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Introducing
Dewey
ALSO AVAILABLE FROM BLOOMSBURY
1 Dewey’s Context 1
3 Pragmatic Experimentalism 51
4 Ethics 75
8 Aesthetics 183
Bibliography 217
Index 226
viii
1
Dewey’s Context
his most important works would appear through the last decades of
his life.
Dewey’s published work was largely well received from an early
point in his career, and his reputation and influence grew steadily
through the early decades of the twentieth century in the several
subdisciplines of philosophy to which he was making major
contributions. Introducing Dewey may seem an odd undertaking
given that for the first half of the last century no American
philosopher gained a higher profile both within and without the
academic world than this mild-mannered Vermonter. His renown
among the professional philosophers of his day was considerable
and based primarily upon such major works as Democracy and
Education (1916), Reconstruction in Philosophy (1919), The Public
and Its Problems (1927), and The Quest for Certainty (1929) while his
reputation in the broader culture was due in the main to his work
as an activist and public intellectual. For decades, no major social
issue would go unremarked from the pen of John Dewey, and his
involvement in organizations such as the International League for
Academic Freedom, the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, and the League for Industrial Democracy
demonstrated a commitment to American national affairs that
regularly took him beyond the confines of the university. As a
philosopher he is perhaps best known as the youngest among the
great trio of classical pragmatists that also includes Charles Sanders
Peirce and William James and for his contributions to political
liberalism and the philosophy of education. If Dewey’s heyday may
be said to encompass the first few decades of the twentieth century,
his work went into something of an eclipse by mid-century for
reasons that are not immediately evident. It can hardly be asserted
that his work across various major branches of philosophy suffered
any sort of large-scale refutation. A more plausible explanation is
Dewey’s Context 3
peers had managed. It would never find favor with Dewey himself,
however. Some of his later works would express skepticism about
“two contemporary schools, now exercising considerable influence,
the British analytic school and the school of logical positivism,
[which] suffer greatly because of their dependence upon pre-Jamesian
psychology.”5 If the latter complained of the pragmatists’ alleged lack
of analytical rigor, Dewey’s numerous criticisms of the new trend
centered in the main upon analytic philosophy’s arid rationalism,
formalism, and narrowness. His critique of his continental European
counterparts was equally and at times still more strident, his
inclination being essentially to ignore continental philosophy in its
entirety much after Marx, whom he held in low regard. The future
of philosophy, Dewey’s conviction had it, lay decisively in the new
world; the old he came to regard as something of a spent force both
culturally and intellectually, although it must be said that his first-
hand knowledge of his European peers left much to be desired.
Dewey was no exception to the rule that philosophers have
influences, and to identify his we must attend to the tradition in
which he began working in the 1880s and which in some manner
would remain with him throughout his life. While his positions
would evolve over the decades, one does not find in Dewey’s
thought any sort of rupture, although many would claim to find
one in the form of a turn away from the Hegelianism of his youth by
the time his major works were being written, a determination that
his autobiographical essay “From Absolutism to Experimentalism”
in 1930 seemed to many to confirm.6 Without going into detail
here, Dewey’s “turn” away from Hegel was nothing so dramatic as
has often been claimed, but a relative shift from what he came to
regard as an “absolutist” rendering of Hegel—or, better, of Anglo-
American neo-Hegelian idealism—which he had imbibed while
in his twenties toward a more sophisticated reading which was
8 Introducing Dewey
kinds. A key notion here is relations; the human being finds itself a
participant in what one scholar calls “a network of interconnections,”
where the connections themselves are organic and reciprocal, on the
model of a garden:
the changes in the living thing are orderly; they are cumulative; they
tend constantly in one direction; they do not, like other changes,
destroy or consume, or pass fruitless into wandering flux; they
realize and fulfil. Each successive stage, no matter how unlike its
predecessor, preserves its net effect and also prepares the way for a
fuller activity on the part of its successor. In living beings, changes
do not happen as they seem to happen elsewhere, any which way;
the earlier changes are regulated in view of later results.13
He would often repeat the point that modern Western culture was
experiencing an unprecedented extent and pace of change, and while
in itself this was nothing to be regretted it had the potential to get
out of hand if no one, whether philosophers, scientists, or anyone
else who could claim real knowledge, should be capable in some
fashion of getting in front of it. Much of the “turmoil” of modern
life, the manifestations of which seemed to him ubiquitous, is owing
to a failure of knowledge as university professors in all disciplines
had become ever-more specialized and incapable of seeing any larger
picture of the human world. What was needed, Dewey believed,
was something of a modern counterpart to the Greek philosopher,
a relative generalist who could venture into various disciplines or
subdisciplines while taking special note of any given specialty’s
implications for some others, thus understanding some aspects of
the whole in its organic interrelatedness rather than in the isolation
that had become customary in his time. What he called the “mentally
active scholar,” of whom he was surely one, possesses a “mind [that]
Dewey’s Context 19
roams far and wide. All is grist that comes to his mill, and he does not
limit his supply of grain to any one fenced-off field.”19
It is no surprise, then, that Dewey’s own writings include major
contributions to most of the major subdisciplines of philosophy,
where his inveterate habit was to analyze a given theme with constant
reference to some of its cognates and in a style of prose that was often
accessible to nonspecialists. The broad-mindedness and far-ranging
curiosity for which he called he also practiced, as a quick survey of
his book titles reveals. If “the great enemy” of knowledge “is scholastic
specialization,” what is needed is a relatively comprehensive view of
the human condition both for the purpose of understanding and “in
order that the current may receive a new direction.”20 The thinker
strives to “get to the soil” of the culture and to attend to the roots
that grow there, as the classical Greek philosophers had attempted
in their time. They were philosophers not of the blackboard but of
the world of human existence, inquiring with their contemporaries
and predecessors into what Dewey would often call “the problems
of men” in contrast to the purely technical and verbal problems that
preoccupy many a philosophical specialist. “Whenever philosophy
has been taken seriously,” Dewey wrote, “it has always been assumed
that it signified achieving a wisdom which would influence the
conduct of life. Witness the fact that almost all ancient schools of
philosophy were also organized ways of living, those who accepted
their tenets being committed to certain distinctive modes of conduct;
witness the intimate connection of philosophy with the theology of
the Roman church in the Middle Ages, its frequent association with
religious interests, and, at national crises, its association with political
struggles.”21 Dewey would never be an opponent of philosophical
theorizing, but the crucial point for him and his fellow pragmatists
was that theoretical rationality is not an end in itself but belongs to
the larger effort of coming to critical terms with our practices. Theory
and practice form a unified structure where the latter is the alpha
20 Introducing Dewey
in American life was owing more to his work as an activist for a wide
variety of social causes than to his more scholarly efforts, activities
that ranged from participation in various organizations to writing
for general audiences on issues ranging from the Pullman strike of
1894 to two world wars, the New Deal, the Great Depression, academic
freedom, the rights of women, and the commission to investigate Leon
Trotsky over which Dewey presided, among various others. Indeed, a
sizeable portion of his collected works is comprised of innumerable
brief essays, reviews, and miscellany that he was forever composing
for any number of outlets. As America’s foremost public intellectual
for half a century, there were few cultural or political issues on which
Dewey would be silent.
One final note by way of introduction to this study concerns
Dewey’s style of writing. Many readers of this philosopher have
commented upon both the ambiguity and the blandness of his prose,
often to the point of exaggeration. Even those of us who find his work
on balance compelling are likely to find the experience of plowing
through a text like Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy
or Logic: The Theory of Inquiry about as thrilling as a walk through
a modern suburb. A master stylist he was not; however, a couple of
comments in his defense may be in order. First, when regarded in the
context of his time and place, Dewey’s writings on the whole were
not atypical of the philosophical prose one finds in the tradition in
which he was working. He was no William James, but James himself
was hardly a typical writer for his era and he also encountered no end
of difficulty from critics for many an artful turn of phrase. Dewey
himself would often need to clarify his friend’s positions on a number
of issues and defend him against often hostile critics, and in doing
so would reverse James’ occasional penchant for artful expression
over precision. Anglo-American philosophy in Dewey’s lifetime, if I
may venture a generalization, was not known for being colorful and
24 Introducing Dewey
Notes
1 All references to Dewey’s work in what follows are from The Collected
Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953, published variously between 1969 and
1991 by Southern Illinois University Press and edited by Jo Ann Boydston.
They are divided into The Early Works (EW), The Middle Works (MW),
and The Later Works (LW), and they will be cited in what follows as either
EW, MW, or LW followed by the volume number and year of original
publication along with the title of the relevant text. Unmodern Philosophy
and Modern Philosophy was also published by Southern Illinois University
Press in 2012.
7 For a detailed exposition of this theme, see Good’s A Search for Unity in
Diversity.
8 Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Popular Science
Monthly, vol. 12, 1878.
12 See Paul Fairfield, ed. John Dewey and Continental Philosophy. (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 2010).
22 Dewey, “Philosophy’s Future in Our Scientific Age: Never Was Its Role
More Crucial,” LW 16 (1949), 377.
separate from its natural and cultural world and from the myriad
things with which it is in continual interaction, while the things
themselves are nothing apart from “what they are experienced as,
or experienced to be,” as the phenomenological movement—largely
unbeknownst to Dewey—was also asserting.11 That rationality is
external to experience was a premise shared by rationalists and
empiricists alike, and pragmatists would reject the premise together
with any notion of consciousness as either passive, mechanistic, or
unmediated; it does not originate in raw sense data to which discrete
mental faculties will later set to work, nor does it stand at some
remove from either experiential objects themselves or the language
and culture that condition our awareness of them.
If the basic error of classical empiricism in Dewey’s estimation
lay with the concept of experience itself, what was needed was a new
articulation of this contested term which better accorded with what
he had appropriated from both Hegel’s idealism and evolutionary
biology, and at this point matters become complex. The notion of
experience would factor prominently in Dewey’s thought across a
range of philosophical areas as would the word itself in a great many
book and essay titles throughout the course of his career, although
many of Dewey’s readers have long found his meaning elusive.
We shall return to this central concept in his work throughout this
study, but for now let us offer a preliminary interpretation of Dewey’s
conception of experience as follows. Let us begin with his notion of
experiential primacy, an idea that is consistent in a number of ways
with the phenomenology that stemmed from the work of Edmund
Husserl. The latter writer and the larger movement that he inspired
had no discernible influence on either James or Dewey, but a variety
of both phenomenological and pragmatic thinkers, including Dewey,
were proposing that philosophical investigation begins with the “lived
experience” of human beings in their everyday dealings with what
34 Introducing Dewey
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