Mindfulness (2017) 8:68–77
DOI 10.1007/s12671-015-0481-9
ORIGINAL PAPER
Meditation, Absorption, Transcendent Experience,
and Affect: Tying It All Together Via the Consciousness State
Space (CSS) Model
Aviva Berkovich-Ohana 1 & Joseph Glicksohn 2,3
Published online: 4 January 2016
# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016
Abstract In this paper, we relate meditation practice to par-
ticipant trait absorption, affect, and transcendent experience.
The motivation for this analysis stems from a new
neurophenomenological model of consciousness which we
recently published, named the consciousness state space.
Here, we compare two distinct forms of meditation: mindful-
ness and transcendental meditation, as well as two different
levels of expertise within the mindfulness group. Participants
comprised 64 mindfulness practitioners, 18 transcendental
meditation practitioners, and 59 healthy controls, who had
no prior meditation experience. We further split our mindful-
ness participants into two groups, using a cutoff point of
2000 h of accumulated experience. We tested three predic-
tions. The first prediction was that contemplative practices
should result in increased first-order awareness as a trait, or
trait absorption. Our findings revealed that meditators (in gen-
eral) scored higher on trait absorption than comparable con-
trols, with no difference between meditators from the two
traditions. A second prediction was that contemplative prac-
tices should result in a reduced sense of regular (narrative)
self; hence, transcendent experience should be enhanced for
long-term practitioners of meditation. Our findings show that
meditators (in general) score higher on the Mystical Scale than
* Aviva Berkovich-Ohana
avivabo@edu.haifa.ac.il
1
Faculty of Education, The Edmond J. Safra Brain Research Center
for the Study of Learning Disabilities, University of Haifa,
Haifa, Israel
2
The Leslie and Susan Gonda (Goldschmied) Multidisciplinary Brain
Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
3
Department of Criminology, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
comparable controls, with no difference between meditators
from the two traditions. We further predicted that contempla-
tive practices should result in lower positive and negative
valence, measured by Positive Affect and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS) scores on both positive and negative affect
scales, as a trait, but this hypothesis was only partly supported
by the data.
Keywords Meditation . Absorption . Transcendent
experience . Affect . Consciousness state space
Introduction
Consciousness state space (CSS) is a new neurophenomenological
model of consciousness (Berkovich-Ohana and Glicksohn
2014). Here, we focus on the phenomenology of this model,
putting aside the suggested neural counterparts. CSS suggests
that three dimensions, time, awareness, and emotion, create a
phenomenological state-space encompassing all possible ac-
cessible phenomenal states (Fig. 1a). These, in turn, fall into
two large categories of consciousness, each with its respective
sense of self: The first is the Bminimal self^ (MS), a self that is
short of temporal extension, which is endowed with a sense of
agency, ownership, and non-conceptual first-person content,
and the second is the Bnarrative self^ (NS), which involves
personal identity and continuity across time, as well as con-
ceptual thought (Gallagher 2000). Consciousness can also be
divided into a simpler and a more complex form, each one of
them supporting one type of self-experience. The first is core-
consciousness (CC), which supports the MS, its scope being
the here and now. The second is extended-consciousness
(EC), which supports the NS, and involves memory of past,
imagination of future, thought, and language (Damasio 1999,
Mindfulness (2017) 8:68–77
Fig. 1 a The consciousness state space (CSS), depicting a
phenomenological space with three psychological dimensions. b The
concentric organization of the CSS. The central point denotes the body.
Around it is the core-consciousness (CC) and minimal-self (MS) sphere in
white, surrounded by the extended-consciousness (EC) and the narrative-
self (NS) sphere in grey. This circular organization depicts a shorter and
2012). Between the two categories of consciousness and self-
hood, there is typical antagonistic dynamic behavior (Fig. 1b).
The CSS’ phenomenological space predicts that alterations
in typical CSS dynamics occur when the regular sense of NS
is modified. In such cases, including any well-reasoned con-
dition in which one would expect alteration in the regular
sense of NS, an altered state of consciousness can occur.
These states have been termed Bno-self,^ Btranspersonal,^ or
Btranscendent^ states, and they can occur in a spontaneous or
training-induced manner (Alexander and Langer 1990;
Hartman and Zimberoff 2008; Pascual-Leone 2000).
Recurring altered states can result in Baltered traits,^ where
the Bcenter of gravity^ moves phenomenologically toward
the center of the CSS, meaning that on each of its three di-
mension, experience moves toward to the central point. Thus,
studying conditions related to alterations in the typical sense
of self can be a good model to test the CSS predictions.
Meditation, previously suggested to alter the experience of
the self (Alexander et al. 1991; Dreyfus and Thompson 2007;
Hölzel et al. 2011; Tang et al. Posner 2015; Vago and
Silbersweig 2012), can serve as an optimal model to test the
CSS. Thus, the prediction is that (any) meditation practice
would result, as a long-term trait effect, in a phenomenological
transition toward the center of the CSS. This can be further
broken down to a series of four predictions. The first prediction
is that meditation practice would result in a reduced sense of
regular (narrative) self. This means a trait movement toward the
central point within MS, which could be conceptualized as
Bselfless^—where identification with a static self is replaced
by identification with the phenomenon of experiencing itself
(Dor-Ziderman et al. 2013). A transient loss of the regular sense
of self has been described as a transcendent or peak experience
(Maslow 1971), flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1988), or mystical ex-
perience (Deikman 2000; Glicksohn 1998; James 1958; Stace
69
longer psychological distance from the body for the CC/MS and EC/NS,
respectively, as well reliance relationship, where each sphere necessitates
the previous one for its existence, but not vise versa. Two trajectories of
experience exist, which typically show an antagonistic behavior (blue
lines, t0 and t1 denote two time points) (adapted from Berkovich-Ohana
and Glicksohn 2014)
1961). The transcendent experience can become permanent as
the result of long meditative training, leading to an altered sense
of self (Austin 1998; Goleman 1988; James 1958; Stace 1961).
The second prediction concerns the time axis in the CSS model,
and posits that meditation practice would result in reduced
sense of the timeline. This means a trait movement toward the
center of the time dimension, where the present moment re-
sides, away from past and future mental time traveling
(Fig. 2a). This prediction was already supported in a previous
publication, which showed that mindfulness meditation prac-
tice alters trait temporal perception in the direction of a longer
subjective time-unit (Berkovich-Ohana et al. 2011). The third
prediction, related to the awareness axis in the CSS model,
theorizes that meditation practice would result in heightened
first-order awareness. This means a trait movement toward
the center of the awareness dimension, where one experiences
first-order awareness (Fig. 2b). First-order awareness, also
called pre-reflective awareness (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008),
is an implicit and direct awareness to experience, prior to any
reflection on the experience. In this state, one will directly be
attentive and process external input from the environment,
without conceptual elaboration of the mental events that are
taking place. Hence, the organism will be totally immersed,
or absorbed in experience (Glicksohn and Berkovich-Ohana
2012; Morin 2006). Finally, the forth prediction, regarding the
affect axis in the CSS model, speculates a reduction in valence,
both positive and negative. This would result in a trait move-
ment toward the center of the emotion dimension, where equa-
nimity is maximal (lowest positive and negative valence)
(Fig. 2c).
Here, we test these specific phenomenological predictions
via self-reported measures, exploring also to the issue of med-
itation style and expertise. To this end, we compare two dis-
tinct forms of meditation: mindfulness meditation (MM) and
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Fig. 2 A summary of the features
of the three CSS dimensions: time
(a), awareness (b), and emotion
(c) (adapted from Berkovich-
Ohana and Glicksohn 2014)
transcendental meditation (TM), as well as two different levels
of expertise within the MM group. TM is a classic Hindu
mantra meditation based on the teaching of Sankaracharya’s
eighth-century Advait school of Vedantic thought, one of the
six classical schools of Hindu philosophy (Goleman 1988); its
final goal being the transcendence of personal self and habit-
ual mental processing, reaching constant witnessing con-
sciousness (Alexander et al. 1987; Mahesh Yogi 1966).
MM, or Vipassana, is a classic practice of Theravada
Buddhism (Gombrich 1995; Gunaratana and Gunaratana
2011). It is a way of self-transformation through self-observa-
tion. By turning inwardly and attending to the way one per-
ceives, feels, and thinks, one can gradually conceive of the
mind as a complex cognitive process consisting of a succes-
sion of related momentary mental states which function on
their own without a self. The final goal is the direct realization
of the nature of reality, including especially the lack of any
essential self and the consequent liberation from suffering
(Dreyfus and Thompson 2007). It is especially interesting to
compare these two types of meditation, as previous work re-
peatedly placed them in different categories of meditation
practices. For example, Lutz et al. (2008) ascribed MM to
the open-monitoring (OM) type, while TM was ascribed to
Mindfulness (2017) 8:68–77
the focused-attention (FA) type. Another type of categoriza-
tion agrees about MM belonging to OM, while placing TM in
a third category, named automatic self-transcending (Travis
and Shear 2010).
We outline three specific hypotheses, derived from the
CSS: (1) Meditative practices should result in increased first-
order awareness as a trait, or trait absorption; (2) Meditative
practices should result in a reduced sense of regular (narrative)
self. In other words, transcendent experience should be en-
hanced for long-term practitioners of meditation; and (3)
Meditative practices should result in lower valence, both pos-
itive and negative. To the extent that scores on positive and
negative affect scales represent valence, we predict that long-
term practice of meditation, either TM or MM, should result in
decreased negative and positive affect scores.
Method
Participants
A total of 141 individuals comprised the participants whose
data are reported here. These participants fulfilled the criteria
Mindfulness (2017) 8:68–77
for inclusion: (i) right handedness; (ii) Bclean^ of any factors
that might influence their reports, such as past head injury,
past or present drug abuse, present use of anti-depressant med-
ication, or present depressive episode; and (iii) age below 70.
This research includes two meditation groups: mindfulness
meditation (MM) and transcendental meditation (TM), as well
as a control group, as specified below. The MM practitioners
were recruited via two organizations: The Israeli Insight
Society (http://www.tovana.co.il), and The Newman Society
(http://www.metta.org.il). The TM practitioners were
recruited via The Israeli TM Society (http://www.maharishi-
meditation.org.il).
Participants comprised 64 MM practitioners (age M ± SD,
43 ± 12 years, 24 females), 18 TM practitioners (58 ± 7 years,
5 females) and 59 healthy controls (C; 38 ± 13 years, 27 fe-
males), who had no prior meditation experience. The medita-
tors had diverse accumulated experience in formal meditation,
gained during retreats and daily practice. Group means by
hours and by years were 5316 ± 6308 h and 12 ± 9 years for
the MM group; 13941 ± 10863 h and 29 ± 8 years for the TM
group. In order to enable a direct comparison between TM and
MM, and between short-term (ST) and long-term (LT) MM,
we split our MM participants into two groups, using a cutoff
point of 2000 h of accumulated experience. This resulted in a
group of ST-MM (n = 20, 8 females), with between 12 and
1720 h (5 ± 3.5 years) of accumulated practice (M = 909
± 590 h), and a group of LT-MM (n = 44, 16 females), with
between 2010 and 29,293 h (16 ± 8.5 years) of accumulated
practice (M = 7346 ± 6705 h). The TM group had between
1810 and 38,000 h of accumulated practice. All participants
were tested as part of three neuroscientific studies, either an
electroencephalographic (EEG) or a magnetoencephalographic
(MEG) study at Bar-Ilan University, partly reported elsewhere
(Berkovich-Ohana et al. 2012; Berkovich-Ohana et al. 2013a,
b), or as part of a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study at the Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel
(Berkovich-Ohana et al., Task-induced activity and resting-state
fluctuations undergo similar alterations in visual and DMN
areas of long-term meditators, under review).
Procedure
After introduction to the lab, the participants signed a
written consent form, and then an oral and written in-
terview was taken concerning some personal details and
meditation experience. Subsequently, they completed the
Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
in its trait form, the TAS and the M-Scale. Then, we
proceeded with various physiological recordings, either
EEG or MEG at Bar-Ilan University (BIU), or fMRI at
the Weizmann Institute. Ethical approval was obtained
via the BIU ethical committee, or the Ichilov Helsinki
committee, respectively.
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Measures
To study trait affect, we used the PANAS questionnaire, which
includes two 10-item mood sub-scales, positive and negative
(Watson et al. 1988). The list of ten descriptors for the
positive-affect (PA) scale is attentive, interested, alert, excited,
enthusiastic, inspired, proud, determined, strong, and active;
and the ten descriptors for the negative-affect (NA) scale are
distressed, upset, hostile, irritable-angry, scared, afraid-
fearful, ashamed, guilty, nervous, and jittery. In this paper,
we focus on affective trait (i.e., what the participants feel about
themselves, in general).
To test trait absorption, we used Tellegen’s Absorption
Scale (TAS). The TAS consists of 34 items in a true-false
format, taken from the Multidimensional Personality
Questionnaire (Tellegen 1982), which assesses an openness
to experience cognitive-affective alterations along a variety
of situations.
To study self-transience experience, we used the Hood
(1975) Mysticism Scale (M-Scale), developed on the basis
of Stace’s (1961) conceptualization of transcendent experi-
ence. Participants are requested to indicate on a four-point
scale from −2 (definitely not true) to +2 (definitely true), the
extent to which each of 32 statements is true of their own
experiences. After reversing appropriate items, these re-
sponses are then converted to a five-point Likert scale, from
1 (low) to 5 (high), where indecision is scored as 3. These
items are grouped into eight components of transcendent ex-
perience: (1) Positive Affect—refers to the positive affective
quality of the experience (typically the experience is of joy or
blissful happiness); (2) Religious Quality—refers to the intrin-
sic sacredness of the experience. This includes feelings of
mystery, awe, and reverence that may, nevertheless, be
expressed independently of traditional religious language;
(3) Noetic Quality—refers to the experience as a source of
valid knowledge. Emphasis is on a non-rational, intuitive,
insightful experience that is, nevertheless, recognized as not
being merely subjective; (4) Unifying Quality—refers to the
experience of the multiplicity of objects of perception as nev-
ertheless unified. Everything is in fact perceived as Bone^; (5)
Inner Subjective Quality—refers to the perception of an inner
subjectivity to all things, even though usually experienced in
purely material forms; (6) Ego Quality—refers to the experi-
ence of a loss of sense of self while consciousness is, never-
theless, maintained. The loss of self is commonly experienced
as an absorption into something greater than the mere empir-
ical ego; (7) Temporal and Spatial Quality—refers to the tem-
poral and the spatial parameters of the experience. Essentially,
both time and space are modified within the extreme experi-
ence of introvertive mystical experience. When the senses are
shut off and attention is internalized, there is an experience of
Btimelessness^ and Bspacelessness^; and (8) Ineffability—re-
fers to the impossibility of expressing the experience in
72
conventional language. The experience simply cannot be put
into words due to the nature of the experience itself and not to
the linguistic capacity of the subject. In this study, we assessed
transcendent experience using both the M-Scale mean, and
these eight constituents.
Data Analyses
The first question we address relates meditation practice to
trait absorption. We ran a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA), contrasting our four groups (C, ST-MM, LT-
MM, TM), subsequently decomposed using three orthogonal
contrasts: (1) contrasting C with all our meditators (ST-MM +
LT-MM + TM), to see whether meditators (in general) score
higher on trait absorption than comparable controls; (2) con-
trasting ST-MM with LT-MM, thus enabling us to investigate
whether long-term MM practice is related to a higher score on
trait absorption; and (3) contrasting mindfulness meditators
(ST-MM + LT-MM) with TM, thereby enabling us to compare
meditators of either tradition in terms of absorption. The sec-
ond question that we address relates meditation practice to
transcendent experience (i.e., the M-Scale mean), using a sim-
ilar set of planned comparisons as described above. We then
viewed the eight components of the M-Scale as constituting
an M-Scale profile, and ran a two-way group × component
ANOVA, with repeated measures on the latter. In a second
step, the increased M-Scale scores and TAS in both TM and
MM prompted us to test the Pearson correlation between these
two measures. Turning to the third question of interest, what is
the relation between meditation practice and affect, we ran a
two-way group × component ANOVA, with repeated mea-
sures on the latter (PA and NA). Finally, we studied the ques-
tion of meditation expertise and age effects by correlating the
measures with meditation expertise (in hours) and age
(respectively).
Results
For the absorption scores, a significant effect was found for
group [F (3, 136) = 8.18, MSE = 42.4, p < .0001; one partici-
pant dropped from the analysis because of missing data],
clearly seen in Fig. 3. Our set of planned comparisons re-
vealed the following: (1) higher trait absorption for meditators
(M = 23.1) compared to the controls (M = 17.8; p < .0001); (2)
no significant difference between ST-MM and LT-MM in ab-
sorption; and (3) no significant difference between MM and
TM in absorption (in addition, we found no significant differ-
ence between LT-MM and TM). These results are not affected
by the age of our participants, given the zero correlation be-
tween age and absorption in the entire sample (r = .10, n = 140,
ns, one participant dropped from the analysis because of miss-
ing data), as well as the meditator groups (r = .09, n = 82). In
Mindfulness (2017) 8:68–77
Fig. 3 Tellegen’s absorption scale (TAS) scores. A significant effect was
found for group. ***p < .0001
addition, TAS significantly correlated both with MM expertise
(r = .29, n = 63, missing data of one participant) and TM ex-
pertise (r = .48, n = 19). No significant difference was found
between the correlations of the two groups (t = 0.78, ns).
A significant effect was found in the M-Scale scores for
group [F (3, 137) = 22.11, MSE = 0.48, p < .0001], clearly seen
in Fig. 4. Our set of planned comparisons revealed the follow-
ing: (1) higher M-Scale mean for meditators (M = 4.2) com-
pared to the controls (M = 3.3; p < .0001); (2) a significant
difference between ST-MM and LT-MM (p < .005), whereby
LT-MM score higher on the M-Scale. This was supplemented
with a significant correlation between the M-Scale and MM
expertise (r = .29, n = 64) as well as with TM expertise (r = .67,
n = 19). There was no significant difference between the cor-
relations of the two groups (t = 1.85, p = 0.06); and (3) no
significant difference between MM and TM (in addition, we
found no significant difference between LT-MM and TM).
These results are not affected by the age of our participants,
despite the small but significant correlation between age and
M-Scale mean (r = .19, n = 141, p < .05), as checked by run-
ning a one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), using age
as covariate (F < 1, ns). The group × component ANOVA for
the eight components within the M-Scale uncovered a signif-
icant effect for both group [F (3, 137) = 22.11, MSE = 0.48,
p < .0001], as before, and component [F (7, 959) = 22.10,
MSE = 0.54, p < .0001], and more importantly, their signifi-
cant interaction [F (21, 959) = 2.28, MSE = 0.54, p < .005].
Figure 4 presents these data. Note the marked difference be-
tween the controls and ST-MM in both Ego Quality and
Unifying Quality, there being a progressive increase in score
with meditative experience. Generally speaking, the same pat-
tern seen for the M-Scale mean is seen for all eight compo-
nents, albeit with slight changes from measure to measure.
Finally, we found a significant correlation between M-Scale
scores and TAS for the control [r = .36, n = 59, p < .005], LT-
MM [r = .67, n = 43, p < .0001], and ST-MM groups [r = .46,
n = 20, p < .05]. However, it did not reach significance in the
TM group [r = .38, n = 18, p = .1].
We uncovered no significant difference in affect between
the four groups [F (3, 136) = 2.27, MSE = 69.8, p = .13].
However, there was a significant group × component interac-
tion when contrasting only the ST-MM and LT-MM groups [F
Mindfulness (2017) 8:68–77
Fig. 4 Mystical Scale (M-Scale) scores. We revealed higher M-Scale
mean for meditators compared to the controls, as well as a significant
difference between ST-MM and LT-MM. The eight components of the M-
Scale show a significant effect for both group and component, as well as
(1,136) = 4.50, MSE = 160.8, p < .05] whereby LT-MM scored
lower on NA and higher on PA compared to ST-MM (Fig. 5).
The correlation analysis revealed that NA significantly corre-
lated with MM expertise (r = −.35, n = 64) while PA showed a
positive but non-significant correlation (r = .21). Interestingly,
similar correlation analyses in the TM group revealed a sig-
nificant positive correlation with PA (r = .49, n = 19), but not
with NA (r = .07).
Discussion
We tested the CSS prediction that meditative practices should
result in increased first-order awareness as a trait, or trait ab-
sorption. Our findings (Fig. 3) revealed that (1) meditators (in
general) score higher on trait absorption than comparable con-
trols; (2) there was a significant correlation between trait ab-
sorption and MM/TM expertise; and (3) there was no differ-
ence between meditators from the two traditions. The findings
are aligned with our hypotheses.
Early research provided conflicting results: while some
studies suggested that trait absorption is higher for advanced
meditators (Davidson et al. 1976; Davidson and Goleman
1977), others found an opposite effect (Pagano and
Warrenburg 1983), or no effect (Anderson 1983). However,
later studies showed that even a short (5 weeks) MM training
Fig. 5 Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) scores.
There was no significant difference between the four groups. However,
there was a significant group × component (positive and negative affect
(PA and NA, respectively)) interaction when contrasting the ST-MM and
LT-MM groups. *p < .05
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their significant interaction. Generally, there is a progressive increase in
score with MM experience for all eight components, albeit with slight
changes from measure to measure. **p < .005; ***p < .0001
significantly enhanced trait absorption for meditators
(Bowden et al. 2011), and that MM practitioners not only
scored higher on the TAS than controls but absorption also
correlated with meditation depth and mindfulness (Hölzel and
Ott 2006). Similarly, Zen meditators showed enhanced trait
absorption which was positively correlated with the tenden-
cies to be observant and non-reactive (Grant et al. 2013).
Taken together, and albeit some controversies, findings
support the notion that meditation in general increases trait
absorption, as our results confirmed. We did not find an in-
crease in trait absorption with meditation expertise when con-
trasting the two ST-MM and LT-MM groups, possibly due to
setting the cutoff between the groups to 2000 h, which is
already a relatively long practice. However, we did find a
significant correlation between trait absorption and MM ex-
pertise. A similar correlation was found with TM expertise.
These results support previous reports, which point toward an
increase in trait absorption with meditation expertise.
While TM is Bin the mainstream of jhana [full absorption]
practice^ (Goleman 1988, p. 67), and scholars agree on the
basic difference between MM and TM, placing them in dif-
ferent categories of training attention (Lutz et al. 2008; Travis
and Shear 2010), our results found no difference between the
two in terms of trait absorption. This is surprising, given early
studies on TM which found no increase in trait absorption
(Anderson 1983; Pagano and Warrenburg 1983). However,
it is aligned with other studies which showed that the perfor-
mance of concentrative and mindfulness meditators on a test
of sustained attention was similar and superior compared with
controls (Valentine and Sweet 1999).
The CSS predicts that meditative practices would result in
reduced sense of regular (narrative) self. In other words, tran-
scendent experience should be enhanced for long-term practi-
tioners of meditation, in general. Our findings (Fig. 4) show
that (1) meditators (in general) score higher on the M-Scale
than comparable controls; (2) there was an increase in M-
Scale scores (both mean and sub-scales) in LT-MM vs. ST-
MM, supplemented with a significant correlation between M-
Scale mean and MM, as well as TM, expertise; and (3) there
74
was no difference between meditators from the two traditions.
All the findings are aligned with our hypotheses, as well as
with previous reports. Indeed, previous studies supported the
notion that various meditation practices increase the transcen-
dent experience, as measured by the M-Scale. For example,
M-Scale were significantly enhanced, compared to control
groups, in TM practitioners (Travis et al. 2002), FA meditators
(Wachholtz 2006; Wachholtz and Pargament 2005), Tibetan
Buddhists (Chen et al. 2011), and meditative practitioners of
Abrahamic traditions (Lazar and Kravetz 2005).
We also report a positive correlation between the M-Scale
and TAS scores, for the control and both MM groups. This is
in accord with previous suggestions, which related absorption
and transcendent experience (Bresnick and Levin 2006;
Glicksohn and Barrett 2003; Hunt 2000, 2007; Ott 2007;
Studerus et al. 2012). Specifically, it was suggested that while
transcendence is an experience, absorption is a trait dimension
or individual characteristic, which predisposes to and facili-
tates one’s transcendent experiences (Levin and Steele 2005;
Nelson 1990). The TM group showed a similar trend by
exhibiting a positive correlation, albeit it did not reach signif-
icance due to the small group size.
The CSS predicts that meditative practices would result in
lower valence, both positive and negative, as a trait.
Specifically, we predicted that to the extent valence is repre-
sented by PANAS scores, long-term practice of meditation,
either TM or MM, should result in increased equanimity,
whereby both positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA)
should diminish. We also expected the effect to increase with
meditation expertise. We tested the PANAS in the trait form,
and found (Fig. 5) (1) no significant trait difference between
controls and meditators, in contrast to our hypotheses; (2) no
significant difference between TM and MM, as hypothesized
(however, both were similar to controls); and (3) lower NA in
ST-MM compared to the LT-MM group, as hypothesized, but
increased PA, as opposed to the trend hypothesized. We also
report a significant negative correlation between NA and MM
expertise, and a significant positive correlation between PA
and TM expertise.
It has been previously suggested that meditation results in
an increase in PA, and a decrease in NA (Easterlin and
Cardeña 1998, 1999; Ivanovski and Malhi 2007; Tang et al.
2007; Walsh and Shapiro 2006). Several studies supported
this notion, using the PANAS in its state form in
mindfulness-related meditations. Specifically, reduced NA
was reported for MM (Davidson et al. 2003; Sears and
Kraus 2009), reduced NA and increased PA was reported for
meditation combining both attentional and loving kindness
aspects of mindfulness (Sears and Kraus 2009), and integra-
tive body-mind training (IBMT), a Chinese form of MM, was
reported to increase PA (Ding et al. 2014). Other studies in-
vestigated FA meditations, and reported similar results of in-
creased PA (Wachholtz and Pargament 2005), or increased PA
Mindfulness (2017) 8:68–77
and reduced NA (May et al. 2012). In contrast, we found no
significant difference between meditators and controls in both
NA and PA. However, while all the studies cited above used
the PANAS in the state form to assess pre-post effects of
training, we used it in the trait form to assess group differ-
ences. This might be the cause of the lack in significant group
differences we report, as it might be the case that PANAS is
more sensitive to state effects than to trait effects.
The only effects we uncovered were related to meditation
expertise correlations with affect. First, there was a significant
interaction of PA and NA with MM expertise, which shows
that with accumulating MM practice, NA is reduced, but PA is
increased. This supports only one of our two predictions, as
the CSS model predicts a trait reduction in both positive and
negative valence. However, we found a significant negative
correlation between MM expertise and NA, but no correlation
between MM expertise and PA, in accord with our hypothesis.
Taken together, the results might be interpreted in two ways.
The first possibility is that the results suggest that indeed
MM reduces negative valence (measured by NA), but does
not affect positive valence (measured by PA). In light of this,
the heightened PA seen in the interaction (Fig. 5) might be
interpreted as self-selection, i.e., those who remain to practice
MM longer are those with higher baseline levels of PA. This
interpretation partly supports the predictions of the CSS mod-
el, in the case of MM practice. The fact that PA did not reduce
while the CSS model predicted a reduction in positive valence
may suggest that the PA scale does not measure only positive
valence, but instead mixes some of its possible experiences,
related with the autobiographic sense of self (such as interest
and pride) with experiences which better fit the arousal dimen-
sion of affect, related with experience of the minimal sense of
self (such as attentive, active, alert, and excited). In order to
test this proposition, further research should use other mea-
sures to assess separately the dimensions of arousal and va-
lence (Glicksohn et al. 1995; Russell and Carroll 1999),
related to the experience of emotion.
The second possible explanation is that indeed MM not
only lowers negative valence but also increases positive va-
lence (measured by NA and PA, respectively). In that case, the
emotion dimension suggested in the CSS model is incorrect,
and warrants further modification. Such an interpretation
might be supported by the proposition that MM practice re-
duces affliction and fluctuating happiness, but instead in-
creases authentic-durable happiness (Dambrun and Ricard
2011). In contrast to MM, the TM group showed a significant
correlation with PA, but not with NA. This provides support to
the previously suggested phenomenological connection be-
tween TM and a state of happiness and bliss (Alexander
et al. 1987). It also highlights the difference between these
two forms of meditation, TM and MM, in terms of their final
goal and relationship to the autobiographic self. While TM
strives at transcending the personality and its related mental
Mindfulness (2017) 8:68–77
activity altogether by reaching a contentless blissful state
(Alexander et al. 1987), MM strives toward lowering identifi-
cation with personality and internal experience, including
emotion, by witnessing non-judgmentally its dynamic internal
processes (Gunaratana and Gunaratana 2011).
Limitations of the Study
This study is a first attempt to put the CSS model to work, and
to test its predictions. It has several limitations. The first is that
while the CSS model is a neuro-phenomenological model,
only the phenomenological part and its predictions were stud-
ied here, using self-report measures (questionnaires). The rea-
son for this is that while all these participants were studied in
neuroscientific setups, they were collected from three different
studies, one using EEG, the other MEG, and the third used
fMRI, thus their physiological data could not be grouped.
Moreover, about 20 % of the participants reported here were
excluded from any neural data analyses, due to various tech-
nical reasons. We did not want to restrict the phenomenolog-
ical data analyses to any sub-group in order to combine phys-
iological data, so to not compromise the statistical significance
of the phenomenology. Certainly, the next step would be to
test the CSS predictions in a large group where both suitable
first-report measures and neural data will be collected. The
second relates to the unbalanced groups of mindfulness and
transcendental meditation (MM and TM, respectively) practi-
tioners. The TM was a much smaller group compared to MM.
That being said, we still received significant correlations be-
tween self-report measures and TM expertise, similarly to
what we found for the MM group, emphasizing the signifi-
cance of the correlations which could survive the small group
size. In addition, the TM group was significantly older than
the MM group and controls, and had significantly more ex-
pertise. As we could not increase the groups to answers to
these group differences, we preferred to show the results and
point toward this weakness of the study, instead of excluding
the TM group. Indeed, further studies matching more compa-
rable TM and MM groups are warranted, to provide solid
support to the results we reported.
Acknowledgments This research was supported by the Mind and Life
Institute, Francisco J. Varela Research Award 2012-Varela-Berkovich,
and by a grant from the Bial Foundation (27/10).
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