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What Remains?
The Dialectical Identities of
Eastern Germans
Joyce Marie Mushaben
What Remains?
Joyce Marie Mushaben
What Remains?
The Dialectical Identities of Eastern Germans
Joyce Marie Mushaben
BMW Center for German & European Studies
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C., WA, USA
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
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Acknowledgements
Indirectly occupying my thoughts for thirty years, this book proves that
national identities are rarely de- and reconstructed in the space of a single
generation. While I cannot personally thank the historical muses who put
me “in the right place, at the right time” with regard to this project on
East German identity, I can express my gratitude to many earth-bound
actors who contributed to the production of this book. For starters, I
acknowledge the Ford Foundation which financed my initial Fellowship in
GDR Studies at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies
(AICGS), 1989–1990, then extended my grant for two months commen-
surate with the increasing complexity of the topic. I also recognize the
BMW Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University
which enabled me to start analyzing my data as its first research fellow,
1990–1991. Likewise included in my thanks are the German Marshall
Fund of the United States, the German Academic Exchange Service, the
GDR Studies Association of the United States and the Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation, whose financial support made it possible for me
to travel to the German Dramatic Republic at critical turning points, as
well as to continue my investigation regarding the fates of eastern resi-
dents over the next few decades.
Completion of this book would not have been possible without the
sustained support of multiple colleagues at different stages of my research,
though some of us have drifted apart since the 1990s. My interactions
with “regulars” and visitors at the AICGS ensured access to a broad spec-
trum of political perspectives on the course of unification, a never-ending
flow of newspaper and journal articles, as well as unanticipated
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
1 Introduction:
Prelude to a German Revolution 1
Methodology 9
2 Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty: The Theoretical Parameters 21
A Concentric Approach to Identity Theory 27
Circle One: Identity as the Bio-Psychology of the Individual 27
Circle Two: Identity as Social Interaction 31
Circle Three: Identity as National Consciousness 32
The Circles Broken: Exit versus Voice 35
Expanding the Framework: Making the Case for Loyalty 45
Reinterpreting die Wende, 1989–1990 49
Identity from Below: Socialist Subcultures 55
3 Selection
by Consequences: What Did It Mean to Be
GDR-German? 63
The Parameters of Political Legitimacy 68
A Spectre Haunting …: The Stalinist Legacy 74
Founding Narrative Versus Historical Record 79
The Quest for Socialist Legitimacy 85
Redefining the Significance of State, Nation, Nationality 89
ix
x Contents
4 Real-Existing
Socialism: Consumer Culture and
Vitamin “B”115
The Perils of Planning Under Real-Existing Socialism 118
Collective Reponses to Chronic Scarcities 126
Intershop Socialism and Its Discontents 134
Creating the “Socialist Consumer” 138
The Paradox of Real-Existing Materialism 149
5 “Now
out of Never”: Exit, Voice, and Riding the
Revolutionary Bandwagon159
Learning to Live with “Arrangements” 161
Protest Currents and the Velvet Revolution 165
Unanticipated Consequences: Freikauf, Expulsions, and Local
Reactions 172
The Dialectical Forces of Exit and Voice 176
Ostalgie: Marketing East German Memories 183
Conclusion: Loyalty, Habitus, and “the Wall in One’s Head” 188
7 Conscience
of the Nation: Writers, Artisans, and
Intellectuals257
Cultural Policies and the Forces of Socialist Realism 260
Anti-fascist Imperatives: Loyalty and the Aufbau Generation 268
“Profiles in Courage”: Christa Wolf and Stefan Heym 272
The Sixty-Eighters and the Dilemmas of Cultural Revolution 281
The Post-Wall Literaturstreit: “The West” Versus Christa Wolf 285
Loyalty, Voice, and the National Question 293
8 From
Losers to Winners, and Back: The Stasi, Pastors,
and Dissidents303
Shield and Sword of the Party: The Ministry for State Security 306
Opiate of the Masses: The SED and Religion, 1945–1970 316
From Peaceful Coexistence (1971–1979) to Church from
Below (1980–1989) 320
(Re)Marginalized Voices: Pastors and Politics, 1990–1998 324
The Helsinki Factor: Loyalty as Dissent 328
Prosecuting the SED Dictatorship 334
Loyalty, Voice, and Retributive Justice 341
9 From
State Paternalism to Private Patriarchy: East
German Women355
Gender and Ideology: State Paternalism 357
Equality without Emancipation: Double Burdens and the
“Right to Work” 365
Revenge of the Cradle: Reproductive Rights and Wrongs 377
Private Patriarchy and the Re-domestication of Eastern Women 387
Deutschland einig Mutterland: Gender Policies under Angela
Merkel 393
Winning Women 397
xii Contents
10 The
Anti-political Identities of East German Youth409
Redefining Class Consciousness: The Uniform Socialist
Education System 413
Not-so-free “Free-time”: FDJ and the Jugendweihe 421
“Leave Us Kids Alone”: Finding Voice Through Music 429
From Voice to Exit: Normalos, Avantis, Gruftis, Punks,
and Skins 435
Writing for the Panzerschrank at the Central Institute for
Youth Research 444
Through the Looking Glass: Unification and Normative Loyalty 451
“Be careful what you pray for …” 462
12 The
Dialectical Identities of Germans United519
Caught in the Middle: Die Wendekinder 525
The Post-Turnaround Generation: Difference Still Matters 529
The Blessings of Late Birth 532
Index545
Abbreviations
xiii
xiv ABBREVIATIONS
xv
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Average gross wages (east marks), according to labor sector,
1955–1988139
Table 4.2 Annual food/nutritional consumption, 1955–1989 142
Table 4.3 Possession of major household appliances (in %), 1955–1985 147
Table 5.1 Out-migration from the SMAD/GDR to the Federal
Republic, 1950–1961 167
Table 5.2 Physical exits, 1961–1989 (including transfers from East to
West Berlin) 174
Table 5.3 “Resettlers” from East to West Germany, 1989 179
Table 6.1 New entries in selected registers of associations, 1990–1996 211
Table 6.2 Projected life expectancy in East Germany 219
Table 9.1 Women’s employment across major economic sectors
(as a proportion of total employment), 1970–1985 372
Table 9.2 GDR women in political leadership positions, 1971–1985 374
Table 9.3 Number of live births per woman, 1955–1989 380
Table 9.4 Divorces initiated by women and men, 1960–1989 384
Table 9.5 Children born to unwed mothers (% of all live births) 385
Table 9.6 East-West unemployment rates, 1990–1996 (socially
insured workers) 389
Table 9.7 Women in state parliaments, 2012 (pre-AfD), and 2022
(with AfD presence) 396
Table 10.1 Class backgrounds of students in higher education,
1960–1966419
Table 10.2 Trust in the SED (in %) 447
Table 10.3 Identification with the SED (in %) 448
Table 10.4 Identification with Marxism-Leninism 450
Table 10.5 Identification with the goals of the FDJ 451
xvii
xviii List of Tables
xix
CHAPTER 1
The date was May 10, 1989, the place was St. Louis, Missouri. In less than
two weeks, I would be moving to Washington, D.C., where I planned to
investigate GDR-identity as it had crystallized across a span of four decades
since its founding in 1949. I had already spent four years exploring the
contours of postwar German identity as it had evolved among the cohorts
born into the Western state, 1949–1989.1 I secured funding and outlined
a research agenda in late 1988, uncertain at the time what barriers I would
encounter in trying to unearth the official and unofficial dimensions of
GDR state-consciousness in a closed socialist society, the German
Democratic Republic. As one of my last formal duties in St. Louis, I
attended a dinner hosted by the Goethe Institute featuring the prominent
if querulous West German author, Günther Grass. Seated next to the guest
of honor, I briefly described my upcoming project, to which Grass imme-
diately responded: “Identity? Homeland? I believe that a homeland is
something one can only define as that which one has lost.”2 Our casual
dinner-party exchange came back to haunt me six months later. On
November 9, 1989—that chaotic, champagne-drenched night during
which the Berlin Wall suddenly came tumbling down—Grass’s definition of
identity wedded to homeland assumed the status of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Nearly twenty years of living and researching abroad have confirmed
my belief that the concepts of Heimat and Identität are most easily defined
from a distance. The pressures and distractions of day-to-day living at
close range tend to obscure the contours of the larger picture. By contrast,
be told unless and/or until Western Germans come to recognize that their
own past and future is intricately connected to the experiences of the
other side.
Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of what used to be GDR-
identity has been rendered no easier by the curious nature of my discipline:
political science pits the scientific against the political, the normative
against the empirical, and institutional imperatives against human compo-
nents. In 1906 Arthur L. Bowley at the Royal Statistical Society (London)
prescribed the first rules for determining a “representative sample,” a
mechanism that has become the lifeline of political behaviorists every-
where. German identity nonetheless predates the existence of survey
research techniques by a few hundred years, its core elements having been
established by countless wars and regime changes. The relatively closed
nature of GDR society made it virtually impossible for scholars to employ
standard methodologies used to test the attitudinal waters in the West.
This does not mean that East German officials prohibited any and all
forms of public opinion data; it does imply, however, that one cannot take
the existing data at face value.
I was the first US-American to be accorded unlimited access to archival
materials at the GDR’s Central Institute for Youth Research (ZIJ) in
Leipzig. Prior to the so-called Turn-around (Wende) of 1989, the survey
data generated there could only be accessed by SED Politburo members,
select Central Committee departments, the Office for Youth Affairs in the
Council of Ministers, and top officials of the Free German Youth League
(FDJ). For better or worse (given the outdated copying facilities I encoun-
tered during my first two-week stay), I was also the last American to enjoy
this privilege as a formal guest “during GDR times.” In accordance with
provisions appended to the Unity Treaty, the ZIJ was abgewickelt, “wound
down” and dissolved in December 1990. Several works drawing on the
Leipzig data have been published since 1991, usually by former ZIJ
researchers, but most texts have appeared only in German. This book
attempts, inter alia, to provide a broader picture of the Institute’s longitu-
dinal findings than is usually accessible to English-speaking readers.
The experience of having both one’s “target-group” and “data base”
officially cease to exist halfway through a research project is but one of the
occupational hazards which have tested the mettle of East European ana-
lysts since 1990. Feeling quite blessed not by my “late birth” but rather by
my good fortune at landing in the GDR when I did, mine was a very mov-
ing but also an extraordinarily chaotic research experience from the start.
4 J. M. MUSHABEN
★★★ At the central CDU office: “You want addresses and phone
numbers of our VK members? We’d like to have them ourselves!
Try the House of Parliamentarians.”
★★★ Back at the HoP reception desk: “We don’t have ‘em. You have
to go back to the party caucuses.”
★★★ At the now smaller, back-door office of the SED-turned-PDS:
“As you can see, they made us move. Maybe Herr-So-und-So
can help you.” Herr-So-und-So found my project very interest-
ing and told me he hoped to receive a copy of my book when it
came out. Regretfully he had no addresses and phone numbers
for his party’s VK delegates.
★★★ Back at the People’s Chamber: “No, [they] didn’t know where
the Liberal Party had moved to. Maybe the SPD could help.”
★★★ Returning to the SPD headquarters: I had a long conversation
with an amiable office worker, Marianne Eschenbach who, in
addition to offering me coffee, cookies and a place to stay, prom-
ised to arrange an interview with “her” MP, Angelika Barbe,
confirmed the next day.
between 1949 and 1989, before one can begin to figure out (with all due
respect to Humpty-Dumpty) how to put them back together again.
This book is divided into three parts. The first part (Chaps. 2 and 3)
explores the historical and “national” components of GDR-Identity as it
was officially defined and propagated over a span of forty years. The second
part (Chaps. 4, 5, and 6) analyzes major factors that contributed to a
growing gap between the national consciousness espoused by the Socialist
leadership and average citizens’ willingness to embrace the official version
prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. It explores the transformation of iden-
tity among former GDR state officials, party functionaries and “true-
believers.” Fired or forced into early retirement, many came to perceive
themselves as outright “losers” following unification, though a few became
surprisingly successful capitalists.
The third part (Chaps. 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11) investigates the unofficial
dimensions of East German identity which imprinted themselves on the per-
sonal consciousness of specific subsets of citizens, as a key to understanding,
in the words of Christa Wolf, what remains.3 It explores an array of often
erroneously conflated subcultures—writers, intellectuals, pastors, dissi-
dents, women and youth—along with working-class men, whose identities
have been marked by alienation and hostility since the political implosion
of 1989, attracting them to the rightwing populist Alternative for Germany
party.4 The concluding chapter is devoted to speculations about the orien-
tations and identities of post-Wall youth (Third Generation East), and the
curious failure of West Germans to recognize the extent to which their own
identities have been reconfigured in the wake of unification.
Methodology
Although my Ford Foundation grant had been approved in mid-1988, I
was unable to commence work on this project exploring DDR-Identität
until June 1989. My initial experiences in the field provided many impor-
tant lessons about the lives and mind-sets of citizens made-in-the-GDR, a
number of which can be used retrospectively to “defend” the eclectic
methodological approach adopted here (see Box 1.1). For younger schol-
ars whose curiosity has been piqued by the collapse of the GDR, my
account will call forth the image of an academic stone-age or, at a mini-
mum, tales of a Great Depression they did not personally witness. They
may find it hard to imagine an industrialized country unable to provide
visiting professors with the names of elected officials, much less to supply
10 J. M. MUSHABEN
Another qualification regarding ZIJ data stems from the fact that
responses were solicited under a command system rather than on the basis
of voluntary participation. Though researchers sought to guarantee ano-
nymity by collecting classroom surveys into a large pile, it was always dif-
ficult to assess the sincerity of the answers provided, the contents of which
may have been motivated by fear, by a concern for one’s university or
career prospects, by a sense of duty-consciousness, or by direct teacher
supervision. Attempts to verify individual responses with follow-up inter-
views would have resulted in further distrust, multiplying the number of
disingenuous replies, although this method was used on occasion. Added
to this dilemma is the fact that most GDR-youth would have been well-
versed in “double-speak” by the time they were teenagers.
Last but not least, there were the formidable problems of interpreta-
tion, replication, publication, and, ultimately, open discussion of the
results. Consistent with its general self-glorification tendencies, the regime
tolerated only those interpretations of data stressing that “the glass was
almost full,” as ominous as the signs of youth discontent had become by
the early 1980s. Though regularly denied permission to publish any data
suggesting an erosion of systemic support, Institute members could, on
occasion, lecture on their findings among “selected” publics permitted to
discuss them, for example, FDJ functionaries. By the summer of 1989, a
direct order from the Chief of the Office for Youth Affairs in the Council
of Ministers barred all ZIJ analysts from discussing the deteriorating polit-
ical climate publicly. That muzzle was only removed in the wake of the
dramatic events of October/November, by which point it had already
become impossible to reverse the course of GDR history.
These serious qualifications notwithstanding, the Leipzig data do tell a
rather astounding story. More important than the extent to which young
survey participants protected themselves by voicing the party-line is the
degree to which they did not, despite the negative repercussions most real-
ized they might face. Surveys of the late 1970s testify to a consciously
articulated loss of faith in the system, especially among young members of
the working class. A comparable decline in support would not be observed
among university students and party-political youth until the mid-1980s.
Educational Minister Margot Honecker, along with the Politburo mem-
bers who were privy to these data, might have undertaken policy changes
at the onset of the decade to ensure the system’s survival, yet they refused
to see the handwriting on the Wall, real and proverbial. Thus, the
1 INTRODUCTION: PRELUDE TO A GERMAN REVOLUTION 15
Notes
1. Joyce Marie Mushaben, From Post-War to Post-Wall Generations. Changing
Attitudes towards the National Question and NATO in the Federal Republic
of Germany (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
2. In his own words: “Identität? Heimat? Ich glaube Heimat ist das was man
nur definieren kann, als was man verloren hat.”
3. This is the title of a literary treatment of Wolf’s own encounters with the
Secret Police or Stasi in the late 1970s. The author’s decision to publish her
account after the Wall fell led to charges of “opportunism,” followed by a
sustained public assault on her literary accomplishments, led by conservative
western male critics. See Chap. 7 for details.
4. Umbruch or implosion is the term some GDR experts prefer to use over the
term “revolution” to describe the peaceful dynamics of democratic awaken-
ing and regime collapse between August 1989 and October 1990.
5. Among its more “historically” valuable survey holdings are a number of
interval/panel studies initiated in 1969, under the titles STUDENT ’69,
STUDENT ’79, and STUDENT ’89, the eastern equivalent of the West
German Shell Studies.
PART I
Once upon a time, there was a country about which most people knew and
probably cared so little that they only referred to it by its initials. It was the
“so-called DDR.” Like other countries throughout history and across the
globe, this one was created to pursue a specific set of ideals, derived from the
not-so-happy history of the big and powerful country that had preceded it,
which had also been German. It wanted to guarantee that this horrible his-
tory would never be repeated, so it adopted a new model for a perfect, peaceful
society—and for a brief period it showed the promise of becoming die deutsche
(anti-faschistische) demokratische Republik, 1945–1948.
But human leaders aren’t perfect and, like so many countries, this one had
a hard time living up to its ideals. Step by step, the theory became alienated
from the praxis so, like many other governments, this one tried to win the
hearts and minds of its citizens by using ever more boasting, propaganda and
even coercion. Its rulers wanted the country to give birth to millions of “social-
ist personalities” in their own image and likeness. But the message became
stale, the schools became authoritarian and the goods were not always deliv-
ered, during this phase of die deutsche demagogische Republik, 1949–1970.
As a result, the people became more apolitical, as they pulled into their
private niches; the state grew ever more distant, but they found a quiet middle
ground. They invented an historical compromise they called an “arrange-
ment.” The people would go to May Day and Founders’ Day parades (most
big governments love parades on their birthdays) and the state would leave
them more or less alone to struggle through the periods of scarce consumer
goods, albeit with lots of subsidies. Contradictions were, after all, just part of
18 Dimensions of the Dialectical Identity
the process of growing up to be real-existing socialists, and this was clearly the
phase of die deutsche dialektische Republik, 1971–1987.
The contradictions worsened, however, when the people in the Land of
Resistance Fighters woke up one day, turned on their televisions to watch the
evening news, on West-TV, and discovered that other countries were changing
all around them, opening their borders, even printing real-news in their
newspapers. DDR citizens wanted to know why they couldn’t at least be as
free as the Hungarians if they couldn’t be as rich as “the other” Germans.
So they headed out, in many new places, for a different kind of parade with
lots of candles; with lots of candles; only this time their children—actually the
children of the children of the comrades who had built the country in the first
place—pointed their fingers and called out loud that the emperor was wear-
ing no clothes. Their parents were a little ashamed, not of their leaders’
nakedness (after all, they had fought for nudist beaches) but of their own
silence all those years, and suddenly they became “the people” in die deutsche
dramatische Republik, 1988–1990.
Now some people wanted to ask important, theoretical questions, after
their own local parades, to talk about rebuilding their country based on a
new set of ideals. Most of their neighbors didn’t want to wait around for the
answers, however. Instead they packed their camping gear, got into their
funny little cars called Trabis (for Traurige Arbeiter und Bauern Initiative/
The Sad Initiative of Workers and Peasants), and following the wisdom of a
famous cigarette commercial, they shouted “Let’s go West.” Though our story
does not end here, this phase could be labeled die deutsche demolierte
Republik, which dominated the headlines from March 18 to October 3, 1990.
Not too long after the Wall came tumbling down, some people who looked
into their academic crystal balls and psychology textbooks predicted it would
take at least a decade for our sheroes and heroes to learn how to live happily
ever after in their glittery new republic. Five years into the internationally
celebrated marriage of the richly attired Western King and the somewhat
haggard-looking Eastern princess, the new people living in the Bigger (though
not totally Better) Kingdom started to ask, in the words of their own
Cassandra, “What remains?” They started to wonder ostagically, so to speak,
why they were being treated like strangers in a strange land. Too many had
lost their jobs, their benefits, their Heimat and often, quite literally, “a home
of their own,” in this new, deutsche däprimierte Republik, 1991–1998.
Now Old King Kohl was not such a merry, bold soul by the end of his reign,
so he and his minions hardly noticed that something amazing was taking
place in the far-away parts of his kingdom. The people started talking out
Dimensions of the Dialectical Identity 19
loud, or talking to each other, while thinking about tactics and tricks they had
used to make their homeland better “in GDR times,” as they were wont to say.
Remembering their clubs, their grill- and other kinds of parties, their Handys,
their days and (k)nights of the Round Table, they took one last look in the
Spiegel (surveys); although the photo still wasn’t very flattering, they suddenly
realized that they had lost their ugly Duckmäuser demeanor and were anx-
ious to become a deutsche dynamische Region, 1999–2007.1
That would have been a happy ending, but the dark clouds of an EU
financial “shit-storm” (as the Germans say) spread across the land. Shortly
thereafter many new people from foreign lands began pouring into the
Kingdom in search of peace and freedom, just like these Germans had done
many years ago. But some of the citizens grew afraid and resentful, so they
took to the streets once again, chanting “we are the people.” But this time they
started voting for angry, taboo-breaking politicians who reminded too many
others at home and abroad of the deutsches dämonisches Reich that had
caused them to be divided in the first place. Unlike most fairy tales, this is not
the end of his- or her-story, so let us continue the tale.
Note
1. An earlier version of this tale appears in Joyce Marie Mushaben. 2010.
“Unification and the Law of Unanticipated Consequences,” German Studies
Review 33 (3): 483–488.
CHAPTER 2
Im traurigen Monat November war’s, It was in November, that dreary month;
Die Tage wurden trüber, The days were growing shorter;
Der Wind riss von den Bäumen das Laub The winds ripped all the leaves from the trees;
Da reist’ ich nach Deutschland hinüber. And I came to the German border.
Und als ich an die Grenze kam, And as I reached the borderline
Da fühlt’ ich ein stärkeres Klopfen A stronger pulse began
In meiner Brust, ich glaube sogar To throb within me; down my cheeks
Die Augen begunnen zu tropfen… I think some teardrops ran.
More than three decades have passed since the two parts of a long-divided
German nation became one, but even thirty years may not be sufficient to
make or break an identity, be it personal or national. Generational studies
suggest that it takes at least twenty years for people to sort through a
myriad of attitudes and behaviors in a conscious effort to determine which
identity traits are worth preserving, and which ones are best pitched into
the recycling bin of historical memory.2
This book began as a narrowly defined effort, prior to the fall of the
Berlin Wall, to pinpoint the quintessential components of a divided
national identity that rendered the German Democratic Republic a sepa-
rate state across a span of four decades. Its initial purpose was to determine
the extent to which specific elements of that identity contributed to, or
worked against, the leadership’s efforts to legitimize the GDR’s existence
in the eyes of its own citizens between its founding in 1949 and the 1989
Wende [Turn-around]. In the mid-1990s, I expanded my framework to
investigate not only the officially mandated “GDR-identity” but also key
features of a little studied, unofficial “eastern” (ostdeutsche) identity likely
to shape the formation of a new all-German identity following unification,
a topic I have followed for three decades.
While the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist as a political
entity on October 3, 1990, a de facto merging of the Eastern and Western
cultures had yet to occur by the time of the 2017 national elections.
Ironically, it took the rise of a rightwing populist party, the Alternative for
Germany (AfD), to force prominent elites in the “old” Federal Republic
to recognize the import of psychological factors in the unification process.
The potential sources of ongoing division I had emphasized in 1990–1991
resurfaced in public debates around 2014, following the rise of the
PEGIDA movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the
Occident) in Dresden.3 The fact that the official GDR-identity lacked deep
roots among average citizens no doubt contributed to the state’s rapid
demise after the dramatic opening of the Wall on November 9, 1989. The
extraordinary pace of unification denied Easterners a chance to assess their
attachment to familiar elements of everyday GDR culture and values,
however, undercutting their ability to voice mounting dissatisfaction with
the path that “unity” had taken.
The GDR’s forty-year history embodies a complex interplay of conti-
nuity and change, successes and failures. Like every society, this one was
fraught with contradictions and conflicts, both class- and gender-based.
But eastern political culture also evinced its own forms of accommodation,
bargaining, and social solidarity. Its dissolution was simplistically charac-
terized in many quarters as the triumph of capitalism over communism,
and/or freedom over dictatorship. But identities do not die as a conse-
quence of new borders and a new currency alone. Were this the case, there
would have been no rational basis, and certainly no socio-cultural founda-
tion for a “reaffirmation” of national unity after forty years of German
division.
2 EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: THE THEORETICAL PARAMETERS 23
Mannheim’s caveat remains relevant for any scholar seeking to capture the
essence of German national character in the post-war and post-Wall eras.
We cannot assume that the GDR’s past efforts to instill a new “national”
identity by fiat were uniformly effective among various segments of its
population. Nor can we presume, as many post-unity prognoses did, that
market forces will move Eastern Germans in equal measure to embrace the
prevailing western or FRG-identity as their own.
This chapter begins by outlining a concentric model of identity devel-
oped in conjunction with my earlier work on West German identity, before
and after the fall of the Wall.14 Building on developmental and “operant
conditioning” theories advanced by Abraham Maslow and B. F. Skinner, I
explore key dimensions of individual-psychological, social-interactive and
national-collective identity. I then consider the ways in which the abrupt
demise of an official GDR-identity—but not its day-to-day counterpart,
East German identity—has redefined the significance assigned to each
dimension over the last three decades.
2 EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: THE THEORETICAL PARAMETERS 27
repressed “desire to become more and more what one is, to become
everything that one is capable of becoming.”17 A fundamental thwarting
of these needs would “give rise to either basic discouragement or else
compensatory or neurotic needs,” and possibly to severe traumatic neuro-
sis.18 The latter is reflected in certain psychological “deformations” affect-
ing particularly sensitive or politically persecuted individuals (but certainly
not all citizens) under the old GDR regime.19
Desire alone will not enable an individual to attain a state of physical
and psychological well-being. Each person must discover and engage in
“functions furthering the interchange between organism and environ-
ment,” known as behavior.20 Not all behaviors move people toward their
desired end of self-actualization; some can even prove counter-productive,
causing humans to pursue a strategy B. F. Skinner characterized as “selec-
tion by consequences.”
Drawing on patterns of biological evolution, Skinner traced persistent
modes of human behavior back to the first molecule that managed to
reproduce itself and prevail against the rest. Other organisms followed,
whose reproduction occurred under ever more diverse and, in part, adverse
conditions. The environment played a determining role in the genetic
endowment of biological functions, rendering an organism most likely to
survive/thrive under conditions equivalent to those underlying its selec-
tion. Hence, “the definition or identity of a species, person, or culture” is
transmitted from one generation to the next to the degree that select
behaviors are reproduced as part of an individual’s repertoire.21
Skinner held that successful reproduction over time depends on two
processes enabling organisms to acquire behaviors appropriate to subse-
quent changes in the environment. The first is known as respondent
(Pavlovian) conditioning, whereby responses pre-programmed by natural
selection can be redirected and controlled by new stimuli. The second
process is operant conditioning, whereby events immediately following
new stimuli serve to strengthen or reinforce new responses. This method
amounts to “selection in progress, resembling a hundred million years of
natural selection or a thousand years of the evolution of a culture com-
pressed into a very short period of time.”22
To the extent that human behavior is primarily social in nature, other
members of the species provide one of the most stable fixtures within a
given environment. “Imitation” of others is critical to reinforcement and
thus to the perpetuation of a behavioral repertoire; contingencies induc-
ing one “organism” to perform in a certain way will generally impel others
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9. Unsere Definition des Sadismus.
Wir fassen den Begriff „Sadismus“ bedeutend weiter, als dies
bisher geschehen ist. Sehen wir uns also zunächst die Definitionen
desselben bei anderen Autoren an.
Lacassagne erklärt den Sadismus für einen „Geisteszustand“, bei
welchem der Sexualtrieb erregt oder befriedigt wird unter dem
Einflusse des Zerstörungstriebes.[623]
Nach R. v. Krafft-Ebing ist der Sadismus jene Form der
Perversion der Vita sexualis, bei welcher die Person einen sexuellen
Genuss darin findet, Anderen Schmerz zuzufügen und auf Andere
Gewalt auszuüben. Er stellt dem Sadismus den Masochismus (nach
dem Schriftsteller Sacher-Masoch) gegenüber, die mit Wollust
betonte Vorstellung, von einem Anderen herrisch behandelt,
gedemütigt und misshandelt zu werden.[624] Er betrachtet
Masochismus und Sadismus als die „Grundformen psychosexualer
Perversion, die auf dem ganzen Gebiete der Verirrungen des
Geschlechtstriebes an den verschiedensten Stellen zu Tage treten
können.“[625]
Demgegenüber macht v. Schrenck-Notzing geltend, dass
zunächst der Unterschied der aktiven und passiven Rolle in den
Romanen des Marquis de Sade und von Sacher-Masoch nicht so
scharf durchgeführt sei, wie dies v. Krafft-Ebing annimmt. Zudem
kämen beide Formen der Perversion oft bei demselben Individuum
vor. Er ordnete also beide Begriffe einem einzigen höheren Begriffe,
der Algolagnie (von ἄλγος = Schmerz und λάγνος = geschlechtlich
erregt) und bezeichnet den Sadismus als aktive Algolagnie, den
Masochismus als passive Algolagnie. Es giebt aber nach diesem
Autor noch andere Formen der Algolagnie: die onanistische
Algolagnie (Selbstverstümmelung, Autoflagellantismus), die visuelle
Algolagnie (geschlechtliche Erregung beim Anblick von
Prügelszenen), zoophile und bestiale Algolagnie, nekrophile
Algolagnie, endlich die ideelle oder symbolische Algolagnie, bei
welcher „der Schmerz ohne jede Nebenbedeutung und
phantastische Ausschmückung um seiner selbst willen eine Rolle
spielt, ohne Rücksicht auf aktive oder passive Bethätigung.“[626]
Thoinot giebt folgende Definition des Sadismus: „Sadismus ist
die Perversion des Sexuallebens, bei welcher der Betreffende
sexuellen Genuss darin findet, Schmerzen von sehr verschiedenen
Graden einem Anderen zuzufügen, sei es, dass er selbst sie zufügt,
oder zufügen lässt oder, ohne dass er der Urheber derselben ist,
dabei zuschaut. Diese leidende Person muss immer ein
menschliches Wesen sein.“[627]
Thoinot und von Schrenck-Notzing stimmen darin überein, dass
die Verbindung von Grausamkeit und Wollust der höhere Begriff ist,
dem die anderen untergeordnet werden müssen, dass also der
Masochismus nicht etwas Besonderes neben dem Sadismus
darstellt, sondern wie dieser eine Form der Algolagnie ist.
Unzweifelhaft hat aber Thoinot Unrecht, dass er den Begriff
Sadismus (welches Wort er für Algolagnie setzt) nur menschlichen
Wesen gegenüber angewendet wissen will.
A. Eulenburg hat wohl noch vor von Schrenck-Notzing darauf
aufmerksam gemacht, dass der Begriff der Algolagnie, den er durch
die Worte Lagnänomanie (= Sadismus) und Machlänomanie (=
Masochismus) ersetzt, sehr viele Ab- und Unterarten umfasst. Auch
er betont, dass „sich das nämliche Individuum abwechselnd aktiv
und passiv verhalten, und aus Beidem geschlechtliche Erregung und
Befriedigung schöpfen kann.“ Ferner erinnert Eulenburg an die
Mittelformen, wobei „das Individuum zum Behufe geschlechtlicher
Erregung weder selbst gewaltsame Handlungen vornimmt noch
solche erduldet — wohl aber dergleichen von Anderen provociert,
sie mit ansieht und durch den Anblick, oder unter Umständen schon
durch die blosse Vorstellung des Anblicks in die gewünschte
Befriedigung versetzt wird.“ Also eine Art von ideeller oder
illusionärer Lagnänomanie und Machlänomanie. Ferner ist die
Begehung grausamer Akte gegen Tiere in Betracht zu ziehen.
Schliesslich erklärt Eulenburg das Beobachtungsmaterial für „noch
bei Weitem nicht abgeschlossen“.[628]
Es handelt sich nun unseres Erachtens darum, eine allgemeine
und für alle Fälle zutreffende Definition des Sadismus zu finden, die
kurz und prägnant den Grundton der Sade’schen Werke ausdrückt
und unter die sich alle Formen der passiven und aktiven Algolagnie
der Zoo- und Nekrophilie, der symbolischen Algolagnie u. s. w.
unterordnen lassen. Bedenkt man, dass in den Werken des Marquis
de Sade auch alle wirklichen und ideellen destruktiven Vorgänge in
der lebenden und toten Natur als Ursachen sexueller Erregung und
Befriedigung betrachtet werden, wie Mord, Folter, Nekrophilie,
Zoophilie, aber auch Ausbrüche von Vulkanen, Schiffbrüche,
Feuersbrünste, Diebstähle u. s. w., so wird man den typischen
Sadismus folgendermassen definieren:
Der Sadismus ist die absichtlich gesuchte oder zufällig
dargebotene Verbindung der geschlechtlichen Erregung und des
Geschlechtsgenusses mit dem wirklichen oder auch nur
symbolischen (ideellen, illusionären) Eintreten furchtbarer und
erschreckender Ereignisse, destruktiver Vorgänge und Handlungen,
welche Leben, Gesundheit und Eigentum des Menschen und der
übrigen lebenden Wesen bedrohen oder vernichten und die
Continuität toter Gegenstände bedrohen und aufheben, wobei der
aus diesen Vorgängen einen geschlechtlichen Genuss schöpfende
Mensch selbst ihr direkter Urheber sein kann, oder sie durch Andere
herbeiführen lässt, oder blosser Zuschauer bei denselben ist, oder
endlich freiwillig oder unfreiwillig ein Angriffsobjekt dieser Vorgänge
ist.
Uns scheint, dass diese Definition dem Wortsadismus ebenso
gerecht wird wie dem Lustmorde, der Folter und der Freude an
zerstörenden Ereignissen.
10. Beurteilung des Menschen Sade nach seinem
Leben und seinen Schriften.
Die wichtigste Frage ist die: War der Marquis de Sade
geisteskrank oder nicht?
Heute, wo die hereditäre und krankhafte Natur der sogenannten
conträren Sexualempfindung so sehr betont und energisch die
Aufhebung des § 175 des deutschen Strafgesetzbuches verlangt
wird, ist man nur zu leicht geneigt, jede schwerere sexuelle
Perversion als Zeichen einer Geisteskrankheit zu deuten.
Demgegenüber betonen wir als unsere feste, aus kulturhistorischen
Studien und Erfahrungen des modernen Lebens geschöpfte
Ueberzeugung, dass wir die Mehrzahl der sexuellen perversen
Personen für geistig gesund halten und ihre Perversion auf
Verführung und geschlechtliche Ueberreizung zurückführen. Die
Anschauungen v. Krafft-Ebing’s, der die hereditäre Natur vieler
sexueller Perversionen vertritt, werden gegenüber den durchaus
berechtigten Ausführungen v. Schrenck-Notzing’s, der die
Erziehung, occasionelle Momente, wie Verführung u. dgl. m.
verantwortlich macht, immer mehr an Boden verlieren, wie weitere
Studien erweisen werden. Selbst von Krafft-Ebing sagt einmal (Arch.
f. Psychiatrie Bd. VII, S. 304): „Wer Tardieus bekannte Studie,
Caspers gerichtsärztliche Werke, Legrand du Saulles Mitteilungen in
den Annales médico-psychologiques, März 1876, gelesen hat, wird
zugeben müssen, dass die greulichsten geschlechtlichen
Verirrungen mit geistiger Gesundheit verträglich sind.“ Es geht
daraus, wie Moll richtig bemerkt, hervor, dass Krafft-Ebing selbst die
greulichsten geschlechtlichen Perversitäten an sich nicht als Beweis
einer Geisteskrankheit ansieht.[629]
Was speziell den Sadismus betrifft, so bemerkt auch Eulenburg,
ein Anhänger der Aufhebung des § 175, dass „bei weitem nicht alle,
namentlich aktiven Algolagnisten als geisteskrank im engeren Sinne
zu betrachten seien. Gewiss sind es die ‚schweren‘ und ‚schwersten‘
unter ihnen, die eigentlichen sexualen Verbrecher, Lustmörder
u. s. w. wohl ausnahmslos, obgleich man auch von ihnen mehrere
als geistesgesund hingerichtet hat (was ich übrigens nicht als ein
Unglück, noch weniger als einen Justizmord ansehen möchte).“[630]
Ueber den Geisteszustand des Marquis de Sade, der bekanntlich
von Royer-Collard für gesund erklärt wurde, haben sich in diesem
Jahre zwei Aerzte geäussert, Dr. Marciat in Lyon und Professor A.
Eulenburg in Berlin. Der letztere hervorragende Neurologe hat ohne
Zweifel das eingehendere und scharfsinnigere Gutachten über Sade
geliefert. Er kommt zu dem Schlusse, dass „auch die Irrenärzte
unserer Zeit der Mehrzahl nach sich kaum in der Lage befunden
haben würden, de Sade vor dem Strafrichter für geisteskrank und
‚der freien Willensbestimmung beraubt‘ zu erklären und ihn der
unzweifelhaften gerichtlichen Verurteilung damit zu entziehen.“[631]
Marciat kommt zu einem ähnlichen Resultat. Der Marquis de Sade
war „nicht geisteskrank im genauen Sinne des Wortes“. Höchstens
könnte man an moral insanity denken, aber nur im Hinblick auf die
Hauptwerke. Aber „man muss sich erinnern, dass Mirabeau, Musset
und viele Andere auch sehr schlüpfrige Bücher veröffentlicht
haben.“[632]
Die Annahme einer „moral insanity“ (folie morale), die Marciat
eventuell zulassen würde, hat Eulenburg (a. a. O. S. 514) bereits
zurückgewiesen, da es eine Form der Seelenstörung, die sich
„lediglich durch eine krankhafte Umwandlung, eine Perversion der
natürlichen sittlichen Antriebe und Gefühle und durch eine daraus
entspringende Neigung zu unsittlichen Handlungen, ohne sonstige
Störungen der Intelligenz charakterisierte“, nicht giebt, vielmehr
„immer und überall die auf angeborener Anlage beruhende
Abschwächung der Intelligenz neben der Gefühlsstörung hervortritt
und dass es sich demnach um Fälle angeborenen Schwachsinns,
meist auf degenerativer Grundlage handelt“ (a. a. O. S. 514).
Wir glauben, dass speziell bei Sade jene Form der Entartung in
Betracht kommen könnte, welche Kraepelin als „impulsives Irresein“
bezeichnet. Es sind „alle jene Formen des Entartungsirreseins,
denen die Entwickelung krankhafter Neigungen und Triebe
eigentümlich ist.“ Dieselben können entweder dauernd den Willen
beherrschen oder nur zeitweise, in einzelnen Anwandlungen,
hervortreten. Der Kranke handelt dabei ohne klaren Beweggrund. So
tragen seine Willensäusserungen vielfach den Stempel des
Unvorbedachten und Zwecklosen, Widersinnigen. Gerade auf dem
Gebiete des impulsiven Irreseins „tritt uns am deutlichsten die
häufige Verbindung krankhafter Antriebe mit dem Geschlechtstriebe
entgegen.“ Die geistige Begabung braucht keine schärfer
hervortretenden Störungen aufzuweisen. Doch ist in schweren
Fällen meist Schwachsinn vorhanden. In allen Fällen findet sich eine
gewisse Beschränktheit, Zerfahrenheit, Verschwommenheit, eine
haltlose Schwäche des Charakters, kindischer Eigensinn,
Menschenscheu, Roheit. Das impulsive Irresein tritt besonders in
den Entwickelungsjahren hervor und zeitigt auch später meist
periodische Krankheitserscheinungen. Man soll aber nach Kraepelin
das Bestehen des impulsiven Irreseins nur dort annehmen, wo
wirklich der triebartige Ursprung des Handelns ohne klares
vernünftiges Ziel hervortritt und wo auch im übrigen Bereiche des
Seelenlebens die Anzeichen einer krankhaften Veranlagung
erkennbar sind. Kraepelin lässt die Möglichkeit zu, dass plötzliche
Antriebe von unbezwinglicher Stärke im Zustande geistiger
Gesundheit bei den „heissblütigen Völkern des Südens“ häufiger
sind als bei uns, und daher die „forza irresistibile“ des italienischen
und spanischen Gesetzbuches vielleicht eine Berechtigung habe.
[633]