.
The illustrations have been moved so that they do not break up paragraphs and so
that they are next to the text they illustrate.
Typographical and punctuation errors have been silently corrected.
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The Roles of the United Nations

of the Westphalian system of states, and the principle of national self-

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

constraints arising from the application of international humanitarian law,

responsibility to rebuild (Fleck 2012; Pattison 2015), and, more broadly,

to the fundamental principles of peacekeeping” (ibid., p. 10). Concep-

conflicts. Firmness and fairness are important in that UN peace opera-

conflict through the virtuous triangle of economic interdependence,

Earl Conteh-Morgan (2005, p. 69) further notes that human security

Efficacy: Promoting Human Security

Established in 2002, the International Criminal Court looks pathetically

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made the first explicit

legally binding, the Committee’s resolutions and discussions have raised

forms of socio-economic and political inequity. Proponents of the ‘broad’

on Human rights, several East Asian states questioned the applicability

ICISS in 2001 as answer to reconciling the neuralgic rejection of ‘human-

with human security. The Permanent Representative of South Korea to

volume analyses both cases from the perspectives of legality—whether the

UN operations in Timor-Leste in fact, out of necessity, went far beyond

Benedek, W., Kettemann, M. C., & Möstl, M. (Eds.). (2010). Mainstreaming

Helfer, L. (2014). Effectiveness of International Adjudicators. In C. P. R.

Kim, H. J., & Sikkink, K. (2012/2013). How Do Human Rights Prosecutions

Park, I. K. (2009). Statement by H. E. Mr. Park In-Kook, Permanent Repre-

UN Foundation. (2002, May 31). United Nations Peacekeeping Success Story:

A Critical Reflection on UNTAC’s

Abstract UNTAC was a limited success when assessed in terms of

Keywords Cambodia · Political factions · Paris Peace Agreements ·