Saine Soldierturnedpresidentialcandidatecomparison 2000

University of Florida Press
THE SOLDIER-TURNED-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE: A COMPARISON OF FLAWED

"DEMOCRATIC" TRANSITIONS IN GHANA AND GAMBIA
Author(s): ABDOULAYE S. SAINE
Source: Journal of Political & Military Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 2, Special Issue on West
Africa (Winter 2000), pp. 191-209
Published by: University of Florida Press
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THE SOLDIER-TURNED-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE:
A COMPARISON OF FLAWED "DEMOCRATIC" TRANSITIONS
IN GHANA AND GAMBIA
ABDOULAYE S. SAINE
Department of Political Science
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 2000, Vol. 28 (Winter): 191-209
Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings ' successful coup d'état in 1981 and his
subsequent rise to the presidency of Ghana in January 1993 has had both a
demonstration and contagion effect . In the former British West Africa colonies
of Nigeria , Gambia, and Sierra Leone, military leaders either tried or have
replicated Rawlings ' tactics to obtain and stay in power. In fact, of the 15
countries in West Africa, "soldier-tumed-civilian" presidents hold " elected "
office in 6. The soldier-turned-civilian transition model (STC) involves the use
of controlled multiparty elections by ex-military, presidential candidates, who
once in office continue to use force to maintain power. This is a new and
growing political phenomenon in former British West Africa that deserves
careful scrutiny. The 1992 and 1996 presidential elections in Ghana and
Gambia, respectively, were emblematic of this process, a process in which
incumbent military leaders engineered their countries' transition and tilted an
already uneven playing field in their favor. These transitions did not necessarily
result in a more democratic environment.
When ex-Chairman J.J. Rawlings was "elected" president in Ghana,

following a dispute-ridden transition program to "civilian" rule in 1992, little
did we suspect that the "soldier-turned-civilian" model he used so effectively
would be widely emulated by other military strongmen in the West Africa
sub-region. The "soldier-turned-civilian" (STC)transition model involves the
use of controlled multiparty elections by ex-military, presidential candidates,
who once in office continue to use force to maintain power. Rawlings'
successful coup d'etat in 198 land his subsequent rise to the presidency in
Ghana in January 1993 have had both a demonstration and contagion effect.
In the three former British West Africa colonies of Sierra Leone, Gambia,
and Nigeria military leaders either tried to recplicate or have replicated
Rawlings' tactics to obtain power and stay in power.
Ghana's presidential election in 1992 was by many accounts,
including those of international observers, "free and fair" (Jeffries &
Thomas, 1992:331). To the domestic opposition parties, however, the
election was far from being free and fair because it bore strong signs and
actual tactics of election engineering (Boahen, 1995:277). The pro-democracy
192 Journal of Political and Military Sociology
opposition parties refused to accept the results and subsequently boycotted

the parliamentary election a month later in protest. Similarly, on September
26, 1996, Gambia held its first presidential election since Lt. Yahya Jammeh
seized power in a bloodless coup on July 22, 1994 (Wiseman & Vidier,
1995:53). Jammeh won 56 percent of the vote to 35 percent won by the
United Democratic Party's (UDP) Ousainou Darboe, a popular veteran
lawyer (Saine, 1997:554). Darboe's refusal to accept the election results
because they did not appear to represent the wishes of the Gambian
electorate cast serious doubts over the results. But unlike Adu Boahen, his
counterpart in Ghana, Darboe contested the National Assembly election.
Public outcry and international pressure on Sierra Leone dissuaded
the Strasser regime from legitimizing its rule through controlled elections.
In Nigeria, the Babangida regime presided over one of the most flawed
transitions in the continent followed by the annulment of the 1993 election
results (Rotimi & Ihonvbbere, 1994:669). By all accounts, the late General
Abacha's transition program that was to culminate in a presidential election
in October 1998 would have more than likely replicated Jammeh's example
in Gambia. Abacha died of a heart attack in June 1998 before he could
implement such a program. General Abdulsalami Abubakar replaced him.
In Francophone West Africa, Campaore of Burkino Faso was elected into
office in 1991 and 1996. In Niger, General Ibrahim Mainasara used
controlled multiparty elections to win the presidency in July 1996. Mainasara
claimed victory with 52 percent of the vote in a much-disputed result. In
fact, of the 15 countries in West Africa, "soldier-turned-civilian" presidents
hold "elected" office in 6, from a total of 9 in 1998. With the death of
Nigeria's Abacha, and the subsequent election to the presidency of retired
General Obasanjo, the assassination of Niger's Mainasara, and the ouster of
Vieira of Guinea-Bissau, the numbers have declined slightly. It seems likely,
however, that future elections in Niger and Guinea-Bissau will almost surely
follow the practice of controlled elections. The return of retired General
Obasanjo as Nigeria's current president and Mathieu Kerekou of Benin do
not fit the STC model, however. Yet, what the election of these retired
generals highlight is another, albeit, rare practice in which retired military
strongmen return to contest relatively "free and fair" presidential elections
and are duly sworn in. Many will argue, however, that Obasanjo's current
ascendancy is merely the latest episode in the military's efforts to lay claim
to the state in Nigeria and the unending game of musical chairs between it
and an equally dissolute political class (Williams, 1999:407). It appears then
that the STC transition model is a new and growing political phenomenon
where military men brought to power through controlled multiparty elections
adhere to some democratic niceties while simultaneously engaging in
repression to keep their opposition in check.
Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate 193
Yet, many elections in Africa have been marred by massive fraud

often in favor of civilian or military incumbents (Makinda, 1996:555).
Certainly, this is nothing new. In the past, according to Wiseman, single-
party elections were the means of choice for military rulers looking to
engineer political legitimacy for themselves. The emerging pattern today,
Wiseman contends, involves the use of constrained multiparty elections for
the same purpose (Wiseman, 1998:75). The 1992 and 1996 presidential
elections in Ghana and Gambia, respectively, were emblematic of this
process, a process in which incumbent military leaders engineered their
countries' transition and, in so doing, tilted an already uneven playing field
in their favor.
This article sheds light on this new but growing political

phenomenon by comparing and contrasting the 1992 and 1996 transition
experiences of Ghana and Gambia and specifically their controlled
multiparty presidential elections. It is argued that Gambia's transition and
Jammeh's role in the process closely resembled and replicated Ghana's and
Rawlings' in 1992. In fact, Rawlings' delayed lift of the ban on political
activity, the guessing game inspired by his late announcement of his
candidature for the presidency, and his liberal use of state resources re-
emerged four years later in Gambia in 1996. What these cases demonstrate
is that supposedly "free and fair" elections can be and are often engineered
to achieve a desired outcome. Also, controlled elections do not mean a
transition to a necessarily more democratic environment, even when
opposition parties are granted some political space. The article is divided
into three major sections. The first provides an overview of the 1981 and
1994 coups in Ghana and Gambia, followed by their transition programs in
the second. In the third section, I conclude by drawing out some parallels
between these two cases.
BACKGROUND TO THE GHANA (1981)

AND GAMBIA (1994) COUPS
In discussing the background to the populist coup in Ghana, it is

necessary to understand the degree to which both economic and political
institutions had deteriorated by the time of Rawlings' 31 December 1981
coup. Ghana had achieved independence in 1957 with a per-capita income
roughly equal to South Korea's. Over the next 25 years, however, disastrous
import-substitution strategies, sagging export revenues, rampant corruption,
and statism laid waste to the economy (Lyons, 1997:67). Ft. Lt. Rawlings'
"housecleaning" intervention in 1979 against General Akuffo was a reaction
to the excesses of the top military brass and a decaying economy. Ghana,
according to Hutchful, was in a state of unprecedented crisis. Food shortages
were common, and inflation then, perhaps the highest in the world, climbed
from 443 percent in June 1975 to 738 percent in December 1979 (Hutchful,
1979:36).
By the end of 1981, Rawlings characterized Ghana as "a running
train, rushing downhill toward a broken bridge." The economy and the
moral fiber of the people appeared to have reached a point of no return
(Novioki, 1984:4). Chazan also noted that, by early 1980, it was apparent
that Ghana had forfeited its elementary ability to maintain internal or
external order and to hold sway of its population. The popularly elected
Limann government proved inadequate and unequal to the immense
challenges those years of neglect, mismanagement, corruption, and abuse
had created. Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata, both of whom had earlier retired
from the military, seized power in the dying hours of December 31, 1981
(Agyeman-Duah, 1987:617). The provisional National Defense council
(PNDC) was established and headed by Rawlings.
Upon assuming power, Rawlings proclaimed a "people's revolution,"
a holy war against local exploiters and international imperialism. Through
People's Defense Committees, Rawlings sought to reform Ghana's political
landscape. The committees acted as both official watchdogs and instruments
of mass mobilization. Public tribunals were created to hear economic crimes
against the state. In factories, worker participation increased, and university
students were mobilized to assist cocoa farmers transport their produce to
market, while the military engaged in other development tasks. Motivated
by a combination of idealism and frustration with the status quo, the
vigilantism that arose threatened the country with anarchy. With the
abduction and shooting of three high court judges and a retired army officer,
the Christian Council and the dissident Bar Association demanded the
PNDC's resignation (Enchill, 1982:1797). With domestic pressure mounting,
Rawlings reined in the "leftist faction."
Lawlessness as well as political and economic dysfunction
characterized the first two years, according to Agyeman-Duah. The PNDC
seemed incapable of controlling the revolutionary expectations that its own
pronouncements had created. The general despondency of the people and
their strange aloofness toward the regime prompted Rawlings to lament the
"culture of silence." Owuso argues that the decision taken by the PNDC in
late 1984 to abolish and replace People's Defense and Worker Committees
with Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) was a timely and
courageous recognition of the serious threat to the struggle for true
democracy posed by the PDCs/WDCs (Owuso, 1996:309).
Faced with an increasingly desperate economic situation, the PNDC
undertook a reform program in the economic sector, contrary to its populist
image and to the dismay of the "left." The Economic Recovery Program
(ERP) retrenched some 100,000 public and parastatal employees, devalued

the Cedi, and in time wages and prices began to reflect more nearly their
market value (Ramsay, 1997:37). ERP had some positive effects as it
reduced inflation while annually attracting $500 million in foreign aid. The
human costs were however high. Unemployment increased and urban salary-
earners suffered from falling wages. The rural sector seemed to have
benefited from higher crop prices and investment in rural infrastructure. In
fact, Bawumia contends that cocoa producers in particular benefited and, in
so doing, voted overwhelmingly for Rawlings in 1992 (Bawumia, 1998:47).
Jeffries' 1992 study of urban attitudes toward the ERP also indicated rural
income improvement, and in urban areas as well (Jeffries, 1992:207).
With ERP also came the "governance agenda" of international
lending institutions. Rawlings, aware of the rising tide against autocratic rule
in favor of liberalization, agreed to a transition program to culminate in
presidential elections in November 1992 and parliamentary elections a
month later. Rothchild and Boadi conclude that Rawlings, in principle,
rejected the individualism, acquisitiveness, and transnational linkages
associated with capitalism and while accepting many of the tenets of
Marxism failed in practice to build a disciplined vanguard party based on
democratic centralism (Rothchild and Boadi, 1989:221). These criticisms not
withstanding, Rawlings was able to rehabilitate the economy, liberalize the
polity, and hold elections without much dislocation to Ghanaian society.
Unlike Ghana, Gambia enjoyed, since independence in 1965,
continuous multiparty democracy and stability under the leadership of Sir
Dawda Jawara. In July 1994, the armed forces overthrew post-colonial West
Africa's longest serving head of state and continuously surviving multiparty
democracy in Africa (Saine, 1996:97). An aborted coup in 1981 led by a
civilian and some disgruntled elements of the Field Force shattered
temporarily Gambia's image of stability and peace. The attempted coup
brought to national attention the growing social and economic disparities
between an emerging middle class and the mass of the population. It also
revealed in particular Jawara's failure to deal effectively with corruption in
the state and growing factionalism within the ruling People's Progressive
Party (PPP). Based on a 1965 mutual-defense agreement, Jawara received
military assistance from Senegal to put down the rebels. Constitutional rule
was restored, but the killing of 400 to 500 people during the uprising and the
subsequent mass arrest of suspected accomplices left Gambians bitter and
divided (Nyang, 1981:18). In the immediate aftermath of the aborted coup,
Jawara agreed to join Senegal in a loose confederation that Senegal hoped
would ultimately lead to full political union. But the speed at which the
confederation was configured and the lack of input from the citizens of
Senegal and Gambia led many Gambians to speak of a "shotgun wedding."
Elite Gambians have historically felt uneasy about closer relations with its
much larger neighbor, Senegal, for fear of losing their local identity and
being disadvantaged in a monetary and customs union (Hughes, 1992:222;
Bayo, 1977:87).
Political reconciliation and economic reform typified post-aborted
coup government policy. Like Ghana, Gambia initiated one of the most
comprehensive Economic Recovery Programs (ERP) in 1985. The broad
objectives of this program were two-fold - halt the deteriorating economy
and lay the foundation for sustained economic growth (Sallah, 1990:628). By
mid- 1986, just a year later, the revival of the economy had begun, but while
Gambia's macro-economic policies engendered modest growth and curbed
inflation (Mcpherson & Radelet, 1995:3), politically, the promised reforms
after the 1981 aborted coup did not take root. Clientelism and patronage
continued to characterize the Jawara regime. By 1992, the PPP government
faced its greatest crisis. Endemic corruption, divisive politics, internal party
fragmentation, and growing loss of confidence in the regime's ability to
reverse what to many was a deepening economic crisis set the public
expectation for a coup.
Also problems internal to the army, an institution unwittingly set up
in 1981 by Jawara to pre-empt further instability, increased resentment
against the regime. In particular, the disparity in living conditions between
Nigerian senior officers who led the army and junior Gambian officers was
a source of resentment against the Jawara regime (Saine, 1996:104). Pay
disputes and reduced opportunities for promotion created by Nigerian
officers in positions of power negatively affected junior officer morale. When
Jawara returned to Gambia following a trip overseas on July 21, 1994, the
atmosphere at the airport reeked of a coup plot. The soldiers who arrived
at the airport to receive him were promptly disarmed. Such public
humiliation was to be the last straw and within twenty-four hours a bloodless
coup was executed. The Armed Forces Provisional Ruling council was
established and headed by Lt. Yahya Jammeh who at the time was under
thirty years old. The ex-president and a good number of his cabinet took the
U.S. Warship La Moure County to Senegal where they were granted asylum.
While the AFPRC enjoyed initial public support, domestic and
international pressure began to mount for a return to civilian rule. Gambia's
major economic donors, Germany, Japan, and the U.K. together with
international lending agencies froze financial assistance. A British
government travel advisory to British and other European tourists set in
motion severe economic contraction, in tourism specifically. These measures
combined to exacerbate an already volatile economic situation arising in part
from a devalued CFA franc in Senegal and from Senegal's decision to stem
Gambia's re-export trade by closing its borders. The AFPRC's popular image
was however belied by internal strife, resulting ultimately in several

countercoup and assassination attempts in 1995 against Chairman Jammeh.
Some 40 soldiers were summarily executed following the alleged
assassination plot, which also triggered a litany of arrests of dissidents. The
mysterious deaths of two cabinet ministers in which some members of the
AFPRC were implicated witnessed the regime's frantic efforts to both
contain and silence intra-council and domestic civil opposition. Additionally,
the restoration of the death penalty, coupled with the arrests and trial of
three journalists and several newspaper editors and other opposition party
members, engendered as in Ghana a contrived "culture of silence." This all
pervasive repressive atmosphere and contrived silence made possible by
AFPRC bans on political activity and political parties, raised concern over
the AFPRC's sincerity and Jammeh's commitment to holding elections.
Jammeh finally agreed to a two-year timetable of military rule instead of
four, to culminate in presidential elections in July 1996.
In discussing the background of the populist coups of Ft. Lt. Jerry
Rawlings in Ghana on December 31, 1981, and Lt. Yahya Jammeh's in
Gambia on July 22, 1994, it is important to distinguish between domestic
environmental factors and those arising from organizational military
structure of both armies. In both countries, before the coup broad public
resentment existed over evidence of extensive misuse of public office for
private gain. Poverty and class inequality were widespread, and these factors,
combined with frustration over the rate of change, made the status quo
relatively insupportable to Rawlings and Jammeh. The combination of
resentments, frustrations, and continuing public expectations for improved
conditions emboldened them to target senior military officers and the system
of civil authority. Since the coup, the material conditions for military officers
and military members of the AFPRC improved remarkably. Frustration also
deriving from internal command and reward structures of the Gambian army
was pivotal to Jammeh's coup.
Following the coup in Gambia, Lt. Jammeh projected himself a
populist leader in the same mold as Ft. Lt. Rawlings. Like Rawlings, he
promised accountability, transparency, and probity to root out corruption
and vice in Gambian society. As "soldiers with a difference," Jammeh
distanced himself and the AFPRC form other military strongmen like the
late Doe of Liberia and promised to promote democracy and human rights.
Jammeh then patterned himself very much along lines already charted by
Rawlings. A July 22 Movement similar to Ghana's June 4 Movement was
quickly formed as the civilian counterpart to the AFPRC, but unlike
Rawlings, Jammeh used the judiciary and Commissions of Inquiry to
investigate economic crimes against the state. It came as little surprise that
President Rawlings was the guest of honor to the AFPRC's first 22 July
anniversary celebration of the coup in 1995. Jammeh and Rawlings also

seem (ed) to share an almost 'fanatical' (Owusu, 1996:318) belief that
corruption is the root cause of all evil and if stamped out their respective
countries would prosper. Thus, for Jammeh in particular, corruption and
poverty of the masses of Gambians reflected character flaws of the banned
or self-exiled politicians. Some of the problems Gambians faced lay not so
much in economic institutions of the state but in those who used politics to
enrich themselves.
Ideologically, Rawlings was more to the "left" and certainly more
charismatic and intellectual than Jammeh. Rawlings' post-coup pronounce-
ments were explicitly Marxist and imbued with the language of revolution.
Though Jammeh appealed to Gambians on class terms, especially in
reference to the deposed politicians, he did not use explicitly Marxist
parlance. He also accepted the free-market, capitalist system that he
inherited from Jawara and seldom questioned Gambia's deepening
dependence on the West. Also, Rawlings and Jammeh harbored deep-seated
distrust of politics and party politics in particular. To both men, party
politics and the quest for power by politicians for self-aggrandizement lay at
the heart of political corruption and decay. To Rawlings, "democracy is not
realized by having a machinery for registering voters and getting them to
vote every four years, but also by there being a machinery for identifying the
needs of those voters in between the election periods, and monitoring the
realization of those needs" (Oquaye, 1995:561). These ideological
suppositions in large part conditioned their views not only toward democracy
but also toward human rights as a whole. The emphasis on economic rights
in turn explains the numerous development projects undertaken in the rural
areas by both men. Predictably, both Rawlings and Jammeh paid little
attention to civil/political liberties, such as freedoms of expression, assembly,
association, and movement. Though self-serving, both men used their
platforms to castigate the press and their detractors and to clamp down on
the rights of dissidents to assemble, etc. To Rawlings and Jammeh,
politically or economically motivated opposition to their regimes was
perceived as the activity of individuals or small groups whose motivation was
private gain (Haynes, 1991:431). These attitudes towards party politics,
politicians, democracy, human rights, and in particular the press, were to
significantly shape and direct their respective transition programs in Ghana
and Gambia. It is on these transitions that I now focus.
THE TRANSITION PROGRAMS

IN GHANA AND GAMBIA
Ghana's transition and presidential election of 1992 was the focus

of much academic discussion. Jeffries and Thomas contend that electoral
irregularities not withstanding, Rawlings legitimately won what international
observers also termed free and fair presidential elections. Contrastingly,
Oquaye and Boahen insist that Rawlings won the election only because it
was "rigged." By comparison with many African states, especially Gambia's,
Ghana's transition program was relatively smooth and open. But the political
reform process, which Rawlings called "political Structural adjustment" and
the presidential election in particular, were controlled from above (Lyons,
1997:69). The PNDC and AFPRC four years later decreed the formation of
Consultative Commissions charged with generating debate and discussion
over forms of appropriate democratic systems. Accordingly, Constitution
Review Commissions were set up to solicit popular input in the drafting of
new Constitutions. Electoral Commissions, hand-picked by these regimes,
were set up and assigned the formidable tasks of conducting referenda over
constitutions, presidential, parliamentary, and national assembly elections.
Almost single-handedly these regimes set their transition timetables.
Yet the objection by opposition leaders to Rawlings' intention to
create a non-party political system and its reversal later, were major
concessions he made. Thus, Rawlings, unlike Jammeh, made several
concessions to the opposition-Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ).
He allowed for open debate over the Constitution and, except for a blanket
indemnity for officials of the PNDC, the march toward Ghana's referendum
was otherwise relatively smooth. Jammeh succeeded in excluding political
parties and maintaining a no-party political system until after the
referendum. He doctored the Constitution and included within it an
indemnity clause for the AFPRC leadership. Not withstanding popular
demand, Jammeh kept the presidential age requirement at thirty years
instead of forty to enable him to run. He then banned from political
participation all individuals who were charged with corruption or found
guilty of negligence or misconduct. The Constitution was yet another tool in
the hands of Jammeh and the AFPRC to eliminate from the political arena
all public officers who may have or were feared to have political ambitions
(Saine, 1998:161).
THE REFERENDA IN GHANA AND GAMBIA
In a referendum on April 28, 1992, Ghanaians overwhelmingly

endorsed the new Constitution, amidst charges of inflated voter rolls in
support of Rawlings. Jeffries and Thomas agree that the total of 8,255,056
registered voters was an impossibly large number for a population variously
estimated at between 14 and 15 million (Jeffries & Thomas, 1992:349).
Following the referendum, the PNDC lifted the ban on party activity and
began preparations to hold a vote for president in November 1992 and for
parliament a month later. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by Adu
Boahen objected to the Government's continued restriction on political
freedoms. While the opposition had from April to November to prepare for
the elections, in reality, registration "difficulties" alluded to by Boahen and
others cut the preparation and campaign period to about three months.
Meanwhile, Rawlings had since December 1991 engaged in campaign
activity, by way of official tours to promote his agenda on development and
stress achievements of the PNDC.
In Gambia, the Constitution was endorsed by a majority at a
referendum on August 8, 1996, but unlike Rawlings who allowed his
opposition three months to campaign, Jammeh maintained the ban on
politics and political parties and allowed opposition parties barely two weeks
to prepare and contest the presidential elections. On August 12, four days
after the referendum, Jammeh again banned the three major political
parties, the ex-president, and almost all of his ex-ministers from all political
activity for periods ranging from five to twenty years. On August 17,
Jammeh declared his candidature for the presidency and announced the
formation of his Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction
(APRC) party. He also "lifted" the ban on political activity and political
parties, but this did not include the three major parties. The only pre-coup
parties that were not banned were small and poorly financed ones, like the
People's DemocraticOrganization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS),
whose chances of winning were negligible. While strongly committed to
principles of equality and change in Gambia, PDOIS still lacked popular
support.
Jammeh then set the "official" period for political campaigning from
September 9-24, 1996. Like Rawlings, though, he had also been campaigning
since his " meet the farmers" tours on coming to office in 1994. Jammeh
often evoked excesses of the old politicians, just as Rawlings had earlier
chastised "intellectuals" in Ghana to enhance his already positive image with
rural voters. Both men and their respective campaigns were widely covered
by radio and television. The use of these media outlets, especially in
Gambia, tilted an unlevel playing field further in these incumbents' favor.
While Electoral Commissions in both Ghana and Gambia,
especially, sought to enforce electoral laws to ensure fair and unfettered
access to media outlets, Jammeh more so than Rawlings ignored such
appeals and in the process continued to subvert their already weakened and
compromised positions. The PNDC provided fairer access to the opposition

even though evasion of its own financial contribution laws gave it some
advantage over the opposition. In Gambia, the Electoral Commission
repeatedly urged Jammeh to lift the ban, provide media access to the
opposition, and cease intimidation of opponents, but to no avail. It appears
that by the time these presidential elections were held, the combined effects
of incumbency, inflated register rolls, delayed registration of opposition
parties or their ban, early campaigning by the incumbents, superior
financing, and unfettered access to media outlets gave Rawlings and Jammeh
a "leg up." As single and seemingly isolated acts, these may not seem
decisive, but cumulatively they made a difference in who ultimately won the
presidency in Ghana and Gambia. Clearly, Rawlings appeared to have
provided a more open and level playing field in spite of the obstacles,
intended or otherwise in the path of opposition parties. It also appears that
the opposition parties and their presidential candidates in Ghana had more
of an opportunity to be heard by the electorate. The difference was only a
matter of degree, however, even though Jammeh's tactics were more
authoritarian.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Voting for the presidential election in Gambia took place on

September 26, 1996 after having been postponed twice. This enabled the
July 22 Movement to campaign on behalf of Jammeh. Jammeh secured 56
percent of the vote to Darboe's 35 percent. However, Darboe's refusal to
accept the results because they were pre-programmed was supported by the
Commonwealth. Thus, while commending the Electoral commission for a job
well done, the Commonwealth raised doubts over the election results. This
was a campaign process in which major political opponents were banned and
were made to feel fear for their lives. Unlike the opposition in Ghana,
opposition parties in Gambia contested the January 2, 1997, National
Assembly election, which by all accounts was free and fair. Jammeh's APRC
party won 33 seats to the combined opposition total of 12 seats in the new
National Assembly. With four additional seats of nominated members,
President Jammeh received a 37-seat majority and control over matters of
state (Saine, 1997:556). In Ghana, four years earlier, the NDC headed by
Rawlings won 58.3 percent of the vote to Adu Boahen's 30.4 percent, but the
opposition's refusal to also accept the results and their subsequent decision
to not contest the parliamentary elections in December 1992 "soured the
taste of victory even for Rawlings' keen supporters. Boahen insists that the
election was rigged, but decided to contest the presidential election anyway
because boycotting them would not have prevented the international
community from accepting the results" (Boahen, 1995:277). Boahen also

faulted the Electoral Commission for its collusion with the NDC to rig the
elections. In a dissenting article to Jeffries' and Thomas', Oquaye (Oquaye,
1995:267) contends that the Electoral Commission's action "led to charges
that the results were pre-programmed." He cites in particular the
"Fonteakwa case," also referred to by Jeffries and Thomas, as a tragic case
of vote rigging in favor of Rawlings', when earlier counts had indicated an
NPP/Boahen victory. Also, the political parties' law outlawing the use of
names, symbols, and colors of previous political parties, foreign
contributions, and limiting individual contributions to about $200 worked in
Rawlings' favor, Oquaye argues.
Accordingly, Ghana's and Gambia's new opposition parties were
weakened. They are fragile creations born of the need to compete in the
electoral process. These parties typically lacked the material, financial, and
sometimes human resources to function effectively under the often-unfair
conditions imposed by Rawlings and Jammeh. In such an atmosphere,
Monga argues, opposition parties have objective reasons for being in no rush
to participate in elections. When they do in order to garner votes, the
feeling that they are taking part in a charade plagues them (Monga,
1997:158). The presidential elections in Ghana and Gambia were therefore
marred by numerous irregularities that, in hindsight, disadvantaged severely
the opposition parties and opposition presidential candidates. Since they, in
general, lack access and the means of communication to sufficiently
articulate their views, these parties and their presidential candidates may
threaten or be forced to boycott elections to register their displeasure with
the electoral process. It appears that in both Ghana and Gambia the
transitions were held hostage. These regimes marginalized leaders and
political parties within civil society that posed actual or perceived threats to
their continued rule.
Such exclusion, however, was not limited to manipulation of the
electoral process. Often, the spate of violence against opposition party
members, coupled with the lack of civility in speeches by incumbents, leaves
opposition leaders and their supporters vulnerable to physical attack and
sometimes death. Rawlings characterized his 1992 opponents as "punks,"
"disgruntled politicians," and "thieves" (Monga, 1997:165). Jammeh's
appellation of his opposition was similarly vile, especially when he
threatened in 1995 that those who opposed his rule "would go six feet
deep." Darboe's threat to boycott the National Assembly election and
Boahen's refusal to contest the parliamentary elections reflected a lack of
confidence in the controlled electoral process. In fact, when the polls closed
in Gambia at 9 p.m. on September 26, Darboe, members of his family, and
seven party supporters of the UDP sought refuge at the Senegalese Embassy
Soldier-T urned-Pr esidential Candidate 203
in Banjul. They vowed to leave only if assured of their safety. They left four
days later after Jammeh assured them of their safety. The actual use of
violent speech is reflective of a political game in which "winner takes all"
fight to the finish. Here, defeat means a loss not only of the emoluments
and status that office brings but sometimes life itself. One must win by any
means necessary. Since regimes such as those in Ghana in 1992 and Gambia
in 1996 had a monopoly over the instruments of violence and their use, the
political process was neither fair nor level. The latter should however be
qualified to note that Ghana's transition was less encumbered, compared to
Gambia's, but it was constrained nonetheless. Perhaps the difference lies
more in degrees of severity of tactics used than the outcomes per se, yet in
the end it was the ultimate outcome, winning, that mattered. And the
parliamentary elections in Ghana as in Gambia may have only consolidated
"military" rule and control.
Albeit by a smaller margin of victory both Rawlings and Jammeh
could have won under more open and competitive conditions. Assessments
of the presidential election of 1992 in Ghana suggest that Rawlings won the
majority of votes in each region, except Ashanti. He lost in many urban
communities including Bolgatanga and Navorongo, Sunyani East (Brong-
Ahafo), Yendi, Sekondi, and Takoradi. In the central region, he won Cape
Coast but with only 45.85 percent of the vote (Bawumia, 1998:48). Similarly,
Jammeh won a majority of the constituencies including Saloum, Serrekunda,
and Banjul North and South. Jammeh lost Wuli, Jarra, and Kiang to his
opponents. In Ghana particularly, the result of the presidential election
suggested that Rawlings derived much of his support from rural
constituencies. The results show a rural-urban split in voter behavior.
Similarly, Jammeh's support seems to have come mostly from the rural areas
and the youth in poor and urban communities.
Another reason why both Jammeh and Rawlings could have won
was their respective successes in enhancing rural standards of living. In
Ghana, a major extension of the national electric grid to the deprived
Northern region and the widespread repair of roads, railways, and bridges
could have won the hearts of northerners. Upon coming to power, Jammeh
also constructed two high schools, numerous middle schools, roads,
overpasses, refurbished Radio Gambia studios and the national airport, gave
Gambia its first television station, and revealed massive corruption of the
deposed Jawara regime. Almost thirty years of PPP rule had left Gambia
with only two government high schools and hospitals to complement
privately owned ones. These revelations of corruption (Wiseman, 1996:931)
in particular and the development projects endeared Jammeh to the
populace.
Jammeh, a sometimes erudite campaigner, accused Darboe and the

UDP of attempting to restore the erstwhile Jawara regime and his system
of clientelism and patronage. To the average Gambian, this seemed plausible
but unlikely, even if Darboe had represented in court some ex-ministers of
Jawara being investigated for corruption. Nonetheless, most Gambians had
little or no interest in the restoration of Jawara through a Darboe presidency
and certainly none cared to risk his life for his return or his ex-ministers.
Likewise, Rawlings' excellent campaign skills, his skillful use of the benefits
of incumbency and splits within the opposition, in part, generated by him,
could have legitimately earned him the presidency. In fact, Lyons suggests
that these factors explain the outcomes better than do theories about fraud
(Lyons, 1997:70). Being populists, both candidates assured their respective
electorate of continuity in their development projects and a future of
improved lives under their respective administrations. As elsewhere, sound
economies are the bedrock of political stability, and voters in Ghana and
Gambia expected their presidential candidates to remove existing class and
regional disparities by extending social and economic benefits to previously
disadvantaged groups. Both Rawlings and Jammeh had already established
a relatively good economic and social development record, and it would
have seemed unlikely that the electorate in Ghana and Gambia would have
changed mid-stream to vote for Boahen and Darboe. Because the PNDC
and AFPRC putatively acted on behalf of "the people," opposition political
parties and their presidential candidates were cast along antagonistic class
terms, intent on undermining the hard won-gains and to reintroduce the
"past." Thus, it appears that Rawlings and Jammeh could have won under
more competitive and a less constrained political environment. This was a
risk they would not take for fear of losing. This is precisely why they
engineered the transitions and controlled their presidential elections as they
did. The tactics employed proved useful in putting them into office and
winning Western acceptance.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the transition programs and presidential elections in

Ghana and Gambia in 1992 and 1996, respectively, suggests remarkable
similarities in both process and outcome. What is striking in particular is the
degree and extent to which Rawlings and Jammeh both macro-managed his
own country's transition programs from the very start to ensure their election
victories. The power and advantages of incumbency, coupled with hand
picked electoral commissions and subverted electoral laws, are cases in
point. Additionally, inflated voter rolls, a ban on politics and political
parties', "unofficial" campaigning by the incumbents, and doctored
constitutions in Gambia further weakened the opposition. Also, outright

bans on major political opponents and political parties, in Gambia as well
as intimidation, violence, and the use of state finances and state-owned
media outlets contributed significantly to the respective victories of Rawlings
and Jammeh. In fact, Rawlings1 ruthless use of Ghana's state funds enabled
him to infiltrate the opposition on the left, the "Nkrumahist", as well as
causing them to divide into four parties (Baker, 1998:121).
The difference between these regimes is that Rawlings appeared
more successful at penetrating Ghana's civil society with various alternative
social organizations to engender acceptance and support for his populist
regime. Jammeh, by contrast, made relatively modest inroads in Gambia's
civil society and, barring the July 22 Movement, most Gambians remained
onlookers. Rawlings also had over a decade with Western help to build a
support base, while Jammeh had less than three years. The combined effects
of international and domestic pressure engendered in Gambia a less tolerant
and relatively more authoritarian political climate. Also, Jammeh's coup in
1994 occurred at a time when the continent was experiencing a resurgence
in "democracy" and "democracy movements," while Rawlings' 1981 coup
occurred under more coup-friendly, cold-war conditions. Furthermore, the
abrupt end to Gambia's long pre-coup tradition of multiparty politics and
democracy was not looked upon kindly by Western countries who control
the purse strings to Gambia's development, which gave way to a relatively
more repressive climate.
Another crucial difference lies in Ghana's relatively more organized,
albeit splintered, opposition whose emergence in part was made possible by
a relatively open and competitive system. This was underpinned by a
relatively buoyant economy and supported by the lending institutions. Thus,
Rawlings appeared to have provided a relatively more open and level playing
field in spite of the intended obstacles in the path of the opposition.
Jammeh's initial defiant posturing since the coup and his growing reliance
on Libya, Taiwan, and Iran to avert an impending economic crisis also
created a contraction of political space for the opposition in Gambia.
In conclusion, this article suggests that the current emphasis on
democratization by the West in Africa must not lose sight of growing
"illiberalism" in the West-Africa sub-region, where soldier-turned-civilian
presidents head 6 of the 15 countries. Additionally, constrained multiparty
elections within a politically proscribed system should not be mistaken for
genuine participatory democracy, nor should a "democratic" façade be
equated with genuine democracy. This is because despite Ghana's much
improved 1996 elections, formidable obstacles to democratic consolidation
persist. With all the money that was spent and the extensive preparations
that were made, the 1996 elections were marred by serious lapses (Boadi,
1997:83). The voter registration figures alone were disturbing. While

opposition parties and their leaders enjoy growing popularity and political
space in Gambia, democratic consolidation is unlikely in the near future.
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University of Florida Press

THE SOLDIER-TURNED-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE: A COMPARISON OF FLAWED

Journal of Political and Military Sociology 2000, Vol. 28 (Winter): 191-209

When ex-Chairman J.J. Rawlings was "elected" president in Ghana,

opposition parties refused to accept the results and subsequently boycotted

Yet, many elections in Africa have been marred by massive fraud

This article sheds light on this new but growing political

BACKGROUND TO THE GHANA (1981)

In discussing the background to the populist coup in Ghana, it is

(ERP) retrenched some 100,000 public and parastatal employees, devalued

was however belied by internal strife, resulting ultimately in several

anniversary celebration of the coup in 1995. Jammeh and Rawlings also

THE TRANSITION PROGRAMS

Ghana's transition and presidential election of 1992 was the focus

THE REFERENDA IN GHANA AND GAMBIA

In a referendum on April 28, 1992, Ghanaians overwhelmingly

compromised positions. The PNDC provided fairer access to the opposition

Voting for the presidential election in Gambia took place on

community from accepting the results" (Boahen, 1995:277). Boahen also

Jammeh, a sometimes erudite campaigner, accused Darboe and the

Analysis of the transition programs and presidential elections in

constitutions in Gambia further weakened the opposition. Also, outright

1997:83). The voter registration figures alone were disturbing. While

Modern African Studies 25:613-642.

Ghana." Review of African Political Economy 14:26-52.

Jeffries, R. & C. Thomas

Modern African Studies 34: 555-573.

McPherson, M., and

Rothchild, D., and E. Boadi

Rotimi, A., and J. Ihonvbere

Wiseman, J., and E. Vidier

World Quarterly 17:917-940.

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