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Transition rocks, b. 530.
Transverse vibrations, b. 44, 93, 101.
Travertin, b. 546.
Trepidation of the fixed stars, a. 179.
Trigonometry, a. 167.
Trivial names, b. 392.
Trivium, a. 199.
Tropics, a. 131.
Truncation (of crystals), b. 319.
Type (in Comparative Anatomy), b. 476.

Uniform force, a. 327.

Unity of Composition (in Comparative Anatomy), b. 483.
Unity of plan (in Comparative Anatomy), b. 483.

Variation of the moon, a. 179, 303. 38

Vegetable alkali, b. 264.
Vertebrata, b. 478.
Vibrations, b. 44.
Vicarious elements, b. 334.
Vicarious solicitations, a. 359.
Virtual velocities, a. 333.
Vitreous electricity, b. 195.
Volatile alkali, b. 264.
Volta-electrometer, b. 299.
Voltaic electricity, b. 239.
Voltaic pile, b. 239.
Volumes, Theory of, b. 290.
Voluntary, violent, and natural motion, a. 319.
Vortices, a. 388.

Week, a. 127.

Year, a. 112.
Zenith, a. 181.
Zodiac, a. 131.
Zones, a. 136.
 A

HISTORY
OF THE

I N D U C T I V E S C I E N C E S.

INTRODUCTION.

“A just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges,

and their sects; their inventions, their diverse administrations and managings; their
flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes; with the
causes and occasions of them, and all other events concerning learning,
throughout all ages of the world; I may truly affirm to be wanting.

“The use and end of which work I do not so much design for curiosity, or
satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning: but chiefly for a more serious
and grave purpose; which is this, in few words—that it will make learned men more
wise in the use and administration of learning.”
Bacon, Advancement of Learning, book ii.
 INTRODUCTION.

I Tof isthemyPhysical
purpose to write the History of some of the most important
Sciences, from the earliest to the most recent
periods. I shall thus have to trace some of the most remarkable
branches of human knowledge, from their first germ to their growth
into a vast and varied assemblage of undisputed truths; from the
acute, but fruitless, essays of the early Greek Philosophy, to the
comprehensive systems, and demonstrated generalizations, which
compose such sciences as the Mechanics, Astronomy, and
Chemistry, of modern times.

The completeness of historical view which belongs to such a

design, consists, not in accumulating all the details of the cultivation
of each science, but in marking the larger features of its formation.
The historian must endeavor to point out how each of the important
advances was made, by which the sciences have reached their
present position; and when and by whom each of the valuable truths
was obtained, of which the aggregate now constitutes a costly
treasure.

Such a task, if fitly executed, must have a well-founded interest for

all those who look at the existing condition of human knowledge with
complacency and admiration. The present generation finds itself the
heir of a vast patrimony of science; and it must needs concern us to
know the steps by which these possessions were acquired, and the
documents by which they are secured to us and our heirs forever.
Our species, from the time of its creation, has been travelling
onwards in pursuit of truth; and now that we have reached a lofty
and commanding position, with the broad light of day around us, it
must be grateful to look back on the line of our vast progress;—to
review the journey, begun in early twilight amid primeval wilds; for a
long time continued with slow advance and obscure prospects; and
gradually and in later days followed along more open and lightsome
paths, in a wide and fertile region. The historian of science, from
early periods to the present times, may hope for favor on the score
of the mere subject of his narrative, and in virtue of the curiosity
which the men 42 of the present day may naturally feel respecting
the events and persons of his story.

But such a survey may possess also an interest of another kind; it

may be instructive as well as agreeable; it may bring before the
reader the present form and extent, the future hopes and prospects
of science, as well as its past progress. The eminence on which we
stand may enable us to see the land of promise, as well as the
wilderness through which we have passed. The examination of the
steps by which our ancestors acquired our intellectual estate, may
make us acquainted with our expectations as well as our
possessions;—may not only remind us of what we have, but may
teach us how to improve and increase our store. It will be universally
expected that a History of Inductive Science should point out to us a
philosophical distribution of the existing body of knowledge, and
afford us some indication of the most promising mode of directing
our future efforts to add to its extent and completeness.

To deduce such lessons from the past history of human

knowledge, was the intention which originally gave rise to the
present work. Nor is this portion of the design in any measure
abandoned; but its execution, if it take place, must be attempted in a
separate and future treatise, On the Philosophy of the Inductive
Sciences. An essay of this kind may, I trust, from the progress
already made in it, be laid before the public at no long interval after
the present history. 1
1 The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences was published shortly
after the present work.

Though, therefore, many of the principles and maxims of such a

work will disclose themselves with more or less of distinctness in the
course of the history on which we are about to enter, the systematic
and complete exposition of such principles must be reserved for this
other treatise. My attempts and reflections have led me to the
opinion, that justice cannot be done to the subject without such a
division of it.

To this future work, then, I must refer the reader who is disposed
to require, at the outset, a precise explanation of the terms which
occur in my title. It is not possible, without entering into this
philosophy, to explain adequately how science which is Inductive
differs from that which is not so; or why some portions of knowledge
may properly be selected from the general mass and termed
Science. It will be sufficient at present to say, that the sciences of
which we have 43 here to treat, are those which are commonly
known as the Physical Sciences; and that by Induction is to be
understood that process of collecting general truths from the
examination of particular facts, by which such sciences have been
formed.

There are, however, two or three remarks, of which the application

will occur so frequently, and will tend so much to give us a clearer
view of some of the subjects which occur in our history, that I will
state them now in a brief and general manner.
 Facts and Ideas. 2 —In the first place then, I remark, that, to the
formation of science, two things are requisite;—Facts and Ideas;
observation of Things without, and an inward effort of Thought; or, in
other words, Sense and Reason. Neither of these elements, by itself
can constitute substantial general knowledge. The impressions of
sense, unconnected by some rational and speculative principle, can
only end in a practical acquaintance with individual objects; the
operations of the rational faculties, on the other hand, if allowed to
go on without a constant reference to external things, can lead only
to empty abstraction and barren ingenuity. Real speculative
knowledge demands the combination of the two ingredients;—right
reason, and facts to reason upon. It has been well said, that true
knowledge is the interpretation of nature; and therefore it requires
both the interpreting mind, and nature for its subject; both the
document, and the ingenuity to read it aright. Thus invention,
acuteness, and connection of thought, are necessary on the one
hand, for the progress of philosophical knowledge; and on the other
hand, the precise and steady application of these faculties to facts
well known and clearly conceived. It is easy to point out instances in
which science has failed to advance, in consequence of the absence
of one or other of these requisites; indeed, by far the greater part of
the course of the world, the history of most times and most countries,
exhibits a condition thus stationary with respect to knowledge. The
facts, the impressions on the senses, on which the first successful
attempts at physical knowledge proceeded, were as well known long
before the time when they were thus turned to account, as at that
period. The motions of the stars, and the effects of weight, were
familiar to man before the rise of the Greek Astronomy and
Mechanics: but the “diviner mind” was still absent; the act of thought
had not been exerted, by which these facts were bound together
under the form of laws and principles. And even at 44 this day, the
tribes of uncivilized and half-civilized man, over the whole face of the
earth, have before their eyes a vast body of facts, of exactly the
same nature as those with which Europe has built the stately fabric
of her physical philosophy; but, in almost every other part of the
earth, the process of the intellect by which these facts become
science, is unknown. The scientific faculty does not work. The
scattered stones are there, but the builder’s hand is wanting. And
again, we have no lack of proof that mere activity of thought is
equally inefficient in producing real knowledge. Almost the whole of
the career of the Greek schools of philosophy; of the schoolmen of
Europe in the middle ages; of the Arabian and Indian philosophers;
shows us that we may have extreme ingenuity and subtlety,
invention and connection, demonstration and method; and yet that
out of these germs, no physical science may be developed. We may
obtain, by such means, Logic and Metaphysics, and even Geometry
and Algebra; but out of such materials we shall never form
Mechanics and Optics, Chemistry and Physiology. How impossible
the formation of these sciences is without a constant and careful
reference to observation and experiment;—how rapid and
prosperous their progress may be when they draw from such
sources the materials on which the mind of the philosopher employs
itself;—the history of those branches of knowledge for the last three
hundred years abundantly teaches us.
2 For the Antithesis of Facts and Ideas, see the Philosophy, book
i. ch. 1, 2, 4, 5.

Accordingly, the existence of clear Ideas applied to distinct Facts

will be discernible in the History of Science, whenever any marked
advance takes place. And, in tracing the progress of the various
provinces of knowledge which come under our survey, it will be
important for us to see that, at all such epochs, such a combination
has occurred; that whenever any material step in general knowledge
has been made,—whenever any philosophical discovery arrests our
attention,—some man or men come before us, who have possessed,
in an eminent degree, a clearness of the ideas which belong to the
subject in question, and who have applied such ideas in a vigorous
and distinct manner to ascertained facts and exact observations. We
shall never proceed through any considerable range of our narrative,
without having occasion to remind the reader of this reflection.

Successive Steps in Science. 3 —But there is another remark

which we must also make. Such sciences as we have here to do
with are, 45 commonly, not formed by a single act;—they are not
completed by the discovery of one great principle. On the contrary,
they consist in a long-continued advance; a series of changes; a
repeated progress from one principle to another, different and often
apparently contradictory. Now, it is important to remember that this
contradiction is apparent only. The principles which constituted the
triumph of the preceding stages of the science, may appear to be
subverted and ejected by the later discoveries, but in fact they are
(so far as they were true) taken up in the subsequent doctrines and
included in them. They continue to be an essential part of the
science. The earlier truths are not expelled but absorbed, not
contradicted but extended; and the history of each science, which
may thus appear like a succession of revolutions, is, in reality, a
series of developments. In the intellectual, as in the material world,

Omnia mutantur nil interit . . . . .

Nec manet ut fuerat nec formas servat easdem,
Sed tamen ipsa eadem est.
All changes, naught is lost; the forms are changed,
 And that which has been is not what it was,
Yet that which has been is.

Nothing which was done was useless or unessential, though it

ceases to be conspicuous and primary.
3 Concerning Successive Generalizations in Science see the
Philosophy, book i. ch. 2, sect. 11.

Thus the final form of each science contains the substance of

each of its preceding modifications; and all that was at any
antecedent period discovered and established, ministers to the
ultimate development of its proper branch of knowledge. Such
previous doctrines may require to be made precise and definite, to
have their superfluous and arbitrary portions expunged, to be
expressed in new language, to be taken up into the body of science
by various processes;—but they do not on such accounts cease to
be true doctrines, or to form a portion of the essential constituents of
our knowledge.

Terms record Discoveries. 4 —The modes in which the earlier

truths of science are preserved in its later forms, are indeed various.
From being asserted at first as strange discoveries, such truths
come at last to be implied as almost self-evident axioms. They are
recorded by some familiar maxim, or perhaps by some new word or
phrase, which becomes part of the current language of the
philosophical world; and thus asserts a principle, while it appears
merely to indicate a transient 46 notion;—preserves as well as
expresses a truth;—and, like a medal of gold, is a treasure as well as
a token. We shall frequently have to notice the manner in which
great discoveries thus stamp their impress upon the terms of a
science; and, like great political revolutions, are recorded by the
change of the current coin which has accompanied them.
 4 Concerning Technical Terms, see Philosophy, book i. ch. 3.

Generalization.—The great changes which thus take place in the

history of science, the revolutions of the intellectual world, have, as a
usual and leading character, this, that they are steps of
generalization; transitions from particular truths to others of a wider
extent, in which the former are included. This progress of knowledge,
from individual facts to universal laws,—from particular propositions
to general ones,—and from these to others still more general, with
reference to which the former generalizations are particular,—is so
far familiar to men’s minds, that, without here entering into further
explanation, its nature will be understood sufficiently to prepare the
reader to recognize the exemplifications of such a process, which he
will find at every step of our advance.

Inductive Epochs; Preludes; Sequels.—In our history, it is the

progress of knowledge only which we have to attend to. This is the
main action of our drama; and all the events which do not bear upon
this, though they may relate to the cultivation and the cultivators of
philosophy, are not a necessary part of our theme. Our narrative will
therefore consist mainly of successive steps of generalization, such
as have just been mentioned. But among these, we shall find some
of eminent and decisive importance, which have more peculiarly
influenced the fortunes of physical philosophy, and to which we may
consider the rest as subordinate and auxiliary. These primary
movements, when the Inductive process, by which science is
formed, has been exercised in a more energetic and powerful
manner, may be distinguished as the Inductive Epochs of scientific
history; and they deserve our more express and pointed notice. They
are, for the most part, marked by the great discoveries and the great
philosophical names which all civilized nations have agreed in
admiring. But, when we examine more clearly the history of such
discoveries, we find that these epochs have not occurred suddenly
and without preparation. They have been preceded by a period,
which we may call their Prelude during which the ideas and facts on
which they turned were called into action;—were gradually evolved
into clearness and connection, permanency and certainty; till at last
the discovery which marks the epoch, seized and fixed forever the
truth which had till then been obscurely and 47 doubtfully discerned.
And again, when this step has been made by the principal
discoverers, there may generally be observed another period, which
we may call the Sequel of the Epoch, during which the discovery has
acquired a more perfect certainty and a more complete development
among the leaders of the advance; has been diffused to the wider
throng of the secondary cultivators of such knowledge, and traced
into its distant consequences. This is a work, always of time and
labor, often of difficulty and conflict. To distribute the History of
science into such Epochs, with their Preludes and Sequels, if
successfully attempted, must needs make the series and
connections of its occurrences more distinct and intelligible. Such
periods form resting-places, where we pause till the dust of the
confused march is laid, and the prospect of the path is clear.

Inductive Charts. 5 —Since the advance of science consists in

collecting by induction true general laws from particular facts, and in
combining several such laws into one higher generalization, in which
they still retain their truth; we might form a Chart, or Table, of the
progress of each science, by setting down the particular facts which
have thus been combined, so as to form general truths, and by
marking the further union of these general truths into others more
comprehensive. The Table of the progress of any science would thus
resemble the Map of a River, in which the waters from separate
sources unite and make rivulets, which again meet with rivulets from
other fountains, and thus go on forming by their junction trunks of a
higher and higher order. The representation of the state of a science
in this form, would necessarily exhibit all the principal doctrines of
the science; for each general truth contains the particular truths from
which it was derived, and may be followed backwards till we have
these before us in their separate state. And the last and most
advanced generalization would have, in such a scheme, its proper
place and the evidence of its validity. Hence such an Inductive Table
of each science would afford a criterion of the correctness of our
distribution of the inductive Epochs, by its coincidence with the views
of the best judges, as to the substantial contents of the science in
question. By forming, therefore, such Inductive Tables of the
principal sciences of which I have here to speak, and by regulating
by these tables, my views of the history of the sciences, I conceive
that I have secured the distribution of my 48 history from material
error; for no merely arbitrary division of the events could satisfy such
conditions. But though I have constructed such charts to direct the
course of the present history, I shall not insert them in the work,
reserving them for the illustration of the philosophy of the subject; for
to this they more properly belong, being a part of the Logic of
Induction.
5 Inductive charts of the History of Astronomy and of Optics, such
as are here referred to, are given in the Philosophy, book xi. ch. 6.

Stationary Periods.—By the lines of such maps the real advance

of science is depicted, and nothing else. But there are several
occurrences of other kinds, too interesting and too instructive to be
altogether omitted. In order to understand the conditions of the
progress of knowledge, we must attend, in some measure, to the
failures as well as the successes by which such attempts have been
attended. When we reflect during how small a portion of the whole
history of human speculations, science has really been, in any
marked degree, progressive, we must needs feel some curiosity to
know what was doing in these stationary periods; what field could be
found which admitted of so wide a deviation, or at least so protracted
a wandering. It is highly necessary to our purpose, to describe the
baffled enterprises as well as the achievements of human
speculation.

Deduction.—During a great part of such stationary periods, we

shall find that the process which we have spoken of as essential to
the formation of real science, the conjunction of clear Ideas with
distinct Facts, was interrupted; and, in such cases, men dealt with
ideas alone. They employed themselves in reasoning from
principles, and they arranged, and classified, and analyzed their
ideas, so as to make their reasonings satisfy the requisitions of our
rational faculties. This process of drawing conclusions from our
principles, by rigorous and unimpeachable trains of demonstration, is
termed Deduction. In its due place, it is a highly important part of
every science; but it has no value when the fundamental principles,
on which the whole of the demonstration rests, have not first been
obtained by the induction of facts, so as to supply the materials of
substantial truth. Without such materials, a series of demonstrations
resembles physical science only as a shadow resembles a real
object. To give a real significance to our propositions, Induction must
provide what Deduction cannot supply. From a pictured hook we can
hang only a pictured chain.

Distinction of common Notions and Scientific Ideas. 6 —When the

49 notions with which men are conversant in the common course of
practical life, which give meaning to their familiar language, and
employment to their hourly thoughts, are compared with the Ideas on
which exact science is founded, we find that the two classes of
intellectual operations have much that is common and much that is
different. Without here attempting fully to explain this relation (which,
indeed, is one of the hardest problems of our philosophy), we may
observe that they have this in common, that both are acquired by
acts of the mind exercised in connecting external impressions, and
may be employed in conducting a train of reasoning; or, speaking
loosely (for we cannot here pursue the subject so as to arrive at
philosophical exactness), we may say, that all notions and ideas are
obtained by an inductive, and may be used in a deductive process.
But scientific Ideas and common Notions differ in this, that the former
are precise and stable, the latter vague and variable; the former are
possessed with clear insight, and employed in a sense rigorously
limited, and always identically the same; the latter have grown up in
the mind from a thousand dim and diverse suggestions, and the
obscurity and incongruity which belong to their origin hang about all
their applications. Scientific Ideas can often be adequately exhibited
for all the purposes of reasoning, by means of Definitions and
Axioms; all attempts to reason by means of Definitions from common
Notions, lead to empty forms or entire confusion.
6 Scientific Ideas depend upon certain Fundamental Ideas, which
are enumerated in the Philosophy, book i. ch. 8.

Such common Notions are sufficient for the common practical

conduct of human life: but man is not a practical creature merely; he
has within him a speculative tendency, a pleasure in the
contemplation of ideal relations, a love of knowledge as knowledge.
It is this speculative tendency which brings to light the difference of
common Notions and scientific Ideas, of which we have spoken. The
mind analyzes such Notions, reasons upon them, combines and
connects them; for it feels assured that intellectual things ought to be
able to bear such handling. Even practical knowledge, we see
clearly, is not possible without the use of the reason; and the
speculative reason is only the reason satisfying itself of its own
consistency. The speculative faculty cannot be controlled from
acting. The mind cannot but claim a right to speculate concerning all
its own acts and creations; yet, when it exercises this right upon its
common practical notions, we find that it runs into barren
abstractions and ever-recurring cycles of subtlety. Such Notions are
like waters naturally stagnant; however much we urge and agitate
them, they only revolve in stationary 50 whirlpools. But the mind is
capable of acquiring scientific Ideas, which are better fitted to
undergo discussion and impulsion. When our speculations are duly
fed from the springheads of Observation, and frequently drawn off
into the region of Applied Science, we may have a living stream of
consistent and progressive knowledge. That science may be both
real as to its import, and logical as to its form, the examples of many
existing sciences sufficiently prove.

School Philosophy.—So long, however, as attempts are made to

form sciences, without such a verification and realization of their
fundamental ideas, there is, in the natural series of speculation, no
self-correcting principle. A philosophy constructed on notions
obscure, vague, and unsubstantial, and held in spite of the want of
correspondence between its doctrines and the actual train of
physical events, may long subsist, and occupy men’s minds. Such a
philosophy must depend for its permanence upon the pleasure which
men feel in tracing the operations of their own and other men’s
minds, and in reducing them to logical consistency and systematical
arrangement.

In these cases the main subjects of attention are not external

objects, but speculations previously delivered; the object is not to
interpret nature, but man’s mind. The opinions of the Masters are the
facts which the Disciples endeavor to reduce to unity, or to follow into
consequences. A series of speculators who pursue such a course,
may properly be termed a School, and their philosophy a School
Philosophy; whether their agreement in such a mode of seeking
knowledge arise from personal communication and tradition, or be
merely the result of a community of intellectual character and
propensity. The two great periods of School Philosophy (it will be
recollected that we are here directing our attention mainly to physical
science) were that of the Greeks and that of the Middle Ages;—the
period of the first waking of science, and that of its midday slumber.

What has been said thus briefly and imperfectly, would require
great detail and much explanation, to give it its full significance and
authority. But it seemed proper to state so much in this place, in
order to render more intelligible and more instructive, at the first
aspect, the view of the attempted or effected progress of science.

It is, perhaps, a disadvantage inevitably attending an undertaking

like the present, that it must set out with statements so abstract; and
must present them without their adequate development and proof.
Such an Introduction, both in its character and its scale of execution,
may be compared to the geographical sketch of a country, with
which 51 the historian of its fortunes often begins his narration. So
much of Metaphysics is as necessary to us as such a portion of
Geography is to the Historian of an Empire; and what has hitherto
been said, is intended as a slight outline of the Geography of that
Intellectual World, of which we have here to study the History.

The name which we have given to this History—A History of the

Inductive Sciences—has the fault of seeming to exclude from the
rank of Inductive Sciences those which are not included in the
History; as Ethnology and Glossology, Political Economy,
Psychology. This exclusion I by no means wish to imply; but I could
find no other way of compendiously describing my subject, which
was intended to comprehend those Sciences in which, by the
observation of facts and the use of reason, systems of doctrine have
been established which are universally received as truths among
thoughtful men; and which may therefore be studied as examples of
the manner in which truth is to be discovered. Perhaps a more exact
description of the work would have been, A History of the principal
Sciences hitherto established by Induction. I may add that I do not
include in the phrase “Inductive Sciences,” the branches of Pure
Mathematics (Geometry, Arithmetic, Algebra, and the like), because,
as I have elsewhere stated (Phil. Ind. Sc., book ii. c. 1), these are not
Inductive but Deductive Sciences. They do not infer true theories
from observed facts, and more general from more limited laws: but
they trace the conditions of all theory, the properties of space and
number; and deduce results from ideas without the aid of
experience. The History of these Sciences is briefly given in
Chapters 13 and 14 of the Second Book of the Philosophy just
referred to.

I may further add that the other work to which I refer, the
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, is in a great measure
historical, no less than the present History. That work contains the
history of the Sciences so far as it depends on Ideas; the present
work contains the history so far as it depends upon Observation. The
two works resulted simultaneously from the same examination of the
principal writers on science in all ages, and may serve to supplement
each other.