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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
ASIA-PACIFIC POLITICAL ECONOMY

Unpacking EU
Policy-Making towards
China
How Member States,
Bureaucracies, and
Institutions Shape its China
Economic Policy
Bas Hooijmaaijers
Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy

Series Editor
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
Mr. & Mrs. S.H. Wong Center for the Study
of Multinational Corporations
Los Gatos, CA, USA
The series aims to publish works, which will be meaningful to academics,
businesspeople, and policymakers and broaden or deepen their knowl-
edge about contemporary events or significant trends, or enable them to
think in new ways about the interaction of politics and economics in the
APR. Possible candidates for the series include topics relating to foreign
direct investment, bilateral investment treaties, multinational corpora-
tions, regional economic institutions, technology policy, economic global-
ization, corporate social responsibility, economic development strategies,
and labor movements.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15638
 Bas Hooijmaaijers

Unpacking EU
Policy-Making
towards China
How Member States, Bureaucracies,
and Institutions Shape its China Economic Policy
Bas Hooijmaaijers
School of Advanced International and Area Studies
East China Normal University
Shanghai, China
Leuven International and European Studies Institute
KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium

Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy

ISBN 978-981-15-9366-6 ISBN 978-981-15-9367-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9367-3

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
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To Liu Fang, for her support and endless patience.
 Foreword

China’s economic comeback story is one of the most dramatic events of

the last four decades. After representing more than 30 per cent of global
gross domestic product (GDP) in the centuries up to 1820, China hit
only five per cent in 1975; now, after 40 years of its opening-up, China’s
economy stands at 15 per cent of global GDP. I first came to China in
1982, and have witnessed the many ups and downs of this continent-sized
country, living in both Beijing and Shanghai for more than 30 years.
Serving as the president of the European Union (EU) Chamber of
Commerce in China for seven years provided me a ringside seat from
which to observe not only China’s challenges, but also the successes it has
enjoyed, since acceding to the World Trade Organization in 2001. While
OECD countries’ economies were badly impacted by the global finan-
cial crisis in 2008, China’s took off in spectacular fashion. This created
new opportunities and benefits for Europe, but it has also brought critical
new challenges. These challenges include the impact of Chinese industrial
overcapacity, dumping and subsidies on the EU market, but also the emer-
gence of state-controlled Chinese companies in third markets. Meanwhile,
China’s domestic market still does not offer reciprocity to European firms.
It was against the backdrop of these issues that I met Dr Bas Hooij-
maaijers for the first time in Beijing in June 2017, to discuss the EU-China
solar panel dispute, the EU’s trade defence investigation into mobile
telecommunications networks from China and the challenges for the Sino-
European trade and investment relationship more generally. His research

vii
viii FOREWORD

led to the publication of his insightful book Unpacking EU policy-making

towards China.
The EU has long been considering how to effectively respond to the
challenge of China’s massive footprint across diverse sectors and loca-
tions. The analytical framework developed in this book helps to contribute
to a better understanding of this challenge and uncovers which tools
best illuminate the EU’s policy-making at various stages of the policy
process. The three case studies on the dispute over Chinese solar panels,
the investigation into Huawei’s telecommunication networks, and China’s
rise in Africa and the subsequent response of the EU, shed light on the
evolving nature of Sino-European trade relations, the internal workings
of EU trade defence policy, and, more generally, the current challenges to
globalisation and the international trading order.
Although this book aims to reach a broader audience, it is also very
much a treasure trove for academics, business people and policy-makers. It
will help businesses carry out more effective risk and business environment
assessments, facilitate business plans and develop government and public
relations strategies.
I wish this book had been published many years ago, and I hope that
it will be as thought-provoking to other readers as it was for me.

Beijing, China Jörg Wuttke

summer 2020 President of the European Union Chamber
of Commerce in China
 Acknowledgments

I am writing these acknowledgments as we are experiencing unprece-

dented times with the impact of COVID-19 being felt across the world.
However, every disadvantage has its advantage, and I was able to use the
time that I had to stay at home in the Netherlands to finalize this book
project. This book is the result of a long and exciting research journey
that allowed me to broaden my view to discover many different facets of
the rapidly changing global order. During this journey, which started in
fall 2013 at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) as a Ph.D. candidate,
and was further strengthened and improved during my time at East China
Normal University (ECNU), I encountered a variety of different individ-
uals and institutions in both Europe and China, and I am deeply grateful
for their support.
To start with, I would like to thank my former Ph.D. supervisor,
colleague, friend, and editor of this book series Professor Jean-Marc F.
Blanchard, for his guidance and support. He deserves my warmest thanks.
This book would not have reached this high level of quality without his
intellectual input. I would like to express my appreciation to ECNU’s
School of Advanced International and Area Studies, particularly Dean
Liu Jun, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Univer-
sities [grant number 2017ECNU-HLYT019] for their financial support
to conduct and improve this research. I am also thankful to Professor
Stephan Keukeleire, my former boss, and master thesis supervisor at KU
Leuven, for his feedback throughout the Ph.D. process, including as an

ix
x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

external reviewer, and the process of writing this book. I also would like to
express my appreciation to the other two external reviewers of my Ph.D.
dissertation, Professor Men Jing (College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium),
and Professor Sebastian Bersick (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany) for
their feedback and suggestions. I would like to thank the Chinese Profes-
sors that participated in the various review rounds of the Ph.D. process:
Professor Zhong Yang, Professor Zhang Junhua, Professor Lin Gang, Li
Mingming (all from SJTU), Professor Liu Hongsong (Shanghai Interna-
tional Studies University), and Professor Chen Zhimin (Fudan Univer-
sity). I am also grateful to Dr. Sven Grimm and Dr. Anna Stahl for their
invaluable comments on the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation case.
I, too, would like to thank the KU Leuven for providing the opportunity
to stay affiliated with them as a research fellow. This allowed me to benefit
from their infrastructure, and this was and is very much appreciated.
The research project has benefitted from interviews carried out in
Europe and China. Each of the more than 100 interviews, consulta-
tions, and conversations with European, Chinese, and African officials and
experts has contributed to connecting the pieces of the research puzzle.
Writing this book would not have been possible without their invaluable
insights. Many of the interviewees concerned cannot be named in person
for anonymity reasons, but they know who they are, and I am incredibly
grateful for their input. This work also benefited from a stay at University
College Cork in the ERASMUS Plus training exchange framework in June
2019. I would like to thank Dr. Niall Duggan and Dr. Andrew Cottey for
making this stay possible. Parts of this work were presented during the
30th Association of Chinese Political Studies Annual Meeting and Inter-
national Symposium in Tianjin June 2017, the 59th Annual Convention
of the International Studies Association in San Francisco in April 2018,
the Europe-Africa-China Cooperation in the New Era: Opportunities and
Challenges conference held in Shanghai in July 2019, and the Develop-
ment Cooperation in a post BAPA+40 world Workshop hosted by Fudan
University in October 2019. I would like to take the opportunity to thank
the organizers and the participants of these events for their feedback.
I am extremely thankful to Jörg Wuttke, President of the European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China and EU Chamber staff Carl
Hayward, Jacob Gunter, and Rachel Rapaport, for providing the foreword
to this book. I would also like to thank my friends Caroline Hielegems,
Willem-Pieter de Groen, Yf Reykers, Gert-Jan Put, Jef Smulders, Irina
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi

Petrova, Atena Feraru, and Javier Luque for sharing this book journey
with me.
I have saved my most fundamental debts for last. Without the affec-
tion and understanding of my family, I could not have written this book.
Special thanks are due to my parents and my godparents Jeanne and Nico
for believing in me and giving me the confidence to pursue my interests.
I would also like to thank my wife, Liu Fang, for her continuous support
and endless patience.
Last but not least, I am grateful to the editors at Palgrave Macmillan—
Jacob Dreyer, Balaji Varadharaju, Ashwini Elango, Shukkanthy Siva, and
Aurelia Heumader—for their assistance in transforming the manuscript
into this book, as well as to the anonymous reviewer for his/her feed-
back. For any errors or inadequacies that may remain in this book, the
responsibility is entirely my own.

Shanghai Bas Hooijmaaijers

August 2020
 Praise for Unpacking EU
Policy-Making towards China

“Unpacking EU Policy-Making towards China is a must-read for those

wanting a richer understanding of the forces driving EU economic policy.
Featuring in-depth analyses of EU disputes with China in areas like solar
panels and telecommunications, this book reveals what analytical tools
best illuminate EU policy-making at various stages of the policy process.
It is invaluable to academics, businesspeople, and decision-makers inter-
ested in the EU and EU-China relations specifically, and foreign economic
policy generally.”
—Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Ph.D., Founding Executive Director, Mr. &
Mrs. S.H. Wong Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations

“This book makes an innovative contribution to the theoretical and

comparative analysis of the EU’s foreign policy towards China, as it eval-
uates the explanatory value of three theories in three stages of the policy
cycle based on three case studies. The analytical framework developed by
Bas Hooijmaaijers will be very valuable for other scholars specialized in
EU-China relations, EU foreign policy, and trade policy.”
—Prof. Stephan Keukeleire, LINES Institute, KU Leuven, Belgium

“In view of the geopolitical turn in international affairs, and its impact on
the EU’s international role, a thorough understanding of the factors that
condition EU foreign policy-making is pivotal. “The challenge that China

xiii
xiv PRAISE FOR UNPACKING EU POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS CHINA

presents to the EU both internally and externally,” as Bas Hooijmaai-

jers rightly frames it, asks for innovative research. His book provides new
analysis to better understand the EU’s China policy-making, as well as
its limitations and should become essential reading for scholars, students,
and practitioners of EU-China relations.”
—Prof. Dr. Sebastian Bersick, Jean Monnet Chair, Ruhr University
Bochum, Germany

“This book offers an in-depth analysis on how different actors in the

EU work together to shape its China policy. In particular, the three case
studies give insights on the EU’s foreign policy making towards China
and make the book a good read.”
—Prof. Jing Men, Ph.D, Baillet Latour Chair of EU-China Relations
and Director of EU-China Research Centre in the Department of EU
International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe,
Bruges, Belgium
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Scope, Rationale, and Relevance of the Book 1
An Introduction to EU–China Relations and the EU’s
China Policy 4
The Scholarly Literature on EU-China Relations and Its
Limits 12
Theoretically-Oriented Explanations of EU Foreign
Policy-Making and Their Limits 13
Research Design, Methodology, and Case Selection 14
Findings 18
Outline 20
References 22

2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 29

The Bureaucratic Politics Model 29
Limitations of the Bureaucratic Politics Model 31
BPM Hypotheses for Each Stage of the Policy-Making Process 32
Issue Identification 32
Decision-Making 33
Policy Implementation 33
Neorealism 34
Limitations of Neorealism 36

xv
xvi CONTENTS

Neorealism Hypotheses for Each Stage of the Policy-Making

Process 37
Issue Identification 37
Decision-Making 37
Policy Implementation 37
Institutionalism 38
Limitations of Institutionalism 40
Institutionalism Hypotheses for Each Stage
of the Policy-Making Process 41
Issue Identification 41
Decision-Making 42
Policy Implementation 42
A Summary of the Models and Their Hypotheses 42
Conceptualization and Operationalization
of the Policy-Making Process 44
Concluding Remarks 46
References 46

3 The EU-China Solar Panel Dispute 51

Background to the Solar Panel Case 51
The European Solar Market: From Boom to Bust 51
Trade Commissioner Vows to Take a Tougher Stance
on China 52
The Option Case 52
Issue Identification: Solar Manufacturers up Against
Something not Market-Driven 53
Decision-Making: Politics Plain and Simple? 56
Policy Implementation: An Uphill Battle
from the Beginning? 71
Conclusion 78
Annex: Specification of the Solar Duties 80
References 82

4 The EU Investigation into Mobile Telecommunications

Networks from China 89
Background: Ex Officio Competences, and the Option Case 90
Issue Identification: Concerns that the Chinese Firms Would
Destroy the EU Market 90
 CONTENTS xvii

Decision-Making: Bargaining to Get a Good Outcome

for Europe 94
Policy Implementation: A Floundering Settlement 106
Conclusion 110
References 112

5 The Rise of China in Africa and the Response

of the EU: The EU-China-Africa Trilateral Dialogue
and Cooperation Initiative 117
Background to the EU-China-Africa Case 118
The Rise of China in Africa 118
The Traditional Primacy of Europe in Africa 120
The EU’s Initially Muted Response 121
Issue Identification: China’s Increasing Presence 123
Decision-Making: Seeking Engagement with China 127
Policy Implementation: A Bridge Too Far? 138
Conclusion 143
Annex: Overview European Dialogues with China on Africa 144
References 147

6 Conclusion 153
Evaluating the Competing Models 155
Theoretical Implications 162
The Business and Policy Value of the Analytical
and Empirical Findings 163
Limitations of This Study 168
Venues for Further Research 170
Closing Remarks 171
References 172

Index 175
 Abbreviations

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group

AFASE Alliance for Affordable Solar Energy
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
AU African Union
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
BPM Bureaucratic Politics Model
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAI Comprehensive Agreement on Investments
CARI China Africa Research Initiative
CCP Common Commercial Policy
CCSA China Communication Standards Association
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
COAFR Council Working Group for Africa
COASI Council Working Group for Asia
COFDI Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DG Directorate-General
DG DEV Directorate-General for Development
DG DEVCO Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Develop-
ment
DG RELEX Directorate-General for the External Relations
DG TRADE Directorate-General for Trade
ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations

xix
xx ABBREVIATIONS

ECJ European Court of Justice

EEAS European External Action Service
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
EUFP European Union Foreign Policy
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HR High Representative
HR/VP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International Relations
JAES Joint Africa-EU Strategy
LT Treaty of Lisbon
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MES Market Economy Status
MIP Minimum Import Price
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
PRC People’s Republic of China
SAIS School of Advanced International Studies
TCA Trade and Cooperation Agreement
TDI Trade Defense Instruments
TEU Treaty on the European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States
WTO World Trade Organization
 List of Graphs

Graph 5.1 China-Africa trade, 1992–2018 (in billion USD) 119

Graph 5.2 Chinese FDI Flow to African Countries, 2003–2018
(in billion USD) 120

xxi
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Overview of the generic hypotheses 43

Table 2.2 Theories from the “stages approach” within public policy 44
Table 3.1 Chronology of the issue identification stage
in the EU-China solar dispute 54
Table 3.2 Chronology of the decision-making stage
in the EU-China solar dispute 57
Table 3.3 Chronology of the implementation of the solar measures 72
Table 4.1 Chronology of the issue identification stage
in the EU-China telecoms case 91
Table 4.2 Chronology of the decision-making in the EU-China
telecoms case 95
Table 4.3 Chronology of the implementation of the EU-China
settlement on telecoms 107
Table 5.1 Political and institutional dialogues of the EU and the big
three with China on Africa (by mid-2020) 145

xxiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Scope, Rationale, and Relevance of the Book

This book is about unpacking European Union (EU) policy-making
toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China). It illuminates how
member states, bureaucracies, and institutions shape the EU’s China
economic policy. China’s rise and economic comeback story are among
the most dramatic developments of the last decades, and present a chal-
lenge to the EU both internally and externally. When observing the EU’s
China policy, one is often confronted with puzzling observations. They
include, among others, the following questions. The EU stands firm
against unfair trade practices and uses trade defense instruments (TDIs)
to uphold its commitment to open markets and free trade. Why were
some EU member states simultaneously sidelining the EU by engaging
in parallel discussions with China regarding the dumping of Chinese
solar panels on the EU market? If an EU industry was aware of unfair
trade practices, for instance, by the Chinese side in telecommunication
networks, why did the industry not lodge a formal complaint to the
European Commission? Moreover, why are the member states that were
aware of these practices influential in the decision-making stage but not
in the issue identification stage of the policy process? When the European
Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) concerned with development
issues (DG DEV) was developing a strategy to deal with China’s rise in

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to 1

Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
B. Hooijmaaijers, Unpacking EU Policy-Making towards China,
Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9367-3_1
2 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

Africa, why was there internal resistance from the Commission’s former
DG involving external relations (DG RELEX)? Furthermore, why have no
concrete EU-China-Africa trilateral development projects seen the light
since the launch of the initiative in 2008? This book offers insights that
contribute to a better understanding of these puzzles.
Although the number of academic publications on EU–China rela-
tions is booming, there is a specific and general inability of contemporary
literature to explain the above’s puzzles. Academic work on EU foreign
policy (EUFP) toward China is heavily policy-driven, with very few works
using theory. This indicates a lacuna in the current literature and current
academic approaches regarding EU foreign policy-making vis-à-vis China
because even fewer academic works seek to test theoretical approaches
thoroughly (Bersick 2015). However, multiple international relations
(IR) theories have the potential to illuminate EUFP vis-à-vis China and to
explain (part of) these puzzles, including the bureaucratic politics model
(BPM), neorealism, and institutionalism. The BPM emphasizes internal
bargaining within an entity; neorealism stresses that state interests domi-
nate; institutionalism highlights the importance of competences, and EU
law and procedures, which is of particular importance in an EU context
with different procedures per issue area.1 These theories assume universal
applicability, which is problematic in two ways. First, these theories do
not apply equally well to all issue areas. Second, these theories do not
illuminate all stages of the policy-making process, even when we focus on
one issue area; that is, economics. When scholars use theory, there is a
failure to unpack the policy cycle. The universal applicability of theories is
a problematic assumption. Indeed, the contemporary literature’s inability
is that those works that use theory do not test them thoroughly because
they do not focus on the various stages of the policy cycle and do not add
scope conditions. Case studies on the EU and China, as well as studies
more generally, often do not focus on the policy cycle, including issue
identification, decision-making, and policy implementation.2
A more in-depth look into the policy cycle stages provides us with
an analytical tool to gain more specific knowledge to explain the EU
foreign policy-making process and add scope conditions. Scope condi-
tions are universal statements that define the circumstances in which a
theory is applicable (Cohen 1989: 83). As pointed out by Foschi (1997),
they limit the applicability of the relationship proposed in a hypothesis.
Scope conditions constitute the antecedent clause of a conditional state-
ment. If a situation does not meet this, then nothing is being said about
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

that relationship. A scope condition specifies what we can and cannot see
as evidence relevant to the formulated hypothesis by limiting the claim a
statement makes. Given the limits of the existing literature, there is a need
to explore EU foreign policy drivers vis-à-vis the PRC anew. The issue I
argue in this manuscript is not that these existing theories are wrong or
lack potential, but that there is an inadequate appreciation of the fact they
do not apply equally well to all domains.
As discussed in the previous paragraph, there is a need to identify the
range of applicability of these theories. When do they work and when do
they not work? I show this by examining three distinct stages of the policy
cycle in three political-economic cases. My three cases are the EU-China
solar panel dispute, the EU investigation into mobile telecommunication
networks from China, and the EU’s response to China’s rise in Africa
where I look at the European Commission initiated EU-China-Africa
trilateral cooperation initiative. These three cases are hot topics in EU-
China relations, but they also have an apparent political-economic angle.
I argue that neorealism works best to understand the decision-making
stage in the solar and telecommunications trade defense cases, and it was
visible in the background of the decision-making stage of the EU-China-
Africa case. Institutionalism illuminates virtually every stage of every issue
area in EU foreign policy-making. The BPM, for instance, fits the stage
of policy implementation. However, this is predominantly correct when
there is more leeway. When key (bureaucratic) actors leave, then policy
implementation will reflect this.
Two main contributions make this project distinctive. The first one is
my findings of theory scope conditions. The second is my empirical work
because I am studying insufficiently studied cases and using more and
better evidence to evaluate existing arguments and cull out these scope
conditions. In more scientific terms, cutting the dependent variable into
policy stages allows us to see if the independent variables highlighted
by various analytical approaches are equally powerful through all policy
process stages. These findings can provide useful analytical lenses for those
studying EUFP toward other countries, regions, and issues.
The policy relevance lies in predicting what might happen in EU
foreign policy-making and understanding which actors and factors are
most influential in the three distinct stages of the policy process. Readers
will get more clarity about how policy stages affect EU identification
of issues, policy selection, and implementation. Given the peculiar insti-
tutional framework of the EU, this is highly important. It is all about
4 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

competences. Also, all three cases are part of a more significant challenge
for the EU, which is how to deal with emerging powers in general and
China in particular (see also Hooijmaaijers 2015, 2018, 2019; Keukeleire
and Hooijmaaijers 2014; Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire 2020). The first
two cases enlighten the readers on the internal workings of EU trade
defense policy, the evolving nature of Sino-European trade relations, and,
more generally, the current challenges to globalization and the inter-
national trading order. The EU-China-Africa case illuminates the EU’s
internal workings against the backdrop of a new party with its view
on development with a focus on trade, investment, and infrastructure
entering the African stage.
This chapter will continue as follows. The next section provides an
introduction to EU–China relations and the EU’s China policy, which
serves as a background for a better understanding of their relations. A
section that focuses on the limitations of current academic approaches
to EU-China relations will follow this. The subsequent section discusses
several potential theoretical candidates for analyzing EU foreign policy-
making. After that, I will set out the research design, methodology, and
case selection, followed by this manuscript’s main findings and the theo-
retical and policy implications of these findings. This introduction chapter
ends with an outline of the entire manuscript.

An Introduction to EU–China
Relations and the EU’s China Policy
Over the past decades, EU-China relations have developed rapidly. There
are various stages in the relationship, including the period of no diplo-
matic relations from the late 1940s until 1974, the period of mutual
disregard (1975–1994), the period of mutual attraction (1995–2002),
and the subsequent honeymoon period (2003–2004/2005), followed
by a period of reflection and adjustment that started in 2005. Equally
important is the move of the Commission and the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of
the European Commission (HR/VP) in 2019. Against the backdrop of
China’s growing economic power and political influence, they reviewed
the EU-China relations and the related opportunities and challenges and
called for a more realistic approach. In their Joint Communication, the
EU side mentioned that “China is simultaneously a cooperation partner
with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner,
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic

competitor in pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival
promoting alternative models of governance” (European Commission
2019).3 It is, however, important to emphasize that the systemic rival
label is not official. The EU has and continues to designate the PRC as
a strategic partner. The Commission called it something else but did not
change the EU’s formal position. Still, the EU is in the nascent stages
of a new debate about China. The Commission paper labeling China as
a systemic rival reflected a sharp change in its balance of assumptions
about EU-China affairs, and the recent COVID-19 pandemic is tilting
that balance further (Small 2020).
The EU and China established bilateral relations in May 1975, with
Christopher Soames being the first European Commissioner to visit
China, in line with the country opening up. There were limited develop-
ments from 1975 until 1995 (though the EU and China signed a trade
agreement in 1978), because both parties were more inward-looking, due
to ongoing reforms in China and European integration. The year 1995
marks a change because, in that year, the EU’s first policy paper on China
titled a long term policy for China-Europe relations was issued. The 1985
Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is the principal legal frame-
work for the relations between both parties.4 Nevertheless, it was only in
1998 that meetings of both parties’ leaders became institutionalized, and
the first EU-China Summit took place. This first bilateral summit was de
facto an offspring of the growing European and Asian interest in mutual
interregional interaction. It was organized back-to-back with the second
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in London (Bersick, 2015).
In 2003, the EU and China launched a strategic partnership to
upgrade the status of their relationship.5 Both sides mutually recog-
nized each other as a strategic partner in 2003, and the EU was on
the receiving end of a “sticks and carrot” approach by Beijing to get to
that point. The development of the Sino-European strategic partnership
in the 2000s suits the broader context of the deepening of integration
in the EU, including the establishment of the EU’s Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as China opening up and reforming
and its subsequent rise (see Cottey and Gottwald 2010; Keukeleire and
Delreux 2014). The 2003–2005 period was the honeymoon period in
Sino-European relations. 2003, in particular, can be seen as the best time
in the parties’ bilateral relationship because frictions between the EU and
6 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

the US over the latter’s invasion of Iraq created an opening for the estab-
lishment of an EU-China strategic partnership. 2005 brought about a
change in Sino-European relations due to a textile dispute, and the EU’s
decision not to lift the arms embargo against China (see Eckhardt 2010;
Zhang 2014).
In the 2006–2010 period, it became clear that the atmosphere had
changed. The EU was again inward-looking with the 2009 Lisbon
Treaty and the subsequent establishment of the European External Action
Service (EEAS), leading to internal EU changes. The EEAS now became
in charge of organizing the EU-China Summit. Over the last decade,
particularly in the economic field, the balance of power has changed
dramatically. China’s agreement in June 2012 to contribute $43 billion to
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) $430 billion bailout fund for
the southern European countries illustrated this. Apart from the Euro-
zone crisis, the more recent migrant crisis, and the Ukraine crisis has made
Brussels “less capable of providing global leadership” (Zeng 2017: 1173).
After an upgrade in 2010, the EU-China strategic partnership now
involves foreign affairs, security matters, and international challenges such
as climate change and global economic governance. The 2013 EU-
China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has continued developing
and diversifying from its original economic focus, creating opportuni-
ties for businesses and contributing to international security, environ-
mental protection, and academic exchanges. Today, over 60 high- and
senior-level dialogues are in place.6 The EU-China dialogue architec-
ture comprises three pillars, including the High-Level Strategic Dialogue,
the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, and the People-to-People
Dialogue (see Burnay et al. 2014).
Since 2016, the EU’s China policy is defined by the Elements for
a new EU Strategy on China that, together with the Council Conclu-
sions EU Strategy on China, forms the EU Strategy on China, with the
jointly signed 2013 EU -China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation
being a critical policy document. Even after the 2019 review of the
Sino-European relations, this remains the cornerstone of the EU’s policy
vis-à-vis China. In 2015, the EU-China Connectivity Platform was estab-
lished to strengthen connections between Europe and Asia. However,
in the Platform, little coordination and cooperation occur due to the
differences between China and the EU.
The importance of Sino-European bilateral relations is manifest in
the fact that the EU is China’s largest trading partner, while on the
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

other hand, China is the EU’s most significant source of imports and its
second-biggest two-way trading partner. There are extensive dialogues,
too, in the economic realm like the annual High-Level Economic and
Trade Dialogue established in 2009 and the sectoral dialogues such as
the Economic and Trade Joint Committee, Trade and Investment Policy
Dialogue, Economic and Trade Working Group, Dialogue on Intellectual
Property, and Trade Defence Instruments Working Group. Moreover, at
the 16th EU-China Summit in 2013, both parties announced that negoti-
ations on an EU-China bilateral investment agreement—formally called a
Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (CAI)—were to be launched.
However, thus far, finding mutual agreement on the CAI has proven to
be challenging. In part, the diverging interests and systems of both parties
explain this. One key issue for the EU in the CAI is market access. This
relates to a lack of reciprocity in EU-China relations. The EU wants China
to treat the European companies in the PRC the same way that the Euro-
peans treat Chinese firms in Europe. Another issue is how to deal with
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Cooperation and dialogue between the EU and China go beyond bilat-
eral trade and investment and include policy areas such as foreign policy
and security, energy and environment, global economic governance, and
human rights. The rise of China is one of the main developments in inter-
national relations over the past few decades, not only in the economic
field, but also in climate change, on the African continent, and concerning
Asian security. This highlights the multiple dimensionalities of China as
an international actor as well as its relations with the EU and its member
states as they also have established bilateral relations with the Chinese,
which makes that they meet on multiple locations and multiple levels,
including on the multilateral, regional, trilateral and bilateral level.
However, as also argued by Chang and Pieke (2018), the EU’s China
policy as a whole, and of its member states is not principally about the
PRC. Due to its starting point not laying in China, but in confronting
challenges in Europe itself, the EU’s policy vis-à-vis China is first and
foremost “a matter of choices about the future of European coopera-
tion and union.” On a related note, a senior EU official described the
EU’s relations with its then 28 member states as “having 28 mothers in
law” (Interview senior EU official, June 14, 2018). This reality points
out the challenges the EU is facing internally due to its hybrid nature,
with Europe’s divided response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
8 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

and increasing Chinese outward foreign direct investment (COFDI) in

Europe just being two recent examples.
The EU has been grappling on how to deal with China’s massive foot-
print in diverse sectors and locations. The EU aims at encompassing a
strategic partnership with China. However, the member states are simul-
taneously sidelining Brussels by concluding bilateral agreements with the
PRC (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). The EU member states’ tendency
to pursue bilateral agreements with China and China’s ability to use the
EU’s internal disagreement is frequently brought forward as the primary
explanation for the EU’s lack of strategic edge (Michalski and Pan 2017).
In a 2009 power audit of the EU-China relations, Fox and Godement
showed that the then 27 EU member states hold diverging positions over
two main issues, including how to manage Beijing’s impact on the Euro-
pean economy and how to engage the PRC politically. The authors argued
that “collectively as well as individually” the EU member states will fail
to get more from the PRC unless they manage to find a way to over-
come their internal divisions and “leverage their combined weight into
a strengthened bargaining position” (Fox and Godement 2009: 7). The
new HR/VP Josep Borrell admitted the EU had been naive about aspects
of the PRC but stated this was now coming to an end. He urged more
collective discipline toward China (The Guardian 2020).
On the issue-level, numerous frictions are bedeviling bilateral relations.
One is the EU’s enormous trade deficit with China. Beijing had pledged
to ease market access significantly, however many on the European side
argue that Beijing is very slow to address these obstacles. The earlier
mentioned lack of reciprocity is relevant here. Furthermore, COFDI in
Europe has recently increasingly drawn attention because of the opaque
state-sponsored Chinese firms (or a suspected state-firm link), COFDI’s
targeted sectors including technology and infrastructure, the sudden-
ness of COFDI, the sensitivity coming with China’s continuing political
rise, and, again, the lack of reciprocity, with the KUKA case, in partic-
ular, being a watershed moment (Hooijmaaijers 2019). One should see
the developments regarding COFDI in the EU and Huawei 5G mobile
telecommunication networks that recently attracted much attention from
both politicians and the public in this broader context.
In late 2018, the European Commission, the Council, and the Euro-
pean Parliament reached a political agreement on the EU framework for
screening FDI, and there has been a reform of TDI. These developments
illustrate that a reality shift has become visible regarding the EU’s trade
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

policy and can be seen as two steps forward to a different EU policy

vis-à-vis China.
In the field of trade, there have been numerous disputes and inves-
tigations relating to solar panels, telecommunications, steel, and wine,
with both parties calling for punitive tariffs. The fundamental differences
between their legal frameworks and their different values and levels of
development and the structural characteristics of their economic models
complicate matters (Hallinan 2016). Another thorny issue is China’s
market economy status (MES). Also, when China pressed the EU to
launch a strong joint statement during the 2018 EU-China Summit
against US President Donald Trump’s trade policies, Europe resisted. The
EU shared the US’ assessment of China when it comes to, for instance,
subsidies and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). However, at the same
time, it felt that by the way the US is doing it, it was destroying the multi-
lateral order. Combining these factors makes the EU-China economic
relationship, “an uneasy partnership” (Farnell and Irwin Crookes 2016).
The 16+1 (or after Greece joining in 2019 17+1) policy of China with
the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) potentially chal-
lenges EU unity. Somewhat related to 17+1, the BRI that was launched
in 2013 causes “a great deal of confusion” for the EU member states and
Brussels (Yu 2018: 232). Beyond the trade statistics and new (proposed)
railway connections, the role of Xi Jinping’s globalization project “is
not yet entirely clear” for Europe. However, various member states have
pledged their support for it (Yu 2018: 232).
Moreover, problematic is the EU arms embargo against China that
flowed from the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. The internal situation
in China, particularly on human rights and the situation in Tibet and
Xinjiang, also causes friction in the EU-China relations. Also, against the
backdrop of the imposition of the Hong Kong national security law in
June 2020, EU concerns had intensified over the erosion of the “one
country, two systems” principle and Hong Kong’s autonomy. The EU
decided to limit exports of surveillance equipment to Hong Kong over
concerns about this controversial new law, leading to Beijing’s warning
not to interfere in Hong Kong matters (Euronews 2020a).
Even though since the mid-1990s, a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue
is in place, in the bilateral relationship between the EU and the PRC, the
issue of human rights remains secondary to economic and geopolitical
interests (Kaya 2014). Internal divisions among the member states play a
role as well, as a recent report revealed that the EU member states adopt
10 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

widely divergent stances on human rights issues in their dealings with the
PRC (Rühlig et al. 2018).
Another area of tension is climate change, in which both parties’
diverging views on multilateralism become visible. The PRC has won
plaudits for its recent moves on climate change, but in 2017 it had
allowed disputes over trade to impede a joint Sino-European declaration
on the matter; consequently, just like after the 2016 EU-China Summit,
no joint statement was launched after the 2017 Summit. On climate
change, the PRC has never signed up to any commitment in a legal
sense. Moreover, when it comes to legally binding issues, with the “delib-
erate dismissal” of The Hague’s arbitration ruling on the South China Sea
issue, Beijing has demonstrated that it will ignore international law “when
it does not suit its interests” (Godement and Vasselier 2017: 12). Further-
more, the African continent is an arena where one can question whether
the EU and China are partners or competitors.
One of the explanations for the differences between the EU and China
lies in the existence of conceptual gaps. Per Pan Zhongqi, the same
concept can often be interpreted and applied in very different senses
by different people. A conceptual gap could breed misunderstandings
in international communication, sometimes without the awareness of
those involved, leading to problems and possible conflict in their bilat-
eral relations, including in the Sino-European relationship (Pan 2010).
Conceptual gaps exist because many concepts are multifaceted, dynamic,
and ambiguous. In theory, conceptual gaps are neither inevitable nor
prevailing over conceptual consensuses. However, in practice, it is
common for different actors to convey connotations by using the same
concepts in their discourse. Conceptual gaps in the Sino-European rela-
tionship occur on a wide range of topics and issues, including sovereignty,
soft power, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, stability, strategic
partnership, global governance, and multilateralism (Burnay et al. 2016;
Pan 2012a).
In the context of broader great power relations, for the EU, the
Sino-European relations are essential. However, China is not the EU’s
most important great power. The US still is the EU’s most important
partner and security guarantor via the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO), and Russia is still the main great power “threat.” For the
PRC, the US is the most important power and its main great power threat
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

and a role for US ally Japan. By contrast, Russia is considered a more reli-
able partner than the EU. For China, Europe is complementary. It is not
a strategic rival, but it is useful for its market and experience platform.
Per Philippe Le Corre, COVID-19 has been “the game-changer” in
finally altering European perceptions of China (The Guardian 2020).
Andrew Small noted that China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic
had changed long-standing European assumptions about its reliability as
a crisis actor and its approach to the European project. For now, Europe’s
immediate medical-supply needs and dire economic situation will limit the
scope of shifts in its policy vis-à-vis China. However, on issues ranging
from supply chains to ideological competition, European governments
have rebalanced their view of what dynamics with Beijing should look
like in the aftermath (Small 2020). In late April 2020, HR/VP Borrell
admitted that China did try to pressure the EU to dilute a COVID-19
disinformation report, adding that this was just normal diplomacy (EUob-
server 2020). Be that as it may, around one week later, the EU expressed
regret after its opinion article in the China Daily was watered down to
remove references to the COVID-19 outbreak beginning in the country
(Euronews 2020b).
In sum, there are four main takeaways from the analysis of EU-China
relations. First, countless thorny issues characterize the Sino-European
relationship. Second, internal divisions and diverging interests on the
European side play a substantial role in the EU’s China policy. Third,
the Commission paper dubbing the PRC as a systemic rival reflected
a sharp alteration in its balance of assumptions about Sino-European
matters, and the COVID-19 crisis is tilting that balance further (Small
2020). Combined with the launch of an EU framework for screening
FDI and TDI reforms, these developments exemplify that a reality shift
has become visible regarding the EU’s China policy. Fourth, the issues
in Sino-European relations fit into three categories, including areas for
(potential) cooperation, negotiation, and difficult issues to talk about
(see Godement and Vasselier 2017). The three selected cases in this
manuscript mirror these four points (see below).
12 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

The Scholarly Literature

on EU-China Relations and Its Limits
The number of academic publications on EU–China relations is booming.
As argued by Bersick (2015), there are several main foci in the contempo-
rary work on the EU-China bilateral relations, with a large share focusing
on the historical development of the EU-China relations, providing anal-
yses of the evolution as well as the implementation of these relations
(see Sandschneider 2002; Shambaugh 2004; Cameron 2009). Another
central theme is descriptions of the EU-China Summits that took place
since 1998 (see Pan 2012b; Song 2012) and the strategic partnership
between both parties (see Renard 2011; Holslag 2011; Casarini 2006;
Maher 2016; Geeraerts 2019). Generally, these kinds of works focus on
the partnership’s policy challenges and offer suggestions for the bilateral
relationship. To the swiftly expanding work on the Sino-European rela-
tions we can also add scholarly work on China’s recently launched BRI
and the role of and consequences for Europe as well as the EU (see Zeng
2017; Li et al. 2018; Van der Putten et al. 2016; Zhao 2016). A third
category focuses on cataloging areas of cooperation and conflict in the
contemporary relations including in the areas of the economy (see Algieri
2002; Farnell and Irwin Crookes 2016; Menegazzi 2017; Reilly 2017),
Chinese investment in Europe (see Meunier 2019a, 2019b; Hanemann
and Huotari 2015), human rights (see Kinzelbach 2015; Baker 2002),
climate change (see Torney 2014; Belis and Schunz 2013), security (see
Kirchner et al. 2016; Noesselt 2016), energy (see Umbach 2007; Liedtke
2017), and global governance (see Men and Linck 2017; Wouters et al.
2012; Gross and Jian 2012). Another category concentrates on EU-China
relations and a third party including Africa (see Hackenesch 2018; Men
and Barton 2011; Stahl 2018), the US (see Shambaugh 2005; Harris
2017), or Central Asia (see Kavalski 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Bossuyt 2015).
However, these academic works are generally policy-driven, with few
works using theory to explain EU-China relations (Bersick 2015).7 The
lack of using theory suggests a lacuna in the current literature and current
academic approaches with regard to EU foreign policy-making vis-à-
vis China because even fewer academic works seek to test theoretical
approaches thoroughly or add theory scope conditions.
Lastly, another limitation of the scholarly literature on EU-China rela-
tions relates to the cases studied and their quality. Indeed, the number
of academic publications on EU–China relations is booming. However,
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

many cases are still insufficiently studied, for instance, because they do
not focus on the various stages of the policy cycle. However, issue iden-
tification (the stage where a specific issue secures the close attention of
policy-makers), decision-making (the stage where the EU foreign policy
actors that possess the ability decide to approve the course of action), and
policy implementation (the stage where the follow through on the policy
is critical) are all equally important and relevant when we want to under-
stand a specific case fully. In this manuscript, I am studying insufficiently
studied political economy-related cases and use more and better evidence
to draw conclusions.

Theoretically-Oriented Explanations of EU
Foreign Policy-Making and Their Limits
While theoretical approaches to EUFP do not dominate the litera-
ture, there are some. These models include the BPM, neorealism, and
institutionalism. Neorealism generally takes the position that the most
powerful states’ security interests are decisive, followed by economic and
other interests (see Waltz 1979). A neorealist argument would argue
that not only state interests dominate, but that the most powerful EU
member states dominate. Without consensus among the Big Three—
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)—it will be hard to
get anything of significant importance done (see Tallberg 2008; Bendiek
2012). Another potentially relevant candidate is institutionalism. Institu-
tionalism looks into EU law, EU procedures, competences, norms, and
regulations to illuminate EU foreign policy dynamics. A third candi-
date theory that might be relevant for explaining EUFP is the BPM
model, given the growing bureaucratization of EUFP. BPM explains
policy-making by focusing on internal bargaining within the state (Allison
and Halperin 1972). As for the growing bureaucratization of EUFP,
the different (European) institutions involved in the making of EUFP
including their staff and Directorate-Generals (DGs), the division of
competences, and the multiple decision-making methods give us reason
to believe that BPM is relevant.
These IR theories are often useful for illuminating a specific situa-
tion including in EUFP. However, just as often their explanatory value is
unsatisfactory, and in these cases, there is a need for another, more appro-
priate theoretical tool (McGlinchey et al. 2017). Chapter 2 will provide
information about the features and limits of these three theoretical models
14 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

that I will test to identify their usefulness and, more importantly, their
scope conditions. Here, I will suffice with emphasizing that these three
theoretical explanations of EU foreign policy-making all have the problem
of scope. The issue I argue in this manuscript is not that these three
models are not useful to better understand the dynamics of EU foreign
policy-making, but that there is an inadequate appreciation of the fact
they do not apply equally well to all domains. Given the limits of the
existing literature, there is a need to explore the drivers of EUFP vis-à-vis
China anew. There is a need to identify the range of applicability of these
theories. These scope conditions may include issues and policy stages.
Some IR theories work better in some stages or even in specific policy
fields than others. For instance, the BPM may be particularly powerful in
illuminating the stage of policy implementation (Caldwell 1977). Given
the nature of the EU with its various procedures, sometimes there may
or may not be a formal institutional role for the EU member states to
execute their power.

Research Design, Methodology, and Case Selection

The case study method is best to examine the scope of the applica-
bility of the three theories mentioned above. Case studies can serve
several overlapping primary purposes that should be pursued simultane-
ously, including theory testing (Van Evera 1997: 55).8 The case study
method, which has also been widely used by BPM analysts (Caldwell
1977; George and McKeown 1985), allows for cross-case comparison
and allows for process tracing. Theory-testing process tracing “involves
assessing whether a hypothesized causal mechanism exists in a single case
by exploring whether the predicted evidence of a hypothesized causal
mechanism exists in reality” (Beach and Pedersen 2016: 319). In partic-
ular, the process tracing is of critical importance because the objective of
this research is to look at issue identification, decision-making, and policy
implementation.
I am not just doing case studies but comparative case studies. Per
Knight, a comparative case study is a research approach to formulate
or assess generalizations that extend across multiple cases. Comparative
case studies can address theory, wherein the cases are selected to test
hypotheses from the theory (Knight 2015). Multiple case studies can
provide more substantial evidence and more robust findings and test the
findings in (extremely) different cases.
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

When it comes to theory testing with case studies, three steps are
essential (Van Evera 1997). The first step is to state the theory. The
second one is to state the expectations about what to observe in case
the theories are valid. The third step is to explore the case (or for this
manuscript the three selected cases) looking for congruence or incon-
gruity between expectations and observations. The structure of the next
chapter follows these three steps. I first discuss these three theories. Then
I formulate hypotheses for each of the distinct stages of the policy-making
process. I state the expectations about what to observe when the theo-
ries are valid. This research project’s comparative design highlights the
multiple dimensionalities of the PRC as an international actor and of
its relations with Europe. The selection of three cases, even though it
remains rather exceptional being conducted by a single author, allows for
better comparison.
As mentioned before, given the limits of the existing literature, there
is a need to explore the drivers of EUFP vis-à-vis China anew. It is
not that existing theories are wrong, but that there is a lack of aware-
ness of the reality they do not apply equally well to all areas. I show
this by looking at three distinct stages of the policy cycle in three cases.
The three cases are all political economy-related, and they also relate to
the challenge that China’s rise presents to the EU. The cases involve
EUFP sensu lato, which means that policy areas like trade and develop-
ment are considered an inherent part of foreign policy (see Keukeleire and
Delreux 2014).9 There are various justifications for focusing on them, as
I will discuss. The first case involves the EU-China solar panel dispute
of the early 2010s, when Belgian politician Karel De Gucht served as
European Trade Commissioner. The following criteria led to its selec-
tion. First, it was the most significant investigation ever conducted by
the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission (DG
Trade) when it comes to volume. On a related note, the case is well-
documented by the Commission and is widely reported in the media.
Second, my three theories make divergent, unique, and sometimes even
opposite predictions about the case. Because I make a clear distinction
between issue identification, decision-making, and policy implementa-
tion, this case allows us to see if the independent variables genuinely
are powerful, which contributes to culling scope conditions. Third, a
case in the trade field is of particular academic relevance, because the
bureaucratic entities in the Commission that deal with foreign policy or
external relations including DG Trade seem to have largely escaped the
16 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

attention from bureaucratic politics, contributing to the justification of

the case selection as it is as a new type of test (Delreux 2015). Another
justification for selecting this case is its resemblance to current policy-
problem cases as it touches upon how to deal with China on trade defense
matters. Continuing tensions between its member states characterize the
EU’s trade policy. These tensions mainly follow the North-South divi-
sion of the EU. The Northern member states prefer an open trading
system, whereas the Southern EU member states prioritize defending
Europe’s economic interests against external threats. Moreover, there is a
third group of countries that includes Germany, which is a swing state.
Because our analytical model also focuses on the interests of the EU’s
most powerful states, there is potential for critical importance.
The second case focuses on the 2012–2014 EU investigation into
mobile telecommunications networks from China. The case selection
criteria for the solar case mostly apply to this case because it is also a
case in the trade defense field. However, there are more arguments to
warrant its selection. In a way, it was as an “extreme case.” It was a
unique and unusual case, because it was the first-ever ex officio investi-
gation conducted by the Commission. There was no formal complaint
lodged by an EU industry. This case contrasts with the solar case that
followed the standard procedure of a valid complaint lodged by an EU
industry and had a clear timetable of events with set procedural deadlines.
What makes it an even more unique case is that DG Trade decided in prin-
ciple to open an ex officio anti-dumping and an anti-subsidy investigation
concerning imports of Chinese telecom networks. However, that decision
was not activated to allow negotiations toward an amicable solution with
the Chinese authorities.
The third case selected to test the merits of the various arguments is
the EU’s reaction to China’s rise in Africa through the launch of the EU-
China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative in 2008. This case involves a
new actor with its view on development with a focus on trade, investment,
and infrastructure entering the African stage. Several reasons warrant the
selection of this case (see Van Evera 1997: 77–88). First, this case is
particularly compelling from an institutional analytical perspective because
three competing visions from the Commission, Council, and Parliament
existed within the EU that harmed its capability to engage with China
in Africa constructively (see Carbone 2011; Austermann 2012). Second,
competing theories make divergent, unique, and sometimes even oppo-
site predictions about the case contributing to testing the relative power
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

of these three theories. On a related note, even though several scholars

have written about EU-China-Africa contributing to the availability of
data, this has not been systematically done for three stages of the policy
process based on various hypotheses flowing from my three candidate
theories. The focus on theory and policy stages also relates to the earlier
mentioned limitations of the existing literature regarding cases studied
and the quality of the studies. An additional reason relates to the resem-
blance to current policy-problem cases. The EU has not yet been able to
deal with China’s rise and the global power shift to the East. It is in this
broader context that one should understand China’s rise in Africa.
My analysis relies on multiple sources of data. The first set of data
includes legal and policy documents such as the Treaties, Council Deci-
sions, Commission documents, policy memos, and official statements
from involved parties. Preparatory documents and the negotiation posi-
tions of the relevant actors are also of importance. However, official
documents are not always available. I supplemented my analysis with
other empirical sources such as newspaper articles from main media
outlets, including Reuters and the Financial Times, and semi-structured
interviews. I did over 100 semi-structured interviews, consultations, and
conversations with a wide range of interviewees, contributing to more
and better evidence. The interviewees include senior officials from the
European Commission’s DG Trade, officials from the Union delegation
(EEAS) in Beijing, and officials from the Permanent Representations
of EU member states to the EU, senior EU and European business
representatives, senior solar panel industry representatives, senior telecom
industry representatives, and trade lawyers that were involved with the
EU-China solar panel dispute and the EU investigation into mobile
telecommunications networks from China. I also interviewed EU officials
from Union Delegations in Africa, the EEAS headquarters in Brussels,
the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and
Development (DG DEVCO), officials from the Union delegation in
Beijing, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), and African busi-
ness representatives that worked on or were involved with China’s rise
in Africa and the response of the EU, as well as Western and Chinese
scholars from renowned universities and research centers with exper-
tise in EU-China trade, or EU-China-Africa. I coded my interviewees
to preserve their anonymity. Finally, I used a considerable amount of
secondary literature on the respective topics to support my analysis.
18 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

Findings
The main theoretical contribution of this work is to specify the scope of
the three selected theoretical approaches. These scope conditions involve
both issue areas and policy stages. The three case studies showed that
neorealism’s explanatory value in the issue identification stage is limited,
partially due to the division of competences. Due to the formal proce-
dures, there was relative power for the member states in the decision-
making stage of the trade defense cases, because the Council has to vote
on the final imposition of measures, supporting a neorealist argument for
this stage. Given traditional national interests, countries have to assert
themselves to defend their economic interests, which Germany demon-
strated in the solar case. Even in the “extreme” telecoms case with no
formal launch of an investigation, and thus no formal procedures that
are part of such an investigation had to be followed, neorealism had
explanatory value for the decision-making stage. In the EU-China-Africa
trilateral cooperation case, the member state support meant the Commis-
sion could go ahead with its idea and launched a framework on which
later member state initiatives could build. Neorealism was present, but in
the background. The results from the decision-making stage affected the
implementation stage as it created a space where the member states could
launch their initiatives with China on Africa.
This research found that institutionalism sheds light on virtually every
stage of the policy-making process and issue. It may not always have
been the most dominant explanatory theoretical model. However, it
almost always contributed to a better understanding of the various stages
of the policy-making process. In short, EU law, procedures, and compe-
tences matter when we want to unpack EU policy-making. These findings
provide useful analytical lenses for those studying EUFP not just toward
China, but also vis-à-vis other countries, regions, and issues.
Concerning the BPM, we saw bargaining throughout the entire case,
on the EU level, and with the Chinese side, in both the solar and telecoms
cases. Then Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht predominantly drove
this. The division of competences and the institutional setup partially
facilitated the BPM’s explanatory value in the issue identification stage
of the development case. We did detect “where you stand depends on
where you sit” in most parts of both the development and trade cases.
Where the agreements made in the decision-making stage were not legally
binding, we saw there was leeway not fully to implement them as agreed
 1 INTRODUCTION 19

upon. When key (bureaucratic) actors left in these situations, policy

implementation reflected this.
The theoretical and policy implications of my findings reveal that it is
essential to take into account that it is all about competences and that
EU law and procedures matter. The competences shape a position for
actors and allow them to act. Different actors may be relevant and influ-
ential in the different policy stages, including the issue identification and
decision-making stages. There still is and continues to be an essential role
for the EU member states in EU foreign policy-making, including trade
defense and development. Considering the role of the (most powerful)
EU member states is critical, given the substantial influence they have
over the broader context of the relations between the EU and China. The
same goes for understanding the role of the EU institutions, including the
Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the
EEAS. EU-China affairs thus always have to contemplate the EU insti-
tutions and the (most powerful) member states. Internal divisions and
diverging interests on the European side remain. They mostly follow the
traditional North-South and East-West lines.
If a party wants to influence how the EU identifies policy in trade
defense cases, it is essential to consider the formal procedures. In the case
of unfair trade practices, industry parties can lodge a formal complaint.
Some industries are better organized than others and thus file more
complaints. Eventually, there is relative power for the (most important)
EU member states in the decision-making stage. Whether the anti-
dumping or subsidy cases are about Chinese solar, telecoms, or steel, the
issue is mostly the same. The question is not whether there is dumping
or subsidies from the Chinese side, which mainly relates to the issue
identification stage. Instead, the question is whether “Europe” wants
to do something about this situation or not, which involves decision-
making. That is the ongoing debate in Europe. The Southern member
states predominantly see it from a political perspective and feel that anti-
dumping and subsidy practices are not acceptable. The Northern EU
member states predominantly see it from a more economic perspective.
They want to assess the overall effect of unfair trade practices on the
EU when taking the interests of manufacturers, consumers, and users
into account. The Commission predominantly feels they are working for
the European industry. Interest groups are empowered in trade defense
cases, but because of other issues, they do not have the full force in
shaping economic globalization. Germany’s position is critical. Not only
20 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

is it Europe’s biggest economy, but also it can be seen as a swing state

regarding anti-dumping issues. Berlin has difficulties making up its mind
on anti-dumping issues. If a businessperson wants to know who should
get his attention at the policy implementation stage, the Commission is
a suitable candidate, but so are the (most powerful) member states. In
trade defense cases, there is a clear timetable of events that makes it easier
to target the relevant DGs of the Commission and the relevant member
states when a decision is about to be made. These findings will help busi-
nesses to do better government relations and to be more aware of the
business environment.

Outline
This manuscript will consist of five more parts. The next chapter
will review the literature of the three selected theoretical models of
(EU) foreign policy-making. This chapter also includes the comparative
research design of the project, where I formulate hypotheses regarding
the distinct stages of the policy cycle. I will provide information about
the features and limits of the IR theories that will be tested later on in
three case studies to identify their usefulness and, more importantly, their
scope conditions. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus on these three case studies.
The first case study (Chapter 3) of this book examines the EU-China
solar panel dispute, the most significant trade defense case ever by volume
that attracted much attention in the early 2010s when Belgian politician
Karel De Gucht served as European Trade Commissioner. The second
case study (Chapter 4) will look into the EU investigation into mobile
telecommunications networks from the PRC. Similar to the EU-China
solar dispute, this is a case study in the trade defense field. However,
it substantially differs from the solar panel case, because this was an ex
officio trade defense action initiated by DG Trade. Chapter 5 focuses on
the EU’s reaction to the rise of China in Africa via the EU-China-Africa
trilateral cooperation initiative. It specifically looks at the emergence of
the EU’s perception of a China in Africa policy issue, its policy responses,
and its implementation of these policy options. The concluding Chapter 6
will bring together the preceding chapters’ findings to unpack EU policy-
making toward the PRC. Furthermore, I will discuss the theoretical and
policy implications of my findings and the limitations of this study and
the venues for further research.
 1 INTRODUCTION 21

Notes
1. The EU Treaties established the EU. The EU member states are the parties
to the treaties. Under the EU Treaties, the member states confer compe-
tences on the EU. The EU can only act within the limits of its competences.
The Treaties founded the EU. The EU amended two key EU treaties
several times. They are the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Treaty
of Lisbon (LT) that entered into force on December 1, 2009, reorganized
these two Treaties.
2. Issue identification is the stage of the policy-making process where a partic-
ular issue secures the close attention of policy-makers. Decision-making is
the stage where actors possess the ability to decide to approve the course
of action. In the policy implementation stage, the follow through on the
policy is critical (see also Carta, 2013; Versluis et al. 2011). For analyt-
ical purposes and manageability reasons, for this manuscript, we focus on
these three stages. However, we encapsulated policy formulation in the
decision-making stage.
3. In October 2020, the European Council reaffirmed the policy approach
vis-à-vis EU-China relations as set out in this Joint Communication.
4. In early 2007, negotiations of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
(PCA) between the EU and China started. However, the PCA negotiation
process stalled.
5. Following the strategic partnership between the EU and China, the PRC
launched bilateral strategic partnerships with various EU member states
(Chen 2013). The various partnerships question the coordination between
the EU and its member states.
6. Worth highlighting is that the over 60 dialogues are often a touted figure by
officials on both the European and Chinese sides. However, the question is
whether it is the more, the merrier. Also, in reality, many of these dialogues
happened a few times then fell away. Others meet very rarely, with little to
show in terms of substantive output.
7. Exemptions include Christiansen (2016); Cottey (2018); Jørgensen and
Wong (2016); Algieri (2002).
8. Per Van Evera (1997), the five primary purposes are explaining cases,
creating theories, testing theories, identifying antecedent conditions, and
testing antecedent conditions. In this manuscript, the overlap becomes
visible as the theory testing is used to explain what happens in the cases.
9. By contrast, EUFP sensu stricto is limited to an analysis of the CFSP and
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
22 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

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Another random document with
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Title: Cœur de sceptique

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 HENRI ARDEL

CŒUR DE SCEPTIQUE
OUVRAGE COURONNÉ PAR L’ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE, PRIX MONTYON

PARIS
LIBRAIRIE PLON
PLON-NOURRIT ET Cie, IMPRIMEURS-ÉDITEURS
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 L’auteur et les éditeurs déclarent réserver leurs droits de
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PARIS. TYP. PLON-NOURRIT ET Cie, 8, RUE GARANCIÈRE. — 4336.

 A HÉLÈNE

SOUVENIR DE SUISSE
(Août 1891)

H. A.
 CŒUR DE SCEPTIQUE

— Alors, décidément, vous me quittez ?… Vous préférez rentrer

sans visiter la sculpture ?
— Chère, entre nous, rien ne me laisse plus froide que les
statues… Puis, il est déjà cinq heures et demie. Il faut que je
retourne chez moi m’habiller ; je dîne en ville, et mon mari, vous le
savez, est l’exactitude personnifiée !
Les deux jeunes femmes s’étaient arrêtées devant l’escalier qui
conduisait des salons de peinture dans le jardin que la profusion des
statues semait de formes blanches, profilées sur le fond verdoyant
des massifs. Elles descendirent lentement les marches, d’un pas
nonchalant de très jolies femmes, certaines qu’aucun détail de leur
mise ne pouvait donner prise à une critique. Sûrement, elles
n’avaient point trop piétiné à travers les salles nombreuses, ni ne
s’étaient fatigué les yeux à contempler les toiles exposées ; leurs
visages, aussi reposés que deux heures plus tôt quand elles étaient
entrées au Salon, le révélaient hautement. Elles avaient simplement
fait une agréable promenade qualifiée d’artistique par suite du milieu
où elles l’effectuaient, et durant laquelle, surtout, elles avaient goûté
le plaisir tout féminin de se sentir très regardées et de recevoir
l’hommage discret des yeux qu’elles charmaient au passage.
— Ainsi, Isabelle, vous restez encore ?
— Très chère, j’ai envie d’accomplir mon pèlerinage au
complet… Et puis, raison majeure, je dois attendre l’heure du
rendez-vous que j’ai donné à mes bébés et à leur gouvernante… six
heures moins le quart… j’ai encore vingt minutes devant moi… Mais
je ne veux pas vous retenir… Alors, ce soir, vous serez chez les de
Bernes… pour vous livrer aux douceurs du poker ?… Au revoir et à
bientôt, n’est-ce pas ?
Elles se serrèrent la main en souriant, comme des amies qui
s’apprécient d’autant plus que, physiquement, elles n’ont rien à
s’envier, ayant été également bien servies par la bonne nature ; et la
comtesse Isabelle de Vianne demeura une seconde immobile, au
seuil du jardin, à suivre des yeux sa compagne qui s’éloignait,
laissant traîner sur le sable les plis de sa longue robe soyeuse, la
taille cambrée, les cheveux d’un or roux serrés en une torsade
mousseuse sous la paille sombre du chapeau voilé de dentelle.
Alors elle eut un retour vers sa propre beauté, dont, quelques
instants plus tôt, elle avait constaté l’éclat dans les hautes glaces du
Salon de conversation ; et un léger sourire de satisfaction, à peine
esquissé, courut sur ses lèvres : elle se savait capable de soutenir
toutes les comparaisons. Puis, suivant au hasard une allée du jardin,
elle se mit nonchalamment à marcher droit devant elle, de son allure
distinguée et indifférente, sans embarras de sa solitude, en femme
habituée, par un veuvage prématuré, à compter sur elle seule dans
tous les milieux et dans toutes les circonstances.
Mais, tout à coup, ses traits perdirent leur expression distraite, et
une imperceptible exclamation lui échappa à la vue d’un homme
jeune, — trente-cinq ans environ, — debout devant un marbre dont il
étudiait les détails si attentivement qu’il ne remarquait pas la jeune
femme arrêtée à ses côtés, le contemplant avec un demi-sourire.
— Quel homme absorbé vous êtes aujourd’hui, mon beau
cousin ! fit-elle, la voix moqueuse.
 Mais l’expression soudain éclairée de son visage disait que la
rencontre ne lui déplaisait point. Le jeune homme se détourna.
— Isabelle !… Pardonnez-moi… Vous avez raison, cette œuvre
s’était si bien emparée de moi que…
— Que vous étiez en passe d’oublier complètement les vivantes
pour les statues !… Enfin, je ne vous en veux pas… Y a-t-il
longtemps que vous êtes au Salon ?
— J’y arrive. En ma qualité d’original, puisque telle est l’épithète
dont vous voulez bien me gratifier souvent, j’aime à venir voir
certains marbres à la lumière des fins d’après-midi. J’avais remarqué
celui-ci, il y a trois jours au Vernissage… Et vous-même, vous êtes
ainsi toute seule ?
— Toute seule ! Mme Dartigue m’a quittée il y a quelques
minutes, et j’attends l’heure à laquelle je vais être remise en
possession, tout ensemble, de mes enfants et de ma voiture ! Je
vous préviens que, jusqu’à ce moment, je vous garde comme
cavalier. Puisque vous connaissez la sculpture, faites-la-moi visiter…
Il s’inclina au moment où, derrière lui, quelqu’un disait en le
désignant :
— Oui, c’est bien Robert Noris, l’écrivain, avec cette jeune
femme…
Isabelle saisit au passage ces paroles, et un fugitif éclair de
plaisir traversa ses yeux brillants. Si habituée qu’elle fût à vivre dans
un monde lettré, entourée d’hommes possédant une notoriété
quelconque, elle s’accommodait fort, dans sa vanité féminine, de
respirer le parfum d’un encens flatteur, encore que cet encens ne
brûlât pas pour elle.
D’ailleurs, il lui plaisait beaucoup ce Robert Noris, un cousin si
éloigné que, en vérité, il fallait une certaine dose de patience pour
démêler entre eux un degré de parenté. A coup sûr, ils étaient de
vieilles connaissances. Autrefois même, si elle l’eût permis, il lui eût
demandé de porter son nom, car il était passionnément épris d’elle ;
mais il ne jouissait alors d’aucune célébrité consacrée et se bornait à
paraître un écrivain très bien doué, cherchant sa voie dans le roman.
Aussi n’avait-elle point pris garde à lui, étant de nature
essentiellement ambitieuse. Elle avait fait le brillant mariage vers
lequel l’attirait son insatiable vanité, elle avait chiffré son papier
d’une couronne comtale, possédé l’un des plus magnifiques hôtels
de Paris, satisfait ses plus coûteuses fantaisies ; cela, en devenant
la femme d’une parfaite nullité, égoïste et violente, d’un homme qui
avait été pour elle, durant huit années, un assez mauvais mari, et lui
avait fait le plus précieux des présents, le jour où il lui avait donné la
liberté du veuvage.
Depuis deux années pleines maintenant, elle usait de sa vie
nouvelle, qui lui semblait charmante ; et, chaque jour, elle se
pénétrait davantage de l’idée que Robert Noris, devenu illustre,
remplacerait fort bien le comte de Vianne. En effet, à trente-cinq ans,
il possédait une renommée que des écrivains même de talent, —
des vétérans dans la littérature, — étaient destinés à ne jamais
connaître ; et c’était là, aux yeux d’Isabelle, une immense qualité.
Elle était dominée toujours par le besoin inné de rechercher, pour en
faire son bien propre, ce que les autres n’étaient point en mesure
d’avoir ; que ce fût la présence d’un homme célèbre dans son salon,
ou simplement un bijou, un bibelot rare, une façon de robe inédite.
Or Robert lui plaisait d’autant plus qu’il avait la réputation d’être
inaccessible, — désormais, — à toute puissance féminine, et qu’il se
montrait, avec elle, bien résolu à ne point ressusciter le passé.
Certes, très souvent, il venait chez elle, et avait même une place
marquée dans son cercle intime. En vertu des droits de la parenté, il
l’accompagnait dans les menues expéditions que la mode impose à
ses fidèles, visites dans les expositions de toute sorte,
représentations de cercle, et le reste. Dès qu’il y avait réunion chez
elle, ses hôtes pouvaient être certains de distinguer, dans la
phalange masculine, la haute taille de Robert Noris, son visage brun,
son front large sous les cheveux châtains coupés courts, ses yeux
brillants, dans l’orbite creusé, avec un regard pénétrant, pensif,
chercheur ; son sourire sceptique et spirituel qui, en s’effaçant,
laissait à la bouche une expression de lassitude mélancolique.
 Donc il venait beaucoup chez Mme de Vianne ; seulement il
existait ainsi, dans Paris, plusieurs autres salons qu’il fréquentait
pareillement. Mais ce fait indiscutable ne troublait nullement
Isabelle ; en sa courte sagesse, elle jugeait que Robert ne pourrait
lui tenir toujours rigueur du passé, car il était homme, et elle était
bien séduisante, l’expérience le lui avait appris. C’est pourquoi elle
s’était juré de l’amener à lui offrir un nom jadis dédaigné, souvenir
qu’elle prétendait lui faire oublier.
Tout en arpentant le jardin, sous son escorte, elle effleurait d’un
regard distrait les œuvres qu’il lui indiquait ; elle causait, souriante,
animée, rencontrant des mots piquants, excitée par cette pensée
qu’il était un merveilleux et terrible observateur de la nature
féminine. Puis, tout à coup, elle interrogea :
— Qu’est-ce que vous écrivez maintenant, Robert, pour continuer
votre grand succès de la fin de l’hiver ?
Il eut un froncement léger des sourcils, car il n’aimait guère qu’on
lui parlât de ses œuvres. Hors de son cabinet de travail, il était
homme de lettres aussi peu que possible.
— Ce que j’écris ?… Rien, absolument rien… Ces journées de
printemps me rendent d’une abominable paresse… D’ailleurs, il
m’est impossible de travailler à Paris en cette saison qui est une
véritable reproduction de l’agréable période du carême, remplie de
concerts, bals et autres divertissements variés… Aussi ai-je renoncé
à l’espoir de pouvoir commencer un nouveau travail, et vais-je
partir…
— Décidément ? fit la jeune femme, dont un pli creusa soudain le
front. Ainsi vous ne renoncez pas à vos projets de villégiature
anticipée… Et vous comptez aller ?…
— Sur les bords du Léman, sans doute. Si je suivais mon goût
intime, je chercherais tout de suite le village le plus isolé et le plus
solitaire que je puisse rencontrer. Mais il me faut gagner mon repos.
Je dois d’abord aller étudier quelques types d’étrangers que je
trouverai inévitablement dans les hôtels, pensions et abris de toute
sorte qui fourmillent en Suisse.
 — Quels types ? demanda curieusement Isabelle.
Il sourit, de ce demi-sourire indéfinissable qui laissait toujours
douter s’il raillait ou non.
— Si je vous dis quel est celui que je suis le plus désireux de
rencontrer, vous allez rire et me trouver d’humeur bien
romanesque… Et cependant Dieu sait que ce serait là un reproche
immérité ! Je voudrais connaître une vraie jeune fille, car je ne me
souviens pas d’en avoir vu depuis… des temps préhistoriques.
De nouveau, le front d’Isabelle eut une légère contraction.
— Robert, quelle déclaration !… Alors comment qualifiez-vous les
jeunes personnes bien élevées, pourvues de mères prudentes,
d’institutrices, de professeurs, de cours, de leçons, dont vous
rencontrez les spécimens dans les maisons sérieuses où vous allez
encore de temps à autre ?
Robert se mit à rire.
— Ces jeunes personnes modèles sont de petites tours d’ivoire
dont les mécréants de mon espèce n’ont point le droit d’approcher.
Ainsi que vous le disiez, elles sont en puissance maternelle ; et si
j’avais le malheur de témoigner quelque attention à l’une d’elles je
me verrais immanquablement attribuer toute sorte d’intentions
matrimoniales… Quant aux autres, aux petites filles fin de siècle,
selon l’expression consacrée, qui ont des allures de femmes, des
propos à l’avenant, des hardiesses inconcevables, qui, à dix-huit
ans, possèdent un cœur, des yeux, des sourires de coquettes, elles
me font tout bonnement horreur !
— Robert, quel moraliste sévère vous faites quand vous vous y
mettez !… Pourquoi en voulez-vous si fort à nos pauvres jeunes
filles du monde ?
— Parce que je trouve que toutes ces charmantes personnes,
élégantes, jolies à souhait, pomponnées suivant les règles du chic
ainsi que de précieuses poupées, jouent un personnage qui n’est
pas le leur et le déflorent en se rendant ridicules… Probablement
parce que je suis un pauvre homme très compliqué, j’adore la
simplicité, en vertu de la loi des contrastes… Ce doit être curieux et
charmant à observer une nature de jeune fille, très pure, très
sincère, très candide.
Robert s’arrêta une seconde, puis acheva, intéressé par la
question qu’il venait de toucher :
— Puisqu’à Paris une pareille étude m’est impossible, je vais la
tenter en Suisse, dans la colonie étrangère qui voyage… Je n’en
aurai que plus de chances de rencontrer un caractère original. Là-
bas, peut-être, découvrirai-je une nature féminine qui m’instruise et
me permette de bien me rendre compte de ce qui passe
d’impressions dans une âme vraiment jeune…
Isabelle ne répondit pas. Le départ, certain maintenant, de
Robert l’irritait comme une défaite personnelle. Elle voulait
reconquérir cet homme qui l’avait tant aimée autrefois ; elle déployait
dans ce but son charme tout-puissant… Et voici qu’elle le sentait de
nouveau insaisissable, maître de lui-même, se dérobant avec une
volonté très ferme à l’empire qu’elle essayait de retrouver sur lui.
Elle le connaissait trop bien d’humeur indépendante et résolue pour
tenter de lui faire abandonner ses projets d’éloignement et reprit
seulement d’un ton de raillerie légère :
— Et où irez-vous chercher votre jeune fille idéale ?
— Je ne sais trop encore… A Lausanne ou ailleurs, dans cette
région ; les bords du lac sont encore abordables ce mois-ci, sans
grandes chaleurs et sans Parisiens. Peut-être vais-je m’installer à
Vevey.
Un éclair de satisfaction traversa le regard d’Isabelle.
Vevey était bien près d’Évian ; et il était si facile de se faire
ordonner une saison dans la petite ville d’eaux.
— Oui, vous auriez bien raison de rester quelque temps à Vevey ;
la société étrangère y est nombreuse, puis vous y retrouveriez notre
vieille amie Mme de Grouville, qui reçoit beaucoup et qui, étant
donnés son humeur et ses goûts, doit certes connaître tout ce que la
colonie exotique renferme de plus original et de plus select… Chez
elle, vous rencontreriez aisément, je suis sûre, un sujet digne de
votre affreux petit travail de dissection et capable de vous inspirer
une collection de ces fameuses notes que le public serait si curieux
de connaître. Vous êtes trop jaloux de les garder, Robert.
D’un mouvement distrait il écrasa sous son pied une petite motte
de terre, et une expression d’amusement éclaira son regard sérieux.
— Mes notes, je vous prie de le croire, ne valent pas l’honneur
que vous leur faites en ce moment ;… une suite de phrases rédigées
en style télégraphique, qui n’ont d’autre mérite que leur grande
sincérité…
Isabelle n’insista pas, dépitée de ce qu’il se refusait, comme
toujours, malgré sa grande courtoisie, à la laisser pénétrer un peu
dans l’intimité de sa pensée. Les promeneurs devenaient rares dans
le jardin ; elle se décida à rejoindre la haute porte de sortie qui,
grande ouverte, laissait apercevoir, dans un lointain vert et lumineux,
l’avenue des Champs-Élysées, inondée d’une clarté de soleil
couchant. Et, d’un ton de badinage destiné à cacher sa déception,
elle interrogea encore :
— Et quand vous aurez découvert votre petite merveille de jeune
fille, Robert, peut-on, sans trop d’indiscrétion, vous demander
comment vous vous y prendrez pour étudier sa personne morale qui,
seule, vous intéresse ?
Sur les lèvres de Robert Noris reparut le même demi-sourire
étrange, tout ensemble triste et railleur.
— Je m’y prendrai comme font les naturalistes qui examinent de
remarquables papillons. Ils les contemplent au microscope, afin de
savoir d’où vient leur beauté, leur découvrent alors des
imperfections, des défauts non soupçonnés au premier regard ; et,
finissant par ne plus voir dans ces brillants papillons, tout comme
leurs frères les plus humbles, qu’une pauvre petite chose faite de
poussière, détournent dédaigneusement la tête et cherchent un
nouveau sujet d’observation. Voilà, au dédain près, toute l’histoire de
ma future étude en Suisse !…
— Vous êtes un homme abominable, Robert, sans ombre de
cœur !…
 — Vous avez raison, Isabelle, sans ombre de cœur, je le
reconnais humblement, fit-il, s’écartant pour la laisser passer, car ils
s’engageaient dans le vestibule où les visiteurs affluaient, sortant
des salons de peinture, maintenant fermés.
Elle fit quelques pas, puis s’arrêta, pour lui permettre de la
rejoindre, le regardant approcher. Elle était vraiment en beauté ce
jour-là, ainsi qu’elle en avait la parfaite conscience : les yeux
étincelaient à l’ombre des paupières un peu lourdes ; les cheveux
noirs, ondés et souples, s’échappaient artistement de la petite
capote de paille claire, caressant la pâleur chaude du teint, qui, dans
la lumière adoucie de cette fin de jour, retrouvait un incomparable
éclat ; et la soie molle du corsage dessinait hardiment les lignes
harmonieuses du buste pleinement épanoui, allongé par la taille
svelte comme une taille de jeune fille. Il était évident qu’avant de
sortir Isabelle avait passé une somme respectable de minutes
devant sa psyché, afin d’obtenir cet ensemble irréprochable dont elle
était jalouse. Mais peu importait à Robert ; il ne demandait à la jeune
femme que d’être, à l’occasion, un joli régal pour ses yeux de blasé ;
et il eut une exclamation sincère en la rejoignant :
— Tout homme abominable que vous me jugez, m’est-il permis
de vous dire, Isabelle, que vous êtes adorablement habillée ?
Elle répondit par un sourire charmé qui entr’ouvrit ses lèvres d’un
carmin foncé, très fines… Trop fines, avait bien souvent pensé
Robert : ces lèvres-là savaient être spirituelles, séduisantes, non pas
aimantes.
— Le compliment vous est permis, parce que je sais que vous
êtes un connaisseur, fit-elle, tendant la main au jeune homme, en
guise d’adieu.
Au bord du trottoir, en effet, se rangeait son coupé, laissant
apercevoir, derrière la glace, deux petites têtes d’enfants.
— A bientôt, n’est-ce pas, Robert ? Vous n’allez pas partir pour
Vevey mystérieusement, sans venir me faire vos adieux ?
— Pour Vevey ?… C’est décidément là que vous prétendez
m’envoyer ?…
 — Pourquoi non ? Vous y trouverez, ce me semble, votre Saint-
Graal, en la personne d’une petite Anglaise quelconque, et vous
aurez, pour champ d’expériences, le salon de Mme de Grouville.
Écoutez-moi, et vous me remercierez à votre retour… Au revoir.
— Au revoir, répéta-t-il.
Il s’inclina très bas devant elle, eut un geste de caresse pour les
deux mignonnes fillettes assises, d’un air grave, dans la voiture,
referma la portière, et le cocher enleva ses chevaux.
Un instant, il demeura immobile à suivre distraitement des yeux
le coupé qui s’éloignait ; à travers la glace de la portière, il distingua
une dernière fois une silhouette menue d’enfant, un élégant profil de
femme, puis cette double vision s’effaça. Alors il se mit à descendre
les Champs-Élysées, songeur, laissant sa pensée fuir vers ce
prochain voyage de Suisse, dont il jouissait étrangement à l’avance,
par la seule idée qu’il échapperait ainsi à cette fiévreuse vie
parisienne et mondaine, dont il était excédé jusqu’à l’écœurement,
— autant pour en avoir usé que pour l’avoir observée avec une
impitoyable pénétration. Ah ! qu’il les connaissait ces femmes du
monde occupées seulement de leurs succès de beauté, de leurs
chiffons, de leurs rivalités, de leurs intrigues, livrées toutes à leur vie
factice, pareille à la vie de plantes précieuses et délicates élevées
en serre chaude !
Combien de fois, sortant d’un five o’clock où il était venu pour
observer, ou simplement pour remplir une obligation de société,
s’était-il senti envahi par un mépris amer pour l’atmosphère
artificielle, énervante par sa mollesse, dans laquelle se mouvaient
les hommes de cercle, les femmes délicieusement élégantes qu’il
venait de quitter ! Qui eût soupçonné que lui, le Parisien sceptique,
désillusionné, passionné par son indépendance, il éprouvait l’âpre
nostalgie d’un vrai foyer très simple et très intime, tout parfumé de
tendresse, semblable à celui qu’il avait vu, enfant, dans la maison
paternelle et dont il gardait le souvenir infiniment cher…
Tout en songeant, il avait atteint l’extrémité de l’avenue des
Champs-Élysées ; et, avant de l’abandonner, il s’arrêta un moment
pour contempler le panorama parisien qui s’allongeait sous son
regard.
Dans cette approche du crépuscule, le ciel prenait des tons d’or
vert d’une douceur exquise ; une première étoile flamboyait solitaire
dans l’immensité limpide, et les têtes fleuries des marronniers
avaient un parfum pénétrant.
Certes, Robert Noris était trop artiste pour ne point sentir la
poésie qui se dégageait de ce renouveau fraîchement épanoui ;
mais il n’en jouissait pas à la manière des simples, qui subissent
leurs impressions sans les comprendre. En cet instant, comme
toujours, il demeurait le dilettante blasé, soigneux de tout ce qui
pouvait éveiller en lui une sensation esthétique.
Il s’était regardé vivre et il avait regardé vivre les autres, avec
une clairvoyance aiguë, se plaçant, pour cette étude constante, en
spectateur curieux et de goût raffiné à qui rien d’intéressant ne doit
échapper. Il s’était plu à rechercher toujours le pourquoi de ses
impressions, douloureuses ou bienfaisantes, comme de celles des
autres. Son esprit insatiable et chercheur avait fouillé toutes les
questions, appris à douter beaucoup et acquis trop vite la certitude
décevante que les grands problèmes de la vie morale ne peuvent
avoir que des solutions relatives.
Ainsi, il était arrivé à se créer une âme compliquée,
profondément triste, impossible à satisfaire, incapable d’illusions,
que le travail seul pouvait encore passionner. Non pas qu’il l’aimât
comme un élément de succès. Il ne tenait point au succès,
l’appréciant en sceptique. Sa brillante réputation le laissait
insensible. S’il souhaitait que ses œuvres fussent remarquables,
c’était pour lui-même, pour la jouissance intellectuelle qu’il éprouvait
à les écrire telles ; mais il était fort indifférent à l’opinion que pouvait
s’en former la majorité de ses contemporains.
De là venait que plusieurs le disaient volontiers d’humeur
hautaine et d’âme sèche, ce en quoi ils commettaient une grande
erreur. Robert Noris ne se livrait pas, parce qu’il avait le dédain
extrême des effusions banales. Au fond, il était seulement un délicat
qui, ayant été tout d’abord cruellement atteint par une inoubliable
déception, s’était replié sur lui-même et, depuis lors, efforcé de
briser en lui cette puissance de sentir, de s’attacher par le cœur, qu’il
avait si entièrement possédée.
En aimant Isabelle, il avait fait autrefois un vrai rêve de la
vingtième année, et il avait horriblement souffert quand elle l’avait
écarté comme un indifférent qui la gênait. Puis, avec le temps, à
mesure qu’il pénétrait davantage dans la compréhension de l’âme
humaine, il était devenu d’une indulgence un peu dédaigneuse,
mêlée d’ironie et de mélancolie, pour les êtres et leurs actions,
considérant qu’il ne faut point demander à des créatures fragiles
plus qu’elles ne peuvent donner, acquérant chaque jour davantage
la conviction de sa propre faiblesse et de celle des autres. Il avait
bien pardonné à Isabelle son dédain et son insensibilité d’antan ; il
avait rencontré tant d’autres femmes lui ressemblant ! Il la jugeait
maintenant froidement, mais avec son implacable perspicacité :
intelligente et fine, plus que jolie, belle à ravir les yeux, mais frivole,
incapable d’un véritable élan du cœur, faite de vanité et de
coquetterie, et devenant impitoyable dès que cette vanité et cette
coquetterie étaient en jeu. Il reconnaissait que peu de femmes
savaient être aussi séduisantes qu’elle ; mais ce charme même dont
elle était revêtue ne résultait que de sa volonté de plaire. Et
justement à cause de cela, elle l’amusait, l’intéressait, comme une
charmante manifestation de l’éternel féminin…
Mais le vieil homme n’était point complètement mort en lui. A
l’essence même de son être moral, qu’il considérait avec rigueur
comme un tout composé de curiosité, d’intelligence et d’égoïsme,
restaient une sorte de soif douloureuse et secrète de tendresse très
pure, de sincérité, un désir sourd d’oublier toute connaissance
psychologique, de vivre comme les sages qui savent être heureux
parce qu’ils n’analysent point toutes leurs joies.
Au moment même où il allait pénétrer sous la porte cochère de
son cercle, un couple jeune passa près de lui, la femme fluette et
mignonne dans sa robe du bon faiseur, appuyée avec une grâce
câline sur le bras de son cavalier, un clubman insignifiant et
distingué. Ils le frôlèrent presque ; elle, riait d’un joli rire gai ; et lui
semblait l’écouter charmé. Par habitude, Robert les analysa d’un
coup d’œil :
— Très bien assortis, très contents l’un de l’autre, très heureux
pour l’instant !… Quels mortels privilégiés ! murmura-t-il, railleur,
mais une secrète amertume vibrait dans son accent.
Alors il eut un haussement d’épaules et entra au cercle.