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 International Archives of the History of Ideas 237
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For my parents

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Acknowledgements

This book was originally written between 2016 and 2018, for my PhD dissertation,
which I defended in February 2019 before the Federal University of Minas Gerais
(Belo Horizonte, Brazil). The research on Locke was quite a challenge for me,
because in the previous decade my work had basically focused on the history of
early modem scepticism. I must say, though, that this challenge was rewarding. I
learnt a lot; Locke broadened my intellectual horizons and introduced me to new
people and places. After defending my dissertation, I turned to the more detailed
study of other authors, such as Pierre J urieu, and to some related issues, such as the
concept of lai"cite. Meanwhile, I have attempted to incorporate the works on Locke
and toleration, published in 2019 and 2020, into the present book.
Several people supported me in different ways on the long path that led to the
publication of this book. I am happy to take this opportunity to publicly acknowl-
edge them for their assistance and friendship.
First of all, I am grateful to Professor Jose Raimundo Maia Neto, my supervisor
since my time as an undergraduate. My PhD dissertation owes a lot to his knowl-
edge and erudition. I could always count on him, even in the years between my
Master's and my PhD, when we had no formal or institutional bonds. I deeply
admire not only his ability to focus on the main philosophical issues but also his
generosity and politeness. Rarely have I seen so remarkable an example of excel-
lence and simplicity.
I am also profoundly grateful to Professor Ian Harris, who advised me as a PhD
candidate when I was an exchange student at the University of Leicester in 2018.
We had several meetings to discuss Locke's philosophy. I owe a debt of gratitude to
him, not only for all that he taught me, through his incisive comments and his wit,
but also for his assistance in grappling with the practicalities of settling in a foreign
country. While in England, I had the honour of discussing my research with
Professor John Dunn, at his office in King's College, Cambridge, and with Professor
John Coffey at the University of Leicester. I thank Professor Timothy Stanton for
placing his trust in me, in sending me an advanced version of his transcription of
Locke'sA Defence of Nonconformity. I also mention Professor G. A. J. Rogers, who
was extremely kind to me, and I regret the fact that we were not able to meet. I thank

ix
x Acknowledgements

The Warburg Institute for giving me opportunity to conducl research lhere, which Contents
made a significant difference for my work.
The suggestions I received from the committee that evaluated my dissertation led
me to see some points that I was unable to perceive before. I am grateful to Professors
Eunice Ostrensky, Antonio Carlos dos Santos, Telma Birchal, Helton Adverse, and
Newton Bignotto for their attentive reading.
Throughout my research, especially in the initial years, I relied on several friends
in Germany, France, England, and Canada to send me articles and books lhat I was
unable to access in Brazil. I can hardly express how indebted I feel to them. I owe
my sincere gratitude to Daniel Arelli, Roberta Miquelanti, Pedro Vianna Faria, Luiz
Philipe de Caux, Julio Cesar Terra, Celso Neto, Sacha Kontic, and Joao Cortese. In
regard to access to bibliographical material, I also record my gratitude to Professors
Jose Raimundo Maia Neto and Ian Harris, who ordered books related to my research
for inclusion in the library archives of the Federal University of Minas Gerais and
the University of Leicester. 1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I am grateful to Fabio Fortes and Wellington Ferreira Lima for agreeing to trans- References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
late the Epistola de Tolerantia for the commented edition that I organised, and that
2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia . . . . . . . . 15
was published by Autentica Editora in November 2019. The technical revision I did
2.1 The Evangelical Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
of the Latin translation was essential for my understanding of Locke.
2.2 The Argument from Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
I thank the two reviewers who approved the manuscript of this book. Both were
2.3 The Argument of Unfitness of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
very generous. I am also grateful to a group of people that, at various times and in
2.4 The Argument of Reductio ad Absurdum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
different ways, helped me to improve my English. Writing in a foreign language is
2.5 Argumentative Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
always a challenge, and Isabela Caixeta, Bennett Bullock, Fiona Stephenson, and
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Husain Bhana saved me from countless pitfalls.
To my family and close friends, I am grateful for all their support for this work, 3 The Locke and Proast Controversy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
but in their case, this is to say too little. My whole life has been shaped and moulded 3.1 The Argument of 'The Letter Concerning Toleration'
by them. Briefly Consider'd andAnswer'd................ .. .... . .... 65
3.2 Locke's Second Letter Concerning Toleration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 Proast's Third Letter Concerning Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.4 Locke' s Third Letter f or Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.5 Further Developments of the Controversy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
References. . ........ ... .. .............. . ... . . ...... ........ 133
4 Ethics of Belief. ... . ....... . .. ................ ... . . . ... . . ... 137
4.1 Obstinacy, Fallibility and Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.2 Examination, Method and Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.3 Reason and Faith, Miracles and Enthusiasm ..... . . . .. . . . ..... 161
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Index....... .. . . .. ...... ... ... . . ... . ... . .. .. . . .... ...... .. . . . . 207

xi
List of Tables

Table 2.1 Synoptic table................................................................................. 55

Table 3.1 Thematic correspondence............................................................... 78

xiii
About the Author

Flavio Fontenelle Loque is associate professor at the Federal University of Lavras,

Brazil. His primary research interests are toleration and the history of scepticism.
He has published a work on fideism, Ceticismo e religiao no in{cio da modernidade
(Loyola, 2012), Scetticismo e religione all'inizio dell'eta moderna (Morcelliana,
2018), and a bilingual and commented edition of John Locke's Epistola de
Tolerantia (Autentica, 2019) in partnership with Fabio Fortes and Wellington
Ferreira Lima. His research interests include the notion of laicite and the translation
of modern authors, such as John Locke, Blaise Pascal, and Pierre Bayle.

xv
Abbreviations1

Arg. Proast, The Argument of the 'Letter concerning Toleration' briefly

consider'd and answer'd, ed. 1690
Cond. Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. P. Schuurman
Corr. Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. de Beer
DM Locke, A Discourse of Miracles, John Locke: writings on religion, ed.
V. Nuovo
DNC Locke, A Defence of Nonconformity, ed. Stanton (the quotations give the
page of the manuscript)
E Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Nidditch
Epist. Locke, Epistola de Tolerantia, A Letter on Toleration, ed. Klibansky
and Gough
ET Locke, An Essay concerning Toleration, ed. Milton and Milton
FL Locke, Fourth Letter for Toleration, Posthumous Works, ed. 1706
Letter Augustine, Letters, ed. 1870-1873
Pol. Es. Locke, Political Essays, ed. Goldie
Popple Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration, ed. Montuori
RC Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. Higgins-Biddle
RLP The Reception of Locke's Politics, ed. Goldie, vol. 5: Long, The Letter for
Toleration deciper'd... ; Proast, The Argument... , A Third Letter. .. , A
Second Letter. ..
SL Locke, A Second Letter concerning Toleration, ed. 1690
SL-P Proast, A Second Letter to the author of the Three Letters for Toleration ,
ed. 1704
TL Locke, A Third Letter for Toleration, ed. 1692
TL-P Proast, A Third Letter concerning Toleration, ed. 1691
TTG Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett
Works Locke, The Works of John Locke, ed. 1823

1 No changes have been made in order to modernise either the spelling or the punctuation of the

early modem English works, or of their critical editions.

xv ii
Chapter 1
Introduction

Abstract This chapter presents a brief overview on toleration in early modern

Europe. It then presents the purpose of this book, which consists of an effort to
understand, in detail, how Locke justified religious toleration in the Epistola de
Tolerantia, in the letters written as part of the controversy with Proast and in An
Essay concerning Human Understanding. The definition of toleration and the cen-
tral conceptual distinction between vertical and horizontal toleration are explained,
along with the two main questions that this book claims are at the core of Locke's
reasoning: why should the ends of State not be extended to include the care ofsouls?
and why should private persons tolerate each other?. The chapter ends with a brief
methodological remark and a summary of the structure of the book.

Religious intolerance is a common phenomenon, but it emerges with greater force

at certain times and places. Once such example occurred in early modern Europe,
when the Reformation divided Christianity, causing the coexistence of Christians to
become such a serious problem that it resulted in a series of wars. Due to these con-
flicts, the beginning of the modern age was also a period when the forms of coexis-
tence with the otherness were widely discussed. In general terms, we can say that
the initial attitude towards religious diversity among Christians was the quest for
concord. Especially in the sixteenth century, the ideal of reconciliation between
Catholics and Protestants was very much alive, and encompassed a political dimen-
sion (restoring peace) as well as a theological and ecclesiastical dimension (agree-
ment about the fundamental articles of faith and the communion of all men in the
same church). The unity that had been lost with the Reformation needed to be recov-
ered, and this was meant to happen with the reestablishment of uniformity through
consensus rather than through force. The hope was to achieve an agreement as to the
fundamentals of the faith - smoothing out all the most crucial differences - so that
only the so-called indifferent things would be left to the individual believer's discre-
tion. Therefore, the main ambition of those who yearned for concord was not really
the coexistence of different Christian denominations, but their reunification.
Accordingly, concord should not be confused with toleration, even though both

©The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature

Switzerland AG 2022
F. F. Loque, John Locke and the Grounds for Toleration , International Archives
of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idees 237,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90363-3_1
 2 1 Introduction
conl:t:pls reject the use of force in religious matters, for toleration presupposes that
diversity is insurmountable. 1
The contrast between these two concepts is illuminating, as it reveals that tolera-
tion holds as permanent the coexistence with the otherness or, strictly speaking,
with a relevant otherness (i) of which we make a pejorative judgment and (ii) to
which we have power to make opposition. By definition, the adjective 'tolerant'
refers to an institution or a person that does not make opposition to what is taken as
bad or false, 2 although he has the power to do so. Without these two features, we
should not speak of toleration, but of indifference (when there is no pejorative judg-
ment) or acquiescence (when there is no superiority of power). 3 Consequently, in its
more immediate sense, toleration consists in a coexistence with an otherness that we
do not have a good opinion of, but that we choose not to combat. This is the reason
why toleration is commonly conceived as concession.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the notion of toleration as concession
was prevalent and it had a characteristic that needs to be emphasised: it was always
a concession of the State towards religious dissenters. The emphasis on this charac-
teristic is important because it helps us to delineate a polysemy that is intrinsic to
the notion: toleration can describe either the vertical relationship between the State
and its citizens, or the horizontal relationship between private persons or groups.4
Historically speaking, the Edict of Nantes (1598) and the Declarations oflndulgence
of Charles 11 (1672) and James II (1687) instance the vertical relationship, whereas
the Augsburg Peace Treaty (1555) instances the horizontal one. As we can see, tol-
eration as concession springs from a power asymmetry, and is properly exemplified
by the institutional acts of France and England, countries already very centralised in
early modem Europe. In the absence of such an asymmetry, toleration can no longer
be conceived as concession, for it refers to a horizontal relation between similar
forces, as in the case of the Holy Roman Empire, where political dispersion and
independence led to an accord among reasonably equal parts that allowed different
regions to have different religions, as the maxim cuius regio, eius religio shows.
1
0n the notions of concord and toleration, see Turchetti (199la, b), Bejan (2017, 20-49) and
Guggisberg ( 1983, 37-39). As Laursen (1999, 4) points out, "the basic idea of concordance was
the proto-Haberrnasian idea that we can all agree in the long run; the basic idea of tolerance is that
we will continue to disagree and dislike one another". For a broad view of research on toleration
in early modem Europe and its main interpretative lines since the end of the nineteenth century, see
Walsham (2006, 6-13).
2
This pejorative valence of the concept is found in the Latin origin of the word, but it is also found
in the Greek words to which it goes back. A s tntoµovf] and µaKpo0oµia , tolerantia describes the
capacity to suffer an evil (both Greek terms occur in the New Testament and were translated as
patientia and longanimitas, cf. Harris 201 3, 82-83). In some vernacular languages, the negative
valence is conveyed in the synonymous of the verb to tolerate: souffrir and Leiden. On the negative
tone of toleration and its medieval heritage, see Bejczy ( 1997).
3 5 0n
For a good view of the concept of toleration in its more abstract and broader aspects, see Forst
(2003), Horton ( 1996, 2011 ) and Galeotti (2015).
4 6 For a broad view of different approaches to toleration, see Nederrnan and Laursen ( 1996) and
On the difference between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of toleration, see Williams and
Waldron (2008, 5).
Introduction 3
With regard to toleration in early modem Europe, we must also take into account
the fact that political stability was traditionally associated with religious uniformity,
i.e. dissidence was seen as politically disruptive. The threat to social order raised by
sedition was a justification for intolerance - a justification of a political nature to
which others were added, notably those of a theological nature, as we shall see. In
this respect, it is interesting to remember the case of France, whose history illus-
trates this line of thought very well. In that country, where the adage une Joi, une Loi,
un roi clearly depicts the association between religious uniformity and political
stability, the disturbances caused by the civil wars were so damaging that they led
the State to concede toleration to dissenters at the end of the sixteenth century (those
who defended toleration in these pragmatic terms became known as politiques).
Nevertheless, almost a century later, France turned to its old conception of itself as
an exclusively Catholic country, and the religious persecutions reached new heights
with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.5
In fact, and not only in France, the pragmatic defence of toleration rests on a
constellation of political forces. As it is a concession, there is nothing to prevent it
being revoked in the future. If its value is merely instrumental, as a means of ensur-
ing peace, it is clear that a social or institutional rearrangement might lead to the
subsequent conclusion that toleration can be discarded. All that would be required,
for instance, would be for the State to gain enough power to suppress dissidence. If
one does not bring into question the association between religious uniformity and
political stability, it is impossible to assign to toleration a value in and of itself.
However, aside from this politically based justification for intolerance, there are
also those of a theological nature, whose central aspect rests on the need to correct
the people that are in error and guide them to truth and salvation. Throughout the
modem age, opposition to these two types of justification for intolerance repre-
sented the main philosophical advancement with regard to toleration. Therefore, in
order to decisively establish the concept of toleration in principle (and not merely in
pragmatic terms), it was necessary to show that religious diversity does not impinge
on the social order, and that each person must be free to search for salvation in what-
ever way he deems most suitable.
There are several concepts and arguments that can be deployed in the philosophi-
cal drive to underpin toleration,6 but it is not the intention of this book to discuss all
of them. The aim here is to analyse the reflection of one of the most important and
influential thinkers on this theme, John Locke ( 1632-1704), in order to understand,
in more detail, how he justified religious toleration. More precisely, this book aims
to elaborate an interpretation of his mature works, reconstructing his arguments and
highlighting some of their political, ethical, theological, and epistemological
aspects. While it is well known that to achieve religious toleration the ends of the
State must be circumscribed to the preservation and advancement of civil goods and
the history of toleration in France, besides Lecler (1994, 400-554), see Garrisson ( 1985),
Labrousse ( 1990), Armogathe (1985) and Negroni (2014).
Laursen and Nederrnan (1998).
4 I Introduction
must never extend lU the salvation uf souls, we cannot say that the reasons for reli-
gious toleration, and the correlation of these reasons, are well-established. Moreover,
the distinction between the secular ends of the State and the saving ends of the
Church cover just one of the dimensions of Locke's treatment of toleration: the
vertical one. But a thorough interpretation of his thought must also encompass the
reasons why private persons should not impose their opinions on others in the hori-
zontal relationship, i.e. between themselves. Indeed, as we shall see, Locke's
treatment of toleration is primarily concerned with the question why should the ends
of State not be extended to include the care of souls? But he is also interested in
answering another question: why should private persons tolerate each other? With
regard to his main writings, the first question is the core of the Epistola de Tolerantia
whereas the second is touched upon in a crucial section of An Essay concerning
Human Understanding. In An Essay concerning Human Understanding, though,
Locke deals still with a third question: Why does a person become impositional?
Throughout the present book, issues related to epistemology will receive particu-
lar attention because we believe it is necessary to disentangle three arguments that
are often confused, especially in the readings of the Epistola. As we shall see below,
all of these arguments deal with the problem of truth, but they are based on different
concepts - fallibility, reciprocity and distinction between belief and knowledge - to
explain why the care of souls should not belong to the State, or the magistrate, as
Locke prefers to call it. Without clarifying these arguments, it is impossible to per-
ceive clearly the moral implications of the duty to examine, which, according to
Locke, is incumbent upon human beings as rational creatures, i.e. it is impossible to
ascertain the horizontal dimension of toleration in contrast to the vertical one. By
way of introduction, we submit that the interpretation proposed here is that in the
Epistola, the arguments of fallibility and reciprocity are politically framed because
they are related to the institution of the ends of the State (the vertical dimension of
toleration) whereas, in An Essay concerning Human Understanding , these two
arguments are formulated and deployed with a moral purpose: to demonstrate that
private persons should not impose their opinions on others (the horizontal dimen-
sion of toleration). Meanwhile, the argument of the distinction between belief and
knowledge, whose locus classicus is An Essay concerning Human Understanding,
is explicitly adduced in Locke's treatment of toleration only in A Third Letter, as a
rejoinder to an important objection to the argument of reciprocity, as we shall
explain.
It must be noted, however, that the distinction between secular and sacred ends
related to State and Church never implied that ethics and politics could be conceived
without taking into account God's existence and designs. From Locke's perspective,
human life (individually and socially) is inconceivable without God's designs.
Therefore, it is no exaggeration to affirm that Locke's philosophy is immersed in a
religious worldview. 7 Inevitably, his arguments in favour of toleration also assume
7 1
As Harris (2002, 181) points out, "in agreement with most of his contemporaries, Locke acknowl-
edged that God wanted there to be a civil government and thought that God was the moral law-
maker". On this topic, see Dunn (1969, 1989, 1990), Waldron (2002) and Nuovo (201 1). On
I Introduction 5
the ~ame standpoint, although his writings on this theme more presuppose than
exhibit it. Accordingly, since it is impossible to disentangle theology from politics,
ethics and even epistemology, the present book points out their relations, but it
nonetheless emphasises the problem of truth, as we just said.8 It is important to
remember, though, that Locke himself was never a sceptic, but that he neatly saw
the limits of human understanding as well as the frequent misuse of truth as a justi-
fication (indeed, as a pretext) for persecution.9
With regard to toleration, the period in which Locke lived was a troubled one.
Born in 1632 and dying in 1704, 10 he lived through some very important events,
such as the end of the Thirty Years War with the Peace of Westphalia ( 1648) and the
above-mentioned revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in October 1685.
With respect to the history of England, Locke saw the civil wars of the 1640s, the
regicide of Charles I (1649), Cromwell's Protectorate (1653-1659), the Restoration
of Monarchy (1660) and the Glorious Revolution (1688-1689), to quote just the
great historical landmarks. Although it is very difficult to establish precisely how
these events may have influenced Locke's treatment of toleration, it is reasonable to
say that at one stage the entanglement of politics and religion was seen by Locke as
a target of attack through the distinction between the ends of State and Church and
the criticism of private persons who impose their beliefs on others, or who make
their own beliefs a pretext to violate civil laws.
In early modem Europe, the most evident entanglement of politics and religion
consisted in the statement that the State should promote salvation, and, ergo, that the
use of force by the State to convert souls was legitimate. Thus, not only a civil func-
tion, the conservation of political stability, but also pastoral and ecclesiastical ones
were assigned to the magistrate, since force was supposed to help guide erroneous
persons to communion into the only true church. As we shall see below, this view
was shared and underpinned by Locke's most important critic, Jonas Proast (c.
1642-1710), but its origins goes back to Augustine (354-430), in particular to his
Locke's religious worldview and the interpretations of his philosophy, see Ashcraft (1996) and
Sigmund (2005).
8
The present work occupies a sort of intennediary position between two groups of interpretations:
on the one hand, the group devoted to the religious worldview that underlies Locke's treatment of
toleration, such as Stanton (2006) and Harris (2013); on the other, the group that focuses on par-
ticular explicit topics on the texts, especially the discussion of usefulness of force, such as
Waldron ( 1988).
9 Although Locke was not a sceptic and never defended toleration based on scepticism, it is conve-
nient to remark that there is a common view according to which there is a necessary conjunction
between scepticism and toleration. This common view, however, is far from true. From a philo-
sophical perspective, toleration would be a straightforward issue if it could be treated in such linear
tenns. In this respect, see Popkin (1998), who discusses two branches in the modem defence of
toleration, the one sceptical, the other dogmatic; and Tuck (1988), who shows how scepticism can
entail intolerance. For a synthesis of this issue, see Coffey (2006).
°For Locke's life, see Cranston ( 1985) and Woolhouse (2007), along with Le Clerc ( 1732), Coste
( 1735), King (1830) and Fox Bourne ( 1876). There are also excellent biographical syntheses writ-
ten by Goldie (2010) and Milton (2011).
6 1 Introduction
writings concerning the Donatists, 11 where several biblical passages are seen as
authorising the use of force to correct heretics and schismatics. Compelle intrare, an
imperative found in Luke's version of the parable of the great banquet (14:23), is the
emblematic expression of this tradition to which Locke opposed himself, and
against which an open attack was launched by Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) in his
Philosophical Commentary on these words of the Gospel, 'Compel them to come in,
that my house may be full ' (1686-1688)_12 In Locke's case, the opposition to
Augustine consists not of an express rebuttal of the injunction compel them to come
in, but essentially of a discussion of the notions of charity in the Epistola and obsti-
nacy in An Essay concerning Human Understanding.
After the Restoration of Monarchy, especially when the reestablishment of the
Anglican Church was at issue, this view was the main justification for the adoption
of persecuting laws for dissenters and Catholics. 13 In spite of the discussions about
comprehension and indulgence, 14 what really took place in the aftennath of Charles
II's enthronement was the institution of laws 15 aimed at preserving the structure of
the Anglican Church and restricting the religious exercise of dissenters and
Catholics. Later, after the Glorious Revolution, the same view concerning the func-
tions of the State still prevailed, but even so, small advances were made towards
11
Of Augustine's writings on the Donatists, the most important are Letters 93 (to Vicentius, dated
408) and 185 (to Boniface, dated 417). For a list of all Augustine's writings in the Donatist contro-
versy (letters, sermons and treatises). see Monceaux (1923, 275-292). There is a good synthesis of
Augustine's position in Lecler (1994, 83-88) and Zagorin (2003, 24-33). On the Donatist contro-
versy and the development of Augustine's thought on coercion, see Evers (2002~. Brown (1964)
and Gaddis (2005, 131- 150). For a detailed analysis of the revival of Augustine during the
Restoration, see Goldie (199 1). On intolerance at the end of the seventeenth century in several
countries of Europe, see Marshall (2006).
12
0n the third volume of A Philosophical Commentary, published in 1687, Bayle openly discusses
Augustine's letters: the two most important ones, letters 93 and 185, but also, on the final chapters,
other letters against the Donatists. For a list of these other letters, see Bayle (2002, 21-22, n. 1).
For a comparison of Locke and Bayle, see, for example, Dunn ( 1996), Jenkinson ( 1996), Almeida
(2010) and Savonius-Wroth (2012).
13
In general, the word 'dissenter' describes those who do not follow the established religion of
their country. In France, the term refers to Protestants as a whole. In England, however, it refers
only to the non-Anglican Protestants (also called non-conformists). For this reason, it is necessary
to point out the 'Catholics' in the universe of those who are not in the Anglican communion.
" In a letter to Philip van Limborch ( 1633-1712) of 12 March 1689 (cf. Corr, v. III, 1120), when
once again Parliament debated comprehension and indulgence, Locke explains these notions as
follows: "the question of toleration has now been taken up in parliament under a twofold title,
namely Comprehension and Indulgence. The former signifies extension of the boundaries of the
Church, with a view to including greater numbers by the removal of part of the ceremonies. The
latter signifies toleration of those who are either unwilling or unable to unite themselves to the
Church of England on the terms offered to them".
llTuese laws constitute the famous Clarendon Code, composed by the Corporation Act (1661 ), Act
of Uniformity (1662), Five Miles Act (1665) and Conventicle Act (1670), which were followed by
two versions of the Test Act (1673). All this legislation, as well as other relevant documents on
toleration from 1660 to 1714, is gathered in English Historical Documents, see Browing (1953,
v. VIll).
Introduction 7
toleration - after all, political decisions are not based on ideology alone, but also on
circumstantial considerations. 16 Clearly a mere concession, the so-called Toleration
Act ( 1689)17 suspended the penalties of part of the legislation against the Trinitarian
dissenters and authorised them to worship in public. That is why it is often seen as
an advancement, even if, on the one hand, nothing was conceded to Anti-Trinitarians
and to Catholics and, on the other, the Test Act ( 1673) remained untouched.
In England, to sum up, the institutional debate about toleration was dualistic. The
debate centred around what should be (r) the conduct of the State regarding those
who do not profess the established religion (dissenters and Catholics) and (11) the
degree of dogmatic, disciplinary and ceremonial rigidity of the Anglican Church. In
the former case, the issue was civil toleration while, in the latter, it was ecclesiasti-
cal toleration. These two branches must be demarcated because there is no neces-
sary bond between them. It was perfectly possible, for instance, to claim ecclesiastical
toleration (as did the latitudinarians) without claiming civil toleration. 18 With respect
to Locke, the defence of the distinction between the ends of State and Church falls
into the field of civil toleration, but he was also in favour of ecclesiastical
toleration. 19
An uncertain issue with respect to Locke is the extent to which the distinction
between State and Church should be pursued. It is not clear whether the distinction
between the ends of these two societies required a real separation of them.20 It
16
ln England, the most important circumstantial element was anti-Catholicism, which influenced
the Glorious Revolution and the so-called Toleration Act ( 1689). For a broad view of Restoration,
Glorious Revolution and the debate on comprehension and indulgence, see Beddard ( 1979), Spurr
( 1989), Schochet (1996) and, in particular, Coffey (2000).
17
Although this act is known as Toleration Act, the word 'toleration' never appears in the text of the
official document, not even in the resume of its content: "an act for exempting their majesties'
Protestant subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the penalties of certain laws" (cf.
Browing 1953, v. VIII, 400). On the Toleration Act and its meaning, see Wykes (1990).
18
ln An Essay concerning Toleration, Locke defines latitudinarianism as the amplification of the
terms of church communion: "few & large" articles in speculative opinions and "few & easy"
ceremonies in worship (cf. ET, 302). However, as we pointed out, latitudinariani sm is not neces-
sarily linked with toleration; in this respect, see Ashcraft (1992). For the context of the concept,
and a general overview of the similarities and differences between Locke and other authors on lati-
tudinarianism, see Spurr (1988), Marshall (1992) and Simonutti (2003).
19
According to Coffey (2000, 11-13, 2006, 630), besides the civil and ecclesiastical branches of
toleration, there are two others: a social and a polemical one. The social branch of toleration refers
to the actual coexistence of private persons, usually in villages and local communities, a coexis-
tence that may be hostile or courteous regardless of the legal status of dissenters and Catholics. On
this topic, see, for instance, Bossy (1991) and Walsham (2006, 269-280). The polemical branch of
toleration, in its tum, describes the civility or incivility of the public debates and corresponds to a
reflection on the persecution of the tongue. For a reading of Locke with an emphasis on this last
branch, see Wilhelm ( 1999) and, in particular, Bejan (20 17).
20
According to Goldie in his introduction to the edition of A Letter concerning Toleration and
Other Writings, "it is unclear if Locke was a categorical separationist. ... If we assume that Locke
was a categorical separationist, then it is not to Britain that one would look for a modern Lockean
state, but to the United States, where the argument of Locke's Letter found futfillment in Thomas
Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom ( 1779), or to France, with its secular republican
8 l Introduction
seems that the Stale could have an established religion as long as it did not discrimi-
nate among its citizens based on religious motives, i.e. as long as it assured equal
civil rights for all. At any rate, this is not a question that the present book seeks to
answer. Similarly, the aim here is not to reconstruct Locke's treatment of toleration
from a chronological perspective in which, in broad terms, toleration was initially
refused and later supported by him, as is commonly said when Locke's major writ-
ings on toleration are compared: on the one hand, his two speeches, one in English
(1660), the other in Latin (c. 1662), known nowadays as Two Tracts on Government;
and on the other, An Essay concerning Toleration ( 1667),A Defence ofNonconformity
(1681-82) and the Epistola de Tolerantia (1689). 21 As we said above, the present
book seeks to analyse Locke's mature reflection in order to understand, in as much
detail as possible, how he sustains religious toleration and how he does so with
regard not only to the vertical relationship between State and citizens, but also to the
horizontal relationship between private persons. From a methodological standpoint,
the interpretation proposed here is focused chiefly on the concepts and arguments
adduced by Locke, i.e. on the objective of identifying, defining and assessing them
by giving precedence to the texts themselves. Evidently, there are other possible
approaches to Locke's writings (as well as to any other author's writings). There are
methodological choices that emphasise the historical and political context or that
seek to ascertain the sources of his thought but, although relevant and fruitful, these
are research itineraries that will not be adopted in this book. 22
The interpretation that will be developed here encompasses three chapters,
besides the introduction (Chap. 1) and the conclusion (Chap. 5). In the second chap-
ter, we shall examine the Epistola de Tolerantia in order to establish its arguments
tradition of lai'cite" (Locke 2010, xiv). In this respect, see also McCabe (1997) and Pritchard
(2014). According to Coffey (2000, 12), Locke was a radical tolerationist who defended "the natu-
ral right or entitlement of religious dissenters to worship freely and enjoy civil equality. The most
radical tolerationists went a stage further and advocated what was later called 'disestablishment',
or 'the separation of church and state', a development that we tend to associate with the American
and French Revolutions, but one which has never taken place in England itself'. For a contempo-
rary discussion of toleration and of the so-called separation of church and state, see Maclure and
Taylor (2010), Baub6rot and Milot (2001), Laegaard (2011) and Taylor (2014).
21We indicate here the dates of composition, except in the case of the Epistola, written in the
European winter of 1685-86 and published in 1689. OfLocke's main writings on toleration, apart
from the publication of excerpts, A Defence of Nonconformity remains unpublished. There is,
though, a transcription of the manuscript in Stanton (2003). An Essay concerni11g Toleration was
published for the first time in 1876 in the Life of Joh11 Locke by Fox Bourne; the Two Tracts 011
Government were originally published in 1961 by Viano (both of Locke's works received a critical
edition in 2006 and 1967, respectively). Of the uncountable articles and books that reconstruct and
analyse Locke's treatment of toleration, see Gough (1973), Cranston (1987), Cay6n (1996),
Sommerville (2004), Tate (2016) and, above all, Stanton (2013), besides the more comprehensive
research of Harris ( 1998), Marshall (1994) and Collins (2020).
22 For examples of other methodological approaches, see Ashcraft ( 1986), whose research focuses
on the historical and political context of Locke's political philosophy, and Loconte (2014), who
seeks to ascertain the sources of Locke's conception of toleration. For a discussion of methodology
and of the interpretations of Locke's philosophy, with an emphasis on the liberal and Marxist read-
ings as well as on the reading of the so-called Cambridge school, see Santos (2017).
References 9
and their correlation. In this analysis we shall reson to some of Locke's already
published manuscripts, to Two Treatises of Government and to The Reasonableness
of Christianity. In the third chapter, our task is to scrutinise the controversy between
Locke and Proast, an adversary against whom Locke composed other three letters
concerning toleration (the last of which remained unfinished). In the fourth chapter,
based on An Essay concerning Human Understanding, and also on the writings Of
the Conduct of the Understanding, A Discourse of Miracles and An Essay for the
Understanding of St Paul's Epistles by consulting St Paul himself, we discuss how
the due examination of truth is associated with toleration. We then analyse Locke 's
broader reflection concerning the duty to examine that is incumbent upon the human
being as a rational creature. From a conceptual perspective, Chaps. 2 and 3 discuss
the grounds for toleration concerning the relationship between State and citizens,
while Chap. 4 develops the grounds for toleration with regard to the relationship
between private persons.
At the end of this book, we hope to convey a coherent and comprehensive view
of Locke's mature treatment of toleration, in which we see clearly the two dimen-
sions of toleration and their grounding reasons. We also hope that this book will
provide elements for reflecting on our contemporary world, in which religious
fanaticism has prompted urgent discussion on the ends of State and Church, and
reflection about the duties of private persons one to another.
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aphora. In The Return of Skepticism from Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle, ed. G. Paganini,
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Sommerville, Johann. 2004. Conscience, Law, and Things Indifferent: Arguments on Toleration
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Spurr, John. 1988. 'Latitudinarianism' and the Restoration Church. The Historical Journal
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Chapter 2
The Argumentative Structure
of the Epistola de Tolerantia

Abstract This chapter aims to identify and analyse the argumentative structure of
the Epistola de Tolerantia. The interpretation developed here argues that there are
two dimensions of toleration in Locke's reasoning-a vertical one (State-to-citizens)
and a horizontal one (citizen-to-citizen)- and that, when considering his arguments,
both dimensions should be taken into account. Vertical toleration relates to the so-
called three considerations and other important arguments. Deeply intertwined, they
constitute the core of the Epistola de Tolerantia, whose central purpose is to dem-
onstrate that the ends of the Commonwealth cannot be extended to the care of souls,
i.e. that the magistrate has no commission to use force in religious matters.
Horizontal toleration, meanwhile, is fonned by a single argument built on the
notions of meekness and charity. Its aim is to show that no Christian shall compel
his neighbour in religious matters, because force is incompatible with Christ's life
and teachings.

Toleration is the abstention from force as a means to convert souls (cf. SL, 2, 6,
Works, 62, 67). 1 Formulated in 1690, approximately one year after the publication
of the Epistola de Tolerantia, Locke's definition presents, in a few words, a duty that
private persons, churches, clergymen and the magistrate should respect. The great
challenge, though, is to substantiate this. Why should one not compel others to sal-
vation when one has the power to do so and believes that he has the truth? Why

1 In his Second Letter, Locke addresses Proast as follows: "Force, you allow, is improper to convert

Men to any Religion. Toleration is but the removing that Force" (SL, p. 2, Works, p. 62); "The
purpose of the Letter is plainly to defend Toleration, exempt from all Force; especially Civil Force,
or the Force of the Magistrate" (SL, p. 6, Works, p. 66). ln A Defence of Noncofonnity, Locke
defines toleration as follows: "taking off the power of the Magistrate from restraining any differ-
ences amongst Christians" (DNC, 7), and, in the same vein, "takeing off the Magistrates hand from
holding men close to uniformity" (DNC, 42). In a similar fashion, this straightforward definition is
also adopted by Bayle. In a letter to David Constant de Rebecque (1638-1733) from 16/26 July
1690, he says that toleration (in his own words, "political toleration") "is nothing but the exemp-
tion from the penal laws" (Bayle 1737, 645).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

Switzerland AG 2022
F. F. Loque, John Locke and the Grounds for Toleration, International Archives
of the History ofideas Archives intemationales d'histoire des idees 237,
https://doi.org/l 0.1007/978-3-030-90363-3_2
16 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
should one accept religious diversity? In the Epistola, the most famous arguments
to support toleration can be easily found (cf. Epist., 66.19-70.17). They are what
Popple's translation2 designates three considerations, but besides not comprising all
of Locke's arguments, neither their interpretation nor their value is consensual.
The first and foremost expression of this lack of consensus about Locke's argu-
ments is Proast's The Argument of the 'Letter concerning Toleration' briefly
consider'd and answer'd, since he judged that there was just one argument in
Locke's reasoning (cf. Arg., 3-4, RLP, 26-27). 3 Nonetheless, at the beginning of A
Second Letter (cf. SL, 6, Works, 67), Locke presents a metaphor to contest this read-
ing: from his perspective, the house he has built is supported by several beams, not
just one. If one of them were removed, the others would hold it up. This analogy is
not enough to prove the insufficiency, maybe even the error, of Proast's reading (a
metaphor is not an argument), but it is an excellent illustration of the way Locke
himself conceived the Epistola, and a significant indication of the difficulty of inter-
preting it, especially if we take into account the historical recurrence of readings
like that of Proast.4 If Locke makes so blunt an opposition to his main critic's read-
ing, and it continues to be formulated centuries later, we shall conclude that his case
for toleration is more intricate than he imagines.
As for the metaphor, it is important to emphasise two conclusions that may be
drawn from it: firstly, there are different arguments to support toleration; secondly,
they are independent of each other, each capable of supporting the whole building
by itself. Nevertheless, when Locke explains the metaphor and sets out the argu-
ments that he describes as the beams of his case for toleration, they do not corre-
spond exactly to the famous three considerations found in the Epistola. It is puzzling
that Locke does not follow literally that exposition enumerated by the adverbs
primo, secundo, tertio which seemed to contain the central points of his reasoning.
Hence, we may ask (1) what, precisely, the arguments to support toleration are and
(n) how they relate to each other. Without answering these questions, it is impossi-
ble to understand the controversy with Proast and assess the grounds for religious
toleration proposed by Locke.
Nonetheless, before analysing Locke's arguments and the relationship between
them, we must have a clear idea of what it means to support religious toleration in
the seventeenth century. As the Epistola shows, the duty to tolerate relates to private
persons, churches, clergymen and the magistrate (cf. Epist., 78.lss). None of them
are permitted to use force in religious matters, but Locke stresses the role of the
magistrate, whose jurisdiction must be circumscribed to the preservation and
2 0n Popple's life and thought, see Robbins (1967) and Simonutti (1998).
3 It
is the argument of unfitness of force, as we shall see below. In The Argument edited by Vernon
(Proast 2010, 55), there is a mistake in the passage referred to here: one should read single argu-
ment and not.final argument.
4
Undoubtedly, Waldron (1988) is the greatest contemporary example of a reading of the Epistola
focused on the argument of unfitness of force. Concerning this topic, see also Spitz (2002) and
Bou-Habib (2003). For a critical assessment of this reading, see Schwartzman (2005) and Chen
(2006), but in particular Stanton (2006) and Harris (2013).
2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de To/erantia 17
advancement of civil goods (cf. Epist., 64.27-28).5 It is in this context - the effon to
define the ends of the Commonwealth and hence its legitimate sphere of action -
that the three considerations are introduced. In political terms, the defence of tolera-
tion requires a distinction to be made between the ends of Church and State, so that
the care for the salvation of souls should be left exclusively to private persons and
the religious societies they enter into, each one of these societies searching to pro-
cure salvation through its own way. To put it crudely, the distinction between the
ends of Church and State means that each person should be allowed to search for his
own salvation in the church he deems most appropriate, i.e. that the magistrate
should not legislate - in other words, prescribe penalties - concerning religion.
If a person is to be punished when he professes his religion, this must never be
done for religious reasons, only for political ones, as the sole obligation of the civil
power is to maintain public order. The magistrate must be guided by political rea-
sons, as we see in Locke's exposition of intolerable practical beliefs (cf. Epist.,
130.12-134.21) and in his example of the prohibition of the slaughter of calves (cf.
Epist., 108.23-110.26). In summary, it is incumbent upon the civil power to punish
crimes, not heresies, schisms or sins. The distinction between the ends of Church
and State sustained in the Epistola implies that the magistrate has no duty regarding
beliefs and ways of worship as such, but solely regarding the consequences these
may have to civil society. Only their political dimension must concern the magis-
trate, not their religious dimension.
In this sense, Locke's main arguments - i.e. the three considerations - are
intended to support the thesis that the magistrate's jurisdiction must be concerned
"only" (unice) with the civil goods, that the right and dominion of the civil power
must be circumscribed and limited "solely" (so/is) by the care and advancement of
these goods, and that the magistrate's jurisdiction neither can nor ought "in any
manner" (ullo modo) comprise the salvation of souls (cf. Epist., 66.14- 18).6 Locke's
case for toleration, therefore, is essentially focused on the restriction of the ends of
the State, i.e. on the vertical dimension of toleration. In A Second Letter, referring
to the author of the Epistola as a third person, Locke sums up his purpose as fol-
lows: "all that he endeavours, is to show the bounds of Civil Power; and that in
punishing others for Religion, the Magistrate misapplies the Force he has in his
hands, and so goes beyond Right, beyond the limits of his Power" (SL, 66,
Works, 135).
5 Locke writes " ... ad bona civilia conservanda promovendaque", which Popple translates as
" ... for the procuring, preserving and advancing their own civil interests" (Popple, 15).
6 As Spitz (2002, 114) says, "Locke does not take the right to liberty of conscience as a starting
point in order to show, then, that all legitimate government ought to respect this right and so abstain
from all persecution. Rather, he meditates on the possible governmental functions in order to show
that compelling consciences is not one of them". Accordingly, it seems inadequate to divide
Locke's defence of toleration into two branches, civil and religious, as Silva (2013) does. Although
the duty to tolerate regards churches and clergymen (besides private persons and the magistrate),
this does not amount to two different types of toleration, a civil toleration based on the first consid-
eration and a religious toleration based on the second consideration.
 18 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
From Locke's perspective, although it is necessary to distinguish between the
ends of Church and State, the magistrate is not supposed to abandon altogether the
care of the salvation of souls. Indeed, he is required not to seek this goal by the use
of force - that is, by the use of his power as magistrate to prescribe laws and thereby
resort to coercion. 7 However, the magistrate is not forbidden to resort to discourses,
as any private person, clergyman or church. He is not forbidden to teach, admonish,
and persuade. There is a crucial distinction between two types of care: cura authori-
tativa, based on authority, and cura charitativa, based on charity (cf. Epist., 90.6-7):
"in teaching, instructing, and correcting the erroneous by arguments, he certainly
does what it becomes any good man to do; the magistrate is not obliged to put off
either humanity or Christianity" (Epist., 68.12-15). Locke's purpose is to remove
from the magistrate just one of the means by which the conversion of souls can sup-
posedly be wrought. All the others - that amount to discourse but also to the exam-
ple of a good life - are preserved.
There is no doubt that by establishing the distinction between magisterial and
charitable care, Locke wishes to stress that the use of force cannot be conceived as
a charitable act and, thereupon, that Christians must abstain from it as a means to
save souls. If charitable admonitions and endeavours to refute errors "are indeed a
Christian's greatest duties (maxima ... officia)" (Epist., 124.9-10),8 their accom-
plishment must necessarily be exempt from force. "We pray every day for their
Conversion, and I think it is our Duty so to do", Locke says in reference to Pagans,
Muslims, and Jews when he replies Proast's critique concerning the extension of
toleration proposed in the Epistola, "but it will, I fear, hardly be believed that we
pray in earnest, if we exclude them from the other ordinary and probable means of
Conversion, either by driving them from, or persecuting them when they are amongst
us" (SL, 2, Works, 62).
According to Locke, there is a Christian duty to evangelise, 9 a duty that Proast
also acknowledges (cf. TL-P, 2, RLP, 42), but the use of force as a means to lead the
erroneous to salvation is incompatible with Christianity: coercion affronts charity,
the main Christian principle. This incompatibility between force and charity consti-
tutes, then, an argument to support religious toleration, but it is distinct from the
three considerations in two aspects, as we shall see below: firstly, given its theologi-
cal and moral character, it corresponds to the horizontal toleration (whereas the
three considerations have a political character and so correspond to the vertical tol-
eration); secondly, since it is based on Scripture it has a confessional nature (while
the three considerations tend to have no appeal to Scripture and so have a secular
nature). These differences are not a problem, however. It is no wonder that Locke
sustains toleration in its vertical and horizontal dimensions. Moreover, his use of
7
Evidently, it means here physical force or the threat to use it. However, in the Epistola there are
metaphors relating the notion of force to persuasion, as Walker (1996) shows.
8 Translation slightly altered.
9
For an interpretation of the modem debate on toleration and the duty to evangelise, see Goldie and
Popkin (2006, 99-104). See also Goldie's introduction to his edition of A Letter (Locke, 2010,
xi- xii) and Marshall (1994, 179).
2.1 The Evangelical Argument 19
scriptural and non-scriptural arguments should cause no wonder either, given that
toleration is "agreeable" (consona) to the Gospel and to reason (cf. Epist., 64.10-12).
In either case, nevertheless, it is important to note the sense and the limits ofLocke's
reasoning. Hence, considering Locke's reasoning as a whole, we may say that the
Epistola displays four arguments: the three considerations and the argument con-
cerning charity, with which we shall begin our analysis.
2.1 The Evangelical Argument
Of all the arguments displayed in the Epistola, the first is the one concerning charity.
As we have seen, this argument is based on Scripture, particularly the New
Testament, and for that reason it is described here as confessional. This argument -
which we shall call the evangelical argument - is found especially in the prologue
(cf. Epist., 58.1-64.26). 10 It is grounded on a conception of Christianity as conform-
ing to the example of Christ, the Prince of Peace, according to Locke (cf. Epist.,
64. l; Isaiah 9:6). In his own words, "if the Gospel and the Apostles are to be
believed, no man can be a Christian without charity (sine charitate), and without the
faith which worketh, not by force, but by love" (Epist., 58.25-26; cf. Galatians 5:6).
In the opening pages of the Epistola, some passages of the New Testament are
expressly mentioned: Luke 22, Romans 1, Galatians 5, and some others are alluded
to, such as Mathew 11, Luke l 4, 2 Corinthians 10. 11 Nevertheless, it is the reference
to Galatians 5, in particular to Galatians 5:6, that is the most important point to
highlight, because it is based on this passage that Locke not only sustains the bold
opposition between love and force, but also emphasises action over belief. In The
Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke quotes the same passage when he speaks of
obedience to Christ's laws, and again he stresses the role of love and action. In The
Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke reiterates his interpretation, citing the sec-
ond chapter of the Epistle of James, whose predominant theme is faith and works
10
The expression evangelical argument was inspired by Goldie and Popkin (2006, 102), who speak
of an "evangelical case for toleration". However, the sense we give to this expression is different
from that of Goldie and Popkin. Here, evangelical argument is the name given to a specific argu-
ment concerning charity or love and Christ's example, which corresponds to just one conceptual
strand explored in the evangelical case.
11
When Locke gives the references of his quotations in the prologue of the Epistola, he mentions
the chapters, but not the verses. The complete references are as follows: Luke 22:25-26, 22: 32,
Romans I: 19, Galatians 5: 19-21 (the first edition of Popple's translation interpolated a quotation
from 2 Timothy 2: 19: "let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity"). As for
the allusions, we fi nd Matthew 11 :29-30, 26:52-53, Luke 14:26, 2 Corinthians 10:4, Ephesians
6:10-18, Hebrews 2:10, besides the important allusion to Isaiah 9:6. In the case of Galatians
5: 19-21 , Locke does not mention "heresies" as one of the "works of the flesh", as Wolfson (2010,
85-91) points out.
20 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
(cf. RC, 118, §§ 210-211; Epistle ofJames 2:14-26). 12 ln a manuscript of uncertain
date 13 entitled Tolerantia Pro, Locke lists a series of biblical passages in favour of
toleration 14 and presents the same perspective: all the verses extracted from the New
Testament are concerned with love and its practice, as well as the persecution of
Christ's followers; the verses taken from the Old Testament explore the treatment
given to foreigners. 15 For Locke, therefore, the core of Christianity is a faith that
consists in love and charitable actions, a faith, then, that is incompatible with the use
force, i.e. with intolerance.
According to Locke, toleration should be understood as a way to follow Christ's
example. Persecution of supposed heretics or schismatics is contrary to the evan-
gelical laws, to the precepts of charity (cf. Epist., 146.4-5). Hence, when Locke
responds to the question about mutual toleration among Christians in the opening
paragraph of the Epistola, he states that toleration is "the chief distinguishing mark
(praecipuum ... criterium) of a true church" (Epist., 58.3). The explanation is sim-
ple: intolerance is contrary to Christ's example. Other criteria may be cited as dis-
tinguishing marks of a true church, for instance, the antiquity of places and names,
the splendour of ritual, the reformation of teaching, or the orthodoxy of faith, but
these can hardly be taken as "signs" (notae) of the church of Christ. Rather, they are
probably signs of a desire for power and empire. Thus, nothing more clearly distin-
guishes a true church (and a true Christian) than toleration, which is tantamount to
saying that no intolerant church (or person) can be considered Christian. 16
Nonetheless, the incompatibility between Christianity and intolerance has two fea-
tures that need to be highlighted: the first, as we read in the prologue to the Epistola,
concerns the relationship between Christians and Christian churches; the second, as
Locke says in the conclusion of the Epistola (cf. Epist., 142.32-144.3) and in A
Third Letter (cf. TL, 183, Works, 354), concerns the attitude of Christians and
Christian churches towards other religions and their followers. In summary, Locke
contends that the use of force in religious matters is incompatible with Christianity,
and that nobody can be called a Christian if he does not show his charitable
12 The relevance of works - and not only of faith - is a point Locke also stresses in his Paraphrase
and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul, as Russo (2019, 129) singles out: "the task Locke set for
himself in his last essay was precisely the attempt to "save works" on a Scriptural, Pauline basis,
ground the need for doing good squarely in the Bible, and oppose those interpretations of Christian
faith that would lead to an ethically anarchical world incomprehensible to reason".
13 Goldie (Locke 2010, xl) estimates that the manuscript was written between 1676 and 1690 whilst
Marshall (2006, 367) considers that it is from 1688.
14
"Matthew 5:43-48, 7:24-27, Luke 6:27-28, Romans J 2: J4, 20-21, 1 Peter 3:9, Luke 23:34, Acts
7:60, 1 Corinthians 4:12-13, Galatians 5:9-10, Deuteronomy 14:21, 15:3, 23:19-20, 28:43,
Exodus 22:2 1, 33:9,Leviticus 19:10, Jeremiah 7:6, 22:3, 'Zachariah 7: 10, Malachi 3:5, Deuteronomy
10:18, 21:14" (cf. Locke 2010, 189).
is In the Epistola, there is one reference to the New Testament concerning foreigners, 1 Corinthians
5: 12-13, which aims to demonstrate that the church does not desire their exclusion from the
Commonwealth (cf. Epist., 144.4).
16 This reasoning supposes that Christianity is the true religion. In A Second Letter, this supposition
is openly admitted (SL, 2, Works, 63).
2. 1 The Evangelical Argument 21
religiosity in practice, towards other Christians and towards the followers of other
religions. 17
Ultimately, Locke gives prominence to the way people live, to the obedience to
Christ's example, "the great pattern for our imitation" (Pol. Es., Pacific Christians,
§ 6, 305); metaphorically, what really matters is to "tread in his steps" (Epist., 64.1 ).
This is why Locke insists on the centrality either of meekness, charity and benevo-
lence, or of sanctity of life, chastity of custom and goodness. There cannot be a
better way to follow Christ than to engage in the struggle against vices and the cul-
tivation of virtues, particularly the greatest one of all: charity. Any conscientious
conviction, "even though erroneous" (quam erronea), 18 or any abstention of out-
ward worship, if accompanied by an innocent life, is not so contrary to God as a
vicious life (cf. Epist., 60.15-17). What is the point of searching to rectify the dog-
mas of a so-called heterodox person, to correct his ceremonies, if the one who per-
secutes does not extirpate his own vices, if he is negligent with the moral errors of
his own close friends and relatives? As we see in the post scriptum to the Epistola,
Locke rejects the zeal devoted to subtle questions, to things that surpass the com-
mon human grasp. To him, there is no doubt that this "zeal" (zelus) serves as a pre-
text to cover non-religious interests, especially when the "fanatics" (zelotae) make
use of force or violence against the supposed heterodox believers.
In the manuscript Toleration A (c. 1675), there is a severe criticism of clergymen
who do not use "the meekness and tender methods of the Gospel" to attract more
members to their congregations. 19 When force is used to increase the number of
church members, we can suspect, as Locke says, "that 'tis not the feeding of the
sheep, but the benefit of the fleece that makes these men endeavour by such methods
to enlarge their fold" (Pol. Es., Toleration A, 231 ). In A Defence of Nonconformity,
we find a similar remark when Locke points out that "it is no wonder they should
contend for the largnesse of their flocks since they have the more to milk, & shear
& have often the selling of them" (cf. DNC, 5", 15). Strictly speaking, Locke reveals
an enormous lack of confidence in, sometimes even contempt towards clergymen,
"Marshall (1994, 367) affirms that in the Epistola there is "the unequivocal statement that it was
a duty of Christianity to tolerate others" and, along the same lines, Marshall (1994, 104) states that
"persuasion ... had been Christ's method". According to Harris (2013, 84), "tolerantia is a product
of love". As Curley (2017) shows, it is radically different from Augustine's position. Marshall
(1994, 119-121 , 367) points out that, in a draft on Galatians 5 :6 among Locke's manuscripts,
which he dates from January 1667 and thinks unlikely to be from Locke himself, one of its pas-
sages speaks of "evangelick charity" and states that it is "not confined to those of our opinion, or
party, or brotherhood, but is extended far and wide".
18
Translation slightly altered.
19
It would not be amiss to observe that, in the article 87 [97) of The Fundamental Constitutions of
Caroline, where there is an express mention of "diversity of opinions", the conversion of heathens,
Jews and dissenters is supposed to be wrought "by good usage and persuasion, and all those con-
vincing methods of gentleness and meekness suitable to the rules and design of the Gospel" (cf.
Pol. Es., The Fundamental..., 178). Likewise, in A Defence of Nonconfonnity Locke states that the
ways Christ authorises are "those wayes of meeknesse, & gentlenesse preaching of the gospell in
simplicity, & exemplarinesse of life in conversation" (DNC, 110).
22 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
given the fact that the zeal for a church, "combined with love of dominion" (cum
amore dominandi conjunctus),20 can "easily" (commode) degenerate into a pretext
for rapine and ambition (cf. Epist. , 112.28-114.3). In the conclusion of the Epistola,
Locke expresses his mistrust even more directly, when he states that the cause of
religious disputes and wars does not lie in the "diversity of opinions" (opinionum
diversitas), but in the refusal of toleration, and when he accuses church leaders of
inciting both the magistrate and the people against the supposed heterodoxies "due
to their avarice and will for dominion" (avaritia et dominandi libidine) (cf. Epist.,
144.24-146.7). 21
In The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke employs, for the first time in his
writings, the word 'priestcraft' (RC, 162, § 286) to indicate the clergymen's inclina-
tion to dominion and the political and religious distortions that it implies.22 However,
this critique had been formulated by him many years earlier, at least since An Essay
concerning Toleration, where he states that compulsion as a means to convert has
nothing to do with the expansion of truth, but with interest and dominion (cf. ET,
296). In the manuscript Toleration A , written almost a decade after An Essay con-
cerning Toleration , the same critique appears, but with more detail, some of which
is restated in the Epistola. In this text composed around 1675, Locke imagines that
throughout history the magistrates of different Commonwealths abstained from
meddling with indifferent things in religion because once these things enter a cult,
they cease to be indifferent to this or that devotee, who considers that they are pleas-
ing to God. However, there was a change when Christianity became the established
religion. Since then, "affecting dominion" (Pol. Es., Toleration A, 233), clergymen
started to vindicate an independent power from the civil government, so that (a),
when the magistrate was more powerful than they were, they pretended that their
own power was only spiritual, but yet pressed him to persecute those they disliked,
and when that happened, they made an apology of the divine right of monarchy, but
(b) when the magistrate was not serviceable to them, they were the first to question
his authority and to disturb the government; finally, (c) when they could not con-
front the prince, they were liberals. In this sense, Locke remarks in the Epistola that
the great combatants for truth rarely manifest their zeal when the magistrate is not
on their side. When the magistrate is not on their side, they encourage mutual tolera-
20
Translation slightly altered.
21Translation slightly altered. According to Ashcraft (2009, 60), "Locke's position in the Letter
concerning Toleration expresses a radical anticlericalism ... While Locke's discussion in the Letter
centres on the magi strate's use of force - because he is the only authority that can legitimately
employ force for any purpose - Locke has no doubt that the real force driving religious persecution
is the clergy". When Locke unveils the clergy's interest, he presents what can be called, according
to Tarcov ( 1999), the psychological foundations of intolerance. In the present book, we shall give
a different meaning to what we shall call psychological justification for intolerance.
22Jn his introduction to A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings, Goldie notes that the
word priestcraft "became fashionable in the 1690s" and that "it denoted a general theory of the
propensities of all priesthoods to pervert religion in pursuit of earthly domination" (Locke 2010,
xxii). On priestcraft, see also Goldie (2018) and Lancaster (2018). For a broader treatment of the
issue, see Lancaster and McKenzie-McHarg (2018).
2.1 The Evangelical Argument 23
tion, but, as soon as they become superior due to the magistrate's favour, they trans-
gress peace and Christian charity. Is it not interesting that when they are inferior in
power, they make no effort to refute the errors that are pleasing to the magistrate and
to the court? (cf. Epist. , 82.25-84.11).
There are yet three other points in this historical reading of the ascension of
Christianity in the manuscript Toleration A: (d) princes favoured those who pro-
moted their authority, (e) the magistrate began to judge religious dissension danger-
ous and assumed the duty to punish those who, according to the clergy, were
heretics, schismatics and fanatics, and (f) people fonned confederacies and combi-
nations to protect themselves when they realized that they could be harmed for
worshipping God in their own way, so that the clash between the oppressor and
people's desire of religious freedom often resulted in persecution and war. These
three points can be found in the Epistola in almost the same words. The third one is
explored in a long section in which Locke discusses the popular view of assemblies
as seditious and factional (cf. Epist., 134.22-140.27). At any rate, what is essential
here is to note that the conflation of Church and State stems from the clergymen's
vicious conduct. Instead of seeking virtue and guiding themselves by charity, they
resort to religion as a pretext to gain power. In the name of faith, they try to achieve
their desire for dominion by imposing beliefs and ways of worships, i.e. by perse-
cuting dissenters.
As we can see, Locke's conception of Christianity has a moral nature. Locke
stresses the importance of action and life compared to belief and worship. So great
is his emphasis on the moral nature of the Christian religion that in the manuscript
Error (1698) he uses the expression "saving orthodoxy" as exempt from any refer-
ence to beliefs and ceremonies: "I lay it down as a principle of Christianity, that the
right and only way to saving orthodoxy, is the sincere and steady purpose of a good
life" (Pol. Es., Error, 347). In another manuscript from 1698, Sacerdos, in which
Locke points out the reunion of religion and morality in Christ, branches that in
Antiquity were split between priests and philosophers, he states that, "for the obtain-
ing the favour and forgiveness of the deity, the chief part of what man could do
consisted in a holy life, and little or nothing at all was left to outward ceremony"
(Pol. Es., Sacerdos, 344-5). Around the same time, Locke wrote in one of his bibles:
"the reforming our lives is the way to believe the Gospel".23 In this sense, it is clear
how much this conception of Christianity reduces the relevance of disputes con-
cerning doctrines and rituals, and how it states the centrality of the imitation of
Christ, who persecuted nobody and asked his disciples to convert souls through
exemplary conduct and evangelical lessons - never through the use of force. As
Locke notes, "the Gospel frequently declares that the true disciples of Christ must
expect and suffer persecution; but that the true church of Christ should persecute or
censure others, or compel them by force, by sword and fire, to embrace her faith and
doctrines, I do not remember to have read anywhere in the New Testament" (Epist.,
23
This note is mentioned by MarshalJ (1994, 373) and Marshall (1990, 997-998), who explains
that it summarises Locke and Benjamin Whichcote's (1609-1683) views of faith and represents
"the later soteriology of Locke himselr'.
24 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
76.4-9). In the manuscript Pacific Christians (1688), a sort of catalogue of princi-
ples for a religious society,24 Locke not only subscribes to the same position, but
also relates it to the problem of the unity among Christians and acknowledges the
impossibility of avoiding difference of opinions:
Nothing being so opposite, or having proved so fatal to unity, love and charity, the first and
great characteristical duties of Christianity, as men's fondness of their own opinions, and
their endeavours to set them up and have them followed, instead of the Gospel of peace; to
prevent these seeds of dissention and division, and maintain unity in the difference of opin-
ions which we know cannot be avoided, if anyone appears contentious, abounding in his
own sense rather than in love, and desirous to draw followers after himself, with destruction
or opposition to others, we judge him not to have learned Christ as he ought, and therefore
not fit to be a teacher of others (Pol. Es., Paci.fie Christians,§ 8, 305-306).
Although Locke never literally states it, his line of thought may have led him to
the express statement that Christ is tolerant. Nevertheless, even without a literal
statement as such, it is clear that his conception of Christianity contradicts the domi-
nant one of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, i.e. the conception inspired by
Augustine's epistles written in the Donatist controversy. It is strange that Locke
never mentioned it, given that he cannot be supposed not to know it. It was ubiqui-
tous in the modem debate on toleration. 25 In the work The 'Letter for Toleration'
deciphrer'd, and the absurd and impiety of an absolute toleration demonstrated, the
very first critique of the Epistola, Thomas Long (1621-1707) refers to the Donatist
controversy and cites De Correctione Donatistarum that Augustine addressed to
Boniface. Proast himself acknowledges that his method, which Locke sarcastically
describes, several times, as "new" in A Second Letter (e.g., SL, 24, 30, 42, Works,
87, 93, 107), was "at least as old as St. Austin" (TL-P, 43, Works, 82).
Certainly, we must admit that Christianity may be conceived in different ways.
As we can see by Augustine's position, it is possible that these different conceptions
have scriptural basis besides the emblematic compelle intrare found in the parable
of the great banquet in Luke 14:23. 26 The gist of Augustine's view is that since the
prophecies concerning the submission of the secular power to God were
24 Jn England, after his exile in the Netherlands, Locke founded a society of virtuosi with edifying
ends, but also concerned with political and philosophical issues, the Dry Club. If we take into
account Pierre Des Maizeaux's ( 167213-1745) remark in the dedication of A Collection ofSeveral
Pieces of Mr. John Locke, this kind of society had always pleased Locke. For more details on this
topic, see Simonutti (2001 and 2008).
25 According to Goldie (1993, 169), "Locke knew well enough that both Anglicans and French
papists drew their arguments from St Augustine's teaching, and that one of the most influential
versions of the Augustinian case amongst Anglican divines had been produced by Thomas Long
[The History of the Donatists, of 1677]."
26 Besides Luke 14:23 (cf. Letters, 93.2.5, 173.10, 185.6.24), Augustine employs other biblical
sources in his letters to Vincentius and Boniface, such as the conversion of Paul in Acts 9:4 (cf.
Letters, 93.2.5; 185.6.22), the domain of Sarah over Hagar in Genesis 16:6 and Galatians 4:26, 29
(cf. Letters, 93.2.6; 185.2.9-11 ), the conversion of Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel 3:24-30 (cf. Le//ers,
93.3.9; 185.2.8). The statement of the necessity to bring to the church those that are in error is
based on Ezekiel 34:4 (cf. Letters, 185.7.31 ) On Augustine's justification of intolerance, see Joly
(1955) and Scalise (1996).
2.1 The Evangelical Argument 25
accomplished (cf. Letters, 87.8, 88.l l , 93.5.18, 105.2.5-6, 204.4; Psalms 2:2,
10-11, 72:11), penalties can be imposed on those who refuse the unity of the
Church. If persuasion was, originally, the only means to restore those who divided
the Church, then afterwards, another means became available: force. In Augustine's
reading of the parable of the great banquet, these two epochs and means correspond
to the two actions of the man who laid on the great feast. When his originally invited
guests made excuses not to come, he asked his servant to "conduct" (adducere) 27 to
his house the poor, the maimed, the halt and the blind, but finding that there was still
room, he then asked the servant to go into the "highways and hedges" and to "com-
pel" (cogere) them come in, hence the distinction between "gently" (leniter) con-
ducting and compelling (Letter, 185.6.24). For Augustine, the great banquet
represents the Church, and the highways and hedges are a figure for heresies and
schisms. Pointing out that some erroneous people are not corrected through persua-
sion, that they resist the "evident" (Letters, 88.9, 185.10.47) and "most manifest"
truth (Letters, 128.4, 141.2, 141.13, 144.1 ), Augustine infers that their correction
requires coercion. Being too hardened, "they cannot be corrected with words" (ver-
bis emendari non potest), but they can be corrected "with a bit of severity of the
discipline" (aliquantula severitate disciplinae) (Letter, 185.7 .26), as Augustine says
euphemistically. This "hardness" (duritia) that makes force necessary to conversion
is, so to speak, a psychological justification for intolerance. Augustine also describes
it in other terms - obstinacy (cf. Letters, 43.1.1, 53.3.7, 89.1, 89.3, 139.1, 185.10.47),
perversity (cf. Letters, 43.1.1, 53.3.7, 56.2, 87.9, 89.2-3, 93.3.10, 97.4, 105.2.6,
139.1, 185.1.1 ) and animosity (cf. Letters, 33.5, 43.1.l, 82.2. 93.3.10, 93.5.17) -
and seems to associate it with the notion of habit (cf. Letters, 52.4, 56.2, 89.6, 89.7,
93.1.1-2, 141.13, 142.4, 185.7.29). Metaphorically speaking, the erroneous people
who resist conversion through words alone are seen as frenetics and lethargies that
must be refrained or awaked for their own health (cf. Letters, 89.6, 93.2.4) and as
children whose parents, for the love of them, must not spare the rod (cf. Letters,
133.2, 185.6.21, 173.3; Proverbs 13:24, 23:14, 29:19, Ecclesiasticus 30:12). For
Augustine, the point at stake is not that they are coerced, but to what they are
coerced (cf. Letters, 93.5.16, 185.6.24). Correcting such people is a "duty of char-
ity" (officium caritatis) (Letter, 43.1.1) whilst toleration is a "false indulgence"
(Letter, 105.2.6), a "freedom for error" (Letter, 105.2.10), a "false and cruel meek-
ness" (Letter, 185.2.7). In short, as Augustine affirms, referring to Proverbs 27 :6, "it
is better to love with severity than to deceive with leniency" (melius est cum severi-
tate diligere, quam cum lenitate decipere) (Letter 93.2.4, cf. Letter 151.7). 28
27
Referring to Luke 14:21, Augustine uses the verb adducere (in the Vulgate, the verb is introdu-
cere). In her English translation, Atkins chose to invite, but this does not seen to be a good alterna-
tive (cf. Augustine 2001, 188). As we read in a sermon devoted to the parable of the great banquet,
Augustine thinks that there are three groups of people: those who were invited (or called), those
who were conducted and those who were compelled to come in (cf. Sermon, 112. l ).
28
As Goldie ( 1991, 348) summarises, "when the mind in bondage is lost to Christian truth, and an
eternal soul is at stake, then coercive discipline by the magistrate in the service of the Christian
pastor is an act of the greatest charity. Indulgence is a 'mistaken kindness' and penal laws are an
26 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
It is no accident, therefore, that one of the points at stake in the modem debate
on toleration concerns the notion of charity - and it concerns the notion of charity
not only from a moral point of view, as we see in the evangelical argument, but also
from a political one, as we shall see in the following chapter concerning the Locke
and Proast controversy. In both cases, however, the main issue remains the same:
can force be compatible with love? For Locke, there is no doubt that force and char-
ity are incompatible, as we just saw in his emphasis on the faith that works "not by
force, but by love" (Galatians 5:6, Epist., 58.25). As he states in An Essay concern-
ing Toleration, "I ... am much indebted to the man that takes care I should be happy
but tis hard to thinke that that comes from charity to my soule which brings such ill
usage to my body" (ET, 296). Locke's position is centred in Christ's meekness, 29 the
major expression of which is seen in the Sermon on the Mountain, and is sum-
marised in the Golden Rule (cf. RC, 123, § 219). This rule was described in An
Essay concerning Human Understanding as "that most unshaken Rule of Morality,
and Foundation of all social Virtue" (E, I.iii.4). 30 When Locke composed The
Reasonableness of Christianity, he restated his conception of Christianity, citing
Christ's answer to Pilate, according to which his kingdom is not of this world
because, if it were, his followers would have struggled for it, since they were not
few and were forward to consider him king; if force should be used, Christ would
have ordered it (cf. RC, 84-85, §§ 144-145; John 18: 33-37). In the Epistola, we
find the same statement when Locke says, ironically, that if infidels should be con-
verted by constraint, an army of heavenly legions would be much more adequate
than the troops of any patron of the church (cf. Epist., 64-7-9).
The purpose of Christianity is "to institute a life with righteousness and piety"
(ad vitam recte pieque instituendam), 31 so that all people that neglect virtue and are
inclined to vice attribute "in vain" (jrustra) to themselves the name of Christian (cf.
Epist., 58.15-19). Christianity is more a rule of righteousness towards good life,
"the great business of true religion", than a notional science (Pol. Es. , Pacific
Christians,§ 6, 305). As we can see in The Reasonableness of Christianity, the good
life, i.e. the sincere effort to obey Christ's law (cf. RC, 112, § 198) is a grounding
notion of Locke's conception of the Christian religion, but it does not exempt the
believers from giving assent to an essential dogma, that Jesus Christ is the Messiah
act of love. It may be better to win by gentle persuasion, but amongst the stubborn there is a 'hard-
ness of heart that cannot be softened by such words'."
29 In A Second Letter, however, Locke acknowledges that on one occasion - the expelling of mer-
chants from the temple (cf. John 2:13-25) - Christ used force (cf. SL, 49, Works, 115). When
Augustine justified his change of attitude regarding the coercion of Donatists, he used this Biblical
passage (cf. Augustine 2019, I, 13, 6).
30 Being easy and plain, this rule may be used in the instruction of children (cf. Locke 1989, 213, §
159). In Of the Conduct of the Understaruling (§ 43 (84)), Locke affirms that "our Saviours great
rule [is) that we should love our neighbour as our selves" as he did in Of Ethic in General(§ 11):
"this rule of our actions set us by our lawmaker is conversant about, and ultimately terminates in,
those simple ideas before mentioned; viz. thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' (Pol. Es. , Of
Ethic... , 303).
31
Translation slightly altered.
2.1 The Evangelical Argument 27
(cf. RC, 23, § 26), and to some concomitant articles (cf. RC, 164, 169, §§ 291, 301;
Locke, 2016, 21 , § 28, 49, 162- 163, §§ 25, 306-308): "these two, Faith and
Repentance; i.e., believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and a good Life; are the indis-
pensable Conditions of the New Covenant to be performed by all those, who would
obtain Eternal Life" (RC, 112, § 199). To obtain eternal life, Christ gave teachings
concerning "faith and manners" (cf. Epist., 116.21-22: quafide, quibus moribus ... ),
so that each person has duties related to "believing" (crede) and "acting" (agere):
everyone is supposed "to investigate" (investigare) and "to perform" (peragere) the
things necessary to salvation (cf. Epist. , 122.27-124.1).32 In a manuscript written in
1694, Locke sustains the same position when he lists "what one must believe to be
saved" (quae credenda ad salutem) and "what one must do to be saved" (quae
agenda ad salutem) (Adversaria Theologica 94, § 5). 33 Therefore, the opposition
between notional science and rule of righteousness is not intended to cast doubt on
the need to believe, but to condemn the speculative excess that ends up serving as a
pretext for clerical dominion. Hence, in the prologue to the Epistola, there are allu-
sions to the so-called indifferent things to salvation. The imposition of indifferent
things concerning either doctrine or ways of worship is a characteristic procedure of
those who distort religion to suit their own interests. In A Third Letter, Locke refers
to "those generous Principles of the Gospel, which so much recommend and incul-
cate universal Charity, and a Freedom from the Inventions and Impositions of Men
in the things of God" (TL, 349, Works , 544-545). Naturally, Locke's conception of
Christianity is very conciliatory and may be easily linked with his defence of tolera-
tion, because it reduces the dogmatic and ceremonial dimensions of religion to a
minimum. 34 As Locke states in A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of
Christianity, his conception of Christianity "tends to Peace and Union amongst
Christians" (Locke 2016, 37, § A3'). Indeed, for him "charity [is] a Vertue much
more necessary than the attaining of the Knowledge of obscure Truths, that are not
easie to be found; and probably, therefore, not necessary to be known" (Locke 2016,
232, § 479).35
Locke focuses on the moral development of individuals (an aspect with which no
Christian would disagree), rather than addressing abstruse discussions (that are so
32
Translation slightly altered.
33
The manuscript, Adversaria Theologia 94, is quoted here according to Nuovo's edition and trans-
lation (cf. Locke 2002b, 23).
34
This is the so-called latitudinarianism. Bejan (2015, n. 13) refers to The Reasonableness of
Christianity as an "an exercise in latitudinarian theology". This perspective of Christianity was
shared by the Dutch Remonstrants with whom Locke lived in exile. On Locke's friendly relations
in the Netherlands, see Simonutti (1999).
35
Similarly, in A Third Letter, Locke wrote: "An Agreement in Truths necessary to Salvation, and
the maintaining of Charity and brotherly Kindness with the Diversity of Opinions in other things,
is that which will very well consist with Christian Unity, and is all possibly to be had in this World,
in such an incurable Weakness and Difference of Mens Understandings" (TL, 82, Works, 237). In
the same vein, we read in A Defence ofNonconformity that '"tis want of joyneing in peace, & char-
ity, and not in all the circumstances of outward worship that causes our eviUs" (DNC, 1, cf.
DNC, 107).
28 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
liable to hide the ulterior motives). It is little wonder, therefore, that in the manu-
script Error he criticises the churches "in which, as one may observe, opinions are
preferred to life and orthodoxy is that which they are concerned for, and not morals"
(Pol. Es., Error, 346). More broadly, in the manuscript Civil and Ecclesiastical
Power, written in 1674, Locke states that "all things tending to the attainment of
future bliss ... are of three sorts": credenda, cultus religiosus and moralia. He then
points out that those things one needs to do to be saved are twofold: some of them
concern "the ways of expressing our honour and adoration of the deity, and of
address to him for the obtaining any good from him" (cu/tus religiosus), others
concern "the right management of our actions in respect of ourselves and others"
(moralia) (Pol. Es., Civil... , 217). 36 A few years later, in 1681-82, in A Defence of
Nonconformity, Locke would formulate a definition of religion that comprises
"those opinions, & actions alone which I entertaine, & performe, onely to please
God, & such as have no concemement at all with my neighbour or the interest, or
affaires of this world" - a definition that seems to exclude moralia from religion.
However, this definition of religion is certainly framed in a restrictive fashion, as
Locke asserts that morality is "acknowledged ... to be a great part of that wherein
God may be offended or pleased with us" (DNC, 76).
Specifically formulated against the use of force in religious matters, the evan-
gelical argument may thus be settled in the following terms: (i) 'Being a Christian
is to follow Christ's example'; (ii) 'Christ's example is to act virtuously with meek-
ness and charity'; (iii) 'Hence, being a Christian is to act virtuously with meekness
and charity'. As the first premise is evident to all Christians, there is no doubt that
the biblical passages to which Locke resorts are intended to support the second
premise. 37 It must be noted, however, that the Augustinian reading of compel/e
intrare in Luke 14:23 clearly contradicts the second premise, at least from Locke's
perspective. Yet, in the Epistola, and also in the works and manuscripts explored
above, Locke never openly compares his conception of Christianity with other con-
ceptions, particularly the Augustinian one. He only does so indirectly, when he
describes the violence to which the supposed heretics were exposed - they were
mutilated, despoiled and killed, to mention nothing more (cf. Epist., 60.1) - and
above all, when he opposes religious coercion to the faith acting through love (cf.
Galatians 5:6, Epist., 58.25).38
36 For a discussion on whether the cultus religious, understood as public worship, and affiliation
with a church are required for salvation, see Lucci (2020, 196-197). We should bear in mind,
though, that at the time Locke composed A Defence of Nonconformity, he believed that "since the
actions of a private solitary life cannot reach to all the instances & purposes of religion in its full
extent therefore men find themselves obliged, when they embrace any religion, to associate, &
joyne in Communion with some society, wherein that religion is professed" (DNC, 19, cf. DNC,
23, 30, 39, 76-77).
37 This is why, contrary to Goldie and Popkin (2006), we have shortened the scope of the evangeli-
cal argument here. The latitudinarian position regarding indifferent things, even though very
important, does not have a scriptural basis like the statement of Christian meekness and charity.
38
Goldie (1991) shows how Locke confronted the Augustinian legacy in the controversy with
Proast, but he does not explore Locke's rebuttal of Augustine (focused on charity) in the Epistola.
Goldie and Popkin (2006, 102), Bejan (2015) and Vernon (1997, 9) touch upon this issue whereas
2.2 The Argument from Commission 29
At any rate, despite the simplicity of the argument, which can be put in the logi-
cal form of a valid categorical syllogism (i) 'C is EC'; (ii) 'EC is ML'; (iii) 'Hence,
C is ML', it is not difficult to perceive the great moral consequences of it, even
though they are restricted to those who identify themselves as Christians, i.e. to
those who accept its scriptural basis. In light of the evangelical argument, we can
say that no Christian can enforce his beliefs and ways of worship upon other per-
sons, which corresponds to an approach to toleration in its horizontal dimension, as
mentioned above. From Locke's perspective, in short, the use of force in religious
matters is a betrayal of charity, which is the "Spirit of the Gospel" (RC, 3, § A2v).
Charity, if it is not to become an empty word, must be understood as "an effectual
forbearance 39 and good will" (Pol. Es., Pacific Christians, § 5, 305).
2.2 The Argument from Commission
As we have seen previously, the other three arguments to support toleration appear
in the section of the Epistola that defines the Commonwealth as "a society of men
constituted only (solummodo) for preserving and advancing their civil goods"
Marshall (2016, 656-{)57) makes this point very clearly. In this sense, it is important to remember
that, in the reviews of the Epistola in the Bibliotheque Universe lie et Historique and in the Histoire
des Ouvrages des Sfavans, there is an emphasis on the "cruel and ridicule charity that consists in
oppressing or beheading one's neighbour for the sake of converting him" (Basnage de Beauval
1721, 22) and a clear assertion that "without toleration there can be no charity, because we cannot
say that dishonouring people, preventing them from keeping their lives, persecuting them, taking
away their goods, and killing them, as those who have no toleration towards those who do not share
their beliefs, are actions compatible with charity" (Le Clerc 1689, 403). On the reviews and on the
immediate reception of the Epistola, see Soulard (2019) and Loque (2020). Likewise, in his cor-
respondence with Locke, Limborch asserts that the Epistola proves, "on grounds never hitherto so
set forth, that all religious persecution is contrary both to the spirit of religion and to the law of
nature" (Corr., v. III, 1131). As Loconte (2014) demonstrates, the emphasis on the incompatibility
of the example of Christ and intolerance represents an influence of Christian humanism on Locke.
From this perspective, contrary to what Nuovo (2011, 242) affirms, we cannot say that the equation
of toleration and the "Christian virtue of charity" seems to be "purely rhetorical". Lamb and
Thompson (2009, 239) also consider that in the Epistola there is an "intermarriage of charity and
toleration", but they focus on the meaning of charity related to Locke's notion of property and
justice (cf. TTG I § 42).
39
In Locke's index to An Essay concerning Human Understanding, there is an entry for toleration
with only one remission to the work, specifically to E, IV.xvi.4, the title of which is "the right use
of it Uudgement] is mutual Charity and Forbearance". Since forbearance has the sense of abstain-
ing from, it appears that Locke is considering it synonymous of toleration, which he defines liter-
ally as the removal of force (cf. SL, 2, 6, Works, 62, 67), as we saw above. In this respect, it is
noteworthy that Pierre Coste (1668-1747) chose 'toleration' when he translated this passage (cf.
Locke 1735, 548). In an earlier stage, though, Locke seems to have conceived forbearance in a
different way. In A Defence of Nonconfonnity, Locke also associates charity and forbearance (cf.
DNC, 7 , 110, 112, 151, 154), but apparently, he believes (referring to Romans 14, in particular, to
Romans 14:13: "Let us not therefore judge one another any more") that forbearance is the action
of not judging others (cf. DNC, 142).
30 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
(Epist., 64.27-28). These arguments correspond to what Popple calls three consid-
erations, and, for the sake of clarity, we shall call them here the argument from
commission, the argument of unfitness of force, and the argument of reductio ad
absurdum. Given their political nature and their secular character, all these argu-
ments are independent of the evangelical argument, which has a theological and
moral nature, and a confessional character. However, taken as a whole, these three
arguments are interconnected, as we shall see.
In order to understand the structure and the interconnection between these three
arguments, we shall start with the first one. It is condensed in one paragraph in
which Locke begins his exposition of the proofs "to demonstrate" (demonstrare)
why the magistrate's jurisdiction must be limited exclusively to civil matters.
First, because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to
other men. It is not committed to him by God; because it does not appear that God ever gave
any such authority to one man over another as to compel other men to embrace his religion.
Nor can any such power be vested in the magi strate by men, because no man can so far
abandon the care of his own eternal salvation as to embrace under compul sion a worship or
faith prescribed by someone else, be he prince or subject. For no man, even if he would, can
beLieve at another's dictation. It is faith that gives force and efficacy to the true religion that
brings salvation. For whatever profession you make, to whatever outward worship you con-
form, if you are not fully persuaded in your own mind that it is both true and well pleasing
to God, far from being any furtherance, it is an obstacle to salvation. For in this way, instead
of expiating your other sins by the exercise of religion, in offering to God Almighty a wor-
ship which you believe to be displeasing to him you add to the number of your sins those of
hypocrisy and contempt of his Divine Majesty (Epist., 66.19-68.2).
Broadly speaking, this is the argument: (iv) 'God has not committed the care of
souls to the civil magistrate'; (v) 'Men have not committed the care of souls to the
civil magistrate'; (vi) 'Hence, the care of souls has not been committed to the civil
magistrate', which is tantamount to saying that his jurisdiction must be confined to
civil matters.40 The argument is straightforward, but its premises are not evident.
They do not support the thesis without further grounding. Why have neither God nor
men committed the care of souls to the civil magistrate? Moreover, what does Locke
mean by 'committing' the care of souls to the civil magistrate?
Locke employs the verb demandare (cf. Epist., 66.20) to refer to the care of souls
committed to the magistrate. Literally, it means to trust and corresponds to the verb
to entrust, often used in the Two Treatises of Government. 41 In the Locke and Proast
controversy, developed in English, it is discussed whether or not, in religious mat-
ters, the magistrate has authority or commission, a word that comes from the Latin
40
In fact, this argument is an enthymeme. In order to be valid, the reasoning requires another prem-
ise: the commission to take care of souls may be committed to the magistrate either by God or by
men. It seems that Locke has always worked with this disjunction. It is found in the First Tract on
Government (cf. Locke 1967, 126) and reappears in An Essay concerning Toleration (ET, 270).
41
When we compare Locke's Latin and English writings, notably the Two Tracts on Government,
it seems that the Latin verb demandare may be doubled in English: to commission and to entrust.
Compare: "whether you suppose him [magistrate) immediately commissioned by God and by him
entrusted with the care of the society ... " (Locke 1967, 126) and "verum cum magistratui a deo
societatis cura demandatur ..." (Locke 1967, 194).
2.2 The Argument from Commission 31
verb committere, and also accepts the sense of to trust. The issue is always a conces-
sion made in confidence, with a determined end. The emphasis on the substantive
commission, however, helps to show that the task to be performed by the magistrate
corresponds to an end entrusted to him. Ultimately, as we see in the Two Treatises
of Government, legislative power is "only a Fiduciary Power" (TTG, II§ 149). 42 The
magistrate cannot do whatever he wants, because he has a trust that restricts what he
can legitimately do.
Therefore, regardless of the translation chosen for demand.are and its cognate
forms, it is important to note that by focusing the discussion on the notion of com-
mission or trust, Locke is indicating that the functions of the Commonwealth are not
evident: his aim is, precisely, to determine them. For Locke, it is necessary to estab-
lish which mandate should be entrusted lo the magistrate. In other words, it is neces-
sary to explain why it should not include the care of souls. Since there are two ways
whereby power may be committed to the magistrate, Locke discusses each one
separately, as he did in the First Tract on Government and in An Essay concerning
Toleration.
The first way regards God, but, according to Locke, it seems that God has never -
literally, "nowhere" (nusquam)43 - given to one man over another the authority to
compel others to embrace his religion. In the Epistola, this is Locke's claim for
denying to the magistrate the commission that could be given to him by God. As we
can see, a modest (ironic, even?) tone is lent to the claim by the expression apparet,
but its most important feature is its scriptural basis. Locke clearly presupposes that
the Scripture contains God's will, and affirms that nowhere in the Revelation does
God concede, to the magistrate, the care of souls. Given the absence of any explicit
concession of this commission to the magistrate, we must conclude that he does
possess it or, at least, that he does not possess it as a divine concession. In A Second
Letter, Locke quotes some biblical passages, such as I Peter 2: 13, to support his
position (which he says is coherent with Richard Hooker (1554-1600)) on the
restriction of the magistrate's jurisdiction: Commonwealths or civil societies or
governments are nothing but an "all0pro7tiVTJ K-ricnc;;", "the contrivance and
42
For the sake of clarity, it is worth quoting this passage in full: "Though in a Constituted
Commonwealth, standing upon its own Basis, and acting according to its own Nature, that is, act-
ing for the preservation of the Community, there can be but one Supream Power, which is the
Legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the Legislative being only a
Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the People a Supream Power to
remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in
them. For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever
that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeitecf' (TTG,
TI§ 149).
43
Some translators, starting with Popple, give a temporal sense to nusquam when its meaning is
locative, as we see in two analogous passages: in A Second Letter, Locke says that "I do not find
any where that. .. " (SL, 54, Works, 12 1); and in the manuscript Toleration D, which will be dis-
cussed below, where Locke states that "God has nowhere given such power to any man or soci-
ety ... " (Pol. Es, Toleration D, 276). In the review of the Epistola published in the Bibliotheque
Universe/le et Historique, which was based on the Latin edition, nusquam is interpreted in the
locative sense: "Dieu n'a dit nulle part qu'il entendoit. .. " (Le Clerc 1689, 404).
32 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
institution of man", whose end is "the Punishment of evil-doers, and the praise of
them that do well" (SL, 54, Works, 121). 44
It must be stressed, however, that some passages of the Old Testament, such as
Isaiah 49:23, are traditionally employed to vest the magistrate with the care of souls
(cf. TL-P, 10, RLP, 49). Locke never mentions them in the Epistola. This silence
may be due to his understanding of the Jewish State: it was a theocracy (cf. Epist.,
116.10). According to Locke, it is clear that the law of Moses implied a unity of the
ecclesiastical and the civil orders, but this unity was broken by Christ: among the
Jews, there could not be, "as is the case after the birth of Christ, ... any distinction
between the church and the Commonwealth" (Epist., 116.11-12). Of the law of
Moses, which was divided into moral, judicial and ceremonial, Christ kept only the
moral part (cf. Epist., 114.31; RC, 19-21, §§ 19-22), so that "there is absolutely no
such thing under the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth" (Epist., 116.18-19).45
Therefore, to prove that God committed the care of souls to the magistrate, it would
be necessary to show a saying of Christ authorizing him to use force in religious
matters, but no such saying appears to exist.
As we pointed out earlier, since the premises of the argument from commission
are not evident, they need to be proved. In the Epistola, each premise is given its
own justification and becomes the conclusion of an additional argument. 46 Hence,
with regard to the first way whereby the magistrate's commission may be instituted,
it is clear that premise (iv) 'God has not committed the care of souls to the civil
magistrate' is backed up by the following proposition: (a) 'It seems that nowhere in
the Scripture has God committed the care of souls to the civil magistrate'. Locke
does not give this additional argument a name; for the sake of clarity, we shall call
it the political scriptural argument, given that it has a scriptural basis, as does the
evangelical argument.
The other way whereby the care of souls can be committed to the magistrate is
through the trust of men. Although at this point of the Epistola Locke does not say
explicitly that he presupposes the transition from the state of nature to the constitu-
tion of a Commonwealth, he does have this transition in mind. His reasoning is cast
in similar terms when compared to the Two Treatises of Government (TTG, II §§
4-21, 95-99, 123-131), as we see in another section of the Epistola, where he
describes the necessity that humankind has to work in order to survive and the threat
to property represented by dishonest men. Locke then refers to the "mutual com-
pacts" (pacta ... mutua) among men to defend the things of this life, and clearly
44
1 Peter 2: 13 also occurs in the Two Treatises of Government (TTG, I § 6) and in the Second Tract
on Government (Locke, 1967, 228). In the case of the latter, however, it is mentioned in order to
prove that the magistrate may legislate about indifferent things, what entails a much larger jurisdic-
tion compared to that sustained by Locke in his later works.
45 As Coffey (2000, 63) points out, "by treating Israel as a pennanent model for Christians, propo-
nents of uniformity were confusing the Law and the Gospel and revealing their failure to compre-
hend the great transformation that had occurred with the coming of Christ".
46
For a comprehensive view of the structure of Locke's arguments in the Epistola, see the Synoptic
Table in the final section of this chapter.
2.2 The Argument from Commission 33
states that the care and power over all these things "are committed to the magistrates
by the society" (a societate magistratibus demandata est). According to Locke, this
is the "origin" (origo) of the legislative power and this power, which is supreme,
must be circumscribed in a manner that reflects its origin. The public good in secu-
lar matters is the "sole reason and the sole end" (unicum ... argumentum unicusque...
finis) of the constitution of the Commonwealth (cf. Epist., 126.1-16).47
In the Epistola, Locke does not develop his reasoning to the extent of making
explicit that there are two stages in the constitution of the Commonwealth. In the
first stage, given the inconveniences of the state of nature, men enter and constitute
a political body. InLocke's words, this stage corresponds to a " Voluntary Agreement"
(TTG, II § 173), hence the recurring notions of consent and compact in the Two
Treatises of Government. In the second stage, in which Locke generally no longer
speaks of consent, but of trust (cf. e.g. TTG, II § 22), men entrust the constituted
power with the mandate of preserving their lives, liberties and estates or, generally
speaking, of preserving their property (cf. TTG, II §§ 123-124). It is in this second
stage, as we have said above in the explanation of demandare, that political power
is entrusted to the magistrate as a commission or mandate. The main difference
between the two stages lies in the fact that consent refers to the powers that men give
up - the powers to punish others and of self-preservation (the latter is only partially
relinquished) - in order to confer them on the legislative (cf. TTG, II§§ 128-13 1;
TL, 62, Works, 214). Trust, however, has to do with the ends of the constituted com-
mon power (cf. TTG, II § 222). 48 In other words, in the first case, the issue is the
concession of power; in the other, it is the scope and the admissible employment of
the constituted common power.49 Hence, one can say, in analytical terms, that firstly,
the community or political body is formed and, secondly, the government is formed.
This is why the dissolution of government does not necessarily entail the dissolution
of society (cf. TTG, II§ 211).
It must be stressed, however, that the magistrate's commission is not chosen by
men. It is derived from the human natural condition, as divine creation, and in
47
Translation slightly altered.
48
In A Third Letter, Locke reasserts the difference between consent and trust when he explains the
two senses of power: "the natural Force of all the Members of any Society, or of those who by the
Society can be procured to assist it, is in one Sense called the Power of that Society. This Power or
Force is generally put into some one or few Persons' Hands with Direction and Authority how to
use it; and this in another Sense is called also the Power of the Society.. .. The Power therefore of
any Society in this Sense, is nothing but the Authority and Direction given to those that have the
Management of the Force or natural Power of the Society, how and to what Ends to use it, by which
Commission the Ends of Societies are known and distinguished" (TL, 65, Works, 217-218).
49
As Laslett sums up in his introduction to the Two Treatises of Government (TTG, 114), Locke
"divides off the process of compact, which creates a community, from the further process by which
the community entrusts political power to a government; although they may take place at the same
time, these two are distinct. This puts his system amongst those which distinguish the 'contract of
society' from the 'contract of government' , though in Locke this second process is not a contract
at all. And this may be his second point; to underline the fact that the relation between government
and governed is not contractual, for a trust is not a contract." In broad terms, Tuckness (2002b) fits
these concepts into what he calls contractual and legislative consent.
34 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
particular from the duty of self-preservation. The ends of the Commonwealth are
determined by the necessity to obey the law of nature and, at the same time, to rem-
edy the inconveniences of the state of nature (cf. TIO, II § 135).5° From this per-
spective, the Two Treatises of Government could have plainly supported toleration,
had this work discussed the possible extension of civil power to the care of souls (in
this work, there are only two incidental references to religion, cf. TTG, II §§
209-210). 51 After all, if the end of the Commonwealth is the preservation of prop-
erty, then the imposition of beliefs and ways of worship by the magistrate is hardly
conceivable. As we shall see in the next chapter, Locke openly resorts to the notion
of state of nature in A Second Letter and, in particular, in A Third Letter to show that
religious imposition is an injury to be remedied by civil society, i.e. that the liberty
to believe and to worship God as each one thinks most appropriate is one of the
liberties to be protected by the Commonwealth. In sum, therefore, when Locke
develops his reasoning on toleration, he applies his conception of the constitution of
the Commonwealth to the specific issue of religion in order to demonstrate that the
jurisdiction of the civil power "neither can nor ought in any way to be extended
(nee ... extendi) to the salvation of souls" (Epist., 66.16-17). However, one may still
ask: what exactly would prevent people from extending the magistrate's jurisdiction
beyond secular matters?
In response to this question, Locke sustains that nobody can abandon the care of
his own salvation, because it is impossible for anyone to believe by prescription.
Even if a person wanted to, he could not embrace a doctrine or a way of worship
prescribed by others. If a person is not convinced "in his heart" (in corde) that his
belief is true and his way of worship pleasing to God, the mere outward profession
and performance are worthless to salvation. Furthermore, this outward profession
and performance without the "conscientious conviction" (Epist., 60.16: conscien-
tiae persuasio)52 is an obstacle to salvation. It is hypocrisy, and implies contempt for
God. Without a "conscientious conviction", nobody can be saved: outward profes-
sion and performance do not suffice, even if they are done on behalf of true religion.
Locke conceives faith as inner persuasion and contends that it is inaccessible to the
magistrate's commands. The understanding cannot be moved by force. This is
Locke's justification to deny that people would commit the care of souls to the mag-
50 On this topic, see Dunn (1980, 1996) and the debate between Stanton (2011, 2012, 2017) and
Tate (2012, 2013, 2017), besides Harris (2013), who analyses the constitution of the Commonwealth
taking into account the natural duty to worship God mentioned by Locke in the fourth and seventh
of the Essays on the Law of Nature (cf. Locke 1954, 156.16-22, 194.11-12).
51 According to Milton and Milton in their introduction to An Essay concerning Toleration, "both
refer to covert royal support for popery, not to disputes between the Church of England and
Protestant dissenters" (ET, 39, n. 1). However, it is interesting to note that, in the preface to the
French translation of the Second Treatise of Government, Jean Le C lerc (1657-1736) makes a
plain reference to the religious persecution in France as an illegitimate excess that deserves to be
resisted (cf. Locke 1691, 3-4). On the first translations of Locke's works into French, see Soulard
(2011). Specifically on the French translation of the Second Treatise of Government, see
Savonius (2004).
52 Translation slightly altered.
2.2 The Argument from Commission 35
istrate. What sense could this concession have, if the means in the magistrate's
hands - the laws and their corresponding penalties - are unable to reach the
understanding?
This is the very same reasoning that constitutes the argument of unfitness of
force, so that there is an interconnection between Locke's first two considerations
made to defend the restriction of the magistrate's jurisdiction to civil goods. 53 In the
second consideration, there is nothing more at stake than the relationship between
force and faith; consequently, it is more appropriate to examine this relationship in
the discussion of the argument of unfitness of force. For now, it is more important
to note that there is, in the Epistola, another reason why people would not commit
the care of souls to the magistrate. It is this reason that appears in the metaphor of
beams in A Second Letter, when Locke states that the argument of unfitness of force
is not the only argument to support the view that the magistrate does not have the
commission to promote salvation (cf. SL, 6, Works, 67). This second reason to sup-
port the view that men would not commit the care of souls to the magistrate is the
argument of fallibility. This argument is referred to often in the Locke and Proast
controversy, but it had been adduced years earlier, in the manuscript Toleration D
(1679),54 when it received an enlightening formulation:
No man has power to prescribe to another what he should believe or do in order to the sav-
ing of his own soul, because it is only his own private interest, and concerns not another
man. God has nowhere given such power to any man or society, nor can man possibly be
supposed to give it [to] another over him absolutely.
(I) Because man in all states being liable to error, as well governors as those under
them, doctors or scholars, it would be unreasonable to be put under the absolute direction
of those who may err in a matter of that concemment, eternal concemment, wherein if they
misguide us they can make us no reparation.
(2) ... because no compulsion can make a man believe against his present light and
persuasion, be it what it will, though it may make him profess indeed. But profession with-
out sincerity will little set a man forwards in his way to any place but that where he is to
have his share with hypocrites, and to do anything in the worship of God which a man
judges in his own conscience not to be that worship he requires and will accept, is so far
from serving or pleasing God in it, that such a worshipper affronts God only to please men
(Pol. Es., Toleration D , 276).
53
Given that these two arguments are intertwined, we cannot agree with Tate (2016, 204, 225), who
claims that they are "categorically distinct". It is surprising that he states, moreover, that the argu-
ment from commission "is not only categorically distinct" from the argument of unfitness of force,
"but also inconsistent with it" (Tate 2016, 138).
54
The argument of fallibility occurs in writings earlier than Toleration D, as An Essay concerning
Toleration (ET, 272-273), but never so clearly associated with the argument from commission and
the argument of unfitness of force. Locke discussed infallibility, but focused on papal infallibility
in a Latin manuscript dated 1661, which is sometimes called by scholars "Essay on infallibility"
(cf. Biddle 1977); in another manuscript entitled "Catholic Infallibility" (cf. Pol. Es., Catholic... ,
226-230), and in a letter to Henry Stubbe of circa September 1659 (cf. Corr., v. I, 75). Jolley
(2016, 117) acknowledges the contractualist dimension of the argument of fallibility, but he con-
siders that it is more noticeable in Locke's replies to Proast. It is unclear why he thinks so, given
that the first consideration is boldly structured from the perspective of men when they enter the
Commonwealth.
36 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
As we can see, in Lhe introductory paragraph of this manuscripl, there is a refer-
ence to the first way whereby the care of souls may be committed to the magistrate:
the divine concession. Once again, Locke denies that it constitutes a ground for the
magistrate's spiritual authority, because nowhere has God given him this power (it
is the political scriptural argument almost in the same terms found in the Epistola).
However, the substantive part of Toleration D deals not with the divine, but with the
human concession, so to speak. This is clear from the enumerated exposition of two
arguments, aimed at justifying why people do not commit the care of souls to the
magistrate. The second of these arguments is the argument of unfitness of force,
which we shall examine below; the first is the argument of fallibility, which is struc-
tured as follows: (p) 'all men, regardless of their position or status, are liable to
error'; (y) 'if a person misguides other with regard to salvation, he can make no
reparation', (v) 'Hence, men have not committed the care of souls to the civil mag-
istrate'. Why would men commit the care of souls to the magistrate, a matter of
eternal concernment, if he is as liable to error as any other person, and cannot repair
his citizens' loss of salvation due to his spiritual misguidance?
In the Epistola, it is also in these terms that the argument of fallibility is framed.
It appears in the section in which Locke discusses the magistrate's duties regarding
toleration and, more accurately, in a passage in which Locke criticises fanatics by
affirming that there is no consensus as to the right way to salvation. Given that the
right way is "controversial" (cf. Epist., 92.19-20: de recta ambiguitur), could the
magistrate choose it for others? Locke's answer is negative. The magistrate could
not do so because "neither the care of the commonwealth, nor the right of enacting
laws, reveals the way that leads to heaven more certainly (certius) to the magistrate
than a private man's study reveals it to himself' (Epist., 92.20-22). By the same
token, but using other words, Locke states that "the one and only narrow way that
leads to heaven is no better known to the magistrate (magistratui non magis notam)
than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safely follow him as my guide who
may probably be as ignorant (aeque ignarus) of the way as I am, and who certainly
must be less concerned for my salvation than I am myself' (Epist., 96.1-5).
The central point of this reasoning is clear: the magistrate is as fallible as anyone
else. His superiority in power does not make him more apt to discover and embrace
the true religion. Therefore, he is virtually as ignorant about religious matters as all
other people. As Locke says in An Essay concerning Toleration, in a clear recourse
to the notion of fallibility, the magistrate has "noe more certain or more infallible
knowledge" of the way to salvation; he is not "made infallible in reference to others,
by being made a governor over them" (ET, 273, 277). In the idiom of the Two
Treatises of Government, it means that all people, being equal, are born to "the use
of the same faculties" (TTG, II§ 4). 55 Even the absolute monarchs, as Locke reminds
the reader, "are but Men" (TTG, II § 13). Power does not influence nature, which
remains the same in all mortals (cf. Epist., 94.2-5). Furthermore, Locke observes
55
Equal endowment does not mean that everyone has the same excellence of parts or ability (cf.
TTG, II§ 54, E, IV.xx.5, Cond., § 2 (4)). However, the real difference among people is due not to
their endowment, but to the use or exercise of their natural capacities (Cond., § 4 (7)).
2.2 The Argument from Commission 37
that each person is especially concerned wilh his own salvation. As we can see,
Locke associates the notions of fallibility and concern, so that, all people being
equally apt to take care of their own souls, each person would take care of his own
salvation better than anyone else, since nobody would put so much effort in it as
himself. From this perspective, it is the individual "effort" (studium) that makes the
difference, all the more so when we consider that there are few beliefs necessary to
salvation and that consequently, the study of religious matters need not be exhaus-
tive: "one day of seven besides other days of rest in the Christian world allows time
enough for this" (Cond., § 8 (28)). 56 In the Epistola, nevertheless, there is no explicit
statement that each person would take care of his own salvation better than the mag-
istrate. In order to prove that men would not commit the care of souls to the magis-
trate when they leave the state of nature, it is enough to sustain the equal capacity
between the magistrate and their subjects or citizens, i.e. that they are equally liable
to error. Why would a person abstain from the care of his own soul if he knew that
he ran the risk of losing salvation? Or to put it another way, why would a person
entrust the care of his own soul to another person if he believed himself to be equally
capable of gaining it57 and more concerned in this endeavour?
Premise CP) 'all men, regardless of their position or status, are liable to error' is
enough to support the proposition that (v) 'men have not committed the care of
souls to the civil magistrate' , but, as we see in the manuscript Toleration D, Locke
strengthens his position with a second proof: (y) 'if a person misguides other with
regard to salvation, he can make no reparation'. In the Epistola, the second premise
(y) can also be found in the section that deals with the magistrate's duties concern-
ing toleration, and seems to imply another feature of fallibility. The magistrate is
fallible for being as liable to error as anyone else (power does not make a person
more cognitively apt), but also for not being able to repair the harm caused by his
misguidance, in case someone loses salvation because of him.
In fact, Locke's reasoning is more audacious in the Epistola than in Toleration D,
because he makes a clear argumentative concession: "but let us grant that the way to
eternal life is probably better known to a prince than to his subjects, or at least that
56
This perspective is also found in An Essay concerning Human Understanding: "no Man is wholly
taken up with the Attendance on the Means of Living, as to have no spare Time at all to think of his
Soul, and inform himself in Matters of Religion" (E, IV.xx.3). Accordingly, Locke affirms in The
Reasonableness of Christianity that "the written Word of God" is "a Collection of Writings
designed by God for the Instruction of the illiterate bulk of Mankind in the way to Salvation" (RC,
6, § 2); see also RC (157-158, 169, §§ 279, 302) and A Vindication of the Reasonableness of
Christianity (cf. Locke 2016, 22, § 30). To Rogers (2002, 111), "Locke's religious position is
grounded on the axiom that we all have sufficient understanding of the way the world functions,
and sufficient capacity to reason in order to identify our duty. This allows us to assure our salvation
without the intervention of others (including the clergy of all churches)".
57
Criticising Waldron (1988), Stanton (2006, 95-96) considers that "the assumption of people's
natural adequacy to self-direction" is central to Locke's case for the distinction between the ends
of Church and State. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Harris (1998, 170-179).
Inspired by Waldron (2002, 83-107), Loconte (2014, 190-195) discusses this topic under the title
of "democratic conscience".
38 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
in such uncertainty it is safer and more convenient to follow his dictates" (Epist.,
94.7-10). Under these conditions, would men commit the care of souls to the mag-
istrate? Again, the answer is negative, but not only because, although he may be
more apt, the magistrate may still err, but because the harm resulting from his error
will be imputed totally upon others. If the magistrate commanded a person to live
by commerce to become rich, as Locke exemplifies, the person could obey the mag-
istrate because he could be repaired if he did not become rich. However, with regard
to eternal life, what can the magistrate do to repair the harm? In the search for the
kingdom of heaven, the magistrate can offer no "security" (sponsio) (cf. Epist. ,
94.20). As Locke wrote in An Essay concerning Toleration , "if he force me to a
wrong religion, he can make me noe reparation in the other world" (ET, 272).
Still reasoning in a concessive vein, Locke makes a second concession: he sup-
poses, now, that "the magistrate's opinion in religion is sound, and the way that he
directs truly evangelical" (Epist., 98.21 -23), i.e. that the magistrate is not cogni-
tively fallible and, consequently, that the question of reparation has disappeared,
since there is no more risk of error. In this case, would men commit the care of souls
to the magistrate? The answer, once again, is negative. But this time Locke resorts
to the argument of unfitness of force. Therefore, Locke's reasoning develops gradu-
ally: firstly, the magistrate is considered as fallible as any other person; then, the
magistrate is considered less fallible, but unable to repair the harm caused by his
error; finally, the magistrate is supposed to be infallible, so that, at this last level,
only through another proof could the care of souls be denied to him.
Taking the argument from commission as a whole, we can conclude that there
are different arguments associated with it: on the one hand, the political scriptural
argument (forming the basis of the premise related to the divine concession of the
care of souls), and on the other, the arguments of fallibility and unfitness of force
(forming the basis of the premise related to the human concession of the care of
souls). In this reasoning, the argument of unfitness of force plays a central role. In
the paragraph that contains the first consideration, it is the argument explicitly
adduced by Locke to justify the second premise (the argument of fallibility appears
in other passages of the Epistola), but its central role has another motive. The argu-
ment of unfitness of force represents an inflection in the argumentative structure of
Locke's reasoning, as we shall see. It is no accident that although present in the first
consideration, this argument is also formulated in a consideration by itself.
2.3 The Argument of Unfitness of Force
In the Epistola, Locke makes concessions in his reasoning several times, and admits
as non-demonstrated what had already been demonstrated. We see this, for instance,
in the discussion of the magistrate's fallibility. Using this procedure, Locke seeks to
strengthen the position he is criticising in order to oblige himself to find more con-
sistent and cogent arguments. Hence, we can say that in his defence of toleration the
argument of unfitness of force represents an inflection and, consequently, that it
2.3 The Argument of Unfitness of Force 39
plays a central role in his case. Why is this argument so important? And what is the
inflection it represents? Basically, the issue at stake is a change of target: in the
second consideration, Locke aims to prove that the "care of souls cannot belong"
(cura animarum non potest pertinere) to the magistrate (Epist., 68.3). 58 This is dif-
ferent from proving, as Locke did in the argument from commission, that the care
of souls "is not committed" (non demandatur) to him. Now, Locke's aim is not to
demonstrate that this care has not been given to the magistrate and, therefore, that it
is not under his jurisdiction (something/actual, so to speak, in the sense that neither
God, in His revelation, nor men, when they left the state of nature, vested him with
this mandate). From this point on, Locke's main purpose is to defend the view that
religious coercion is irrational, as force is inapt to produce beliefs, and, as a conse-
quence, the care of souls not only is not, but cannot be committed to the magistrate.
As formulated in the second consideration, the argument of unfitness of force is
wider in scope and perhaps, for this reason, it is emphasised by Locke in a specific
consideration.
It is noteworthy, however, that the argument of unfitness of force is intended to
prove the irrationality of the imposition of beliefs, providing an explanation for why
men would restrict the ends of the Commonwealth to civil goods. This point must
be clarified because the argument can be read in another way, as seeking to convince
the magistrate of the irrationality of the use of force to produce beliefs. 59 The differ-
ence is remarkable: in the former perspective, the argument has an explanatory
character, it clarifies the commission that men entrusted to the magistrate when they
entered civil society (and justifies their restriction of the magistrate's functions); in
the latter perspective, the argument has a performative character, it is addressed to
the magistrate and is aimed at convincing him that it is not incumbent on him to
meddle with religious matters (it aims to lead him, by himself, to restrict his own
functions).
The imposition of beliefs is irrational from both perspectives, but Locke's rea-
soning always presupposes the first one, as we see in Toleration D and in the incon-
testable presence of the argument of unfitness of force in the composition of the
argument from commission.6() Even Proast adopts this perspective, as he attempts to
58
It is important to note that this way of setting out the issue echoes (or maybe rehearses) some of
Augustine's letters in the Donatist con1roversy, in particular letter 88 from the Clergy of Hippo
Regius to Januarius, where Augustine asks "si ad imperatores christianos haec cura pertinere non
debet" (Letter, 88.5), and Letter 155 from Augustine to Macedonius, where he discusses the.finis
that should peninere to the secular power (cf. Letter, 155.3.10).
59
It is from this second perspective that Waldron (1988) develops his influential thesis or, more
accurately, the first part of his thesis. According to Waldron, (a) Locke's purpose is to show that
religious persecution is irrational, since force acts upon the will and not upon the understanding,
but (b) yet the magistrate could promote salvation, as Proast states, as long as the magislrate resorts
to "the epistemic apparatus that surrounds and supports belief - the apparatus of selection, atten-
tion, concentration and so on - which, although it does not generate belief directly, nevertheless
plays a sufficienl role in its genesis to provide a point o f leverage" (Waldron 1988, 82).
60 It is Spitz (2002) who develops the distinction between these two perspectives, but like Waldron
( 1988), he also claims that the argument of unfitness of force is aimed at convincing the persecu-
40 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
show not only that religious coercion may be useful, but also that, given its useful-
ness and necessity (hence, its rationality), "it is every man's true Interest, not to be
left wholly to himself in this matter" (Arg., 22, RLP, 35). According to Proast, men
would commit the care of souls to the magistrate, i.e. his major critique of the
Epistola is not intended to prove that the mere usefulness of coercion would autho-
rise the magistrate to use force in religious matters. Proast would not need to resort
to the notion of interest (in his Third Letter, he reiterates the expression "every
man's true Interest", cf. TL-P, 78, RLP, 114), if the argument of unfitness of force
were addressed exclusively to the magistrate, because in this case only the notions
of means and end are at stake. Therefore, it is due to Proast's recognition of the
explanatory character of the argument of unfitness of force that his objection to
Locke culminates in the attempt to demonstrate that it is men's interest to commit
the care of souls to the magistrate and to enlarge the ends of the Commonwealth.61
As we pointed out above, the argument of unfitness of force has different meanings,
depending on whether an explanatory or performative reading is given to it, but we
shall explore this point later on, when we examine the Locke and Proast contro-
versy. For now, it is important to note that, in either case, the structure of the argu-
ment does not vary, given that in both cases the demonstration of the irrationality of
coercion to produce beliefs is grounded on the same statements concerning human
understanding, faith and force.
The second consideration, as well as the first, is synthesized in a short paragraph
in the section in which Locke defines the State. However, unlike the first consider-
ation, it contains just one argument: the argument of unfitness of force, as we know.
Moreover, it is formulated in a way that is compatible with its other occurrences
throughout the Epistola62 :
tors and, therefore, is addressed to the magistrate. According to Wootton (1993, 102), "what
Waldron fails to notice is that it is precisely this complex argument about the proper functions of
government, looked at from the point of view of the interests of the citizen, that Locke is concerned
with, and that he returns to again and again in his dispute with Proast". In this same sense, Vernon
( 1997, 71) affirms: "the argument is not brought to bear on the acts of a constituted State: it is
brought to bear in the constitution of the State". Pevinic (2009) questions the position supported by
Waldron (1988) and tries to fit Locke's defence of toleration into the perspective of men, but he
does so through the Two Treatises of Government and does not to show how this perspective is
found in the Epistola, or in the Locke and Proast controversy.
61 If we take into account the explanatory and performative dimensions (the former corresponding
to the perspective of men ; the latter to the magistrate's), we can understand why Waldron (1988)
sn:esses the distinction between the functionalist and modal conceptions of the State, and why he
thinks that Locke sustains the latter. Like Spitz (2002), Waldron ( 1988) does not realise that Proast
himself employs the notion of interest in his objection to Locke, and that the controversy is not
limited to a discussion of the usefulness of force, i.e. to a discussion of the adequacy between
means and ends. Why would the notion of interest be introduced if the discussion were solely about
what the magistrate is apt to do? Ultimately, it is the perspective of men that is at stake in the argu-
ment of unfitness of force, not the magistrate's perspective.
62 And with its other occurrences in Locke's writings as a whole, even when his aim was not to
support toleration (cf. Locke 1967, 127-128).
2.3 The Argument of Unfitness of Force 41
In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his
power consists wholly in compulsion. But the true and saving religion consists in the inward
faith of the mind, without which nothing has any value with God; and such is the nature of
human understanding, that it cannot be compelled by any outward force. Confiscate a man's
g~s, imp~son or torture his body: such punishments will be in vain, if you hope that they
will make him change his inward judgement of things (Epist., 68.4-9). 63
As we can see, Locke's first statement regards the magistrate's power, which
consists in nothing but compulsion. Evidently, the magistrate may employ other
means to propagate religion: he can admonish, exhort, convince; for none of these
means is illegitimate (cf. Epist., 68.l(}-18). But there is something characteristic
and intrinsic to the magistrate's role: "it is proper to the magistrate (magistratus
proprium) to give orders by decree and compel with the sword" (Epist., 68.19-20). 64
It is this difference that grounds the distinction between the two types of care men-
tioned above, one based on authority, the other on charity. There is nothing obscure
about this way of putting things; rather, it is straightforward: on the one hand, the
magistrate is conceived as being entrusted with the civil power; on the other, as
Christian. In this sense, it should be emphasised that force, his proper means to act,
manifests itself either as punishments stemming from a failure to respect some law
or decree, or as rewards for obedience (cf. Pol. Es., Law, 270). As long as it is con-
fined to the ends commissioned by the individuals, political power is "a Right of
making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties" (TTG, II
§ 3), as Locke says in the Two Treatises of Government. It makes no sense to imag-
ine that laws can dispense with some sort of penalty (for, if they did, how can we
suppose they would be obeyed?). Even ecclesiastical laws cannot dispense with
penalties, but these penalties must not compromise the civil goods of church mem-
bers (cf. Epist., 72.13-26).
Strictly speaking, churches have no right to coerce, if by that we mean the use of
force that results in harm to the transgressors' estates, liberty or life. However, obe-
dience is an issue in religious as well as civil societies. Therefore, churches must
have some form of influencing their members' conduct when the fear of losing
eternal happiness is not sufficient inducement (cf. Pol. Es., Civil and Ecclesiastical
Power, 218). Given that it is illegitimate for them to cause harm to property, the
maximum ecclesiastical sanction is excommunication. As Lockes says in A Defence
of Nonconformity, "the onely meanes to keep in order their particular members is
admonition & reproof & if these will not doe, their utmost power is onely expulsion
Which in this sort of societyes is termed Excommunication" (DNC, 21). By defini-
tion, the magistrate's power is inevitably the only incumbent to compel. 65 Hence, by
making a paraphrase of the Epistola, we can formulate the first premise of the argu-
63
Translation slightly altered.
64 Translation slightly altered.
6i As Pritchard (2014, 7) sums up, "Locke is adamant that the difference between church and state
is a difference in power. But for Locke this is not a case of powerlessness and powerful; rather, it
is about types of power. For Locke church, public, and state employ persuasive power; the state
alone employs punitive power".
42 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
ment of unfitness of force as follows: (vii) 'The magistrate's power consists in coer-
cion', understanding by that the magistrate's power qua magistrate (not qua
Christian), which power corresponds to his exclusive right to make coercive laws.
After the explanation of the magistrate's proper way of acting, Locke makes a
second statement. He reiterates that faith has an inner dimension (what we saw in
the formula "conscientious conviction", cf. Epist., 60.16) and that it is indispensable
to salvation. If a person wants to gain eternal happiness, outward conformity and lip
service to God are not enough. In the section in which Locke discusses the magis-
trate's duties concerning toleration, he notes that the true religion, even if professed
by the magistrate, will not bring his subjects or citizens to salvation if they are not
convinced "in their souls" (ex anima) (cf. Epist., 98.23). A few lines later, more
emphatically, Locke says that "no way that I walk in against my conscience will
ever lead me to the mansions of the blessed.. .. It is useless for an unbeliever to
assume the outward appearance of morality; to please God he needs faith and inward
sincerity" (Epist., 98.24-25, 28-29).
In the Epistola, there is an unquestionable association between faith and con-
science (or soul), between belief and interiority, without which the requirements for
salvation cannot be understood. This is why the second premise of the argument of
unfitness of force may be resumed in the proposition (viii) 'Salvation requires inner
faith'. Purposely, it is not specified here whether salvation requires only inner faith
(as though sincerity were a sufficient condition) or whether it requires inner faith as
well (as though sincerity were a necessary condition). In order for a person to be
saved, besides the duties concerning manners, must he have a sincere belief, or a
sincere and true belief? In the Epistola, there seems to be no passage that sheds light
on Locke's position. 66 We shall touch on this issue in the fourth chapter, when we
analyse An Essay concerning Human Understanding. For now, we simply note that
the sense of the argument of unfitness of force does not change if we choose one or
the other alternative.
In his reasoning in the Epistola, Locke only needs to sustain that faith (or a sin-
cere religious belief) is essential to salvation, regardless of whether it is a sufficient
or necessary condition to salvation. In other words, it is enough for Locke to sustain
the value of interiority in order to show the functioning of the understanding, i.e. the
limits of external influence in the production of beliefs. In fact, Locke aims to dem-
onstrate the irrationality in the employment of a means incompatible with the
intended end. To make this demonstration, it is enough to show that force is inca-
pable of bringing a person to believe sincerely, thus, Locke does not need to support
any polemic thesis regarding salvation, as it is beside the point. If sincerity is suffi-
cient or necessary to salvation, it does not matter for the sake of the argument of
unfitness of force. From the time of the Two Tracts on Government it was clear for
Locke that force can influence a person's actions, but that it does not reach his judg-
ment: God has not "entrusted man with a liberty at pleasure to believe or reject'',
whereof the opposition between "internal persuasion" and "outward conformity"
66 For a reading of the Epistola that considers sincerity sufficient for salvation , see Kraynak (1980).
2.3 The Argument of Unfitness of Force 43
(cf. Locke, 1967, 127-128). This is why Locke considered, at that time of his intel-
lectual development, that the necessity to obey and the liberty of conscience could
be harmonized: obedience presupposes the "assent of the will" (assensum volunta-
tis) and not "assent of the judgement" (iudicii) (cf. Locke, 1967, 207/239).
Therefore, it is the centrality of interiority and involuntariness of faith that allows
Locke to show the gap between understanding and force as means to form beliefs.
In the short paragraph containing the second consideration, Locke does not resort
explicitly to the distinction between will and judgement, although he mentions the
latter notion. Nevertheless, it is this distinction that underpins his reasoning, as we
see in the Two Tracts on Government, and also in the restatement of the argument in
the section of the Epistola dedicated to speculative opinions: "to believe this or that
to be true is not within the scope of our will" (in nostra voluntate situm non est)
(Epist., 120.17-18). Regardless of the degrees and length of punishments, it is
impossible for force to produce sincere religious belief. Thus, we may say the third
and final premise of the argument of unfitness of force is that (ix) 'Human under-
standing cannot be compelled by outward force', which is tantamount to saying that
by compelling the will, the magistrate cannot oblige a person to change his assent
from what appears true to that person to what seems false to him.
It must be added, however, that Locke's view on the relationship between belief
and will is not as straightforward as the Epistola seems to suggest. Although Locke
urges that "to believe this or that to be true is not within the scope of our will", in
other works he states that at least sometimes belief can be voluntary. In the Draft A
he writes: "and were not faith at least sometimes a voluntary act I doe not see how
infidelity could be a sin" (Locke 1990, § 42). Evidently, it is possible to suppose that
this statement, made in 1671, adduces a view that Locke would have rejected when
he wrote the Epistola in 1685. After all, if belief were voluntary, coercion (by acting
upon the will) could make a person change his belief. Nonetheless, this evolutionist
interpretation of Locke's thought is unsatisfactory because it does not resolve the
theological problem concerning the involuntariness of belief pointed out in Draft A:
if infidels are not responsible for their beliefs, would it be just to condemn them?
Apparently, it turns out to be a dilemma: on the one hand, we can state the involun-
tariness of belief and reject coercion, but it raises a theological problem; on the
other, we can avoid the theological problem by assuming that belief can be volun-
tary, but then it impinges on the rejection of coercion. As we shall see, this is a false
dilemma, but in order to clarify the issue we need to analyse the relationship between
belief and will in more detail. We need, then, to have recourse to An Essay concern-
ing Human Understanding:
Our Knowledge, as in other Things, so in this, has a great Conformity with our Sight, that it
is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary. .. . Just thus is it with our Understanding,
all that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the employing, or with-holding any of our
Faculties from this or that sort of Objects, and a more, or less accurate survey of them: But
they being employed, our Will hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind one
way or other; that is done only by the Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discov-
ered (E, IV.xiii.1-2).
44 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
When the Agreement of any two Ideas appears to our Minds, whether immediately, or by
the Assistance of Reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than
I can avoid seei ng those Objects, which I turn my Eyes to, and look on in day-light: And
what upon full Examination I find the most probable, I cannot deny my Assent to. But
though we cannot hinder our Knowledge, where the Agreement is once perceived; nor our
Assent, where the Probability manifestly appears upon due Consideration of all the
Measures of it: Yet we can hinder both Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our Enquiry,
and not imploying our Faculties in the search of any Truth. If it were not so, Ignorance,
Error, or Infidelity could not in any Case be a Fault (E., IV.xx. 16).
Locke weaves together two conceptions of the relationship between belief and
wi11 67 : on the one hand, the will can influence belief, because belief depends on the
employment of the human faculties; on the other, the will cannot influence belief,
because, once the human faculties are employed, the will is unable to refuse what
appears true to the understanding. However subtle, it is not difficult to see the con-
trast Locke attempts to draw. In the first case, he stresses the process of investiga-
tion: if the ideas available to the understanding depend on the will, it is clear, then,
that the will influences belief (so we can say that belief has a voluntary dimension);
in the second case, he stresses the assent: once a judgement is made based on the
ideas available to the understanding in a certain moment, it is impossible that, by
will, a person can transfer his assent from what appears true to what does not (hence
the involuntariness of belief). Locke does not explain this distinction as clearly in
the Epistola as he does in An Essay concerning Human Understanding, but it cannot
be denied that Locke does use the distinction. Indeed, in the Epistola, we see a fluc-
tuation between the two possible meanings of the relationship between belief and
will: when Locke says that force cannot act upon the understanding, he presupposes
the involuntariness of belief (a person can only assent to what seems true to him),
but, when he says that arguments can act upon the understanding, he presupposes
the voluntary dimension of belief (a person is free to employ his faculties in order
to reconsider his views, and in so doing, he might conclude that what seemed true
to him is not so).
Given this distinction, we can see why the dilemma mentioned above is false.
Similarly, we can see, in detail, what dimension of the relationship between belief
and will Locke emphasises in the argument of unfitness of force. When Locke says
that, if faith is not voluntary, it is difficult to imagine how infidelity can be a sin, he
resorts to the process of investigation and points out the individual responsibility -
and duty - to examine religious matters. Depending on a person's effort, he may
never come to the true religion and, from this perspective, it is his own fault.
Conversely, when Locke says that "to believe this or that to be true is not within the
scope of our will", he means that coercion is incapable of making a person shift his
67
The quotations from An Essay concerning Human Understanding make it clear that belief and
will as well as knowledge and will hold a similar relation, but for the sake of simplicity we shall
speak here only of belief and will. On this topic, the so-called "ethics of belief', the main interpre-
tations are Passmore (1978), Wolterstorff (1996) and Corneanu (2011, 141-168), but see also
Ayers (2005, v. I, 90--97, 127-131), Tully (1988), Losonsky (2001, 72-104), Savonius-Wroth
(2012), Harnou (20 18), Green (2019) and Kilcullen (1988, 136-174).
2.3 The Argument of Unfitness of Force 45
assent as Jong as a belief seems true to him. As we shall see in the next chapter, the
existence of a voluntary dimension of belief gives rise to an important objection to
the refusal of the use of force in religious matters. In the Epistola, Locke does not
foresee this objection. He develops his reflection on the process of investigation
only in An Essay concerning Human Understanding and, later, in Of the Conduct of
the Understanding. Hence, in the Epistola, with regard to premise (ix) of the argu-
ment of unfitness of force, his reasoning privileges the involuntariness of belief. The
reason for this is simple: it is this dimension that allows him to assert that the use of
force to produce beliefs is irrational, given that it is useless, due to the inadequacy
between means and end.
However, from a practical point of view, coercion is useless in the best hypoth-
esis, for it tends to be counterproductive in most cases. In a context in which indi-
viduals are liable to punishment for not professing the established religion, what
should we expect? Naturally, as Locke states several times, we should expect that
many people would conform outwardly in order to avoid the legal penalties imposed
to dissenters. Hence, it is not surprising that the notions of hypocrisy and dissimula-
tion figure in the Epistola, and that they are restated in the controversy with Proast.
When the argument of unfitness of force is at stake, it is not surprising to find refer-
ences to hypocrisy, as in An Essay concerning Toleration (cf. ET, 278) and in A
Defence of Nonconformity (cf. DNC, 15). Nevertheless, the use of force in religious
matters is counterproductive because it produces insincere conformity, but also
because many people who suffer violent punishments, or who see the suffering
caused to dissenters refuse the religion in whose name these punishments are meted
out, as Proast himself would acknowledge (cf. Arg., 13-14, RLP, 30-31).68
So, the structure of the argument of unfitness of force is as follows : (vii) 'The
magistrate's power consists in coercion', (viii) ' Salvation requires inner faith', (ix)
'Human understanding cannot be compelled by outward force', (x) 'Hence, the care
of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate'. But if the care of souls cannot belong
to the magistrate, to whom it should belong? Inevitably, each person must be incum-
bent upon his own salvation, and it implies that each person "must be left to himself
and to his own conscience" (Epist., 100.10-11). There can be no other outcome of
Locke's reasoning, all the more if we consider that all people are equally apt or are
equally fallible in the search for salvation. In other passages of the Epistola, Locke
reiterates his position that each person should "be left" to himself and to his own
conscience (the Latin verb is relinquere, literally, to be left, to abandon, cf. Epist.,
68
Con Li (2015) develops this aspect of the argument of unfitness of force. He stresses that Waldron's
( 1988) analysis is incomplete due to its focus on the categorical dimension of the argument (the
contrast between belief and will) and its contempt for the empirical dimension: the aversion caused
by force in the victims and by-standers is also a proof of the irrationality of the use of force in
religious matters. In a certain sense, Conti (2015) demonstrates how Locke's reasoning resorts to
the perspective of men, but he does so without noticing that the recourse to the notion of aversion
is not enough to call into question Waldron's (1988) thesis, i.e. Conti does not cast doubt on the
perfonnative perspective Waldron adopts. Pevinic (2009) also explores the empirical dimension of
the argument and says that the use of force, even if it followed Proast's proposal, would be coun-
terproductive for another reason: it would create resistance and could lead to disorder.
46 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
100.10, 112.14, 124.28), but he also introduces an important element: the religious
pursuit of a person, even if erroneous, is "inoffensive" (innocuus) to others (cf.
Epist., 80. l). Even if a person loses his salvation, this loss does not cause "harm"
(damnum) to his neighbour (cf. Epist., 124.30). Nobody takes any "prejudice" (det-
rimentum) when other people search their salvation following their own judgement
(cf. Epist., 124.16) because religion, "whether true or false, does no injury (nu/lam
facit ... injuriam) to the rest of the citizens in their worldly affairs" (Epist.,
128.14-15). As Locke points out in A Defence of Nonconformity, "the faults, &
miscarriages of one man hinders not anothers right, no not his owne right" (DNC,
3). From Locke's standpoint, a person's error (in ecclesiastical terms, the multiplic-
ity of sects) does not represent a risk to others. It is not a poison or a plague to be
attacked by the magistrate.69 It is only according to the intolerants that the spreading
of a putative error is an evil to be prevented by law, as Long states in his book
against the Epistola: "I believe it is the Duty of Magistrates to keep Men from
infecting the Souls of their Subjects with destroying Errors, if he may lawfully shut
up a Man that hath the Plague on his Body, why not him that hath the Plague of
Heresie on his Soul?" (Long, 1689, 9, RLP, 13). As the intolerants in general, among
which Proast, to whom men "cannot err, without dishonouring God, and endanger-
ing their own and other Men's eternal Salvation" (TL-P, 2, RLP, 42), Long simply
does not question the sharp distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. He
assumes it to be obvious that his side has the truth without trying to explain how it
can be known. If Locke had answered him directly, he could have contested him in
the same terms as those he used when criticising Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699)
and Proast: he "supposes himself to be in the right" (DNC, p. 111), he resorts to a
"lurking supposition" (SL, 4, Works, 65).
However, in the second consideration, Locke nowhere touches on the problem of
religious truth. His only aim was to show that coercion is incapable of producing
beliefs - and, in order to do so, it is indifferent whether these beliefs are true or false.
As we read in A Defence of Nonconformity, the matter is not "whether the doctrine
be in it self true, or false, but whether I doe beleive it" (DNC, 118). In fact, the
problem of religious truth emerges in the third consideration, which is formulated
after a new concession. Locke has demonstrated that force cannot compel the under-
standing and that, consequently, the care of souls cannot belong to the magistrate.
Yet, in the following stage of his reasoning, Locke concedes these two points. The
question that he then makes is this: what would happen if the care of souls belonged
to the magistrate?
69 Marshall (2006, 440--466) explores the imaginary concerning intolerance in England. In his
Third Letter, Proast speaks of a "mortal Infection" when he discusses the toleration of Pagans,
Jews, and Muslims (cf. TL-P, 3, RLP, 43). In The Mischief of Separation, Stillingfleet says that a
"general toleration" would have "dangerous consequences" and that it would give room for the
dissenter's folly, which is a "catching disease" (cf. Stillingfleet 1680, 58). On this topic, see also
Marshall (2006b).
2.4 The Argument of Reductio ad Absurdum 47
2.4 The Argument of Reductio ad Absurdum
Here, once again, Locke reasons in a concessive vein. Having already proven that
the care of souls is not committed to the magistrate, and that the use of force cannot
belong to the civil power because coercion is incapable of producing beliefs, he sup-
poses, in the third consideration, that force can act on the understanding and, conse-
quently, that the care of souls belongs to the magistrate. This is Locke's last
consideration and, as in the other two, it is condensed into a single paragraph in the
section of the Epistola where Locke defines the ends of the Commonwealth:
In the third place, the care of the salvation of souls can by no means belong to the civil
magistrate ; because, even if the authority of laws and the force of penalties were capable of
converting men's minds, yet this would not help at all in the salvation of their souls. For
there being but one true religion, one way to heaven, what hope is there that most men
would reach it, if mortals were obliged to ignore the dictates of their own reason and con-
science, and blindly accept the doctrines imposed by their prince, and worship God in the
manner laid down by the laws of the country? Amid all the variety of opinions that different
princes hold about religion, the narrow way and the strait gate that leads to heaven would
inevitably be open to very few, and they in one country only: and what would heighten the
absurdity and ill suit the notion of God, men would owe their eternal happiness or misery
simply to the accident of their birth (Epist. , 70.3-17).
The thesis to be demonstrated is that the care of souls cannot belong to the mag-
istrate. Here, Locke is slightly more emphatic than in his argument of unfitness of
force, as he uses the expression "by no means" (nullo modo). As in the second con-
sideration, it is supposed that coercion is designed to convert a man's mind, and not
to conform actions and manners, as in the Two Tracts on Government. However,
according to Locke's description, this conversion is less a persuasion and more a
submission, because it requires of each person that he "ignores" or "puts aside"
(posthabere) the dictates of his own reason and conscience. A genuine conversion
can spring only from the understanding as long as it is moved by the light of reason.
At any rate, Locke now supposes that force is capable of producing beliefs. The
third consideration is built on this presupposition. Naturally, when Locke supposes
that force can convert the understanding, he also supposes that the care of souls
belongs to the magistrate. But what does this imply? Would there be any gain in the
salvation of souls? Locke thinks it would not promote salvation. If the care of souls
belonged to the magistrate, the outcome would be that people would obtain the
future life according to their birthplaces - and that is nonsense. As we can see,
Locke's reasoning begins with a premise accepted by concession and amounts to an
unacceptable conclusion, whose content is universally rejected. The third consider-
ation is thus a reductio ad absurdum. However, in order to understand it in full, we
need to perceive its structure.
The first premise, the one to be demonstrated false, is (xi) 'Force is capable of
converting the understanding and, consequently, the care of souls belongs to the
magistrate' . There is no doubt that Locke does not agree with this proposition: it is
accepted as a hypothesis, in a concessive vein. Strictly speaking, Locke intends to
deny the causal relation presupposed in premise (xi) between (xi.a) the usefulness
48 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
of force and (xi.b) the magistrate's commission lo take care of souls, so that, even if
we admit (xi.a), we do not come to (xi.b). The second premise is introduced by
Locke without further discussion: (xii) 'There is only one true religion'. Nowhere in
the Epistola does Locke seek to justify this proposition, because it is not a polemic
theological statement that requires proof. Rather, we could say that it was consid-
ered evident. In A Third Letter, addressing Proast openly, Locke affirms: "I agree
with you, that there is but one only true Religion" (TL, 160, Works, 326). By the
same token, the third premise is presented as certain. It is an incontestable factual
truth: (xiii) 'The princes of different countries profess different religions'. Given
these three premises, what is the conclusion?
To Locke, there is no other conclusion but that (xiv) 'The salvation of soul
depends on the chance of being born in the right place'. This conclusion is absurd
for two reasons: firstly, because the association of birthplace and salvation implies
an ill conception of God; secondly, because the number of people saved would be
very small, since there are several false religions and just one true one, i.e. since
most religious beliefs imposed throughout the world would be false. Hence, if the
issue were to consider how the magistrate could contribute to the salvation of souls
in the case that force were capable of producing beliefs, the upshot is that the mag-
istrate cannot be given this commission, even if force were useful. As there are
countless false religions around the world, several false beliefs would be imposed.
Then, most people would lose eternal life simply for having been born in a country
whose prince professes a false religion. Civil power is "the same everywhere" and
it would be lawful for each magistrate to require anything "to conform to a rule of
truth (ad normam veritatis) which he has invented for himself' (Epist., 112. l , 9-10).
Therefore, if Locke's reasoning is valid, the only way to avoid the conclusion is to
reject one of the premises. Since it is impossible to reject either premise (xii), which
is a theological truth, or premise (xiii), which is factually true, the one to be rejected
is premise (xi). As we can see, this rejection means that the care of souls cannot
belong to the magistrate.
Proast boldly refuses the third consideration, because the reductio ad absurdum
allows every magistrate to take care of souls and not only the one who professes the
true religion. Evidently, Proast does not deny the factual truth contained in premise
(xiii), what he denies is the implication that (xiii-i) 'if the care of souls belongs to
the magistrate, different religions will be imposed around the world'. From his per-
spective, premise (xi) should not be contested. His point is that the care of souls
belongs solely to whom professes the true religion. It is not only the usefulness of
force that would make people interested in committing to the magistrate the right to
take care of souls. Ultimately, it is the truth that authorises the magistrate to convert
others: even if the commission to take care of souls were given to him, this right
could be exerted only on behalf of truth. This is a central point in the debate about
the ends of Church and State: it is not just the usefulness of force that is at stake.
Regardless of the terms in which the Locke and Proast controversy unfolded, to
which the next chapter shall be dedicated, it is important to perceive, here, that the
implication (xiii-i) of premise (xiii) needs to be proved. As we have already pointed
out, if we admit that force is capable of producing beliefs and, consequently, that the
2.4 The Argument of Reductio ad Absurdum 49
care of souls is incumbent upon the magistrate, all magistrates would impose their
own religious beliefs, no matter how different they are, even though there is just one
true religion. If that is the case, people then would be saved depending on their
birthplace. However, why would every magistrate impose his own religion? This
would occur "for every man in what he beleives, has soe far this persuasion that he
is in the right" (ET, 294). As Locke says in the Epistola, everyone - private person,
church, prince - is orthodox to himself (cf. Epist. 58.6, 80.30, 112.2).70 To each one
his own religion seems to be true, since nobody believes something that seems false
to him. Hence, given that (5) 'everyone is orthodox to himself', (xiii-i) 'if the care
of souls belongs to the magistrate, different religions will be imposed around the
world'. This is the proof of the implication (xiii-i) of premise (xiii), which proof will
be called here argument of reciprocity. All magistrates, as well as any private per-
son, profess a religion that is true to himself. If it were not so, we would fall into the
nonsense that a person could believe something that seems false to him. Therefore,
if the care of souls were an end of the Commonwealth, we must conclude that each
magistrate would legislate according to the way to salvation which seems true
to him. 71
As for the argument of reciprocity, we must note that premise (o) is a matter of
fact and, as such, it does not need to be proven. In this argument, it is also important
to note that Locke neither discusses the content or the grounds for the different reli-
gious beliefs, nor does he debate the human cognitive capacity. In order to show that
in religious matters everyone is orthodox to himself, he resorts neither to the distinc-
tion between belief and knowledge (as he will later do in the controversy with
Proast), nor to the notion of fallibility (which in the Epistola is related only to the
first consideration).72 In other words, Locke does not assess the religious beliefs
based on their differences (if they are true or false, well or ill grounded), but on what
they have in common (the fact of being true to those who profess them). As we read
in An Essay concerning Human Understanding, when Locke asserts that "the
strength of our Perswasions are no Evidence at all of their own rectitude", there is
nothing at stake but the fact that "crooked things may be as stiff and unftexible as
70 InA Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianiry, Locke resorts to the same state-
ment: "every one is Orthodox to himself' (Locke 2016, 193, § 382). In the same vein, he says in
the Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul that "every Sect" is "perfectly Orthodox in its
own Jugdment" (Locke 1987, v. I, 107).
71
Analysing another passage of the Epistola in which Locke adduces a similar reasoning (cf.
Epist., 152.26-154.3), Marshall (2016, 583) affirms that Locke applies "implicitly a rule of equity
or reciprocity" and turns the argument into a "reductio ad absurdum" .
72 The interpretation of this argument varies and several readings consider that the distinction
between belief and knowledge plays an important role here, e.g. that of Black (1998, 2007) and
Owen (2007). On the other hand, there are scholars who equate the third consideration to the argu-
ment of fallibility, such as Van der Schaar (2012), whereas others associate fallibility and distinc-
tion between belief and knowledge, such as Tate (2016, 127-132). For a reading that singles out
the argument of reciprocity, see Goldie (Locke 2010, xv-xvi).
50 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
streight: and Men may be as positive and peremptory in Error as in Truth" (E,
IV.xix.11). 73
In his Third Letter, Proast raises a significant objection to this reasoning, an
objection that can, perhaps, be included in the charges of scepticism made against
Locke (cf. TL-P, 35, RLP, 73). 74 As we have shown, however, the aim of the argu-
ment of reciprocity, in particular of its premise (o), is solely to shed light on the fact
that for everyone his own religious belief is true; Locke does not want (nor does he
need) to question the truth of any religion, still less the truth of Christianity. By the
same token, it is important to remark that the argument would not change, even if
Locke had acknowledged (as he later does when addressing Proast directly) that the
"true Religion and Christian Religion are, I suppose, to you and me, the same thing"
(SL, 2, Works, 63) and that "that only true Religion is professed and held in the
Church of England" (TL, 160, Works, 326). In sum, what is at stake is that it is
impossible for anyone to claim a right to himself to use force in religious matters
because he believes to have the truth without giving the same right to others. In A
Defence of Nonconformity, Locke makes it clear that the members of different reli-
gions think they are the " the sole deliverers of unmixed truth in doctrine & disci-
pline. This they all doe severally with the same confidence & zeale", that all of them
are "Equall pretenders to say they are the true Church & must be beleived or have
the magistrate on their side & must be obeyd" (DNC, 86, 87). When two religious
parties are opposed, none of them can claim a right that cannot be demanded by the
other. If it is the truth (in fact, the putative truth) that ultimately forms the basis of
the magistrate's right to use force to take care of the souls, all magistrates may have
the very same right, since all of them judge their own religion to be true. From each
one's perspective, the others are wrong. 75 Anyone who puts himself above others,
saying that his beliefs are certain, cannot do it but out of enthusiasm, as if his tenets
were "divinely inspired" (pro theopneustis, cf. Epist., 152.21).76 In the Epistola, as
73 That the intensity of assent is not a criterion of truth seems to be an issue that Locke intended to
tackle in the Essays on the Law of Nature. In a manuscript (MS. Locke e. 6) that contains a draft
of some of these essays, he mentions a title of an essay that he never came to write: "if the firm
persuasion of the soul (firma animi persuasio) proves the law of nature" (cf. Long 1959, 31).
74
0n Locke and scepticism, see Rogers (1998) and, in particular, Rogers (2003) and Sina (2015a,
b).However, we must observe that most convictions of scepticism that Locke received came from
those authors who raised objections against An Essay concerning Human Understanding, like John
Sergeant (1623-1707) and Henry Lee (t1713), as Yolton (1968) shows. In Proast's three letters,
there is one occurrence of the word (the one just quoted). Locke rejects emphatically the statement
that the Epistola or A Second Letter promote scepticism (cf. TL, 237, Works, 415). For a broad
view of the revival of scepticism in the modern age, see Popkin (2003) and Schmitt (1 972).
75
This is why Tuckness (2008) stresses the notion of universality when he discusses this argument,
but we must recall, in contrast with what the author says elsewhere (cf. Tuckness 2002a), that this
argument is addressed to men, not to the magistrate. For an interpretation of this argument based
on the notion of "public reason", see Vernon (1997, 35-51 ).
76
Locke is a well-known critic of enthusiasm, but he does not deny the possibility of genuine
divine inspirations (cf. E, IV.xix.5). In the sixth of the Essays on the Law of Nature, he points out
that the divine will can be known by the light of nature or revealed " by God-inspired men or in
some other manner" (vet per viros Beonvevarovi:; vel alio modo) (Locke 1954, 186.5-7). In the
2.4 The Argument of Reductio ad Absurdum 51
for the truth in religion, Locke confines himself to saying that "the decision of that
question belongs only to the Supreme Judge of all men" (Epist., 82.4-5).
As we saw in the argument of unfitness of force, one may ask to whom the argu-
ment is addressed. Is the third consideration addressed to the magistrate or to men?
Once again, it is to men that it is addressed. In the reductio ad absurdum, there is a
sort of calculus of consequence that makes sense only when we imagine that several
religions could be imposed simultaneously. If it were addressed to the magistrate,
the third consideration would be paradoxical. Since each magistrate believes his
religion to be true, none of them could admit that others could impose their reli-
gions, unless he thought that they were also true (but this is theologically unaccept-
able) or that their imposition would be beneficial to salvation (but this is a mistake).
Thus, given the paradox that would follow if the third consideration were addressed
to the magistrate, it is prudent to build an interpretation that makes it coherent. This
is why we should read it as addressed to men, like the second consideration. Once
again, Locke squares his reasoning in a contractualist framework, and gives it an
explanatory dimension, not a performative one. 77 When men leave the state of
nature, they have no assurance that the magistrate will really profess the only true
religion. Uncertain about the religion they would be compelled to, they would run
the risk of losing the future life if the care of souls were committed to the civil
power. If we assume that there are several religions and only one is true, the chance
of being coerced on behalf of error is greater than of being coerced on behalf of
truth. So it is unreasonable to commit the care of souls to the magistrate.
This reasoning, which explores the consequences of the use of force in religious
matters, is used by Locke in his reply to Proast. But unsurprisingly, we find it in the
Epistola (it had already appeared in the second consideration, when Locke con-
tended that the use of force to promote conversion would be not only inefficient, but
counterproductive). In fact, it is because this consequentialist way of reasoning is
second of the Essays on the Law of Nature, inspiration is pictured as a kind of knowledge (cf.
Locke 1954, 122.23- 26). According to Locke in the preface to the Paraphrase and Notes on the
Epistles of St Paul, Paul is the major example of a God-inspired man: "I remembered that St Paul
was miraculously called to the Ministry of the Gospel, and declared to be a chosen Vessel; that he
had the whole Doctrine of the Gospel from God by immediate Revelation" (Locke 1987, v. I, 110).
On Paul and immediate revelation, see also E, IV.xviii.3 and Locke (1987, v. I, 306-308; cf.
Corinthians 12: l-13).
77
There is no doubt that this framework may impose some limits to Locke's reflection on tolera-
tion, as Spitz (2002, 123- 124) states : "the argument [the third consideration] is valid from the
subjects' point of view (it is contrary to the rational calculus to vest in a third person the power to
govern my belief), but it cannot serve to show to the persecutors that their conduct is not rational
because, strictly speaking, they are convinced that they have the truth. One might say, therefore,
that Locke's argumentation is deep and pertinent in the context of a political theory that affirms
that the civil magistrate does not have any powers except for those the subjects or citizens wanted
or could want to commit to him. Locke's argumentation is very cogent when we presuppose that
the citizens reflect on the power they could be j ustified in commitin g to those who govern them.
But it is no more cogent when Locke's theory of political power is not presupposed ... and when
one endeavours to elaborate a justification for toleration independent from any particular theory
about the origin and end of political power".
52 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
found in the Epistola that empirical concerns will be so recurrent in the controversy
provoked by The Argument. To Locke, there has never been an interest to support
toleration resorting only to the argument of unfitness of force (in other words, to the
opposition between will and understanding), as though his aim were simply to show
that, in principle, force cannot produce beliefs. As we saw in this chapter, there are
several arguments to support the restriction of the ends of the Commonwealth to
civil goods. The last of these arguments, the reductio ad absurdum, is the culmina-
tion of a development in three gradual stages: in the first moment, Locke aims to
show that the care of souls does not belong to the magistrate; in the second, that it
cannot belong to him; and in the third, that there would be dire consequences if it
belonged to him, since it would restrict salvation to few people and would imply an
offense to God. 78 In this sense, even if force could produce beliefs, as Proast sus-
tains, there would be one reason not to institute the care of souls as an end of the
Commonwealth: the argument of reciprocity. It is, therefore, no accident that a good
part of the Locke and Proast controversy turns to the debate about the true religion,
as we shall see.
2.5 Argumentative Synthesis
In the Epistola, Locke deploys his three considerations in a contractualist frame-
work. They have an explanatory character, rather than a perfonnative one, as men-
tioned in the analysis of the arguments of unfitness of force and reductio ad
absurdum. 79 The considerations justify the restriction of the magistrate's mandate to
civil goods or, in other words, they explain why the ends of the Commonwealth can-
not be extended beyond civil goods. However, one may ask whether these argu-
ments are able to move the intolerants, i.e. those who think that the magistrate has
the right to use force to promote the only true religion (and it so happens that the
only true religion is always the one professed by each intolerant). It is not easy to
answer this question, but an analysis of the Locke and Proast controversy may give
us some clues, as we shall see in the next chapter. When we consider the objections
raised against the Epistola and the way Locke's replies were received, it will shed
light on the intolerants' way of reasoning. In fact, it will reveal that we should have
no hope that they will rethink their tenets.
Regardless of the possibility of convincing an intolerant (supposing that a dia-
logue with him is really feasible), Locke's defence of religious toleration entailed
the distinction between the ends of Church and State, i.e. that the ends of the
Commonwealth must be circumscribed to the preservation and advancement of civil
78 Lennon (1997, 188-189) also sees a development in the three considerations, but he puts it in the
following way: "the magistrate's control of religious belief would be inappropriate, anyhow
impossible, and, even if possible, improbable in achieving its intended effect".
79
Therefore, it cannot be said, as Tate (2016, 16) does, that Locke's first consideration takes prior-
ity over the others. They are intertwined and should be read from a contractualist perspective.
2.5 Argumentative Synthesis 53
goods. As Locke says in An Essay concerning Toleration , "the magistrate hath noe
thing with the good of mens soules or their concemments in an other life but is
ordeind, & intrusted with his power, only for the quiet & comfortable liveing of men
in society one with an other" (ET, 281-282). It is noteworthy, however, that defend-
ing the position that no magistrate, nowhere in the world, should use force to take
care of souls is different from defending the position that everything in religion
should be accepted. Locke never supports the latter statement. On the contrary, he
acknowledges the possibility of legal interventions in certain ways of worships for
political reasons and vindicates the exclusion of those who profess intolerable prac-
tical beliefs, as we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter.
This observation is important because Locke's arguments are not intended to
show that religious toleration is an inalienable individual right, if by that we mean
that each person would have the right to profess and perform any beliefs or wor-
ships. It is an inalienable right as long as its enjoyment does not endanger civil
society. 80 In fact, in all four of his letters on toleration, there is only one passage
where Locke associates toleration with the notion of individual right. He makes this
association in a context in which he discusses the transition from the state of nature
to civil society and in which it is clear that the statement "every Man has a right to
Toleration" entails no more than the right of not being coerced to someone else's
religion: the "Protection from such Injury is one of the Ends of a Commonwealth"
(TL, 61, Works, 212).81 In short, toleration is a negative right: the right of not being
compelled to convert. It is gained (or kept, since it is a natural right) when the mag-
istrate abstains from the use of force to impose or to forbid beliefs and ways of
worship on behalf of a putative truth. Political power has no business with salvation.
In the Epistola, the defence of toleration is focused on the magistrate, even if private
persons, churches and clergymen also have the duty to tolerate other religions and
their followers. Such is Locke's emphasis on the civil power and its ends that he
touches on the issue of active resistance. He admits that men may "defend, with the
arms at their disposal, the rights which God and nature have granted them"; when
the liberty of belief and worship is violated, "it is lawful to repel force with force"
(Epist., 146.15-17, cf. TTG, II§ 209). Active resistance is the last resort available
to men in defence of their right to take care of their own salvation, which is, accord-
ing to Locke, a "natural & Evangelical right" (DNC, 102). Active resistance is not,
however, a path to anarchy or confusion. As Locke states in the Two Treatises of
80
Collins (2020, 234, 256) also speaks of an inalienable individual right. He argues that the Defence
of Nonconformity is the turning point for the case of "conscientious religious exercise" in Locke's
intellectual progression from the Two Tracts on Government to the Epistola.
81
In Popple's translation, there is a passage that reads "that liberty of conscience is every man's
natural right" (Popple, 95), but it is not in the original. Compare: " .. . ut omnes ecclesiae teneremur
docere et pro libertatis suaefundamento ponere" (Epist., 134.28-29) and " ... that all churches
were obliged to Jay down toleration as the foundation of their own liberty, and teach that liberty of
conscience is every man ' s natural right" (Popple, 93-95). In A Third Letter, the expression "right
to toleration" occurs in another passage, but it refers to "those who deny Atheism (which takes
away all Religion) to have any Right to Toleration at all" (TL, 236, Works, 414 ).
54 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia 2.5 Argumentative Synthesis 55

Government, "Force is to be opposed to nothing, but to unjust and unlawful Force" 1'dblt! 2.1 Synoptic table
(TIG, II § 204, cf. TIG, II §§ 224-228).
Synoptic Table
Therefore, even if we cannot deny the relevance of the evangelical argument,
whose tenor is theological and moral, it is unquestionable that Locke's arguments Evangelical Argument
are mainly political. From this perspective, we can say that Locke aims to demon- (i) 'Being a Christian is to follow Christ's example'
strate that the magistrate has, and must have, a restricted authority,82 but also to (ii) 'Christ's example is to act virtuously with meekness and charity'
(iii) 'Hence, being a Christian is to act virtuously with meekness and charity'
prove that this jurisdiction of the political power is coherent with Christianity. This
endeavour is made through a cluster of arguments, whose relationship can now be
synoptically perceived (Table 2.1).
Political Scriptural Argument
Of all these arguments, the arguments of unfitness of force and of reciprocity are (a) 'It seems that nowhere in the Scripture
the most important, but we must stress that both of them fit into the contractualist has God committed the care of souls to
First Consideration the civil magistrate'
framework, i.e. both of them are explanatory and not performative. Of these two, the Argument from
argument of unfitness of force is the only one directly associated with the argument (iv) 'God has not committed the care of
Commission souls to the civil magistrate'
from commission (because it is literal in the first consideration), but the third con- (iv) 'God has not
sideration must also be associated with it. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in the committed the care of souls
to the civil magistrate'
Epistola the argument of fallibility has a political character, whereas in a famous (v) 'Men have not
Argument of Fallibility
passage of An Essay concerning Human Understanding (cf. E, IV.xvi.4) it has a (~) 'all men, regardless of their position
committed the care of souls
or status, are liable to error'
moral character, as we shall see in the fourth chapter. In the Epistola, this argument to the civil magistrate'
(y) 'if a person misguides another with
is not intended to show that a man should tolerate another because both of them are (vi) 'Hence, the care of
regard to salvation, he can make no
souls has not been
liable to error, but to justify why people restrict the magistrate's jurisdiction to civil committed to the civil
reparation'
goods. Fallibility here acts as a political reason for toleration, because it justifies (v) 'Men have not committed the care of
magistrate'
souls to the civil magistrate'
men's refusal to commit the care of souls to the magistrate. It is not a moral reason
for toleration, because Locke extracts no eirenic implications from it. The issue, in
short, is the vertical, not the horizontal toleration. Fallibility may, no doubt, have a Argument of Unfitness of Force
moral implication, but it is not present in the Epistola, even in the section where
Locke discusses the duties in regard to toleration incumbent on private persons. In Second Consideration
that section, their duties to toleration are based exclusively on the statement that a Argument of Unfitness of Force
man's error is inoffensive to others (cf. Epist., pp. 78.30-80.1). (vii) 'The magistrate's power consists in coercion'
(viii) 'Salvation requires inner faith'
We may now understand precisely not only Locke's arguments in the Epistola, (ix) 'Human understanding cannot be compelled by outward force'
but also their interconnection. Locke started his reflection by exposing what seemed (x) 'Hence, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate'
to him to be the distinguishing mark of a true church, and attempting to prove that
Christians must tolerate others because love and meekness are the core of Christ's
Third Consideration
Argument of Reductio ad Absurdum
(xi) 'Force is capable of converting the
82 "Locke's argument, to put it simply, is not a defence of rights; it is a challenge to authority. What understanding and, consequently, the care Argument of
he proposes to demonstrate in the Letter concerning Toleration is that the claim for authority to use of souls belongs to the magistrate' Reciprocity
force to persecute individuals for their religious beliefs is not defensible on any ground .... Not (xii) 'There is only one true religion' (o) 'Everyone is
only has Locke put his opponents on the defensive, challenging them to produce a justification for (xiii) 'The princes of different countries orthodox to himself
authority which he denies exists, but also, it is obvious that without such a justification, the natural profess different religions' = (xiii-i) 'if the (xiii-i) 'Hence, if the
tight of individuals to worship freely is preserved" (Aschcraft 2009, 59-60). Nevertheless, it must care of souls belongs to the magistrate, care of souls belongs
be stressed that, even if the Epistola represents a challenge to political authority, it seems undeni- different religions will be imposed around to the magistrate,
able that it vindicates to each individual "the tights that are granted to other citizens" (concessa the world' different religions
aliis civibusjura) (Epist., 140.28-29). ln a letter to Limborch of 10 September 1689, Locke seems (xiv) 'Hence, the salvation of soul will be imposed
to express the same point when he speaks of "the establishment of equal liberty for all" (aequ/i depends on the chance of being born in around the world'.
omnibus... libertate) (Corr., v. III, 1182). Locke's purpose is not to propose a policy (that may be the tight place'
withdrawn if circumstances change), but a definition of the Commonwealth itself according to
which all citizens or subjects have the same tights (cf. Schochet 1992, 150-151 ).
56 2 The Argumentative Structure of the Epistola de Tolerantia
example. As the Epistola develops, this theological and moral dimension is given
less emphasis in favour of a political one. However, this theological and moral
dimension is never undermined. As we saw above, the relationship between force
and charity is an essential topic of the modem debate on toleration. Hence, if
Locke's metaphor in A Second Letter indicated that different beams sustain reli-
gious toleration, we may say that the building is based, on the one hand, on the
evangelical argument, and, on the other, on the three considerations, which com-
prise a cluster of arguments to explain and justify the restriction of the magistrate's
commission to the civil goods. Indeed, therefore, there are two beams that support
the house built in the Epistola, but the second one is a reinforced beam, a threefold
beam, since the three considerations are intertwined. It must be stressed, however,
that each of these beams reflects different meanings of the notion of toleration: the
evangelical argument turns to the relationship between private persons (the horizon-
tal dimension of toleration) whereas all the other arguments deal with the relation-
ship between State and citizens or subjects (the vertical dimension).
In A Second Letter, when Locke explains the metaphor of the beams, he is not
fair to his reasoning in the Epistola, as we shall see in the next chapter. In The
Argument, Proast perceived the contractualist framework of Locke's reasoning and
the centrality of the discussion of the magistrate's authority. As a result, his critique
of Locke culminated in the statement that in religious matters "it is every man's true
Interest, not to be left wholly to himself' (Arg., 22, RLP, 35). Proast's main target is
the beam formed by the three considerations, but this does not prevent him from
dealing with the evangelical argument (or, precisely, with the conception of
Christianity that underpins the argument), as we shall also see in the next chapter.
Ultimately, Locke and Proast attempt to assess the reasons why the ends of the
Commonwealth should be instituted more restrictedly or largely, but they both also
discuss whether or not force is compatible with Christianity. Having set forth
Locke's arguments, we shall now analyse the objections raised against the Epistola,
and the controversy that unfolded.
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ing separately each of the main letters written by the two authors, this chapter shows
the progression of objections and answers from Proast's The Argument to Locke's
Fourth letter, and determines why and when important reasonings were developed,
such as the argument of the distinction between belief and knowledge. The present
chapter demonstrates that the controversy has significant conceptual developments
when compared to the Epistola . The interpretation proposed here also aims to high-
light the importance of the notion of obstinacy as a justification for intolerance, and
to single out the more evident appropriations of Augustine.

In 1689, a few months after its publication, the Epistola received its first critique.
The 'letter for Toleration ' deciphrer'd, and the absurd and impiety of an absolute
toleration demonstrated was written by Thomas Long, a polemist of the 1670s and
1680s. In this book, Locke's evangelical argument and his three considerations are
never discussed, and several passages of the Epistola are simply described as "wild
freaks and excursions, the mention of them is a sufficient Confutation" (Long 1689,
3, RLP, 7). Although Long's tone is more defamatory than argumentative, which
might explain why Locke did not answer him directly, his work is interesting
because it reveals the intolerant zeal of some Anglicans, and unveils part of their
concerns, such as the fear that toleration would strengthen Catholicism (cf. Long
1689, 9, RLP, 13). However, this work is also interesting because it presupposes that
the defence of toleration was made by a dissenter (Long censures the Presbyterians
in particular, as they had refused mutual toleration in the 1640s, but now embraced
it). The supposed authorship of a dissenter deserves to be highlighted because it
tends to discard the possibility that Anglicans could contest the imposition of reli-
gious uniformity. Why could the defence of toleration be made only by dissenters?
Some supporters of toleration could very well be under the communion of the
Church of England, which was internally divided between those in favour of

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64 3 The Locke and Proast Controversy
persecution of nonconfonnists (broadly speaking, the High Church) and those
inclined towards latitudinarianism (the Low Church). 1
Given this division, when Locke replies to Proast, his main critic on toleration,
whose first book, The Argument of 'The Letter concerning Toleration' briefly
consider'd and answer'd, was published in 1690, both of them knew they were of
the same communion, but that they were on opposite sides from the ecclesiastical
and political standpoints. Proast was aligned with the High Church and the Tories,
whereas Locke was aligned with the Low Church and the Whigs. In this sense, the
controversy between them may be conceived as part of a broader debate that
unfolded after the Glorious Revolution and that took place within the Church and
Parliament. This debate covered topics such as comprehension, the Toleration Act
and the revocation of the Test and Corporation Acts. In some passages Locke gives
us glimpses into this debate, e. g. when he suspects that Proast's defence of punish-
ments for dissenters represents less a "care of the Salvation of Mens Souls" than a
"care of a Party" (SL, 35, Works, 99, cf. SL, 68, Works, 137) or when he mocks
Proast's statement that God and the salvation of souls are the party he defends (cf.
TL, 346-348, Works, 541-544).
While the controversy unfolded, other political issues gained weight, such as the
change of Archbishop of Canterbury,2 the accession of Queen Anne in 1702 and the
debate concerning occasional conformity, which Proast touches on in the post scrip-
tum of his Second Letter, written in 1704. Nonetheless, Locke and Proast rarely
address these issues directly. The controversy was penned in the tenns set out in the
Epistola 3 and in The Argument, despite the influence of new works then published,
such as Gilbert Bumet's (1643-1715) A Discourse of Pastoral Care (1692) and
Limborch's History of Inquisition (1692). At any rate, it is notable that in his strug-
gle to respond to Proast's objections and contest his apology for the use of force in
religious matters, Locke did not display the contractualist framework of his line of
reasoning and the interconnection between his three considerations as clearly as he
did in the Epistola. Evidently, his main purpose remained the same, but the distinc-
tion between the ends of Church and State was underpinned, above all, by the metic-
ulous refutation of his adversary's proposal of religious coercion.
The Locke and Proast controversy comprises several works whose titles are mis-
leading. Hence, before we go on to analyse them, we shall first give an overview of
the works to be analysed:
1 Allhistorical information in this introductory section is based on Goldie (1993).
2 When John Tillotson (1691-94) replaced William Sancroft (1677-90) as Archbishop of
Canterbury, Proast was directly affected, as the new archbishop postponed the answer to Proast's
claim to be restored as chaplain of All Souls College in Oxford and to be paid retroactively from
1688, when he was expelled by Leopold Finch. On Proast's claim, see Goldie (1993, 148-153) and
the summaries given by Vernon (1997, 9-14) and Spitz (2010).
3 Here, it is worth mentioning, as Tate (2016, 148) does in his criticism of Goldie (1993), that the
Locke and Proast controversy cannot be placed entirely within the post-Glorious Revolution dis-
putes between the High and Low Church, or the Tories and Whigs, given that the Epistola was
written in the European winter of 1685-1686. For an overview of the debate sparked by the
Epistola, see Sell (1997, 173-184).
3.1 The Argument of 'The letter Concerning Toleration' Briefly Consider'd... 65
(!.A) Locke, Epistula de Tolerantia (Gouda, 1689), anonymous;
lst ed. English translation by William Popple (London, 1689);
2nd ed. (revised) English translation by William Popple (London, 1690);
(LB) Proast, The Argument of 'The Letter concerning Toleration' briefly consider'd
and answer'd (Oxford, 1690), anonymous;
(11.A) Locke, A Second Letter concerning Toleration (London, 1690) by Philantropus;
(n.B) Proast, A Third Letter concerning Toleration (Oxford, 1691), anonymous;
(III.A) Locke, A Third Letter for Toleration (London, 1692) by Philantropus;
(m.B) Proast, A Second Letter to the author of the Three Letters for Toleration
(Oxford, 1704) by Philochristus;
(IV.A) Locke, A Fourth Letter for Toleration (London, 1706, Posthumous Works ).4
3.1 The Argument of 'The Letter Concerning Toleration'
Briefly Consider'd and Answer'd
The few pages of The Argument are clear and well written. In the critique of the
Epistola, Proast displays the foundations of his defence of the imposition of the true
religion and deconstructs what appeared to him to be the only argument Locke had
employed to refute the view that the care of souls belongs to the magistrate.
However, as in a good review, Proast starts his analysis by establishing, precisely,
the terms of the issue, in a summary of the position he intends to criticise. The dedi-
cation aside,5 The Argument then gives a brief explanation of the notion of tolera-
tion. For Proast, the extension of the toleration proposed by Locke is impressive.
Although Locke's reflection starts as a question about the differences among
Christians, it ends up including followers of other religions, as we read in a passage
of the conclusion of the Epistola quoted by Proast: "neither Pagan, nor Mahumetan,
nor Jew ought to be excluded from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, because
of his Religion" (Arg., 1, RLP, 25).6 This extension of toleration stems from the
4
The Fourth letter, published in the Posthumous Works, later reproduced in the Works of John
Locke in 10 (1823) and 9 volumes (1824), lacks three short paragraphs which are crossed out in the
manuscript and were published by King in his biography of Locke (cf. 1830, v. II, 229-230).
Moreover, it is also worth noting that the last paragraph of the text in the Posthumous Works is not
in the manuscript. It probably indicates that the edition was based on another copy, as Long (1959,
33) points out.
5
Proast does not say to whom he addresses the dedication, but, according to Thomas Hearne, anti-
quarian and Jacobite, one of his closest friends in Oxford, the "very worthy Friend" is Arthur
Charlett, also from Oxford and aligned with the High Church (cf. Goldie 1993, 154).
6
Proast used Popple's translation, which reads "civil rights of the commonwealth" and not simply
"commonwealth" (respublica) as in the original (Epist., 144.2-3). The imprimatur of The Argument
is dated 9 April 1690 and the dedication was signed on 27 March 1690. Proast could hardly have
used the second and revised edition of A letter concerning Toleration, which was published in
March 1690. However, in order to clarify the issue, an advertisement after the dedication states that
"the Edition of the letter conceming Toleration, here cited, it that in Quarto". As we read in the
66 3 The Locke and Proast Controversy
requirements (certainly inadequate, from Proast's perspective) for a person to qual-
ify for it: nobody is excluded, except atheists, those who transgress civil laws, and
those who do not acknowledge and teach the duty to tolerate. Quoting from Popple's
preface, Proast thus concludes that all sects and religions ought "to enjoy an Equal
and Impartial liberty", as long as they do not hold beliefs contrary to civil society
and are "ready to tolerate each other" (Arg., 2, RLP, 26). Proast never goes into the
details concerning the intolerable practical beliefs (cf. Epist., 130.12-134.21).
After these initial remarks, Proast then expresses his assessment: considering the
experiments of more restricted toleration that have been made (he does not say
which experiments he refers to, but they seem to concern the interregnum of
1649- 1660, cf. TL-P, 13, RLP, 52), one cannot expect that the toleration supported
by Locke be beneficial to the true religion, even if it contributes to trade and com-
merce. 7 Proast stresses that he does not believe the Epistola intended to cause preju-
dice to any religion or to Christianity in particular, which is tantamount to saying
that the author of the Epistola was mistaken about the fruits of the toleration pro-
posed. In The Argument, Proast is assertive in this forecast concerning toleration,
but he limits himself to the statement that it seems difficult to conceive how tolera-
tion could be serviceable to true religion or its followers. At the beginning of his
Third Letter, however, he clearly affirms that toleration would not be serviceable to
true religion; rather, that toleration could ruin it (cf. TL-P, 2-4, RLP, 42-44). In this
second critique of Locke, Proast' s reasons are then set out, as we shall see below. In
The Argument, Proast states that his purpose is not to assess the value of the tolera-
tion defended by Locke, but to examine the proofs offered to sustain it.
For Proast, there is just one argument to support toleration: the argument of unfit-
ness of force. Why does Proast affirm that there is just one argument? How is it
possible when at least three arguments were clearly adduced: the so-called three
considerations? The reason is simple. For Proast, the argument from commission
begs the question of the distinction between the ends of Church and State (and,
being invalid, it should not be considered a real argument) while the argument of
reductio ad absurdum is ill-formulated (according to Proast, what is at stake is the
possibility of the magistrate imposing the true religion, and never his own, even if
the latter appears true to him). As we saw in the second chapter, in the Epistola there
is still the evangelical argument, which Proast seeks to reject by resorting to a con-
ception of Christianity that allows the possibility of a charitable use of force. Thus,
despite stating that there is only one argument in the Epistola, Proast ends up
responding to all of Locke's arguments.
bibliographical descriptions of Locke's works, the first edition of Popple 's translation was in 4°
while the second was in 12° (cf. Yolton 1998, 4-6, items 3-4; Attig 1985, 14, items 51-52).
7 In the Epistola, Locke does not present the contributions to trade and commerce as an argument
for toleration, but this is touched on in An Essay concerning Toleration (cf. ET, 301) and in the
manuscript Trade of 1674 (cf. Pol. Es., Trade, 222). For a study of the relationship between com-
merce and toleration, see Santos (2013). For a broad overview of this issue, at least in the late
1680s, see Ashcraft (1986, 506--511). On toleration in the Interregnum, see Worden (1984).
3. 1 The Argument of 'The Letter Concerning To lera tion' Briefly Consider'd... 67
In the first pages of 1he Argument, Proast gives his own formulation of the prem-
ises and the conclusion of the argument of unfitness of force. He divides the argu-
ment in five propositions about which there is not complete disagreement. The first
two premises are acknowledged by both Locke and Proast: (Jst) that there is only
one true religion; (2nd) in which men must believe to be saved. Proast shows further
agreement with Locke when he acknowledges that (3rd) reason and argument are
the proper means to produce belief and, consequently, that the understanding cannot
be coerced to believe by an outward force. To employ Proast's own words: "Force
is very improper to be used to that end instead of Reason and Arguments" (Arg., 4,
RLP, 27). Notwithstanding this inadequacy, it does not mean that (4th) force is
"utterly of no use for the promoting True Religion" (Arg., 3, RLP, 26). Force cannot
act directly in the production of beliefs, instead of reason, but it can perfectly act
"indirectly and at a distance" (Arg., 5, RLP, 27). It is his disagreement concerning
the fourth proposition that leads Proast to refute Locke's conclusion that (5th)
nobody has the right to use force in religious matters (Arg. , 4-5, RLP, 27).
Proast draws a distinction in the use of force that Locke does not explore in the
Epistola. Proast contends that there is a sort of duplicity in the use of force: its direct
and immediate or indirect and distant character. He employs this distinction to con-
test the fourth premise of the argument of unfitness of force and so destroy the
conceptual house built in the Epistola. 8 If force were "utterly useless", as Proast
reiterates (Arg., 27, RLP, 37), it would be impossible to employ it to promote the
true religion. However, if one acknowledges that it might be serviceable, its use in
favour of the salvation of souls cannot, in principle, be discarded. Taken as a whole,
the line of reasoning developed in The Argument has two stages, the first being to
demonstrate that force may be serviceable. As we shall see below, Proast initially
proves that the right to compel on behalf of true religion can belong to the magis-
trate, then argues that this right ought to belong to him. In the first stage, the central
concept is that of the utility of force; in the second, it is the necessity of force, as
Locke himself acknowledged (cf. TL, 18-19, Works, 164) when he corrected his
misinterpretation of The Argument (in A Second Letter, Locke considered the utility
of force sufficient to justify the magistrate's commission to take care of souls, cf.
SL, 47, Works, 113). According to Proast, Locke should have proven that force has
no utility at all to produce belief in order to successfully defend toleration, but the
Epistola is nothing more than a declamation (the allusion to rhetoric has a pejorative
connotation) for the impossibility of promoting religion by force and for the inhu-
manity of compelling with fire, sword and capital punishments (cf. Arg., 28, RLP,
37). But how can force be useful ? What does Proast mean when he says that it can
be useful indirectly and at a distance? According to his own reconstruction of the
argument of unfitness of force, how does Proast demonstrate that the fourth premise
is false?
8 Inthe Philosophical Commentary, Bayle also deals with the objection concerning indirect and at
a distance use of force (cf. Bayle 2014, 97-101). This objection was a commonplace among the
intolerants, contrary to Locke's ironic remark that Proast 's method is new (e.g., SL, 24, Wo rks, 87).
68 3 The Locke and Proast Controversy
The indirect usefulness of force is manifest when private persons do not inform
themselves about the true religion due to carelessness and negligence as well as
when they reject it at once as an error due to prejudice. In these cases, Proast con-
tends that force can "bring men to consider those Reasons and Arguments which are
proper and sufficient to convince them, but which, without being forced, they would
not consider" (Arg., 5, RLP, 27). Thus, force cannot make a person withhold his
assent to a belief while it appears true to him, in order to assent to another one that
appears false to him. Proast never doubts the involuntary nature of belief when the
relationship between belief and will is viewed from the perspective of assent (hence
the agreement concerning the third premise). On the contrary, his critique of Locke
explores the voluntary nature of belief when it comes to the process of investigation.
In a nutshell, force acts upon the will, but in order to make a person take into account
arguments he had previously refused to consider, i.e. to make him enrich the infor-
mation available to his understanding. According to Proast, this would entail a reas-
sessment of his beliefs and, consequently, a shift of assent. Therefore, this shift of
assent springs from the new truth value of the beliefs, so that one can speak of the
indirect, distant and mediated usefulness of force. When Proast states that force has
an indirect usefulness, he is claiming that it can lead those who had previously
refused to consider the proofs that are apt to convince them to finally consider them.
Proast is in no doubt that there are "proper and sufficient" arguments in favour of the
true religion, and that those arguments, if duly considered, cannot fail to convince
all those who give them a fair hearing. As we read in his Third Letter, "no man who
rejects Truth necessary to his Salvation, has consider'd already, as he ought to con-
sider" (TL-P, 28, RLP, 67). Apart from the "desperately perverse and obstinate"
(Arg., 14, RLP, 31), all other men should bow to this "instruction" offered them "for
the enlightening their minds and discovering the Truth to them" (Arg., 13, RLP, 31 ).
Metaphorically speaking, force obliges a person to tum to the arguments he had
insisted on ignoring; it acts as a means to "balance the weight" of prejudices (Arg.,
11, RLP, 30). Coercion does not convince by itself, directly, by acting upon the
assent, but indirectly, as it leads a person to consider what he had put aside. If a
person has not yet embraced the true religion, this will certainly happen as soon as
he is exposed to the truth. The fact of being instructed by force is not problematic:
religious truth is no less true for having been embraced after reflection under con-
straint just as obedience to God does not lose its value for being reached through
chastisement and afflictions (cf. Arg., 6, RLP, 27). Truth and obedience obtained by
force are still perfectly acceptable to God.
Not only does Proast think that there is just one true religion, but he also thinks
it has an undeniable foundation. From his perspective, the only factor that can
account for a person's rejection of it is the fact that it was not duly sought. But what
does 'due examination' really mean? Nowhere does Proast describe in detail the
search for truth or show positively how this search should be conducted. His descrip-
tion does not advance beyond the assertion that the examination must be "severe
and impartial" or "serious and impartial" (Arg., 10, 26, RLP, 29, 36). In The
Argument, as well as in the Third Letter, Proast only mentions the motives for which
3.1 The Argument of 'The Letter Concerning Toleration' Briefly Consider'd ... 69
the due examination is often not properly conducted and explains why he presup-
poses that anyone can discover the way to salvation:
Now here I grant, that if all men were but so faithful to their own Souls, as to seek the way
of Saving them, with such Care and Diligence as the Importance of the matter deserves, and
with Minds free from Prejudice and Passion; there could be no need of Force to compell any
man to do, what in that case every man would be sure to do voluntarily, an of his own
accord. But then it must be granted withal, That if this were the case; as there is indeed but
one true Religion, so there could be no other Religion but that in the world, John 7: 17.
Because (if we believe the Scriptures) no Man can fail of finding the way of Salvation, who
seeks it as he ought; Psalms 25:9, 12, 14, Proverbs 2:1-5; and in this case all Men are sup-
posed so to seek it. And yet there is nothing more notorious, than that Men have sought out
many Inventions, and contrived a great variety of Religions to themselves: so that there is
nothing about which the World is more divided, then it is about the way that leads to Eternal
Blessedness. Which is an evident demonstration, that all Men have not sought the Truth in
this matter, with that application of mind, and that freedom of Judgement, which was req-
uisite to assure their finding it (Arg., 6-7, RLP, 28).
Initially, we see that Proast, once again, resorts to the notions of care and preju-
dice, but this time he associates them with the notions of diligence and passions. It
is not his purpose to define them precisely, but to indicate the motives that hinder the
search for the true religion (passions and prejudices are frequently mentioned) and
their implications on the examination (carelessness and negligence). Repeatedly,
and not only in The Argument, Proast seems to make the following distinction: on
the one hand, he points out the obstacles to the search for truth; and on the other, he
describes how these obstacles affect the examination, which may then be said to be
careless or negligent. In different passages of The Argument, Proast mentions
"lusts", "foolish humours'', and "crafty Seducer" (Arg., 7, 20-21, 27, RLP, 28, 34,
37), as well as the "Impressions of Education, the Reverence and Admiration of
Persons, Wordly respects, and the like incompetent Motives", all of which, accord-
ing to him, "determine far greater numbers, than Reason, or such Considerations as
are apt and proper to manifest the Truth of things" (Arg., 8, RLP, 28). Proast does
not use these notions rigorously, nor does he need to do so, for what he is seeking to
demonstrate by these confluent terms is clear: people are liable to be influenced by
factors that affect the search for truth (the most prominent of which are passions and
prejudices, as we have just singled out). Nobody denies this proposition, and Locke
himself acknowledges it (cf. SL, 32, 34, 37, 61, Works , 95, 98, 101, 129), adopting
it as a subject of study until the end of his life, as seen in his Of the Conduct of the
Understanding. Therefore, Proast's greatest challenge is not to prove that people
often do not seek truth with "application of mind" and "freedom of judgement" (if
it were so, there would be no need for force), but to articulate this proposition with
the much more controversial statement that nobody who seeks as he ought can fail
lo discover the way to salvation.
In order to make this articulation, as we can see from the Jong quotation above,
Proast mentions a passage from Scripture, Proverbs 2: 1-5, which assures the dis-
covery of the "knowledge of God" for those who "incline" their "ear unto wisdom",
"apply" their "heart to understanding" and search for it "as for hid treasures". This
scriptural basis is crucial for him, as it is through this passage that he ultimately
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