HAZOPS METHODOLOGY

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 OBJECTVES OF A HAZOP STUDY

‰ To identify all potential causes of process upset

scenarios which could lead to significant safety or
operability consequences.
‰ To decide whether the current design ensures that the
risk from each identified scenario is at a suitably low
level.
‰ To recommend modifications which will reduce the risk
to a suitability low level, or specify a further study to
investigate the issue, with the objective identifying a
suitable modifications.

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 BENEFITS

‰ The improvements in safety that we can expect after

implementing the recommendations.
‰ Most companies undertaking studies of this kind, find
that the study costs are balanced by the improvements
in productivity they gain as a result of the many
operability recommendations generated.

3
 HAZOPS Methodology
Table of Contents

‰ Terminology
‰ Fundamental assumption - HAZOPS
‰ HAZOPS clarification
‰ Deviation matrix
‰ HAZOPS - how?
‰ HAZOPS - flowchart
‰ HAZOPS - team
‰ Review team: who?
‰ Team functions: leader
‰ Team functions: scribe
‰ Team functions: members
‰ Team rules
‰ HAZOPS - when ?

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 HAZOPS TERMINOLOGY

Attitude Meeting
Preparation Leadership

HAZOPS
Review Documentation Follow-up
By
Team
Knowledge Information for
Experience Study (P&IDs , PFDs)
Team’s HAZOPS
Experience Table

Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Action

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Company : HAZOPS WORKSHEET
Facility :
Session :
Node : Drawing No. :
Paremeter : Intention :

Guide Action
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards S L R Recommendations
Word by

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 HAZOPS TERMINOLOGY

Intentions How the “process” sections are

expected to operate
Parameters Process and operating variables such
as flow, pressure, and temperature
Guidewords No, more, as-well-as, part of, reverse,
and other than
Deviations Departures from the design intentions
(guideword + parameter)
Causes Reasons why deviations might occur
(possible causes)

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 HAZOPS TERMINOLOGY

Consequences Results of the unique cause -- an event

causing damage, injury,or other loss
(potential consequences)
Safeguards Design and operating features that reduce
the frequency or mitigate the
consequences (existing systems and
procedures)
Recommendations Recommendations for design or
operating changes, or further study
Section/Node Study reference : used to organize study
into manageable segments

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 Technical Approach to
HAZOP
Guidewords,
NO or NOT Negation of intention No Flow of A

MORE Quantitative increase Flow of A greater than design flow

LESS Quantitative decrease Flow of A less than design flow

AS WELL AS Quantitative increase Transfer of some component additional to

A
PART OF Quantitative decrease
Flow of A in direction opposite to design
REVERSE Logical opposite of direction
intention Failure to transfer all components of A
OTHER
THAN Complete substitution Transfer of some material other than A
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 Technical Approach to
HAZOP
Specific Parameters
• Flow • Utility
• Temperature • Start-Up
• Pressure • Shut-Down
• Level • Emergency Shut-
• Composition/substa Down
nces • Maintenance
• Contamination • Others

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 Technical Approach to HAZOP
Screening for Causes of Deviations,
A deviation is considered realistic if there are
sufficient causes to believe the deviation can
occur, however, only credible causes should be
listed

Team judgment is used to decide whether to

include events with a very low probability of
occurring. However, good judgment must be made
by the team in determining what events have a low
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probability of occurring so that credible causes are
t l k d
 Technical Approach to HAZOP
There are three basic types of causes. They are:

1. Human error which are acts of omission or

commission by an operator, designer, constructor or
other person creating a hazard that could possibly
result in a release of hazardous or flammable material.

2. Equipment failure in which a mechanical, structural or

operating failure results in the release of hazardous or
flammable material.

3. External Events in which items outside the unit being

reviewed affect the operation of the unit to the extent
that the release of hazardous or flammable material is
12 possible. External events include upsets on adjacent
units affecting the safe operation of the unit (or node)
 Technical Approach to HAZOP
Consequences and Safeguards
The primary purpose of the HAZOP is identification
of scenarios that would lead to the release of
hazardous or flammable material into the
atmosphere, thus exposing workers to injury, and
two, it will help make the determination as to
whether a particular deviation results in an
operability problem or hazard.

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 Technical Approach to HAZOP
Consequences and Safeguards
Safeguards should be included whenever the team
determines that a combination of causes and
consequences presents a credible process hazard. What
constitutes a safeguard can be summarized based on the
following general criteria:
1. Those systems, engineered designs and written procedures that
are designed to prevent a catastrophic release of hazardous or
flammable material.
2. Those systems that are designed to detect and give early warning
following the initiating cause of a release of hazardous or
flammable material.
3. Those systems or written procedures that mitigate the
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consequences of a release of hazardous or flammable material.
 Technical Approach to HAZOP
Deriving Recommendations (Closure)
Recommendations are made when the safeguards for a
given hazard scenario, as judged by an assessment of the
risk of the scenario, are inadequate to protect against the
hazard.

The following guidelines are suggested for the

implementation of hazard analysis recommendations:
– High priority action items should be resolved within 4
months
– Medium priority action items should be resolved within
15 4-6 months, and
– Lower priority action items should be resolved following
 Technical Approach to HAZOP
Deriving Recommendations (Closure)
Recommendations include design, operating, or
maintenance changes that reduce or eliminate
Deviations, Causes and/or Consequences.

Recommendations identified in a hazard analysis

are considered to be preliminary in nature.
Requests for additional information or study can
also be recommended!!
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 FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION - HAZOPS

When a process is operating within its

design envelope, the potential for
hazard and operability problems does
not exist.

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 HAZOPS CLARIFICATION

‰ A HAZOPS is a systematic evaluation of

deviations outside the design envelope
‰ The purpose of a deviation is to guide the study
team into identifying unique causes
‰ The potential for hazard or operability problems
exists only when the process deviates outside
its design envelope

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 DEVIATION MATRIX*
Guideword + Parameter = Deviation
Guidewords
Design As Well Other
No Less More Reverse Part of
Parameters As Than
Wrong
Less More Reverse Contam- Mis-
Flow No Flow Concen-
Flow Flow Flow ination directed
tration
Less More
Temperature
Temp. Temp.
Less More
Pressure
Pressure Pressure
Less More
Level
Level Level
Startup/ Leak/ Human
Miscellaneous
Shutdown Rupture Factors

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 ADDITIONAL DEVIATIONS

Mechanical Seal Damage No Mixing

Exchanger Tube Leak More Mixing
Sampling Less Mixing
Maintenance Service Failure
Wrong Material Instrumentation
Corrosion/Erosion Testing
Pipe Specification Break Relief
No Reaction Ignition
More Reaction Abnormal Operation
Less Reaction External Events
As-well-as Reaction Safety
Wrong Reaction

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 HAZOPS -- HOW ??
Select a node/section
Apply a “deviation”
Brainstorm all “possible causes” (stay within the
section)
Develop ultimate “potential consequence(s) (look
inside and outside the section)
List “existing safeguards” (for each cause and
consequence scenario)
Develop risk ranking (optional but recommended)
Propose “recommendations” (weigh consequences
against safeguards)
Repeat for each cause
Repeat for each deviation
Repeat for each section
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 HAZOPS -- FLOWCHART
Select first section

Describe design intention, operating

conditions, etc. A
Consider first or next deviation

Identify all causes and record them

Consider first or next cause
Identify ultimate consequence(s) and record
them
Are likelihood and severity of
ultimate consequences for this NO
cause too great for the existing
Safeguards? Utilize Risk Ranking
Matrix for guidance

Identify existing safeguards and record them YES

Agee on actions to remove
Agree on necessary actions and record them or reduce cause likelihood or
NO mitigate consequence(s) or
Last Cause? consider further study.

YES
NO B
Last Deviation?
YES Review Additional Deviations list when
Study next section reach the Miscellaneous deviation; use
to discuss potential hazard or
operability issues not identified with
Last Section? standard deviations

Review “other issues” during study wrap-up

session to cover global hazard and
operability issues and verify study
22 compliance with OSHA rule 1910.119
 HAZOPS -- FLOWCHART (cont.)
Cause-by-cause Method

Are likelihood and severity

of ultimate consequences
for this cause too great for
No
Existing safeguards?
Utilize Risk Ranking
Matrix for guidance

Yes

Agree on actions to remove or

reduce cause likelihood or mitigate
consequence(s) or consider further
study

B
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HAZOP Analysis Method Flow Diagram

Repeat for Develop

Repeat for All Action
Repeat for All Process Guideword Assess
Item
All Process Variable acceptability of
Selection risk based on
consequences

Select a Identifying
process Existing
section or Safeguards
operating to prevent
step deviation

Explain Examine
Design Select a consequences
Intention process List associated with
Apply
variable or Possible deviation
Guideword to
24 task causes of
process
deviation
variable
 Technical Approach to HAZOP
The principals of examination include:
1. Intention
2. Deviation
3. Causes
4. Consequences
A. hazards
B. operating difficulties
5. Safeguards
6. Recommendations / Actions
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 ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

• Are the Safeguards enough ?

• Are you comfortable with Safeguards ?

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 Consequences Additional Considerations if needed

Causes Safequards

Consequences Vs Safeguards

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 HAZARD ANALYSIS TEAM

ƒ Leader
ƒ Scribe
ƒ Team Members
Í Design Engineer(s)
Í Process Engineer(s)
Í Operations
Í Safety/environmental specialist
Í Rotating equipment specialist
Í Maintenance/inspection/metallurgy
Í Instrument engineer
Í Electrical engineer
Í Other specialists

28
 REVIEW TEAM : WHO?

ƒ Each process hazards review team should be

composed of individuals from different facility
functions and/or backgrounds

ƒ Each discipline/function on a multi-discipline

review team brings a different perspective and
different assigned responsibilities

ƒ Promote synergistic interaction

ƒ Field operations representative a must

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 TEAM FUNCTIONS: LEADER

ƒ Has responsibility for ensuring that all tasks are

carried out:
- Planning
- Running
- Recording
- Reporting
ƒ Ensures that the team works together toward a
common goal
ƒ Limits opinion
ƒ Ensures expertise of all team members utilized

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 TEAM FUNCTIONS: SCRIBE

ƒ Records the HAZOP study in sufficient detail for

the proceedings to be easily understood

ƒ Does not take part in the discussions unless

requested by Leader

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 TEAM FUNCTIONS: MEMBERS

ƒ Use their experience, training and judgment to

identify any issues that should be discussed by
the whole team

ƒ Assist the team in resolving issues by suggesting

changes that may overcome the problem
ƒ Assist the team in arriving at a consensus

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 HAZOPS -- WHEN?

ƒ Full study when mechanical design is firm

ƒ Mini-study of design changes, anytime
ƒ Follow-up studies at regular intervals during the life
cycle of the facility
ƒ Existing facilities

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 CONDUCTING A HAZOPS
Brainstorming Causes

‰ Stay in the section when identifying causes

‰ For feed sections (from off-plot) it is
appropriate to identify causes outside the node
‰ Do not criticize causes during brainstorming
‰ Use a flip chart or document in the computer

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35
36
 Original Design

Low Suction
P pressure trip

Compressor

37
 Installation of a temporary start up filter (Modification)

Low Suction
P pressure trip

Compressor Filter

38
Company : HAZOPS WORKSHEET
Facility :
Session :
Node : Drawing No. :
Paremeter : Intention :

Guide Action
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards S L R Recommendations
Word by

39
 Original Design

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 AFTER MODIFICATION

41
Company : HAZOPS WORKSHEET
Facility :
Session :
Node : Drawing No. :
Paremeter : Intention :

Guide Action
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards S L R Recommendations
Word by

42
 Gambar 12.

Original Design

43
 Gambar 13

Modified Design

44
Company : HAZOPS WORKSHEET
Facility :
Session :
Node : Drawing No. :
Paremeter : Intention :

Guide Action
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards S L R Recommendations
Word by

45
 CONDUCTING A HAZOPS
Develop “Consequences” Without “Safeguards”

‰ Common error by hazards analysis teams is to take

credit for safeguards when developing consequences
‰ When developing consequences consider the following:

¾ Operator is not available or is not paying attention

¾ Control valves are in manual
¾ Alarms and safety interlocks do not function
¾ Procedures are not followed or are not understood
¾ Do not take credit for soft alarms associated with
control loop if controller failure may be underlying
reason for valve action failure (wide open or
closed); consider the control loop as "blank box"
with all functionality lost.

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 CONDUCTING A HAZOPS (cont.)
Develop “Consequences” Without “Safeguards”

‰ Evaluate global consequences (inside and outside section)

¾ Upstream
¾ Downstream
¾ Off-plot, if appropriate

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 DEVELOPING CONSEQUENCES
Develop Events Chronologically

Upstream Upstream Final

Event Event Upstream
1 2 Consequence

Initiating
Cause

Downstream Downstream Final

Event Event Downstream
1 2 Consequence

Time

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 CONDUCTING A HAZOPS
Identifying Safeguards

‰ Evaluate global safeguards (inside and outside the section)

‰ Challenge effectiveness of safeguards
‰ “Visualize” the accident sequence
‰ Consider time effects
• urgency may reduce effectiveness of human
reactions (stress)

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 PRIORITY FOR SAFEGUARDS
‰ “Cause elimination” first, “consequence mitigation”
second
‰ Inherent design cushion (better than minimum consensus
standards)
‰ Written procedures for
¾ Operations
¾ Maintenance
¾ Inspection
¾ Testing
‰ Training
‰ History
¾ Previous incidents (lack of)
¾ Equipment inspection (I.e., clean or non-corrosive
service
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 PRIORITY FOR SAFEGUARDS (cont.)

Ä Equipment
‰ PSVs
‰ Redundant/voting instruments
‰ Independent alarms/shutdowns
‰ Control instruments

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 EXAMPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SAFEGUARDS
œ Operating procedures are written, up-to-date, understood, and
followed
œ Alarms and shutdowns are tested as necessary to ensure
reliability
œ Operators are trained in the duties of their area, both initial and
refresher training
œ Vehicular traffic is limited through plant. Lines are routed and
equipment located such that potential for vehicle impact to
piping and equipment is minimized.
œ Equipment is fit for its intended use (verify relief and drainage
systems for existing plants).
œ Emergency response plans are written and communicated to all
employees, including contractors. Evacuation signals are
known and evacuation routes established. Hypothetical drills
are held as appropriate.

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 EXAMPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SAFEGUARDS (cont.)

œ Piping and instrument diagrams reflect actual field

conditions.
œ Fire protection and mitigation equipment is installed,
adequately sized, functional, and tested on suitable
frequency.
œ Fire department or brigade is trained with sufficient
equipment available. Fire monitors, pumps, etc. are
located appropriately.
œ Electrical area classification is understood and followed
œ Maintenance procedures are written, up-to-date,
understood and followed. Work permit system is in
place and followed, Hot work, vessel entry, and other
work permit procedures are in place and followed.
œ Inspection procedures and training are appropriate for
the equipment under review.
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54
 TC

TY TT
MPS

TE

C-3605
SET 11 bar (g)

PSV
36001
T

C-3604 E. 3602
F. 3602
LG
FEED DRUM

LT LC H FC
3602
L L
STM
OUT DR FT

FC 6" 36100007-B
8" 3610005-A

DEPROPANISER

M T
J.-3602A J.-3602B

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 EXPLANATION OF DEVIATION AND
GUIDEWORDS
No Flow:
Wrong routing - blockage - incorrect slip blind - incorrectly installed check valve
- ruptured pipe - large leak - equipment failure (control valve, isolation valve,
pump, vessel, etc.) - incorrect pressure differential - isolation in error, etc.
More Flow:
Increased pumping capacity - increased suction pressure - reduced delivery
head - greater fluid density - exchanger tube leaks - restriction orifice plates
removed - cross connection of systems - control faults -control valve trim
changed - open bypass - more quantity (incorrect timer)
Less Flow:
Line restriction - filter blockage - defective pumps - fouling of vessels, valves,
orifice plates - density or viscosity changes - less quantity (incorrect timer) -
small leak (flange, valve), etc.
Reverse Flow:
Defective check valve - siphon effect - incorrect differential pressure - two-way-
flow - emergency venting - incorrect operation - in-line spare equipment -
minimum flow bypass - etc.
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 EXPLANATION OF DEVIATION AND
GUIDEWORDS
Misdirected Flow:
Wrong routing - isolation in error - etc.
More Level:
Outlet isolated or blocked - inflow greater than outflow - multiple inlets - control
failure - faulty level measurement - etc.
Less Level:
Inlet flow stops - leak - outflow greater than inflow - control failure - faulty level
measurement - etc.

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 EXPLANATION OF DEVIATION AND
GUIDEWORDS
More Temperature :
Ambient conditions - fouled or failed exchanger tubes - fire situation - cooling water
failure - defective control -header control failure - internal fires - reaction control
failures - heating medium leak into process - etc.
Less Temperature :
Ambient conditions - reducing pressure - fouled or failed exchange tubes - loss of
heating -depressurization of liquefied gas (auto refrigeration) - Joule/Thompson
effect - etc.
More Viscosity
Incorrect material specification - incorrect temperature - high solids concentration -
emulsification - etc.
Less Viscosity
Incorrect material specification - incorrect temperature - solvent flushing rate.

58
 EXPANSION OF DEVIATION AND
GUIDEWORDS
More Pressure :
Surge pressure (water hammer) problems - leakage from interconnected HP
system - gas breakthrough (inadequate venting) - isolation procedures for relief
valves defective - thermal overpressure - positive displacement pumps - failed
open PCVs - design pressures - specification of pipes - vessels - fittings,
instruments - etc.
Less Pressure :
Generation of vacuum condition (reduced/pressure) - condensation - gas
dissolving in liquid - restricted pump/compressor suction line - undetected
leakage - vessel drainage - blockage of blanket gas reducing valve, etc.

59
 EXPANSION OF DEVIATION AND
GUIDEWORDS
Instrumentation:
Control philosophy - location of instrumentation - response time - set points of alarms
and trips - time available for operator intervention - alarm and trip testing - fire
protection - trip/control amplifier - panel arrangement and location - auto/manual
facility and human error - fail-safe philosophy - etc.
Sampling:
Sampling procedure - frequency - time for analysis result - calibration of automatic
samplers - reliability/accuracy of representative sample - diagnosis of result ,etc.
Corrosion/Erosion:
Cathodic protection arrangements - internal/external corrosion protection engineering
specification - embrittlement - stress corrosion cracking - fluid velocities (vibration) -
etc.
Service Failure:
Failure of instrument air/steam/nitrogen/cooling water/hydraulic power/electric
power/water or other - contamination of instrument air, nitrogen, etc. -
telecommunications - heating and venting systems - computers - etc.

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 EXPLANATION OF DEVIATION AND
GUIDEWORDS
Composition Change
Wrong material or concentration - leaking isolation valves - leaking exchanger
tubes - phase change (condensation, boiling or freezing) - incorrect feedstock/
specification - inadequate quality control - process control upset - reaction
intermediates/byproducts - polymerization - settling of slurries (lack of mixing) -
missing component - etc.

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 EXPLANATION OF DEVIATION AND
GUIDEWORDS
Ignition :
Grounding arrangements - insulated vessels/equipment - insulating flanges (stray
current) - low conductance fluids - splash filling or vessels - static gyration -
insulated strainers and valve components - dust degenerating and handling - hot
surfaces (auto ignition) etc.
Spare Equipment :
Installed/non-installed spare equipment - availability of spares - modified
specification - storage of spares - catalog of spares - test running of spare
equipment - etc.
Safety :
Toxic properties of process materials - fire and gas detection system/alarms -
emergency shutdown arrangements - fire-fighting response time - emergency and
major emergency training - contingency plans - TLVs of process materials and
methods of detection - first aid/medical resources - effluent disposal - hazards
created by others (adjacent storage areas/process plant, etc.) - testing of
emergency equipment - compliance with local/national regulations.

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 EXPLANATION OF DEVIATION AND
GUIDEWORDS
Contamination:
Leaking exchanger tubes or isolation - incorrect operation of system -
interconnected systems (especially services, blanket systems) - effect of
corrosion - wrong additives - ingress of air - shutdown and startup conditions-
H2S - liquid carryover - etc.
Relief:
Relief philosophy (process/fire, etc.) -type of relief device and reliability - relief
valve discharge location - pollution implications - two-phase flow - effect of
debottlenecking on relief capacity - cascaded thermal relief valves - etc.
Abnormal Operation (Startup/Shutdown):
Purging - flushing - startup - normal shutdown - emergency shutdown -
emergency operations - etc.
Maintenance (Testing):
Frequency - sequence of steps - substitution of steps - isolation philosophy -
drainage - purging - cleaning - drying - blinding - access - rescue plan - training -
pressure testing (hydrostatic) - work permit system - condition monitoring, etc.

63
 EXPLANATION OF DEVIATION AND
GUIDEWORDS
Instrumentation:
Control philosophy - location of instruments - response time - set point of alarms
and trips -time available for operator intervention - alarm and trip testing - fire
protection - trip/control amplifier - panel arrangement and location - auto/manual
facility and human error - fail-safe philosophy, etc.
Sampling
Sampling procedure - frequency - time for analysis result - calibration of
automatic samplers - reliability/accuracy of representative sample - diagnosis of
results, etc.
Corrosion/Erosion:
Cathodic protection arrangements - internal/external corrosion protection
engineering specification - embrittlement - stress corrosion cracking - fluid
velocities (vibration) - etc.
Service Failure:
Failure of instrument air/steam/nitrogen/cooling water/hydraulic power/electric
power/water or other - contamination of instrument air, nitrogen, etc. -
telecommunications - heating and ventilating systems - computers, etc.
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 HAZOPS FOR PROCEDURES

‰ Procedures define the actions necessary to perform a

function and the timing or sequence of the actions
‰ Basic parameters are action, time and sequence
‰ Leader may identify additional appropriate parameters

65
 HAZOPS - Guidewords & Definitions
for Procedures
Guideword Definition
No Does not perform the step or operation. A step or important operation in the
procedure is skipped.
More Does more than is specified or required in a quantitative sense (e.g. opens a
valve fully when the procedure calls for “cracking” the valve).

Less Does less than is specified or required in a quantitative sense (e.g. purges a
vessel for 5 minutes when the procedure calls for 10 minutes)

As-well-as Does more than is specified or required in a qualitative sense (e.g. opens the
transfer valves to a number of tanks when only one tank is to be filled.)

Part Of Performs part of the step in a qualitative sense (e.g. closes only one block
valve when the procedure says to close double block valves and open a bleed
valve).
Reverse Does the opposite of what is specified (e.g opens a valve when the procedure
says that it is to be closed).
Other Than Does something different than intended (e.g. opens the wrong valve).
66
 HAZOPS - Guidewords & Definitions
for Procedures
Auxiliary Guidewords

Guideword Definition
How How is the step to be accomplished? Are adequate facilities provided to
allow the operator to perform the step as required?
Why Is there a logical reason for the step? Is the step or operation really
needed? Is anything else needed?
When Is timing of the step or operations important?
Where Is it important where the step or operation is performed?
Who Is is clearly obvious or stated who is to perform each part of the procedure?
Check How can it be checked or verified that the step has been properly
accomplished?
Order Is the order of steps important?

67
 Node Selection for Procedures

‰ Large procedure should be broken down into sub-

procedures for study purposes
‰ A study node should be defined as the sequence of
actions required to achieve a specific purpose; for
instance, steaming out a vessel or process train is a
multi-step procedure whose function may be “to
displace air from the system prior to introduction of
hydrocarbon”.

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69
 EXERCISE
STUDY TYPE : BATCH
STUDY TITLE : PIG LAUNCHER

Description / Background :
The pig launcher is used to launch a Pig. Pigs are devices
used primarily to remove scale and debris from long runs of
piping. There are a wide variety of shapes and styles of
pigs available; the simplest being the round ball type used
to push liquids out of gas lines, to the fully instrumented
intelligent pig used to measure line conditions. The pig
launcher serves as the entry point and mechanism for
inserting the Pig into a live line. The attached procedure
details the steps necessary to launch a Pig. The valve
numbers in the instruction correspond to those marked on
the schematic. You may assume that two trained operators
are launching the Pig for the gas line.

70
 SECTION/NODE SELECTION
Factors to consider:
‰ Purpose or function of the section
‰ Material volume in the section
‰ Processing considerations/physical state
‰ Number of equipment components
‰ Reasonable isolation points
‰ Study objectives

Guidelines
‰ Define each major process component as a section/node
‰ Define one line section between major components
‰ Define additional line sections for each flow split
‰ Define sections at connections to existing equipment

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 HAZOPS EXAMPLE

72
 HAZOPS WORKSHEET
Company :
Facility :
Session :
Node : Drawing No. :
Paremeter : Flow Intention :
Guide Action
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations
Word by
No. No Flow Pump failure P75A/B Unable to circulate water FI-44 should show zero 1. Consider pump running
electrical or mechanical reading on control panel. lights for P75A and B.

Manual valve (s) closed Residue to storage at higher TRC 89 should fully open 2. Consider low flow alarm
temperature control valve V37 on FI-44.

Line blockage As above TI-90,TI-91 and TI-42 3. Consider high temperature

will indicate high alarm on TI-90
temperatu res on long
residue stream

V37 closes on failure or As above 4. Check design

- speciification for heat
due to malfunctioning of exchangers with regard to
TRC 89. temperature and pressure.
Line rupture As above 5. Consider adding pump
Loss of water level in
V330. LRC40 will fully strainers.
open V36 if level falls
quicker than make up 6. Ensure regular patrolling
supply. LAL41 relayed to of the plant by operating
control panel. personnel.
Valve on V330 bottom Unable to charge system
outlet closed or plugged. LRC 40 cascading onto 7. Check whether V330 is an
valve indicates closed open or closed tank. If
position of V36 on closed then install a vent
control panel. or overflow.

V330 empty. No make-up As above V36 indicated fully open

available. 8. Check reliability of
Possible P75A/B pump LAL 41 should function. upstream water supply.
cavitation.
73
 HAZOPS WORKSHEET
Company :
Facility :
Session :
Node : Drawing No. :
Paremeter : Flow Intention :
Guide
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Action by
Word

NO. No Flow By-pass valves opened in Insufficient cooling of TRC 89 notes tempera 9. Consider positive isolation
error long residue. ture inrease and V37 i.e. spade insertion and
would open fully. registration.

Reverse Reverse flow Pump rotation wrong Similar to No Flow. FI-44 shows a zero 10. As action 2)
direction reading 11. Consider installation of non
Pump through spare pump return valves on pump
if valves on spare pump discharge lines.
opened in error.
More More flow V37 by-passed, control May cause excessive TRC 89 shows lower 12. Consider low temperature
valve failure or wrong cooling of long residue temperature. alarm on TI-90.
setting. with waxing and fouling
Two pumps running of equipment. Only by visual 13. As per action 1)
simultaneously. Inefficient operation. inspection.
Less Less flow Tube fouling by residue Inefficient heat transfer TI-48 and FI-43 on 14. Routine monitoring of
causing partial plugging with possible increse in control panel. plant.
of E50A/B. flow to fin-fan cooler.
Throttling of manual Only by visual 15. Visual inspection.
valves. observations.
Leak in system. 16. Routine checking and good
Poor pump performance. maintenance practice.

74