Babrak Karmal

Babrak Karmal (Dari/Pashto: ‫ ;ﺑﺒﺮک ﮐﺎرﻣﻞ‬born Sultan Hussein; 6 Janua 1929 – 1 or 3

December 1996) was an Afghan communist revolutiona and polit ician who was the leader
of Afghanistan, se ing in the post of general secreta of the People's Democratic Pa y of
Afghanistan from 1979 to 1986.
Babrak Karmal
‫ﮐﺎرﻣﻞ‬
َ ‫ﺒﺮک‬
َ َ ‫ﺑ‬

Karmal in 1983
 General Secreta of the People's
Democratic Pa y of Afghanistan
In o ce
27 December 1979 – 4 May 1986
Preceded by Ha zullah Amin
Succeeded by Mohammad
Najibullah
Chairman of the Revolutiona Council
In o ce
27 December 1979 – 24 November 1986
Preceded by Ha zullah Amin
Succeeded by Haji Mohammad
 Chamkani
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
In o ce
27 December 1979 – 11 June 1981
Preceded by Ha zullah Amin
Succeeded by Sultan Ali Keshtmand
People's Representative for Kabul at the
12th Parliament of Afghanistan
In o ce
1964–1968
Personal details
Born Sultan Hussein
6 Janua 1929
 Kamari, Kabul
Province,
Afghanistan
Died 3 December 1996
(aged 67)
Moscow, Russia
Resting place Hairatan,
Afghanistan
Political pa y People's Democratic
Pa y of Afghanistan
Alma mater Kabul University
Occupation Politician
 Profession Economist
Born in Kabul Province into a Tajik family,[1] Karmal attended Kabul Universit y and developed
openly leftist views there, having been introduced to Ma ism by Mir Akbar Khyber during
his imprisonment for activit ies deemed too radical by the government. He became a
founding member of the People's Democratic Pa y of Afghanistan (PDPA) and eventually
became the leader of the Parcham faction when the PDPA split in 1967, wit h their
ideological nemesis being the Khalq faction. Karmal was elected to the Lower House after
the 1965 parliamenta election, se ing in parliament until losing his seat in the 1969
parliamenta election.
Under Karmal's leadership, the Parchamit e PDPA pa icipated in Mohammad Daoud Khan's
rise to power in 1973, and his subsequent regime. While relations were good at the
beginning, Daoud began a major purge of leftist in uence in the mid-1970s. This in turn led
to the reformation of the PDPA in 1977, and Karmal played a role in the 1978 Saur
Revolution when the PDPA took power. Karmal was appointed Deputy Chair man of the
Revolutiona Council, synonymous wit h vice head of state, in the communist government.
The Parchamit e faction found it self under signi cant pressure by the Khalqists soon after
taking power. In June 1978, a PDPA Central Commit tee meeting voted in favor of giving the
Khalqist faction exclusive control over PDPA policy. This decision was followed by a failed
Parchamit e coup, after which Ha zullah Amin, a Khalqist, init iated a purge against the
Parchamit es. Karmal su ived this purge but was exiled to Prague and eventually dismissed
from his post. Instead of returning to Kabul, he feared for his life and lived wit h his family in
the forests protected by the Czechoslovak secret police StB. The Afghan secret police
KHAD had allegedly sent members to Czechoslovakia to assassinate Karmal.[2] In late 1979
he was brought to Moscow by the KGB and eventually, in December 1979, the Soviet Union
inte ened in Afghanistan (wit h the consent of Amin's government) to stabilize the count .
The Soviet troops staged a coup and assassinated Amin, replacing him wit h Karmal.
Karmal was promoted to Chair man of the Revolutiona Council and Chair man of the Council
of Ministers on 27 December 1979. He remained in the latter o ce until 1981, when he was
succeeded by Sultan Ali Keshtmand. Throughout his term, Karmal worked to establish a
suppo base for the PDPA by introducing several reforms. Among these were the
"Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan", introducing a general
amnesty for those people imprisoned during Nur Mohammad Taraki's and Amin's rule. He
also replaced the red Khalqist ag wit h a more tradit ional one. These policies failed to
increase the PDPA's legit imacy in the eyes of the Afghan people and the Afghan mujahidin
rebels - he was widely seen as a Soviet puppet amongst the populace.[3] These policy
failures, and the stalemate that ensued after the Soviet inte ention, led the Soviet
leadership to become highly crit ical of Karmal's leadership. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the
Soviet Union deposed Karmal in 1986 and replaced him wit h Mohammad Najibullah.
Following his loss of power, he was again exiled, this time to Moscow. It was Anahit a
Ratebzad who persuaded Najibullah to allow Babrak Karmal to return to Afghanistan in
1991, where Karmal became an associate of Abdul Rashid Dostum and possibly helped
remove the Najibullah government from power in 1992. He eventually left Afghanistan again
for Moscow. Not long after, in 1996, Karmal died from liver cancer.

Early life and career

Karmal was born Sultan Hussein[note 1] on 6 Janua 1929[4] in Kamari, a village close to
Kabul.[5] He was the son of Muhammad Hussein, a dagar jenral (lieutenant general, three-
star rank)[6][7] in the Afghan Army and former governor of the province of Paktia and Herat
provinces, and was the rst of six siblings. His family was one of the wealthier families in
Kabul.[4] His ethnic background was publicly disputed, wit h some sources claiming he was
Pashtun and that he was Tajik .[8] Throughout his tenure in the Afghan Parliament, Karmal
strategically sowed confusion by alternately identifying himself as Pashtun and Tajik ,
demonstrating a deliberate avoidance of strict ethnic categorization. Karmal's ethnicit y was
a subject of persistent dispute, wit h con icting claims made by Pashtun sympathizers and
a liates asse ing that he belonged to the Mullahkhel Kakar tribe of Khost and Paktia as a
Pashtun, while Tajik sympathizers and a liates insisted that he was a Tajik wit h roots
originating from Kashmir. It is impo ant to note that during and after the Cold War, many
English language sources tended to categorize him as a Tajik , often wit h the intention of
discredit ing him and providing a rationale for the Russians' decision to oust him from power
for not being Pashtun.
He attended Nejat High School, a German-speaking school,[4] and graduated from it in 1948,
and applied to enter the Faculty of Law and Polit ical Science of Kabul Universit y. Karmal's
application was init ially denied admission to Kabul Universit y because of his student polit ical
activist and his openly leftist views. He was always a charismatic speaker and became
involved in the student union and the Wikh-i-Zalmayan (Awakened Youth Movement), a
progressive and leftist organization.[9] He studied at the College of Law and Polit ical Science
at Kabul Universit y[5] from 1951 to 1953. In 1953 Karmal was arrested because of his
student union activit ies, but was released three years later in 1956 in an amnesty by
Muhammad Daoud Khan. Sho ly after, in 1957, Karmal found work as an English and
German translator, before quit ting and leaving for milit a training. Karmal graduated from
the College of Law and Polit ical Science in 1960, and in 1961, he found work as an employee
in the Compilation and Translation Depa ment of the Minist of Education. From 1961 to
1963 he worked in the Minist of Planning.[9] When his mother died, Karmal left wit h his
maternal aunt to live somewhere else. His father disowned him because of his leftist views.
Karmal was involved in much debauche , which was controversial in the mostly conse ative
Afghan society.[10]
Communist politics
Imprisoned from 1953 to 1956, Karmal befriended fellow inmate Mir Akbar Khyber, who
introduced Karmal to Ma ism.[11] Karmal changed his name from Sultan Hussein to Babrak
Karmal, which means "Comrade of the Workers'" in Pashtun, to disassociate himself from his
bourgeois background. When he was released from prison, he continued his activit ies in the
student union, and began to promote Ma ism.[12] Karmal spent the rest of the 1950s and
the early 1960s becoming involved wit h Ma ist organizations, of which there were at least
four in Afghanistan at the time; two of the four were established by Karmal.[13] When the
1964 Afghan Provisional Constit ution, which legalised the establishment of new polit ical
entit ies, was introduced several prominent Ma ists agreed to establish a communist
polit ical pa y. The People's Democratic Pa y of Afghanistan (PDPA, the Communist Pa y)
was established in Janua 1965 in Nur Muhammad Taraki's home.[14] Factionalism wit hin the
PDPA quickly became a problem; the pa y split into the Khalq led by Taraki alongside
Ha zullah Amin, and the Parcham led by Karmal.[15]
During the 1965 parliamenta election Karmal was one of four PDPA members elected to
the lower house of parliament; the three others were Anahit a Ratebzad (whom he would
later have an a air wit h according to Vasili Mit rokhin[16]), Nur Ahmed Nur and Fezanul Haq
Fezan. No Khalqists were elected; however, Amin was 50 votes sho of being elected. The
Parchamit e victo may be explained by the simple fact that Karmal could contribute
nancially to the PDPA electoral campaign.[17] Karmal became a leading gure wit hin the
student movement in the 1960s, electing Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal as Prime Minister
after a student demonstration (called for by Karmal) concluded wit h three deaths under the
former leadership.[18] In 1966 inside parliament, Karmal was physically assaulted by an
Islamist MP, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.[19]
In 1967, the PDPA uno cially split into two formal pa ies, one Khalqist and one Parchamist.
The dissolution of the PDPA was init iated by the closing down of the Khalqist newspaper,
Khalq. Karmal crit icis ed the Khalq for bein g too communis t, and believed that it s leadership
should have hidden it s Ma ist orientation instead of promoting it .[20] According to the
o cial version of events, the majorit y of the PDPA Central Commit tee rejected Karmal's
crit icism. The vote was a close one, and it is repo ed that Taraki expanded the Central
Commit tee to win the vote; this plan resulted in eight of the new members becoming
polit ically unaligned wit h and one swit ching to the Parchamit e side. Karmal and half the
PDPA Central Commit tee left the PDPA to establish a Parchamit e-led PDPA.[21] O cially the
split was caused by ideological di erences, but the pa y may have divided between the
di erent leadership styles and plans of Taraki versus Karmal. Taraki wanted to model the
pa y after Leninist norms while Karmal wanted to establish a democratic front. Other
di erences were socioeconomic. The majorit y of Khalqists came from rural areas; hence
they were poorer, and were of Pashtun origin. The Parchamit es were urban, richer, and
spoke Dari more often than not. The Khalqists accused the Parchamit es of having a
connection wit h the monarchy, and because of it , referred to the Parchamit e PDPA as the
"Royal Communist Pa y".[22] Both Karmal and Amin retained their seats in the lower house
of parliament in the 1969 parliamenta election.[23]

The Daoud era

Mohammed Daoud Khan, in collaboration wit h the Parchamit e PDPA and radical milit a
o cers, ove hrew the monarchy and instit uted the Republic of Afghanistan in 1973.[24]
After Daoud's seizure of power, an American embassy cable stated that the new
government had established a Soviet-style Central Commit tee, in which Karmal and Mir
Akbar Khyber were given leading posit ions. Most ministries were given to Parchamit es;
Hassan Sharq became Deputy Prime Minister, Major Faiz Mohammad became Minister of
Internal A air s and Niamatullah Pazhwak became Minister of Education. The Parchamit es
took control over the ministries of nance, agriculture, communications and border a air s.
The new government quickly suppressed the opposit ion, and secured their power base.[25]
At rst, the National Front government between Daoud and the Parchamit es seemed to
work. By 1975, Daoud had strengthened his posit ion by enhancing the executive, legislative
and judicial powers of the Presidency. To the dismay of the Parchamit es, all pa ies other
than the National Revolutiona Pa y (NRP, established by Daoud) were made illegal.[25]
Sho ly after the ban on opposit ion to the NRP, Daoud began a massive purge of
Parchamit es in government. Mohammad lost his posit ion as interior minister, Abdul Qadir
was demoted, and Karmal was put under government su eillance.[25] To mit igate Daoud's
suddenly anti-communist directives, the Soviet Union reestablished the PDPA; Taraki was
elected it s General Secreta and Karmal, Second Secreta . While the Saur Revolution
(lit erally the April Revolution) was planned for August, the assassination of Khyber led to a
chain of events which ended wit h the communists seizing power.[26] Karmal, when taking
power in 1979, accused Amin of ordering the assassination of Khyber.[26]

Taraki–Amin rule
Taraki was appointed Chair man of the Presidium of the Revolutiona Council and Chair man
of the Council of Ministers, retaining his post as PDPA general secreta . Taraki init ially
formed a government which consisted of both Khalqists and Parchamit es;[27] Karmal
became Deputy Chair man of the Revolutiona Council,[28] while Amin became Minister of
Foreign A air s[27] and Deputy Chair man of the Council of Ministers.[29]Mohammad Aslam
Watanjar became Deputy Chair man of the Council of Ministers. The two Parchamit es Abdul
Qadir and Mohammad Ra , became Minister of Defence and Minister of Public Works,
respectively.[30] The appointment of Amin, Karmal and Watanjar led to split s wit hin the
Council of Ministers: the Khalqists answered to Amin; Karmal led the civilian Parchamit es;
and the milit a o cers (who were Parchamit es) were answerable to Watanjar (a Khalqist).[31]
The rst con ict arose when the Khalqists wanted to give PDPA Central Commit tee
membership to milit a o cers who had pa icipated in the Saur Revolution; Karmal
opposed such a move but was overruled. A PDPA Polit buro meeting voted in favour of giving
Central Commit tee membership to the o cers.[32]
On 27 June, three months after the Saur Revolution, Amin outmaneuvered the Parchamit es
at a Central Commit tee meeting,[33] giving the Khalqists exclusive right over formulating and
deciding policy.[34] A purge against the Parchamit es was init iated by Amin and suppo ed by
Taraki on 1 July 1979. Karmal, fearing for his safety, went into hiding in one of his Soviet
friends' homes. Karmal tried to contact Alexander Puzanov, the Soviet ambassador to
Afghanistan, to talk about the sit uation. Puzanov refused, and revealed Karmal's location to
Amin. The Soviets probably saved Karmal's life by sending him to the Socialist Republic of
Czechoslovakia.[35][36] In exile, Karmal established a network wit h the remaining Parchamit es
in government. A coup to ove hrow Amin was planned for 4 September 1979. Its leading
members in Afghanistan were Qadir and the Army Chief of Sta General Shahpur Ahmedzai.
The coup was planned for the Festival of Eid, in anticipation of relaxed milit a vigilance. The
conspiracy failed when the Afghan ambassador to India told the Afghan leadership about
the plan. Another purge was init iated, and Parchamit e ambassadors were recalled. Few
returned to Afghanistan; Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah stayed in their respective
countries.[34] The Soviets decided that Amin should be removed to make way for a Karmal-
Taraki coalit ion government. However Amin managed to order the arrest and later the
murder of Taraki.
 One of the dirty faces who for years under the false revolutionary mask and false
slogans wanted to seduce the youth was Babrak Karmal, a product of tyrannical
and despotic rule of Daoud, the unprecedented hangman of history.

— Excerpt from the New

Kabul Times, October 19,
1978, demonstrating the
bitter break between the
Khalq rulers and Karmal
after the revolution[37]
Amin was informed of the Soviet decision to inte ene in Afghanistan and was init ially
suppo ive,[38] but was assassinated. Under the command of the Soviets, Karmal ascended
to power.[39] On 27 December 1979, Karmal's pre-recorded speech to the Afghan people
was broadcast via Radio Kabul from Tashkent in the Uzbek SSR (the radio wavelength was
changed to that of Kabul), saying: "Today the to ure machine of Amin has been smashed,
his accomplices – the primit ive executioners, usurpers and murderers of tens of thousand
of our fellow count men – fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, sons and daughters,
children and old people . ."[40] Karmal was not in Kabul when the speech was broadcast; he
was in Bagram, protected by the KGB.[40]
That evening Yuri Andropov, the KGB Chair man, congratulated Karmal on his rise to the
Chair manship of the Presidium of the Revolutiona Council, some time before Karmal
received an o cial appointment.[40] Karmal returned to Kabul on 28 December. He travelled
alongside a Soviet milit a column. For the next few days Karmal lived in a villa on the
outski s of Kabul under the protection of the KGB. On 1 Janua 1980 Leonid Brezhnev,
the General Secreta of the Central Commit tee of the Communist Pa y of the Soviet
Union, and Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Chair man of the Council of Ministers, congratulated
Karmal on his "election" as leader.[41]

Leadership

Domestic policies
Karmal's ascension was quickly troubled as he was e ectively installed by the invading Soviet
Union, delegit imizing him. Unrest in the count quickly escalated, and in Kabul two major
uprisings, on 3 Hoot (22 Februa ) and the months long students' protests were early signs
of trouble. Karmal would also arrest Major Saddiq Alamyar in 1980, the commander of the
444th Commando Battalion, who commit ted the Kerala massacre while Afghanistan was still
under the leadership of the Khalq. Other perpetrators were also arrested, such as other
commandos and soldiers in the 11th Division of the Afghan Army. Alamyar remained in jail
for a decade, even after Karmal was removed from his post as president.[42][43]

The "Fundamental Principles" and

amnesty
When he came to power, Karmal promised an end to executions, the establishment of
democratic instit utions and free elections, the creation of a constit ution, and legalization of
alternative polit ical pa ies. Prisoners incarcerated under the two previous governments
would be freed in a general amnesty (which occurred on 6 Janua ). He promised the
creation of a coalit ion government which would not espouse socialism. At the same time, he
told the Afghan people that he had negotiated wit h the Soviet Union to give economic,
milit a and polit ical assistance. The mistrust most Afghans felt towards the government
was a problem for Karmal. Many still remembered he had said he would protect private
capit al in 1978—a promise later proven to be a lie.[44]

Flag change under Karmal

Flag in use from 1978 to Flag in use from 1980 to
1980 1987

Karmal's three most impo ant promises were the general amnesty of prisoners, the
promulgation of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and
the adoption of a new ag containing the tradit ional black, red and green (the ag of Taraki
and Amin was red). His government granted concessions to religious leaders and the
restoration of con scated prope y. Some prope y, which was con scated during earlier
land reforms, was also pa ially restored. All these measures, wit h the exception of the
general amnesty of prisoners, were introduced gradually. Of 2,700 prisoners, 2,600 were
released from prison; 600 of these were Parchamit es. The general amnesty was greatly
publicized by the government. While the event was hailed wit h enthusiasm by some, many
others greeted the event wit h disdain, since their loved ones or associates had died during
earlier purges. Amin had planned to introduce a general amnesty on 1 Janua 1980, to
coincide wit h the PDPA's sixteenth anniversa .[45]
Work on the Fundamental Principles had sta ed under Amin: it guaranteed democratic
rights such as freedom of speech, the right to securit y and life, the right to peaceful
association, the right to demonstrate and the right that "no one would be accused of crime
but in accord wit h the provisions of law" and that the accused had the right to a fair trial.
The Fundamental Principles envisaged a democratic state led by the PDPA, the only pa y
then permit ted by law. The Revolutiona Council, the organ of supreme power, would
convene twice eve year. The Revolutiona Council in turn elected a Presidium which would
take decisions on behalf of the Revolutiona Council when it was not in session. The
Presidium consisted mostly of PDPA Polit buro members. The state would safeguard three
kinds of prope y: state, cooperative and private prope y. The Fundamental Principles said
that the state had the right to change the Afghan economy from an economy where man
was exploit ed to an economy where man was free. Another clause stated that the state had
the right to take "families, both parents and children, under it s supe ision."[46] While it
looked democratic at the outset, the Fundamental Principles was based on
contradictions.[46]
The Fundamental Principles led to the establishment of two impo ant state organs: the
Special Revolutiona Cou , a specialized cou for crimes against national securit y and
territ orial integrit y, and the Instit ute for Legal and Scienti c Research and Legislative A air s,
the supreme legislative organ of state, This body could amend and draft laws, and introduce
regulations and decrees on behalf of the government. The introduction of more Soviet-
style instit utions led the Afghan people to distrust the communist government even
more.[47]
The Fundamental Principles constit ution came into power on 22 April 1980.

Dividing power: Khalq–Parcham

Wit h Karmal's ascension to power, Parchamit es began to "settle old scores".[48]
Revolutiona Troikas were created to arrest, sentence and execute people. Amin's guard
were the rst victims of the terror which ensued. Those commanders who had stayed loyal
to Amin were arrested, lling the prisons. The Soviets protested, and Karmal replied, "As
long as you keep my hands bound and do not let me deal wit h the Khalq faction there will
be no unit y in the PDPA and the government cannot become strong . . They to ured and
killed us. They still hate us! They are the enemies of the pa y . ."[48] Amin's daughter, along
wit h her baby, was imprisoned for twelve years, until Mohammad Najibullah, then leader of
the PDPA, released her.[48] When Karmal took power, leading posts in the Pa y and
Government bureaucracy were taken over by Parchamit es. The Khalq faction was removed
from power, and only technocrats, oppo unists and individuals which the Soviets trusted
would be appointed to the higher echelons of government. Khalqists remained in control of
the Minist of Interior, but Parchamit es were given control over KHAD and the secret
police. The Parchamit es and the Khalqists controlled an equal share of the milit a . Two out
of Karmal's three Council of Ministers deputy chair men were Khalqists. Khalqists controlled
the Minist of Communications and the interior minist . Parchamit es, on the other hand,
controlled the Minist of Foreign A air s and the Minist of Defence.[49] In addit ion to the
changes in government, the Parchamit es held clear majorit y in the PDPA Central
Commit tee. Only one Khalqi, Saleh Mohammad Zea , was a member of the PDPA
Secretariat during Karmal's rule.[50]
Over 14 and 15 March 1982 the PDPA held a pa y conference at the Kabul Polytechnic
Instit ute instead of a pa y congress, since a pa y congress would have given the Khalq
faction a majorit y and could have led to a Khalqist takeover of the PDPA. The rules of
holding a pa y conference were di erent, and the Parchamit es had a three- fths majorit y.
This infuriated several Khalqists; the threat of expulsion did not lessen their anger.[51] The
conference was not successful, but it was po rayed as such by the o cial media. The
conference broke up after one and a half days of a 3-day long program, because of the
inter-pa y struggle for power between the Khalqists and the Parchamit es. A "program of
action" was introduced, and pa y rules were given minor changes. As an explanation of the
low pa y membership, the o cial media also made it seem hard to become a member of the
pa y.[52]

PDPA base
 Karmal cabinet (1979–1981)[53]
O ce Incumbent Took o ce Left o ce
Deputy Chair man of the Council of Assadullah Sarwari 28 December 11 June 1981
Ministers 1979
Minister of Planning Sultan Ali Keshtmand 28
1979
December 11 June 1981
Minister of National Defence Muhammad Ra e 28 1979
December 11 June 1981
Minister of Interior Sayed Mohammad 28 December 11 June 1981
Gulabzoy 1979
Minister of Foreign A air s Shah Muhammad 28 December 11 June 1981
Dost 1979
Minister of Education Anahit a Ratebzad 28 1979
December 11 June 1981
Minister of Finance Abdul Wakil 28 December 11 June 1981
1979
Minister of Transpo Sherjan Mazdu ar 28 1979
December 11 June 1981
Minister of Border and Tribes Faiz Muhammad 28 December 14 September
1979 1980
Minister of Trade Muhammad Khan 28 December 11 June 1981
Jalalar 1979
Minister of Communications Muhammad Aslam 10 Janua 11 June 1981
Watanjar 1980
Minister of Mines, Industries Muhammad Isma'il 10 Janua 11 June 1981
 Danesh 1980
Minister of Water, Power Raz Muhammad 10 Janua 11 June 1981
Paktin 1980
Minister of Higher Education Guldad 10 Janua 11 June 1981
1980
Minister of Health Nazar Muhammad 10 Janua
1980 11 June 1981
Minister of Agriculture, Land Fazl Rahim Mohmand 10 Janua 11 June 1981
Reform 1980
When Karmal took power, he began expanding the suppo base of the PDPA. Karmal tried
to persuade ce ain groups, which had been referred to class enemies of the revolution
during Taraki and Amin's rule, to suppo the PDPA.[54] Karmal appointed several non-
communists to top posit ions. Between March and May 1980, 78 out of the 191 people
appointed to government posts were not members of the PDPA. Karmal reintroduced the
old Afghan custom of having an Islamic invocation eve time the government issued a
proclamation. In his rst live speech to the Afghan people, Karmal called for the
establishment of the National Fatherland Front (NFF); the NFF's founding congress was
held in June 1981. Unfo unately for Karmal, his policies did not lead to a notable increase in
suppo for his regime, and it did not help Karmal that most Afghans saw the Soviet
inte ention as an invasion.[55]
By 1981, the government gave up on polit ical solutions to the con ict. At the fth PDPA
Central Commit tee plenum in June, Karmal resigned from his Council of Ministers
chair manship and was replaced by Sultan Ali Keshtmand, while Nur Ahmad Nur was given a
bigger role in the Revolutiona Council. This was seen as "base broadening".[51] The
previous weight given to non-PDPA members in top posit ions ceased to be an impo ant
matter in the media by June 1981. This was signi cant, considering that up to ve members
of the Revolutiona Council were non-PDPA members. By the end of 1981, the previous
contenders, who had been heavily presented in the media, were all gone; two were given
ambassadorships, two ceased to be active in polit ics, and one continued as an advisor to the
government. The other three changed sides, and began to work for the opposit ion.[51]
The national policy of reconciliation continued: in Janua 1984 the land reform introduced
by Taraki and Amin was drastically modi ed, the limit s of landholdings were increased to win
the suppo of middle class peasants, the lit eracy programme was continued, and
concessions to women were made. In 1985 the Loya Jirga was reconvened. The 1985 Loya
Jirga was followed by a tribal jirga in September. In 1986 Abdul Rahim Hatef, a non-PDPA
member, was elected to the NFF chair manship. During the 1985–86 elections it was said
that 60 percent of the elected o cials were non-PDPA members. By the end of Karmal's
rule, several non-PDPA members had high-level government posit ions.[56]

Civil war and milita

Troop levels
Soldiers As of
25,000 1980[57]
25–30,000 1981[58]
25–30,000 1982[58]
40,000 1983[59]
40,000 1984[60]
35–40,000 1985[61]
In March 1979, the milit a budget was 6.4 million US$, which was 8.3 percent of the
government budget, but only 2.2 of gross national product. After the Soviet inte ention,
the defence budget increased to 208 million US$ in 1980, and 325 million US$ by 1981. In
1982 it was repo ed that the government spent around 22 percent of total expendit ure.[62]
When the polit ical solution failed (see "PDPA base" section), the Afghan government and
the Soviet milit a decided to solve the con ict milit arily. The change from a polit ical to a
milit a solution did not come suddenly. It began in Janua 1981, as Karmal doubled wages
for milit a personnel, issued several promotions, and decorated one general and thi een
colonels. The draft age was lowered, the obligato length of arms duty was extended and
the age for rese ists was increased to thi y- ve years of age. In June 1981, Assadullah
Sarwari lost his seat in the PDPA Polit buro, replaced by Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, a
former tank commander and Minister of Communications, Major General Mohammad Ra
was made Minister of Defence and Mohammad Najibullah appointed KHAD Chair man.[63]
These measures were introduced due to the collapse of the army during the Soviet
inte ention. Before the inte ention the army could eld 100,000 troops, after the
inte ention only 25,000. Dese ions were pandemic, and the recruit ment campaigns for
young people often drove them to the opposit ion.[63] To better organize the milit a , seven
milit a zones were established, each wit h it s own Defence Council. The Defence Councils
were established at the national, provincial and district level to empower the local PDPA.[51]
It is estimated that the Afghan government spent as much as 40 percent of government
revenue on defense.[64]
Karmal refused to recognize the rebels as genuine, saying in an inte iew:

The people of Afghanistan do not recognise [the rebels] who include a number of
hired people of the reactionary circles of Pakistan, Chinese chauvinists, imperialist
America and Britain, and the reactionaries of Arab countries and the Zionists, who
pretend to be the representatives of Afghanistan.[65]
Economy
Indicators 1980 1981 1982 1986
Total (millions of afghanis) 31,692 40,751 42,112 88,700
Expenditure Ordina (in percent) 62 66 69 74
Development (in percent) 38 34 31 26
Domestic revenue: excluding gas 50 40 37 31
(in percent)
Sales of natural gas (in percent) 33 34 34 17
Sources of Finances Foreign aid (in percent) 28 26 28 29
Rentier income (in percent) 61 59 62 48
Domestic borrowing (in percent) −11 1 0 23
During the civil war and the ensuing Soviet–Afghan War, most of the count 's
infrastructure was destroyed. Normal patterns of economic activit y were disrupted.[66] The
Gross national product (GNP) fell substantially during Karmal's rule because of the con ict;
trade and transpo was disrupted wit h loss of labor and capit al. In 1981 the Afghan GDP
stood at 154.3 billion Afghan afghanis, a drop from 159.7 billion in 1978. GNP per capit a
decreased from 7,370 in 1978 to 6,852 in 1981. The dominant form of economic activit y was
in the agricultural sector. Agriculture accounted for 63 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) in 1981; 56 percent of the labor force was working in agriculture in 1982. Indust
accounted for 21 percent of GDP in 1982, and employed 10 percent of the labor force. All
industrial enterprises were government-owned. The se ice sector, the smallest of the
three, accounted for 10 percent of GDP in 1981, and employed an estimated one-third of
the labour force. The balance of payments, which had grown in the pre-communist
administration of Muhammad Daoud Khan, decreased, turning negative by 1982 at
70.3 million $US. The only economic activit y which grew substantially during Karmal's rule
was expo and impo .[67]

Foreign policy
Karmal obse ed in early 1983 that wit hout Soviet inte ention, "It is unknown what the
destiny of the Afghan Revolution would be . . We are realists and we clearly realize that in
store for us yet lie trials and deprivations, losses and di culties."[68] Two weeks before this
statement Sultan Ali Keshtmand, the Chair man of the Council of Ministers, lamented the
fact that half the schools and three-qua ers of communications had been destroyed since
1979.[68] The Soviet Union rejected several Western-made peace plans, such as the
Carrington Plan, since they did not take into consideration the PDPA government. Most
Western peace plans had been made in collaboration wit h the Afghan opposit ion forces. At
the 26th Congress of the Communist Pa y of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Leonid Brezhnev,
the General Secreta of the CPSU Central Commit tee, stated;[69]

We do not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed in

conjunction with the question of security in the Persian Gulf. Naturally here on
only the international aspects of the Afghan problem can be discussed, not internal
Afghan affairs. The sovereignty of Afghanistan must be fully protected, as must its
nonaligned status.
The stance of the Pakistani government was clear, demanding complete Soviet wit hdrawal
from Afghanistan and the establishment of a non-PDPA government. Karmal, summarizing
his discussions wit h Iran and Pakistan, said "Iran and Pakistan have so far not opted for
concrete and constructive posit ions."[70] During Karmal's rule Afghan–Pakistani relations
remained hostile; the Soviet inte ention in Afghanistan was the catalyst for the hostile
relationship. The increasing numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan challenged the PDPA's
legit imacy to rule.[71]
The Soviet Union threatened in 1985 that it would suppo the Baloch separatist movement
in Pakistan if the Pakistani government continued to aid the Afghan mujahideen.[72] Karmal,
problematically for the Soviets, did not want a Soviet wit hdrawal, and he hampered
attempts to improve relations wit h Pakistan since the Pakistani government had refused to
recognise the PDPA government.[73]

Public image
Because Karmal was put into power wit hout a formal ceremony as in Afghan tradit ion, he
was seen as an illegit imate leader in many eyes of his people. A poor pe ormance in foreign
inte iews also did not help his public image where he was noted to speak like an
"exhibit ionist" rather than a statesman.[1] Karmal was widely viewed as a puppet leader of
the Soviet Union by Afghans and the Western press.[74][75]
Despit e his posit ion, Karmal was apparently not permit ted to make key decisions as he was
following advice from Soviet advisers. The Soviet control of the Afghan state was
apparently so much that Karmal himself admit ted to a friend of his unfree life, telling him:
“The Soviet comrades love me boundlessly, and for the sake of my personal safety, they
don’t obey even my own orders.”[1]

The hands, feet and tongue of the poor Sultan had been tied, and he had no right to
speak [without permission] with his personal friends.

— Zia Majid, a personal

friend of Babrak Karmal[1]

Fall from power and succession

Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secreta of the Central Commit tee of the Communist
Pa y of the Soviet Union, said, "The main reason that there has been no national
consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sit ting in Kabul wit h our
help."[76] Karmal's posit ion became less secure when the Soviet leadership began blaming
him for the failures in Afghanistan. Gorbachev, worried over the sit uation, told the Soviet
Polit buro "If we don't change approaches [to evacuate Afghanistan], we will be ghting
there for another 20 or 30 years."[77] It is not clear when the Soviet leadership began to
campaign for Karmal's dismissal, but Andrei Gromyko discussed the possibilit y of Karmal's
resignation wit h Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secreta -General of the Unit ed Nations in
1982. While it was Gorbachev who would dismiss Karmal, there may have been a consensus
wit hin the Soviet leadership in 1983 that Karmal should resign. Gorbachev's own plan was to
replace Karmal wit h Mohammad Najibullah, who had joined the PDPA at it s creation.[78]
Najibullah was thought highly of by Yuri Andropov, Boris Ponomarev and Dmit riy Ustinov,
and negotiations for his succession may have sta ed in 1983. Najibullah was not the Soviet
leadership's only choice for Karmal's succession; a GRU repo noted that the majorit y of
the PDPA leadership would suppo Assadullah Sarwari's ascension to leadership. According
to the GRU, Sarwari was a better candidate as he could balance between the Pashtuns,
Tajiks and Uzbeks; Najibullah was a Pashtun nationalist. Another viable candidate was Abdul
Qadir , who had been a pa icipant in the Saur Revolution.[79]
Najibullah was appointed to the PDPA Secretariat in November 1985. During Karmal's March
1986 visit to the Soviet Union, the Soviets tried to persuade Karmal that he was too ill to
govern, and that he should resign.[80] This back red, as a Soviet doctor attending to Karmal
told him he was in good health. Karmal asked to return home to Kabul, and said that he
understood and would listen to the Soviet recommendations. Before leaving, Karmal
promised he would step down as PDPA General Secreta . The Soviets did not trust him and
sent Vladimir K uchkov, the head of intelligence (FCD) in the KGB, into Afghanistan. At a
meeting in Kabul, Karmal confessed his undying love for the Soviet Union, comparing his
ardor to his Muslim fait h. K uchkov, concluding that he could not persuade Karmal to
resign, left the meeting. After K uchkov left the room, the Afghan defence minister and
the state securit y minister visit ed Karmal's o ce, telling him that he had to resign from one
of his posts. Understanding that his Soviet suppo had been eliminated, Karmal resigned
from the o ce of the General Secreta at the 18th PDPA Central Commit tee plenum. He
was succeeded in his post by Najibullah.[81]
Karmal still had suppo wit hin the pa y, and used his base to curb Najibullah's powers. He
began spreading rumors that he would be reappointed General Secreta . Najibullah's power
base was in the KHAD, the Afghan equivalent to the KGB, and not the pa y.[81] Considering
the fact that the Soviet Union had suppo ed Karmal for over six years, the Soviet
leadership wanted to ease him out of power gradually. Yuli Vorontsov, the Soviet
ambassador to Afghanistan, told Najibullah to begin undermining Karmal's power slowly.
Najibullah complained to the Soviet leadership that Karmal used most of his spare time
looking for errors and "speaking against the National Reconciliation programme".[82] At a
meeting of the Soviet Polit buro on 13 November 1986 it was decided that Najibullah should
remove Karmal; this motion was suppo ed by Gromyko, Vorontsov, Eduard Shevardnadze,
Anatoly Dob nin and Viktor Chebrikov. A PDPA meeting in November relieved Karmal of his
Revolutiona Council chair manship, and exiled him to Moscow where he was given a state-
owned apa ment and a dacha.[82] Karmal was succeeded as Revolutiona Council chair man
by Haji Mohammad Tsamkani, who was not a member of the PDPA.[83]

Later life and death

Many years after the end of his leadership, he denounced the Saur Revolution of 1978 in
which he took pa , taking aim at the Khalq governments of Taraki and Amin. He told a
Soviet repo er:

It was the greatest crime against the people of Afghanistan. Parcham's

leaders were against armed actions because the country was not ready
for a revolution... I knew that people would not support us if we
decided to keep power without such support.[84]

Karmal was invit ed back to Kabul by Najibullah, and "for equally obscure reasons Karmal
accepted",[85] returning on 20 June 1991 (this could have been on the recommendation of
Anahit a Ratebzad who was ve close to Karmal and also respected by Najibullah). If
Najibullah's plan was to strengthen his posit ion wit hin the Watan Pa y (the renamed PDPA)
by appeasing the pro-Karmal Parchamit es, he failed – Karmal's apa ment became a center
for opposit ion to Najibullah's government. When Najibullah was toppled in 1992, Karmal
became the most powe ul polit ician in Kabul through leadership of the Parcham. However,
his negotiations wit h the rebels collapsed quickly, and on 16 April 1992 the rebels, led by
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, took Kabul.[86] After the fall of Najibullah's government, Karmal was
based in Hairatan. There, it is alleged, Karmal used most of his time eit her t ing to establish
a new pa y, or advising people to join the secular National Islamic Movement (Junbish-i-
Milli). Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of Junbis h-i-Milli, was a suppo er of Karmal durin g
his rule. It is unknown how much control Karmal had over Dostum, but there is lit tle
evidence that Karmal was in any commanding posit ion. Karmal's in uence over Dostum
appeared indirect – some of his former associates suppo ed Dostum. Those who spoke
wit h Karmal during this period noted his lack of interest in polit ics.[87] In June 1992 it was
repo ed that he had died in a plane crash along wit h Dostum, although these repo s later
proved to be false.[88]
In early December 1996, Karmal died in Moscow's Central Clinical Hospit al from liver cancer.
The date of his death was repo ed by some sources as 1 December [89][90] and by others as
3 December.[91][92] The Taliban summed up his rule as follows:

[he] committed all kinds of crimes during his illegitimate rule ... God
inflicted on him various kinds of hardship and pain. Eventually he died
of cancer in a hospital belonging to his paymasters, the Russians.[89]

Notes