Civil Law Reviewer

IN GENERAL Nationality Theory

Lex Rei Sitae Rule and its exceptions 1. All statutes, including those of local
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS application and private laws;
Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebraciones
2. Presidential decrees and executive orders
PROPERTY G. Human relations promulgated by the President in the exercise of
Principle of Abuse of Rights legislative powers;
PRESCRIPTION
Unjust Enrichment 3. Administrative rules and regulations, if their
SUCCESSION Parens Patriae purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
OBLIGATIONS Damages Against Public Officials and for Unfair
Competition 4. The charter of a city;
CONTRACTS 5. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board, if
A. When law takes effect they are meant not merely to interpret but to
NATURAL OBLIGATIONS "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act
When does an ordinary law take effect? which that body is supposed to enforce.
ESTOPPEL ART 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
When publication NOT required
following the completion of their publication
SPECIAL CONTRACTS either 1. Interpretative regulations and those merely
QUASI-CONTRACTS 1. in the Official Gazette OR internal in nature;
2. in a newspaper of general circulation in the 2. Letters of instructions;
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. 3. Municipal ordinances are not covered by this
xxxx rule but by the Local Government Code.
TORTS
Is publication needed?
DAMAGES The publication must be in full or it is no
Tañada v. Tuvera publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to public of the contents of the laws.
IN GENERAL the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. Fariñas v. Executive Secretary
A. When law takes effect This clause does not mean that the legislator may make The "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No.
B. Retroactivity of laws the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any 9006 which provides that it "shall take effect
other date without its previous publication. immediately upon its approval," is defective.
C. Mandatory or prohibitory laws
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
D. Waiver of rights legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
E. Repeal of laws
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect
F. Conflict of laws What needs to be published? fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette
Theory of Territoriality or a newspaper of general circulation.
Effectivity of the Civil Code
This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
Lara v. Del Rosario
August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into
effect, that is, one year after its publication in the
Official Gazette.
B. Retroactivity of laws
ART 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.
Meaning of Prospectivity
Mun. of Coron v. Carino
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to
that extent.
Exceptions to the rule on prospectivity
1) When the law provides for its retroactivity;
2) When the law is curative or remedial;
3) When the law is procedural;
4) When the law is penal in character and
advantageous to the accused;
5) When substantive right is declared for the first
time, unless vested rights are impaired.
Camacho v. CIR
A retrospective or retroactive law is that which
1. creates a new obligation,
2. imposes a new duty or
3. attaches a new disability in respect to a
transaction already past;
but that statute is not made retrospective because it
draws on antecedent facts for its operation.
Our Constitution does not in terms prohibit the
enactment of retrospective laws which do not impair
the obligations of contract or deprive a person of
property without due process of law, that is, which do
not divest rights of property and vested rights.
People v. Patalin, et al. on the Death Penalty
There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty
in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited accused-
appellants. The above-cited provision of the
Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the
penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This penal
provision may be given retroactive effect during three
possible stages of a criminal prosecution:
(a) when the crime has been committed and the
prosecution began;
(b) when sentence has been passed but the service
has not begun; and
(c) when the sentence is being carried out.
There is no question that the abolition of the death
penalty benefits herein accused-appellants. Perforce,
the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty
will NOT affect them.
Bernabe v. Alejo on Vested Rights
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code
to illegitimate children who were still minors at the
time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or
taken away. The minors have up to four years from
attaining majority age within which to file an action for
recognition.
Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it
gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition
within four years from attaining majority age.
Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take
Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because
that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
C. Mandatory or prohibitory laws
ART 5. Acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
Except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
GR: Acts in violation of Mandatory or Prohibitory
laws is VOID.
EXC: When the law makes the act
1. Not void but merely voidable;
2. Valid, but penalizes the wrongdoer;
3. Valid , when it should have been void;
4. Void, but recognizes some legal effect flowing
therefrom.
PAFLU v. Sec. of Labor et al.
Legal provisions prescribing the period within which a
decision should be rendered are directory, not
mandatory in nature — in the sense that, a judgment
promulgated after the expiration of said period is not
null and void, although the officer who failed to comply
with law may be dealt with administratively, in
consequence of his delays - unless the intention to the
contrary is manifest.
Marcos v. COMELEC, et al.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring
rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, "so that
non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended
such result it would have clearly indicated it."
D. Waiver of rights
The concept of waiver has been defined as a voluntary
and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim
or privilege, which except for such waiver the party
would have enjoyed.
Rule and Exceptions
ART 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver
is
1. contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or
2. prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
Requisites for a valid waiver
 1. The person waiving must be capacitated to make
the waiver;
2. The waiver must be made clearly, but not
necessarily express;
3. The person waiving must actually have the right
which he is renouncing;
4. The waiver must not be contrary to law, morals,
public policy, public order, or good customs;
5. The waiver must not prejudice others with a
right recognized by law.
Rights that cannot be waived
Cui v. Arellano University
WON the waiver of petitioner’s right to transfer to
another school without refunding to the respondent the
equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
The stipulation in question is contrary to public policy
and hence, null and void. Scholarships are awarded in
recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in
school to bolster its prestige.
Scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep
brilliant students in school for their propaganda value
but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom
society has an established interest or a first lien.
Leal v. IAC
The law provides that for conventional redemption to
take place, the vendor should reserve, in no uncertain
terms, the right to repurchase the thing sold. Thus, the
right to redeem must be expressly stipulated in the
contract of sale in order that it may have legal existence.
In the case before us, we cannot find any express or
implied grant of a right to repurchase, nor can we infer,
from any word or words in the questioned paragraph,
the existence of any such right.
Otamias v. Republic 2016 Leonen, J
A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a
retired officer of the AFP, which is the subject of a deed
of assignment drawn by him granting support to his
wife and five (5) children. The benefit of exemption
from execution of pension benefits is a statutory
right that may be waived, especially in order to
comply with a husband's duty to provide support under
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution and the Family Code.
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of
Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim that
his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The
right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel
Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his
retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of
third persons, but even protects the right of his family
to receive support.
E. Repeal of laws
How are laws repealed?
ART 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall
not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be VOID
and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
F. Conflict of laws
Theory of Territoriality
ART 14. Penal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to
treaty stipulations.
Nationality Theory
ART 15. Laws relating
a) to family rights and duties, or
b) to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
Orion Savings v. Suzuki 2014
All matters concerning the title and disposition of real
property are determined by what is known as the lex
loci rei sitae. This principle even governs the capacity
of the person making a deed relating to
immovable property, no matter what its nature may
be.
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem 2014
Under the doctrine of processual presumption,
if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law
is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
However, when the foreign law, judgment or contract
is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied.
Lex Rei Sitae Rule and its exceptions
ART 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect
a) to the order of succession and
b) to the amount of successional rights
and
c) to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, and
d) to the capacity to succeed (Art 1039)
shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
Renvoi Doctrine
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the
court of the forum, in determining the question before
it, must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws,
and then apply the law to the actual question which
the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may
be the law of the forum.
Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebraciones
ART 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall
be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Intrinsic Validity of Contracts
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts
is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule
followed by most legal systems, however, is that the
intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by
the lex contractus or “proper law of the contract.”
This is
1. the law voluntarily agreed upon by the
parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or
2. the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly (the lex loci intentionis).
The law selected may be implied from such factors
as substantial connection with the transaction, or the
nationality or domicile of the parties.
G. Human relations
Principle of Abuse of Rights
ART 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties,
a) act with justice,
b) give everyone his due, and
c) observe honesty and good faith.
The principle of abuse of rights sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of
one's duties.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for
the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper.
Albetz Investment Inc. v. CA
The demolition complained of in the case at bar was not
carried out in a manner consistent with justice and
good faith. At the instance of petitioner, it was done in a
swift, unconscionable manner, giving the occupants of
the house no time at all to remove their belongings
therefrom. No damage worth mentioning would have
been sustained by petitioner if their men, led by the
Sheriff, had been instructed to allow said occupants to
remove their personal properties, considering that this
would not have taken a considerable length of time.
Velayo v. Shell Co. Phil.
The Defendant schemed and affected the transfer of its
credits (from which it could derive practically nothing)
to its sister corporation in the United States where
CALI's plane C-54 was then situated, succeeding by such
swift and unsuspected operation in disposing of said
insolvent's property by removing it from the possession
and ownership of the insolvent. We hold Defendant
liable to pay to the plaintiff, for the benefit of the
insolvent CALI and its creditors, as compensatory
damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at
the time aforementioned and another equal sum as
exemplary damages.
Meralco v. CA
A prior written notice to the customer is required
before disconnection of the service. Failure to give
such prior notice amounts to a tort.
The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent
to cause additional mental and moral suffering to
private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21
of the Civil Code.
In the Manila Gas Corporation case, the Court held that
respondents’ default in the payment of his bills “cannot
be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for
damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered
as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of
damages to which respondent is entitled.”
Go v. Cordero 2010
The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act
with fairness, honesty and good faith in securing better
terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from
AFFA, to the prejudice of Cordero as the duly appointed
exclusive distributor, is further proscribed by Article 19
of the Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following:
1) There is a legal right or duty;
2) which is exercised in bad faith;
3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article
20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has
the following elements:
1) There is an act which is legal;
2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order, or public policy; and
3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and
that is, the act complained of must be intentional.
Cebu Country Club v. Elqueizaga
In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary
membership, we find that petitioners violated the rules
governing human relations. Petitioners committed
fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving
respondent’s applications. This is contrary to morals,
good custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are
liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the same Code.
As to petitioners’ reliance on the principle of damnum
absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to
state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v.
Gutierrez, we held that this principle does not apply
when there is an abuse of a person’s right, as in this
case.
Under Article 2219, moral damages may be
recovered, among others, in acts and actions referred
to in Article 21.
Acts contrary to law done willfully or negligently
causing damage
ART 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
No right impaired, no basis for damages
Felipe v. Leuterio, et al.
Whether the courts have the authority to reverse the
award of the board of judges of an oratorical
competition.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the
contestants, because theirs was merely the privilege to
compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen
into a demandable right unless and until they were
proclaimed winners of the competition by the
appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong"
as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the
deprivation or violation of a right.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet
in law there are instances of "damnum absque
injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been
proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her
action should be directed against the individual judge or
judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not
against the other judges. The judiciary has no power
to reverse the award of the board of judges of an
oratorical contest.
University of the East v. Jader
May an educational institution be held liable for damages
for misleading a student into believing that the latter had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is
not the case?
YES. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform
the students of their academic status and not wait for
the latter to inquire from the former. Want of care to
the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with
a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated
to produce them would make the erring party liable.
Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly
inform respondent of the result of an examination and
in misleading the latter into believing that he had
satisfied all requirements for the course.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence
and thus liable to respondent for the latter’s actual
damages, we hold that respondent should not have
been awarded moral damages.
At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify
for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations.
Willful acts that are contrary to law causing damage to
another
ART 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry, is it actionable?
"Mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an
actionable wrong.
What kind of damage can be recovered?
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21.
Cecilio Pe v. Alfonso Pe
The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita's affection cannot lead to any other conclusion
than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her
fall in love with him. Defendant not only deliberately,
but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and
her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact
that he is a married man.
Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil
Code.
Wassmer v. Velez
Hermosisima v. CA, as reiterated in Estopa v. Piansay,
ruled that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an
actionable wrong.
This here is not a case of mere breach of promise to
marry. To formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation, and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach
of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
 or neglects, without just cause, to perform his 4. Absolute Community of Property
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
official duty may file an action for damages and 5. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
however, that such injury should have been
other relief against the latter, without prejudice
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good 6. Regime of Separation of Property
to any disciplinary administrative action that may
customs or public policy.
be taken. 7. Judicial Separation of Property
Unjust Enrichment ART 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, 8. Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor G. THE FAMILY
Solutio Indebiti and Accion en rem verso through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or 1. Concept
ART 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, highhanded method shall give rise to a right of 2. Effects on legal disputes
acquires or comes into possession of something action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
3. Family Home
at the expense of the latter without just or legal
H. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
ground, shall return the same to him. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
1. Legitimate children
Requisites for an Accion in rem verso
A. PERSONS 2. Proof of filiation
a) Defendant has been enriched;
1. Kinds of Persons 3. Illegitimate children
b) Plaintiff suffered a loss;
2. Capacity to Act 4. Action to impugn legitimacy
c) Enrichment of defendant is without just or legal
ground; and 3. Domicile and Residence of Persons 5. Legitimated children
C. MARRIAGE I. ADOPTION
d) Plaintiff has NO other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict. 1. Requisites 1. Domestic Adoption Law
Even without fault one is liable for damages if benefited 2. Marriages Celebrated Abroad 2. Law on Inter-Country Adoption
3. Foreign Divorce J. SUPPORT
ART 23. Even when an act or event causing
damage to another's property was not due to the 4. Void Marriages 1. What it compromises
fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter 2. Who are obliged to give support
5. Voidable Marriages
shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or
event he was benefited. D. LEGAL SEPARATION 3. Source
1. Grounds 4. Order
Parens Patriae
2. Defenses 5. Amount
Meaning of court’s vigilance for the protection of the
poor 3. Procedure 6. Manner and time of payment
4. Effects 7. Renunciation and termination
ART 24. In all contractual, property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a 5. Reconciliation 8. Support pendente lite
disadvantage on account of his moral 6. Effect of Death 9. Procedure in applications for support
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
E. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN K. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the
courts must be vigilant for his protection. HUSBAND AND WIFE 1. General provisions
Damages Against Public Officials and for Unfair F. PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES 2. Substitute parental authority
Competition 1. Marriage Settlements 3. Special parental authority
2. Donations by reason of marriage 4. Effect of parental authority over the child's
ART 27. Any person suffering material or moral person
loss because a public servant or employee refuses 3. Void donations by the spouses
 5. Effects of parental authority over the child's Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Product
property NO. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's
6. Suspension or termination of parental of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for
authority injured, if no action for such damages could be lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of could not have been, validly served with summons.
7. Solo parents the injuries it received, no such right of action could He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity,
L. EMANCIPATION derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn was lost through death.
M. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
FAMILY CODE since no transmission to anyone can take place from ART 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or
N. USE OF SURNAMES one that lacked juridical personality. more persons who are called to succeed each
O. ABSENCE other, as to which of them died first, whoever
Recovery can not be had for the death of an unborn
alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
1. Provisional Measures in Case of Absence child. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled
prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is
to collect any damages at all. But such damages must
2. Declaration of Absence presumed that they died at the same time and
be those inflicted directly upon them, as
3. Administration of the Property of the Absentee there shall be no transmission of rights from one
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights
to the other.
4. Presumption of Death of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity.
P. CIVIL REGISTRAR Juridical Persons
Extinguishment of civil personality
Kinds of juridical persons
A. PERSONS ART 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and
ART 44. The following are juridical persons:
1. Kinds of Persons
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, 1) The State and its political subdivisions;
by contract and by will.
Natural Persons 2) Other corporations, institutions and entities
Rallos v. Felix Gochan & Sons Realty for public interest or purpose, created by law;
ART 40. Birth determines personality; but the their personality begins as soon as they have
Is the sale of the undivided share of Concepcion Rallos in
conceived child shall be considered born for all been constituted according to law;
lot 5983 valid although it was executed by the agent after
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be
the death of his principal? 3) Corporations, partnerships and associations
born later with the conditions specified in the
following article. for private interest or purpose to which the
By reason of the very nature of the relationship law grants a juridical personality, separate
Commencement of civil personality between principal and agent, agency is extinguished by and distinct from that of each shareholder,
the death of the principal or of the agent. It follows a partner or member.
ART 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is fortiori that any act of an agent after the death of his
considered born if it is alive at the time it is principal is void ab initio unless the same falls under 2. Capacity to Act
completely delivered from the mother's womb. the exceptions provided for in Articles 1930 and 1931.
Juridical Capacity distinguished from Capacity to Act
However, if the foetus had an intrauterine life of
Here, the agent, Simeon Rallos, knew of the death of his ART 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness
less than seven months, it is not deemed born if
principal at the time he sold the latter's share in Lot No. to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete
5983 to respondent. Thus, Article 1931 of the Civil Code every natural person and is lost only through
delivery from the maternal womb.
is inapplicable. death.
Geluz v. CA
People v. Tirol Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts
Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily
with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
procured her abortion, could recover damages from the Death extinguishes criminal liability. Civil liability
physician who caused the same. however generally subsists. Restrictions on the capacity to act
 ART 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state C. MARRIAGE considering as disqualified from work any woman
of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of,
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity ART 1. Marriage is a special contract of and the right against, discrimination, afforded all
to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated permanent union between a man and a woman women workers by our labor laws and by no less than
person from certain obligations, as when the entered into in accordance with law for the the Constitution.
latter arise from his acts or from property establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
relations, such as easements. foundation of the family and an inviolable social Private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of
Factors that modify or limit capacity to act institution whose nature, consequences, and her status from PT&T could not be properly
incidents are governed by law and not subject to characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was
ART 39. The following circumstances, among stipulation, except that marriage settlements moved to act the way she did mainly because she
others, modify or limit capacity to act: may fix the property relations during the wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company.
marriage within the limits provided by this Code. In other words, she was practically forced by that very
1. age,
same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her
State policy on marriage civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.
2. insanity,
Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol
3. imbecility,
Law governing validity of marriage
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from
4. the state of being a deaf-mute,
working in the same company violates the rights of the Castillo v. De Leon-Castillo 2016
5. penalty, employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must
a valid exercise of management prerogative. be determined in accordance with the law in effect
6. prodigality,
at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in
7. family relations, YES. The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that
force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the
the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly
8. alienage, Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born
established to uphold the questioned employment
while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and
9. absence, policy. The employer has the burden to prove the
1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the
existence of a reasonable business necessity. The
10. insolvency and provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages.
burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but not
11. trusteeship. in PT&T.
1. Requisites
3. Domicile and Residence of Persons Petitioners' sole contention that "the company did not
just want to have two (2) or more of its employees Essential Requisites
ART 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the related between the third degree by affinity and/or ART 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of consanguinity" is lame. essential requisites are present:
natural persons is the place of their habitual
residence. Duncan v. Glaxo 1) ⭐Legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female;
ART 51. When the law creating or recognizing The prohibition against personal or marital and
them, or any other provision does not fix the relationships with employees of competitor companies
domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the 2) Consent freely given in the presence of
understood to be the place circumstances because relationships of that nature the solemnizing officer.
might compromise the interests of the company. In Formal Requisites
1. where their legal representation is
laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only
established or ART 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
2. where they exercise their principal functions. competitor company will gain access to its secrets and 1) ⭐Authority of the solemnizing officer;
procedures.
Family Code of the Philippines 2) ⭐A valid marriage license except in
PT&T v. NLRC the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
In the case at bar, petitioner’s policy of not accepting or
 3) A marriage ceremony which takes
place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age.
⭐Absence makes the marriage VOID.
Sevilla v. Cardenas
A marriage license is an essential requisite for the
validity of marriage. The certification to be issued by
the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular
entry could not be found in the register despite diligent
search.
Here, the first two certifications bear the statement that
"hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you
our full force locating the above problem." It could be
easily implied from the said statement that the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts
to locate and determine the existence of Marriage
License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise,
both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty
whether or not such license was issued.
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based
on the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Alcantara v. Alcantara
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative
value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then,
we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day
period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound
to investigate whether or not a marriage license has
been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is
that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of
the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to
ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled
the requirements of law.
Kho v. Republic 2016
Petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with
the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient
evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage
license. The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no
doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his
favor.
By virtue of such certification, it becomes the burden of
respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is
she who alleges such validity. The Certificate of
Marriage issued by the officiating priest does not
contain any entry regarding the said marriage
license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their
marriage contract from the National Archives and
Records Section, where information regarding the
marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license
number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to
do so.
In Republic v. CA, this Court considered the certification
issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of
due search and inability to find the record or entry
sought by the parties despite the absence of a
categorical statement that "such document does not
exist in their records despite diligent search."
Diaz-Salgado v. Anson 2016
A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis
and Severina reveals that no marriage license
number was indicated therein. It also appears therein
that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer.
Instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed
issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied
mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This
presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie
evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has
established that no marriage license was presented to
the solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license
issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage
contract was not explained at all. Neither the original
nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No
other witness also testified to prove its existence,
whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding
its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one,
and is uncertain about the documents they purportedly
submitted in the Municipal Hall.
Absence of any essential requisite – Void
ART 4. The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
xxxx
Republic v. Albios 2013
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
NO. A “freely given” consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices
of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that
the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. That their consent was freely given
is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to
a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the
very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship.
Aranes v. Occiano
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license. In
People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is
void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer
the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Beso v. Daguman
A marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances:
1. at the point of death;
2. in remote places in accordance with Article 29,
or
3. upon the request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect.
Morigo v. People
In the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration
of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
Eugenio, Sr., v. Velez
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the
fact that common law relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form
of co-ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has
a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.
Abbas v. Gloria Goo Abbas 2013
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly
issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and
that the serial number of the marriage license pertained
to another couple. The marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exemptions, and thus,
having been solemnized without a marriage license, is
void ab initio.
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan Jr. 2013
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally “was made
only in jest” and “a simulated marriage, at the instance
of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the
society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives.” In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
Defect in any of essential requisites — Voidable (Art. 45
FC)
xxxx
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
Effect of irregularity in any of the formal requisites
Navarro v. Domagtoy
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage.
The second issue involves the solemnization of a
marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.
ART 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38,
may contract marriage.
ART 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall
be necessary, however, for the contracting parties
to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife. xxxx
Persons authorized to solemnize marriage
ART 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction;
2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of
any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect
and registered with the civil registrar
general xxx;
3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only
in the case mentioned in Article 31;
4) Any military commander of a unit to
which a chaplain is assigned, in the
absence of the latter, during a military
operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32;
5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-
consul in the case provided in Article 10.
Enumeration not exclusive. Mayor may also solemnize.
People v. Bustamante
When the issue involves the assumption of powers and
duties of the office of the mayor by the vice-mayor,
when proper, it is immaterial whether it is because the
latter is the Acting Mayor or merely acting as Mayor, for
in both instances, he discharges all the duties and
wields the powers appurtenant to said office.
Venue of Marriage —
Exceptions: Articulo Mortis
and Written request
ART 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly
in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except
1. in cases of marriages contracted on the
point of death or
2. in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 or
3. where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at
a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.
Marriage License — Where issued
ART 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the
local civil registrar of the city or municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides,
except in marriages where no license is required
xxxx.
Who will issue
ART 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens
abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general,
consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the
Philippines. xxxx.
If previously married
ART 13. In case either of the contracting parties
has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or
baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article,
1. the death certificate of the deceased
spouse or
2. the judicial decree of the absolute
divorce, or
3. the judicial decree of annulment or
4. declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage.
In case the death certificate cannot be secured,
the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this
circumstance and his or her actual civil status and
the name and date of death of the deceased
spouse.
Marriage Certificate — Best proof of marriage
ART 22. The marriage certificate, in which the
parties shall declare that they take each other as
husband and wife, shall also state: xxxx
Proof to attack the validity of marriage
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete
The primary evidence of a marriage must be an
authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a
marriage may also be proved by other competent
evidence, the absence of the contract must first be
satisfactorily explained. The certification of the person
who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible
evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the
contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-
production is first presented to the court.
Perido v. Perido
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated
in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the
statement was not conclusive to show that he was not
actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it
is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that
persons living together as husband and wife are
married to each other. This presumption, especially
where the legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this
case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part
of those who allege the illegitimacy.
Pugeda v. Trias
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or
by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been
held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.
Sy v. CA
On the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab
initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the
marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet,
neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided
in Carmona.
Villanueva v. CA
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the
marriage contract itself. A Torrens certificate is the
best evidence of ownership of registered land, not of the
civil status of the owner.
SSS v. Enobiso 2013
In Trinidad v. CA, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of
marriage may be presented:
a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony;
b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock;
c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children
born during such union; and
d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
Here, Petronilo's siblings unequivocally declared
that Lourdes was married to their brother and that
the couple had nine children. Moreover, the PAG-IBIG
nomination form indicated Lourdes and her four
children as Petronilo's beneficiaries. In the Member's
Data Change or Addition Report forms submitted by
Petronilo to the SSS, Lourdes was likewise named as a
beneficiary and a "housewife".
Thus, the lack of prompt recording with the OCR does
not amply rebut the presumption that Lourdes was

Petronilo's wife. This especially holds true in the light of
our declaration in Vda. de Jacob that the "failure to
send a copy of a marriage contract for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage." It is not
the duty of the couple to send a copy of the marriage
contract to the civil registrar.
Avenido v. Avenido 2014
Whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to
Eustaquio.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole
and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of
marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina,
Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted fact of the birth
within the cohabitation of Tecla and Eustaquio of four
(4) children coupled with the certificates of the
children’s birth and baptism; and the certifications of
marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy
Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
In the matter of the Intestate Estates of Delgado and
Rustia
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans
toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in
fact married. This is the usual order of things in society
and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves
out to be, they would be living in constant violation of
the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.
2. Marriages Celebrated Abroad
ART 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
latter to remarry.
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Llorente v. CA
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
morality.
Order 227)
3. Foreign Divorce Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. CA,
that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna 2014 Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right
under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine
to inherit" from him.
law.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the CFI of Sto.
obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality rule,
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty.
persons.
Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his
death.
Bayot v. CA
Republic v. Orbecido III The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen
when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens,
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
said decree is, as here, sufficient.
under Philippine law?
We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be Garcia v. Recio
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at The divorce decree and the governing personal law of
the time of the celebration of the marriage, were the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the must be alleged and proven according to our law on
time of the solemnization of the marriage. evidence.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the Ando v. DFA 2014
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is With respect to her prayer for the recognition of her
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed,

instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her
foreign divorce from her first husband.
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority
to remarry filed before a trial court actually constitutes
a petition for declaratory relief, we are still unable to
grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there
appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented
on record of both the national law of her first husband,
Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree
under that national law.
Fujiki v. Marinay 2013
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage “does NOT apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.”
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
on the ground of bigamy. Since the recognition of a
foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition
under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is NOT an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law.
⭐Republic v. Manalo 2018 En Banc
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage, are of two types:
1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii,
which terminates the marriage, and
2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New
Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws.
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be
a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the
law does not demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the
divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish
whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can
We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers.
Morisono v. Morisono 2018 reiterating Manalo
Pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained
to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien
citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction,
regardless of who between the spouses initiated the
divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning
for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree –
presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.
Republic v. Cote 2018
WON the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies in a
case involving recognition of a foreign decree of divorce.
Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or
she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. A decree of absolute divorce procured
abroad is different from annulment as defined by our
family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers void
and voidable marriages that are specifically cited
and enumerated in the Family Code of the
Philippines.
It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of
petitioner's appeal Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Since Florie followed the procedure for cancellation of
entry in the civil registry, a special proceeding governed
by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, an appeal from the
RTC decision should be governed by Section 3 of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Noveras v. Noveras 2014
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the
divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. Based on the records, only the
divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the
pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it
follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding
directly to liquidation.
Nullada v. the Civil Registrar of Manila 2019
Applying the same legal considerations and considering
the similar factual milieu that attended in Manalo, the
present case warrants a reversal of the RTC's decision
that refused to recognize the divorce decree that was
mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner spouse
in Japan solely on the ground that the divorce was
jointly initiated by the spouses. The Court finds no
reason to deviate from its recent disposition on the
issue, as made in Manalo.
4. Void Marriages
1) Marriages that are Void ab initio
ART 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
1) Those contracted by any party below
eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians;
2) Those solemnized by any person not
legally authorized to perform marriages
unless such marriages were contracted
with either or both parties believing in
good faith that the solemnizing officer
had the legal authority to do so;
3) Those solemnized without license,
except those covered the preceding
Chapter;
4) Those bigamous or polygamous
marriages not failing under Article 41;
5) Those contracted through mistake of
one contracting party as to the identity
of the other; and
6) Those subsequent marriages that are
void under Article 53.
2) Psychological Incapacity
ART 36. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Meaning
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support.
Requisites
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
a) Gravity, the incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage;
b) Juridical antecedence, it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and
c) Incurability, it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. (Santos v. CA)
Macam v. Macam 2014
In a void marriage, it is as though no marriage had
taken place; thus, it cannot be the source of any right.
Consequently, any party may attack the marriage,
directly or collaterally. A void marriage may be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage.
Indeed, a void marriage may be impugned either:
1) directly, by filing an action attacking the
validity thereof; or
2) collaterally, in a suit instituted not to
specifically question the same, but where the
determination of the issue of its validity is
essential to the resolution of the controversy,
as in the case at bar.
Mallion v. Alcantara
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity BAR a subsequent petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
YES. A party cannot evade or avoid the application of
res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the
validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this
reason, the Court finds that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack
of marriage license is barred.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA
One of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Republic v. Molina
The following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be

(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
“the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to
marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.
⭐Tenebro v. CA
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the
second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Antonio v. Reyes ✔
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the
guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in
proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. He
presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological
incapacity.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts,
and clearly explained in the trial court's decision.
The Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos that
personal examination of the subject by the
physician is NOT required for the spouse to be
declared psychologically incapacitated.
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated
friends and made up letters from fictitious characters
well before she married petitioner.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. One unable to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well
to any legal or emotional commitments.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with
the essential marital obligations as embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.
Sixth. The CA clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties
was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Ngo Te v. Te as reiterated in Azcueta v. Republic and CA
✔ psychological incapacity means that one is truly
Petitioner's behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent's, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together. As clearly shown
in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to
him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak
and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has
no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said
of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations. Both parties being
afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage is thus declared
null and void.
Halili v. Halili and Republic ✔
In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that
petitioner's dependent personality disorder was
evident in the fact that petitioner was very much
attached to his parents and depended on them for
decisions.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
psychological condition that was grave and incurable
and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same
Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable
personality disorders usually have long-term concerns,
and thus therapy may be long-term. From the foregoing,
it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering
from psychological incapacity that effectively renders
him unable to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is declared null and void.
Buenaventura v. CA
By declaring the petitioner as psychologically
incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages
on the same set of facts was negated. Since
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one
must assume and discharge as a consequence of
marriage, it removes the basis for the contention
that the petitioner purposely deceived the private
respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it
was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner.

Therefore, the award of moral damages was
without basis in law and in fact.
Rumbaua v. Rumbaua
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed
the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and
may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In
effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any
procedural lapse on the certification prior to its
promulgation. Thus, what is important is the presence
of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial
requirement that he be certified to be present. From
this perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the
Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.
Ting v. Velez-Ting
Far from abandoning Molina, the Court in Te v. Te
simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein.
Reyes So v. Valera
The factual background of this case covers at least 18
years. The case raises novel and unavoidable questions
because of the lapse of time the couple has been
together and their intimate knowledge of each other at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Specifically,
how do these factors affect the claim of psychological
incapacity that should exist at the time of the marriage,
considering that marriage came near or at the end of the
parties' relationship?
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we
note that she lived with the petitioner for 18 years and
begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 -
developments that show a fair level of stability in the
relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between
the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her
Dentistry and joined her husband in the
communications business - traits that do not at all
indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read
with the comment that she had been strict with
employees and in business affairs.
Kalaw v. Fernandez 2015 ✔
In her Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Dayan
impressed that the respondent had “compulsive and
dependent tendencies” to the extent of being
“relationship dependent.”
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing
should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity.
Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure
to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her
children’s moral and mental development. This
disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and
protect her children, as expressly defined under Article
209 and Article 220 of the Family Code.
Vinas v. Parel-Vinas 2015
The lack of personal examination or assessment of
the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is
not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage. “If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.”
NB: Please note the 2021 En Banc case of Tan-Andal
v. Andal, penned by Leonen, J. Some notable
pronouncements:
1. The plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case
with clear and convincing evidence.
2. The second Molina guideline is abandoned.
Psychological incapacity is neither a mental
incapacity nor a personality disorder that must
be proven through expert opinion.
There must be proof, however, of the durable or
enduring aspects of a person's personality, called
"personality structure," which manifests itself
through clear acts of dysfunctionality that
undermines the family. The spouse's personality
structure must make it impossible for him or her
to understand and, more important, to comply
with his or her essential marital obligations.
3. A party to a nullity case is still required to prove
juridical antecedence because it is an explicit
requirement of the law.
Proof of juridically antecedent psychological
incapacity may consist of testimonies describing
the environment where the supposedly
incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a
particular behavior.
4. The third Molina guideline is amended.
Psychological incapacity is incurable, not in the
medical, but in the legal sense.
This means that the incapacity is so enduring and
persistent with respect to a specific partner, and
contemplates a situation where the couple's
respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result
of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage.
5. With respect to gravity, the requirement is
retained. The psychological incapacity cannot be
mere "refusal, neglect[,] or difficulty, much less ill
will."242 In other words, it must be shown that
the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious
psychic cause.
6. The persuasive effect of the decisions of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church of the Philippines on nullity cases
pending before secular courts is retained.
While Article 36 is similarly worded to the third
paragraph of Canon 1095, canonical decisions
based on the second paragraph should likewise
have a persuasive effect in secular decisions on
psychological incapacity.
3) Incestuous Marriage
ART 37. Marriages between the following are
incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
1) Between ascendants and descendants of
any degree; and
2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of
the full or half blood.
 4) Void Marriage for Reason of Public
Policy
ART 38. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1) Between collateral blood relatives
whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to
the fourth civil degree;
2) Between step-parents and step-children;
3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-
law;
4) Between the adopting parent and the
adopted child;
5) Between the surviving spouse of the
adopting parent and the adopted child;
6) Between the surviving spouse of the
adopted child and the adopter;
7) Between an adopted child and
legitimate child of the adopter;
8) Between adopted children of the same
adopter; and
9) Between parties where one, with the
intention to marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse, or his or her own
spouse.
5) Imprescriptibility of
Action to Declare Nullity
of Marriage
ART 39. The action or defense for the declaration
of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe.
Niñal v. Bayadog, supra
The law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
6) Bigamous Marriage Under Art 40
Absolute Nullity of Previous Marriage must be based on
Final Judgment before One can Remarry
ART 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
⭐Domingo v. CA
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a
void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether
the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
The Family Code settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of
a a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as
1. in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses,
2. an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the
latters’ presumptive legitimes.
In such cases, evidence needs to be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void.
IN SUMMARY
1. For purposes of remarriage, final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void is the sole
basis, whereas
2. For other purposes, other evidence are
acceptable.
Article 40 and the crime of Bigamy
For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the
following elements must concur:
1) that the offender has been legally
married;
2) that the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case of an
absentee spouse, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to
the provisions of the Civil Code;
3) that the offender contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and
4) that the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for
validity.
Mercado v. Tan
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as “void.”
Nicdao Cariño v. Cariño
The marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of
nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee.
The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized
without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and
the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Montañez v. Cipriano 2012
Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the
Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
YES. Here, at the time respondent contracted the
second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting
as it had not yet been legally dissolved. The subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would
not change the fact that she contracted the second
marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.
Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of
bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense
charged were sufficiently alleged.
In Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the
declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively.
Capili v. People 2013
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of
the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy.
NO. It is undisputed that a second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili
contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the
second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of
the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does
not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
People v. Odtuhan 2013
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense and
from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law and that the time of
filing of the criminal complaint or information is
material only for determining prescription.
Antone v. Beronilla 2010
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when, in so quashing the Information, it considered an
evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat
disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is
a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the
information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be
appreciated only under exceptional circumstances,
none of which is obtaining in the instant petition.
Sarto y Misalucha v. People 2018
Redante admitted that he had contracted two
marriages. He, however, put forth the defense of the
termination of his first marriage as a result of the
divorce obtained abroad by his alien spouse.
Since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged
Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type
of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro —
whether an absolute divorce which terminates the
marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends
it— and whether such divorce capacitated her to
remarry could not also be ascertained. As such, Redante
failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to
remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to
Fe. His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond
question.
Iwasawa v. Custodio Gangan 2013
This Court has consistently held that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from
the beginning as provided in Article 35(4).
No retroactive effect for Article 40
Castillo v. De Leon-Castillo, supra 2016
We find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of
her children. As held in Jison v. CA, the Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested
rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. As
earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus
concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to
Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first
marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration
that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is
not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless,
the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City
declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves
to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent
marriage to Renato is valid.
Vitangcol v. People 2016 Leonen, J
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must
first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first
marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage
without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of
bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first
marriage.
Mere presentation of a certification from the civil
registrar that the marriage license cannot be found is
not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no
such marriage license was issued.
7) Judicial Declaration of Presumptive
Death
ART 41. A marriage contracted by any person
during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the
 provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Requisites
There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for
four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there
is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
Republic v. Nolasco
Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing
wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-
founded belief" that she is dead.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the
investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet's whereabouts is too sketchy
to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose,
Antique after learning of Janet's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British
Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and
went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there.
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he
confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on
his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. We do
not consider that walking into a major city like
Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow
bumping into one particular person there — which is in
effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a
reasonably diligent search.
Republic v. Espinosa Cantor 2013 En Banc
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment
in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41
of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and
executory. Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter
how erroneous, is no longer permissible. The final and
executory nature of this summary proceeding thus
prohibits the resort to appeal.
The law did not define what is meant by “well-
founded belief.” It depends upon the circumstances
of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak,
remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply
with this requirement, the present spouse must prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort (not a mere passive one).
Judicial Declaration of Presumptive
Death NOT required prior to
effectivity of Family Code
Valdez v. Republic
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared
an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for
its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however,
the law only requires that the former spouse has been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that such
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law and no court declaration is
needed for the presumption to arise.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed
since no decree on the presumption of Sofio's death can
be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption
having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare
that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the
time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and,
therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
Matias v. Republic 2018
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death
filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and
should have been dismissed by the RTC because
petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A reading of
Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of
death established therein is ONLY applicable for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage
under the said law.
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family
Code, there is no reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments
rendered thereunder, by express provision of Art 247,
are “immediately final and executory”. It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due
course to the Republic’s appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the CA.
The CA should have dismissed the appeal on ground of
lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the
RTC decision was immediately final and executory.
Republic v. Tango
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious
procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the
CA instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally
erred in giving due course to said appeal and ordering
the transmittal of the records of the case to the
appellate court. By no means did the CA acquire
jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC which,
by express provision of law, was immediately final and
executory.
Republic v. Catubag 2018
Since what is involved in the instant case is a petition
for declaration of presumptive death, the relevant
provisions of law are Articles 41, 238, and 253 of the
Family Code. These provisions explicitly provide that
actions for presumptive death are summary in nature.
Parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal
decisions in summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code because by express mandate of law,
judgments rendered thereunder are immediately final
and executory. The Court finds that petitioner's resort
to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
challenge the RTC's Order declaring Shanaviv
presumptively dead was proper.
Applying the standards discussed by the Court in
Cantor, Granada, and Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court
finds that private respondent's efforts falls short of the
degree of diligence required by jurisprudence.
First, private respondent failed to present any of the
alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these
"inquiries."
Second, private respondent did not seek the help of
other concerned government agencies, namely, the local
police authorities and the NBI.
Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's
manager, private respondent bases his "well-founded
belief” on bare assertions that he exercised earnest
efforts in looking for his wife.
Taken together, the Court is of the view that private
respondent's efforts in searching for his missing wife,
Shanaviv, are merely passive.
Santos v. Santos 2014 Leonen, J
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an
action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of
reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
8) Voidable Bigamous Marriage
SSS v. Vda. De Bailon
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit
does not preclude the filing of an action in court to
prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit
or by court action, such absentee's mere reappearance,
even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent
marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues in spite of the spouse's physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still
be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by
registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by
judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in
the case at bar, the effects of dissolution of valid
marriages shall arise.
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in
accordance with law, Bailon's and respondent's
marriage prior to the former's death in 1998,
respondent is rightfully the dependent beneficiary of
Bailon.
Effects of Reappearance
ART 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in
the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there
is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances
of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage at the instance of ANY
interested person, with due notice to the spouses
of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being
judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
Effects of termination of subsequent
marriage by reappearance of the
absent spouse
ART 43. The termination of the subsequent
marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
produce the following effects:
1) The children of the subsequent marriage
conceived prior to its termination shall
be considered legitimate;
2) The absolute community of property or
the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but
if either spouse contracted said marriage
in bad faith, his or her share of the net
profits of the community property or
conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of
a) the common children or,
b) if there are none, the children of
the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or
c) in default of children, the
innocent spouse;
3) Donations by reason of marriage shall
remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith,
such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law;
4) The innocent spouse may revoke the
designation of the other spouse who
acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such
 designation be stipulated as irrevocable;
and
5) The spouse who contracted the
subsequent marriage in bad faith shall
be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession.
Effects if both parties to the subsequent marriage are
in bad faith
ART 44. If both spouses of the subsequent
marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be
void ab initio and all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary dispositions made by
one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
5. Voidable Marriages
1) Grounds for Annulment of Marriage
ART 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
Simply
1. Lack of Parental Consent;
2. Unsoundness of mind;
3. Consent obtained by Fraud;
4. Consent obtained by force, intimidation,
or undue influence;
5. Physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage;
6. Afflicted with STD that is serious and
incurable.
Elmer Bermudo v. CA 2013
Petitioner’s claim of vitiated consent as a result of
the force and intimidation employed by respondent’s
friends in obtaining his agreement to his marriage with
respondent has no merit.
Petitioner is an educated person. He is a seaman by
profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went out with
respondent's friends and even if, as he insisted, he was
surprised that they did not go to the place that they
intended to be and instead, they went to the Manila City
Hall, he still knowingly and voluntarily, went through a
marriage ceremony. No evidence was presented to
reveal force, intimidation or undue influence. There is
no proof of the facts or circumstances constituting
force, intimidation or undue influence that respondent
or her friends have improperly taken advantage of, or
used their power, if any, over the will of petitioner,
depriving him of a reasonable freedom of choice.
Petitioner is a healthy male with sufficient intellectual
capacity to resist any untoward intimidation against
him.
Kinds of Fraud that could invalidate the marriage
ART 46. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:
1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction
by final judgment of the other party of a
crime involving moral turpitude;
2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that
at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her
husband;
3) Concealment of STD, regardless of its
nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
4) Concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism or homosexuality
or lesbianism existing at the time of the
marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage.
Aquino v. Delizo the ‘plump’ case
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of
the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment
of marriage.
The defendant wife was alleged to be only more than
four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to
plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that
her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since
she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff.
If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally
plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by
looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of
their marriage, more so because she must have
attempted to conceal the true state of affairs.
The evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial,
taken together with what has already been adduced,
would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud
alleged by plaintiff.
2) Prescriptive period for Annulment of
Marriage
ART 47. The action for annulment of marriage
must be filed by the following persons and within
the periods indicated herein:
1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of
Article 45 by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent,
within 5 years after attaining the age
of twenty-one, or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge of
the minor, at any time before such
party has reached the age of twenty-
one;
2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of
Article 45, by the same spouse, who had
no knowledge of the other's insanity; or
by any relative or guardian or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any
time before the death of either party,
or by the insane spouse during a lucid
interval or after regaining sanity;
3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of
Articles 45, by the injured party, within
5 years after the discovery of the fraud;
4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of
Article 45, by the injured party, within 5
years from the time the force,
 intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased;
5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6
of Article 45, by the injured party, within
5 years after the marriage.
3) No declaration of default in annulment
cases
Role of the Fiscal in annulment cases
ART 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding
paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
Tuason v. CA, supra
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in
annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties and to take care that the evidence
is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence
was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to
assure lack of collusion between the contending
parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in
the trial court.
Ancheta v. Ancheta
The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file
an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the
motion of the respondent herein to declare her in
default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the
trial court when he interposed no objection to the
motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith
received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a
whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The
actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor
are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code.
Republic v. Iyoy
The general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case
is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who
actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the OSG takes over when the
case is elevated to the CA or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is
only reasonable and practical that even while the
proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the OSG
can already exercise supervision and control over the
conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to
better guarantee the protection of the interests of the
State.
Sin v. Sin
We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the
State did not participate in the proceedings. While
Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation,
stating that he found no collusion between the parties,
he did not actively participate therein. Other than
entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case,
nothing more was heard from him. Neither did the
presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to
contribute to the proceedings.
Thus, the case was remanded to the RTC for proper
trial.
4) Custody and support of
children during
pendency of the case
Visitorial rights of parent
ART 49. During the pendency of the action and in
the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall
provide for the support of the spouses and the
custody and support of their common children.
The Court shall give paramount consideration to
the moral and material welfare of said children
and their choice of the parent with whom they
wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall
also provide for appropriate visitation rights of
the other parent.
Silva v. CA
The case merely concerns the visitation right of a parent
over his children which the trial court has adjudged in
favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have
“visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays
and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the
children without the written consent of the mother x x
x." The visitation right referred to is the right of access
of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
5) Effects of Annulment of Marriage
ART 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs
(2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44
shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages
which are declared ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for
1. the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the
spouses,
2. the custody and support of the common
children, and
3. the delivery of third presumptive
legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot
on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102
and 129.
Valdes v. RTC
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article
147 or Article 148, such as the case may be.
A court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a
nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with
authority to resolve incidental and consequential
matters.
Macadangdang v. CA
WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the
questioned decision had not become final and executory
since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
part-nership of gains of the absolute community of
property as among the effects of the final decree of
legal separation.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary
conse-quences of the final decree. This legal effect of the
decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically
follows, as an inevitable incident of, the judgment
decreeing legal separation — for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal
assets.
Ledesma v. Intestate Estate of Pedrosa
The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation
but, with equal reason, the doctrine enunciated therein
should be applied to a marriage annulment which is the
situation at bar. The respondent presiding judge is
directed to decide the partition (liquidation) case
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of this
decision to determine which of the properties of the
conjugal partnership should be adjudicated to the
husband and the wife. This is but a consequence or
incident of its decision rendered in the same case
annulling the marriage.
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio 2011
The family court shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And
following the pertinent provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner
asserts.
The trial court may receive evidence on the subject
incidents after a judgment granting the petition but
before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is
issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to
comply with in issuing the assailed orders.
Diño v. Diño 2011
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
YES. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of
the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.
In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply
to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be
declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership.
Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "partition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x." It is NOT necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Salas Jr. v. Aguila 2013
Under Art 147 of the Family Code, property acquired
during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the present case, Salas did not rebut this
presumption. Where the ground for nullity of marriage
was psychological incapacity, we held that the
properties acquired during the union of the parties, as
found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed
by co-ownership.
6) Partition and Presumptive Legitime
ART 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of
the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property
or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of
their property may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein
prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon
the death of either of both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the
decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime.
Requirement of registration of the decree of annulment
or nullity of marriage — Effects of non-compliance
ART 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and
the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate
civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect third persons.
⭐ART 53. Either of the former spouses may marry
again after compliance with the requirements of
the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Status of children of dissolved marriages
 ART 54. Children conceived or born before the
judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become final and
executory shall be considered legitimate.
Children conceived or born of the subsequent
marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be
legitimate.
7) Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages
See A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
D. LEGAL SEPARATION
A.M. No. 02-11-11, Rule on Legal Separation
A.M. No. 02-11-12, Rule on Provisional Orders
1. Grounds
ART 55. A petition for legal separation may be
filed on any of the following grounds:
1) Repeated physical violence or grossly
abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;
2) Physical violence or moral pressure to
compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or
induce the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
4) Final judgment sentencing the
respondent to imprisonment of more
than six years, even if pardoned;
5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism
of the respondent;
6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the
respondent;
7) Contracting by the respondent of a
subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
9) Attempt by the respondent against the
life of the petitioner; or
10) Abandonment of petitioner by
respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall
include a child by nature or by adoption.
Gandionco v. Penaranda, et al.
Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such
as, the application for support pendente lite, should be
suspended in view of the criminal case for concubi-nage
filed against him by the private respondent. WRONG.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of
concu-binage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evi-dence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.
2. Defenses
ART 56. The petition for legal separation shall be
denied on any of the following grounds:
1) Where the aggrieved party has
condoned the offense or act complained
of;
2) Where the aggrieved party has
consented to the commission of the
offense or act complained of;
3) Where there is connivance between the
parties in the commission of the offense
or act constituting the ground for legal
separation;
4) Where both parties have given ground
for legal separation;
5) Where there is collusion between the
parties to obtain decree of legal
separation; or
6) Where the action is barred by
prescription.
ART 57. An action for legal separation shall be
filed within 5 years from the time of the
occurrence of the cause.
1) Condonation
Almacen v. Baltazar
There has been a condonation by the defendant of the
acts committed by the wife because the defendant had
given money to the plaintiff on several occasions
through third persons and, in our opinion, such
evidence is really sufficient to show condonation or
reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant, for had
there been no condonation of plaintiff's infidelity and
no reconciliation between her and defendant, the latter
would not certainly have given any amount of money
for her support.
Pardon or condonation does not require sexual
intercourse and it may be express or implied.
Bugayong v. Ginez
Condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or
remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial
offense which the latter has committed".
Does the husband's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2
nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to
him, amount to a condonation of her previous and
supposed adulterous acts?
A single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the
innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is
ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation,
especially as against the husband.
If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be
to constitute condonation?
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation, and where the parties live in the same
house, it is presumed that they live on terms of
matrimonial cohabitation.
 2) Consent
People v. Sensano
The husband consented to the adulterous relations
existing between the accused and therefore he is not
authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
3) Connivance
The furtive consent of one person to cooperate with
another in the commission of an unlawful act. The
tacit encouragement of or assent to another's
wrongdoing. An agreement or consent, indirectly
given, that something unlawful shall be done by
another.
4) Recrimination or Mutual Guilt
Arroyo Jr. v. CA
While there is a conceptual difference between consent
and pardon in the sense that consent is granted prior to
the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit
affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to
benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing
of a criminal complaint.
5) Collusion
Ocampo v. Florenciano
Collusion in divorce, or legal separation means the
agreement.
"* * * between husband and wife for one of them to
commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
(represented in court as having committed, a
matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a
valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other
to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express,
may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a
ground for denying the divorce."
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had
arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense
had been committed although it was not, or if the
parties had connived to bring about a legal separation
even in the absence of grounds therefor.
Here, the offense of adultery had really taken place,
according to the evidence. It has been held that
collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that
the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus
enables the other party to procure evidence necessary
to prove it. And proof that the defendant desires the
divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
6) Prescription
Brown v. Yambao
Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings
until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery.
An action for legal separation can not be filed except
within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years
from and after the date when such cause occurred.
Actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or
annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is
the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if
any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
3. Procedure
1) No hearing within 6 months from filing —
Cooling-off period
ART 58. An action for legal separation shall in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition.
EXC: Where violence as specified in RA 9262
is alleged, cooling-off period shall not
apply. (§19)
2) No decree can be issued without efforts
towards conciliation
ART 59. No legal separation may be decreed
unless the Court has taken steps toward the
reconciliation of the spouses and is fully
satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation
is highly improbable.
3) No decree based on stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment
ART 60. No decree of legal separation shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.
4) Court should order Fiscal to take steps to
prevent collusion
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
Macias v. Ochotorena
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor
Paculanag had filed a Certification dated May 04, 2001
with the respondent judge’s court, stating, among
others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor
General during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff’s
evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff and his
witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Zalsos, and that he had no
objection to the granting of the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice
to comply with the mandatory requirement that the
court should order the investigating public prosecutor
whether a collusion exists between the parties. Such
directive must be made by the court before trial
could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of
the case had already been had. Notably, said
Certification was filed after the respondent judge had
ordered the termination of the case.
Pacete v. Carriaga
The special proscriptions on actions that can put the
integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled
by no less than the State's interest in the marriage
relation and its avowed intention not to leave the
matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of
the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray
for legal separation. That other remedies, whether
principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the
same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance,
with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.
4. Effects
1) After filing, the spouses may live separately.
ART 61. After the filing of the petition for legal
separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement
between the spouses, shall designate either of
them or a third person to administer the absolute
community or conjugal partnership property.
xxxx
2) During pendency of the action, the court may
provide order of support and custody of
children in accordance with Art. 49 F.C.
ART 62. During the pendency of the action for
legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall
likewise apply to the support of the spouses and
the custody and support of the common children.
3) Absolute Community or Conjugal Partnership is
dissolved and the guilty Spouse is not entitled
to a share in the profit
4) Offending spouse disqualified to inherit from
innocent spouse
ART 63. The decree of legal separation shall have
the following effects:
1) The spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other, but the
marriage bonds shall not be severed;
2) The absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership,
which shall be forfeited in accordance
with the provisions of Article 43(2);
3) The custody of the minor children shall
be awarded to the innocent spouse; and
4) The offending spouse shall be
disqualified from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession.
Moreover, provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent spouse shall be revoked by
operation of law.
5) Innocent spouse may revoke donation in favor
of guilty spouse
ART 64. xxxx The action to revoke the donation
under this Article must be brought within five
years from the time the decree of legal
separation become final.
5. Reconciliation
There should be joint manifestation under oath of
reconciliation to be filed in court
ART 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a
corresponding joint manifestation under oath
duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in
the same proceeding for legal separation.
Consequences of reconciliation
ART 66. The reconciliation shall have the following
consequences:
1) The legal separation proceedings, if still
pending, shall thereby be terminated at
whatever stage; and
2) The final decree of legal separation shall be
set aside, but the separation of property
and any forfeiture of the share of the
guilty spouse already effected shall
subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive
their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be
recorded in the proper civil registries.
Agreement to revive former property regime must also
be under oath
ART 67. The agreement to revive the former
property regime shall be executed under oath and
shall specify:
1) The properties to be contributed anew to
the restored regime;
2) Those to be retained as separated
properties of each spouse; and
3) The names of all their known creditors,
their addresses and the amounts owing
to each.
6. Effect of Death
a) In case a party dies at any stage of proceedings
BEFORE the entry of judgment, the court shall
order the case closed and terminated without
prejudice to the settlement of estate proper
proceedings in the regular courts.
b) If the party dies AFTER the entry of judgment, the
same shall be binding upon the parties and their
successors in interest in the settlement of the
estate in the regular courts. (§21 AM No 02-11-11-
SC)
E. RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE
Basic Obligations
ART 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Arroyo v. Vazquez de Arroyo
It is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. Of course where the property rights of one of the
pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights
can be maintained.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, supra
One of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
People v. Jumawan 2014 on Marital Rape
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
Fixing of the Domicile
ART 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living
with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for
the exemption. However, such exemption shall
not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family.
Joint responsibility for the Support of the family
ART 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for
the support of the family. The expenses for such
support and other conjugal obligations shall be
paid
1. from the community property and,
2. in the absence thereof, from the income
or fruits of their separate properties and,
3. in case of insufficiency or absence of said
income or fruits, from the separate
properties.
Joint management of the household
ART 71. The management of the household shall
be the right and the duty of both spouses. The
expenses for such management shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
Application for relief from the court if one party
commits acts which will bring danger or dishonor to
the family
ART 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or
her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts
which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to
the other or to the family, the aggrieved party
may apply to the court for relief.
Objection on the exercise of profession
ART 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity
without the consent of the other. The latter may
object only on valid, serious, and moral
grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide
whether or not:
1) The objection is proper, and
2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter.
a) If the benefit accrued PRIOR to the
objection, the resulting obligation
shall be enforced against the
community property.
b) If the benefit accrued THEREAFTER,
such obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the
spouse who has not obtained
consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the
rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (as
amended by RA 10572)
F. PROPERTY
RELATIONS OF
THE SPOUSES
ART 74. The property relationship between
husband and wife shall be governed in the
following order:
1) By marriage settlements executed
before the marriage;
2) By the provisions of this Code; and
3) By the local custom.
1. Marriage Settlements
Definition
By an ante-nuptial settlement or agreement, the
parties may define their property rights in property
existing or after acquired, and they may vary
substantially property rights that would otherwise
arise on their marriage by operation of law,
superseding, in a sense, statutes on that subject.
Types of regime that may be included and how
modified
ART 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage
settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute
community, conjugal partnership of gains,
complete separation of property, or any other
regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement,
or when the regime agreed upon is void, the
system of absolute community of property
as established in this Code shall govern.
Requisites for its validity
ART 76. In order that any modification in the
marriage settlements may be valid, it must be
made BEFORE the celebration of the marriage
xxxx.
ART 77. The marriage settlements and any
modification thereof shall be
1. In writing;
2. Signed by the parties;
3. Executed before the celebration of
marriage; and
4. Registered in the LCR and Registry of
Properties.
Persons other than parties who must sign the marriage
settlement
ART 78. A minor who according to law may
contract marriage may also execute his or her
marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only
if the persons designated in Article 14 to give
consent to the marriage are made parties to the
agreement.
ART 79. For the validity of any marriage
settlement executed by a person
a) upon whom a sentence of civil
interdiction has been pronounced or
b) who is subject to any other disability,
 it shall be indispensable for the guardian
appointed by a competent court to be made a
party thereto.
Laws that governs marriage settlement (Nationality
Theory)
ART 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in
a marriage settlement, the property relations of
the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws,
regardless of the place of the celebration of the
marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
1) Where both spouses are aliens;
2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of
contracts affecting property not situated
in the Philippines and executed in the
country where the property is located;
and
3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of
contracts entered into in the Philippines
but affecting property situated in a
foreign country whose laws require
different formalities for its extrinsic
validity.
Effects if marriage did not materialize
ART 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements
or contracts referred to in the preceding articles
in consideration of a future marriage, including
donations between the prospective spouses made
therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage
does not take place. However, stipulations that
do not depend upon the celebration of the
marriages shall be valid.
2. Donations by reason of marriage
1) Must be made before the celebration of marriage;
2) Must be in consideration of marriage;
3) In favor of either or both of the future spouses.
Definition
ART 82. Donations by reason of marriage are
those which are made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same, and in favor of one or
both of the future spouses.
Limitations on Donation Propter Nuptias
ART 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime
other than the absolute community of
property, they cannot donate to each other in
their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of
their present property. Any excess shall be
considered VOID.
Donations of future property shall be governed
by the provisions on testamentary succession
and the formalities of wills.
Donation of property subject to encumbrance
ART 85. Donations by reason of marriage of
property subject to encumbrances shall be valid.
In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the
property is sold for less than the total amount of
the obligation secured, the donee shall not be
liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for
more than the total amount of said obligation, the
donee shall be entitled to the excess.
Grounds for revocation of donation
ART 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be
revoked by the donor in the following cases:
1) If the marriage is not celebrated or
judicially declared void ab initio except
donations made in the marriage
settlements, which shall be governed by
Article 81;
2) When the marriage takes place without
the consent of the parents or guardian,
as required by law;
3) When the marriage is annulled, and the
donee acted in bad faith;
4) Upon legal separation, the donee being
the guilty spouse;
5) If it is with a resolutory condition and
the condition is complied with;
6) When the donee has committed an act of
ingratitude.
3. Void donations by the spouses
ART 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
Donation between people living together without
marriage
The prohibition shall also apply to persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
WON the ban on a donation between the spouses
during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.
YES. If the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor; then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of nuptials.
Agapay v. Palang
The provision of law applicable here is Article 148
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
woman who are not capacitated to marry each other
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage. Under Article 148, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed
money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no
basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel
and Carlina Palang.
With respect to the house and lot, the transaction was
properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one

which was clearly void and inexistent by express
provision of law because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil
Code.
Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Co
Appellants are not in a position to challenge the
validity of the transfer, if it may be called such. They
bore absolutely no relation to the parties to the
transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or
interests inchoate, present, remote,or otherwise, in the
property in question at the time the transfer occurred.
Although certain transfers from husband to wife or
from wife to husband are prohibited in the article
referred to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of
only by persons who bear such a relation to the parties
making the transfer or to the property itself that such
transfer interferes with their rights or interests. Unless
such a relationship appears the transfer cannot be
attacked.
4. Absolute Community of Property
When it will commence
ART 88. The absolute community of property
between spouses shall commence at the
precise moment that the marriage is
celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied,
for the commencement of the community regime
at any other time shall be VOID.
No waiver of rights in the ACP during marriage. Rule &
exception
ART 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of
the absolute community of property during the
marriage can be made except in case of judicial
separation of property. xxxx
What comprise the Community Property
ART 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter
or in the marriage settlements, the community
property shall consist of all the property owned
by the spouses at the time of the celebration of
the marriage or acquired thereafter.
What are excluded from the Community Property
ART 92. The following shall be excluded from the
community property:
1) Property acquired during the marriage by
gratuitous title by either spouse, and the
fruits as well as the income thereof, if any,
unless it is expressly provided by the donor,
testator or grantor that they shall form part
of the community property;
2) Property for personal and exclusive use of
either spouse. However, jewelry shall form
part of the community property;
3) Property acquired before the marriage by
either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the
fruits as well as the income, if any, of such
property.
Property acquired during marriage using exclusive
money of one spouse.
ART 93. Property acquired during the marriage
is presumed to belong to the community, unless it
is proved that it is one of those excluded
therefrom.
Charges and Obligations of the ACP
ART 94. The absolute community of property shall
be liable for:
1) The support of the spouses, their common
children, and legitimate children of either
spouse;
2) All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage;
3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to
the extent that the family may have been
benefited;
4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses,
including major or minor repairs, upon the
community property;
5) All taxes and expenses for mere
preservation made during marriage upon
the separate property of either spouse used
by the family;
6) Expenses for self-improvement;
7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar
as they have redounded to the benefit of the
family;
8) The value of what is donated or promised by
both spouses in favor of their common
legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of self-improvement;
9) In case of absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse
a) Other antenuptial debts of either
spouse,
b) the support of illegitimate children of
either spouse, and
c) liabilities incurred by either spouse
by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict,
the payment of which shall be considered as
advances to be deducted from the share of
the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the
community; and
10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses
unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the community property is insufficient to cover
the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under
paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.
ART 95. Whatever may be lost during the
marriage in any game of chance, betting,
sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling,
whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be
borne by the loser and shall not be charged to
the community but any winnings therefrom shall
form part of the community property.
Ayala Investment v. CA
What debts and obligations contracted by the husband
alone are considered “for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership” which are chargeable against the conjugal
partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation

contract entered into by the husband in favor of his
employer within the contemplation of the said provision?
When there is no showing that the execution of an
indemnity agreement by the husband redounded to
the benefit of his family, the undertaking is NOT a
conjugal debt but an obligation personal to him.
There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the
spouses. From the jurisprudential rulings of the Court,
we can derive the following conclusions:
a) If the husband himself is the principal obligor
in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own
business or his own profession, that contract
falls within the term “x x x x obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. Simply
stated, where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business,
the law presumes that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
b) On the other hand, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of
“obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.”
No presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to
the conjugal partnership.
Marmont Resort Hotel v. Guiang
The second Memorandum of Agreement, although
ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with
Maris Trading, was also signed by her husband
Federico, as one of the witnesses thereto. This
circumstance indicates not only that Federico was
present during the execution of the agreement but also
that he had, in fact, given his consent to the execution
thereof by his wife Aurora. Otherwise, he should not
have appended his signature to the document as
witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the
second Memorandum of Agreement as their effective
consent thereto is sufficiently manifested in the
document itself.
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment &
Disposition of ACP
Husband and wife are joint administrator
ART 96. The administration and enjoyment of the
community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
When the spouse can be the sole administrator?
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the common properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by
the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
Neither spouse can dispose or donate a community
property without the consent of the other spouse.
ART 98. Neither spouse may donate any
community property without the consent of the
other. However, either spouse may, without the
consent of the other, make moderate donations
from the community property for charity or on
occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
The sale of a common property by one spouse only is
VOID
PNB v. CA
Does the presumption of conjugality of properties
acquired by the spouses during coverture apply to
property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the
name of the widow?
The presumption of conjugality applies to property
acquired during the lifetime of the husband and
wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that
the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor
when she was already a widow. When the property is
registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption cannot
prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse
and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
Docena v. Lapesura
Under the Family Code, the administration of the
conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife
jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or
encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not
require that the husband and wife always act together.
Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
management alone, subject to the intervention of the
court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of
the Family Code.
The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum
shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. If
anybody may repudiate the certification or
undertaking for having been incorrectly made, it is
the wife who may conceivably do so.
Uy v. CA
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124. The situation
contemplated is one where the spouse is
1. absent, or
2. separated in fact or

3. has abandoned the other or
4. consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.
Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the
subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in
comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of
stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and
mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as such administrator of the conjugal property
must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s
estate required of judicial guardians, not the summary
judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
Villaranda v. Villaranda
Without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely
voidable.
Sabalones v. CA
Pending the appointment of an administrator over the
whole mass of conjugal assets, the CA was justified in
allowing the wife to continue with her administration.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint
administration over the conjugal properties as clearly
provided in Article 124 of the Family Code. However,
Article 61 states that after a petition for legal separation
has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a
written agreement between the couple, appoint either
one of the spouses or a third person to act as the
administrator.
Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, et al.
WON the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal
property without the wife’s written consent.
Article 124 of the Family Code requires that the
disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written
consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is VOID.
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were
conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective,
the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Respondent Norma may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties.
However, being merely aware of a transaction is not
consent.
Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma
unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts
to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the
Family Code is warranted. It should be stressed that
court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted
to in cases where the spouse who does not give
consent is incapacitated.
Sps Carlos v. Tolentino 2018
The Court is disinclined to rule that the Deed of
Donation is wholly void ab initio and that the Spouses
Carlos should be totally stripped of their right over the
subject property. In consonance with justice and
equity, We deem it proper to uphold the validity of the
Deed of Donation but only to the extent of Mercedes'
one- half share in the subject property.
Dissolution of Absolute Community
Grounds for dissolution
ART 99. The absolute community terminates:
1) Upon the death of either spouse;
2) When there is a decree of legal
separation;
3) When the marriage is annulled or
declared void; or
4) In case of judicial separation of
property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138.
Effect of de-facto separation on the ACP
ART 100. The separation in fact between husband
and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute
community except that:
1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal
home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be
supported;
2) When the consent of one spouse to any
transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be
obtained in a summary proceeding;
3) In the absence of sufficient community
property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial
authority to administer or encumber any
specific separate property of the other
spouse and use the fruits or proceeds
thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
Effect of abandonment or failure to comply with his/her
obligation to the family.
ART 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons
the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse
may petition the court
a) for receivership,
b) for judicial separation of property or
c) for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute
community.
Meaning of abandonment?
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other
when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The spouse who
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
three months or has failed within the same
period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to
have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.
 Liquidation of the Absolute Community
Marigsa v. Macabuntoc
The community property of the marriage, at the
dissolution of this bond by the death of one of the
spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership
and becomes the property of a community, by
operation of law, between the surviving spouse and
the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive
property of the widower or the widow if he or she
be the heir of the deceased spouse.
Noveras v. Noveras, supra 2014
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage
settlements must be made before the celebration of
marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed
provided that the modification is judicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,
67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for
judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6
of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has
abandoned the latter or failed to comply with
his or her obligations to the family as provided
for in Article 101;
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses
have been separated in fact for at least one
year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than
a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute
community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th
paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code. Under
Article 102, liquidation follows the dissolution of the
absolute community regime and the following
procedure should apply:
ART 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute
community regime, the following procedure
shall apply:
1) An inventory shall be prepared,
listing separately all the properties of
the absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
2) The debts and obligations of the
absolute community shall be paid out
of its assets. In case of insufficiency of
said assets, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties
in accordance with the provisions of
the second paragraph of Article 94.
3) Whatever remains of the exclusive
properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
4) The net remainder of the properties of
the absolute community shall
constitute its net assets, which shall
be divided equally between husband
and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements, or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver of such
share.
5) The presumptive legitimes of the
common children shall be delivered
upon partition, in accordance with
Article 51.
6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties, in the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and
the lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom
the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court
has decided otherwise. In case there is
no such majority, the court shall
decide, taking into consideration the
best interests of said children.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine
courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the
Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be
limited to the Philippine properties.
Effect if no liquidation is made after the death of a
spouse on the subsequent marriage of the surviving
spouse
ART 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the community property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted,
the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
community property either judicially or extra-
judicially within 6 months from the death of
the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
months period, no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the
community property of the terminated marriage
shall be VOID.
Should the surviving spouse contract a
subsequent marriage without compliance with
the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime
of complete separation of property shall govern
the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
Quiao v. Quiao 2012
WON petitioner’s vested right over half of the common
properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the
trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant
to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code? NO.
To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or
equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of
property.
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,”
he may lose the same if there is due process and
such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr., we reiterated
our long-standing ruling that:
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets
is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes
neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not
ripen into title until it appears that there are assets
in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains
are all the fruits of the separate properties of the
spouses and the products of their labor and
industry.
As to the definition of “net profits,” Article 102(4) of
the Family Code, provides that net profits “shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.”
5. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Concept of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
ART 105. In case the future spouses AGREE in the
marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership gains shall govern their property
relations during marriage. xxxx
ART 106. Under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains, the husband and wife place
in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits
and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through
their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained by either or both
spouses shall be divided equally between them,
unless otherwise agreed in the marriage
settlements.
What are the exclusive properties of each spouse?
ART 109. The following shall be the exclusive
property of each spouse:
1) That which is brought to the marriage
as his or her own;
2) That which each acquires during the
marriage by gratuitous title;
3) That which is acquired by right of
redemption, by barter or by exchange
with property belonging to only one of
the spouses; and
4) That which is purchased with
exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband.
Presumption of conjugality
ART 116. All property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Real property acquired by a Filipina wife of a foreigner
is exclusive
Matthews v. Taylor
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely
not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized
exceptions. Benjamin has no right to nullify the
Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from
acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated
"vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she
acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if
we sustain Benjamin's claim that he provided the funds
for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created
in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the
subject property was part of the conjugal/community
property of the spouses.
Pacific Ace Finance v. Yanagisawa 2012
An undertaking not to dispose of a property pending
litigation, made in open court and embodied in a court
order, and duly annotated on the title of the said
property, creates a right in favor of the person relying
thereon. The latter may seek the annulment of actions
that are done in violation of such undertaking.
Eiji did not claim ownership of the Parañaque
townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his
basis for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his
right to rely on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of
or encumber the property, and the annotation of the
said commitment on TCT No. 99791.
Ownership, Enjoyment, and Administration
of Exclusive Property
Rule on transfer of administration of exclusive property
of one spouse of the other spouse
ART 110. The spouses retain the ownership,
possession, administration and enjoyment of
their exclusive properties.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer
the administration of his or her exclusive
property to the other by means of a public
instrument, which shall be recorded in the
registry of property of the place the property is
located.
ART 111. A spouse of age may mortgage,
encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or
her exclusive property, without the consent of the
other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate
with regard to the same.
ART 112. The alienation of any exclusive property
of a spouse administered by the other
automatically terminates the administration over
such property and the proceeds of the alienation
shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.
Rule in case of donation pro-indiviso in favor of both
spouses during the marriage
ART 113. Property donated or left by will to the
spouses, jointly and with designation of
determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-
spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and
in the absence of designation, share and share
 alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion
when proper.
Rule in case of onerous donation
ART 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount
of the charges shall be borne by the exclusive
property of the donee spouse, whenever they
have been advanced by the conjugal partnership
of gains.
Rule on retirement benefits, pensions etc. acquired
during the marriage
ART 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities,
gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be
governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous
acquisitions as may be proper in each case.
What are the conjugal partnership properties?
ART 117. The following are conjugal partnership
properties:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry,
work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or
received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits
from the exclusive property of each spouse;
4) The share of either spouse in the hidden
treasure which the law awards to the finder
or owner of the property where the treasure
is found;
5) Those acquired through occupation such as
fishing or hunting;
6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of
the partnership in excess of the number of
each kind brought to the marriage by either
spouse; and
7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as
winnings from gambling or betting. However,
losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively
by the loser-spouse.
Dela Peña v. Avila 2012
Although it is not necessary to prove that the property
was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of
acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership.
In the case Ruiz v. CA, this Court ruled that the phrase
"married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status
of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that
the husband is also a registered owner.
Rules to determine conjugality
Rule on property bought on installment by one spouse
before the marriage
ART 118. Property bought on installments paid
partly from exclusive funds of either or both
spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs
a) to the buyer or buyers if full ownership
was vested BEFORE the marriage and
b) to the conjugal partnership if such
ownership was vested DURING the
marriage.
In either case, any amount advanced by the
partnership or by either or both spouses shall be
reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership.
Rule on amount received by one spouse during the
marriage as payment of credit
ART 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable
within a period of time belongs to one of the
spouses, the sums which may be collected during
the marriage in partial payments or by
installments on the principal shall be the
exclusive property of the spouse.
However, interests falling due during the
marriage on the principal shall belong to the
conjugal partnership.
Rule on ownership of improvements made by the
conjugal partnership on the exclusive property of one
spouse
ART 120. The ownership of improvements,
whether for utility or adornment, made on the
separate property of the spouses at the expense of
the partnership or through the acts or efforts of
either or both spouses shall pertain to the
conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-
spouse, subject to the following rules:
a) When the cost of the improvement made by
the conjugal partnership and any resulting
increase in value are MORE than the value of
the property at the time of the improvement,
the entire property of one of the spouses
shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
subject to reimbursement of the value of
the property of the owner-spouse at the time
of the improvement; otherwise,
b) said property shall be retained in ownership
by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire
property shall be vested upon the
reimbursement, which shall be made at the time
of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Muñoz, Jr. v. Ramirez, et al. 2010
As a general rule, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been made, contracted or registered in the name of one
or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless
the contrary is proved.
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda
inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership. Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the
Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by
either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded
from the community property and be the exclusive
property of each spouse. The residential lot, therefore,
is Erlinda's exclusive paraphernal property.
Wong v. IAC
WON the execution of a decision in an action for

collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the
ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at
public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a
husband who did not participate in his wife's business
transaction from which said action stemmed.
The writ of execution cannot be issued against
Romarico as he has not yet had his day in court and,
necessarily, the public auction sale is null and void.
Moreover, the power of the court in the execution of
judgments extends only over properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor. Having been
acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership even though
Romarico and Katrina had been living separately.
While there is proof that Romarico acquired the
properties with money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to
repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then
the money is part of the conjugal assets and not
exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount
importance considering that in the determination of the
nature of a property acquired by a person during
coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the
money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding,
Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them,
her obligation not having been shown by the
petitioners to be one of the charges against the
conjugal partnership. In addition to the fact that her
rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent
of her husband and her authority to incur such
indebted-ness had not been alleged in the complaint
and proven at the trial.
Jocson v. CA
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title
show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively
Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because
the words "married to" preceding "Alejandra Poblete"
are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio
Jocson.
In the instant case, had Moises Jocson presented
sufficient proof to show that the disputed properties
were acquired during his parents' coverture, We would
have ruled that the properties, though registered in the
name of Emilio Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in
view of the presumption under Article. 160. There being
no such proof, the condition sine qua non for the
application of the presumption does not exist.
Necessarily, We rule that the properties are the
exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.
Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
In the present case, the contract of carriage was entered
into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were
incurred, during marriage. Hence, the rights accruing
from said contract, including those resulting from
breach thereof by the defendant, are presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs.
Zulueta. The fact that such breach of contract was
coupled, also, with a quasi-delict constitutes an
aggravating circumstance and can not possibly have the
effect of depriving the conjugal partnership of such
property rights.
Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co.
It appears that there are two distinct theories as to
whether damages arising from an injury suffered by
one of the spouses should be considered conjugal or
separate property of the injured spouse.
The theory holding that such damages should form part
of the conjugal partnership property is based wholly
on the proposition that by the injury, the earning
capacity of the injured spouse is diminished to the
consequent prejudice of the conjugal partnership. It is
held that the sum of P10,000 with interest thereon
awarded to Sonja Maria Lilius as damages is
paraphernal property.
Charges Upon and Obligations of the CPG
ART 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for:
1) The support of the spouse, their common
children, and the legitimate children of either
spouse; however, the support of illegitimate
children shall be governed by the provisions
of this Code on Support;
2) All debts and obligations contracted during
the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, or by both
spouses or by one of them with the consent
of the other;
3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to
the extent that the family may have
benefited;
4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses,
including major or minor repairs upon the
conjugal partnership property;
5) All taxes and expenses for mere
preservation made during the marriage
upon the separate property of either spouse;
6) Expenses to enable either spouse to
commence or complete a professional,
vocational, or other activity for self-
improvement;
7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar
as they have redounded to the benefit of the
family;
8) The value of what is donated or promised by
both spouses in favor of their common
legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a
professional or vocational course or other
activity for self-improvement; and
9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses
unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to
cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties.
Ros v. PNB 2011
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x

x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It
is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at
the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit
from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial,
if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, Ros' loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.
Sps Buado v. CA and Nicol
Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose
conjugal property is being executed on account of the
other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a
"stranger?"
Mariano v. CA and Sps Ching v. CA held that the
husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a
"stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against
his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, Naguit v. CA and Sy v. Discaya held
that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action
wherein the writ of execution was issued and is
therefore justified in bringing an independent action to
vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or
paraphernal property.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime
or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community
of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal
partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of
gains has no duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be
concluded that the civil obligation arising from the
crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held
liable for the personal obligation contracted by one
spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown
to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Francisco v. Gonzales
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only
a) when she purchases things necessary for the
support of the family, or
b) when she borrows money for that purpose
upon her husband's failure to deliver the
needed sum;
c) when administration of the conjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts or by the husband; or
d) when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity.
Failure to establish any of these circumstances means
that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for
the wife's personal obligation. Here, the liability
incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in
an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner
Matrai.
Alipio v. CA
A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a
decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of
a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal
partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to
file a claim in the settlement of estate of the
decedent.
As held in Calma v. Tañedo, after the death of either of
the spouses, no complaint for the collection of
indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving
spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the
proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the
conjugal property.
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., et.al. 2012
Post-marriage modification of marriage settlements
can take place only where:
a) the absolute community or conjugal
partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon
a decree of legal separation;
b) the spouses who were legally separated
reconciled and agreed to revive their former
property regime;
c) judicial separation of property had been had on
the ground that a spouse abandons the other
without just cause or fails to comply with his
obligations to the family;
d) there was judicial separation of property
under Article 135;
e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the
voluntary dissolution of their absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains.
None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren
and Melecia.
Melecia has no exclusive property of her own and thus,
Article 122 of the Family Code applies. The civil
indemnity that the decision in the murder case
imposed on her may be enforced against their
conjugal assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 have been covered.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 allows
payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his
wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even
before these are liquidated. No prior liquidation of
those assets is required.
Payment of Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse by the
CPG. What is its difference from the ACP?
ART 122. The payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities
imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts
contracted by either spouse before the marriage,
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them,
as well as the support of illegitimate children of
either spouse, may be enforced against the
partnership assets
a) after the responsibilities enumerated in
the preceding Article have been covered,
b) if the spouse who is bound should have
no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient;
at the time of the liquidation of the partnership,
such spouse shall be charged for what has been
paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Administration of the Conjugal Partnership
ART 124. The administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal partnership shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
Sps Guiang v. CA
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent
of both the husband and the wife. The absence of
the consent of one renders the sale null and void,
while the vitiation thereof makes it merely
voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure
the defect.
Here, private respondent’s consent to the contract of
sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent
or absent. Said contract properly falls within the ambit
of Article 124.
The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the
absence of private respondent’s consent. Neither can
the “amicable settlement” be considered a continuing
offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties,
following the last sentence of Art 124.
Sps Ravina v. Villa Abrille et al.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded
after the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by
Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition to be void if done
a) without the consent of both the husband and
the wife, OR
b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority
of the court.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for
annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of
sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to
annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house
and lot.
Roxas v. CA, et al.
WON a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal
partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease
involving conjugal real property without the knowledge
and consent of the wife.
NO. The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a
lease is an encumbrance and/or alienation. The
concept of encumbrance includes lease, thus "an
encumbrance is sometimes construed broadly to
include not only liens such as mortgages and taxes, but
also attachment, LEASES, inchoate dower rights, water
rights, easements, and other RESTRICTIONS on USE."
Moreover, lease is not only an encumbrance but also a
"qualified alienation, with the lessee becoming, for all
legal intents and purposes, and subject to its terms, the
owner of the thing affected by the lease." Thus, the
joinder of the wife, although unnecessary for an
oral lease of conjugal realty which does not exceed
one year in duration, is required in a lease of
conjugal realty for a period of more than one year,
such a lease being considered a conveyance and
encumbrance within the provisions of the Civil Code
requiring the joinder of the wife in the instrument
by which real property is conveyed or encumbered.
Sps Aggabao v. Parulan, Jr., et al. 2010
Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction
executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the
proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not
occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.
On the other hand, the void sale was a continuing
offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio
had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer
was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the
petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph
of Article 124 makes this clear.
Article 124 categorically requires the consent of both
spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed
of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition.
Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must
observe two kinds of requisite diligence,
namely:
a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the
title covering the property; and
b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of
the transacting spouse to sell conjugal
property on behalf of the other spouse.
ART 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal
partnership property without the consent of the
other. However, either spouse may, without the
consent of the other, make moderate
donations from the conjugal partnership
property
1) for charity or
2) on occasions of family rejoicing or
3) family distress.
Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership
ART 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
1) Upon the death of either spouse;
2) When there is a decree of legal
separation;
3) When the marriage is annulled or
declared void; or
4) In case of judicial separation of
property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138.
ART 127. The separation in fact between husband
and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal
partnership, except that:
1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal
home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to
be supported;
2) When the consent of one spouse to any
transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be
obtained in a summary proceeding;
3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal
partnership property, the separate
property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the support of the
family. xxxx
ART 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons
the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse
may petition the court
1) for receivership,
2) for judicial separation of property, or
3) for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal
partnership property, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court
may impose.
Quiao v. Quiao, supra 2012
On Conjugal Partnership Regime
ART 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, the following procedure
shall apply:
1) An inventory shall be prepared,
listing separately all the properties of
the conjugal partnership and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal
partnership in payment of personal
debts and obligations of either spouse
shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset thereof.
3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for
the use of his or her exclusive funds in
the acquisition of property or for the
value of his or her exclusive property,
the ownership of which has been
vested by law in the conjugal
partnership.
4) The debts and obligations of the
conjugal partnership shall be paid out
of the conjugal assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties.
5) Whatever remains of the exclusive
properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
6) Unless the owner had been
indemnified from whatever source, the
loss or deterioration of movables
used for the benefit of the family,
belonging to either spouse, even due to
fortuitous event, shall be paid to said
spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
7) The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute
the profits.
8) The presumptive legitimes of the
common children shall be delivered
upon the partition.
9) In the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties,
be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. xxxx
Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership
ART 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the conjugal partnership property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted,
the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal
partnership property either judicially or extra-
judicially within six months from the death of
the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-
month period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugal partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a
subsequent marriage without compliance with
the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime
of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
Heirs of Go v. Servacio 2011
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal
property by the surviving spouse without the prior
liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family
Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not
yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At
any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does
not prejudice vested rights.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105
of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the
conjugal property after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership must be made only AFTER the
liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
The appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where
their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided
shares of some of the co-owners is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Domingo v. Sps Genaro 2016
Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was
dissolved upon Flora's death.
While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any
disposition involving the conjugal property without
prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this
rule does not apply since the provisions of the Family
Code shall be "without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws."
An implied co-ownership among Flora's heirs
governed the conjugal properties pending
liquidation and partition.
In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna,
we held that the properties of a dissolved conjugal
partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership
among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition.
The surviving spouse, however, has an actual and
vested one-half undivided share of the properties,
which does not consist of determinate and segregated
properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal
partnership.
An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Flora's surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with
respect to Flora's share of the conjugal partnership until
final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other
hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership
properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest.
Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any
specific portion of the conjugal properties without an
actual partition being first done either by agreement or
by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right
to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in
the subject property.
Barrido v. Nonato 2014
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the
woman:
1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
2) live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and
3) their union is without the benefit of marriage
or their marriage is void.
Here, all these elements are present. Under this
property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed to
the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household.
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired
the subject property during the subsistence of their
marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in
common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be
divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
6. Regime of Separation of Property
ART 144. Separation of property may refer to
present or future property or both. It may be
total or partial. In the latter case, the property
not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the
absolute community.
ART 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of,
possess, administer and enjoy his or her own
separate estate, without need of the consent of
the other. To each spouse shall belong all
earnings from his or her profession, business or
industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil,
due or received during the marriage from his or
her separate property.
Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in
proportion to their income. Liability is solidary.
ART 146. Both spouses shall bear the family
expenses in proportion to their income, or, in
case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the
current market value of their separate properties.
The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for
family expenses shall, however, be solidary.
7. Judicial Separation of Property
ART 134. In the absence of an express declaration
in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place except by judicial order.
Such judicial separation of property may either be
voluntary or for sufficient cause.
What are sufficient causes for judicial separation of
property?
ART 135. Any of the following shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:
1) That the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction;
2) That the spouse of the petitioner has
been judicially declared an absentee;
3) That loss of parental authority of the
spouse of petitioner has been decreed by
the court;
4) That the spouse of the petitioner has
abandoned the latter or failed to comply
with his or her obligations to the family;
 5) That the spouse granted the power of
administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
6) That at the time of the petition, the
spouses have been separated in fact for
at least one year and reconciliation is
highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and
(3), the presentation of the final judgment against
the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis
for the grant of the decree of judicial separation
of property.
Voluntary separation — How is it done?
ART 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified
petition with the court for the voluntary
dissolution of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, and for the
separation of their common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the
conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the
personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in
the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The
court shall take measures to protect the creditors
and other persons with pecuniary interest.
Toda, Jr. v. CA
The separation of property is not effected by the mere
execution of the contract or agreement of the parties,
but by the decree of the court approving the same. It,
therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial
approval, without which it is void.
Espinosa et al. v. Omaña 2011
Whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and
Espinosa's "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."
This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution
of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary
public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation
of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the
conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did
in this case.
Effects of the decree of separation of property
ART 137. Once the separation of property has been
decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains shall be liquidated in
conformity with this Code.
During the pendency of the proceedings for
separation of property, the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the
support of the spouses and their children.
Revival of the previous property regime
1. Revival if separation is based on Art. 135 = Pars 1
- 6;
2. Revival if separation is based on Art. 136 = Par 7.
ART 141. The spouses may, in the same
proceedings where separation of property was
decreed, file a motion in court for a decree
reviving the property regime that existed
between them before the separation of property
in any of the following instances:
1) When the civil interdiction terminates;
2) When the absentee spouse reappears;
3) When the court, being satisfied that the
spouse granted the power of
administration in the marriage
settlements will not again abuse that
power, authorizes the resumption of
said administration;
4) When the spouse who has left the
conjugal home without a decree of legal
separation resumes common life with
the other;
5) When parental authority is judicially
restored to the spouse previously
deprived thereof;
6) When the spouses who have separated in
fact for at least one year, reconcile and
resume common life; or
7) When after voluntary dissolution of
the absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership has been judicially
decreed upon the joint petition of the
spouses, they agree to the revival of the
former property regime. No voluntary
separation of property may thereafter
be granted.
The revival of the former property regime shall
be governed by Article 67.
Administration of Exclusive Properties — When can
the court order the transfer of administration of an
exclusive property of one spouse to another spouse?
ART 142. The administration of all classes of
exclusive property of either spouse may be
transferred by the court to the other spouse:
1) When one spouse becomes the guardian
of the other;
2) When one spouse is judicially declared
an absentee;
3) When one spouse is sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction; or
4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive
from justice or is in hiding as an accused
in a criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of
incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other
just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable
person to be the administrator.
8. Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage
⭐If no legal impediments to marry each other or the
marriage is void, the regime is CO-OWNERSHIP.
ART 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
 efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is
in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong
to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong
to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
Diño v. Diño, supra 2011
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred
when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties' properties under Article
147 of the Family Code
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court. For Article 147
of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated
to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void.
In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. The rules on co-ownership
apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership. It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Salas Jr. v. Aguila, supra 2013
In Diño v. Diño, we held that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in
this case.
Here, the partition of the Discovered Properties as
ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but
on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains.
⭐Paterno v. Arcaya-Chua 2017
What are the common properties included in the
dissolution of the co-ownership?
Petitioner should be reminded of the legal effect of a
confirmation of a void ab initio marriage: it is
retroactive to the time when the marriage ceremony
transpired. In short, after the trial court declared her
marriage to Mr. Paterno void in 2005 because of both
parties' psychological incapacity, the marriage
ceremony on December 27, 1987 was invalidated as if
no marriage took place. This means then that during
their ten-year cohabitation, Ms. Lomongo and Mr.
Paterno lived together merely as common-law spouses.
This is where Article 147 comes in.
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, supra 2014
Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares were prima facie presumed to be equal.
However, for this presumption to arise, proof of
actual contribution was required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money
and evidence of credit.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it
is but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the
law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm.
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to
contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for
the law office amortization and for the law books. It is
more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his
earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for
use of the law firm that he headed.
1. Effect of dissolution of co-ownership if one party
is in bad faith;
2. If there is legal impediment — Co-ownership only
for actual contribution.
3. Share of the married party shall go to the ACP or
CPG of his existing valid marriage, otherwise, his
share will be forfeited in accordance with Art. 147
last paragraph.
ART 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another,
his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph
of the preceding Article.
 The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in both faith.
Nicdao Cariño v. Cariño, supra
Article 148 of the Family Code refers to the property
regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, multiple alliances of the
same married man.
Thus, one-half of the subject "death benefits" under
scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the
property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal
heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr
This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The crux of the petition is the ownership of Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium and how the properties acquired by
petitioner and respondent should be partitioned.
Suite 204 was acquired during the parties' cohabitation.
Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code,
said property should be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
IN SUMMARY
1. The key to determine whether to apply Art 147 or
148: LEGAL CAPACITY.
a. With LC, Art 147;
b. Without LC, Art 148.
2. The following void marriages fall under Art 147
on ABSOLUTE CO-OWNERSHIP:
a. Arts 36, 44, 53;
b. Absence of consent;
c. Lack of authority of solemnizing officer;
d. Lack of valid marriage license;
e. Absence of marriage ceremony.
3. Article 148 on CO-OWNERSHIP based on
ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION refers to the property
regime of
a. bigamous marriages,
b. adulterous relationships,
c. relationships in a state of concubine,
d. relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons,
e. multiple alliances of the same married
man.
G. THE FAMILY
1. Concept
As a basic social institution
ART 149. The family, being the foundation of the
nation, is a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects. Consequently,
family relations are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
family shall be recognized or given effect.
Family relations – what is covered
ART 150. Family relations include those:
1) Between husband and wife;
2) Between parents and children;
3) Among other ascendants and
descendants; and
4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of
the full or halfblood.
2. Effects on legal disputes
Earnest effort to compromise from suit between
members of same family
ART 151. No suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed. If it is shown that
no such efforts were in fact made, the same case
must be dismissed.
These rules shall not apply to cases which may
not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.
Gayon v. Gayon
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her
children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained
in said Art. 217 — which should be construed
strictly, it being an exception to the general rule — and
Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party
in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not
come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's
failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint
does not bar the same.
Hontiveros v. RTC
The absence of the verification required in Art 151
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the complaint. The verification is
merely a formal requirement.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art 151 of the
Family Code does not apply in this case since the
suit is not exclusively among family members.
Whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving
family members, the requisite showing of earnest
efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory.
The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant
and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the
case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
Martinez v. Martinez
A sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the
enumeration.
A party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the
Family Code before filing a complaint against a family
member would render such complaint premature.
Santos v. CA, et al.
Civil Case No. 1784 MN being merely an action for
revival of judgment of a dormant decision rendered

in an original action, can hardly be the kind of suit
contemplated in Article 222 of the Code.
Vda. De Manalo v. CA
Art 222 of the Civil Code (now Art 151 of the Family
Code) is applicable only to ordinary civil actions
and not to special proceedings.
Heirs of Favis, Sr v. Gonzales 2014
The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may
dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure
to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made. A failure to allege earnest
but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among
members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional
defect but merely a defect in the statement of a
cause of action. The defect may however be waived
by failing to make a seasonable objection, in a motion to
dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural
imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court.
If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and
did not, after filing their answer to petitioner’s
complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the
required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise,
the appellate court unquestionably did not have any
authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint.
3. Family Home
Concept of Family Home
ART 152. The family home, constituted jointly by
the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family, is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated.
ART 156. The family home must be part of the
properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latter's
consent. It may also be constituted by an
unmarried head of a family on his or her own
property.
Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a
conditional sale on installments where
ownership is reserved by the vendor only to
guarantee payment of the purchase price may be
constituted as a family home.
When is it deemed constituted
ART 153. The family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law.
ART 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of
a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a
person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of,
only ONE family home.
Modequillo v. Breva
Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals
in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of
execution of a family home constituted under the Family
Code.
The residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family
home by operation of law only under Article 153 of
the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family
home upon the effectivity of the Family Code.
The contention of petitioner that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was occupied
by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.
Article 162 does not state that the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of
the money judgment aforecited? NO. The debt or liability
which was the basis of the judgment arose or was
incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March
16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom
was rendered by the appellate court on January 29,
1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code.
Beneficiaries of family home
ART 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and
2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family
home and who depend upon the
head of the family for legal
support.
Advantages of a family home is that it is exempt from
execution, forced sale and attachment. Exceptions to the
rule
ART 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except:
1) For nonpayment of taxes;
2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home;
3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such
constitution; and
4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, materialmen and
others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction
of the building.
Limitations on the value of family home
ART 157. The actual value of the family home shall
not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the
amount of the PHP300K three hundred
thousand pesos in urban areas, and PHP200K
two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or
such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes
after the adoption of this Code, the value most
favorable for the constitution of a family home
shall be the basis of evaluation.
Disposition and encumbrance of a family home
ART 158. The family home may be sold, alienated,
donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner
or owners thereof with the written consent of
a) the person constituting the same,
b) the latter's spouse, and a
c) majority of the beneficiaries of legal age.
In case of conflict, the court shall decide.
Can a family home be sold?
ART 160. When a creditor whose claims is not
among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a
judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable
grounds to believe that the family home is
actually worth more than the maximum amount
fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court
which rendered the judgment for an order
directing the sale of the property under
execution. The court shall so order if it finds that
the actual value of the family home exceeds the
maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of
its constitution. If the increased actual value
exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and
results from subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person or persons constituting
the family home, by the owner or owners of the
property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same
rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value
allowed for a family home shall be considered.
The proceeds shall be applied
1. first to the amount mentioned in Article
157, and
2. then to the liabilities under the judgment
and the costs;
3. the excess, if any, shall be delivered to
the judgment debtor.
Continuance of the family home despite the death of the
owner
ART 159. The family home shall continue despite
the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of 10
years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
Ramos v. Pangilinan 2010
For family homes constructed AFTER the effectivity of
the Family Code, there is no need to constitute
extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as
long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually
resides therein. The debts incurred for which the
exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155
for which the family home is made answerable must
have been incurred after August 3, 1988.
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the
Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and
proved.
Manacop v. CA
May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment
issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be
executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home
under the provision of said Code?
Modequillo explicitly ruled that Art 153 of the Family
Code does not have retroactive effect. There being
absolutely no proof that the subject property was
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home, it follows that the law’s protective mantle cannot
be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt involved
herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial
court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner
cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the
Family Code.
List of Beneficiary-Occupants Restricted to Those
Enumerated in the Code
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the
family home either by the owner thereof or by “any
of its beneficiaries” must be actual. That which is
“actual” is something real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or to something
which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy,
however, need not be by the owner of the house
specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by
the “beneficiaries” enumerated by Article 154.
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the
family home is constituted jointly by the husband and
wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and
overseers.
Sps Versola v. CA
WON petitioners timely raised and proved that their
property is exempt from execution.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced
sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as
such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
debtor himself before the sale of the property at public
auction.
The records of the case do not disclose that
petitioners in the said motion set up and proved
that the property to be sold was their family home.
In any event, said motion was treated by the trial court
as a mere scrap of paper presumably on the ground that
such motion did not contain a notice of hearing.
It was only after almost two years from the time of the
execution sale and after the "Sheriff's Final Deed of
Sale" was issued did petitioners rigorously claim that
the property in question is exempt from execution. Even
then, there was no showing that petitioners adduced
evidence to prove that it is indeed a family home.
Josef v. Santos
Upon being apprised that the property subject of
execution allegedly constitutes petitioner's family
home, the trial court should have observed the
following procedure:
1. Determine if petitioner's obligation to
respondent falls under either of the
exceptions under Article 155 of the Family
Code;
 2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioner's
claim that the property was his family home;
3. If the property is accordingly found to
constitute petitioner's family home, the court
should determine:
a) if the obligation sued upon was
contracted or incurred prior to, or
after, the effectivity of the Family Code;
b) if petitioner's spouse is still alive, as
well as if there are other beneficiaries
of the family home;
c) if the petitioner has more than one
residence for the purpose of
determining which of them, if any, is
his family home; and
d) its actual location and value, for the
purpose of applying the provisions of
Articles 157 and 160 of the Family
Code.
Eulogio et al. v. Bell, Sr. et al. 2015
Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents'
family home is barred by res judicata.
The issue of whether the property in dispute exceeded
the statutory limit of P300,000 has already been
determined with finality by the trial court. Its finding
necessarily meant that the property is exempt from
execution.
Respondents' family home cannot be sold on
execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family
home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish
these facts:
1) there was an increase in its actual value;
2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by
the persons constituting the family home, its
owners or any of its beneficiaries; and
3) the increased actual value exceeded the
maximum allowed under Article 157.
Here, the trial court had already determined with
finality that the property was a family home, and there
was no proof that its value had increased beyond the
statutory limit due to voluntary improvements by
respondents.
Arriola v. Arriola
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject
lot on which it stands) is the family home of the
deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from
immediate partition under Article 159 of FC.
Even if the family home has passed by succession to the
co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one
of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family
home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the
protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the
individual co-owner or owner of the family home
cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159
to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10
years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a
longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary
residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot
be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason
exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction
and order the partition of the property.
Patricio v. Dario III
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three
requisites must concur:
1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
2) they live in the family home; and
3) they are dependent for legal support upon
the head of the family.
As to the third requisite, Marcelino IV cannot demand
support from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him. Thus,
despite residing in the family home and his being a
descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino IV cannot
be considered as beneficiary contemplated under
Article 154. With this finding, there is no legal
impediment to partition the subject property.
Gomez v. Sta. Ines
Marietta's liability, which was the basis of the judgment,
arose long before the levied property was constituted as
a family home by operation of law in August 1988.
Under the circumstances, it is clear that the liability
incurred by Marietta falls squarely under one of the
instances when a family home may be the subject of
execution, forced sale, or attachment, as provided for by
Article 155 of the Family Code, particularly, to answer
for debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home.
Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero et al. 2012
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for
purposes of exemption from execution, could be
summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the
effectivity of the Family Code must be constituted
as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially
in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code are automatically
deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially
or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were
existing thereafter, are considered as family homes
by operation of law and are prospectively entitled
to the benefits accorded to a family home.
The family home’s exemption from execution
must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before
the sale of the property at public auction.
At no other time can the status of a residential house as
a family home can be set up and proved and its
exemption from execution be claimed but before the

sale thereof at public auction.
Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the
petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the
prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to
presume or raise the status of the subject property as a
family home.
H. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
ART 163. The filiation of children may be by
nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be
legitimate or illegitimate.
1. Legitimate children
Meaning of legitimate child
ART 164. Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
For a child conceived through artificial insemination
to be considered legitimate, the following elements
must concur:
1) Both spouses authorized it in writing;
2) If the husband had no knowledge, he ratifies later
upon knowledge;
3) The instrument containing the agreement must
be executed before the birth of the child;
4) The instrument shall be recorded in the civil
registry together with the birth of the child.
ART 165. Children conceived and born outside a
valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise
provided in this Code.
ART 167. The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
Grounds to impugn the legitimacy of the child
ART 165. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned
only on the following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the
child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife
were living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse was not
possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevented sexual
intercourse;
2) That it is proved that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have
been that of the husband, except with regard
to Article 164(2); or
3) That in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
ART 168. If the marriage is terminated and the
mother contracted another marriage within
three hundred days after such termination of
the former marriage, these rules shall govern in
the absence of proof to the contrary:
1) A child born before 180 days after the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage
is considered to have been conceived during
the former marriage, provided it be born
within 300 days after the termination of the
former marriage;
2) A child born after 180 days following the
celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during
such marriage, even though it be born within
the 300 days after the termination of the
former marriage.
ART 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
born after three hundred days following the
termination of the marriage shall be proved by
whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
Tan v. Trocio
Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of
Complainant and her husband and the presumption
should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical
access between the couple was impossible. From the
evidence on hand, that presumption has not been
overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact,
Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the
legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband,
Tan Le Pok.
Arbolario v. CA
Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to
continue until proof that it has been legally ended is
presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the
husband with another woman will not give rise to a
presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children
born of the second union, until and unless there be
convincing proof that the first marriage had been
lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully
entered into.
There is no presumption of legitimacy or
illegitimacy in this jurisdiction; and whoever alleges
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after the
dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation of the
spouses must introduce such evidence to prove his or
her allegation.
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship
that must be judicially established. It stands to reason
that children born within wedlock are legitimate.
Petitioners, however, failed to prove the fact or even the
presumption of marriage between their parents, Juan
Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot
invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.
Chua Keng Giap v. IAC
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua
Keng Giap was really her son? More than any one else, it
was Sy Kao who could say - as indeed she has said these
many years - that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of
her womb.
Andal v. Macaraig
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would
include
1) absence during the initial period of conception,
2) impotence which is patent, continuing and
incurable, and
3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt
violation of prison regulations.
Experience shows that tuberculosis does not prevent
carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons
suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even
in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined
to sexual intercourse. The presumption of legitimacy
under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not,
therefore, been overcome.
Agustin v. CA
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the
action for support into one for recognition but merely
allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action
against petitioner who had been denying the
authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution
and order effectively integrated an action to compel
recognition with an action for support, such was valid
and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. CA,
we allowed the integration of an action to compel
recognition with an action to claim one’s inheritance.
We take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our
stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
Herrera v. Alba
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a
valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support,
or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on
the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child. There are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
which parties have to face:
1. a prima facie case,
2. affirmative defenses,
3. presumption of legitimacy, and
4. physical resemblance between the putative
father and child.
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she
had sexual relations with the putative father. In our
jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the
burden forward and shift it to the putative father.
There are two affirmative defenses available to the
putative father. The putative father may show
1. incapability of sexual relations with the
mother, because of either physical absence or
impotency; OR
2. that the mother had sexual relations with other
men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate. The child’s
legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict
standards provided by law.
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative
father and child may be offered as part of evidence of
paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a
paternity proceeding.
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from
paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If
the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA
analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then
there is refutable presumption of paternity. This
refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected
to the Vallejo standards.
Estate of Ong v. Diaz
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is
not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown
by evidence to the contrary.
The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation. The death of the petitioner does not
ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as
long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his
DNA.
Surposa Uy v. Ngo Chua
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the
status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be
no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.
Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is
for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the
Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio.
Concepcion v. CA
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code.
He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the
status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa's husband
Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the
legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right
to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the
sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception. Here, the separation between
Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was
certainly not such as to make it physically impossible
for them to engage in the marital act. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as
the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and
Mario, stands.
Gotardo v. Buling 2012
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate,
through
a) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment,
b) an admission of filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or
c) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or
d) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. Such other proof of one's
filiation may be
1) a “baptismal certificate,
2) a judicial admission,
3) a family bible in which [his] name has been
entered,
4) common reputation respecting [his]
pedigree,
5) admission by silence,
6) the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
7) other kinds of proof [admissible] under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.”
Who can impugn the legitimacy of the child
ART 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of
the child shall be brought within 1 year from
the knowledge of the birth or its recording in
the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper
case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was
recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do
not reside at the place of birth as defined in the
first paragraph or where it was recorded, the
period shall be 2 years if they should reside in
the Philippines; and 3 years if abroad.
If the birth of the child has been concealed from
or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the
period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact
of registration of said birth, whichever is
earlier.
ART 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn
the filiation of the child within the period
prescribed in the preceding article only in the
following cases:
1) If the husband should die before the
expiration of the period fixed for
bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the
complaint without having desisted
therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of
the husband.
De Jesus v. Dizon
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated as not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, judicial action within
the applicable statute of limitations is essential in
order to establish the child's acknowledgment.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their
illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate
status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of
children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest
in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child
has been successfully impugned that the paternity of
the husband can be rejected.
Legitimacy can only be assailed in a DIRECT action
Liyao v. Liyao
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able
to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately
from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner
was conceived and born is of no moment. While
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis
that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the
child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may
only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his
heirs.
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the
period limited by law.
Babiera v. Catotal
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon
adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a
certificate which shows that the mother was already
fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and
which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by
the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights
are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such
mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the
cancellation of the said certificate.
The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her
legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in
Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily,
the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not
prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
San Juan Geronimo v. Santos 2015
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts
a quo. The appellate court itself ruled that the
irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on
the date of birth and the name of the informant made
the document questionable. These irregularities and the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of regularity attached to respondent's
birth certificate.
2. Proof of filiation
ART 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
1) Primary Proofs
a. Record of birth;
b. Admission in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by
the parent.
Mariategui v. CA
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the
private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a
record of birth. In the case of the two other private
respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required
by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status
of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as
their brother Jacinto.
Thus, private respondents are legitimate children and
heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time
limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action
for recognition is inappli-cable to this case.
2) Secondary Proofs
a. Open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child;
b. Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court.
Berciles v. GSIS
The rule is that although the baptismal record of a
natural child describes her as a child of the decedent,
yet, if in the preparation of the record the decedent had
no intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held to
be a voluntary recognition of parentage. There is
jurisprudence that a type-written letter signed by the
father is not an authentic writing.
Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz 2016
Whether or not the respondents are legal heirs of
Silvestra.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be
questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, as held in Sps Fidel v. CA, this Court
however deems it necessary to pass upon the
respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to
determine their legal rights to the subject property.
A certificate of live birth is a public document that
consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in
public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). Thus, being
public documents, the respondents' certificates of live
birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must
be signed by the father in order to be a competent
evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in
law and jurisprudence. Only in the registration of birth
of an illegitimate child does the law require that the
birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father
refuses to acknowledge the child.
Aguilar v. Siasat 2015
Petitioner – who was born during the marriage of
Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and
before their respective deaths – has sufficiently proved
that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses.
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the
Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code;
by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.”
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his
Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering
the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of
Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the
introduction of other documentary evidence to prove
filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said
document as mere proof of open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it
is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph
thereof, the same being an express recognition in a
public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be
proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, and such due
recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and
no further court action is required.
Reyes v. CA
The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than
natural to inherit must be first recognized voluntarily or
by court action is well settled in Our jurisprudence.
What Irene may have proved is that she had been in
continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate
child who is not natural. But such fact alone without a
valid recognition in a record of birth, will, statement
before a court of record, or authentic writing does not
make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not
natural. She nevertheless possesses the right to
compel judicial recognition and the action for this
must be brought within the proper prescriptive
period. Since Irene was already of age (35 years old)
when her alleged father died, and she had not presented
any discovered document wherein her presumed father
recognized her, the action to compel recognition is
already barred.
San Juan De la Cruz v. Gracia
In the present case, special circumstances exist to hold
that Dominique's Autobiography, though unsigned by
him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court
sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is
the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with
the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim
of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent
as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
Mendoza v. CA
To establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," it is necessary to comply with certain
jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not
mean that the concession of status shall continue
forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues. The possession of such
status means that the father has treated the child as his
own, directly and not through others, spontaneously
and without concealment though without publicity
(since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a
showing of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his own, by continuous
and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the
status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro
Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code.
Although Teopista has failed to show that she was in
open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has
nevertheless established that status by another
method.
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or
"by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant
is her father," according to the Family Code.
Ong v. CA
The four times during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo
and gave the latter money cannot be considered proof
of continuous possession of the status of a child. The
father’s conduct toward his son must be spontaneous
and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Here there
are no acts shown of Manuel Ong treating Alfredo Ong,
Jr. as his son except on the four occasions during which
they met. In the case of Robert Caballes, there is no
proof at all that Manuel Ong treated him as his son.
Nor can it be said that there was proof of cohabitation
in this case. While Saturnina Caballes testified that she
and Manuel Ong lived together for four months as
husband and wife in order to justify a finding of
cohabitation, the relationship was not open and
public so as to constitute cohabitation. While the
parties are not required to hold themselves out as
husband and wife, neither must they act clandestinely
or secretly, otherwise they will be considered to have
merely engaged in illicit sexual intercourse.
Nonetheless, we hold that the evidence in this case
sufficiently makes this case fall under the last
paragraph of Art. 283, i.e., any other evidence showing
that Manuel Ong was the father of private respondents.
Sps Alcantara v. Sps Belen 2017
In Bagayas v. Bagayas, this Court reiterated that
courts must refrain from making a declaration of
heirship in an ordinary civil action because "matters
relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely
for the purpose of determining such rights."
Straightforwardly, the CA is precluded from
determining the issue of filiation in a proceeding for
the quieting of title and accion reivindicatoria.
While there are exceptions to this rule, none obtains in
this case. There is no allegation on record that, as
regards the parties, a special proceeding was instituted
but was finally closed and terminated. In the
proceedings before the RTC, none of the parties
exhaustively presented evidence regarding the issue of
filiation. The CA should not have adjudicated the status
of Elvira Alcantara as a legitimate daughter or an
adopted child in succeeding to the rights of Asuncion
Alimon.
Locsin v. Locsin
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local
Civil Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil
Registry General, is prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. However, if there are material
discrepancies between them, the one entered in the
Civil Registry General prevails.
Action to claim legitimacy – Prescriptive period
ART 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of 5
years within which to institute the action.
Rights of a legitimate child
ART 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
1) To bear the surnames of the father and
the mother, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
2) To receive support from their parents,
their ascendants, and in proper cases,
their brothers and sisters, in conformity
 with the provisions of this Code on
Support; and
3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other
successional rights granted to them by
the Civil Code.
3. Illegitimate children
ART 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same
period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Ara v. Pizarro 2017 Leonen, J
Open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child of a person can only be admissible as
proof of filiation during the lifetime of the alleged father
because it is only a secondary proof of filiation. Once the
alleged parent is already dead, the said evidence could
no longer be used.
In this case, although the petitioners also presented the
birth certificate of Garcia, the same could not be given
great weight by the Court because it is very
questionable as it was a product of a delayed
registration. It was registered only in 2003 or after the
death of the alleged parent, Josefa Ara. Such evidence is
clearly tenuous proof of filiation to warrant scant
consideration by the court.
Tayag v. CA
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino v.
Paulino, et al. The only difference is that at the time of
the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that
case had already reached the age of majority, whereas
the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In
Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled
to support and successional rights from the putative or
presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter.
We also said that it is necessary to allege in the
complaint that the putative father had acknowledged
and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the
right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death
of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino,
therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for
failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of
acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription
of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar,
although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by
herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor
Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased
and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the
allegations therein the same may be considered as one
to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to
claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is
not new in our jurisprudence.
The next question to be resolved is whether the action
to compel recognition has prescribed. Article 175 of the
Family Code finds no proper application to the instant
case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of
private respondent and, consequently, of the minor
child she represents, both of which have been vested
with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court
is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of
Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Potenciano v. Reynoso
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or
in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court
action is required. Under the Family Code, filiation may
likewise be established by holographic as well as
notarial wills, except that they no longer need to be
probated or to be strictly in conformity with the
formalities thereof for purposes of establishing filiation.
Bernabe v. Alejo
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code
to illegitimate children who were still minors at the
time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or
taken away. The minors have up to four years from
attaining majority age within which to file an action
for recognition.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether
Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was
granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already
vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our
answer is affirmative. We hold that Article 285 of the
Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the
right to file his petition for recognition within four years
from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family
Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an
action for recognition, because that right had
already vested prior to its enactment.
Abella v. Cabañero 2017 Leonen, J
Filiation must be established for a child to claim
support from a putative father. When "filiation is
beyond question, support follows as a matter of
obligation." To establish filiation, an action for
compulsory recognition may be filed against the
putative father ahead of an action for support. In the
alternative, an action for support may be directly filed,
where the matter of filiation shall be integrated and
resolved.
Rights of an illegitimate child
1. Right to legitime;
2. Right to support;
3. To use the surname only of the mother.
ART 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father
1. through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register, or
2. when an admission in a public document
or
 3. private handwritten instrument is made
by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. (as amended by RA
No 9255)
Grande v. Antonio 2014 En Banc
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel
the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon
his recognition of their filiation.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use
the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. In such a situation,
the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father.
Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the
change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Art. 176 gives illegitimate
children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father
(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname
of their illegitimate children.
Respondent’s position that the court can order the
minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
Leonardo v. CA
Whether an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of
the Family Code has the right to use her father's surname.
NO.
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother. The rule
applies even if petitioner's father admits paternity.
4. Action to impugn legitimacy
Filiation not established
Labagala v. Santiago
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a
man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not
one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are
asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate
child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title
and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article
263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioner’s failure to show her birth certificate would
raise the presumption that if such evidence were
presented, it would be adverse to her claim. Petitioner's
counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago
all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does
not establish pedigree.
5. Legitimated children
1. Concept
ART 177. Children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception
of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, or were so
disqualified only because either or both of them
were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be
legitimated. (as amended by RA No 9858)
ART 178. Legitimation shall take place by a
subsequent valid marriage between parents. The
annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect
the legitimation.
2. Requisites
1) The child was born AND conceived outside of
wedlock;
2) The parents do not suffer any legal impediments,
aside from minority, to marry each other at the
time of the conception of the child;
3) The parents subsequently enter into a valid
marriage.
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
Despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these
three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way
be considered legitimate since at the time they were
born, there was an existing valid marriage between
respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.
De Santos v. Angeles
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?
A child's parents should not have been disqualified to
marry each other at the time of conception for him to
qualify as a "natural child."
Although natural children by legal fiction have the same
rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum
leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they
likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not
necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the
legally existing marriage between the children's father
and his estranged first wife effectively barred a
"subsequent marriage" between their parents.
The question that must be confronted next is: How are
the offspring of the second union affected by the first
wife's death and the ensuing celebration of a valid
marriage between her widower and his ostensible second
wife? Natural children by legal fiction cannot be
legitimized in this fashion.
3. Rights of a legitimated child
ART 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the
same rights as legitimate children.
4. Who can impugn legitimation and when?
ART 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by
those who are prejudiced in their rights, within 5
years from the time their cause of action accrues.
5. Effects of legitimation
ART 180. The effects of legitimation shall
retroact to the time of the child's birth.
6. Posthumous legitimation
 ART 181. The legitimation of children who died
before the celebration of the marriage shall
benefit their descendants.
I. ADOPTION
Definition of Adoption
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is
a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely
as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.
1. Domestic Adoption Law
Who may adopt
A. Filipino
1. of legal age,
2. in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights,
3. of good moral character,
4. has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude,
5. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring
for children,
6. at least sixteen (16) years older than the
adoptee, and
7. who is in a position to support and care for
his/her children in keeping with the means of the
family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between
the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when
the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is
the spouse of the adoptee's parent
B. Foreigners
Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above
stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
1. That his/her country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines,
2. that he/she has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered,
3. that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal
capacity to adopt in his/her country, and
4. that his/her government allows the adoptee to
enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter:
Exemption from the 3 years
residence requirements for
foreigners
1. a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
2. one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
3. one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouse.
C. The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his/her financial accountabilities.
JOINT ADOPTION of Husband and Wife if adapter is
married
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
1. if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
2. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However,
that the other spouse has signified his/her
consent thereto; or
3. if the spouses are legally separated from each
other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Republic v. Toledano
Sps Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon
Joseph Alcala. Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt
Solomon under any of the exceptional cases. In the first
place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural
born citizen of the United States of America. In the
second place, Solomon is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In
the third place, when Sps Clouse jointly filed the
petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when
she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1988.
Evelyn may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph
3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino
citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be
granted in her favor alone without violating Article
185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife.
Who may be adopted
The following may be adopted:
a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who
has been administratively or judicially declared
available for adoption;
A child is one below 18 years old OR even over 18
but unable to take care of himself because of a
physical or mental defect. (as amended by RA
9523)
b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by
the other spouse;
c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified
adopter to improve his/her status to that of
legitimacy;
d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said
person has been consistently considered and
treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child
since minority;
 e) A child whose adoption has been previously
rescinded; or
f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has
died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be
initiated within six (6) months from the time of
death of said parent(s).
RA 9523 on DSWD Certification of Availability for
Adoption
Child Legally Available for Adoption refers to a
child in whose favor a certification was issued by the
DSWD that he/she is legally available for adoption
after the fact of abandonment or neglect has been
proven through the submission of pertinent
documents, or one who was voluntarily committed by
his/her parent(s) or legal guardian.
Whose consent is necessary to the adoption
The written consent of the following to the adoption is
required:
a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or
the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the
child;
c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten
(10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;
d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of
age or over, of the adopter if living with said
adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and
e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
Cathey v. Republic
Robert H. Cathey, though an American citizen, is a
resident alien entitled to remain in the Philippines, as
his Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows. As
petitioner spouses have no child of their own, they wish
to adopt Bertha Ann Rivera and thus make her their
heir. The welfare of the child being the paramount
consideration under the law (Art. 363, New Civil Code),
the child now sought to be adopted being virtually
unwanted by her own mother, who, by the way, has
seven other children to feed, We see no reason why the
adoption should not be granted.
Santos v. Aranzanso
WON respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and
Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings
the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora
Santos. Under our law on the matter, consent by the
parents to the adoption is NOT an absolute
requisite.
If the natural parents have abandoned their
children, consent to the adoption by the guardian
ad litem suffices.
Abandonment imports "any conduct on the part of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child". It means "neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe to their children."
The Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a
collateral attack, the determination of the adoption
court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had
abandoned them. This is so even if such fact of
abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a point which
we need not—and do not—rule upon in this case.
Adoption is a proceeding in rem and that
constructive notice, such as the publication duly made
as aforesaid, is enough where the residence of the
parents is unknown. Notice, moreover, is not
required in adoption cases in regard to the
abandoning parent.
Aranzanso and Ventura and those who claim an interest
in the estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins,
cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement
proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of
intestate succession adopted children exclude first
cousins. The same holds true as long as the adoption
must be—as in the instant case—considered valid.
Cang v. CA
Can minor children be legally adopted without the
written consent of a natural parent on the ground
that the latter has abandoned them?
The written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child or that such parent is "insane or
hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written
consent of the parents or one of the parents provided
that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to
warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
In cases where the father opposes the adoption
primarily because his consent thereto was not sought,
the matter of whether he had abandoned his child
becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue
of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first
confront.
Here, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly,
petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the
United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims.
In re Petition for Adoption of Michelle and Michael Jude
P. Lim
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the
sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has
remarried, can singly adopt. It is undisputed that, at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no
other recourse but to affirm the trial court's decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The
law is explicit.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There
are certain requirements that Olario must comply being
an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications
set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552. None of these
qualifications were shown and proven during the trial.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects:
1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and
3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including but not limited to:
a. the right of the adopter to choose the
name the child is to be known; and
b. the right of the adopter and adoptee to
be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate
child.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to
the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.
Procedures in Adoption
1. No hurried decision;
2. Case Study;
3. Supervised trial custody;
No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until
the adopter(s) has been given by the court a
supervised trial custody period for at least six (6)
months within which the parties are expected to
adjust psychologically and emotionally to each other
and establish a bonding relationship. During said
period, temporary parental authority shall be
vested in the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any
to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
party reduce the trial period if it finds the same to be
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the
in the best interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons
adopting parents had no actual or physical custody
for the reduction of the period. However, for alien
over the adopted child. Retro-active effect may
adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-month
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
trial custody except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b)
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
(i) (ii) (iii).
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is
placed with the prospective adopter(s) through a pre-
Effects of adoption
adoption placement authority issued by the
Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall enjoy all 1. Parental Authority;
the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled 2. Legitimacy;
from the date the adoptee is placed with the
3. Succession.
prospective adopter(s).
4. Issuance of the Decree of Adoption; Santos, Jr. v. Republic
5. Confidential nature of adoption. Whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger
brother. YES.
Sayson v. CA
It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, In re Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
years after it became final and executory. That was way
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
back in 1967.
natural father, use the surname of her natural
A no less important argument against the petitioners is mother as her middle name? YES.
that their challenge to the validity of the adoption
There is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for
partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane
addressing the issue. and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry
out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The
Effectivity of Adoption Decree interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every
Tamargo v. CA reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto
with an air rifle occured when parental authority was the law.
still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
that the natural parents who had then actual custody
to use as middle name her mother’s surname, we
of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to
find no reason why she should not be allowed to do
the suit for damages.
so.
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor
child is the relationship existing between the Rescission of adoption
parents and the minor child living with them and
over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition
supervision and control. of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department
if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may
 be rescinded on any of the following grounds
committed by the adopter(s):
a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite
having undergone counseling;
b) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
c) sexual assault or violence; or
d) abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall
not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code.
Effects of rescission of adoption
1. If the petition is granted, the parental authority of
the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or
the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and
obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to
each other shall be extinguished.
2. The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel
the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee
and restore his/her original birth certificate.
3. Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to
adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of
judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to
judicial rescission shall be respected.
4. All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption
shall be without prejudice to the penalties
imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal
acts are properly proven.
2. Law on Inter-Country Adoption
1) Concept
Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal
process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a
Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where
the petition is filed, the supervised trial custody is
undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued
outside the Philippines.
2) Basic policy behind Inter-country adoption
Efforts shall be exerted to place the child with an
adoptive family in the Philippines.
3) Who may adopt
An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing
abroad may file an application for inter-country
adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age
AND at least sixteen (16) years older than
the child to be adopted, at the time of
application unless the adopter is the parent
by nature of the child to be adopted or the
spouse of such parent;
b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file
for the adoption;
c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights
and responsibilities of parental authority
under his national laws, and has undergone
the appropriate counseling from an
accredited counselor in his/her country;
d) has not been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national
law;
f) is in a position to provide the proper care and
support and to give the necessary moral
values and example to all his children,
including the child to be adopted;
g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child;
h) comes from a country with whom the
Philippines has diplomatic relations and
whose government maintains a similarly
authorized and accredited agency and that
adoption is allowed under his/her national
laws; and
i) possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided herein and in
other applicable Philippine laws.
4) Who may be adopted
Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-
country adoption.
Legally-free child means a child who has been
voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth
Welfare Code.
Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of
age unless sooner emancipated by law.
5) Where to file application
An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed
either with the Philippine Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board,
through an intermediate agency, whether
governmental or an authorized and accredited
agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive
parents, which application shall be in accordance with
the requirements as set forth in the implementing
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Board.
6) The Inter-Country Adoption Board
Acts as the central authority in matters relating to
inter-country adoption. It shall act as the policy-
making body for purposes of carrying out the
provisions of this Act, in consultation and
coordination with the Department, the different child-
care and placement agencies, adoptive agencies, as
well as non-governmental organizations engaged in
child-care and placement activities.
7) Procedures in Inter-country adoption
The Board shall ensure that all possibilities for
adoption of the child under the Family Code have
been exhausted and that inter-country adoption is in
the best interest of the child.
8) Who will grant the decree of adoption
The governmental agency or the authorized and
accredited agency in the country of the adoptive
parents which filed the application for inter-country
adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and
the care of the child. It shall also provide family
counseling and other related services. The trial
custody shall be for a period of six (6) months from
the time of placement. Only after the lapse of the
period of trial custody shall a decree of adoption be
issued in the said country, a copy of which shall be
sent to the Board to form part of the records of the
child.
9) Read: Rule on Adoption (Domestic and Inter-
Country Adoption) under A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
Simulated Birth Rectification Act
1. A person or persons who, prior to the effectivity
of RA 11222, simulated the birth of a child, and
those who cooperated in the execution of such
simulation, shall not be criminally, civilly, or
administratively liable for such act: Provided,
a. That the simulation of birth was made for
the best interest of the child and
b. That the child has been consistently
considered and treated by such person or
persons as her, his, or their own daughter
or son;
c. That such person or persons has or have
filed a petition for adoption with an
application for the rectification of the
simulated birth record within ten (10)
years from the effectivity of this Act.
All the benefits of this Act shall also apply to adult
adoptees.
2. Administrative proceedings for the adoption and
rectification of the simulated birth record of the
child may be availed of: Provided,
a. That the child has been living with the
person for at least three (3) years before
the effectivity of this Act; and
b. That a certificate declaring the child
legally available for adoption (CDCLAA)
is issued by the DSWD in favor of such
child.
J. SUPPORT
1. What it compromises
ART 194. Support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be
supported referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the
age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to and
from place of work.
Thus, support includes:
1. Sustenance;
2. Dwelling;
3. Clothing;
4. Medical attendance;
5. Education;
6. Transportation.
2. Who are obliged to give support
ART 195. Subject to the provisions of the
succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extent set forth
in the preceding article:
1) The spouses;
2) Legitimate ascendants and
descendants;
3) Parents and their legitimate children
and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter;
4) Parents and their illegitimate children
and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
5) Legitimate brothers and sisters,
whether of full or half-blood.
Support between brothers and sisters
ART 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately
related, whether of the full or half-blood, are
likewise bound to support each other to the full
extent set forth in Article 194, except only when
the need for support of the brother or sister,
being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the
claimant's fault or negligence.
Quintana v. Lerma
The action is by a wife against her husband for support.
It is based upon a written contract. The agreement in
suit is void. The wife, however, has a right of action
against her husband for support under the provisions of
the Civil Code and, although the contract in question is
void, her right of action does not for that reason fail.
We are of the opinion that the special defense of
adultery set up by the defendant in his answer both to
the original and the amended complaint is a good
defense, and if properly proved and sustained will
defeat the action.
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an
action for support. However, the alleged adultery of the
wife must be established by competent evidence. The
mere allegation that the wife has com-mitted adultery
will not bar her from the right to re-ceive support
pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly
proved and sustained will defeat the action.
Sps. Lim v. Lim et al.
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with
Edward to provide support to respondents.
YES. The liability of ascendants to provide legal support
to their descendants is beyond cavil.
Although the obligation to provide support arising from
parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the
child, the same obligation arising from spousal and
general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's
lifetime. Also, while parental authority pertains to
parents, passing to ascendants only upon its
termination or suspension, the obligation to provide
legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon
default of the parents but also for the latters
inability to provide sufficient support.
Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the
Alternative Option
Petitioners pray that they be allowed to fulfill their
obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners'
Makati residence. The option is unavailable to
petitioners.
Here, the persons entitled to receive support are
petitioners' grandchildren and daughter-in-law.
Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will

secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future;
however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house
which, for her, is the scene of her husband's infidelity.
While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as
indeed, Cheryl's charge against Edward for concubinage
did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast
insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral
impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the
exception clause.
3. Source
ART 197. In case of legitimate ascendants;
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate;
and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or
illegitimately related, only the separate
property of the person obliged to give support
shall be answerable provided that in case the
obligor has no separate property, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, if
financially capable, shall advance the support,
which shall be deducted from the share of the
spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the
absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership.
4. Order
ART 199. Whenever two or more persons are
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
1) The Spouse;
2) The Descendants in the nearest degree;
3) The Ascendants in the nearest degree; and
4) The Brothers and sisters.
5. Amount
When the obligation to give support to one person falls
on several persons
ART 200. When the obligation to give support
falls upon two or more persons, the payment of
the same shall be divided between them in
proportion to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special
circumstances, the judge may order only one of
them to furnish the support provisionally,
without prejudice to his right to claim from the
other obligors the share due from them.
If several persons demanded support from one person
and his means is not enough to satisfy their claim
When two or more recipients at the same time
claim support from one and the same person
legally obliged to give it, should the latter not
have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the
order established in the preceding article shall be
followed, unless the concurrent obligees should
be the spouse and a child subject to parental
authority, in which case the child shall be
preferred.
How much is the amount of support to be given?
ART 201. The amount of support, in the cases
referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
ART 202. Support in the cases referred to in the
preceding article shall be reduced or increased
proportionately, according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to
furnish the same.
Order of support will not be final.
6. Manner and time of payment
ART 203. The obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a
right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from
the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. xxxx
Payment shall be made within the first five days
of each corresponding month or when the
recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to
return what he has received in advance.
Jocson, et al. v. Empire Insurance Co.
Support does include what is necessary for the
education and clothing of the person entitled thereto.
But support must be demanded and the right to it
established before it becomes payable (Marcelo v.
Estacio). For the right to support does not arise from
the mere fact of relationship, even from the relationship
of parents and children, but "from imperative necessity
without which it cannot be demanded, and the law
presumes that such necessity does not exist unless
support is demanded."
The claim for support should be enforced in a
separate action and not in these guardianship
proceedings.
Option available to supporter
ART 204. The person obliged to give support shall
have the option to fulfill the obligation either
a) by paying the allowance fixed, or
b) by receiving and maintaining in the
family dwelling the person who has a
right to receive support.
The latter alternative cannot be availed of in
case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
Goitia v. Campos Rueda
This is an action by the wife against her husband for
support outside of the conjugal domicile.
The husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at
his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by
receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the
husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose
this option and be compelled to pay the pension? The
option may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Amount of support to be received cannot be attached or
levied by creditors
ART 205. The right to receive support under this
Title as well as any money or property obtained
as such support shall not be levied upon on
attachment or execution.
ART 206. When, without the knowledge of the
person obliged to give support, it is given by a
stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the
 same from the former, unless it appears that he
gave it without intention of being reimbursed.
ART 207. When the person obliged to support
another unjustly refuses or fails to give support
when urgently needed by the latter, any third
person may furnish support to the needy
individual, with right of reimbursement from
the person obliged to give support. This Article
shall particularly apply when the father or
mother of a child under the age of majority
unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support
to the child when urgently needed.
7. Renunciation and termination
Future support cannot be waived/renounced in
advance.
De Asis v. CA
The right to receive support can neither be
renounced nor transmitted to a third person.
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject
of a compromise.
8. Support pendente lite
Validity of the relationship must be proven first
ART 198. During the proceedings for legal
separation or for annulment of marriage, and for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses
and their children shall be supported from the
properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership. After the final judgment
granting the petition, the obligation of mutual
support between the spouses ceases. However, in
case of legal separation, the court may order that
the guilty spouse shall give support to the
innocent one, specifying the terms of such order.
Sanchez v. Zulueta
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid
defense against an action for support (Quintana
v. Lerma). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a
defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations,
for in that case, it would not be the child of the
defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support
as such. But as this defense should be established, and
not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof
thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to
go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient
that the court ascertain the kind and amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to
justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in
view of the merely provisional character of the
resolution to be entered.
Dolina v. Vallecera 2010
This case is about a mother's claim for temporary
support of an unacknowledged child, which she sought
in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection
order that she brought against the supposed father.
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain
support for her child. To be entitled to legal support,
petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the
filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolina's demand for support for
her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera's
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina
shall have proved his relation to him. The child's
remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If
filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter
of obligation. Alternatively, she may directly file an
action for support, where the issue of compulsory
recognition may be integrated and resolved.
K. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
1. General provisions
ART 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of
parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and
responsibility shall include the caring for and
rearing them for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-being.
Medina v. Makabali
The right of parents to the company and custody of
their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
parental duties to provide the children with adequate
support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training
and development.
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the
custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the
basic principle that "in all questions of the care, custody,
education and property of children, the latter's welfare
shall be paramount", and that for compelling reasons,
even a child under seven may be ordered separated
from the mother.
Sagala-Eslao v. CA
In the instant petition, when private respondent
entrusted the custody of her minor child to the
petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely
temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
For the right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan
institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
Santos v. CA
Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
Santos, Sr. has not been shown to be an unsuitable and
unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love
and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the
legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding
factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the
boy.
While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable
and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be

construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep
his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious
efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him
custody would help enhance the bond between parent
and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove
his love for his son and for the son to experience the
warmth and support which a father can give.
Renunciation
ART 210. Parental authority and responsibility
may not be renounced or transferred except in
cases authorized by law.
Celis v. Cafuir
The word "entrusted" cannot convey the idea of
definite and permanent renunciation of the mother's
custody of her child.
The second document merely designated respondent
Soledad as the "real guardian" of the child. The
designation of one as the guardian of another cannot
and does not mean that said guardian will always
assume and discharge the duties of the office or
position. Guardianship is always or almost invariably
understood to be temporary. While one is a minor or is
incompetent, a guardian is appointed; but when
minority has passed or incapacity has ceased,
guardianship also terminates.
While petitioner Ileana was still unable to care for and
support her child and because she could not bring said
child to live with her in the home of her father, she
entrusted its custody and care to respondent. Now that
she has been emancipated from the parental authority
of her father and now that she has already been married
and is now in a position to care for and support her own
child, this with the consent and desire of her husband,
who joins her in the petition, there can no longer be any
reason for depriving her of the custody of her boy. In
her legitimate efforts, and to have her realize her
natural desire in this respect, the law and this Court
should give her every help.
Joint exercise of parental authority
ART 211. The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of disagreement,
the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is
a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and
reverence towards their parents and are obliged
to obey them as long as the children are under
parental authority.
Hirsch v. CA
The CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted joint custody of the minor child to both parents.
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article
213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. Here,
the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly
incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no
compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the
child from the mother's custody.
Rule on parental authority for illegitimate child
Dempsey v. RTC
Illegitimate children have rights to the same nature as
legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in
Art. 3, P.D. 603 which provides that “ALL children shall
be entitled to the rights herein set forth without
distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social
status, political antecedents, and other factors.” Rights
must be enforced or protected to the extent that it is
possible to do so.
Rule in case of separation of parents
ART 213. In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall
take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
1. In case of disagreement, the court will decide who
between the parents will have custody.
2. Basic rule is if the child is below 7 years old, he should
be with the mother. If over 7 years old, the child will
decide.
3. Best interest and welfare of the child rule.
4. Joint custody is NOT encouraged.
Beckett v. Sarmiento, Jr 2013
The matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v.
Court of Appeals, “is not permanent and unalterable
and can always be re-examined and adjusted.”
The preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom
he desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover,
custody, even if previously granted by a competent
court in favor of a parent, is not, to reiterate,
permanent.
Cang v. CA, supra
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental
authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply
because he could give the child a larger measure of
material comfort than his natural parent.
The law only confers on the innocent spouse the
"exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the
child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of
parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The
innocent spouse shall have the right to the child’s
services and earnings, and the right to direct his
activities and make decisions regarding his care and
control, education, health and religion.
Here, petitioner may not be deemed as having been
completely deprived of parental authority,
notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in
the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was
arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the
agreement of the spouses.
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental
authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such
reason was established in the legal separation case. In
the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not
petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption.
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of
a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree
of adoption in this case precisely because the finding of
the courts below on the issue of petitioner’s
abandonment of his family was based on a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-
appreciation of facts on record.
Dacasin v. Del Mundo-Dacasin 2010
For review is a dismissal of a suit to enforce a post-
foreign divorce child custody agreement for lack of
jurisdiction.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for
spouses separated in fact or in law is also undisputed:
"no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother." Clearly then, the
Agreement's object to establish a post-divorce joint
custody regime between respondent and petitioner
over their child under seven years old contravenes
Philippine law.
Simply put, for a child within this age bracket, the law
decides for the separated or divorced parents how
best to take care of the child and that is to give
custody to the separated mother.
A custody agreement can never be regarded as
“permanent and unbending,” the simple reason being
that the situation of the parents and even of the child
can change, such that sticking to the agreed
arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s best
interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving
the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the
force and effect of res judicata.
Luna v. IAC
The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would
kill herself or run away from home if she should be
taken away from the herein petitioners and forced to
live with the private respondents, made during the
hearings on the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ
of execution and reiterated in her letters to the
members of the Court, and during the hear-ing of the
case before this Court, is a circumstance that would
make the execution of the judgment rendered in Spec.
Proc. No. 9417 inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not
illegal.
Chua v. Cabangbang
The reasons relied upon by the lower court - i.e.,
"petitioner is not exactly an upright woman" and "it
will be for the welfare of the child" - are not, strictly
speaking, proper grounds in law to deprive a
mother of her inherent right to parental authority
over her child. However, there are indeed valid
reasons for depriving the petitioner of parental
authority over the minor.
The child was given to the Cabangbangs by Villareal
with the knowledge and consent of the pe-titioner.
Abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving
parents of parental authority over their children. Was
the petitioner's acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of
her child to the Cabangbangs tantamount to
abandonment of the child? To our mind, mere
acquiescence - without more - is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment. But the record yields a host
of circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably
betray the pe-titioner's settled purpose and intention to
completely forego all parental responsibilities and
forever relinquish all parental claim in respect to the
child.
The absence of any kinship between the child and
the Ca-bangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the lower
court from award-ing her custody to them. Indeed, the
law provides that in certain cases the custody of a
child may be awarded even to strangers, as against
either the father or the mother or against both.
Laxamana v. Laxamana
Here, the court a quo should have conducted a trial
notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit
the case for resolution. Thus, the father is not estopped
from questioning the absence of a trial considering
that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s
primary basis in awarding custody to the mother, is
insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental
policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of
children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality
in resolving disputes which involve the family and the
youth.
While petitioner may have a history of drug
dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral,
financial and social well-being. Moreover, the children
in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the
promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not
ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to
live with.
Gualberto v. Gualberto
There being no sufficient proof of any compelling
reason to separate the minor from his mother,
custody should remain with her.
The word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and
Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held
to connote a mandatory character. The principle of
“best interest of the child” pervades Philippine
cases involving adoption, guardianship, support,
personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and
child custody. The so-called "tender-age
presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code
may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the
mother's unfitness.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian
relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn
of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain
circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may
constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of
custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not
prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the
fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been
unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to
have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the
welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercising proper parental care.
Sombong v. CA
Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where "the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto." Thus, although the Writ of
Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is
voluntary, we have held time and again that the said
writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to
regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter
be in the custody of a third person of her own free
will.

The grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend
on the concurrence of the following requisites:
1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over
the minor;
2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being
withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and
3) that it is to the best interest of the minor
concerned to be in the custody of petitioner
and not that of the respondent.
Madrinan v. Madrinan
After petitioner moved out of their Parañaque
residence, he twice transferred his sons to provinces
covered by different judicial regions. This situation is
what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369's
provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed.
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369
reveals that family courts are vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas
corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be
issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b)
of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be
availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of
minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Meaning of compelling reasons
The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances:
1. neglect,
2. abandonment,
3. unemployment,
4. immorality,
5. habitual drunkenness,
6. drug addiction,
7. maltreatment of the child,
8. insanity, or
9. affliction with a communicable disease.
Unson III v. Navarro and Araneta
The fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about
her stay with her mother in the past when she was still
too young to distinguish between right and wrong and
have her own correct impressions or notions about the
unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother
with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's
mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she has
reached a perilous stage in her life. The Court finds no
alternative than to grant private respondent no more
than visitorial rights over the child in question.
Tonog v. Daguimol
Employing simple arithmetic, it appears that Gardin
Faith is now twelve years old.
Inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now
exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
preference and opinion must first be sought in the
choice of which parent should have the custody over
her person.
David v. CA
The fact that private respondent has recognized the
minor child may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him
custody of the child.
Although the question of support is proper in a
proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this
case is justified by the fact that private respondent has
expressed willingness to support the minor child. The
order for payment of allowance need not be
conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the
child.
Yu v. Yu
The main issue raised in the present petition is whether
the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated
before the Pasay RTC or before the Pasig RTC.
By petitioner's filing of the case for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he
automatically submitted the issue of the custody of
Bianca as an incident thereof. The custody issue in a
declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.
Section 21 of the "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages" directs the court taking jurisdiction over a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve
the custody of common children, by mere motion of
either party, it could only mean that the filing of a new
action is not necessary for the court to consider the
issue of custody of a minor.
The petition filed by petitioner for the declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the more
appropriate action to determine the issue of who
between the parties should have custody over Bianca in
view of the express provision of the second paragraph
of Article 50 of the Family Code. This must be so in line
with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits.
see A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
Silva v. CA, supra
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and
legal duty, to care for their children, see to their
upbringing and safeguard their best interest and
welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be
unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced
by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their
affection for each other is lost, the attachment and
feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this
affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and
imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
2. Substitute parental authority
Who will exercise substitute parental authority?
ART 216. In default of parents or a judicially
appointed guardian, the following person shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the
child in the order indicated:
1) The surviving grandparent, as provided
in Art. 214;
2) The oldest brother or sister, over 21
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified;
and
 3) The child's actual custodian, over
twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian
over the property of the child becomes necessary,
the same order of preference shall be observed.
Bagtas v. Santos
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases where the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
persons entitled thereto. In cases involving minors, the
purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited
to the production of the child before the court. The
main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus is to
determine who has the rightful custody over the
child.
What is a foundling?
ART 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned
neglected or abused children and other children
similarly situated, parental authority shall be
entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to
heads of children's homes, orphanages and
similar institutions duly accredited by the proper
government agency.
Substitute Parental authority by Surviving
Grandparents
ART 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability
of the parents, substitute parental authority shall
be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In
case several survive, the one designated by the
court, taking into account the same consideration
mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise
the authority.
3. Special parental authority
Who will exercise special parental authority
ART 218. The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside
the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Extent of liability of those exercising special parental
authority
ART 219. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor.
The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said
minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
What are the available defenses for them
The respective liabilities of those referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is
proved that they exercised the proper diligence
required.
Amadora v. CA
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was
the teacher-in-charge.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge,
there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in
enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or
condoned their non-observance. His absence when the
tragedy happened cannot be considered against him
because he was not supposed or required to report to
school on that day.
The Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
directly liable under the article because only the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades
is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer
for the tort committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been found to have
been charged with the custody of the offending student
or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.
PSBA v. CA
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a
contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising
from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented
this Court from determining the existence of a tort
even when there obtains a contract.
The school may still avoid liability by proving that the
breach of its contractual obligation to the students was
not due to its negligence.
4. Effect of parental authority over the child's
person
Civil liability of parents for damage caused by their
unemancipated children
ART 221. Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living
in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law.
Defense of the parents
Libi v. IAC
Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the
civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed
by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven
that the former acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damages.
Tamargo v. CA, supra
Article 221 of the Family Code insists upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in
 5. Effects of parental authority over the child's
the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
property
liable for the ensuing damage.
St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpetanos
For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show
that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James
Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was
not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
Respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code
was unfounded. The negligence of petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident.
Cuadra v. Monfort
In the present case there is nothing from which it may
be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the
damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in
any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority
in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which
caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school,
where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as
he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which
caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent
prank not unusual among children at play and which no
parent, however careful, would have any special reason
to anticipate, much less guard against. Nor did it reveal
any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the
child's character which would reflect unfavorably on
her upbringing and for which the blame could be
attributed to her parents.
ART 225. The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise legal guardianship over the property of
the unemancipated common child without the
necessity of a court appointment. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the
annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the
parent concerned shall be required to furnish a
bond in such amount as the court may determine,
but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the
value of the property or annual income, to
guarantee the performance of the obligations
prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond
shall be filed in the proper court of the place
where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a
foreign country, in the proper court of the place
where the property or any part thereof is
situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary
special proceeding.
ART 226. The property of the unemancipated
child earned or acquired with his work or
industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall
belong to the child in ownership and shall be
devoted exclusively to the latter's support and
education, unless the title or transfer provides
otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and
income of the child's property shall be limited
primarily to the child's support and secondarily
to the collective daily needs of the family.
ART 227. If the parents entrust the management
or administration of any of their properties to an
unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such
property shall belong to the owner. The child
shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in
an amount not less than that which the owner
would have paid if the administrator were a
stranger, unless the owner grants the entire
proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds
thus given in whole or in part shall not be charged
to the child's legitime.
6. Suspension or termination of parental authority
Permanent Termination
ART 228. Parental authority terminates
permanently:
1) Upon the death of the parents;
2) Upon the death of the child; or
3) Upon emancipation of the child.
ART 232. If the person exercising parental
authority has subjected the child or allowed him
to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall
be permanently deprived by the court of such
authority.
Terminated unless subsequently revived
ART 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final
judgment, parental authority also terminates:
1) Upon adoption of the child;
2) Upon appointment of a general
guardian;
3) Upon judicial declaration of
abandonment of the child in a case filed
for the purpose;
4) Upon final judgment of a competent
court divesting the party concerned of
parental authority; or
5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or
incapacity of the person exercising
parental authority.
Ipso Facto Suspension
ART 230. Parental authority is suspended upon
conviction of the parent or the person exercising
the same of a crime which carries with it the
penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is
automatically reinstated upon service of the
penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the
offender.
Suspension by court action
 ART 231. The court in an action filed for the
purpose in a related case may also suspend
parental authority if the parent or the person
exercising the same:
1) Treats the child with excessive harshness
or cruelty;
2) Gives the child corrupting orders,
counsel or example;
3) Compels the child to beg; or
4) Subjects the child or allows him to be
subjected to acts of lasciviousness.
Corporal punishment prohibited
ART 233. The person exercising substitute
parental authority shall have the same authority
over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher
of individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority inflict corporal
punishment upon the child.
Salvana and Saliendra v. Gaela
The Court is of the opinion and so hold:
1) That the writ of habeas corpus is the proper
legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor daughter, even though the
latter be in the custody of a third person of her
own free will; and
2) that neither the fact that the parents of a minor
daughter sought to compel her to marry against
her will, where it does not appear such a
purpose has continued, nor their refusal to
consent to her marriage to another young man,
by whom she is pregnant, is a legal ground for
depriving said parents of their parental
authority and the custody of said daughter.
7. Solo parents
See Rep. Act No. 8972 here
Who is a solo parent? "Solo parent" — any individual
who falls under any of the following categories:
1) A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and
other crimes against chastity even without a final
conviction of the offender: Provided, That the
mother keeps and raises the child;
2) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of
parenthood due to death of spouse;
3) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of
parenthood while the spouse is detained or is
serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at
least one (1) year;
4) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of
parenthood due to physical and/or mental
incapacity of spouse as certified by a public
medical practitioner;
5) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of
parenthood due to legal separation or de facto
separation from spouse for at least one (1) year,
as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of
the children;
6) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of
parenthood due to declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or
by a church as long as he/she is entrusted with
the custody of the children;
7) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of
parenthood due to abandonment of spouse for at
least one (1) year;
8) Unmarried mother/father who has preferred to
keep and rear her/his child/children instead of
having others care for them or give them up to a
welfare institution;
9) Any other person who solely provides parental
care and support to a child or children;
10) Any family member who assumes the
responsibility of head of family as a result of the
death, abandonment, disappearance or
prolonged absence of the parents or solo parent.
A change in the status or circumstance of the parent
claiming benefits under this Act, such that he/she is no
longer left alone with the responsibility of parenthood,
shall terminate his/her eligibility for these benefits.
L. EMANCIPATION
When emancipation takes place?
ART 234. Emancipation takes place by the
attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years. (as amended by RA 6809)
Liability of parents for acts committed by their child
between the age of 18 and 21 even though married.
ART 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental
authority over the person and property of the
child who shall then be qualified and responsible
for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by existing laws in special cases.
Contracting marriage shall require parental
consent until the age of twenty-one.
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to
derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards
below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the
second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. (as amended by RA 6809)
Elcano v. Hill
The marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a
minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same
manner that the parents are answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of
real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now
of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
Libi v. IAC, supra
Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the
civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed
by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven
that the former acted with the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent such damages.
Under Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability
shall be effected against the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother. Under the Family Code,
this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those
who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of Julie Ann
Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict
committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not
err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising
therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the
premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of
the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its
findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the
requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such
damages.
M. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
THE FAMILY CODE
A. Cases involving Separation in Fact between
Husband and Wife
Petition for Judicial Approval of transaction that
requires consent of the other spouse
ART 239. When a husband and wife are separated
in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of
them seeks judicial authorization for a
transaction where the consent of the other
spouse is required by law but such consent is
withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified
petition may be filed in court alleging the
foregoing facts.
Petition for Judicial Authority to encumber or sell the
exclusive property of abandoning spouse to answer for
the expenses of the family
ART 248. The petition for judicial authority to
administer or encumber specific separate
property of the abandoning spouse and to use the
fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the
family shall also be governed by these rules.
Where to file?
ART 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon
proof of notice to the other spouse, be exercised
by the proper court authorized to hear family
cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or
its equivalent sitting in the place where either of
the spouses resides.
Decision is immediately final and unappealable
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be
immediately final and executory.
B. Cases Involving Parental Authority
ART 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225
and 235 of this Code involving parental authority
shall be verified.
1. Petition filed by Parents for an Order from the
court providing disciplinary action against a
disobedient child. (Art 223)
2. Disagreement between parents on how to
manage the property of their child. (Art 225)
ART 250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed
in the proper court of the place where the child
resides.
C. Other Matter Subject to Summary Proceedings:
1. Petition for Judicial Declaration of Presumptive
Death of a Spouse (Art. 41)
2. Petition for the Delivery of Presumptive Legitime
of the Child (Art. 51)
3. Petition for Judicial Determination of the Family
Domicile in case of Disagreement of the Spouses
(Art. 69)
4. Petition for Judicial Determination of the Validity
of the Objection of A Spouse to Exercise of the
Other Spouse's Profession or Calling (Art. 73)
5. Petition filed by the Wife Questioning the
Decision Of the Husband on the Matter of
Administration of the Common Property (Art. 96
and 124)
6. Appointment of One Spouse as the
Administrator of the Common Property.
Republic v. CA
WON a petition for declaration of the presumptive
death of a person is in the nature of a special
proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and
the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of
appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to
perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an
ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from
notice or decision or final order appealed from and the
appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal.
The petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent
spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose
her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage.
Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary
proceeding," following Art. 41, paragraph 2.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains
the following provision, inter alia:
ART 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court,
the procedural rules provided for in this Title
shall apply as regards separation in fact between
husband and wife, abandonment by one of the
other, and incidents involving parental authority.
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc
required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding
under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under
the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the
filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary
ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal
from the trial court's order sufficed.
N. USE OF SURNAMES
Legitimate and Legitimated Children
ART 134. Legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father.
Adopted Children
ART 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname
Sole of the adopter.
Illegitimate Children
 ART 368. Illegitimate children referred to in
Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.
Alba v. CA
Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in
civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy
of a person may be effected through the institution of a
petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
with the proper RTC. Being a proceeding in rem,
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
is therefore not required in the present case. It is
enough that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. The absence of personal service of the
order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial court's
compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires
notice by publication.
Married Women
ART 370. A married woman may use:
1) Her maiden first name and surname and
add her husband's surname, or
2) Her maiden first name and her husband's
surname or
3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a
word indicating that she is his wife, such
as "Mrs."
Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs 2010
A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to
use the surname of the husband in any of the ways
provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code.
The conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA
8239, including its implementing rules and regulations,
does not prohibit a married woman from using her
maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of
this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies
for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name.
Such an applicant is not required to adopt her
husband's surname.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman
may either adopt her husband's surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to
adopt her husband's surname in her new passport, the
DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate.
Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden
name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her
from continuously using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her
husband's surname in her passport, she may not revert
to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances
are:
1) death of husband,
2) divorce,
3) annulment, or
4) nullity of marriage.
Since petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, she
may not resume her maiden name in the replacement
passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based
only on the severance of the marriage.
Legally Separated Wife
ART 372. When legal separation has been granted,
the wife shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation.
Laperal v. Republic
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife,
even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall
continue using her name and surname employed before
the legal separation. This is so because her married
status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum.
Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact
of legal separation alone which is the only basis for
the petition at bar—is, in our opinion, not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to
provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provisions of the said Article 372.
Change of Name
ART 376. No person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority.
Republic v. Vicencio
In Republic v. Hernandez, we have recognized inter
alia, the following as sufficient grounds to warrant
a change of name:
a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b) when the change is a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption;
c) when the change will avoid confusion;
d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name and
was unaware of alien parentage;
e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice
to anybody; and
f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose,
or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that
there be ‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the
change is sought. A legitimate child generally bears the
surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a
change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
More confusion with grave legal consequences could
arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-
father’s surname, even if she is not legally adopted by
him. While previous decisions have allowed children to
bear the surname of their respective step-fathers even
without the benefit of adoption, these instances should
be distinguished from the present case.
In Calderon v. Republic, and Llaneta v. Agrava, this
Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the
surname of the step-father, but unlike the situation in
the present case where private respondent is a
legitimate child, in those cases the children were not
of legitimate parentage.
Yasin v. Shari'a District Court, Third Sharia Judicial
District
When the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as
in the case of death of the husband or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee
need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in
her civil status in order to revert to her maiden
name as use of her former husband's is optional and
not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her
husband, she did not change her name but only her civil
status. Neither was she required to secure judicial
authority to use the surname of her husband after the
marriage as no law requires it.
Usurpation of Name
ART 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may
be the subject of an action for damages and other
relief.
Tolentino v. CA
Whether or not a woman who has been legally
divorced from her husband may be enjoined by the
latter's present wife from using the surname of her
former husband.
There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and
surname in this case so that the mere use of the
surname Tolentino by the private respondent cannot be
said to have injured the petitioner's rights.
The following are the elements of usurpation of a
name:
1) there is an actual use of another's name by the
defendant;
2) the use is unauthorized; and
3) the use of another's name is to designate
personality or identify a person.
None of these elements exists in the case at bar and
neither is there a claim by the petitioner that the private
respondent impersonated her. In fact, it is of public
knowledge that Constancia Tolentino is the legal wife of
Arturo Tolentino so that all invitations for Senator and
Mrs. Tolentino are sent to Constancia. Consuelo never
represented herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo
Tolentino but simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino.
The private respondent has legitimate children who
have every right to use the surname Tolentino.
Ursua v. CA
The use of a fictitious name or a different name
belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the user intends to
be known by this name in addition to his real name
from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
Read: R.A. 9048 or the Clerical Error Act
O. ABSENCE
1. Provisional Measures in Case of Absence
(Temporary Absence)
When a person disappears from his domicile, his
whereabout being unknown, and without leaving an
administrator of his properties
ART 381. When a person disappears from his
domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and
without leaving an agent to administer his
property, the judge, at the instance of an
interested party, a relative, or a friend, may
appoint a person to represent him in all that may
be necessary.
Appointment of an Administrator of his property. His
wife is prefered to administrator.
ART 382. The appointment referred to in the
preceding article having been made, the judge
shall take the necessary measures to safeguard
the rights and interests of the absentee and shall
specify the powers, obligations and remuneration
of his representative, regulating them, according
to the circumstances, by the rules concerning
guardians.
2. Declaration of Absence
Declaration of Absence by the court if the
disappearance is two (2) years, and if he left behind an
administrator of his properties he can be declared an
absentee after five (5) years.
ART 384. Two years having elapsed without any
news about the absentee or since the receipt of
the last news, and five years in case the absentee
has left a person in charge of the administration
of his property, his absence may be declared.
Who can ask for declaration of absence
ART 385. The following may ask for the
declaration of absence:
1) The spouse present;
2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may
present an authentic copy of the same;
3) The relatives who may succeed by the
law of intestacy;
4) Those who may have over the property
of the absentee some right subordinated
to the condition of his death.
When judicial declaration of absence will take effect
ART 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall
not take effect until six months after its
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
3. Administration of the Property of the Absentee
ART 388. The wife who is appointed as an
administratrix of the husband's property cannot
alienate or encumber the husband's property, or
that of the conjugal partnership, without judicial
authority.
ART 389. The administration shall cease in any of
the following cases:
1) When the absentee appears personally
or by means of an agent;
2) When the death of the absentee is proved
and his testate or intestate heirs appear;
 3) When a third person appears, showing
by a proper document that he has
acquired the absentee's property by
purchase or other title.
4. Presumption of Death
Ordinary disappearance (7 years)
ART 390. After an absence of seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
Opening up of estate (10 years)
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years.
If he disappeared after the age of 75 years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order
that his succession may be opened.
Extra-Ordinary disappearance (4 years)
ART 391. The following shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
1) A person on board a vessel lost during a
sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for
four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
2) A person in the armed forces who has
taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
3) A person who has been in danger of
death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four
years.
P. CIVIL REGISTRAR
Acts, Events and Matters to be Registered
ART 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
Civil Registrar's Books are Public Documents
ART 410. The books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
Republic v. Olaybar 2014
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or
adversary.
1. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure
to be adopted is summary.
2. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary.
Here, respondent sought, not the nullification of
marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the
truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
Republic v. Kho
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to
implead Marivel and Carlito's parents rendered the trial
short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial
court's judgment void. Barco v. Court of Appeals has
ruled that the publication of the order of hearing under
Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an
indispensable party.
Onde v. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las
Piñas 2014
Under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or
typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be
corrected and changes of first name can be done by the
concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial
order.
In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No.
9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with administrative
officers. The remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.
Correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that
his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in
Bicol to “not married” is a substantial correction
requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is
substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert
him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one.
Republic Act No. 9048 as amended by Republic Act
10172
Babiera v. Catotal, supra
The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her
legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in
Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily,
the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not
prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
Chuc Siu v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila
A summary petition as authorized by Article 412 of
the New Civil Code does not lie where the matter
"concerns the citizenship not only of petitioner but of
his children." There is need for its being "threshed out
in an appropriate action."
In Re Petition for Change of Name Julian Carulasan
Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar
Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have
his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his
registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
A name is said to have the following characteristics:
1) It is absolute, intended to protect the
individual from being confused with others.
2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody
can be without a name.
3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least
at the start, and may be changed only for good
 3. Effects
cause and by judicial proceedings. and did not make the proceedings less adversarial in
nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the 4. Loss or unlawful deprivation of a movable
4) It is outside the commerce of man, and,
therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by petition and the motion to present respondent's 5. Classes
act inter vivos or mortis causa. evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so,
it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the 6. Rights of the possessor
5) It is imprescriptible. lower court were defective. In this regard, this Court 7. Loss or termination of possession
adheres to the principle that even substantial errors
This citation does not make any reference to middle G. USUFRUCT
in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
names, but this does not mean that middle names have 1. Characteristics
facts established under Rule 108 provided the
no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of 2. Classification
to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a
the appropriate adversary proceeding.
person as well as further distinguish him from others 3. Rights and Obligations of Usufructuary and
who may have the same given name and surname as he Owner
has. PROPERTY 4. Extinction, termination, and extinguishment
Here, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the H. EASEMENTS
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, A. CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
how such change of name would make his integration 1. Characteristics
1. Immovables
into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not 2. Classification
clearly established. That the continued use of his middle 2. Movables
3. Modes of acquiring easements
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not B. OWNERSHIP
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from 4. Rights and obligations of the owners of the
1. Bundle of rights
his registered complete name. dominant and servient estates
2. Actions to Recover
5. Modes of extinguishment
Republic v. Vergara 2015 3. Limitations of ownership
6. Legal Easements
The Court has held that not all alterations allowed in C. ACCESSION
one's name are confined under Rule 103 and that I. NUISANCE
1. Right to hidden treasure
corrections for clerical errors may be set right under 1. Liabilities
Rule 108. 2. Rules of Accession
2. Attractive Nuisance
D. QUIETING OF TITLE
Here, respondent never had any intention to change her 3. No prescription
name and sex. What she seeks is simply the removal 1. Requisites
4. Extrajudicial abatement
of the clerical fault or error in her registered sex 2. Distinctions between quieting title and
and given name, and to set aright the same to 5. Special injury to individual
removing/ preventing a cloud
conform to her real sex and the name she grew up 6. Right of individual to abate a public nuisance
with. 3. Prescription/non-prescription of action
7. Right to damages
E. CO-OWNERSHIP
In any event, even granting that Rule 103 applies to this 8. Who may sue on private nuisance
case, it still cannot be denied that respondent complied 1. Characteristics
with the requirements for an adversarial proceeding J. MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
2. Sources
before the RTC. The publication and posting of the 1. Occupation
notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation 3. Rights of co-owners
2. Donation
and the notices sent to the OSG, the Civil Registrar- 4. Termination
General and the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City are 3. Prescription
F. POSSESSION
sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that
no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not 1. Characteristics A. CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same 2. Acquisition
Importance of classification
 Different provisions of the law govern the acquisition,
disposition, loss, and registration of immovables and
movables.
Classification of Property on the basis of its nature
ART 414. All things which are or may be the object
of appropriation are considered either:
1) Immovable or REAL property; or
2) Movable or PERSONAL property.
1. Immovables
What is immovable property?
ART 415. The following are immovable
property:
1) Land, buildings, roads and
constructions of all kinds adhered to
the soil;
2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while
they are attached to the land or form
an integral part of an immovable;
3) Everything attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, in such a way that
it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object;
4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other
objects for use or ornamentation,
placed in buildings or on lands by the
owner of the immovable in such a
manner that it reveals the intention to
attach them permanently to the
tenements;
5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments
or implements intended by the owner
of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works;
6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses,
beehives, fish ponds or breeding
places of similar nature, in case their
owner has placed them or preserves
them with the intention to have them
permanently attached to the land, and
forming a permanent part of it; the
animals in these places are included;
7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of
land;
8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps,
while the matter thereof forms part of
the bed, and waters either running or
stagnant;
9) Docks and structures which, though
floating, are intended by their nature
and object to remain at a fixed place on
a river, lake, or coast;
10) Contracts for public works, and
servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property.
Classification of Real properties:
1. Real property by nature (trees and plants);
2. By incorporation (building);
3. By destination or purpose (machinery);
4. By analogy (right of usufruct).
Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery
The building of strong materials in which the rice-
cleaning machinery was installed by the "Compania
Agricola Filipina" was real property, and the mere fact
that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and
apart from the land on which it stood in no wise
changed its character as real property.
It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel
mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a
chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery
installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of
the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect
whatever so far as the building was concerned.
Punsalan, Jr. v. Lacsamana
The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an
immovable or real property as provided in Article
415(1). Buildings are always immovable under the
Code.
The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the
annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does
not operate to efface the fundamental and prime
objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said
real property. It is a real action.
Standard Oil Co. v. Jaramillo
The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the
registration of chattel mortgages are of a purely
ministerial character; and no provision of law can be
cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-
judicial power to determine the nature of any document
of which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage.
Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo
While not conclusive, the characterization of the
machineries as chattels by the appellant is indicative
of intention and impresses upon the property the
character determined by the parties.
It is machinery which is involved; moreover, machinery
not intended by the owner of any building or land for
use in connection therewith, but intended by a lessee
for use in a building erected on the land by the latter to
be returned to the lessee on the expiration or
abandonment of the lease.
Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the
property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a
usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary
right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner.
Makati Leasing v. Wearever Textile Mills
If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in
the Tumalad case, may be considered as personal
property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage
thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree
and no innocent third party will be prejudiced
thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery,
which is movable in its nature and becomes
immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be
likewise treated as such.
As stated in Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo,
it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by
agreement treat as personal property that which by
nature would be real property, as long as no interest
of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.
Mindanao Bus Company v. City Assessor
So that movable equipment to be immobilized in
contemplation of the law must first be "essential and
principal elements" of an industry or works without
which such industry or works would be "unable to
function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it
was established."
Similarly, the tools and equipment in question in this
instant case are, by their nature, not essential and
principal elements of petitioner's business of
transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks.
They are merely incidentals—acquired as movables
and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or
improve its service. Even without such tools and
equipments, its business may be carried on.
Aside from the element of essentiality, Art 415(5) also
requires that the industry or works be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land. In the case at bar, the
equipments in question are destined only to repair or
service the transportation business, which is not carried
on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as
demanded by the law. Said equipments may not,
therefore, be deemed real property.
Caltex Philippines Inc. v. CBAA
This case is about the realty tax on machinery and
equipment installed by Caltex in its gas stations located
on leased land.
Said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the
gas station building or shed owned by Caltex and which
fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas
station, for without them the gas station would be
useless, and which have been attached or affixed
permanently to the gas station site or embedded
therein, are taxable improvements and machinery
within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real
Property Tax Code.
Serg’s Products v. PCI Leasing
After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or
immovable property be considered as personal or
movable, a party is estopped from subsequently
claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a
proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the
other contracting party.
Tumalad v. Vicencio
Although there is no specific statement referring to the
subject house as personal property, yet by ceding,
selling or transferring a property by way of chattel
mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant
to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to
treat the same as such, so that they should not now be
allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming
otherwise.
Ago v. CA
By the installation of the sawmill machineries in the
building of the Golden Pacific Sawmill, Inc. for use in the
sawing of logs carried on in said building, the same
became a necessary and permanent part of the building
or real estate on which the same was constructed,
converting the said machineries and equipment into
real estate.
Considering that the machineries and equipments in
question valued at more than P15K appear to have been
sold without the necessary advertisement of sale by
publication in a newspaper, as required in Sec. 16 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the sale made by the
sheriff must be declared null and void.
HPS Software and Communication v. PLDT 2012
The business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service is personal property which can be
the object of theft under Article 308 of the RPC. Business
may be appropriated under Section 2 of the Bulk Sales
Law, hence, could be the object of theft.
Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as
personal property in the Civil Code in force at the time
the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in
business was declared to be personal property since it is
capable of appropriation and not included in the
enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil
Code provides that all things which are or may be the
object of appropriation are considered either real
property or personal property. Business is likewise not
enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code.
Just like interest in business, however, it may be
appropriated. Following the ruling in Strochecker v.
Ramirez, business should also be classified as
personal property. Since it is not included in the
exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article
415, it is therefore personal property.
Benguet Corp. v. CBAA
Whether a structure constitutes an improvement so as
to partake of the status of realty would depend upon the
degree of permanence intended in its construction and
use. The expression "permanent" as applied to an
improvement does not imply that the improvement
must be used perpetually but only until the purpose to
which the principal realty is devoted has been
accomplished. It is sufficient that the improvement is
intended to remain as long as the land to which it is
annexed is still used for the said purpose.
Here, the subject dam falls within the definition of an
"improvement" because it is permanent in character
and it enhances both the value and utility of
petitioner's mine. Moreover, the immovable nature of
the dam defines its character as real property under
Article 415 of the Civil Code and thus makes it taxable
under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.
Star Two, Inc. v. Paper City Corp. 2013
The real estate mortgages which specifically included
the machineries and equipments were subsequent to
the chattel mortgages dated 26 August 1992, 20
November 1992, 7 June 1994 and 24 January 1995.
Without doubt, the real estate mortgages superseded
the earlier chattel mortgages.

The real estate mortgage over the machineries and
equipments is even in full accord with the classification
of such properties as immovable property.
2. Movables
ART 416. The following things are deemed to be
personal property:
1) Those movables susceptible of
appropriation which are not included in
the preceding article;
2) Real property which by any special
provision of law is considered as
personality;
3) Forces of nature which are brought
under control by science; and
4) In general, all things which can be
transported from place to place without
impairment of the real property to which
they are fixed.
ART 417. The following are also considered as
personal property:
1) Obligations and actions which have for
their object movables or demandable
sums; and
2) Shares of stock of agricultural,
commercial and industrial entities,
although they may have real estate.
a. General Test of Movable Character
Manresa mentions of three tests to determine whether
a property is movable or immovable:
1. If the property is capable of being carried
from place to place (test by description);
2. If such change in location can be made
without injuring the real property to which it
may in the meantime be attached (test by
description); and
3. If the object is not one of those enumerated in
Art 415 (test by exclusion)
The inevitable conclusion is that the property is
personal.
b. Consumables and Non-Consumables
According to the nature of the movable property.
ART 418. Movable property is either consumable
or non-consumable. To the first class belong
those movables which cannot be used in a
manner appropriate to their nature without their
being consumed; to the second class belong all
the others.
c. Fungible and Non-Fungible
According to the intention of the parties.
US v. Carlos
The true test of what is a proper subject of larceny
seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal or
incorporeal, but whether it is capable of
appropriation by another than the owner. It is well-
settled that illuminating gas may be the subject of
larceny, even in the absence of a statute so providing.
⭐Laurel v. Abrogar
This Court, in US v. Genato, US v. Carlos, and US v.
Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal
property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object
of theft.
Appropriation of forces of nature which are brought
under control by science such as electrical energy can be
achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for
generating or measuring such forces of nature,
wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such
apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain
such forces of nature.
The act of conducting ISR operations by illegally
connecting various equipment or apparatus to PLDT's
telephone system, through which petitioner is able to
resell or re-route international long distance calls using
PLDT's facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction.
The business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service is likewise personal property
which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the
RPC.
While it may be conceded that "international long
distance calls" take the form of electrical energy, it
cannot be said that such international long distance
calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT
since the latter could not have acquired ownership
over such calls. PLDT not being the owner of said
telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such
telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the
use of these communications facilities without the
consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft,
which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
services and business.
Chiang v. PLDT 2017
Toll bypass operations could not have been
accomplished without the installation of
telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone
lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held liable for
violation of PD No. 401, which penalizes the
unauthorized installation of any telephone connection
without previous authority from PLDT.
Fort Bonifacio Development Corp. v. Fong 2015
An assignment of credit for a consideration and
covering a demandable sum of money is considered as a
sale of personal property.
Laud v. People 2014
Laud’s posturing that human remains are not
“personal property” and, hence, could not be the subject
of a search warrant deserves scant consideration.
“Personal property” refers to the thing’s mobility, and
not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a
particular person. Considering that human remains can
generally be transported from place to place, and
considering further that they qualify under the phrase
“subject of the offense” given that they prove the crime’s
corpus delicti, it follows that they may be valid subjects
of a search warrant.
B. OWNERSHIP
ART 427. Ownership may be exercised over things
or rights.
Definition of Ownership
Ownership is the independent and general right of a
person to control a thing particularly in his
possession, enjoyment, disposition, and recovery,
subject to no restrictions except those imposed by the
state or private persons, without prejudice to the
provisions of the law.
1. Bundle of rights
ART 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the
holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it.
a) Right to enjoy;
i) To Possess; jus possidendi
ii) To Use; jus utendi
iii) To the Fruits. jus fruendi
b) Right to dispose; jus disponendi
i) To consume or destroy or abuse;
jus abutendi
ii) To encumber or alienate.
c) Right to recover or vindicate; jus
vindicandi
ART 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means without
detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
Principle of “Self-Help”
ART 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof.
For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property.
German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA
A party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his prior possession,
if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain in the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having better right by
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Both the MTC and the RTC have rationalized
petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying
the crops of private respondents on the basis of the
doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429. Such
justification is unavailing because the doctrines of self-
help can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at
bar.
When possession has already been lost, the owner
must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
property.
Tan-Yap v. Patrick 2019
The doctrine of "self-help" applies only when the
person against whom the owner has the right to use
force (in order to exclude the former from the latter's
property) is really an "aggressor." In this case, Sheriff
Alvarez was not an aggressor, as indeed he could not
have been one, because as an officer or agent of the
court, he was simply carrying out his official duty to
implement the writ of execution.
Acts in a State of Necessity
ART 432. The owner of a thing has no right to
prohibit the interference of another with the
same, if
1. the interference is necessary to avert an
imminent danger and
2. the threatened damage, compared to the
damage arising to the owner from the
interference, is much greater.
The owner may demand from the person
benefited indemnity for the damage to him.
2. Actions to Recover
ART 433. Actual possession under claim of
ownership raises disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of the
property.
of Personal Property
a. Replevin, Rule 60 Rules of Court
An action or provisional remedy where the
complainant prays for the recovery of the
possession of personal property.
of Real Property
b. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer, Rule 70,
Rules of Court
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct
causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer
(desahuico).
In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of real property by means of force,
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas
in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of
his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied.
The two are distinguished from each other in
that in forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that
the issue is which party has prior de facto
possession while in unlawful detainer, possession
of the defendant is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are
summary in nature, lies in the proper MTC.
Both actions must be brought within one year
from the date of actual entry on the land, in case
of forcible entry, and from the date of last
demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in
said cases is the right to physical possession.
Estate of Manantan v. Somera
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the
recovery of possession of real property. This action may
be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied.
The Complaint does not allege facts showing compliance
with the prescribed one year period to file an action for
unlawful detainer. It does not state the material dates
that would have established that it was filed within one
year from the date of Manantan's last demand upon
respondent to vacate the disputed portion of land. Such
allegations are jurisdictional and crucial, because if the
complaint was filed beyond the prescribed one year
period, then it cannot properly qualify as an action for
unlawful detainer over which the MTCC can exercise
jurisdiction. It may be an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover
the right of possession, which should be brought before
the proper RTC when dispossession has lasted for more
than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title.
Accion reivindicatoria, meanwhile, is an action to
recover ownership, as well as possession, which should
also be brought before the proper RTC in an ordinary
civil proceeding.
Here, the respondent was already in possession of
the disputed portion at the time Manantan bought the
subject property from the Bayot family, and it was only
after the conduct of a relocation survey, which
supposedly showed that respondent was encroaching
on the subject property, did Manantan begin asserting
her claim of ownership over the portion occupied and
used by respondent. Clearly, respondent's possession
of the disputed portion was not pursuant to any
contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and,
resultantly, respondent's right of possession over the
disputed portion is not subject to expiration or
termination.
Casilang v. Casilang-Dizon 2013
Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the
question of ownership raised by the defendant in an
ejectment suit, but only to resolve the issue of
possession; its determination is not conclusive on
the issue of ownership.
Quijano v. Amante 2014
Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged
tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the
possession is deemed illegal from the beginning.
Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an
improper remedy. But the action cannot be
considered as one for forcible entry without any
allegation in the complaint that the entry of the
defendant was by means of force, intimidation,
threats, strategy or stealth.
c. Accion Publiciana
is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession when dispossession has lasted for more
than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title.
d. Accion Reivindicatoria
is an action to recover ownership, as well as
possession in an ordinary civil proceeding.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada
On the issue of prescription of action
The action of respondents was one for quieting of title
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article
476 of the New Civil Code.
The owner of a real property, as plaintiff, is entitled to
the relief of quieting of title even if, at the time of the
commencement of his action, he was not in actual
possession of real property. After all, under Article 477
of the New Civil Code, the owner need not be in
possession of the property.
Since respondents were in actual or physical
possession of the property when they filed their
complaint against petitioner, the prescriptive period for
the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to
run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT over the
property in 1984. The reason for this is that one who is
in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be
the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps
to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being,
that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim
of a third party and its effect on his own title, which
right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Suarez v. Emboy 2014
Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the
respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of
action for unlawful detainer.
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition
for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the
issuance of new certificates of title can abate
Carmencita’s ejectment suit.
As a general rule, a pending civil action involving
ownership of the same property does not justify the
suspension of ejectment proceedings. Only in rare
instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of
the pending civil action. As an exception to the general
rule, the respondents’ petition for nullification of
partition can abate Carmencita’s suit for unlawful
detainer.
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would
have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of
the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning,
considerations of equity require the suspension of the
ejectment proceedings. Needlessly, the litigants as well
as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by
proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best
temporary, but the result of enforcement is
permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.
Gabriel v. Crisologo 2014
Who between petitioners and respondent Crisologo have
a better right of possession over the subject parcels of
land.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to
recover possession ONLY, not ownership. When
parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court
may pass upon the issue to determine who between the
parties has the right to possess the property. This
adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for
the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where
the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue
of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property.
The Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of
possession over the subject parcels of land.
Petitioners, as private individuals, are not the proper
parties to question the status of the respondent’s
registered titles within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation. It is the SolGen who is the proper party.
Javelosa v. Tapus 2018
The petitioner failed to adduce evidence to establish
that the respondents' occupation of the subject property
was actually effected through her tolerance or
permission. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to prove
how and when the respondents entered the subject lot,
as well as how and when the permission to occupy was
purportedly given. In fact, she was conspicuously silent
about the details on how the permission to enter was
given, save for her bare assertion that the respondents'
occupied the premises as caretakers thereof. The
absence of such essential details is especially troubling
considering that the respondents have been occupying
the subject property for more than 70 years.
e. Injunction, Rule 58, Rules of Court
A person deprived of his possession of property is
ordinarily not allowed to avail himself of the
remedy of injunction, the reason being that the
defendant in actual possession is presumed
disputably to have the better right.
In civil cases, however, the remedy of writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction may be availed
of in the original case of forcible entry; and during
appeal, in the case of unlawful detainer.
f. Writ of Possession
Used in connection with the Land Registration
Law, is an order directing the sheriff to place a
successful registrant under the Torrens system in
possession of the property covered by a decree of
the Court.
Requisites in an Action to Recover
ART 434. In an action to recover, the property
must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness
of the defendant's claim.
3. Limitations of ownership
a. Imposed by the State
i. Police Power
ART 436. When any property is condemned or
seized by competent authority in the interest of
health, safety or security, the owner thereof
shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he
can show that such condemnation or seizure is
unjustified.
City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta
An ordinance that provides that at least 6% of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
is being challenged.
This is not a mere police regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation.
OSG v. Ayala Land
The total prohibition against the collection of parking
fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities
has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR.
The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by
generally invoking police power, since said prohibition
amounts to a taking of respondents' property without
payment of just compensation.
MMDA v. Trackworks
This case concerns whether the MMDA could
unilaterally dismantle the billboards, signages and other
advertising media in the structures of the MRT3.
MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a
system, and administration. Nothing in RA 7924 granted
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
ii. Eminent Domain
ART 435. No person shall be deprived of his
property except by competent authority and for
public use and always upon payment of just
compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied
with, the courts shall protect and, in a proper
case, restore the owner in his possession.
Heirs of Moreno v. MCIAA
In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos. 916
and 920 to the government with the latter obliging itself
to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport;
failing to keep its bargain, the government can be
compelled by petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land
to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the use
of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not
conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation
was authorized.
MCIAA v. Lozada, supra 2010 En Banc
We now expressly hold that the taking of private
property, consequent to the Government's exercise of
its power of eminent domain, is ALWAYS subject to
the condition that the property be devoted to the
specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not
initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
 attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, higher estates and such should be free from any
may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the human intervention. In the instant case, what flowed a. Accession, not a mode of acquiring ownership
return of the amount of just compensation received. In from Hilltop City Subdivision was not water that
such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent naturally flowed from a higher estate. Alco Homes and Accession is the right of a property owner to everything
domain has become improper for lack of the required Golden Village are not anymore obligated to receive such which is:
factual justification. waters and earth coming from Hilltop City Subdivision. a) Produced thereby (Accession discreta);
b) Or which is incorporated or attached thereto,
Republic v. Heirs of Borbon 2015 Therefore, E.B. Villarosa is responsible for the damage
either naturally or artificially (Accession
suffered by Spouses Ermino. E.B. Villarosa should have
The expropriator who has taken possession of the continua), which is either natural or artificial.
provided for the necessary measures such as retaining
property subject of expropriation is obliged to pay walls and drainage so that the large volume of water b. Kinds of Accession
reasonable compensation to the landowner for the emanating from it would not unduly cause i. Accession Discreta
period of such possession although the proceedings had inconvenience, if not injury, to the lower estates.
been discontinued on the ground that the public 1. Natural fruits;
purpose for the expropriation had meanwhile ceased. 2. Industrial fruits;
c. Imposed By The Grantor
3. Civil fruits.
b. Imposed by law E.g. the donor may prohibit the donees from ii. Accession Continua
partitioning the property for a period not exceeding
ART 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use 20 years. 1. with respect to Real Property
thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of a a. Accession industrial
third person. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA
i. Building
Lunod v. Meneses The deed of donation involved herein expressly
provides for automatic reversion of the property ii. Planting
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the donated in case of violation of the condition therein, iii. Sowing
easement of receiving and giving passage to the waters hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not b. Accession natural
proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of necessary. The cause of action herein is based on the
Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory i. Alluvium (Art 457)
agreement between the interested parties; it is of a condition in the deed of donation that the property ii. Avulsion (Art 459)
statutory nature, and the law has imposed it for the donated should not be sold within a period of one iii. Change of course of rivers
common public utility in view of the difference in the hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the (Arts 461-462)
altitude of the lands. deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion,
constitutes an undue restriction on the rights iv. Formation of Islands (Arts
Valisno v. Adriano arising from ownership of petitioners and is, 464 -465)
therefore, contrary to public policy. 2. with respect to Personal Property
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant
has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from a. Adjunction or conjunction
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such d. Imposed By The Owner i. Inclusion (engraftment)
as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to
E.g. when the owner leases his property to another, ii. Soldadura (attachment)
deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga
River. said owner in the meantime cannot physically occupy iii. Tejido (weaving)
the premises.
iv. Pintura (painting)
Ermino v. Golden Village Homeowners, 2018 C. ACCESSION v. Escritura (writing)
The bulldozing and construction works at the Hilltop Right of Accession, Classification, Basis, and Principles b. Mixture
City Subdivision, made Alco Homes and Golden Village's
obligation, as lower estates, more burdensome than i. Confusion - liquids;
ART 440. The ownership of property gives the
what the law contemplated. Lower estates are only right by accession to everything which is ii. Commixtion - solids.
obliged to receive water naturally flowing from produced thereby, or which is incorporated or c. Specification
Right of Accession with Respect to what is Produced by
Property
ART 441. To the owner belongs:
1) The natural fruits;
2) The industrial fruits;
3) The civil fruits.
Under this article, the owner of the land owns the
fruits. In these cases however, it is not the owner who
owns the fruits:
a. Possessor in good faith of the land as per Art
544 par 1;
b. Usufructuary;
c. Lessee;
d. Antichretic creditor.
Riosa v. Verzosa
The purchaser of lands sold at public auction under a
writ of execution only has an inchoate right in the
property, subject to be defeated and terminated within
a period of twelve months from the date of sale, by a
redemption on the part of the owner. We have already
held, in the case of De la Rosa v. Santos, that the
purchaser, where the land was in possession of the
owner and not a tenant, was not entitled to recover
the rents and profits of the land sold during the
period within which the owner might redeem.
Velasco v. Rosenberg
That the rents received by the purchaser during the
period allowed for redemption must be applied on
account of the redemption price, the judgment debtor
in possession of such property should not be required
to pay rent, inasmuch as he would thereby simply be
paying rent to himself.
Fruits, kinds of, obligation of recipient of fruits
ART 442. Natural fruits are the
1. spontaneous products of the soil, and
2. the young and other products of animals.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands
of any kind through cultivation or labor.
Civil fruits are
1. the rents of buildings,
2. the price of leases of lands and other
property and
3. the amount of perpetual or life annuities
or other similar income.
ART 443. He who receives the fruits has the
obligation to pay the expenses made by a third
person in their production, gathering, and
preservation.
1. Bad faith of previous possessor immaterial. He is
still entitled to reimbursement for the necessary
expenses.
2. Even when expenses exceed the value of the
fruits, the previous possessor must still be paid as
the law makes no distinction.
ART 444. Only such as are manifest or born are
considered as natural or industrial fruits.
With respect to animals, it is sufficient that they
are in the womb of the mother, although unborn.
1. Right to hidden treasure
ART 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of
the land, building, or other property on which it is
found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the
property of another, or of the State or any of its
subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof
shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a
trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of
the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or
the arts, the State may acquire them at their just
price, which shall be divided in conformity with
the rule stated.
ART 439. By treasure is understood, for legal
purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of
money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the
lawful ownership of which does not appear.
2. Rules of Accession
1) Right of Accession with respect to Immovable
Property
ART 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on
the land of another and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the
land, xxxx
Basic principles of Accession Continua
a. Accessory follows the principal. To the owner
of the principal must belong also the accessions;
b. The union or incorporation must, within certain
exceptions, be effected in such a manner that to
separate the principal from the accessory would
result in substantial injury to either;
c. He who is in good faith may be held responsible
but he should not be penalized;
d. He who is in bad faith may be penalized;
e. No one should enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another;
f. Bad faith of one party neutralizes the bad faith of
the other so both should be considered in good
faith.
ART 446. All works, sowing, and planting are
presumed made by the owner and at his expense,
unless the contrary is proved.
ART 447. The owner of the land who makes
thereon, personally or through another,
plantings, constructions or works with the
materials of another, shall pay their value; and,
if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to
the reparation of damages.
The owner of the materials shall have the right
to remove them only in case he can do so without
injury to the work constructed, or without the
plantings, constructions or works being
destroyed.
However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the
owner of the materials may remove them in any
event, with a right to be indemnified for damages.
 1) acts in good faith believing himself to be the 2. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the
LO OM
owner of the land, or at least, to have a claim of possessor in good faith with the same right of
title; or retention, the person who has defeated him in
Rights Liabilities Rights Liabilities the possession having the option of refunding the
2) proceeded with the knowledge, tolerance,
consent, or permission of owner. amount of the expenses or of paying the increase
Payment in value which the thing may have acquired by
Both in GF or removal 3) or in special cases where builder:
reason thereof.
or BF Pays value if not a) Built his house at the time he was still co-
of material injurious 3. Article 548. Expense for pure luxury or mere
owner that overlapped the land of another
Becomes pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor
(Del Campo);
LO in GF; owner of No right of in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments
Damages
OM in BF material removal b) Built with consent of owner (Boyer-Roxas); with which he has embellished the principal thing
c) Relied on consent of another they believed to if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successors
Absolute
be the landowner (Sarmiento); in the possession do not prefer to refund the
LO in BF; Pays value right of
amount expended.
OM in GF + Damages removal + d) As son, built with knowledge and consent of
Damages his father (Javier); i. Liability of Builder to Account for Fruits
Legend: LO = Landowner; OM = Owner of Material; GF = Received
e) As children, built to lots owned by their
Good Faith; BF = Bad Faith parents who invited them and fully consented a) Whatever fruits he receives during
to the improvements introduced (Macasaet) period of retention must be deducted
⭐ART 448. The owner of the land on which
from indemnity due to him;
anything has been built, sown or planted in good 3. Inapplicable where one’s interest in the land is
faith, shall have the right merely that of: b) If Fruits > Indemnity, the excess shall be
a) to appropriate as his own the works, returned to the landowner.
1) A holder such as a tenant or lessee (Quevada,
sowing or planting, after payment of the Mores); c) If building is occupied by the builder in
indemnity provided for in articles 546 GF, landowner has no right to collect rent
and 548, or 2) An agent; or
during period of retention.
b) to oblige the one who built or planted to 3) A usufructuary (Macasaet)
b. To oblige the builder or planter to pay the price of
pay the price of the land, and the one Good Faith the land and the sower, to pay the proper rent
who sowed, the proper rent.
Consists in the honest belief that the land he is i. When this right cannot be exercised
However, the builder or planter cannot be building, sowing or planting on is his or that by some
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably If value of LAND >> BUILDING.
title he has a right to build thereon, and his ignorance
more than that of the building or trees. In such ii. Fixing of Price; Remedies of the
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of of any defect or flaw in his title is not shown. It is
presumed. (Art 527) Landowner if Builder/Planter Refuses to
the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The Pay
Option Given to Landowner
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease a) Forced lease is created wherein the
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the a. To appropriate improvement upon payment of
court fixes the terms of lease. (Depra v.
terms thereof. the required indemnity (Art. 546, 548, 448)
Dumlao)
1. Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be
b) Sell the property at public auction
refunded to every possessor; but only the
1. Refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by at wherein proceeds are applied first to the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until
least two parties, one of whom has built some works land, then improvements.
he has been reimbursed therefor.
thereon. c) Have improvements removed at
2. Applies when builder builder’s expense.
Right of Landowner to Remove or Demolish b. that the planting or sowing be e. A son in possession of a land, who built his house
Improvement removed, in order to replace things thereon after his predecessors-in-interest had
in their former condition been summoned in an action for partition of the
Only when after having chosen to sell his land, the
other party fails to pay for the same. at the expense of the person who built, property, is a builder in bad faith who must lose
planted or sowed; OR his improvement to the owners of the land
Builder's/Sower's/Planter's Right to Retain
2. he may compel without right to indemnity.
Improvement
a. the builder or planter to pay the 2. Consequences of Bad Faith (Art. 449 and 450)
1. Right of Retention protects builders in good price of the land, and
faith. It is to guarantee full and prompt a. Article 450 applies when landowner chooses not
b. the sower the proper rent. to appropriate the improvements of the builder
reimbursement as it allows the actual possessor
to remain in possession while he has not been ART 451. In the cases of the two preceding in BF. He may elect to require builder to:
reimbursed for the necessary improvements. articles, the landowner is entitled to damages i. Remove at builder’s expense; or
from the builder, planter or sower.
2. A builder in GF cannot be compelled to pay ii. Pay the price of land or proper rent in
rentals during this period nor be disturbed of his ART 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad case of a sower.
possession. faith is entitled to reimbursement for the
necessary expenses of preservation of the land. b. In both instances, landowner is entitled to
3. Offsetting of expenses with the fruits of builder in damages.
GF prohibited. 3. Rights of Builder/Planter/Sower in Bad Faith (Art.
1. Instances of Bad Faith
4. Applies only to private land. 452)
a. On the date of the service of summons upon
Effect of Alienation by Owner of Land with appellee in this case, considering that the a. Examples of necessary expenses for preservation
Improvements appellant was thereafter declared owner by final of land
1. A purchaser who buys land with improvements judgment, appellee's possession in good faith was i. Defense work to prevent erosion;
belonging to another knowing such fact, places interrupted and hence from that time he lost the
ii. Litigation expenses in defense of land
himself in the position of a landowner in BF and right to the fruits.
against usurpers.
must therefore pay for the indemnity. b. Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes
iii. Real property taxes.
2. If new owner paid for the improvements, the that of the other and hence as between
action may still be brought against him without themselves their rights would be as if both of b. Right of Retention (Art. 546), Right to expenses of
prejudice to his right to recover from the former them had acted in good faith at the time of the production
owner. transaction, this legal fiction of the buyer's good i. Only possessor in GF is entitled to retain
faith ceased when the complaint against him was the thing until he is fully reimbursed.
3. Option transferred to purchaser if former owner
filed.
fails to elect either options. 4. Rights of Owner of the Land (Art. 450-451)
c. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
a. To appropriate what has been built without
only so long as his possession is not legally
ART 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad obligation to pay any indemnity therefor except
interrupted, and such interruption takes place
faith on the land of another, loses what is built, for necessary expenses for the preservation of the
upon service of judicial summons.
planted or sown without right to indemnity. land + damages; or
d. A possessor in good faith cannot recover the
ART 450. The owner of the land on which b. To ask the removal or demolition + damages; or
value of a new building constructed after the
anything has been built, planted or sown in bad c. To compel the builder or planter to pay the price
filing of an action for annulment of the sale of
faith of land regardless if it is considerably higher than
land on which it is constructed, thus rendering
1. may demand him a builder in bad faith who is denied by law that of what was built, and the sower, to pay rent
a. the demolition of the work, or any right of reimbursement. + damages.

ART 455. If the materials, plants or seeds belong
to a third person who has not acted in bad faith,
the owner of the land shall answer subsidiarily
for their value and only in the event that the one
who made use of them has no property with
which to pay.
This provision shall not apply if the owner makes
use of the right granted by article 450. If the
owner of the materials, plants or seeds has been
paid by the builder, planter or sower, the latter
may demand from the landowner the value of the
materials and labor.
ART 456. In the cases regulated in the preceding
articles, good faith does not necessarily exclude
negligence, which gives right to damages under
article 2176.
Sarmiento v. Agana
We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in
view of the peculiar circumstances under which they had
constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they knew, the
LAND was owned by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having statedThe choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
they could build on the property, could reasonably be expected to
later on give them the LAND.
Balucanag v. Francisco
Stohner cannot be considered a builder in good faith.
There is no dispute that the relation between Baiucanag
and Stohner is that of lessor and lessee, the former
being the successor in interest of the original owner of
the lot. A lessee who introduces improvements in the
leased premises, does so at his own risk in the sense
that he cannot recover their value from the lessor, much
less retain the premises until such reimbursement.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 1678.
This article gives the lessor the option to appropriate
the useful improvements by paying one-half of their
value; and the lessee cannot compel the lessor to
appropriate the improvements and make
reimbursement, for the lessee's right under the law is to
remove the improvements even if the leased premises
may suffer damage thereby. But he shall not cause any
more damage upon the property than is necessary.
⭐Floreza v. Evangelista
Petitioner did not construct his house as a vendee a
retro. The house had already been constructed as far
back as 1949 (1945 for the house of light materials)
even before the pacto de retro sale in 1949. Petitioner
incurred no useful expense, therefore, after that sale.
The house was already there at the tolerance of the
EVANGELISTAS in consideration of the several loans
extended to them. Since petitioner cannot be classified
as a builder in good faith within the purview of Article
448, nor as a vendee a retro, who made useful
improvements during the lifetime of the pacto de retro,
petitioner has no right to reimbursement of the
value of the house which he had erected on the
residential lot of the EVANGELISTAS, much less to
retention of the premises until he is reimbursed.
The rights of petitioner are more akin to those of a
usufructuary who, under Article 579, may make on
the property useful improvements but with no right
to be indemnified therefor.
PNB v. De Jesus
accords with the principle of accession. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one.
Article 448 refers to a piece of land whose ownership
is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has
built some works (or sown or planted something) and
not to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale. In fine, petitioner is not
in a valid position to invoke the provisions of Article
448.
Heirs of Sarili v. Lagrosa 2014
As for Sps. Sarili, they knew – or at the very least, should
have known – from the very beginning that they were
dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to
sell the subject property considering the palpable
irregularity in the subject SPA’s acknowledgment. Yet,
relying solely on said document and without any
further investigation on Ramos’s capacity to sell, Sps.
Sarili still chose to proceed with its purchase and even
built a house thereon. Based on the foregoing, it cannot
be seriously doubted that Sps. Sarili were actually
aware of a flaw or defect in their title or mode of
acquisition and have consequently built the house on
the subject property in bad faith under legal
contemplation.
Ballatan, et.al. v. CA
Go built his house in the belief that it was entirely
within the parameters of his father's land. In short,
respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached
on petitioners' lot. They are deemed builders in good
faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them
of their encroachment on her property.
Respondent Yao built his house on his lot before any of
the other parties did. There is no evidence, much less,
any allegation that Yao was aware that when he built
his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on
Go's adjoining land. Good faith is always presumed,
and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof.
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith.
Article 448 has been applied to improvements or
portions of improvements built by mistaken belief on land
belonging to the adjoining owner.
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents
Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must be
fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of
payment.
Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Sps Nanol 2012
As a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good
faith does not apply where there is a contractual
relation between the parties, such as in the instant
case. However, the parties failed to attach a copy of the
Contract to Sell. As such, we are constrained to apply
Article 448.
Good faith is presumed on the part of the respondent-
spouses. This presumption is bolstered by the fact that
as the subdivision developer, petitioner must have
given the respondent-spouses permits to commence
and undertake the construction. The RTC is right in

requiring petitioner to pay respondents the value of the
new house minus the cost of the old house based on Art
448.
Vda. de Roxas v. Our Lady’s Foundation 2013
Ballatan v. CA already specifies that in the event that
the seller elects to sell the lot, “the price must be fixed at
the prevailing market value at the time of payment.”
More recently, Tuatis v. Sps Escol illustrates that the
present or current fair value of the land is to be
reckoned at the time that the landowner elected the
choice, and not at the time that the property was
purchased.
In Sarmiento v. Agana, we reckoned the valuation of
the property at the time that the real owner of the land
asked the builder to vacate the property encroached
upon. Depra v. Dumlao likewise ordered the courts of
origin to compute the current fair price of the land in
cases of encroachment on real properties.
Parilla v. Pilar
Petitioners, being dealers of Pilipinas Shell's petroleum
products, were allowed to occupy the property.
Petitioners are thus considered agents of Pilipinas Shell.
As the law on lease has specific rules concerning useful
improvements introduced by a lessee on the property
leased, it is erroneous on the part of petitioners to
urge this Court to apply Article 448, in relation to
Article 546.
It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
always be in the power of the tenant to "improve"
his landlord out of his property.
Macasaet v. Sps Macasaet
Toleration is defined as “the act or practice of
permitting or enduring something not wholly approved
of.”
Here, respondents had invited petitioners to occupy the
subject lots in order that they could all live near one
another and help in resolving family problems. The
occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not
merely “something not wholly approved of” by
imperceptible;
respondents. Neither did it arise from what Tolentino
refers to as “neighborliness or familiarity.” Article 447 b) Cause is the current of the river;
is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that
c) The river must continue to exist (otherwise, Art
apply when the owner of the property uses the
461 applies);
materials of another. On the other hand, when a person
builds in good faith on the land of another, the d) The increase must be comparatively little.
applicable provision is Article 448.
Avulsion
Respondents fully consented to the improvements
introduced by petitioners. Thus, petitioners may be
Avulsion is the process whereby the current of a river,
deemed to have been in good faith when they built the creek, or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a
structures on those lots. known portion of land and transfers it to another estate. It
is the removal of a considerable quantity of earth upon or
The structures built by petitioners were “useful” annexation to the land of another, suddenly and by the
improvements, because they augmented the value or perceptible action of the water.
income of the bare lots. Thus, the indemnity to be paid
by respondents under Article 448 is provided for by
Requisites of Avulsion
Article 546.
1. Segregation or transfer must be caused by the
current of a river, creek or torrent;
Kilario v. CA
Neither did the promise of the Padas that they were 2. Must be sudden or abrupt; and
going to donate the premises to petitioners convert 3. The portion of land transported must be known
them into builders in good faith for at the time the or identifiable.
improvements were built on the premises, such
promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere ALLUVIUM AVULSION
expectancy of ownership that may or may not be
realized. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be Deposit of soil is gradual Sudden or abrupt process
entitled to the value of the improvements that they built
Soil cannot be identified Identifiable or verifiable
on the said lot.
Belongs to the owner of Belongs to owner from
Alluvium property to which it is whose property it was
attached detached
Alluvium is the soil deposited or added to the lands
adjoining the banks of rivers, and gradually received as an Right of Accession with Respect to Movable Property
effect of the current of the waters. By law, the accretion is
owned by the owner of the estate fronting the river bank, Criteria to Determine Principal
or the riparian owner.
a. Rule of importance and purpose — to which the
a) Accretion is the process whereby the solid is accessory has been united as an ornament or for
deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited; its use or perfection (Art 467);
b) Accretion is a broader term because alluvium b. Of greater value; if they are unequal in value;
applies only to the soil deposited on river banks.
c. Of greater value, if they are of an equal value (Art
Requisites of Alluvium 468); and
a) The deposit should be gradual and d. That of greater merits (sentimental value)
Adjunction, Mixture, and Specification b. Proportion to the value. legal form but which is, in fact, invalid or unfounded,
or which would be inequitable to enforce.
Adjunction 2. By owner in GF or by chance
Requisites
The union of two movables belonging to different a. If same kind - Proportion;
owners in such a way that they form a single object, b. If different kind or quality - co-ownership a. There is a Price, Record, Instrument, Claim, or
but each one of the component things preserves its arises. Encumbrance (P.R.I.C.E.) which is apparently
value. 3. By owner in BF - loses thing plus liable for effective or valid;

Requisites damages. b. Such is in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or

Specification (Art 474) unenforceable, or has been extinguished or
1. There are two movables belonging to
Takes place whenever the work of a person is done on terminated, or has been barred by extinctive
different owners;
the material of another, such material thereby prescription (Art 478);
2. United in such a way that they form one
object; and undergoing transformation. c. Such may be prejudicial to said title.
Rules Instances
3. Are inseparable that their separation would
impair their nature or result in substantial 1. Person used material of another in GF — a. Absolute fictitious contract of sale;
injury to either component. Worker owns new thing but must indemnify
b. Sale by an unauthorized agent;
Ownership owner of material.
c. Forged contract;
i. If union took place without BF, owner of EXC: if material more precious than new thing,
principal acquires accessory with obligation OM may: d. Contract of sale or donation that has become
to indemnify the latter’s owner for its value. inoperative due to non-performance of a
a. Appropriate new thing to himself but condition precedent; and
ii. If with BF, Art 470 applies. must pay cost of labor; or
e. Voidable contract.
Accessory in BF Principal in BF b. Demand indemnity for material.
Nature of action to quiet title
Lose accessory; AND Pay value of accessory + 2. Person used material of another in BF — OM
either appropriates the new thing without An action for quieting of title is imprescriptible
Damages; OR
until the claimant is ousted of his possession.
paying the maker; or to demand the value of
Damages Owner of accessory ha material + damages. Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings
absolute right of removal quasi in rem. In an action quasi in rem, an individual
+ Damages EXC: if value of work is more valuable, for
is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a
artistic or scientific purpose, first option quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the
Mixture (Arts 472-473)
not available. parties.
The process or act of mixing or combining two or
Sentimental Value (Art 475) It is a remedy or proceeding which has for its purpose
more things belonging to different owners with the
Shall be duly appreciated in the payment of the an adjudication that a claim of title to realty or an
respective identities of the component parts
interest thereon, adverse to the plaintiff, is invalid or
destroyed or lost. proper indemnity in accessions with respect to
inoperative, or otherwise defective and hence, the
movables particularly in Arts 468(1) and 469(2). plaintiff and those claiming under him may forever be
Kinds
free of any hostile claim.
1. Commixtion — solid; D. QUIETING OF TITLE
1. Requisites
2. Confusion — liquid. What is cloud on title?
Rules 1) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
Is a semblance of title, either legal or equitable, or a equitable title to or interest in the real property
1. By will of owners claim or a right in real property, appearing in some
subject of the action;
a. Stipulation; 2) The defendant claims an interest therein adverse
 to the plaintiff; and
3) The deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
Heirs of Prodon v. Heirs of Alvarez 2013
In an action for quieting of title based on the
inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase
that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property,
the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the
defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence
other than the original document.
It is not denied that this action does not involve the
terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. The principal issue raised by the
respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged
head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right
to repurchase, duly executed by the late Alvarez, Sr.,
had really existed.
Sy, Sr. v. IAC
The basic rule is after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree
of registration is no longer open to review or attack,
even though the issuance thereof may have been
attended by fraud. This does not mean, however, that
the aggrieved party is without remedy at law. If the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser
for value, an action for reconveyance is still available.
If the property has passed unto the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action
for damages.
The private respondent was correct in filing a complaint
for quieting of title pursuant to Article 476. This is an
ordinary Civil remedy sanctioned by Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act. The one year prescriptive
clause of Section 38 is NOT applicable in cases of
double registration.
2. Distinctions between quieting title and
removing/preventing a cloud
Gallar v. Husain
This action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is
to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast on appellees’
ownership as a result of appellant’s refusal to recognize
the sale made by their predecessor. And, as plaintiff-
appellee is in possession of the land, the action is
imprescriptible.
An action for Quieting of Title is NOT
a remedy to settle a boundary
dispute
Vda. de Aviles v. CA
Is the special civil action of Quieting of Title under Rule
64 the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute?
NO. The construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the
disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are
not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in
an action for quieting of title.
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be
brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in
adversarial proceedings where possession or
ownership may properly be considered and where
evidence aliunde, other than the "instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding" itself, may be
introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever
warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for
recovery of possession de facto, also within the
prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners,
in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully
threshed out.
3. Prescription/non-prescription of action
a. Plaintiff in possession — imprescriptible.
b. Plaintiff not in possession — 10 or 30 years.
May also be barred by laches.
Republic v. Mangotara 2010
Here, Vidal asserted title to the two parcels of land as
Doña Demetria's sole heir. The cloud on Vidal's title,
which she sought to have removed, was Teofilo's
adverse claim of title to the same properties, also as
Doña Demetria's only heir. For it to determine the
rights of the parties, it was therefore crucial to
squarely make a finding as to the status, filiation,
and heirship of Vidal in relation to those of Teofilo. A
finding that one is Doña Demetria's sole and rightful
heir would consequently exclude and extinguish the
claim of the other.
In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, the Court recognized
that there are instances when a declaration of heirship
need not be made in a separate special proceeding:
If the special proceedings are pending, or if there
are no special proceedings filed but there is, under
the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings.
Where special proceedings had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, however,
or if a putative heir has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-
heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening,
then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the
annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging
to the estate of the deceased.
On prescription
An action for quieting of title to real property is
indubitably a real action. Article 1141 plainly provides
that real actions over immovables prescribe after
30 years.
Since the ordinary acquisitive prescription period of
10 years does not apply to LANDTRADE, then the Court
turns its attention to the extraordinary acquisitive
prescription period of 30 years set by Article 1137.
LANDTRADE adversely possessed the subject
properties no earlier than 1996, when it bought the
same from Teofilo, and Civil Case No. 4452 was already
instituted two years later in 1998. LANDTRADE cannot
tack its adverse possession of the two parcels of land to
that of Teofilo considering that there is no proof that
the latter, who is already residing in the U.S.A.,

adversely possessed the properties.
E. CO-OWNERSHIP
ART 484. There is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons.
Exists whenever an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons.
Requisites
1. Plurality of owners;
2. Object is undivided;
3. Each co-owner’s right is limited only to his ideal
share of the physical value.
1. Characteristics
1) There are at least two co-owners;
2) Co-owner of the whole and at the same time
absolute owner of his own ideal (abstract, pro
indiviso, fractional, aliquot) but definite share.
3) There is a single object which is not materially
divided and over which and his ideal share of the
whole, each co-owner exercises ownership,
together with the other co-owners;
4) There is no mutual representation by the co-
owners;
5) It exists for the common enjoyment of the co-
owners;
6) It has no distinct legal personality; and
7) It is governed by the contract of the parties,
otherwise, by special legal provisions, and in
default, by Title III on Co-ownership.
2. Sources
1) Contract;
2) Law — easement of party walls, absolute
community of property between spouses;
3) Succession;
4) Testamentary disposition, or donation inter
vivos;
5) Fortuitous event or chance — commixtion or
confusion;
6) Occupancy.
Pardell v. Bartolome
Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his
rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy
the same with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his coowners, for the reason that,
until a division be made, the respective part of each
holder can not be determined and every one of the
coowners exercises, together with his other co-
participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same.
Matilde, in occupying with her husband the upper floor
of the said house, did not injure the interests of her
coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the
latter from living therein, but merely exercised a
legitimate right pertaining to her as coowner of the
property.
However, that Matilde's husband occupied for four
years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same
house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the
justice of the peace, strict justice requires that he pay
his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly
rent which the said quarters could have produced, had
they been leased to another person.
Gapacan v. Omipet
A property owner whose property rights were being
disturbed may ask a competent court for a proper
determination of the respective rights of the party-
claimants.
As the two (2) surviving heirs of Paicat Gapacan, neither
Maria nor Antonio can claim absolute ownership over
the entire property to the prejudice of the other, for
each, in legal contemplation, is entitled to only one-half
(1/2) pro-indiviso share of his or her father's estate.
Prior to partition, Maria and Antonio, and upon the
latter's death, the petitioners, hold the disputed
property in their capacity as co-owners.
3. Rights of co-owners
Share of Co-Owners in Benefits and Charges
ART 485. The share of the co-owners, in the
benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any
stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be
void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the
co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless
the contrary is proved.
Renunciation by a Co-owner of his Share in the Co-
ownership
Is in reality a case of dacion en pago. It is not a
unilateral act which will extinguish an existing
liability of co-owner without formal acceptance by the
others.
It must be a free act. He who has not renounced may
be compelled by an action in court to pay his share in
the necessary expenses.
Right of any Co-Owner to Recover, Limitation of Right of
Co-Owner
ART 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned
in common xxxx
ART 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment.
Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid 2014
In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned
property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition
from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly
obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the
execution of a valid sale. In essence, Lapinid steps into
the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and
proportionate share in the property held in common.
Thus, from the perfection of contract, Lapinid
eventually became a co-owner of the property.
In a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court had

repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a
definite or concrete portion before partition of co-
owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right
to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition.
However, in case he disposes his share before partition,
such disposition does not make the sale or alienation
null and void. What will be affected on the sale is only
his proportionate share, subject to the results of the
partition.
Adlawan v. Adlawan
Where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff
alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled
to the possession of the litigated property, the
action should be dismissed.
Here, petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer
in his name alone and for his own benefit to the
exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed
an affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed
property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot
validly maintain the instant action considering that he
does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily
flows from his theory of succession to the property of
his father, Dominador.
Resuena v. CA
Respondent has a right to eject the petitioners from Lot
No. 2587.
A co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect
the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-
owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will
benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot
prejudice their rights.
Arcelona v. CA
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. The fishpond is
undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific
portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and
which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not
possible to show over which portion the tenancy
relation of private respondent has been established and
ruled upon. Indeed, petitioners should have been
properly impleaded as indispensable parties. No final
determination of a case could be made if an
indispensable party is not impleaded.
Carandang v. De Guzman
Assuming that the four checks created a debt for which
the spouses Carandang are liable, such credits are
presumed to be conjugal property. As such, Quirino de
Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership
property, is certainly a real party in interest.
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner
of the credits allegedly extended to the spouses
Carandang, seems to be either an indispensable or a
necessary party. Taken with the presumption of the
conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four
checks used to pay for petitioners' stock subscriptions,
and with the presumption that the credits themselves
are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino
and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged
credit. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino
and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action
for the recovery thereof.
Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in
the action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned
money to the spouses Carandang.
Expenses for Preservation, Useful Expenses
ART 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to
compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right
owned in common and to the taxes. xxxx
ART 489. Repairs for preservation may be made
at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if
practicable, first notify his co-owners of the
necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve
or embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a
majority as determined in article 492.
Renunciation by a Co-Owner of his share in the Co-
Ownership
ART 488. xxxx Any one of the latter may exempt
himself from this obligation by renouncing so
much of his undivided interest as may be
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes.
No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership.
Alteration of a Property under Co-Ownership
ART 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the
thing owned in common, even though benefits for
all would result therefrom.
However, if the withholding of the consent by one
or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to
the common interest, the courts may afford
adequate relief.
ART 492. For the administration and better
enjoyment of the thing owned in common, the
resolutions of the majority of the co-owners
shall be binding.
There shall be no majority unless the resolution
is approved by the co-owners who represent the
controlling interest in the object of the co-
ownership.
Should there be no majority, or should the
resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial
to those interested in the property owned in
common, the court, at the instance of an
interested party, shall order such measures as it
may deem proper, including the appointment of
an administrator.
Definition of Alteration
1. Involves change of the thing from the state or
essence in which the others believe it should
remain; or
2. Withdrawal of the thing from the use to which
they wish it to be intended; or
3. Any other transformation which prejudices the
condition or substance of the thing or its
enjoyment by others.
4. Any act of ownership — alienation, donation,
lease, mortgage, pledge.
Necessity of Consent, Form
1. Unanimous consent;
2. May be expressly or impliedly given.
Liability
If the co-owner makes the alteration without the
consent of others, he acts in bad faith and must:
1) Lose what he has spent;
2) Be obliged to demolish the improvements
done, and
3) Be liable to pay for losses and damages that
may have been suffered.
Acts of Administration and Better Enjoyment
1. Contemplates of acts or decisions for the common
benefit of all the co-owners and not for the
benefit of only one or some.
2. Merely transitory, while alteration is more or less
permanent.
Examples
1. Unregistered lease of one year or less;
2. Legal fees to preserve ownership and possession
of property;
3. Payment made in the ordinary course of
management.
Majority Rule
1. For the administration and better enjoyment of
the thing owned in common, the resolutions of
the majority of the co-owners shall be binding.
2. There shall be no majority unless the resolution is
approved by the co-owners who represent the
controlling interest in the object of the co-
ownership.
⭐Cruz v. Catapang on entry by strategy
Whether consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land
to a person to construct a house on the co-owned
property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case
filed by another co-owner against that person.
A co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to
build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act
tantamount to devoting the property to his or her
exclusive use. Giving consent to a third person to
construct a house on the co-owned property will injure
the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-
owners from using the property in accordance with
their rights.
The construction of a house on the co-owned
property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an
alteration falling under Article 491. Consent of only one
co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder.
The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of
the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon
respondent any right to enter into the co-owned
property. Her entry into the property still falls under
the classification “through strategy or stealth.” As
such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry.
Sps Cruz v. Leis
Gertrudes’ redemption of the property from the Daily
Savings Bank did NOT vest in her ownership over the
same to the exclusion of her co-owners. The
redemption of the land "did not terminate the co-
ownership nor give her title to the entire land
subject of the co-ownership."
⭐Arambulo v. Nolasco 2014 on adequate relief of Art
491
We have to remove the issue out of the coverage of
Article 491. It does not apply to the problem arising out
of the proposed sale of the property co-owned by the
parties in this case.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-
owners may bring a suit for partition, which is one of
the modes of extinguishing co-ownership. Corollary to
Article 494, Article 498 of the Civil Code states that
whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the
co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of
them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is
resorted to
a) when the right to partition the property is
invoked by any of the co-owners but because of
the nature of the property, it cannot be
subdivided or its subdivision would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and
b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned the
entire property upon proper reimbursement of
the co-owners.
This is the result obviously aimed at by petitioners at
the outset. As already shown, this cannot be done while
the co-ownership exists.
Extent of Co-Owner’s Right
ART 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved.
Paulmitan v. CA
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership
over the entire lot by virtue of the redemption she
made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to be
reimbursed for half of the redemption price she paid to
the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on
behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa holds
a lien upon the subject property for the amount due
her.
Sanchez v. CA
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to
the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
attribute.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the
properties in co-ownership is to create an express
trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties.
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a
trustee for the others.
Nufable v. Nufable
When Angel Nufable and his spouse mortgaged the
subject property to DBP, they had no right to mortgage
the entire property. Angel's right over the subject
property was limited only to ¼ pro indiviso share. As
co-owner of the subject property, Angel's right to sell,

assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that may
be allotted to him upon termination of the co-
ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner
can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-
owned property.
Therefore, as regards the remaining ¾ pro indiviso
share, the same was held in trust for the party
rightfully entitled thereto, who are the private
respondents herein.
Sale or Mortgage of Common Property
Del Banco v. IAC
Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided
property owned in common by the heirs and successors-
in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel
Pansacola.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide
the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn
in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive
possession of their respective portions in the plan and
titles issued to each of them accordingly.
An action for partition does not prescribe. Article
497 provides that the assignees of the co-owners may
take part in the partition of the common property, and
Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the common property, a
provision which implies that the action to demand
partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by
laches. An action for partition does not lie except when
the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-
owner.
Pamplona v. Moreto
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the
moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its
location and even indicated the boundaries over
which the fences were to be erected with-out
objection, protest or complaint by the other co-
owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and
tolerated such alienation, occupation and
possession, We rule that a factual partition or
termination of the co-ownership, although partial,
was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano
Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents
herein from asserting as against the vendees-
petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of
sale executed by said vendor Flaviano Moreto.
Sps Del Campo v. CA
Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an
undivided property held in common be valid?
The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a
definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and
bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the
sale a nullity.
Where the transferees of an undivided portion of the
land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a
definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same
for a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a
better condition or right than said transferees. Such
undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial
partition of the co-owned property which entitles the
possessor to the definite portion which he occupies.
Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the disputed
land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof
for a total of 49 years up to the present.
Although Regalado's certificate of title became
indefeasible after the lapse of one year from the date of
the decree of registration, the attendance of fraud in
its issuance created an implied trust in favor of
petitioners and gave them the right to seek
reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully obtained by the
former.
1) An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten
years.
2) But when the right of the true and real owner is
recognized, expressly or implicitly such as
when he remains undisturbed in his
possession, the said action is imprescriptible,
it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of
title.
Effect of Redemption of Co-Owned Property by one Co-
Owner
Adille v. CA
May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the
property held in common?
NO. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-
owner with respect to his share alone. Necessary
expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to
his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining
co-owners. There is no doubt that redemption of
property entails a necessary expense.
In the case at bar, the property was registered in 1955
by the petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of
the private respondents was presented in 1974. Has
prescription, then, set in?
NO. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of
co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation of the co-ownership. The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions:
1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;
2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners;
3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclu-sive;
and
4) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the property for
the period required by law.
Here, the right of the private respondents commenced
from the time they actually discovered the
petitioner's act of defraudation.
Tan v. CA
Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by
the deceased parents, there can be no question that a
co-ownership existed among the heirs during the
period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property.
Redemp-tion by one during this period would have
inured to the benefit of all.
Verdad v. CA
It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law, is not an
intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro’ s

right to the property is not because she rightfully can
claim heirship in Macaria’s estate but that she is a legal
heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate
is a share in his mother’s inheritance.
When their interest in the property was sold by the
Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption arose
in favor of private respondents.
Aguilar v. Aguilar
The following are the requisites for the exercise of
legal redemption:
1) There must be a co-ownership;
2) one of the co-owners sold his right to a
stranger;
3) the sale was made before the partition of the
co-owned property;
4) the right of redemption must be exercised by
one or more co-owners within a period of
thirty days to be counted from the time that he
or they were notified in writing by the vendee
or by the co-owner vendor; and
5) the vendee must be reimbursed for the price of
the sale.
Here, petitioner was seven (7) years late. Moreover, by
the time Senen filed the case for legal redemption, his
right was no longer available to him. We have held that
after a property has been subdivided and
distributed among the co-owners, the community
has terminated and there is no reason to sustain
any right of pre-emption or redemption.
Sps Pascual v. Sps Ballesteros 2012
The 30-day period given to the respondents within
which to exercise their right of redemption has not
commenced in view of the absence of a written notice.
Verily, despite the respondents’ actual knowledge of the
sale to the respondents, a written notice is still
mandatory and indispensable for purposes of the
commencement of the 30-day period within which to
exercise the right of redemption.
Consequently, the respondents may still redeem from
1. When co-owners have agreed to keep the thing
the petitioners the portion of the subject property that
undivided for a certain period of time not
was sold to the latter.
exceeding ten years;
Reyes v. Concepcion 2. Prohibited by the donor or testator for a certain
period not exceeding twenty years;
In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-
ownership do not grant to any of the owners of a 3. Prohibited by law;
property held in common a pre-emptive right to 4. Partition would render the thing unserviceable
purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners. (Art 495); and
5. Co-owner has possessed the property as
Here, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for
exclusive owner and for a period sufficient to
injunction and damages against private respondents, no
acquire it by prescription
sale of the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party
had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Prescription
Code finds no application to the case at bar.
Generally, imprescriptible unless properly
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin repudiated. In such case, action prescribes ten (10)
private respondents from alienating their pro-indiviso years after repudiation.
shares to a third party. The rights of a co-owner of a When Right to Demand Partition Not Available
property are clearly specified in Article 493. None of the
legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at ⭐ART 498. Whenever the thing is essentially
bar. Private respondents' counterclaim for the partition indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that
of the subject properties was therefore entirely proper. it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify
the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
4. Termination distributed.
Effects of Partition
ART 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand 1. Mutual accounting for benefits received;
at any time the partition of the thing owned in 2. Mutual reimbursement for expenses;
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
3. Indemnity for damages in case of negligence or
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing fraud;
undivided for a certain period of time, not 4. Reciprocal warranty for
exceeding ten (10) years, shall be valid. This
term may be extended by a new agreement. a. Defects of title or eviction;
b. Quality or hidden defects.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a
period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. 5. Each former co-owner is deemed to have had
exclusive possession of the part allotted to him
Neither shall there be any partition when it is for the entire period during which the co-
prohibited by law. possession lasted.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner 6. Confers upon each, the exclusive title over his
or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so respective share.
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership. Termination of Co-Ownership
a) Judicial partition;
Exceptions
b) Extrajudicial partition;
c) When by prescription, one co-owner has acquired
 the whole property by adverse possession;
d) When a stranger acquires by prescription the
thing owned in common;
e) Merger in one co-owner;
f) Loss or destruction;
g) Expropriation.
Aguilar v. CA
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of
the property and the trial court granted the petition
and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-
ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the
continued stay of respondent and his family in the
house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the
property should have been sold and the proceeds
divided equally between them. To this extent and from
then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly
rentals until he and his family vacate.
Partition, Rule 69, Rules of Court, Exceptions to Right
to Demand Partition
Quintos v. Nicolas 2014
Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of
the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of
dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or
not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without
prejudice.
This is not to say that the action for partition will never
be barred by res judicata. There can still be res judicata
in partition cases concerning the same parties and the
same subject matter once the respective shares of the
co-owners have been determined with finality by a
competent court with jurisdiction or if the court
determines that partition is improper for co-ownership
does not or no longer exists.
⭐Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla 2013
The first stage in an action for partition is the
settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an action
will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the
subject property.
When Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their
names to the exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust
was created by force of law and the two of them were
considered a trustee of the respondent’s undivided
share. As trustees, they cannot be permitted to
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.
⭐Delima v. CA
Whether or not petitioners' action for partition is already
barred by the statutory period provided by law which
shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of
ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of
petitioners from their shares in the disputed property.
When a co-owner of the property in question executed
a deed of partition and on the strength thereof
obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of
their predecessor and the issuance of a new one
wherein he appears as the new owner of the property,
thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership
of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of
limitations started to run for the purposes of the action
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the
existence of the co-ownership and of their rights
thereunder. Since an action for reconveyance of land
based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after
ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of
such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for
purposes of the statute of limitations is counted.
As the certificate of title was notice to the whole
world of his exclusive title to the land, such
rejection was binding on the other heirs and started
as against them the period of prescription. Hence,
when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance
and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968, such
action was already barred by prescription.
Pangan v. CA
Whether or not Teodora Garcia, by her failure to assert
her right, allowed the statutory period to lapse, thus
enabling the petitioners to perfect their claim of
ownership by acquisitive prescription and so exclude her
from her share in the subject property.
There was no adequate notice by the petitioners to the
private respondent of the rejection of her claim to her
share in the subject property.
⭐Mariategui v. CA
Assuming petitioners’ registration of the subject lot in
1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership,
prescrip-tion had not yet set in when private
respondents filed in 1973 the present action for
partition.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in
their names in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can
only be deemed to have commenced from the time
private respondents dis­covered the petitioners’ act
of defraudation.
Heirs of Maningding v. CA
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of
actual possession, as in the instant case, tax
declarations and receipts are strong evidence of
ownership.
The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as
21 April 1926. It was only in 1986 when the heirs of
Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the
properties and conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60)
years have already elapsed. Even granting that Roque
Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the death of
his father in 1948, more than thirty (30) years have
already passed. In either case, acquisitive prescription
has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.
F. POSSESSION
ART 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right.
1. Characteristics
Elements of Possession
a. There must be a holding or control of a thing or a
right.
b. Animus possidendi;
 c. Possession must be by virtue of one’s own right;
Degrees of Possession
a) Mere holding without any right;
b) Possession with juridical title; (juridical
possession)
c) Possession with a just title; (real possessory
right)
d) Possession with a title of dominium. (ownership)
Some Presumptions re Possession
a) Good faith is always presumed;
b) Continuity of character of possession whether in
good or bad faith;
c) Non-interruption;
d) Presumption of just title of a possessor in the
concept of an owner who is not obliged to show
or prove it.
e) Non-interruption of possession of property
unjustly lost but legally recovered (Art 561);
f) The present possessor who was also the
possessor at a previous time, has continued to be
in possession during the intervening time, unless
there is proof to the contrary;
g) The possession of real property presumes that of
the movables therein;
h) Each one of the participants of a thing possessed
in common shall be deemed to have exclusively
possessed the part which may be allotted to him
upon the division thereof, for the entire period
during which the co-possession lasted.
2. Acquisition
Acquisition of Possession, Requisites
a. Material occupation;
b. Subjection of the thing or right to the will of
possessor;
c. Proper acts and legal formalities.
ART 531. Possession is acquired by the material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or
by the fact that it is subject to the action of our
will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.
Essential requisites
a) For personal acquisition
i) Intent
ii) Capacity
iii) Object must be capable of
possessed.
b) Through an authorized person
i) Intent to possess for principal;
ii) Authority or capacity to possess for
another;
iii) Principal has intent and capacity to
possess.
c) Through an unauthorized person,
negotiorum gestio
i) Intent to possess for another;
ii) Capacity of principal to possess;
iii) Ratification by principal.
3. Effects
Wolfson v. Aenlle
In order to bar the true owner of land from recovering
it from an occupant in adverse possession and claiming
ownership through the operation of the statute of
limitations, the possession must have been, for the
whole period prescribed by the statute, actual, open,
visible, notorious, continuous, and hostile to the true
owner's title and to the world at large. It is also
essential that the possession must have been held
under claim of right or color of title.
4. Loss or unlawful deprivation of a movable
Possession of Movables; Possession as Equivalent to
Title, When Owner can or cannot Recover in case of
Loss, What is “Unlawful Deprivation”
ART 556. The possession of movables is not
deemed lost so long as they remain under the
control of the possessor, even though for the
time being he may not know their whereabouts.
ART 559. The possession of movable property
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or
has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the
same.
being
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the
owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Summary of Recovery or Non-recovery Principle
1) Owner MAY RECOVER WITHOUT
REIMBURSEMENT
as in
a) From possessor in bad faith;
b) From possessor in good faith if owner had
LOST the property or been unlawfully
deprived of it.
2) Owner MAY RECOVER but should REIMBURSE
a) If possessor acquired the object in good faith
at a PUBLIC SALE or AUCTION.
3) Owner CANNOT RECOVER
a) If possessor had acquired in good faith by
purchase from a merchant’s store, or in fairs,
or markets;
b) If owner is estopped from denying the seller’s
authority to sell;
c) If the possessor had obtained the goods
because he was an innocent purchaser for
value and holder of a negotiable document of
title to the goods.
Dizon v. Suntay
The right of the owner to recover personal property
acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being
dispossessed without his consent.

The only exception the law allows is when there is
acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public
sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price. As authoritatively
interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the right of the owner
cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good
faith in the acquisition by the possessor.
EDCA Publishing v. Santos
The case before us calls for the interpretation of Article
559 of the Civil Code and raises the particular question
of when a person may be deemed to have been
“unlawfully deprived” of movable property in the hands of
another.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz
acquired ownership over the books which he could then
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that
he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter
between him and EDCA and did not impair the title
acquired by the private respondents to the books.
Edu v. Gomez
As the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be
compelled to surrender possession nor to be required
to institute an action for the recovery of the chattel,
whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor.
The filing of an information charging that the chattel
was illegally obtained through estafa from its true
owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does
not warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel
against the will of the possessor.
5. Classes
ART 524. Possession may be exercised in one's
own name or in that of another.
ART 525. The possession of things or rights may
be had in one of two concepts: either in the
concept of owner, or in that of the holder of the
thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership
pertaining to another person.
Just Title, its Definition
ART 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has
in his favor the legal presumption that he
possesses with a just title and he cannot be
obliged to show or prove it.
Kinds of Titles
1) True and Valid Title. There was a mode of
transferring ownership and the grantor was the
owner. This is the just title referred to in Art 541.
2) Colorable Title. Although there was a mode of
transferring ownership, the grantor is NOT the
owner. This is the just title in the law of
prescription.
3) Putative Title. Although a person believes
himself to be the owner, he nonetheless is not
since there was NO mode of acquiring ownership.
Possession in the concept of an owner and of a mere
holder
ART 540. Only the possession acquired and
enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a
title for acquiring dominion.
Estreller v. Ysmael and Alvarez
A co-owner may file an action for recovery of
possession without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs since the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.
Possession in Good Faith and Possession in Bad Faith
ART 542. The possession of real property
presumes that of the movables therein, so long as
it is not shown or proved that they should be
excluded.
Manotok Realty v. CA
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it.
Villamil v. Villarosa
There were no traces of bad faith on Villarosa's part in
acquiring the subject property by purchase. When he
visited the site, he inquired from Mateo Tolentino about
the unfinished structure and was informed that the
latter allegedly ran out of money and eventually lost
interest in pursuing the construction because of his old
age. Villarosa was then given a copy of the title. He went
to the Register of Deeds and was able to verify the
authenticity of the title. He also found out that the
property was mortgaged under the name of Mario
Villamor, who turned out to be the employer of
Tolentino. Upon reaching an agreement on the price of
P276K, Villarosa redeemed the title from Express
Financing Company. Thereafter, the property was
released from mortgage and a deed of sale was
executed. Villarosa then secured the transfer of title in
his name.
In sum, Villarosa was able to establish good faith when
he bought the subject property.
Holder of Torrens Title, Right to Possession
Sps Apostol v. CA
In Pangilinan v. Aguilar, the Court held that it is an
accepted rule that a person who has a torrens title
over the property, such as the respondents, is entitled
to the possession thereof. This is reiterated in
Javelosa v. CA, declaring that the registered owners are
entitled to the possession of the property covered by
the said title from the time such title was issued in their
favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondents were
never in prior physical possession of the subject land is
of no moment, as prior physical possession is
necessary only in forcible entry cases.
Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled,
except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in
accordance with law.
Villa v. Heirs of Altavas
Being a mere lessee, petitioner steps into the shoes of
her lessor, Virginia. However, Virginia's claim of
ownership was not sustained by the MCTC, which
instead found that she was not the owner of and had no
right to possess the disputed property or to transfer
possession of the same, through lease, in favor of

another person.
6. Rights of the possessor
Possessor in Good Faith and Bad Faith, Right to Fruits,
Expenses and Improvements
ART 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted.
Natural and industrial fruits are considered
received from the time they are gathered or
severed.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong
to the possessor in good faith in that proportion.
State Investment House v. CA
We take judicial notice of the uniform practice of
financing institutions to investigate, examine and assess
the real property offered as security for any loan
application especially where, as in this case, the subject
property is a subdivision lot located at Quezon City. It is
a settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot
close its eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in
good faith under the belief that there was no defect in
the title of the vendor or mortgagor. Petitioner’s
constructive knowledge of the defect in the title of the
subject property, or lack of such knowledge due to its
negligence, takes the place of registration of the rights
of respondents-spouses. Respondent court thus
correctly ruled that petitioner was NOT a purchaser
or mortgagee in good faith; hence petitioner can not
solely rely on what merely appears on the face of the
Torrens Title.
Sps Bornales v. IAC
The petitioners claim that they were not aware of any
defect in the title of their vendors because the
certificate of title in the name of their predecessors-in-
interest which their lawyer examined contained
nothing to put them on guard. The fact however
remains that the petitioners knew and were parties to
the fraud committed against the private respondent.
Necessary Expenses, Useful Expenses, Expenses for Pure
Luxury or Mere Pleasure, Rights of Possessors in
Relation to these Expenses
ART 546. Necessary expenses shall be
refunded to EVERY possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded ONLY to the
possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in
the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase
in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof.
Necessary expenses are those without which the thing
would physically deteriorate or be lost; hence, those made
for the preservation of the thing. Samples are those:
1) Incurred for cultivation, production and upkeep;
2) Made for necessary repairs of a house to prevent
it from being useless;
Possessor in good faith is entitled to both refund and
right of retention until fully reimbursed; whereas one
who is in bad faith is only entitled to a refund.
Useful expenses are those that add value to the
property, or increase the object’s productivity, or useful
for the satisfaction of spiritual and religious yearnings, or
give rise to all kinds of fruits.
ART 547. If the useful improvements can be
removed without damage to the principal thing,
the possessor in good faith may remove them,
unless the person who recovers the possession
exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the
preceding article.
Rights of a possessor as to the Useful Expenses
1) If in good faith
a) Right to reimbursement of either the
amount spent or the increase in value at
owner’s option.
b) Right to retention;
c) Right of removal unless owner reimburses.
2) If in bad faith
a) NO RIGHTS at all.
Damage means a substantial one that reduces the value of
the property.
ART 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere
pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor
in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments
with which he has embellished the principal thing
if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor
in the possession does not prefer to refund the
amount expended.
Ornamental expenses are those which add value to the
thing only for certain determinate persons in view of their
particular whims. They are neither essential nor useful to
everybody in general.
Rights of a possessor as to the Ornamental
Expenses
1) If in good faith, generally no right of refund or
retention but can remove if no substantial injury
is caused. However, owner has option to allow:
a) Possessor to remove; or
b) Retain for himself the ornament by refunding
the amount spent.
2) If in bad faith, same as one in good faith, the only
difference is when the owner chooses to retain
for himself the ornament by refunding the value it
has at the time the owner enters into possession.
This means the refund would be less compared
to that in good faith since depreciation would
have set in.
Rights of a possessor as to the Fruits (Art 549)
1) If in good faith
a) Gathered or severed or harvested fruits are
his own;
b) Pending fruits will be prorated between
possessor and owner of expenses, net harvest
and charges.
2) If in bad faith
 a) As to gathered fruits — must return value of
fruits already received as well as value of
fruits which the owner or legitimate
possessor could have received with due care
or diligence minus necessary expenses for
cultivation, gathering and harvesting;
b) As to pending fruits — NO RIGHTS at all.
ART 550. The costs of litigation over the property
shall be borne by every possessor.
ART 551. Improvements caused by nature or time
shall always inure to the benefit of the person
who has succeeded in recovering possession.
MWSS v. CA abrogated Carbonell
Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to remove
useful improvements? NO.
As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity.
Angeles v. Lozada
The defendants' right of retention by virtue of their
having defrayed the expenses for repairs to the
property, is not a prior lien to that of the
redemptioners.
It is true that the purchaser of real property sold at
public auction in the execution of a judgment is not
entitled to the possession of said property pending the
repurchase. But it is certain that the repairs to the real
property here in question, according to the evidence,
were made in good faith, and that they were useful and
necessary, inasmuch as the house, as has been stated,
was uninhabitable and almost in ruins. Consequently,
the defendants are entitled to reimbursement of the
amount of said repairs from the plaintiffs, and they
would have a perfect right to retain the property, were
it not for the fact that the defendants are indebted to the
plaintiffs for rent for the occupation thereof, because
the defendants were not entitled to its possession.
Alburo v. Villanueva
The right of a tenant in regard to improvements is that
the tenant may make such improvements, either useful
or convenient, as he considers advantageous, provided
he does not alter the form and substance of the
thing rented, but that he will have no right for
indemnification therefor, though he can take away such
improvements if it is possible to do so without injury or
damage to the thing rented.
Liability for Loss and Deterioration, Possessor in Good
Faith and Bad Faith
ART 552. A possessor in good faith shall not be
liable for the deterioration or loss of the thing
possessed, except in cases in which it is proved
that he has acted with fraudulent intent or
negligence, after the judicial summons.
A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for
deterioration or loss in EVERY case, even if caused
by a fortuitous event.
Rules applicable as to Deterioration
1) Possessor in good faith
a) BEFORE receipt of judicial summons — NOT
LIABLE;
b) AFTER judicial summons
i) Loss or deterioration through fortuitous
events — NOT LIABLE;
ii) Through fraudulent intent or negligence
— LIABLE.
2) Possessor in bad faith
a) ALWAYS LIABLE.
Presumption of Continuity of Possession
ART 554. A present possessor who shows his
possession at some previous time, is presumed to
have held possession also during the
intermediate period, in the absence of proof to
the contrary.
7. Loss or termination of possession
ART 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
1) By the abandonment of the thing;
2) By an assignment made to another
either by onerous or gratuitous title;
3) By the destruction or total loss of the
thing, or because it goes out of
commerce;
4) By the possession of another, subject to
the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer than one
year. But the real right of possession is
not lost till after the lapse of ten years.
Abandonment is the voluntary renunciation of a thing.
The following must concur:
1) Abandoner must have been a possessor in the
concept of an owner;
2) Has the capacity to renounce or to alienate;
3) There must be a physical relinquishment of the
thing;
4) There must be no more spes recuperandi or
expectation to recover, and no more animus
revertendi or intent to return or get back.
Assignment means the complete transmission of
ownership rights to another person, onerously or
gratuitously.
Possession of another
1) If a person is not in possession for more than 1
year but less than 10 years, he loses possession
de facto which means he can no longer bring an
action for ejectment since the action has already
prescribed. Constructive possession is also lost.
The proper remedy would be to file an accion
publiciana.
2) If the loss of possession is for more than 10 years,
possession de jure is lost. The proper remedy may
be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria,
unless prescription has set in.
US v. Key
Can one be charged with the abandonment of his
property without even knowing that the same has passed
out of his possession or has been lost? NO.
Property can not be considered abandoned under
the law and the possession left vacant for the finder
 usufruct; As to Number of Persons Enjoying the Right
until the spes recuperandi is gone and the animus
revertendi is finally given up. ii) The number of years it will exist; a) Simple;
iii) Whether it is in favor of one or several b) Multiple –
G. USUFRUCT persons.
i) Simultaneous;
ART 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the Object
ii) Successive.
property of another with the obligation of a) May be real or personal property;
preserving its form and substance, unless the title As to Quality or Kind of Object
constituting it or the law otherwise provides. b) May be sterile or productive;
a) Usufruct over RIGHTS as long as it is not strictly
c) May be created over a right as long as it is not personal or intransmissible;
ART 564. Usufruct may be constituted on the
strictly personal or intransmissible, and as long as
whole or a part of the fruits of the thing, in favor b) Usufruct over THINGS
it has an independent existence. Thus, there can
of one more persons, simultaneously or
be no usufruct over an easement. i) NORMAL or perfect or regular, which
successively, and in every case from or to a
involves non-consumable things where
certain day, purely or conditionally. It may also What is “Abnormal Usufruct”? the form and substance are preserved.
be constituted on a right, provided it is not
strictly personal or intransmissible. The obligation of conserving or preserving the form ii) ABNORMAL or imperfect or irregular.
and substance of the thing may be provided otherwise Involves usufruct over
Usufruct is the right to enjoy the property of another, by the title or the law, giving rise to an abnormal or
with the obligation of preserving its form and substance. It imperfect or irregular usufruct, such as the usufruct 1) Consumable property
is a real right, of a temporary nature, which authorizes its over sterile animal. 2) Non-consumables that gradually
holder to enjoy all the benefits which result from the
Causes or Sources of Usufruct (Art 563) deteriorate by use.
normal enjoyment of another’s property, with the
obligation to return, at the designated time, either the a) by law, As to Terms or Conditions
same thing, or its equivalent.
b) by the will of private persons expressed in acts a) PURE
Usufruct = Full Ownership – Naked Ownership inter vivos or in a last will and testament, and b) With a term or period
1. Characteristics c) by prescription. i) ex die — from a certain day
a) ESSENTIAL 2. Classification ii) in diem — up to a certain day;
i) It is a REAL right; Must be duly As to Origin iii) ex die in diem — from a certain day up to
registered to bind third parties. a certain day.
a) LEGAL. Created by law.
ii) Of a temporary nature or duration; c) With a condition.
b) VOLUNTARY or CONVENTIONAL
iii) Its purpose is to enjoy the benefits and 3. Rights and Obligations of Usufructuary and
derive all advantages from the object. i) By will of the parties INTER VIVOS;
Owner
b) NATURAL ii) Created MORTIS CAUSA, as in last will.
c) MIXED or PRESCRIPTIVE. Created by both law ART 566. The usufructuary shall be entitled to all
i) The obligation of conserving or the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the
preserving the form and substance of a and act of person.
property in usufruct. With respect to hidden
thing. It is merely a natural element since As to Quantity or Extent of Fruits or Object treasure which may be found on the land or
it can be eliminated by a contrary tenement, he shall be considered a stranger.
stipulation. a) As to fruits — total or partial;
b) As to object Rules on Pending Natural or Industrial Fruits
c) ACCIDENTAL, which depends upon the
stipulation of the parties. Examples are: i) Universal — over the entire patrimony; a) Fruits pending at the BEGINNING of usufruct
i) Whether it be pure or conditional ii) Singular or Particular. i) Belong to the usufructuary;
 ii) No necessity of refunding owner for
expenses incurred;
iii) BUT without prejudice to the right of
third persons, such as possessors in good
faith as per Art 545.
b) Fruits pending at the TERMINATION of usufruct
i) Belong to the OWNER;
ii) BUT the owner must reimburse the
usufructuary for ordinary cultivation
expenses and for the seeds and similar
expenses.
iii) Rights of innocent third parties should
also not be prejudiced.
ART 568. If the usufructuary has leased the
lands or tenements given in usufruct, and the
usufruct should expire before the termination of
the lease, he or his heirs and successors shall
receive only the proportionate share of the
rent that must be paid by the lessee.
ART 569. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily,
and belong to the usufructuary in proportion to
the time the usufruct may last.
ART 570. Whenever a usufruct is constituted on
the right to receive a rent or periodical pension,
whether in money or in fruits, or in the interest
on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each
payment due shall be considered as the proceeds
or fruits of such right.
Simply put
a) If the duration of usufruct is fulfilled, then all
profits go to the usufructuary.
b) If, say only half of the duration is fulfilled,
then only half of the total profits for the
entire duration of the usufruct go to the
usufructuary, while the other half to the
owner. This is regardless of when the profit
accrued.
ART 571. The usufructuary shall have the right to
enjoy any increase which the thing in usufruct
may acquire through accession, the servitudes
established in its favor, and, in general, all the
benefits inherent therein.
ART 572. The usufructuary may personally enjoy
the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or
alienate his right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous
title; but all the contracts he may enter into as
such usufructuary shall terminate upon the
expiration of the usufruct, saving leases of rural
lands, which shall be considered as subsisting
during the agricultural year.
Effect of the Deterioration on the Liability of
Usufructuary
If these fast deteriorating things deteriorate due to
a) NORMAL USE, the usufructuary is NOT liable;
b) An event or act that endangers their preservation,
the usufructuary is required under Art 592 to
make the NECESSARY or ORDINARY REPAIRS.
c) FRAUD amounting to an EVASION of the
obligation to preserve, or NEGLIGENCE, the
usufructuary is liable. Such liability may however
be OFFSET against improvements.
ART 578. The usufructuary of an action to
recover real property or a real right, or any
movable property, has the right to bring the
action and to oblige the owner thereof to give him
the authority for this purpose and to furnish him
whatever proof he may have. If in consequence of
the enforcement of the action he acquires the
thing claimed, the usufruct shall be limited to the
fruits, the dominion remaining with the owner.
Useful and Luxurious Improvements (Art 579)
a) Usufructuary must not alter the form or
substance of the property held in usufruct.
b) He is NOT ENTITLED to a REFUND, but he
may
i) REMOVE the improvements if no
substantial damage is caused to the
property in usufruct; OR
ii) SET OFF the improvements against
damages for which he may be liable.
ART 580. The usufructuary may set off the
improvements he may have made on the
property against any damage to the same.
ART 581. The owner of property the usufruct of
which is held by another, may alienate it, but he
cannot alter its form or substance, or do anything
thereon which may be prejudicial to the
usufructuary.
ART 582. The usufructuary of a part of a thing
held in common shall exercise all the rights
pertaining to the owner thereof with respect to
the administration and the collection of fruits or
interest. Should the co-ownership cease by
reason of the division of the thing held in
common, the usufruct of the part allotted to the
co-owner shall belong to the usufructuary.
Rights of Usufructuary, Ungathered Fruits
Fabie v. David
Who has the right to manage or administer the
property—to select the tenant and to fix the amount of
the rent? We find that the said usufructuary has the
right to administer the property in question. All the acts
of administration—to collect the rents for herself, and
to conserve the property by making all necessary
repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments,
and insurance premiums thereon—were by said
judgment vested in the usufructuary.
Hemedes v. CA
Only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is
transferred to the usufructuary. There is no doubt that
the owner may validly mortgage the property in favor
of a third person and the law provides that, in such a
case, the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the
debt of the mortgagor, and should the immovable be
attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt,
the owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for
whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof.
Being an innocent mortgagee for value, R & B Insurance
validly acquired ownership over the property, subject
only to the usufructuary rights of Justa Kausapin
thereto, as this encumbrance was properly annotated
upon its certificate of title.
Effect of Transfer of Rights and Alienation of Thing in
Usufruct
a) Naked owner may alienate the property held in
usufruct;
b) BUT he cannot alter its form or substance;
c) Or do anything prejudicial to the usufructuary;
d) The purchaser must respect the usufruct in case it
is registered or known to him. Otherwise, he can
oust the usufructuary, who can then look to the
naked owner for damages.
e) If property is bequeathed or devised, the heir
must also respect the usufruct.
Rules on Abnormal Usufruct on Consumables
a) The usufructuary can use them as if he is the
owner, with complete right of pledge or
alienation;
b) BUT at the end of the usufruct, he must
i) Pay the APPRAISED value; or
ii) If there is no appraisal, return the same
kind, quality, and quantity OR pay the
price current at the termination of the
usufruct.
Obligations of the Usufructuary, Effect of Failure to
Make an Inventory
ART 583. The usufructuary, before entering upon
the enjoyment of the property, is obliged:
1) To make, after notice to the owner or his
legitimate representative, an inventory
of all the property, which shall contain an
appraisal of the movables and a
description of the condition of the
immovables;
2) To give security, binding himself to
fulfill the obligations imposed upon him
xxxx.
Requirements for the Making of Inventory
a) The owner must be previously NOTIFIED;
b) The condition of the immovables must be
described;
c) The movables must be appraised;
d) As a rule, NO FORM is required except that when
there are real properties, Art 1358 demands a
public instrument to affect third parties.
e) Expenses are to be borne by the usufructuary;
f) Effect of not making inventory same as when
security is not given;
g) When inventory is NOT required
i) When no one will be injured thereby
provided the naked owner consents;
ii) In case of waiver by the naked owner or
the law, or when there is a stipulation in a
will or contract.
The Giving of Security
a) Purpose is to insure faithful compliance of the
Effects of Failure to Give Security unless exempted
duties of the usufructuary.
b) Any kind of sufficient security should be allowed
— such as cash or personal bond, mortgage, etc.
c) When security NOT required (Art 584, 585)
i) When no one will be injured or
prejudiced;
ii) When there is a waiver by the naked
owner;
iii) When the usufructuary is the DONOR of
the property;
iv) When there is a parental usufruct except
when the parents contract a second
marriage.;
v) When there is Caucion juratoria.
ART 586. Should the usufructuary fail to give
security in the cases in which he is bound to give
it, the owner may demand that the
a) immovables be placed under
administration,
b) movables be sold,
c) public bonds, instruments of credit
payable to order or to bearer be
converted into registered certificates or
deposited in a bank or public institution,
and
d) capital or sums in cash and the proceeds
of the sale of the movable property be
invested in safe securities.
The interest on the proceeds of the sale of the
movables and that on public securities and bonds,
and the proceeds of the property placed under
administration, shall belong to the usufructuary.
Furthermore, the owner may, if he so prefers,
until the usufructuary gives security or is excused
from so doing, retain in his possession the
property in usufruct as administrator, subject to
the obligation to deliver to the usufructuary the
net proceeds thereof, after deducting the sums
which may be agreed upon or judicially allowed
him for such administration.
a) On the Rights of Naked Owner –
i) He may deliver the property to the
usufructuary; OR
ii) The naked owner may choose
RETENTION of the property as
ADMINISTRATOR; OR
iii) The naked owner may demand
RECEIVERSHIP or administration by
another of the real property, sale of
movable, conversion or deposit of credit
instruments, or investment of cash or
profits.
b) On the Rights of Usufructuary –
i) He cannot possess the property until he
gives the security.
ii) He cannot administer the property,
hence, he cannot execute a lease thereon;
iii) He cannot collect credits that have
matured, nor invest them unless the
Court or naked owner consents;
iv) But he can alienate his right to the
usufruct. The grantee steps into the
shoes of the usufructuary.
 ART 587. Refers to — Caucion juratoria which
takes the place of a bond, and is made by taking
an oath to fulfill properly the duties of a
usufructuary. It is based on necessity and
humanity as when a poor family acquires by
inheritance, the usufruct of a badly needed house.
Requisites before Caucion juratoria is Allowed
a) Proper court petition;
b) Necessity for delivery of furniture, implements or
house included in the usufruct;
c) Approval of the court;
d) Sworn promise.
If caucion juratoria is allowed, the usufructuary cannot
alienate or lease the property for this means he does not
need it.
Retroactive effect of security given
ART 588. After the security has been given by the
usufructuary, he shall have a right to all the
proceeds and benefits from the day on which, in
accordance with the title constituting the
usufruct, he should have commenced to receive
them.
ART 592. The usufructuary is obliged to make the
ordinary repairs needed by the thing given in
usufruct.
By ordinary repairs are understood such as are
required by the wear and tear due to the
natural use of the thing and are indispensable
for its preservation. Should the usufructuary fail
to make them after demand by the owner, the
latter may make them at the expense of the
usufructuary.
ART 593. Extraordinary repairs shall be at
the expense of the OWNER. The usufructuary is
obliged to notify the owner when the need for
such repairs is urgent.
ART 594. If the owner should make the
extraordinary repairs, he shall have a right to
demand of the usufructuary the legal interest
on the amount expended for the time that the
usufruct lasts.
Should he not make them when they are
indispensable for the preservation of the thing,
the usufructuary may make them; but he shall
have a right to demand of the owner, at the
termination of the usufruct, the increase in
value which the immovable may have acquired
by reason of the repairs.
Kinds of Extraordinary Repairs and who to pay
a) Those caused by natural use but NOT needed for
preservation;
b) Those caused by ABNORMAL or exceptional
circumstances AND needed for preservation;
c) Those caused by ABNORMAL or exceptional
circumstances but NOT needed for preservation;
Generally, the NAKED OWNER pays because it is his
property.
Naked owner can demand legal interest from the
usufructuary on the amount for the duration of the
usufruct.
Before the usufructuary is allowed to make
extraordinary repairs, the following requisites must
concur:
a) There must be due notification to naked owner
of urgency;
b) The naked owner failed to make them;
c) The repair is needed for preservation.
The usufructuary who has made extraordinary
repairs has the RIGHT
a) To get increase in value or get reimbursement of
expenses;
b) Of retention till paid.
ART 596. The payment of annual charges and
taxes and of those considered as a lien on the
fruits, shall be at the expense of the
usufructuary for all the time that the usufruct
lasts.
Charges the Usufructuary must pay
a) Annual charges on the fruits;
b) Annual taxes on the fruits;
c) Theoretically, also the annual taxes on the land.
However, refer to BAA of Zamboanga del Sur
case.
d) Other charges on fruits:
i) Ordinary repairs;
ii) Necessary cultivation expenses;
ART 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to
notify the owner of any act of a third person, of
which he may have knowledge, that may be
prejudicial to the rights of ownership, and he
shall be liable should he not do so, for damages,
as if they had been caused through his own fault.
When Notification by Usufructuary Required and
Effects of Non-compliance
a) If a third party commits acts prejudicial to the
rights of ownership;
— Usufructuary is liable for damages.
b) If urgent repairs are needed;
— Usufructuary cannot make the extraordinary
repairs needed.
c) If an inventory at the beginning of the usufruct is
to be made.
— Naked owner may later point out
discrepancies and omissions in the inventory.
ART 602. The expenses, costs and liabilities in
suits brought with regard to the usufruct shall be
borne by the usufructuary.
BAA of Zamboanga Del Sur v. Samar Mining
It is well settled that a real tax, being a burden upon the
capital, should be paid by the owner of the land and
not by a usufructuary.
4. Extinction, termination, and extinguishment
Extinguishment of Usufruct
ART 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless
a contrary intention clearly appears;
 2) By the expiration of the period for
which it was constituted, or by the
fulfillment of any resolutory
condition provided in the title creating
the usufruct;
3) By merger of the usufruct and
ownership in the same person;
4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
5) By the total loss of the thing in
usufruct;
6) By the termination of the right of the
person constituting the usufruct;
7) By prescription.
ART 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor
of a town, corporation, or association for more
than fifty years. xxxx
ART 606. A usufruct granted for the time that may
elapse before a third person attains a certain
age, shall subsist for the number of years
specified, even if the third person should die
before the period expires, unless such usufruct
has been expressly granted only in consideration
of the existence of such person.
Rules on Usufruct on a Building and/or the Land
Concerned (Art 607)
When the building is destroyed before expiration of period
a) Usufruct on BOTH building and land
i) Usufruct on building is ended, but that on
the land continues;
ii) Usufructuary is entitled to the use of the
land and the use of whatever materials of
the house remain;
iii) Thus, usufructuary may refuse if naked
owner wants to rebuild.
b) Usufruct on Building ALONE
i) Usufruct ends, but usufructuary can still
make use of whatever materials of the
house remain.
ii) Entitled to the use of the land.
iii) However, naked owner has preferential
right since there was no usufruct over
the land.
ART 608. Rules on the Payment of INSURANCE
on the Tenement Held in Usufruct
a) If Naked Owner and Usufructuary share in the
premiums and the property is destroyed
i) If the owner rebuilds, the usufruct
continues on the new building.
ii) If the owner does not rebuild, the naked
owner gets the insurance indemnity but
should pay the interest thereon to the
usufructuary.
Effect of “Bad Use” of the Thing
b) If the Naked Owner ALONE pays for the insurance
and the Usufructuary has REFUSED to share, and
the property is destroyed
i) The naked owner gets the WHOLE
indemnity.
ii) If usufruct was on the building and the
land, the usufruct continues on the land
and the materials.
iii) If usufruct was on the building alone, the
naked owner may rebuild, but he must
pay interest on the value of the land and
the old materials that may have been
used.
c) If the Naked Owner ALONE paid for the insurance
but there is failure or omission of Usufructuary to
share
The effect is the same as if there was a sharing,
but the usufructuary must reimburse the naked
owner his share of the insurance premium.
d) If the Usufructuary ALONE pays the premium
i) The indemnity goes to the usufructuary
ALONE;
ii) Usufruct continues on the land;
iii) Usufructuary has no obligation to
rebuild.
ART 609. Rules in case of Expropriation
a) If naked owner alone was given the indemnity, he
has the OPTION
i) To replace with equivalent thing; OR
ii) To pay to the usufructuary legal interest
on the indemnity.
b) If both were separately given indemnity, usufruct
is totally extinguished.
c) If usufructuary alone was given the indemnity, he
must give it to the naked owner and compel the
latter to return either the interest or to replace
the property. He may even deduct the interest
himself, if the naked owner fails to object.
ART 610. A usufruct is not extinguished by bad
use of the thing in usufruct; but if the abuse
should cause considerable injury to the owner,
the latter may demand that the thing be delivered
to him, binding himself to pay annually to the
usufructuary the net proceeds of the same, after
deducting the expenses and the compensation
which may be allowed him for its administration.
a) Which does not cause considerable injury to
the naked owner.
Usufruct continues. Naked owner cannot demand
administration.
b) Which causes considerable injury.
Usufruct continues, but naked owner can
DEMAND delivery to and administration by him,
but he will be obliged to pay NET PROCEEDS to
usufructuary. Naked owner gets paid
administration fees and expenses.
ART 611. A usufruct constituted in favor of
several persons living at the time of its
constitution shall not be extinguished until the
death of the last survivor.
ART 612. Upon the termination of the usufruct,
the thing in usufruct shall be delivered to the
owner, without prejudice to the right of
retention pertaining to the usufructuary or his
 heirs for taxes and extraordinary expenses
which should be reimbursed.
After the delivery has been made, the security or
mortgage shall be cancelled.
Death of Usufructuary — Exceptions:
a) In the case of multiple usufructs;
b) When there is a period fixed based on the number
of years that would elapse before a person would
reach a certain age, UNLESS the period was
expressly granted only in consideration of the
existence of such person, in which case it ends at
the death of said person;
c) In case the contrary intention CLEARLY appears.
Other Causes of Extinguishment of Usufruct
a) Annulment;
b) Rescission;
c) Mutual withdrawal;
d) Legal causes, as when attainment of age of
majority extinguishes parental usufruct.
Moralidad v. Sps Pernes
Whether the existing usufruct may be deemed to have
been extinguished or terminated.
The document executed by the petitioner constitutes
the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the
usufruct. The occurrence of any of the following: the
loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or
the cessation of harmonious relationship
between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition
which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes
the usufruct. Thus, the continuing animosity between
the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence
and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her
advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual
bases to consider the usufruct as having been
terminated.
By express provision of Arts 579 and 580,
respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to
reimbursement for the improvements they may have
introduced on the property. The respondents may,
however, remove or destroy the improvements they
may have introduced thereon without damaging the
petitioner’s property.
H. EASEMENTS
ART 613. An EASEMENT or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable
for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that
which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
1. Characteristics
Characteristics of Easements
a) A real right;
b) Imposable only on ANOTHER’s property;
c) A real right that may be alienated;
d) It is a limitation or encumbrance on the
servient estate for another’s benefit, the
dominant estate
i) It is essential that there be a
BENEFIT;
ii) It is not essential that the benefit be
exercised;
iii) Not presumed.
e) There is INHERENCE or INSEPARABILITY
from the estate to which it belongs (Art 617);
f) It is INDIVISIBLE (Art 618);
g) It is INTRANSMISSIBLE;
h) It is PERPETUAL.
ART 619. Easements are established either by law
or by the will of the owners. The former are
called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos 2011
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on
the property rights of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient
estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant
estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the presence of all the preconditions before his claim
for easement of right of way may be granted.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
what is required by law as the basis of setting up a
compulsory easement. To be sure, the true standard
for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy."
Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners
The dominant estate cannot be the servient estate
at the same time. One of the characteristics of an
easement is that it can be imposed only on the property
of another, never on one’s own property. An easement
can exist only when the servient and the dominant
estates belong to different owners.
2. Classification
ART 615. Easements may be continuous or
discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of
which is or may be incessant, without the
intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are
used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made
known and are continually kept in view by
external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment
of the same.
Nonapparent easements are those which show
no external indication of their existence.
ART 616. Easements are also positive or negative.
A positive easement is one which imposes upon
the owner of the servient estate the obligation of
allowing something to be done or of doing it
himself, and a negative easement, that which
 prohibits the owner of the servient estate from ⭐Sps Garcia v. Santos 2019
dominant estate.
doing something which he could lawfully do if the
Whether the Sps. Garcia have indeed acquired an
easement did not exist.
Alcantara v. Reta, Jr. easement of light and view, imposing a burden on
Resume of Classification According to Lot 1 not to obstruct the subject property's free access to
Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on
a) Party given benefit light and view.
the land because it would facilitate his gathering of
tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal What is the significance of determining whether an
i) Real or predial
easement under Article 614. easement is positive or negative? According to Article
ii) Personal 621, in order to acquire easements by prescription in
b) Manner of exercise Public and Private Easements positive easements, the prescriptive period shall
commence from the day on which the owner of the
i) Continuous North Negros Sugar v. Hidalgo
dominant estate, or the person who may have made use
ii) Discontinuous An easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the
of a community. Consequently, the plaintiff may not servient estate.
c) Whether or not existence is indicated establish discriminatory exceptions against any
i) Apparent private person. With respect to negative easements — from the day on
which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an
ii) Non-apparent What stamps a public character on a private property, instrument acknowledged before a notary public, the
d) Purpose or nature of limitation like the road in question, is not the number of persons owner of the servient estate, from executing an act
who may have an interest in its use, but the fact that all which would be lawful without the easement.
i) Positive or Sufferance or Intrusion those who may desire to use it may do so upon payment
of the required indemnity. The road in question being a How then is an easement of light and view classified?
ii) Negative or Abstention or Restriction
public utility, or, to be more exact, a private property Is it a positive or a negative easement? The answer is
e) Right given affected with a public interest, it is not lawful to it may be both.
i) Partial use make arbitrary exceptions with respect to its use
and enjoyment. As a general rule, an easement of light and view is a
ii) Getting of specific material positive one if the window or opening is situated in a
party wall, while it is a negative one if the window or
f) Source or origin Continuous and Discontinuous Easements
opening is thru one's own wall, i.e., thru a wall of the
i) Voluntary Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners 2012 dominant estate. However, even if the window is on
one's own wall, still the easement would be positive if
ii) Legal In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot
the window is on a balcony or projection extending
11, Block 5 of the Subdivision for the benefit of the
iii) Mixed over into the adjoining land.
community. It is continuous and apparent, because it
Real and Personal Servitudes is used incessantly without human intervention, and Aside from prescription, easements may likewise be
because it is continually kept in view by the overhead acquired through title. The term "title" refers to a
ART 614. Servitudes may also be established for water tank, which reveals its use to the public.
the benefit of a community, or of one or more juridical act or law sufficient to create the encumbrance.
persons to whom the encumbered estate does not The easement of water facility has been voluntarily The mode of acquiring an easement under Article 624 is
belong. established. For more than 30 years, the facility was a "legal presumption or apparent sign." Article 624
Jabonete v. Monteverde continuously used as the residents’ sole source of water. finds application in situations wherein two or more
The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent estates were previously owned by a singular owner,
The servitude established was clearly for the benefit easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or or even a single estate but with two or more portions
alone of the plaintiffs and the persons above by prescription of 10 years. It is therefore clear that being owned by a singular owner. According to Article
enumerated. In other words, the right acquired by the an easement of water facility has already been acquired 624, there arises a title to an easement of light and
original plaintiffs was a personal servitude under through prescription. view, even in the absence of any formal act
Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not a predial servitude
undertaken by the owner of the dominant estate, if
that inures to the benefit of whoever owns the
Positive and Negative Easements

this apparent visible sign, such as the existence of a
door and windows, continues to remain and subsist,
unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided,
1) the contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or
2) the sign aforesaid should be removed before
the execution of the deed.
Here, from the time the Sps. Santos transferred the
subject property to the Sps. Garcia, there arose by title
an easement of light and view, placing a burden on the
servient estate, i.e., Lot 1, to allow the Sps. Garcia's
residence unobstructed access to light and view, subject
to certain limitations.
The existence of an easement of light and view under
Article 624 is established as long as
1) there exists an apparent sign of servitude
between two estates;
2) the sign of the easement must be established
by the owner of both tenements;
3) either or both of the estates are alienated by
the owner; and
4) at the time of the alienation nothing is stated in
the document of alienation contrary to the
easement nor is the sign of the easement
removed before the execution of the document.
Based on Articles 669 and 670, there are two kinds of
windows:
1) regular or full or direct view windows, and
2) restricted, or oblique or side view windows.
As for openings, they may be
1) direct views, or
2) oblique views.
Here, the openings found on the property of the Sps.
Garcia offer a direct view of the property of the
respondents Sps. Santos. There are two distance rules
or distances that must be observed before they can be
made or established.
Firstly, there is the two-meter distance rule under
Article 670, which is the general rule, provides that
when a window or any similar opening affords a direct
view of an adjoining land, the distance between the wall
in which such opening is made and the border of the
adjoining land should be at least two meters.
Secondly, the three-meter distance rule in Article
673 states that whenever by any title a right has been
acquired to have direct views, balconies or belvederes
overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the
servient estate cannot build thereon at less than a
distance of three meters, not two meters, from the
property line, to be measured in the manner
provided in Article 671.
Article 673 is the exception to the general rule.
Therefore, considering that the Sps. Garcia have
acquired by title an easement of light and view in
accordance with Article 624, the Sps. Santos should
necessarily demolish or renovate portions of their
residential building so that the three-meter
distance rule as mandated under Article 673 is
observed.
3. Modes of acquiring easements
ART 620. Continuous and apparent easements
are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
ART 622. Continuous nonapparent easements,
and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
a. Prescription as a mode of acquiring easement
ART 621. See Sps Garcia v. Santos case
ART 623. The absence of a document or proof
showing the origin of an easement which cannot
be acquired by prescription may be cured
1. by a deed of recognition by the owner
of the servient estate or
2. by a final judgment.
Thus, easement may be acquired by
a) TITLE or PRESCRIPTION of 10 YEARS if
i) Continuous AND Apparent.
b) TITLE ONLY if
i) Discontinuous and Apparent;
ii) Continuous and Non-apparent;
iii) Discontinuous and Non-apparent.
⭐Bogo-Medellin Milling, Co. v. CA, supra
The easement of right of way is considered
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person
passes or sets foot on somebody else's land. Like a road
for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of
right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous. The
presence of physical or visual signs only classifies
an easement into apparent or non-apparent.
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the
passage of petitioner's trains denotes the existence of
an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of
way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code,
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not,
may be acquired only by TITLE.
When is a party deemed to acquire title over the use of
such land? In at least two cases, we held that if:
a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual
right of way with the heirs for the continued
use of the land under the principles of
voluntary easements or
b) it had filed a case against the heirs for
conferment on it of a legal easement of right of
way under Article 629 of the Civil Code,
then title over the use of the land is deemed to exist.
Abellana, Sr. v. CA
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of
way is continuous and apparent and may be acquired
by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is
erroneous. The use of a footpath or road may be
apparent but it is a discontinuous easement because
its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man.
It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet
over somebody else's land. Hence, a right of way is not

acquirable by prescription.
1) Existence of an Apparent Sign of Easement
Tañedo v. Bernad
The alien-ation of the dominant and servient
estates to different persons is not one of the
grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On
the contrary, use of the easement is continued by
operation of law, specifically, Art 624. Accordingly, the
spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim, the new owners of the
servient estate, cannot impair, in any manner
whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
4. Rights and obligations of
the owners of the dominant
and servient estates
Dominant Estate
Rights
1. Exercise the easement and all 1.
necessary rights; (Art 625)
2. To make on the servient estate 2.
all necessary works for its use
and preservation, BUT
a. Must be at his own expense;
b. Must notify the servient
owner;
c. Select convenient time and
manner; 3.
d. Must not alter the easement
or make it more
burdensome. (Art 627)
3. Ask for a mandatory injunction
to prevent impairment or
obstruction;
4. Renounce totally the easement if
he desires exemption from
contribution to expenses (Art
628)
6) By the redemption agreed upon
Duties
between the owners of the dominant and
servient estates.
1. Cannot use the easement except 1. Cannot impair the use
ART 632. The form or manner of using the
for the benefit of the immovable of the easement; (Art
easement may prescribe as the easement itself,
originally contemplated. 629)
and in the same way.
2. Cannot exercise the easement in 2. Must contribute to the
any other manner than that ART 633. If the dominant estate belongs to
expenses in case he also
previously established. (Art uses the easement; (Artseveral persons in common, the use of the
626) 628) easement by any one of them prevents
prescription with respect to the others.
3. Cannot alter the easement; 3. In case of impairment,
4. Cannot make it more Salimbangon
to restore conditions to v. Tan 2010
burdensome; the status quo at his
When the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner
expense plus damages;
5. For several dominant estates, of Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B
each must contribute to 4. To pay for the expenses
became extinct by operation of law. The existence of
necessary repairs and expenses incurred for the change
a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible
in proportion to the BENEFIT of location or formwith
of the idea that both estates belong to the same
the easement. (Artperson
629) (Art 631[1]).
received. (Art 628)
Servient Estate
5. Modes of extinguishment Solid Manila v. Bio Hong Trading
In a personal servitude, there is no "owner of a
ART 631. Easements are extinguished: dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement
1) By merger in the same person of the pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this
Retain ownership and
ownership of the dominant and servient case, the public at large.
possession; (Art 630)
estates;
To make use of the Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior
easement unless 2) By nonuser for ten years; servient-dominant owner relationship, and the
deprived by stipulation termination of that relation leaves the easement of no
a) with respect to discontinuous
provided that the use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of
easements, this period shall be
exercise of easement is the public—if that is possible—no genuine merger
computed from the day on which
not adversely affected can take place that would terminate a personal
they ceased to be used; and,
and that he contributes easement.
to the expenses; b) with respect to continuous
To change the location easements, from the day on which an 6. Legal Easements
of a very inconvenient act contrary to the same took
place; Legal easements are ones imposed by law, and which
easement provided that have, for their object, either public use or interest of
an equally convenient 3) When either or both of the estates fall private persons, as opposed to voluntary easements that
substitute is made, into such condition that the easement are established by the agreements of the parties. The
without injury to the cannot be used; xxxx different legal easements are:
dominant estate. (Art
629) 4) By the expiration of the term or the a) easement relating to waters;
fulfillment of the condition, if the
easement is temporary or conditional; b) right of way;
c) party wall;
5) By the renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate; d) light and view;
 e) drainage;
f) intermediate distances;
g) easement against nuisance; and
h) lateral and subjacent support.
Easements Relating to Waters
a) Natural drainage of lands; (Art 637)
b) Natural drainage of buildings; (Art 674)
c) Easement on riparian banks for navigation,
floatage, fishing, salvage; (Art 638)
d) Easement of a dam; (Art 639, 647)
e) Easement for drawing water or for watering
animals; (Art 640-641)
f) Aqueduct; (Art 643-646)
g) Construction of a stop lock or sluice gate. (Art
647)
Requirement of Easement for drawing water or for
watering animals
a) Must be for public use;
b) Must be in favor of a town or village;
c) Right must be sought by the town or village;
d) There must be payment of proper indemnity;
e) The right of way must have a maximum width of
10 meters, which cannot be altered although the
direction of the path may be changed.
Requisites to Acquire Easement of AQUEDUCT
a) Indemnity must be paid;
b) If for private interests, the easement cannot
be imposed on EXISTING buildings,
courtyards, annexes, out-houses, orchards or
gardens;
c) There must be PROOF:
i) That he can dispose of the water;
ii) That the water is SUFFICIENT for the
use for which it is intended;
iii) That the proposed course is the most
convenient and the least onerous to
third persons and the servient
estate;
iv) That proper administrative
permission be obtained.
Requisites to Construct a Stop Lock or Sluice Gate
a) Purpose must be for irrigation or improvement;
b) Construction must be on the estate of another;
c) Damages must be paid;
d) Third persons should not be prejudiced.
Easement of Right of Way, Requisites of
Villanueva v. Velasco
The essential requisites for an easement to be
compulsory are:
1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway;
2) proper indemnity has been paid;
3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate;
4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and
5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest.
The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter
wide easement obstructs the entry of private
respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle. One
meter is insufficient for the needs of private
respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the
dominant estate determine the width of the
easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to
demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in
view of the needs of private respondents' estate.
The proposition that petitioner is not bound by the
contract of easement because the same was not
annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of
the complaint to enforce the easement was not
recorded with the Register of Deeds, is unmeritorious.
Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition
of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious
or artificial, necessity for it.
Quimen v. CA
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement where
the way is shortest and will cause least prejudice shall
be chosen. However, if the two circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way where damage
will be least shall be used even if not the shortest
route. This is so because least prejudice prevails over
shortest distance.
Floro v. Llenado
Whether or not a valid contract of easement of right of
way exists when the owner of one estate voluntarily
allows the owner of an adjacent estate passage through
his property for a limited time, without compensation.
The use of Road Lots 4 and 5 by the Llenados during the
month of March was by mere tolerance of Floro
pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions of
the right of way. Although such use was in anticipation
of a voluntary easement of right of way, no such
contract was validly entered into by reason of the
failure of the parties to agree on its terms and
conditions. Thus, Llenados cannot claim entitlement to
a right of way through the Floro Park Subdivision on the
basis of a voluntary easement.
Valdez v. Tabisula
A document stipulating a voluntary easement must be
recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to
prejudice third parties.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory
easement of right of way. Petitioners and their family
are also the owners of two properties adjoining the
subject property which have access to two public roads
or highways. Since petitioners then have more than
adequate passage to two public roads, they have no
right to demand the grant by respondents of an
easement on the "western side of respondents' lot."
Sps Dela Cruz v. Ramiscal
Did respondent voluntarily accord petitioners a right of
way? NO.
Concepcion de la Peña had provided petitioners with an
adequate ingress and egress towards Boni Serrano
Avenue. Inasmuch as petitioners have an adequate
outlet to a public highway (Boni Serrano Avenue), they
have no right to insist on using a portion of
respondent’s property as pathway towards 18th
Avenue and for which no indemnity was being paid by
them.
De la Peña, not petitioners, is the real party-in-interest
to claim a right of way although, as explained earlier,
any action to demand a right of way from de la Peña’s
part will not lie inasmuch as by her own acts of building
houses in the area allotted for a pathway in her
property, she had caused the isolation of her property
from any access to a public highway.
1) Right to Compensation of owner of servient estate
a) If permanent = Value of land + Damages;
Upon extinction, return the indemnity without
interest.
b) If temporary = Damages only.
2) Width of an Easement of Right of Way
Encarnacion v. CA
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a widening of an
already existing easement of right-of-way.
While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters
from the dominant tenement, that access is grossly
inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be
demanded:
1) when there absolutely no access to a public
highway, and
2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or
dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.
In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a
semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress
from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the
highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5)
meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river
bed is impassable due to the flood. Thus, it can only be
used at certain times of the year. With the inherent
disadvantages of the river bed which make passage
difficult, if not impossible, it is as if there were no
outlet at all.
The law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the
owners of the servient estate including Mamerto
Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken
to constitute the original path several years ago. Since
the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is
of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage caused to the servient estate
pursuant to Article 649.
3) Payment of Indemnity
Talisay-Silay Milling v. CFI of Negros Occidental
Prepayment means the delivery of the proper
indemnity required by law for the damage that might be
incurred by the servient estate in the event the legal
easement is constituted. The fact that a voluntary
agreement upon the extent of compensation cannot be
reached by the parties involved, is not an impediment
to the establishment of such easement. Precisely, the
action of the dominant estate against the servient estate
should include a prayer for the fixing of the amount
which may be due from the former to the latter.
Notably, the action filed by the Central did not opt for
this.
Woodridge School v. ARB Construction
Since the intention of petitioners is to establish a
permanent passage, the second paragraph of Article
649 of the Civil Code particularly applies. The Civil Code
categorically provides for the measure by which the
proper indemnity may be computed: value of the land
occupied plus the amount of the damage caused to
the servient estate.
De Guzman v. Filinvest Development 2015
Woodridge is on all fours with the present case. Hence,
as held therein and pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 649, the proper indemnity in this case shall
consist of the value of the land plus the damages caused
to the servient estate.
Easement of Party Wall, its Nature, Co-Ownership or
Easement
a. Its Existence
ART 659. The existence of an easement of
party wall is presumed, unless there is a title,
or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary:
1) In dividing walls of adjoining buildings
up to the point of common elevation;
2) In dividing walls of gardens or yards
situated in cities, towns, or in rural
communities;
3) In fences, walls and live hedges dividing
rural lands.
Light and View
Gargantos v. Tan Yanon
Whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an
easement of light and view against the property of
petitioner Gargantos.
The existence of the doors and windows on the
northeastern side of the house, is equivalent to a
title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement
is the title that characterizes its existence.
It should be noted, however, that while the law declares
that the easement is to "continue," the easement
actually arises for the first time only upon
alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that
time there is no easement to speak of, there being but
one owner of both estates
Lateral and Subjacent Support
Castro v. Monsod 2011
Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support
exists on the subject adjacent properties and, if it does,
whether the same may be annotated at the back of the
title of the servient estate.

An easement is established either by law or by will of
the owners. The courts cannot impose or constitute any
servitude where none existed. There are therefore no
judicial easements.
Article 684 provides that no proprietor shall make
such excavations upon his land as to deprive any
adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his surface
right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is
subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any
adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support.
In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and
lateral support exists in favor of respondent. It was
established that the properties of petitioner and
respondent adjoin each other. It was proven that
petitioner has been making excavations and diggings on
the subject embankment and, unless restrained, the
continued excavation of the embankment could cause
the foundation of the rear portion of the house of
respondent to collapse, resulting in the destruction of a
huge part of the family dwelling.
A permanent injunction on the part of petitioner from
making injurious excavations is necessary in order to
protect the interest of respondent. However, an
annotation of the existence of the subjacent and
lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists
whether or not it is annotated or registered in the
registry of property.
I. NUISANCE
ART 694. A nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:
1) Injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; or
2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; or
4) Obstructs or interferes with the free
passage of any public highway or street,
or any body of water; or
5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Rana v. Wong 2014
Article 695 classifies nuisances with respect to the
object or objects that they affect. In this regard, a
nuisance may either be:
a) a public nuisance, or one which "affects a
community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the
extent of the annoyance, danger or damage
upon individuals may be unequal"; or
b) a private nuisance, or one "that is not
included in the foregoing definition", or, as case
law puts it, one which "violates only private
rights and produces damages to but one or a
few persons".
Nuisance per se and per accidens
Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to
their legal susceptibility to summary abatement
(that is, corrective action without prior judicial
permission). In this regard, a nuisance "may either be:
a) a nuisance per se, or one which "affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and
may be summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity"; or
b) a nuisance per accidens, or that which
"depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a
question of fact, it cannot be abated without
due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to
decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance."
There is a need for judicial intervention when
the nuisance is NOT a nuisance per se.
Aside from the remedy of summary abatement, a
private person whose property right was invaded or
unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission,
establishment, business or condition of the property of
another may file a civil action to recover personal
damages. To note, the remedies of abatement and
damages are cumulative; hence, BOTH may be
demanded.
The Court finds it prudent to sustain the CA's verdict
offsetting the damage caused by said parties against
each other. However, this is not because of the in pari
delicto rule as it is inapplicable to this case.
The principle of in pari delicto provides that when two
parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they
are and denies recovery by either one of them.
However, this principle does not apply with respect
to inexistent and void contracts as is in this case.
1. Liabilities
ART 696. Every successive owner or possessor of
property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance
in that property started by a former owner or
possessor is liable therefor in the same manner
as the one who created it.
2. Attractive Nuisance
Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan
The Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance states that one
who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises.
Is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or
appliance likely to attract little children in play? In other
words, is the body of water an attractive nuisance?
NO. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is NOT
applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or
artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location.
3. No prescription
ART 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any
nuisance, whether public or private.
4. Extrajudicial abatement
ART 702. The district health officer shall
determine whether or not abatement, without
judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a
public nuisance.
Estate of Francisco v. CA
Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily,
without judicial process, order the demolition of
petitioner's quonset building.
Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers
the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies.
On the contrary, the LGC imposes upon him the duty "to
cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection
with the violation of ordinances."
Respondents can not seek cover under the general
welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se. The storage of copra in the quonset
building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not
be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or
of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Parayno v. Jovellanos
Petitioner's business could not be considered a
nuisance which respondent municipality could
summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police
powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial
proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A
gas station is NOT a nuisance per se or one affecting
the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it
cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to
another location.
Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. Jac Liner
Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner
argues. For their operation is a legitimate business
which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the
rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.
Perez v. Sps Madrona and Pante 2012
For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur:
first, there must be a right to be protected and second,
the acts against which the injunction is to be directed
are violative of said right. Here, the two requisites are
clearly present: there is a right to be protected, that is,
respondents’ right over their concrete fence which
cannot be removed without due process; and the act,
the summary demolition of the concrete fence, against
which the injunction is directed, would violate said
right.
Telmo v. Bustamante
Petitioner claims that his act of summarily removing
respondent's concrete posts was authorized under the
National Building Code.
Nowhere was it shown that the concrete posts put up
by respondent in what he believed was his and his co-
owners' property were ever declared dangerous or
ruinous, such that they can be summarily demolished
by petitioner. Applying the statutory construction
principle of ejusdem generis, the word "structure"
should be construed in the context of the definition of
the word "building." The concrete posts put up by
respondent on the property are not properly covered
by the definition of the word "building" nor is it
embraced in the corresponding interpretation of the
word "structure."
Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club 2016
In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a
factual finding that the basketball ring was a nuisance
per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. A
basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or
danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation.
Also, the chief executive of the local government, like
the Punong Barangay, is not authorized as the official
who can determine the propriety of a summary
abatement.
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay 2014
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation,
the LGU effectively made a determination that
constructions therein, without first securing
exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances
for they pose a threat to public safety.
The hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance
per se. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident–
–its location––and not its inherent qualities that
rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not
been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West
Cove could have secured the necessary permits without
issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not
a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance
per accidens.
Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and
removal of illegally constructed establishments for
failing to secure the necessary permits.
5. Special injury to individual
ART 703. A private person may file an action on
account of a public nuisance, if it is specially
injurious to himself.
ART 704. Any private person may abate a public
nuisance which is specially injurious to him by
removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing
which constitutes the same, without committing a
breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.
But it is necessary:
1) That demand be first made upon the
owner or possessor of the property to
abate the nuisance;
2) That such demand has been rejected;
3) That the abatement be approved by the
district health officer and executed with
the assistance of the local police; and
4) That the value of the destruction does
not exceed P3K.
6. Right of individual to abate a public nuisance
ART 699. The remedies against a public nuisance
 are:
1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or
any local ordinance: or
2) A civil action; or
3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
ART 700. The district health officer shall take care
that one or all of the remedies against a public
nuisance are availed of.
ART 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of
the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action
shall be commenced by the city or municipal
mayor.
7. Right to damages
ART 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not
preclude the right of any person injured to
recover damages for its past existence.
8. Who may sue on private nuisance
ART 705. The remedies against a private nuisance
are:
1) A civil action; or
2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
ART 706. Basically the same as Art 704
ART 707. A private person or a public official
extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable
for damages:
1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or
2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by
the courts to be not a real nuisance.
J. MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
a) Occupation;
b) Intellectual creation;
c) Law;
d) Donation;
e) Succession;
f) Tradition, as a consequence of certain contracts;
and
g) Prescription.
1. Occupation
Ways by which Occupation may be Effected
ART 713. Things appropriable by nature which
are without an owner, such as animals that are
the object of hunting and fishing, hidden treasure
and abandoned movables, are acquired by
occupation.
Occupation of Land
ART 714. The ownership of a piece of land cannot
be acquired by occupation.
Of Movables
ART 718. He who by chance discovers hidden
treasure in another's property shall have the
right granted him in Art 438.
ART 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not
treasure, must return it to its previous possessor.
xxxx
ART 720. If the owner should appear in time, he
shall be obliged to pay, as a reward to the finder,
one-tenth of the sum or of the price of the
thing found.
Requisites
1. Seizure or apprehension of property;
2. Property is corporeal personal property;
3. Property is without an owner;
4. With intent to appropriate;
5. Subject to compliance with specific conditions
and prohibitions laid down by law.
2. Donation
a. Definition, Concept of, Elements
ART 725. Donation is an act of liberality
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing
or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
ART 726. Other instances where there is
donation
a) when a person gives to another a thing or
right on account of the latter's merits or of
the services rendered by him to the donor,
provided they do not constitute a demandable
debt, or
b) when the gift imposes upon the donee a
burden which is less than the value of the
thing given.
ART 727. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple
and remuneratory donations shall be considered
as not imposed.
b. Requisites of Donation
1) Consent, subject matter, cause;
2) Necessary form;
3) Consent or acceptance by donee during
donor’s lifetime;
4) Irrevocability;
5) Intent to benefit the donee;
6) Resultant decrease in the patrimony of
donor.
c. Classification of Donation
i. Simple
ii. Remuneratory
iii. Modal
iv. Onerous
Validity of Conditions in an “Onerous Donation”
ART 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall
be governed by the rules on contracts and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the
present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA, supra
Although it is true that under Article 764 an action for
the revocation of a donation must be brought within
four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in
the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein
expressly provides for automatic reversion of the
property donated in case of violation of the condition
therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is
not necessary.
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly
provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the
general rules on prescription should apply, and not
Article 764.
Thus, the cause of action of herein private respondents
has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a
written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our
view that Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial
remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of
conditions specified in the deed of donation if and
when the parties have not agreed on the automatic
revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the
contingency contemplated therein.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in
an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee. A prohibition against
alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual
or for an unreasonable period of time.
In the case at bar, the prohibition in the deed of
donation against the alienation of the property for an
entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and
denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be
declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727. Consequently, such
condition shall be considered as not imposed.
Lagazo v. CA
Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose any
burden — the expressed consideration being purely one
of liberality and generosity — but the recipient actually
paid charges imposed on the property like land taxes and
installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed
onerous and thus governed by the law on ordinary
contracts?
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure
liberality, while an onerous donation is one which is
subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to
or more in value than the thing donated. Under Article
733, donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the
formalities required for a valid simple donation are not
applicable.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous.
Even conceding that petitioner’s full payment of the
purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to
him, such payment was not however imposed by the
donor as a condition for the donation. The payments
made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts.
d. Perfection of Donation
ART 734. The donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance
by the donee.
Pajarillo v. IAC
The purpose of the formal requirement is to ensure that
the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to
the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested
that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact
confirmed it later and requested that the donated land
be not registered during her lifetime by Salud. Given
this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience
declare the donation ineffective because there is no
notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's
acceptance.
The donation became effective upon acceptance by
Salud except that, in obedience to her mother's request,
she chose not to register the land in the meantime and
to allow her mother to enjoy its fruits. What was
deferred was not its effectivity but only its
enjoyment by Salud. Registration was not necessary
to make the donation a binding commitment insofar as
the donors and the donee were concerned.
Dolar v. Barangay Lublub
According to petitioner, the subject donation is, by force
of Article 745, void, the accepting barangay captain
being without sufficient authority for the purpose.
Petitioner is hardly the proper party to challenge the
validity of the donation — which is presumed to be
valid — on the ground he presently invokes. The honor
belongs to the Sanggunian. The Sangguniang Barangay
and the good people of P.D. Monfort North, by availing
themselves of such benefits for more than two decades
now, effectively ratified Militar's acceptance of the
donation.
Where, however, the donee denies, as here, the
rescission or challenges the propriety thereof, then
only the final award of the court can, to borrow from
UP v. de los Angeles, "conclusively settle whether the
resolution is proper or not."
In the case at bench, respondent barangay denied or
challenged the purported revocation of the donation.
Owing to the prescriptive component of Article 764, an
action to revoke prescribes after four (4) years from
non-compliance by the donee with any of the conditions
set forth in the deed of donation. Seventeen (17) years
is, in turn, too far removed, from the 4-year prescriptive
period referred to in Article 764 or even from the 10-
year period under Article 1144. Thus, petitioner's
action to revoke is time-barred.
e. Making and Acceptance of Donation
Quilala v. Alcantara
Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an
immovable must be made in a public instrument in
order to be valid, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy.
The specification of the location of the signature is
merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs
on the wrong side of the page, that does not invalidate
the document. In the same vein, the lack of an
acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public
does not also render the donation null and void. The
instrument should be treated in its entirety. The fact
that the donee was not mentioned by the notary
public in the acknowledgment is of no moment.
Heirs of Salamat v. Tamayo

It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real
property from one person to another cannot take effect
as a donation unless embodied in a public document.
Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa
ART 728. Mortis Causa. Donations which are to
take effect upon the death of the donor partake of
the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall
be governed by the rules established in the Title
on Succession.
ART 729. Inter Vivos. When the donor intends
that the donation shall take effect during the
lifetime of the donor, though the property shall
not be delivered till after the donor's death, this
shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the
property from the time of the acceptance of the
donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the
donor provides otherwise.
Distinctions as to Form and Effect
a) Inter vivos
i) Takes effect during lifetime of donor;
ii) Must follow formalities of donations;
iii) Cannot be revoked except for lawful
grounds;
iv) In case of impairment of legitime,
donations inter vivos are preferred to
donations mortis causa;
v) The right of disposition is completely
transferred to the donee;
vi) Acceptance of donee must be
DURING the lifetime of the donor.
b) Mortis causa
i) Takes effect after death of donor;
ii) Must follow the formalities of wills;
iii) Revocable while donor is alive;
iv) In case of impairment of legitime,
donations mortis causa are reduced
ahead of inter vivos;
v) Right of disposition not transferred
to donee while donor is alive;
vi) Acceptance must be AFTER the
death of the donor.
Concepcion v. Concepción
It is the body of the document of donation and the
statements contained therein, and not the title that
should be considered in ascertaining the intention of
the donor.
When from the body of the instrument or donation it is
to be gathered that the main consideration of the
donation is not the death of the donor but rather
services rendered to him, by the donee or his affection
for the latter, then the donation should be considered
as inter vivos, and when duly accepted, it transfers
title immediately to the donee, and the condition that
the donation is to take effect only after the death of
donor should be interpreted as meaning that the
possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the property
donated should take place only after donor's death.
Austria-Magat v. CA
In the case at bar, the decisive proof that the deed is a
donation inter vivos is in the provision that: Ibinibigay
ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa
naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga
tagapagmana, ang aking lupang residential o tirahan
sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon xxx. This is a clear
expression of the irrevocability of the conveyance.
Bonsato v. CA enumerated the characteristics of a
donation mortis causa, to wit:
1) It conveys NO title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2) That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed;
3) That the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee.
In Cuevas v. Cuevas, when the deed of donation
provides that the donor will not dispose or take away
the property donated (thus making the donation
irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter
vivos.
In Gestopa v. CA, the prohibition to alienate does not
necessarily defeat the inter vivos character of the
donation. It even highlights the fact that what remains
with the donor is the right of usufruct and not anymore
the naked title of ownership over the property donated.
In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of donation
that the donated property will remain in the possession
of the donor just goes to show that the donor has given
up his naked title of ownership thereto and has
maintained only the right to use and possess.
Another indication in the deed of donation that the
donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause
therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance
clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
On the other hand, donations mortis causa, being in the
form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the
donees during the donor’s lifetime.
Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan
Whether the donations made by the late Conchita
Cabatingan are donations inter vivos or mortis causa.
The phrase “to become effective upon the death of
the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation but that
Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of
the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the
donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners
predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v.
Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be
considered void if the donor should survive the
donee.
Sps Gestopa v. CA
Whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership
over the properties upon the execution of the deed. YES.

First, the granting clause shows that Diego donated the
properties out of love and affection for the donee. This
is a mark of a donation inter vivos.
Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates
that the donor intended to transfer the naked
ownership over the properties.
Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his
maintenance in accordance with his standing in society,
indicating that the donor intended to part with the six
parcels of land.
Lastly, the donee accepted the donation.
Sicad v. CA
Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take
effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that
the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the
property for such period.
A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but
withholds from the donee that right to dispose of the
donated property during the donor’s lifetime is in truth
one mortis causa.
Persons who may Give or Receive a Donation
ART 735. All persons who may contract and
dispose of their property may make a donation.
ART 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate
the property entrusted to them.
ART 737. The donor's capacity shall be
determined as of the time of the making of the
donation.
ART 738. All those who are not specially
disqualified by law therefor may accept
donations.
Arcaba v. Tabancura
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of
evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is VOID under Art 87 of the
FC.
Void Donation as Basis For Title By Acquisitive
Prescription
ART 739. The following donations shall be VOID:
1) Those made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation;
2) Those made between persons found
guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;
3) Those made to a public officer or his
wife, descendants and ascendants, by
reason of his office.
ART 740. Incapacity to succeed by will shall be
applicable to donations inter vivos.
ART 741. Minors and others who cannot enter into
a contract may become donees but acceptance
shall be done through their parents or legal
representatives.
ART 742. Donations made to conceived and
unborn children may be accepted by those
persons who would legally represent them if they
were already born.
ART 743. Donations made to incapacitated
persons shall be VOID, though simulated under
the guise of another contract or through a person
who is interposed.
ART 744. Donations of the same thing to two or
more different donees shall be governed by the
provisions on DOUBLE SALE.
ART 745. The donee must accept the donation
personally, or through an authorized person with
a special power for the purpose, or with a general
and sufficient power; otherwise, the donation
shall be VOID.
ART 746. Acceptance must be made DURING the
lifetime of the donor AND of the donee.
ART 748. The donation of a movable may be
made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous
delivery of the thing or of the document
representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated
exceeds P5K, the donation and the acceptance
shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the
donation shall be VOID.
Formalities for the Donation of Movable Property
a) If value is > P5K
i) BOTH donation and acceptance must be
in WRITING.
b) If P5K or less
i) Can be made orally, but there must be
1) Simultaneous delivery of thing OR
2) Simultaneous delivery of the
document representing the right
donated.
ii) Can be in writing.
ART 749. In order that the donation of an
immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy.
Formalities for the Donation of Real Property
a) If the deed of donation and the acceptance are in
the SAME instrument
i) The instrument must be a PUBLIC
document;
ii) The document must specify the property
donated and the charges or burdens, if
any.
b) If NOT in the same instrument
 i) The donation must be in a public
instrument or document;
ii) The document must specify the property
donated and the charges, if any;
iii) The acceptance in a separate instrument
must also be in a public instrument;
iv) The donor shall be notified in authentic
form of the fact that acceptance is being
made or has been made in a separate
public instrument;
v) The fact that there has been a notification
must be noted in both instruments.
Calicdan v. Cendana
The trial court found the donation of the land void
because Fermina was not the owner thereof,
considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his
parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal
property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan.
Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find
that respondent has become the rightful owner of the
land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void
for having been executed by one who was not the
owner of the property donated, may still be used to
show the exclusive and adverse character of
respondent’s possession.
Effect of Donations and Limitation
ART 750. The donation may comprehend all the
present property of the donor, or part thereof,
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to
be supported by the donor.
Without such reservation, the donation shall
be reduced in petition of any person affected.
ART 751. Donations cannot comprehend future
property.
By future property is understood anything which
the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the
donation.
ART 753. When a donation is made to several
persons jointly, it is understood to be in equal
shares, and there shall be NO right of accretion
among them, unless the donor has otherwise
provided.
The preceding paragraph shall not be applicable
to donations made to the husband and wife
jointly, between whom there shall be a right of
accretion, if the contrary has not been provided
by the donor.
Instances when accretion is proper
a) In case of predecease, the donee dying ahead of
donor before perfection;
b) In case of incapacity of donee;
c) In case of refusal or repudiation of donee.
In all three cases, there ordinarily would not be any
perfection of the donation.
ART 754. The donee is subrogated to all the
rights and actions which in case of eviction would
pertain to the donor. The latter, on the other
hand, is not obliged to warrant the things donated,
save when the donation is onerous, in which case
the donor shall be liable for eviction to the
concurrence of the burden.
The donor shall also be liable for eviction or
hidden defects in case of bad faith on his part.
When WARRANTY exists
a) If donor is in bad faith;
b) If donation is ONEROUS;
c) If warranty is expressly made;
d) If donation is PROPTER NUPTIAS unless the
contrary is stipulated.
ART 756. The ownership of property may also be
donated to one person and the usufruct to
another or others, provided all the donees are
living at the time of the donation.
ART 757. Reversion may be validly established
in favor of only the donor for any case and
circumstances, but not in favor of other persons
unless they are all living at the time of the
donation.
Rules on Stipulation that Donee Pays Debts of
Donor
a) Pay only for PRIOR debts;
b) Pay only for debts up to the value of the property
donated.
ART 759. There being no stipulation regarding the
payment of debts, the donee shall be responsible
therefor only when the donation has been made in
fraud of creditors.
The donation is always presumed to be in
fraud of creditors, when at the time thereof the
donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay
his debts prior to the donation.
Revocation and Reduction of Donations and the
grounds thereof
ART 765. The donation may also be revoked at the
instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude
in the following cases:
1) If the donee should commit some
offense against the person, the honor
or the property of the donor, or of his
wife or children under his parental
authority;
2) If the donee imputes to the donor any
criminal offense, or any act involving
moral turpitude, even though he should
prove it, unless the crime or the act has
been committed against the donee
himself, his wife or children under his
authority;
3) If he unduly refuses him support when
the donee is legally or morally bound to
give support to the donor.
 ART 772. Only those who at the time of the donor's
death have a right to the legitime and their heirs
and successors in interest may ask for the
reduction or inofficious donations.
Those referred to in the preceding paragraph
cannot renounce their right during the lifetime
of the donor, either by express declaration, or by
consenting to the donation.
ART 773. If, there being two or more donations,
the disposable portion is not sufficient to cover
all of them, those of the more recent date shall
be suppressed or reduced with regard to the
excess.
De Luna v. Abrigo
The donation subject of this case is one with an
onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden
requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery
and a kindergarten school in the donated property
within five years from execution of the deed of
donation.
Judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of
obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract,
but in order to determine whether or not the rescission
was proper.
As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971,
compliance with the terms and conditions of the
contract of donation, shall be made within five (5) years
from its execution. The complaint which was filed on
September 23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10)
year prescriptive period to enforce a written
contract.
Prescriptive Period to Revoke Donation
Imperial v. CA
Inofficiousness as a cause of action may arise only
upon the death of the donor, as the value of the
donation will then be contrasted with the net value of
the estate of the donor-deceased.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus,
the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required
under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that
they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The
case of Mateo v. Lagua, recognized that the cause of
action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of
the donor-decedent. It took private respondents 24
years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case.
The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
Santos v. Alana
Gregorio could not donate more than he may give by
will. Clearly, by donating the entire lot to petitioner, we
agree with both lower courts that Gregorio's donation is
inofficious as it deprives respondent of her legitime.
Gregorio died in 1986. Consequently, respondent had
until 1996 within which to file the action. Records show
that she filed her suit in 1992, well within the
prescriptive period.

Resume of Rules on Revocation and Reduction

BASIS TIME OF ACTION TRANSMISSIBILITY EFFECT

Rules on Revocation

Birth, Appearance, or Within 4 years from birth of first child, or from
adoption of a child his legitimation, or adoption, or from the judicial
(Art 760) declaration of filiation, or from receipt of
information regarding the existence of the child
believed dead (Art 763[1])
To children and descendants Property returned; or its value if donee has sold Donee shall return t
of donor upon his death (Art same; or the donor may redeem the mortgage on filing of the complai
763[2]) the property, with a right to recover such
property (Art 762[1,2])

Non-compliance with Within 4 years from non-compliance with the To the donor’s heirs and may Property returned; alienations and mortgages Return the fruits wh
condition/s (Art 764) condition (Art 764[3]) be exercised against the are void subject to rights of innocent third after having failed to
donee’s heirs (Ibid.) persons (Art 764[2]) 768[2])

Act of Ingratitude (Art Within one year from when donor knew of the Generally intransmissible Property returned; but alienations and Donee shall return t
765) fact of ingratitude (Art 769) (Art 770) mortgages effected before the notation of the filing of the complai
complaint for revocation shall subsist (Art 766)
Rules on Reduction

Failure of donor to reserve At any time by the donor or by the relatives Intransmissible; duty to Reduced to the extent necessary to provide Donee entitled to th
sufficient means for entitled to support during lifetime of donor give support is personal in support (Art 750) the property (Art 44
support (Art 750) (Ibid.) nature (Art 195, FC)

Birth, Appearance, or Entitled as to the pa

Adoption of a child (Art As to excess, return
760) of complaint.

Inofficiousness for being in
excess of what the donor
can give by will (Arts 750,
771)
Within 10 years after death of donor (Arts
771, 1144, Imperial case)
To the donor’s heirs as the
donation shall be reduced as
regards the excess at the
time of donor’s death. (Art
771)
Donation takes effect during lifetime of donor Donee entitled to th
subject to reduction only upon his death with the property (Art 44
regard to the excess (Ibid.)

Fraud against Creditors Action for rescission brought within four years To creditor’s heirs or Property returned subject to rights of innocent Fruits of property af
(Art 759) from perfection of donation, or at the latest, successors-in-interest (Art third persons (Art 1387) (Ibid.)
from the time creditor had knowledge of such 1178) If donee is in bad fai
donation (Art 1389) impossible, he shall
creditors for damag
1388[1])
3. Prescription of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession
must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful ART 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion
and uninterrupted. Possession is and other real rights may be ordinary or
ART 1106. By prescription, one acquires
extraordinary.
ownership and other real rights through the lapse a) open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
of time in the manner and under the conditions a) ORDINARY
notorious and not clandestine;
laid down by law. (ACQUISITIVE)
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
b) continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and
In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by possession of things in good faith and with just
not intermittent or occasional;
prescription. (EXTINCTIVE) title for the time fixed by law.
c) exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
ART 1131. For the purposes of prescription, just
exclusive dominion over the land and an
PRESCRIPTION appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
title must be proved; it is never presumed.
b) EXTRAORDINARY
A. TYPES OF PRESCRIPTION d) notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or ART 1137. Ownership and other real rights over
B. WHEN PRESCRIPTION IS INAPPLICABLE the people in the neighborhood. immovables also prescribe through
C. PRESCRIPTION OR LIMITATION OF ACTIONS uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession
D. INTERRUPTION thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
must prove the presence of the essential elements of
acquisitive prescription. Requisites of Acquisitive Prescription
A. TYPES OF PRESCRIPTION
★ Other names for acquisitive prescription are a) Capacity of acquirer to acquire by prescription;
1. Acquisitive adverse possession and usucapcion.
b) Capacity of loser to lose by prescription;
Two Types of Acquisitive Prescription
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring c) Object must be susceptible of prescription;
ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse
d) Lapse of required period of time;
 e) Possession must be 4. Action to quiet title if plaintiff is in possession
by prescription or adverse possession. It follows that an
i) In concept of owner; action by the registered owner to recover a real It is an established doctrine in land ownership
property registered under the Torrens System does not disputes that the filing of an action to quiet title is
ii) Public;
prescribe. This rule extends to the heirs of the imprescriptible if the disputed real property is in
iii) Peaceful; and registered owner as well. the possession of the plaintiff. (Syjuco v. Bonifacio
2015)
iv) Continuous or uninterrupted. In recent cases, however, the Court held that while it is
true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and The law creates the obligation of the trustee to
f) For ordinary prescription
imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of
i) Good faith; right to recover possession of his registered property by the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
PD No. 1529 and Article 1456 with Article 1144(2) of
ii) Just title. reason of laches.
the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for the
2. Extinctive Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the
ART 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of that which, by exercising due diligence could or should issuance of the certificate of title.
time fixed by law. have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to There is but one instance when prescription cannot
a. Another name for extinctive prescription is assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is,
litigation of action, liberatory presumption that the party entitled to assert his right when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be
prescription. has either abandoned or declined to assert it. reconveyed. (Heirs of Saludares v. CA)
b. This also refers to Arts 1139 - 1155 as to the The following elements must be present in order to 5. Void contracts
Prescription of Actions or the Statute of constitute laches:
Limitations.
ART 1410. The action or defense for the
1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
Period of Prescription under whom he claims, giving rise to the not prescribe.
situation of which complaint is made for which
Movable Immovable 6. Action to demand partition; distinguished from
the complaint seeks a remedy;
laches
Ordinary 4 years 10 years 2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, ART 494. xxxx NO prescription shall run in favor
Extraordinary 8 years 30 years of the defendant’s conduct and having been of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.
B. WHEN PRESCRIPTION IS 3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert PRESCRIPTION LACHES
INAPPLICABLE the right on which he bases his suit; and

1. By offender 4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the Effect of delay Fact of delay
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or
ART 1133. Movables possessed through a crime the suit is not held to be barred.
can never be acquired through prescription by Matter of time Question of inequity of permitting a c
the offender. 3. Actions to demand right of way; to abate a nuisance be enforced, this inequity being foun
2. Registered lands ART 1143. The following rights, among others some change in the condition
specified elsewhere in this Code, are not property or the relation of the parties
Heirs of Nieto v. Muni of Meycauayan
extinguished by prescription:
An action to recover possession of a registered land
never prescribes in view of the provision of Section 47 1) To demand a right of way; Statutory Not statutory
of PD 1529 to the effect that no title to registered land in 2) To bring an action to abate a public or
derogation of that of a registered owner shall be acquired private nuisance. Applies at law Applies at equity
Based on a fixed Not fixed time 10 a) Mortgage action; ART 1121. Possession is naturally interrupted
time YEARS when through any cause it should cease for > 1
b) Upon a written contract; year.
7. Property of public dominion c) Upon an obligation created by law; The old possession is not revived if a new
d) Upon a judgment. possession should be exercised by the same
ART 1113. xxxx Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall adverse claimant.
6 YEARS a) Upon an oral contract;
not be the object of prescription. ART 1122. If the natural interruption is for only 1
b) Upon a quasi-contract.
8. Other actions that do NOT prescribe year or less, the time elapsed shall be counted in
favor of the prescription.
a) Declaration of contract of marriage as null and 4 YEARS a) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
void or inexistent; b) Upon a quasi-delict; Civil Interruption

b) Probate of will; ART 1123. Civil interruption is produced by

c) Annulment of marriage based on non-age,
fraud, force, or intimidation; judicial summons to the possessor.
c) Right to demand support, but installments on
support in arrears may prescribe; d) Revocation or reduction of donations; ART 1124. Judicial summons shall be deemed not
e) Rescission of contracts; to have been issued and shall not give rise to
d) Generally, an action to recover property
f) Annulment of contracts. interruption:
expressly placed in trust
1) If it should be void for lack of legal
Unless such trust has been unequivocally 1 YEAR a) For forcible entry and detainer; solemnities;
repudiated;
b) For defamation;
2) If the plaintiff should desist from the
e) Action brought by a buyer of land to compel the c) Legal separation; complaint or should allow the
seller to execute the proper deed of conveyance,
d) To impugn the legitimacy of a child; proceedings to lapse;
provided that said buyer is still in possession;
e) Revocation of donation on the ground of 3) If the possessor should be absolved
f) Right of applicant for registered land to ask for a
ingratitude; from the complaint.
writ of possession.
f) Rescission or for damages for sale of
In all these cases, the period of the interruption
C. PRESCRIPTION OR LIMITATION OF immovable encumbered with any non- shall be counted for the prescription.
apparent burden.
ACTIONS
6 Reduction of the price or rescission of a sale ofSUCCESSION
real
1. To recover movables MONTHS estate if the vendor is unable to deliver on demand all
ART 1140. Actions to recover movables shall that is stated in the contract, or included within the
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
prescribe 8 years from the time the possession boundaries;
1. Definition
thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired
5 YEARS All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this 2. Succession occurs at the moment of death
the ownership by prescription for a less period
Code or in other laws must be brought within five
xxx. 3. Kinds of Successors
years from the time the right of action accrues.
2. To recover immovables B. TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

ART 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe D. INTERRUPTION 1. Wills

after 30 years. Interpretation of wills
ART 1125. Any express or tacit recognition which
3. Other actions the possessor may make of the owner's right also Who may make a will
PERIOD ACTION interrupts possession. Notarial Wills
Natural Interruption Witnesses
Holographic Wills
 Incorporation of Document by Reference 2. Succession occurs at the moment of death
Codicils ART 777. The rights to the succession are
Revocation of Wills and Testamentary transmitted from the moment of the death of the
Disposition decedent.
Republication and Revival ART 533. The possession of hereditary property
Allowance of Wills is deemed transmitted to the heir without
Disallowance interruption and from the moment of the death of
2. Institution of heirs the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.
Preterition One who validly renounces an inheritance is
deemed never to have possessed the same.
3. Substitution of heirs
4. Conditional testamentary dispositions and Objects of Succession
testamentary dispositions with a term a. Transmissible rights and obligations
5. Legitime ART 776. The inheritance includes all the
Concurrence of legitime property, rights and obligations of a person
6. Reserva Troncal which are not extinguished by his death.
7. Disinheritance
Rabadilla v. CA
8. Legacies and Devises
Under Article 776 inheritance includes all the property,
C. LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION
rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by
1. General provisions his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
2. Order of intestate succession Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
D. COMMON PROVISIONS transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death.
And since obligations not extinguished by death also
1. Right of Accretion form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr.
2. Capacity to Succeed by will or intestacy
Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
3. Acceptance and Repudiation of the inheritance compulsory heirs upon his death.
4. Collation
5. Partition and Distribution of Estate ART 781. The inheritance of a person includes not
only the property and the transmissible rights
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
and obligations existing at the time of his death,
but also those which have accrued thereto
1. Definition
since the opening of the succession.
ART 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by ART 1311. xxxx The heir is not liable beyond the
virtue of which the property, rights and value of the property he received from the
obligations to the extent of the value of the decedent.
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
Examples of rights NOT extinguished by death, and
his death to another or others either by his will
thereby TRANSMISSIBLE
or by operation of law.
a) Right to bring or continue an accion interdictal;
b) To compel the execution of a document necessary
for convenience;
c) To continue a lease contract;
d) Property right in an insurance policy.
NHA v. Almeida
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her in
over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Cont
Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demis
Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Cont
Sell was an obligation on both parties–Margarita Herrera an
Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obliga
pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by
by operation of law.
Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety
While in our successional system the responsibility of the he
the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value
inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains
that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the dec
but also to his obligations.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature
obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warra
conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contem
as a principal inducement for the contract.
The second exception is intransmissibility by stipulation
parties.
The third exception exists when they are "not transmissi
operation of law" as is the case in
a. legal support,
b. parental authority,
c. usufruct,
d. contracts for a piece of work,
e. partnership and
f. agency.
By contrast, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guara
suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision
the guaranty is extinguished upon the death
guarantor or the surety.
3. Kinds of Successors
ART 782. An heir is a person called to the
succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law.
Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts
of real and personal property are respectively
given by virtue of a will.
Kinds of Succession
a. Testamentary
ART 779. Testamentary succession is that
which results from the designation of an heir,
made in a will executed in the form prescribed by
law.
b. Legal or intestate
ART 960. Legal or intestate succession takes
place:
1) If a person dies without a will, or with a
void will, or one which has subsequently
lost its validity;
2) When the will does not institute an heir
to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator.
In such case, legal succession shall take
place only with respect to the property of
which the testator has not disposed;
3) If the suspensive condition attached to
the institution of heir does not happen or
is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before
the testator, or repudiates the
inheritance, there being no substitution,
and no right of accretion takes place;
4) When the heir instituted is incapable of
succeeding.
c. Mixed
ART 780. Mixed succession is that effected obvious reasons, because it was to take effect after the de
partly by will and partly by operation of law. one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the s
because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own proper
B. TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION the other.
Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latte
1. Wills
acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the savings account of the Bank of America. Being the se
the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take deceased.
effect after his death.
i. testator must have animus testandi
Characteristics
j. Individual
a. purely statutory;
ART 818. Two or more persons cannot make a
b. free and voluntary act;
will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for
c. solemn and formal; their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a
d. disposition of property. third person.
Seangio v. Reyes k. purely personal act
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as aART 784. The making of a will is a strictly
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of personal
a act; it cannot be left in whole or in part
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated andto the discretion of a third person, or
signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to disposeaccomplished through the instrumentality of an
mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative dispositionagent or attorney.
of the latter's property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,Interpretation of wills
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.
a. interpretation should favor validity
e. essentially revocable ART 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of
ART 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
any time before his death. Any waiver or interpretation by which the disposition is to be
restriction of this right is VOID. operative shall be preferred.
f. testator has testamentary capacity b. in case of ambiguities
g. unilateral ART 789. When there is an imperfect description,
h. mortis causa or when no person or property exactly answers
the description, mistakes and omissions must be
Vitug v. CA
corrected, if the error appears from the context of
The conveyance in question is not, first or all, one of mortis causa,the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the
which should be embodied in a will. The monies subject of theoral declarations of the testator as to his intention;
savings account were in the nature of conjugal funds. and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, forthe will, as to the application of any of its
provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the will, taking
into consideration the circumstances under
which it was made, excluding such oral
declarations.
Kinds of Ambiguity
a) Latent or Intrinsic — that which does not
appear on its face, and is discovered only by
evidence aliunde.
b) Patent or Extrinsic — appears on the face of
the will.
How to cure?
a) By examining the will itself;
b) Extrinsic evidence such as WRITTEN
declarations of the testator.
c. interpretation of words
ART 790. The words of a will are to be taken in
their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a
clear intention to use them in another sense can
be gathered, and that other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their
technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it
satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn
solely by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense.
d. interpretation as a whole.
ART 791. The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render
any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy.
“Testacy is preferred over intestacy.”
e. severability of invalid provision existing at the time of the death of the
testator.
ART 792. The invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in
g. extent of interest covered
the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is
to be presumed that the testator would not have ART 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the
made such other dispositions if the first invalid interest which the testator could devise or
disposition had not been made. bequeath in the property disposed of, unless it
f. after-acquired property clearly appears from the will that he intended to
convey a less interest.
ART 793. Property acquired after the making of a
will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had Law governing form
possessed it at the time of making the will, should a. as to time of execution
it expressly appear by the will that such was his
ART 795. The validity of a will as to its form
intention.
depends upon the observance of the law in force
ART 930. The legacy or devise of a thing at the time it is made.
belonging to another person is VOID, if the
Enriquez v. Abadia
testator erroneously believed that the thing
pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law in fo
though not belonging to the testator when he the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed
made the will, afterwards becomes his, by presented in court for probate or when the petition is deci
the court but at the time the instrument was executed
whatever title, the disposition shall take effect.
b. as to place of execution
GR: What is given by the will are those properties
already owned by the testator at the time the Testator Where executed Governing law as to for
will was made, NOT those acquired after.
Filipino Abroad Foreign law as to form (Art 81
EXC:
a) If it expressly appears that it was the Alien Abroad Formalities observed in
a. the place in which he
intention to include after-acquired resides, or
properties; b. his country; or
b) If the will is republished or modified by a c. The NCC. (Art 816)
subsequent will or codicil;
Anyone PH National law (Art 817)
c) If the testator erroneously thought he owned
certain properties, such gift is invalid, unless
Law governing content
after making the will, said properties will
belong to him. a. as to time see ART 2263
d) Legacies of credit or remission are effective b. as to successional rights
only as regards that part of the credit or debt
ART 16. xxxx Intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to
 a) the order of succession and b) Law of the place where he may unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
b) the amount of successional rights and be; injury or other cause.
c) the intrinsic validity of testamentary c) Lex loci celebrationis It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the
provisions, time of making the will to know the
2) An alien abroad:
shall be regulated by the national law of the 1) nature of the estate to be disposed
a) Law of his domicile;
person whose succession is under consideration,
b) His National Law;
of, the
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property c) PH Law; or 2) proper objects of his bounty, and
may be found. the
d) Lex loci celebrationis.
3) character of the testamentary act.
Miciano v. Brimo 3) An alien in PH:
a) His National Law; ART 800. The law presumes that every person
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's b) PH Law.
will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of contrary. xxxx
his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.b) INTRINSIC validity
The fact is, however, that the said condition is VOID, being i) TIME — Successional rights are
contrary to law. Presumption: Testator is of sound mind.
governed at the time of DEATH of
DECEDENT. Burden of Proof on the one alleging the contrary.
Cayetano v. Leonidas EXC: Testator is presumed INSANE if:
ii) PLACE — National law of Decedent
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the subject to the rules on renvoi. Thus, if the a) One month or less before making the will,
petitioner, the private respondents have sufficiently established national law of the decedent refer the he was publicly known to be insane; OR
that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen
matter to the law of his domicile, say PH, b) He made the will after being judicially
and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Thus, the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of then the PH laws must be applied. declared to be such.
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimesWho may make a will Burden of Proof SHIFTS to the one who maintains
and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
a. age the will’s validity.
complete stranger.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of theART 797. Persons of either sex under 18 years of Supervening incapacity
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 ofage cannot make a will.
the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. b. not disqualified by law ART 801. Supervening incapacity does not
invalidate an effective will, nor is the will of an
General Rules on VALIDITY ART 796. All persons who are not expressly
incapable validated by the supervening of
prohibited by law may make a will.
a) EXTRINSIC validity capacity.
c. of sound mind
i) TIME — the law in force when the WILL Kind of Wills
WAS MADE; ART 798. In order to make a will it is essential that a. notarial
the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
ii) PLACE — depends if testator is: ART 804. Every will must be in writing and
execution.
1) Filipino: executed in a language or dialect known to the
ART 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary testator.
a) PH Law;
that the testator be in full possession of all his
b. holographic
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
 ART 810. A person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Notarial Wills
a. General requirements
ART 806. Every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required
to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court
Abangan v. Abangan
In a will consisting two sheets the first of which contains all the
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the
testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the 2. Attested and subscribed by at least 3
attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on
their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
Suroza v. Honrado
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that 5. Attestation clause.
it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously
illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is
void.
b. specific requirements
⭐ART 805. Every will, other than a holographic
will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to
write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages
used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that
the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known
to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
1. Subscribed;
witnesses;
3. Sign each and every page which shall be
numbered in letters;
4. Number of pages shall be stated;
Mercado v. Lacuesta
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to staterequirement
Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to writeorthe
testator's name under his express direction.
The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a
thumbmark. Nera v. Rimando
Testate Estate of Abada v. Abaja
A scrutiny of Abada’s will shows that it has an attestation clause.
The pages are numbered correlatively with the letters “ONE”eachand of them, but that at that moment existing conditions an
“TWO”. The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signedposition
will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
In applying the rule on substantial compliance in determining
the number of witnesses, while the attestation clause do
state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will
that three witnesses signed it.
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation cla
desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-lik
of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if fro
language employed it can reasonably be deduced th
attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.
Azuela v. CA
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the num
pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will
attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witne
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will whic
not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is
defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny pro
notarial will with all three defects is just aching for j
rejection.
Barut v. Cabacungan
It is immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix prov
is written at her request and in her presence and in the prese
all the witnesses to the execution of the will.
Balonan v. Abellana
The name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not a
written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by D
Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the e
that in the law that the testator must himself sign th
that his name be affixed thereto by some other person
presence and by his express direction.
The question whether the testator and the subscribing wit
to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each
does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes
actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscript
the with relation to each other were such that by m
casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have
each other sign.
Taboada v. Rosal
act. corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signi
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and acknowledgement take place.
satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnessesGuerrero v. Bihis
signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the d. substantial compliance
testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will An wasacknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the
officer's jurisdiction is VOID as if the person taking it were whollyART 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or
properly identified by subscribing witness Timkang to be the same
will executed by the testatrix. without official character. fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the
Santos Mitra v. Saban-Guevara 2018 cf. Lopez v. Lopez in Ortega v. Valmonte
1) form of attestation or in the
Art 809
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
2) language used therein
When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testatorexistenceto of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show
subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers tootherwise
the shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showingshall not render the will invalid if it is proved that
logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary of credible evidence of fraud. the will was in fact executed and attested in
disposition ends. As the probate court correctly appreciated, the substantial compliance with all the
last page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition;c. special requirements requirements of Article 805.
it is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.
ART 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, Gil v. Murciano
An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestationhe must personally read the will, if able to do so;
clause indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising theotherwise, he shall designate two persons to Failure to state in the attestation clause that testator sign
will. However, as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was will is fatal, for the precise purpose of the attestation claus
supplied in the Acknowledgment. It was specified therein thatread it and communicate to him, in some certify that the testator signed the will, this being the
the will is composed of four pages, the Acknowledgment included.practicable manner, the contents thereof. essential element of the clause. Without it there is no atte
at all.
ART 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be
Cagro v. Cagro read to him twice; once, by one of the
Caneda v. CA
The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attendingsubscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary
the execution of the will" required by law to be made by thepublic before whom the will is acknowledged. Omissions which can be supplied by an examination of th
attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, w
Garcia v. Vasquez
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowa
the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions
For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the deceased
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result
thereof negatives their participation.
Gliceria del Rosario was like a blind testator, and the due execution
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the w
of her will would have required observance of Art 808.
Cruz v. Villasor An attestation clause that fails to specifically state the fact th
Alvarado v. Gaviola attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, li
cannot be considered as the third instrumen-tal witness since he
Brigido was blind. Since Brigido was incapable of reading thesigned
final the will and every page thereof in the presence
cannot acknowledge before himself his hav-ing signed the will.
drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of testator
their and of each other, is FATALLY DEFECTIVE.
execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there
Javellana v. Ledesma ⭐The rule on substantial compliance must be limit
can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado
disregarding those defects that can be supplied b
comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art 808.
Whether or not the notary signed the certification of examination of the will itself.
acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix andInthe the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and
witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. The newcodicil
Civil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental
Calde v. CA
Code does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the
witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
 b) At least 18 years old; their becoming subsequently incompetent shall
The signatures of some attesting witnesses in decedent’s will and
its codicil were written in blue ink, while the officers were in c) Able to read and write; not prevent the allowance of the will.
black. iv. Competency of interested witnesses
d) Not be blind, deaf or dumb;
Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to e) Domiciled in PH; ART 823. If a person attests the execution of a
disbelieve petitioner's claim that both testamentary documents in will, to whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or
question were subscribed to in accordance with Art. 805. f) Not have been CONVICTED of:
child, a devise or legacy is given by such will,
i) Falsification of a document; such devise or legacy shall, so far only as
Cuevas v. Achacoso
ii) Perjury; or concerns such person, or spouse, or parent, or
An instrumental witness does not merely attest to the signature of iii) False Testimony. child of such person, or any one claiming under
the testator but also to the proper execution of the will. The fact such person or spouse, or parent, or child, be
that the three instrumental witnesses have signed the will VOID, unless there are three other competent
immediately under the signature of the testator, shows that theyART 824. A mere charge on the estate of the
witnesses to such will. However, such person so
have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of his signaturetestator for the payment of debts due at the time
but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such
of the testator's death does not prevent his devise or legacy had not been made or given.
attestation clause.
creditors from being competent witnesses to his
Lopez v. Lopez 2012
will. Holographic Wills
Gonzales v. CA
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages a. general requirements
used upon which the will is written. The instrumental witnesses in order to be competent must be 1. in writing;
shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil
The statement in the Acknowledgement portion of the subject
Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for 2. language known to the testator
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT that it “consists of 7 pages including
their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitledb. specific requirements
the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established
written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will
on record that the witnesses have a good standing in theART 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of
actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which
community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to bethe testator written below his signature must be
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be suchdated and signed by him in order to make
itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde. Thus, the
unless the contrary is established otherwise.
doctrine on substantial compliance cannot be relied upon. them valid as testamentary dispositions.
ii. Disqualifications ART 813. When a number of dispositions
Witnesses
appearing in a holographic will are signed
ART 821. The following are disqualified from
i. who are competent without being dated, and the last disposition has
being witnesses to a will:
a signature and a date, such date validates the
ART 820. Any person of sound mind and of the 1) Any person not domiciled in the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time
age of eighteen years or more, and not Philippines; of prior dispositions.
blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and 2) Those who have been convicted of
ART 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation,
write, may be a witness to the execution of a will falsification of a document, perjury or
erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the
mentioned in article 805 of this Code. false testimony.
testator must authenticate the same by his full
iii. Supervening incompetency
signature.
Qualifications for WITNESSES to notarial wills ART 822. If the witnesses attesting the execution
Roxas v. de Jesus
of a will are competent at the time of attesting,
a) Of sound mind;
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritte
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to
the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when there is But a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holograph
pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure
probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are may not be allowed because comparison can be made wi
and the authenticity of the Will is established, probate of the standard writings of the testator.
powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and
holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case at bench,
substantial compliance.
decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic willAzaolathat v. Singson
the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father. Thus,
Kalaw v. Relova she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, whichSince she the authenticity of the will was not contested, he w
shares with her father's other heirs. required to produce more than one witness; but even
The holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with opinion that Article 811 can not be interpreted as to requ
another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite ofLabrador
full v. CA
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identi
authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the p
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in
be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason denied.
perfect compliance with Article 810. The law does not specify a
that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain
particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The
valid.
only requirements are that the date be in the will itselfCodoy and v. Calugay
executed in the hand of the testator.
Ajero v. CA We cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holog
In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the onlyc. requirements for probate will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to decla
issues to be resolved are: ART 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The w
1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, theshall be necessary that at least one witness found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but wi
decedent's last will and testament; of the respondents.
who knows the handwriting and signature of the
2) whether said will was executed in accordance with thetestator explicitly declare that the will and the
formalities prescribed by law; Incorporation of Document by Reference
signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If
3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentarythe will is contested, at least three of such ART 827. If a will incorporates into itself by
capacity at the time the will was executed; and, witnesses shall be required. reference any document or paper, such document
4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were theIn the absence of any competent witness referred or paper shall not be considered a part of the will
voluntary acts of the decedent. unless the following requisites are present:
to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formaldeem it necessary, expert testimony may be
1) The document or paper referred to in the
solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and
resorted to. will must be in existence at the time
acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806.
Gan v. Yap of the execution of the will;
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures
authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic 2) The will must clearly describe and
or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Art The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic identify the same, stating among other
810. will may NOT be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
things the number of pages thereof;
have seen and/or read such will.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its 3) It must be identified by clear and
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in satisfactory proof as the document or
Rodelas v. Aranza
the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign paper referred to therein; and
and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other 4) It must be signed by the testator and
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best
not render the whole testament void. and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It the witnesses on each and every page,
is necessary that there be a comparison between sample
 except in case of voluminous books of
account or inventories.
Unson v. Abella
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as anand if the revocation takes place in this country,
integral part of it, we find that the foregoing attestation clause is inwhen it is in accordance with the provisions of
compliance which requires this solemnity for the validity of a will,this Code.
and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of
the inventory.
Codicils
1. Definition
ART 825. A codicil is a supplement or addition
to a will, made after the execution of a will and
annexed to be taken as a part thereof, by which
disposition made in the original will is explained,
added to, or altered.
2. Solemnities
ART 826. In order that a codicil may be effective,
it shall be executed as in the case of a will.
Revocation of Wills and Testamentary
Disposition
1. Definition of revocation
An act of the mind, terminating the potential capacity
of the will to operate at the death of the testator,
manifested by some outward or visible act or sign,
symbolic thereof.
It is simply an act to annul a will in whole or in part.
2. When may revocation be effected
ART 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at
any time before his death. Any waiver or
restriction of this right is VOID.
3. Law governing revocation
ART 829. A revocation done outside the
Philippines, by a person who does not have his
domicile in this country, is valid when it is done
according to the law of the place where the will
was made, or according to the law of the place in
which the testator had his domicile at the time;
4. Modes of revocation — Art. 830
a. Revocation by implication of law
1) Testator sells or donates the legacy or devise;
2) Guilty spouse in a suit for legal separation;
3) Heir, legatee or devisee commits an act of
unworthiness;
4) A credit given as a legacy judicially demanded
by testator;
5) Preterition.
b. Revocation by subsequent will/ codicil/ other
writing
1) May be expressed or implied, as when there
is complete inconsistency between the two
wills.
2) There is nothing wrong in making the
revocation conditional.
c. Revocation by physical destruction
Requisites:
1) There must be an overt act;
2) Completion of at least the subjective phase
of the overt act;
3) Animus revocandi;
4) At the time of revoking, testator had capacity;
5) Done by the testator himself, or by some
other person in his presence and by his
express direction.
Maloto v. CA
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like b
in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revo
unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi
part of the testator.
There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with
requirements. For one, the document or papers burn
Adriana's maid, Guadalope, was not satisfactorily establishe
a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For anoth
burning was not proven to have been done under the e
direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not
presence.
5. Implied revocation
ART 831. Subsequent wills which do not revoke
the previous ones in an express manner,
annul only such dispositions in the prior wills
as are inconsistent with or contrary to those
contained in the later wills.
6. Effect of revocation
ART 833. A revocation of a will based on a false
cause or an illegal cause is null and void.
ART 834. The recognition of an illegitimate
child does not lose its legal effect, even though
the will wherein it was made should be revoked.
7. Doctrine of dependent relative revocation
ART 832. A revocation made in a subsequent will
shall take effect, even if the new will should
become inoperative by reason of the incapacity of
the heirs, devisees or legatees designated therein,
or by their renunciation.
Molo v. Molo
The rule is established that where the act of destruct
connected with the making of another will so as fairly to ra
inference that the testator meant the revocation of the
depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition intended
substituted, the revocation will be conditional and depe
upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any r

the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative,
the revocation fails and the original will remains in full
force.
A subsequent will, containing a revocatory clause,
having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of law as
to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said
revocatory clause is void. Thus, the earlier will can
still be admitted to probate under the principle
of "dependent relative revocation".
Republication and Revival
ART 835. The testator cannot republish, without
reproducing in a subsequent will, the dispositions
contained in a previous one which is void as to its
form.
Republication is the process of re-establishing a will,
which has become useless because of its nullity or it
having been revoked. It is made by:
1) Re-execution of the original will (COPYING the
original provisions);
2) Execution of a codicil or implied republication.
ART 836. The execution of a codicil referring to a
previous will has the effect of republishing the
will as modified by the codicil.
1) To republish a VOID will as to form, all
dispositions must be reproduced in the
new will.
2) To republish a valid but REVOKED will,
the execution of a codicil which makes
reference to that will is sufficient.
ART 837. If after making a will, the testator makes
a second will expressly revoking the first, the
revocation of the second will does not revive the
first will, which can be revived only by another
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property
will or codicil.
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed
1) Republication is an act of the testator, whereas absence of Alfredo.
Revival takes place by operation of law.
2) Samples of Revival In probate proceedings, the court —
a) Preterition nullifies the institution. But If a) Orders the probate of the will;
the omitted heir dies ahead of the b) Grants letters testamentary or letters with a will
testator, the institution is revived. (Art annexed;
856) c) Hears and approves claims against the estate;
b) If testator makes a second will that d) Orders the payment of lawful debts;
impliedly revokes the first, the
e) Authorizes the sale, mortgage, or any other
revocation of the second will revives the
encumbrance of real estate;
first. (Art 837)
f) And directs the delivery of the estate or
Allowance of Wills properties to those who are entitled thereto.
NB: Even if a will is never probated, property may be
ART 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
transmitted if a partition agreement is entered
property unless it is proved and allowed in
into which is based on the will.
accordance with the Rules of Court.
3. Modes of probate
The testator himself may, during his lifetime,
petition the court having jurisdiction for the a) DURING testator’s lifetime; Ante mortem
allowance of his will. b) AFTER death. Post mortem
1. Concept of probate. → TWO PARTS:
Probate is the act of proving before a competent court 1) Probate Proper — deals with EXTRINSIC
the due execution of a will by a person possessed of validity;
testamentary capacity, as well as approval of said
2) Inquiry into INTRINSIC validity and
court.
DISTRIBUTION of estate.
2. Necessity of probate
→ Any person interested in the probate of the
Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan will may file a petition.
4. Effect of allowance of wills
Without having been probated, the last will and testament could
not be the source of any right. 1) The probate proper or ALLOWANCE of the will is
binding upon the WHOLE WORLD insofar as
Seangio v. Reyes
a) Testamentary capacity; AND
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the b) Due execution
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
are concerned.
disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
2) It is NOT an interlocutory order, and is therefore
immediately appealable.
3) Proceeding for distribution of properties NOT
proceeding in rem and cannot affect persons
stranger to the case.
4) Distribution is the division, by order of the court
having authority, among those entitled thereto,
of the estate of a person, after the payment of
debts and charges.
5) A competent court to conduct probate must be
the RTC of the province
a) Where NON-RESIDENT testator has real
estate;
b) Where RESIDENT testator resided at the
time of his death.
6) The following are NOT included in the probate
order as they delve into the INTRINSIC validity
of the will:
a) Exclusion of widow from inheritance;
b) Disinheritance of a child;
c) Impairment of legitime;
d) Declaring a certain woman the true wife
of testator;
e) Partitioning of conjugal properties;
f) Right of a widow to inherit;
g) Titles to property, and annulment of
alleged fraudulent sales.
These matters are to be brought in the 2nd part,
and if disposed of in the first, CANNOT be res
judicata.
7) The probate court can decide provisionally
questions of title for the purpose of inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory, without prejudice
to a final determination of the question in a
separate action. Adverse claims of ownership
must be ventilated in an independent action. The
appropriate step is for the claimant to have the
proper annotation of lis pendens.
8) Thus, the GR is that a probate court has NO
jurisdiction to decide question of ownership
EXC:
a) When the parties voluntarily submit the
matter to the court; OR
b) To decide provisionally to determine
whether to include the property in the
inventory.
9) Exclusion of properties from the inventory is an
interlocutory order and may not be appealed
until the entire case is elevated on appeal.
10) Proof of filiation may be allowed in probate
proceedings if it is essential to establish which of
the two wills has been revoked.
It can also be given to prove prima facie WON an
oppositor or intervenor who claims to be related
to the testator, can be allowed to intervene for
the purpose of protecting his rights.
11) An acknowledged natural child has two
alternatives to prove his status and interest in
the estate of his deceased parent:
a) Intervene in the probate proceeding, if
still open; OR
b) Ask that it be reopened if already closed.
12) There is NO prescriptive period for instituting
probate proceedings.
13) ESTOPPEL is NOT applicable as well.
14) Before properties are to be distributed,
a) There must be a decree of partition;
b) Then, payment of estate tax.
15) When deceased was a defendant in a money
claim, the case should be dismissed and refiled
with the probate court. Had the claim be based
on an action that subsists, such as tort, the same
must be continued.
16) Probate proceedings are TERMINATED:
a) Upon approval of the project of
partition;
b) Granting of petition to close the
proceedings; and
c) Issuance of the order of distribution
directing the delivery of the properties to
the heirs.
17) Matters that should be brought up before the
probate court:
a) Determination of heirs;
b) Proof of filiation;
c) Determination of estate of decedent; AND
d) Claims thereto.
Gallanosa v. Arcangel
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as
voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.
De la Cerna v. Potot
The probate decree in 1939 could only affect the share
deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not inclu
disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, wh
then still alive.
Maninang v. CA
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy re
it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof g
the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his prope
Will may be rendered nugatory.
Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
Preterition 'consists in the omission in the testator's will
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they a
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are n
 should be his will at the time of affixing ii) Heir certain or ascertainable;
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
his signature thereto. see ART 1331. iii) No preterition.
Disinheritance, in turn, 'is a testamentary disposition depriving
any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause Pascual v. De la Cruz c) Must be EFFECTIVE.
authorized by law.' i) No predecease;
The contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the
testimonies of the witnesses and the notary, pointed out by the ii) No repudiation;
Nepomuceno v. CA
appellants, relate to unimportant details or to impressions of the iii) No incapacity of heir.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when witnessesafter about certain details which could have been affected by
declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass uponthe thelapse of time and the treachery of human memory, and which
2. Effect if will institute no heir
inconsisten-cies,
intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the by themselves would not alter the probative
petitioner null and void. value of their testimonies on the due execution of the will. ART 841. A will shall be VALID even though it
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the should
making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery Reyes v. Barreto-Datu
1) not contain an institution of an heir, or
or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes VOID. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. TheThe veryonly instance that we can think of in which a party interested 2) such institution should not comprise the
wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator in a probate proceeding may have a final liquida-tion set aside is entire estate, and
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he is left out by reason of circums-tances beyond his control
when
he had been living in concubinage. or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 3) even though the person so instituted
Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the should not accept the inheritance or
same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, should be incapacitated to succeed.
Disallowance instead of an independ-ent action. In such cases the testamentary dispositions made
ART 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of in accordance with law shall be complied with
2. Institution of heirs
the following cases: and the remainder of the estate shall pass to
ART 840. Institution of heir is an act by virtue of the legal heirs. (intestate succession applies)
1) If the formalities required by law have
not been complied with; which a testator designates in his will the person 3. Freedom of Disposition
or persons who are to succeed him in his
2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise ART 842. One who has no compulsory heirs
property and transmissible rights and
mentally incapable of making a will, at may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of
obligations.
the time of its execution; it in favor of any person having capacity to
1) Institution of an Heir is defined as: succeed.
3) If it was executed through force or under
duress, or the influence of fear, or a) A voluntary act that cannot affect the One who has compulsory heirs may dispose
threats; see ART 1335. legitime; of his estate provided he does not contravene the
4) If it was procured by undue and b) Generally applicable to devises and legacies; provisions with regard to the legitime of said
improper pressure and influence, on heirs.
c) Applicable only in testamentary succession;
the part of the beneficiary or of some 4. Disposition in favor of a definite class
d) May be done to a conceived child.
other person; see ART 1337.
2) Requisites ART 845. Every disposition in favor of an
5) If the signature of the testator was unknown person shall be VOID, unless by
a) Will is EXTRINSICALLY valid;
procured by fraud; see ART 1338. some event or circumstance his identity becomes
b) Institution INTRINSICALLY valid; AND certain. However, a disposition in favor of a
6) If the testator acted by mistake or did
not intend that the instrument he signed i) Legitime not impaired; definite class or group of persons shall be
VALID.
 Unknown person — one who cannot be identified in
the will; not one who is a stranger to the testator.
5. Equality of heirs — FIRST RULE
ART 846. Heirs instituted without designation of
shares shall inherit in equal parts.
Exception is when the instituted heir is likewise a
compulsory heir, since he automatically gets ½
or the legitime. His equal share will only pertain
to the free portion.
6. Individuality of institution — SECOND RULE
1) As to VOLUNTARY heir — no right of
would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of the cause. representation; his heir gets NOTHING;
Article 850 is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause2) As to COMPULSORY heir — his heir will get his
the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. share in the legitime as his representative.
Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after
an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have3) As to INCAPACITATED heir — same as for
made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. compulsory heir;
4) As to REPUDIATING heir — no right of
9. Shares in the institution
representation; his heir gets NOTHING.
ART 851. If the testator has instituted only one
heir, and the institution is limited to an Preterition

ART 847. When the testator institutes some heirs
individually and others collectively as when he
says, "I designate as my heirs A and B, and the
children of C," those collectively designated
shall be considered as individually
instituted, unless it clearly appears that the
intention of the testator was otherwise.
7. Simultaneity of institution — THIRD RULE
ART 849. When the testator calls to the
succession a person and his children, they are all
deemed to have been instituted
simultaneously and not successively.
8. Institution based on a false cause
ART 850. The statement of a false cause for the
institution of an heir shall be considered as not
written, unless it appears from the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if
he had known the falsity of such cause.
Austria v. Reyes
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Arti-cle 850
of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur:
First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in
the will;
Second, the cause must be shown to be false; and
Third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator
aliquot part of the inheritance, legal
succession takes place with respect to the
remainder of the estate.
The same rule applies if the testator has
instituted several heirs, each being limited to an
aliquot part, and all the parts do not cover the
whole inheritance.
ART 852. If xxxx aliquot parts together do not
cover the whole inheritance, or the whole free
portion, each part shall be increased
proportionally.
ART 853. If xxxx the parts together exceed the
whole inheritance, or the whole free portion, as
the case may be, each part shall be reduced
proportionally.
10. Predecease of heirs
ART 856. A voluntary heir who dies before the
testator transmits nothing to his heirs.
A compulsory heir who dies before the
testator, a person incapacitated to succeed, and
one who renounces the inheritance, shall
transmit no right to his own heirs except in cases
expressly provided for in this Code.
Effect of Predecease
ART 854. The preterition or omission of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of
the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before
the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.
ART 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the
testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be
fully satisfied. — Remedy of COMPLETION OF
LEGITIME.
1. Concept. Preterition or pretermission is the
omission, whether intentional or not, of a compulsory
heir in the inheritance of a person.
Effects:
1) Institution of heirs is VOID, without need of court
action;
2) Legacies and devises shall remain VALID insofar
as they are NOT inofficious.
2. Requisites
a) There is a TOTAL omission in the inheritance;
 b) The omission must be of a COMPULSORY heir; Escuin v. Escuin 2) If the charges or conditions are personally
and applicable only to the heir instituted.
The testator wished to dispose of his property in his will,
c) The compulsory heir omitted must be in the altogether ignoring his recognized natural child who is2. Kinds his of substitution
DIRECT line. general heir. In view thereof, and for the reason that he exceeded
his rights, the said designation of heirs became void in so far as
ART 858. Substitution of heirs may be:
Nuguid v. Nuguid it impaired the right of his general heir and deprived him of 1) Simple or common; sustitución vulgar
his legal portion; the will, however, is valid with respect to the
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate two-thirds
or of the property which the testator could freely dispose 2) Brief or compendious; sustitución
of. —
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line brevilocua o compendiosa
her parents, now oppositors. And, the will completely omits both
3) Reciprocal; sustitucion reciproca or
of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly,The theyabove-mentioned will is neither null, void, nor illegal in so far
were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly as the testator leaves two-thirds of his property to his father and
4) Fideicommissary. sustitución
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. wife; testamentary provisions impairing the legal portion of a
general heir shall be reduced in so far as they are illegal or fideicomisaria
Article 854 merely nullifies "the institution of heir." excessive. a. simple or common
Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for
the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more,JLT Agro v. Balansag ART 859. The testator may designate one or more
the result is the same. The entire will is null. persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since whatin case such heir or heirs
Morales v. Olondriz 2016 he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as
evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it 1) should die before him, (predecease) or
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to 2) should not wish, (renounce or
Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the thedeath of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a
repudiate) or
decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir inlegal the heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties
direct line. There was preterition. which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don 3) should be incapacitated to accept the
Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise inheritance. (incapacity)
Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line.
Balanay v. Martinez
Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s NOTE: heirs
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse.from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is1. The substitute enters the inheritance, not as
His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
heir succeeding the first heir, but as an heir of
signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his
hereditary rights. 3. Substitution of heirs the testator.

ART 857. Substitution is the appointment of 2. Instances when substitution is extinguished:

Aznar v. Duncan another heir so that he may enter into the a) Substitute predeceases the testator;
Helen Garcia is only entitled to the COMPLETION OF HERinheritance in default of the heir originally b) Substitute is incapacitated;
LEGITIME. instituted.
c) Substitute renounces;
Effect on the Substitution of Charges and Conditions
Solano v. CA d) Institution of heir is annulled;
Imposed in the Institution. (Art 862)
e) Institution or substitution is revoked;
The preterition of the GARCIAS should annul the institution ofGR: If substitute inherits, he MUST FULFILL the
ZONIA as heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs conditions imposed on the original. f) Will is void or revoked.
is impaired. The Will, therefore, is valid subject to that limitation.
EXC: b. brief or compendious
In the case at bar, there is a specific bequest or legacy so that
Article 854 applies merely annulling the "institution of heir". 1) If testator has expressly provided the
contrary;
 ART 860. Two or more persons may be
substituted for one (BRIEF); and one person for
two or more heirs (COMPENDIOUS).
c. reciprocal
ART 861. If heirs instituted in unequal shares
should be reciprocally substituted, the substitute
shall acquire the share of the heir who dies,
renounces, or is incapacitated, unless it clearly
appears that the intention of the testator was
otherwise. If there are more than one substitute,
they shall have the same (proportionate) share
in the substitution as in the institution.
IOW: The instituted heirs are also made substitutes of
each other.
d. fideicommisary
1. An indirect substitution by virtue of which a
testator institutes a 1st heir, and charges him to
preserve and transmit the whole or part of the
inheritance later on to a 2nd heir.
2. BOTH 1st and 2nd heirs inherit.
Requisites and Limitations:
a) FIRST HEIR called primarily to the enjoyment of
the property;
b) An OBLIGATION clearly imposed upon him TO
PRESERVE and TRANSMIT to a 3rd person the
whole or part of the inheritance; (Art 863)
c) SECOND HEIR;
d) 1st and 2nd heirs must be ONE DEGREE APART;
(Art 863)
★ Relationship is counted from the 1st heir.
e) Both ALIVE (or at least conceived) at the time of
testator’s death; (Art 863)
f) Made in an EXPRESS manner; (Art 865)
g) Must NOT BURDEN THE LEGITIME; (Art 864)
h) Must NOT BE CONDITIONAL.
i. Fiduciary fiduciaro
NOTE: Deductions to be made in case of transmittal:
a) Legitimate expenses — necessary repairs for
preservation; increase in the value through useful
improvements;
b) Legitimate credits;
c) Legitimate improvements.
ii. Fideicommisary heir fideicomisario
ART 866. The second heir shall acquire a right to
the succession from the time of the testator's
death, even though he should die before the
fiduciary. The right of the second heir shall pass
to his heirs.
In other words. The 2nd heir inherits not from the 1st
heir but from the testator himself.
The 2nd heir may predecease the 1st heir, transmitting his
rights to his own heirs. But neither should predecease
the testator.
ART 867. The following shall not take effect:
1) Fideicommissary substitutions which are
not made in an express manner,
either by giving them this name, or
imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute
obligation to deliver the property to a
second heir;
2) Provisions which contain a perpetual
prohibition to alienate, and even a
temporary one, beyond the limit fixed in
article 863; (Note: To be read with Art
870)
3) Those which impose upon the heir the
charge of paying to various persons
successively, beyond the limit prescribed
in article 863, a certain income or
pension;
4) Those which leave to a person the whole
or part of the hereditary property in
order that he may apply or invest the
same according to secret instructions
communicated to him by the testator.
ART 868. The nullity of the fideicommissary
substitution does not prejudice the validity of the
institution of the heirs first designated; the
fideicommissary clause shall simply be
considered as NOT written.
ART 869. A provision whereby the testator leaves
to a person the whole or part of the inheritance,
and to another the USUFRUCT, shall be valid. If
he gives the usufruct to various persons, not
simultaneously, but successively, the provisions
of Article 863 shall apply.
Rabadilla v. CA
In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject
do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil prov
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulf
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to s
seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here
instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to aliena
property provided the negotiation is with the near descenda
the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important elemen
fideicommissary substitution is lacking — the obligation
imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the proper
its transmission to the second heir.
Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix
definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part
usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitu
also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir
fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduci
fideicommissary substitution is therefore void if the first
not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case
 4. Conditional testamentary b) Ascendants or descendants of deceased
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. dispositions and testamentary spouse
dispositions with a term 3) Relative prohibition to contract a 1st
Perez v. Garchitorena marriage or remarry — VALID unless it
1. Conditional
becomes burdensome.
All the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution are present inART 871. The institution of an heir may be made
the case now under consideration, to wit: 4) Condition to marry a particular person or at a
conditionally, or for a certain purpose or cause.
1. A first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. particular place or time — VALID unless
NOTE: The condition may be imposed only on the free
In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called impossible or illegal.
to the enjoyment of the estate. portion, never on the legitime. (Art 904) c. Disposicion captatoria — VOID
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preservea. Kinds
and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the ART 875. Any disposition made upon the
estate. 1) With a condition; condition that the heir shall make some provision
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress 2) With a term; in his will in favor of the testator or of any other
instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs. 3) For a certain purpose or cause (modal) person shall be VOID.

Thus, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiressb. Inoperative conditions d. Compliance
instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her
ART 872. The testator cannot impose any charge, ART 876. Any purely potestative condition
children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix.
condition, or substitution whatsoever upon the imposed upon an heir must be fulfilled by him as
legitimes prescribed in this Code. Should he do soon as he learns of the testator's death.
Crisologo v. Singson
so, the same shall be considered as not imposed. This rule shall NOT apply when the condition,
The substitution of heirs is not expressly made of the
NOTE: already complied with, cannot be fulfilled again.
fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to The only prohibition that is VALID is against the
the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy partition of the legitime for a period not exceeding 20 e. Effect
usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked years. (Art 1083)
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As ART 879. If the potestative condition imposed
already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death—ART 873. Impossible conditions and those upon the heir is negative, or consists in not
whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix—hercontrary to law or good customs shall be doing or not giving something, he shall comply
share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix. considered as not imposed and shall in no manner by giving a security (caucion muciana) that
Thus, the will established a mere sustitucion vulgar, theprejudice the heir, even if the testator should he will not do or give that which has been
substitution of Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of theotherwise provide. prohibited by the testator, and that in case of
testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death ofNOTES the ON ART 874: contravention he will return whatever he may
former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix. have received, together with its fruits and
1) Absolute prohibition to contract a 1st
interests.
3. Time-limitation on inalienability marriage - VOID;
2) Absolute prohibition to remarry ART 880. If the heir be instituted under a
ART 870. The dispositions of the testator
suspensive condition or term, the estate
declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for GR: VOID;
shall be placed under administration until
more than 20 years are VOID. EXC: When imposed on the widow or widower
the condition is fulfilled, or until it becomes
by
certain that it cannot be fulfilled, or until the
a) Deceased spouse; arrival of the term.
 The same shall be done if the heir does not give
the security required in the preceding article.
2. With a term
a. Kinds
1) Suspensive term or ex die;
2) Resolutory term or in diem;
3) Ex die in diem.
b. Effect
ART 878 A disposition with a suspensive term
does not prevent the instituted heir from
acquiring his rights and transmitting them to his
heirs even before the arrival of the term.
ART 885(2). In both cases, the legal heir shall be
considered as called to the succession until the
arrival of the period or its expiration. But in the
first case he shall not enter into possession of the
property until after having given sufficient
security, with the intervention of the instituted
heir.
c. Modal
ART 882. The statement of the object of the
institution, or the application of the property left
by the testator, or the charge imposed by him,
shall not be considered as a condition unless it
appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be
claimed at once provided that the instituted heir
or his heirs give security for compliance with
the wishes of the testator and for the return of
anything he or they may receive, together with its
fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard
this obligation.
NOTE:
1) Occurs when any or all of the following are stated:
a) Object of the institution;
b) Application of the property left by the
testator;
c) The charge imposed by the testator.
2) One practical difference between modal and
conditional institution is when the condition is
suspensive. In modal, inheritance can be
immediately demanded upon giving of the bond,
whereas in conditional, property is placed under
administration in the meantime.
3) Some principles:
a) When in doubt between condition or
mode, MODE;
b) When in doubt between mode or
suggestion, SUGGESTION;
c) Condition suspends but does not
obligate; Mode obligates but does not
suspend.
ART 883. When without the fault of the heir, the
modal cannot take effect, it shall be complied
with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with the testator’s wishes.
If the person interested in the condition should
prevent its fulfillment, without the fault of the
heir, the condition shall be deemed to have been
complied with.
5. Legitime
1. Concept
ART 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's
property which he cannot dispose of because
the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are,
therefore, called compulsory heirs.
Manongsong v. Estimo
We find no basis for the trial court's declaration that the sale
embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs ofCompulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5
Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivosare not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither
by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuabledo they exclude one another. xxxx
consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller
the disposition is for valuable consideration, there
diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values,
the property sold is replaced by the equivalent mo
consideration.
Sps. Joaquin v. CA
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the prop
subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court
petitioners' right to their parents' properties is merely in
and vests only upon their parents' death. While still livin
parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties.
Raymundo v. Vda de Suarez
Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs, exc
secondary compulsory heirs, and preferred over conc
compulsory heirs in the distribution of the decedent's est
fine, Teofista's ownership over the subject properties
absolute. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the s
properties, only that portion could have been, and was ac
levied upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of R
2. Who are entitled
ART 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1) Legitimate children and descendants,
with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and
descendants;
3) The widow or widower;
4) Acknowledged natural children, and
natural children by legal fiction;
5) Other illegitimate children referred to
in article 287.
 ART 902. The rights of illegitimate children are Still ONE-HALF if couple had been living as
SS gets
transmitted upon their death to their husband and wife for more than 5 years. equal to
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Estate of an Illegitimate Child legitime of
89 IC
one LCD;
Baritua v. CA 1) If parents only compulsory heir, ONE HALF of 7 SS (At (At
LCD IC gets ½ of
89 most) mos
estate;. one LCD.
The parents of the deceased succeed ONLY when the latter dies 8 t)
TN: There
2) If there are children, parents get no legitime;
without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving could be FD
spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. Mere estrangement is3) If surviving spouse + parents, the spouse gets left.
NOT a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving
spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. ONE FOURTH, the parents also get ONE FOURTH.
89 S F
SUMMARY OF CONCURRENCE OF LEGITIMES LPA IC D
9 S
Concurrence of Legend: LCD - Legitimate Children or Descendants; LPA -
SS only
legitime Legitimate Parents or Ascendants; SS - Surviving Spouse; compulsory
IC - Illegitimate Children; FD - Free Disposal heir; At
Rules in Cases of Concurrence of Legitimate and SS FD
least living
Illegitimate Children Art DISTRIBUTION NOTES
as spouse
1) First, Give the legitime to the legitimate children for 5 years.
and surviving spouse, if any; 88
LCD FD 90 Marriage in
8
2) Second, Give the legitime of illegitimate children, 0 articulo
½ of a legitimate one - if estate sufficient; 88 mortis AND
LPA FD testator
9
3) Third, if NOT sufficient, give whatever remains to SS (⅓) FD died within
the illegitimate. If 2 or more 3 months
LCD, SS from
Requisites: 89 SS (At marriage,
LCD FD gets equal
2 most) SS 1/3
1) At least one legitimate parent or ascendant; to legitime
of one LCD.
2) Surviving spouse; AND 90
IC FD
3) At least one illegitimate child. 89 1
LPA SS FD
3
TN: DOES NOT apply when there are legitimate children If only IPA
or descendants. 89 as
IC (⅓) SS (⅓) FD (⅓) compulsory
4
Rules as to Surviving Spouse heirs; If
GR: Surviving spouse gets ONE-HALF of the estate, if This IPA FD there are
assumes 1 90 children
only compulsory heir.
89 IC (At LCD and 1 3 left, IPA
EXC: Only ONE-THIRD if: LCD FD
5 most) IC. IC gets gets
½ of one NOTHING.
1) Marriage in articulo mortis; AND
LCD.
2) Testator dies within 3 months from celebration of IPA SS FD
marriage. 89
LPA IC FD
6
EXC to the EXC: TIPS AND TRICKS IN DETERMINING LEGITIME
Generally:
1) Compulsory Heirs ALWAYS get at least ONE-
HALF of the Estate;
Only exception is an SS married in articulo
mortis.
2) LCD and LPA, whether concurring with other
compulsory heirs or not, ALWAYS get ONE-
HALF of the estate.
3) SS = 1 LCD; 1 IC = ½ of 1 LCD.
Specifically:
4) If an SS or IC concur with LPA, each of the
former gets ONE-FOURTH.
If an SS and IC concur with LPA, IC gets ONE-
FOURTH, SS gets ONE-EIGHTH.
5) If SS and IC concur, each gets ONE-THIRD.
6) If IPA and SS concur, each gets ONE-
FOURTH.
3. Restrictions regarding the legitime
ART 904. The testator cannot deprive his
compulsory heirs of their legitime, except in cases
expressly specified by law.
Neither can he impose upon the same any
burden, encumbrance, condition, or substitution
of any kind whatsoever.
ART 905. Every renunciation or compromise as
regards a future legitime between the person
owing it and his compulsory heirs is VOID, and
the latter may claim the same upon the death of
the former; but they must bring to collation
whatever they may have received by virtue of the
renunciation or compromise.
4. Determination or computation
ART 908. NET HEREDITARY ESTATE =
PROPERTY LEFT — DEBTS and
CHARGES + COLLATIONABLE
DONATIONS
ART 909 Donations given to children shall be
charged to their legitime.
Donations made to strangers shall be charged
to free portion.
ART 911. After the legitime has been determined,
the reduction shall be made as follows:
1) Donations shall be respected as long as
the legitime can be covered, reducing or
annulling, if necessary, the devises or
legacies made in the will;
2) The reduction of the devises or legacies
shall be pro rata, without any
distinction whatever.
If the testator has directed that a certain
devise or legacy be paid in preference to
others, it shall not suffer any reduction
until the latter have been applied in full
to the payment of the legitime.
3) If the devise or legacy consists of a
usufruct or life annuity, whose value
may be considered greater than that of
the disposable portion, the compulsory
heirs may choose between complying
with the testamentary provision and
delivering to the devisee or legatee the
part of the inheritance of which the
testator could freely dispose.
Order of Preference in the Hereditary Estate
1) Legitimes;
2) Donations inter vivos;
3) Preferred legacies and devises;
4) All other legacies and devises pro rata.
TN: Reduction be made in the inverse order of payment.
Cross Reference to Art 950
1) Art 911 applies when aside from the legacies and
devises, there are also legitimes and donations
inter vivos to be preserved.
2) Art 950 only applies when there are no
compulsory heirs and donations to speak of. They
are paid in the following order: (RPSESA)
a) Remuneratory
b) Preferred;
c) Support
d) Education;
e) Specific, Determinate things;
f) All others pro rata;
ART 912. Reduction of Inofficious Devises
1) If the reduction < ½ the value of devise, it
goes to the DEVISEE, but he must reimburse
the compulsory heirs of such reduction.
2) If reduction => ½, it goes to the
COMPULSORY HEIRS, but they must
reimburse the devisee the amount equal to
the Value of Devise - Reduction.
ART 913. If the heirs or devisees do not choose to
avail themselves of the right granted by the
preceding article, any heir or devisee who did not
have such right may exercise it; should the latter
not make use of it, the property shall be sold at
public auction at the instance of any one of the
interested parties.
5. Freedom to dispose free portion
ART 914. The testator may devise and bequeath
the free portion as he may deem fit.
6. Presumptive Legitime
STEPS TO DETERMINE LEGITIMES, INOFFICIOUS
DONATIONS AND EXCESSIVE LEGACIES AND DEVISES
 1) From the value of property left, SUBTRACT debts
and charges;
2) ADD to (1) all the COLLATIONABLE DONATIONS;
3) From the NET HEREDITARY ESTATE, determine
the actual legitimes of the surviving compulsory
heirs;
4) CHARGE or IMPUTE donations;
5) ADD Donations to LEGACIES and DEVISES;
6. Reserva Troncal
Illustration
1. Concept
ART 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.
People Involved in Reserva Troncal
1) ORIGIN. The ascendant or sibling from whom the
property came;
2) PROPOSITUS. The descendant who acquired the
property gratuitously.
3) RESERVOR or RESERVISTA. The ascendant who
acquired the property from the propositus by
operation of law.
How Reserva EXTINGUISHED
4) RESERVEES or RESERVATARIOS. The relatives
within the 3rd degree belonging to the line from
which the property came.
2. Requisites
Three transmissions are involved:
1) a first transmission by lucrative title
(inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or
brother or sister to the deceased descendant;
2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law
(intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in
favor of another ascendant, the reservor or
reservista, which two transmissions precede the
reservation, and
3) a third transmission of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the
reservista to the reservatarios or the relatives
within the third degree from the deceased
descendant belonging to the line of the origin.
1) Death of Reservista;
2) ALL Reservatarios PREDECEASE the Reservista;
3) LOSS of reservable property without fault of the
reservista;
4) Prescription;
5) Registration under the Torrens System as free
from reservation;
6) Renunciation or waiver of ALL reservatarios
AFTER death of reservista.
IMPORTANT Points
1) The Propositus must have no spouse nor
descendant for reserva to operate, or no issue.
2) Reservista must inherit from the propositus via
intestate succession or by virtue of the legitime.
If he inherits from the free portion, there is NO
reserva to speak of.
3) The reservista is a FULL Owner subject to a
resolutory condition that if at the time of his
death, there should still exist relatives within the
3rd civil degree of the propositus, and belonging
to the line from which the property came, his
ownership over the property is terminated.
4) Duty to make an inventory. Generally, the
reservista must make an INVENTORY of the
reservable property, and must furnish a BOND,
SECURITY, or MORTGAGE to guarantee the safe
delivery of the property to the reservatarios.
5) The reservista has the duty to register the
reservable nature of the property with the
Register of Deeds. Should he fail to comply, the
reservatarios can bring an action to compel him
to register.
6) Notwithstanding the reserva, the reservista may
still alienate the reservable property. However,
his estate is liable to reimburse the reservatarios
for whatever they have lost due to the alienation
of such property.
7) The reservatarios inherit the property from the
propositus and not from the reservista. They
must be LEGITIMATE relatives of the Origin and
Propositus. Relationship by affinity is
excluded.
8) At the moment the propositus dies, the
reservatarios have an EXPECTANCY. At the
 moment the reservista dies, all those surviving
have a DEFINITE RIGHT subject to the rules of
a) Preference of the Direct Line to the
Collateral Line; and
b) The nearer excludes the farther.
9) Right of representation is still applicable
provided the representative himself is a relative
within the 3rd civil degree of the propositus.
10) How much is reservable? For example, P
received from O by virtue of a will P200K. P
already had P400K. Upon the death of P, he had
P600K that was passed on to RR. Two theories:
a) Reserva maxima. Reservable property
includes all that can be included in the
half constituting the legitime of the
reservista. Thus, ALL of the P200K must
be reserved.
b) Reserva minima. Only half of the
property received from the origin should
be reserved. Thus, only half of P200K, or
P100K, must be reserved.
According to Manresa, reserva minima should be
followed because it is more just, equitable and
logical.
Gonzalez v. CFI
Additional points re Reserva Troncal are the following:
1. The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters.
2. The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the
reservor but he can require that the reservable character of
the property be recognized by the purchaser.
3. The renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable
property is illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance.
4. The reservor can-not make a disposition mortis causa of the
reservable properties as long as the reservees survivedReversion
reservor.
5. without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respec
The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reservee
of Faustino (the praepositus), they are excluded fro
to whom the reserv-able property should be awarded.
succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although th
a. Upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to to him within the same degree as the latter.
related
the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation
of law, the owner of the reservable property." Sumaya v. IAC
The buyers are NOT innocent purchasers for value and in
Mendoza v. Delos Santos 2013 faith of the disputed properties regardless of the abse
annotations of their reservable character.
The properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant).
After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the
The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo
properties as inheritance. the source of the properties thereby showing the rese
nature thereof was registered with the Register of De
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the
Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole wo
property should be an ascendant (also known as the
accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Dec
reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however,
is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Re
relative. of Property of the right reserved in real property sub
reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva tronca
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/
despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Cod
reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of
rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second para
Gregoria from whom the properties came. The conclusion,
of Section 51 of P.D. 1529.
therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are
reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva
troncal. Solivio v. CA
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana Jr.,
Chua v. CFI reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascenda
the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from wh
As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free
inherited the properties in question.
from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. It does
not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this7. Disinheritance
case
1.
Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standard Oil Co. of New York the Concept
amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature
of the transmission of the property to him. ART 915. A compulsory heir may, in
consequence of disinheritance, be deprived of his
De Papa v. Camacho legitime, for causes expressly stated by law.
ART 917. The burden of proving the truth of the
The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
(reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; butcause for disinheritance shall rest upon the
within that group, the individual right to the property should beother heirs of the testator, if the disinherited
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession,heir should deny it.
since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise.
ART 918. Disinheritance without a specification of
the of the reservable property being governed by the rulesthe cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if
on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held
contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of
 those set forth in this Code, shall annul the Representation of Disinherited Heir. The heirs of the
Leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life ✔
institution of heirs insofar as it may disinherited heir can represent the latter only insofar as
prejudice the person disinherited; but the the legitime is concerned. Civilly interdicted ✔
devises and legacies and other testamentary 2. Requisites
dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will Loss of Parental Authority ✔
ART 916. Disinheritance can be effected only
not impair the legitime.
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor Abandoned their children or induced to live a
ART 922. A subsequent reconciliation shall be specified. corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against ✔
between the offender and the offended person their virtue
Requisites of a Valid Disinheritance
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, and Attempt by one of the parents against the life
1) Made in a valid will; ✔
renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may of the other
have been made. 2) Expressly made;
3) For a legal cause; Given cause for legal separation
Characteristic of Reconciliation. There is no special
form. It may be express or implied. 4) For a true cause; 8. Legacies and Devises
Effects 5) For an existing cause;
ART 924. All things and rights which are within
1) If no disinheritance yet, it can no longer be done. 6) Total or complete; the commerce of man be bequeathed or
2) If there is one already made, such becomes 7) Cause must be stated in the will; devised.
INEFFECTUAL.
8) Disinherited heir be clearly identified; 1. Bequeathed - personal property; Legacy ⭐
How about if the cause of disinheritance is also a cause Legatee
9) Not have been revoked.
of unworthiness, such as abandonment?
3. Grounds 2. Devised - real property; Devise ⭐ Devisee
1) If the cause of unworthiness was made a ground
TSDA = Testator, his Spouse, Descendant, Ascendant Who has the duty of giving the legacies and devises?
for disinheritance and there is a reconciliation,
Art 922 applies. Thus, unworthiness is also Ground CD PA S GR: Estate, represented by the executor, or
extinguished. administrator with a will annexed.
Guilty of an attempt of the life of the TSDA ✔ ✔ ✔EXC: Compulsory heirs, if duty given by
2) However, if the cause of unworthiness was NOT
made a ground for disinheritance, Art 1033 Accused the testator, without ground, of a testator.
applies. Thus, the condonation should be in crime for which the law prescribes ✔ ✔ Classification
✔ according to person burdened
writing. imprisonment for six years or more
a. Legacy proper - estate is burdened.
ART 923. The children and descendants of By fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue b. Pre-legacy - duty is given to the estate but the
the person disinherited shall take his or her influence cause the testator to make a will or ✔ ✔ ✔ gift is given to a specific heir or legatee.
place and shall preserve the rights of compulsory to change one
heirs with respect to the legitime; but the ART 926. When the testator charges one of the
Unjustifiable refusal to support ✔ ✔ ✔heirs with a legacy or devise, he alone shall be
disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or
administration of the property which constitutes bound.
Convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator
✔ ✔
the legitime. Should he not charge anyone in particular, ALL
shall be liable in the same proportion in which
Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed ✔
they may inherit.
 ★ Compulsory heirs charged with a sub-legacy are though not belonging to the testator when he In the first case, the estate shall comply with the
liable in proportion to their institution to the made the will, afterwards becomes his, by legacy by assigning to the legatee all rights of
free disposal. whatever title, the disposition shall take effect. action it may have against the debtor. In the
second case, by giving the legatee an
Problem: A and B, legitimate children, were instituted ⅗ ART 933. If the thing bequeathed belonged to the
acquittance, should he request one. xxxx
and ⅖ respectively of an estate worth P1M. A legacy of legatee or devisee at the time of the execution of
P100,000 is to be given to X. How much should A and B the will, the legacy or devise shall be without ART 940. In alternative legacies or devises,
contribute? effect, even though it may have been the choice is presumed to be left to the heir upon
Proportion Share in subsequently alienated by him. whom the obligation to give the legacy or devise
Inheritance = Free may be imposed, or the executor or
of Free Legacy = If the legatee or devisee acquires it gratuitously
Heir P1M x Portion
Proportion Portion P100K x administrator of the estate if no particular heir is
(-P250K) after such time, he can claim nothing by virtue of
(PFP) PFP so obliged.
the legacy or devise; but if it has been acquired
A by onerous titlehe can demand If the heir, legatee or devisee, who may have been
P600,000 P350,000 70% P70,000
(⅗) reimbursement from the heir or the estate. given the choice, dies before making it, this right
shall pass to the respective heirs.
B ART 934.
P400,000 P150,000 30% P30,000 Once made, the choice is irrevocable. xxxx
(⅖)
GR: The estate must free the property from:
ART 927. If two or more heirs take possession of ART 941. A legacy of generic personal
a) Pledges;
the estate, they shall be solidarily liable for the property shall be valid even if there be no
b) Mortgages;
loss or destruction of a thing devised or things of the same kind in the estate.
c) Any other encumbrance or lien, if given to secure
bequeathed, even though only one of them should A devise of indeterminate real property shall
a recoverable debt.
have been negligent. be valid only if there be immovable property of
EXC: its kind in the estate.
ART 928. The heir who is bound to deliver the
legacy or devise shall be liable in case of a) If there be contrary intention; The right of choice shall belong to the executor or
eviction, if the thing is indeterminate and is b) if the pledge or mortgage was given not to secure administrator who shall comply with the legacy by
indicated only by its kind. a recoverable debt. the delivery of a thing which is neither of inferior
Remedies of Mortgagee if mortgaged property given as nor of superior quality.
★ There are also warranties against hidden defects
and hidden encumbrances. a devise: ART 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to
a) ABANDON his security and prosecute his claim the pure and simple legacies or devises from
ART 929. If the testator, heir, or legatee owns only
before the probate court; the death of the testator, and transmits it to his
a part of, or an interest in the thing bequeathed,
b) FORECLOSE the mortgage; OR heirs.
the legacy or devise shall be understood limited
to such part or interest, unless the testator c) RELY on the mortgage ALONE. When is right transmitted?
expressly declares that he gives the thing a) If SPECIFIC - from testator’s death;
ART 935. The legacy of a credit against a third
in its entirety. b) If GENERIC - from the time selection has been
person or of the remission or release of a debt of
ART 930. The legacy or devise of a thing the legatee shall be effective only as regards that made, so as to make specific;
belonging to another person is VOID, if the part of the credit or debt existing at the time of the c) If ALTERNATIVE - from the time choice has been
testator erroneously believed that the thing death of the testator. made.
pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed,
 d) If ACQUIRED from a stranger - from the moment
of acquisition.
NB: A voluntary heir who predeceases the testator, or is
incapacitated, or repudiates, transmits NO RIGHT to his
own heirs.
ART 950. If the estate should not be sufficient to
cover all the legacies or devises, their payment
shall be made in the following order:
1) Remuneratory legacies or devises;
2) Legacies or devises declared by the
testator to be preferential;
3) Legacies for support;
4) Legacies for education;
5) Legacies or devises of a specific,
determinate thing which forms a part
of the estate;
6) All others pro rata.
NB: Art 950 applies when there are only legacies and
devises to contend with. If there are legitimes or
donations inter vivos to be respected, Article 911 should
be applied instead.
ART 956. If the legatee or devisee cannot or is
unwilling to accept the legacy or devise, or if the
legacy or devise for any reason should become
ineffective, it shall be merged into the mass of
the estate, except in cases of substitution and of
the right of accretion.
ART 957. The legacy or devise shall be without
effect:
1) If the testator transforms the thing
bequeathed in such a manner that it does
not retain either the form or the
denomination it had;
2) If the testator by any title or for any
cause alienates the thing bequeathed
xxxx. If after the alienation the thing
should again belong to the testator, even
if it be by reason of nullity of the
contract, the legacy or devise shall NOT
thereafter be valid, unless the
reacquisition shall have been effected
by virtue of the exercise of the right of
repurchase;
3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost
during the lifetime of the testator, or
after his death without the heir's fault.
xxxx
ART 959. A disposition made in general terms in
favor of the testator's relatives shall be
understood to be in favor of those nearest in
degree.
C. LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION
1. General provisions
1. When does it take place — Art 960
1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void
will, or one which has subsequently lost its
validity;
2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or
dispose of all the property belonging to the
testator.
In such case, legal succession shall take place only
with respect to the property of which the testator
has not disposed;
3) If the suspensive condition attached to the
institution of heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or
repudiates the inheritance, there being no
substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;
4) When the heir instituted is incapable of
succeeding.
2. Who are the intestate heirs
In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests the
inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter
set forth, in the legitimate and illegitimate relatives
of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in the
State.
Principles for the Exclusion of an Intestate Heir
1) The excluded heir MUST NOT BE a compulsory
heir.
2) The State, as legal heir, must NEVER be excluded
expressly.
3) When a person is excluded, he alone is excluded
and not his own descendants and heirs.
4) Express exclusion of one intestate heir makes the
property go to those of the same degree, if any; if
none, then to the next degree.
Rosales v. Rosales
An intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, or
right of representation provided for in Article 981. There
provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. Indeed, the surviving sp
considered a third person as regards the estate of the par
law.
3. Order of and share in intestate succession
In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving
the right of representation when it properly takes
place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal
shares, subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with
respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of
Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division
between the paternal and maternal lines.

Some Important Rules
1) The right of representation takes place in the
direct descending line, NEVER in the ascending.
(Art 972)
2) In the collateral line, the right of representation
takes place only in favor of children of siblings,
regardless of blood relationship. (Art 972)
3) Siblings of full blood are entitled to DOUBLE the
share of those of the half-blood. (Art 1006)
4) Should there be more than one ascendant of equal
degree of the same line, they shall share per
capita; should they be of different lines but of
equal degree, ½ shall go to the paternal, and the
other ½ to the maternal. In each line, division
shall still be per capita.
5) Exceptions to the rule of equal division:
a) In the ascending line;
b) Between relatives of the full and half
blood;
c) In cases of representation.
Bagunu v. Piedad
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the
late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth
degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
4. Relationships
ART 968. If there are several relatives of the same
degree, and one or some of them are unwilling or
incapacitated to succeed, his portion shall
accrue to the others of the
same degree, save the right
of representation when it
should take place.
Accretion in Intestate Succession
A, B and C are legitimate children of D. X and Y are ART 970. Representation is a right created by
legitimate children of A. fiction of law, by virtue of which the
D leaves P300,000 intestate. representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires
1) If A is incapacitated, X and Y inherits the P100K
the rights which the latter would have if he were
share of A by right of representation.
living or if he could have inherited.
2) However, should A repudiate, his P100K share
will go to B and C by accretion.
Right of Representation exists in case of:
1) PREDECEASE;
ART 969. If the inheritance should be repudiated
2) INCAPACITY;
by the nearest relative, should there be one only,
or by all the nearest relatives called by law to 3) DISINHERITANCE.
succeed, should there be several, those of the
NOTE
following degree shall inherit in their own
a) In testacy, the right of representation covers
right and cannot represent the person or
ONLY THE LEGITIME. There is no right to
persons repudiating the inheritance.
represent a voluntary heir.
Effect of Repudiation
b) In intestacy, the right covers ALL that the person
Suppose the estate is P1.2M. If A, B being represented would have inherited.
and C repudiate, how will the
Thus:
estate be divided?
If the estate of D is P900K, A, B and C
★ W, X, Y and Z each gets
would get P300K each but A is
P300K in his OWN RIGHT.
incapacitated:
If only C repudiates?
a. X and Y shares the P150K
★ A and B will each get legitime of A. The remaining P150K
P600K. W, X and Y are excluded will go to B and C by accretion.
because the nearer excludes the
b. X and Y thus get P75K each,
farther; and Z is also excluded because there is
while B and C get P375K each.
no right of representation in repudiation.
Suppose A, B and C are all incapacitated or that they all
Rules in Adoption
predeceased D?
1) An adopted child CANNOT represent.
★ Then their children will inherit by right of
representation. X and Y will share the P400K 2) Neither may an adopted child be represented.
share of A; while W and Z will each inherit the
P400K share of B and C respectively.
ART 974. Whenever there is succession by
5. Representation representation, the division of the estate shall be
made per stirpes, in such manner that the
 representative or representatives shall not Thus: A Renouncer may Represent BUT may not be Surviving Spouse
inherit more than what the person they represent represented. c) Illegitimate Children and c) Illegitimate Children an
would inherit, if he were living or could inherit. Abellana-Bacayo v. Ferraris-Borromeo Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Survi
of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse
Illegitimate
A decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long Parents)
Two Ways of Inheriting as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willingd)and
Surviving Spouse d) Surviving Spouse and
qualified to succeed. Illegitimate Parents
1) Per stirpes or per capita;
e) Brothers and e) Brothers and Sisters/N
Per stirpes means inheritance by group, all those Corpuz v. Corpuz Sisters/Nephews and Nieces and Nieces and Survivi
within the group inherit in equal shares. Spouse
There is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and
2) By representation or by one’s own right. illegitimate relatives. f) Other Collateral Relatives f) Alone
(within the fifth civil degree)
Sayson v. CA g) State g) Alone
ART 975. When children of one or more brothers
or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to 2. beOrder
a of intestate succession
inherit from the latter by representation, if they legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights
1. Descending direct line
do not include the right of representation. The relationship created
survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
ART 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to
portions. party. the descending direct line.

Inheritance by Nephews and Nieces
B and C are brothers of A. A died leaving a P900,000
estate. If C predecease A, divide the estate:
★ B gets P450K and Y and Z each gets P225K.
If both B and C predecease A?
★ Then X, Y and Z each gets P300K in their OWN
RIGHT and thus inherits per capita.
ART 976. A person may represent him whose
inheritance he has renounced.
Manuel v. Ferrer
Order of Intestate Succession to the Estate of a
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly Legitimate Child
referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute1) Legitimate children and their legitimate
separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
descendants;
family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the
collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and2) Legitimate parents and other ascendants;
illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally
disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is3) Illegitimate children and their descendants;
predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no4) Surviving spouse;
application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
5) Collateral relatives up to the 5th degree of
From Manuel v. Ferrer: order of preference and consanguinity. (Art 1010)
concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through 6) The State.
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz: Order of Intestate Succession to the Estate of an
Order of Preference Illegitimate Child
Order of Concurrence
a) Legitimate Children and a) Legitimate Children and 1) Legitimate children and other legitimate
Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate descendants;
Children and Descendants, and
Surviving Spouse 2) Illegitimate children and other descendants;

b) Legitimate Parents and b) Legitimate Parents and 3) Illegitimate parents;

ART 977. Heirs who repudiate their share may not
Ascendants Ascendants, Illegitimate
be represented.
Children and Descendants, and
 4) Surviving spouse, Illegitimate brothers and ART 987. In default of the father and mother, the
sisters; nephews and nieces. ascendants nearest in degree shall inherit. xxxx
This article speaks of the BARRIER between the
5) The State. legitimate and illegitimate families. b. Illegitimate parents
ART 994. In default of the father or mother, an
Rules for Adopted Children c. surviving spouse illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her
1) An exception to the 2nd par is “If the adopter is surviving spouse who shall be entitled to the
survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and 1) Legitimate ascendants - ½; entire estate.
by an adopted person, the latter shall not have 2) Surviving Spouse - ¼; If the widow or widower should survive with
more successional rights than an acknowledged
3) Illegitimate Children - ¼. brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or
natural child.”
he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the
2) The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the latter the other half.
adopted, whose parents by nature shall inherit ART 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
from him. children survive with the widow or widower,
Intestate Shares of Surviving Spouse
3) Presence of adopted children excludes a sibling of the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
the deceased from the inheritance. inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their 1) Surviving spouse ONLY - ALL;
ART 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, children to the other half. 2) SS + Brothers and Sisters (Illegitimate) - ½;
leaving no children or descendants, his parents ART 1002. In case of a legal separation, if the 3) Brothers, Sisters, Nephews and Nieces - they get
and relatives by consanguinity and not by surviving spouse gave cause for the separation, ALL.
adoption, shall be his legal heirs. he or she shall not have any of the rights granted
Leonardo v. CA in the preceding articles. 4. Collateral Line
Santillon v. Miranda ART 1003. If there are no descendants,
At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right
to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided whenspouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
his father,
the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child? Each gets
an EQUAL share. the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista with the following articles.
3. Ascending
As ruled in Diaz v. IAC, Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a Direct Line ART 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers
barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely aa. Legitimate parents and ascendants and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the equal shares.
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of saidART 985. In default of legitimate children and
legitimate child. descendants of the deceased, his parents and ART 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the together with nephews and nieces, who are the
2. Estate of an illegitimate decedent exclusion of collateral relatives. children of the descendant's brothers and sisters
of the full blood, the former shall inherit per
ART 992. An illegitimate child has no right to ART 986. The father and mother, if living, shall
capita, and the latter per stirpes.
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children inherit in equal shares.
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall Should one only of them survive, he or she shall
ART 1007. In case brothers and sisters of the half
such children or relatives inherit in the same succeed to the entire estate of the child. blood, some on the father's and some on the
manner from the illegitimate child. mother's side, are the only survivors, all shall
 inherit in equal shares without distinction as to
the origin of the property.
Bicomong v. Almanza
Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and
all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the6)
surviving colla-teral relatives. Thus, the nephews and nieces are
entitled to inherit in their own right.
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification
as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or
paternal line and without preference as to whether their
relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole7)
niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten
nephews and nieces of half blood. The only difference in their right
of succession is provided in Art. 1008, in relation to Art. 1006,
which provisions, in effect, entitles the sole niece of full blood to a
share DOUBLE that of the nephews and nieces of half blood.
5. The State
ART 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed
in accordance with the provisions of the
preceding Sections, the State shall inherit the
whole estate.
ART 1014. If a person legally entitled to the estate
of the deceased appears and files a claim thereto
with the court within five years from the date
the property was delivered to the State, such
person shall be entitled to the possession of the
same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be
accountable to him for such part of the proceeds
as may not have been lawfully spent.
CARDINAL PRINCIPLES OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION
1) Even if there is an order of intestate succession,
D. COMMON PROVISIONS
the compulsory heirs are never excluded.
2) The nearer excludes the farther without 1. Right of Accretion
prejudice to the right of representation.
1. Concept
3) There is NO right of representation in the
ascending line; ONLY in the descending line.
4) In the collateral line, the right of representation
is due only to children of brothers and sisters.
5) The intestate shares are either EQUAL to or
GREATER than the legitime.
In case of partial intestacy, the legacies and
devises must be charged PROPORTIONATELY
against the intestate heirs who are given
intestate shares greater than their legitimes, but
in no case should the legitime be impaired.
Grandchildren ALWAYS inherit by right of
representation. Thus, when all children
repudiate, the grandchildren inherit IN THEIR
OWN RIGHT, since representation is NOT
PROPER.
8) Nephews and nieces inherit:
a) By right of representation when they
concur with aunts and uncles;
b) In their own right whenever they do not
concur with same.
9) Illegitimates of legitimates CANNOT represent
because of the BARRIER, but illegitimates or
legitimates of illegitimates CAN.
10) There can be reserva troncal in legal
succession.
11) A renouncer CAN represent, but CANNOT be
represented.
12) A person who cannot represent a near relative
cannot also represent a relative farther in
degree.
ART 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of
which, when two or more persons are called to
the same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part
assigned to the one who renounces or cannot
receive his share, or who died before the testator,
is added or incorporated to that of his co-heirs,
co-devisees, or co-legatees.
How Accretion be avoided
1) By expressly designating a substitute;
2) By expressly providing that no accretion should
take place.
REQUISITES
1) Unity of object;
2) Plurality of subjects;
3) Vacant portion;
4) Acceptance.
Causes (Art 1016 par 2)
1) Predecease;
2) Incapacity;
3) Repudiation;
4) If a suspensive condition is not fulfilled;
5) If there is failure to identify one particular heir,
devisee, or legatee but the others can be
identified (ineffectiveness of institution).
ART 1016. In order that the right of accretion may
take place in a testamentary succession, it shall
be necessary:
1) That two or more persons be called to
the same inheritance, or to the same
portion thereof, pro indiviso; and
2) That one of the persons thus called die
before the testator, or renounce the
 inheritance, or be incapacitated to
receive it.
ART 1017. The words "one-half for each" or "in
equal shares" or any others which, though
designating an aliquot part, do not identify it by
such description as shall make each heir the
exclusive owner of determinate property, shall
not exclude the right of accretion.
In case of money or fungible goods, if the share of
each heir is not earmarked, there shall be a right
of accretion.
1) If EARMARKED - NO accretion;
2) If NOT EARMARKED - there can be accretion.
ART 1019. The heirs to whom the portion goes by
the right of accretion take it in the same
proportion that they inherit.
ART 1020. The heirs to whom the inheritance
accrues shall succeed to all the rights and
obligations which the heir who renounced or
could not receive it would have had.
EXCEPTIONS
1) Contrary express provision;
2) Obligations are personal.
2. In legal succession
ART 1018. In legal succession the share of the
person who repudiates the inheritance shall
ALWAYS accrue to his co-heirs.
3. Compulsory succession
ART 1021. Among the compulsory heirs the
right of accretion shall take place only when the
free portion is left to two or more of them, or to
any one of them and to a stranger.
Should the part repudiated be the legitime, the
other co-heirs shall succeed to it in their own
right, and NOT by the right of accretion.
Accretion only concerns the FREE portion, NEVER the
legitime.
4. Testamentary Capacity and Intent
ART 1022. In testamentary succession, when the
right of accretion does not take place, the vacant
portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has
been designated, shall pass to the legal heirs of
the testator, who shall receive it with the same
charges and obligations.
Apply ISRAI — After Accretion → Intestacy
ART 1023. Accretion shall also take place
among devisees, legatees and usufructuaries
under the same conditions established for heirs.
2. Capacity to Succeed by will or intestacy
1. Determination
ART 1034. In order to judge the capacity of the
heir, devisee or legatee, his qualification at the
time of the death of the decedent shall be
the criterion.
xxxx
If the institution, devise or legacy should be
conditional, the time of the compliance with
the condition shall also be considered.
ART 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent.
2. Who may succeed
ART 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit,
the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the
moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper.
A child already conceived at the time of the death
of the decedent is capable of succeeding provided
it be born later under the conditions prescribed
in article 41.
Parish Priest of Victoria v. Rigor
The said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male r
living at the time of his death and not to any indefinit
thereafter.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew
became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the beq
question was ineffectual or inoperative.
3. Who are incapable of succeeding
ART 1027. The following are incapable of
succeeding:
1) The priest who heard the confession of
the testator during his last illness, or the
minister of the gospel who extended
spiritual aid to him during the same
period;
2) The relatives of such priest or
minister of the gospel within the fourth
degree, the church, order, chapter,
community, organization, or institution
to which such priest or minister may
belong;
3) A guardian with respect to
testamentary dispositions given by a
ward in his favor before the final
accounts of the guardianship have been
approved, even if the testator should die
after the approval thereof; nevertheless,
 any provision made by the ward in favor
of the guardian when the latter is his
ascendant, descendant, brother, sister, or
spouse, shall be valid;
4) Any attesting witness to the execution
of a will, the spouse, parents, or children,
or any one claiming under such witness,
spouse, parents, or children;
5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health
officer or druggist who took care of the
testator during his last illness;
6) Individuals, associations and
corporations not permitted by law to
inherit.
ART 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article
739, concerning donations inter vivos, shall
apply to testamentary provisions.
ART 1031. A testamentary provision in favor of a
disqualified person, even though made under the
guise of an onerous contract, or made through
an intermediary, shall be void.
ART 1032. The following are incapable of
succeeding by reason of unworthiness:
1) Parents who have abandoned their
children or induced their daughters to
lead a corrupt or immoral life, or
attempted against their virtue;
2) Any person who has been convicted of
an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants,
or ascendants;
3) Any person who has accused the
testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years
or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
4) Any heir of full age who, having
knowledge of the violent death of the
testator, should fail to report it to an
officer of the law within a month, unless
the authorities have already taken
action; this prohibition shall not apply to
cases wherein, according to law, there is
no obligation to make an accusation;
5) Any person convicted of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse of the
testator;
6) Any person who by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence
should cause the testator to make a will
or to change one already made;
7) Any person who by the same means
prevents another from making a will,
or from revoking one already made, or
who supplants, conceals, or alters the
latter's will;
8) Any person who falsifies or forges a
supposed will of the decedent.
ART 1033. The cause of unworthiness shall be
without effect if the testator
a) had knowledge thereof at the time he
made the will, or
b) if, having known of them subsequently,
he should condone them in writing.
4. Effect of alienations by the excluded heir
ART 1036. Alienations of hereditary property, and
acts of administration performed by the excluded
heir, before the judicial order of exclusion, are
valid as to the third persons who acted in good
faith; but the co-heirs shall have a right to
recover damages from the disqualified heir.
5. Rights of the excluded heir
ART 1035. If the person excluded from the
inheritance by reason of incapacity should be a
child or descendant of the decedent and should
have children or descendants, the latter shall
acquire his right to the legitime.
The person so excluded shall not enjoy the
usufruct and administration of the property thus
inherited by his children.
ART 1037. The unworthy heir who is excluded
from the succession has a right to demand
indemnity or any expenses incurred in the
preservation of the hereditary property, and to
enforce such credits as he may have against the
estate.
6. Liabilities of the excluded heir
ART 1038. Any person incapable of succession,
who, disregarding the prohibition stated in the
preceding articles, entered into the possession of
the hereditary property, shall be obliged to
return it together with its accessions.
He shall be liable for all the fruits and rents he
may have received, or could have received
through the exercise of due diligence.
7. Prescription of action
ART 1040. The action for a declaration of
incapacity and for the recovery of the inheritance,
devise or legacy shall be brought within five
(5) years from the time the disqualified person
took possession thereof. It may be brought by
any one who may have an interest in the
succession.
3. Acceptance and Repudiation of the inheritance
1. Concept
ART 1041. The acceptance or repudiation of
the inheritance is an act which is purely
voluntary and free.
ART 1042. The effects of the acceptance or
repudiation shall always retroact to the
moment of the death of the decedent.
ART 1044. Any person having the free disposal of
his property may accept or repudiate an
inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by
their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians
may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization.
xxxx
ART 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit.
An express acceptance must be made in a public
or private document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by
which the intention to accept is necessarily
implied, or which one would have no right to do
except in the capacity of an heir.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional
administration do not imply an acceptance of the
inheritance if, through such acts, the title or
capacity of an heir has not been assumed.
ART 1050. An inheritance is deemed accepted:
1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his
right to a stranger, or to his co-heirs, or
to any of them;
2) If the heir renounces the same, even
though gratuitously, for the benefit of
one or more of his co-heirs;
3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of
all his co-heirs indiscriminately; but if
this renunciation should be gratuitous,
and the co-heirs in whose favor it is
made are those upon whom the portion
renounced should devolve by virtue of
accretion, the inheritance shall NOT be
deemed as accepted.
ART 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance
shall be made in a public or authentic
instrument, or by petition presented to the
court having jurisdiction over the testamentary
or intestate proceedings.
ART 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to
the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter
may petition the court to authorize them to
accept it in the name of the heir.
xxxx
ART 1053. If the heir should die without having
accepted or repudiated the inheritance his right
shall be transmitted to his heirs.
ART 1055. If a person, who is called to the same
inheritance as an heir by will and ab intestato,
repudiates the inheritance in his capacity as a
testamentary heir, he is understood to have
repudiated it in both capacities.
Should he repudiate it as an intestate heir,
without knowledge of his being a testamentary
heir, he may still accept it in the latter
capacity.
ART 1056. The acceptance or repudiation of an
inheritance, once made, is irrevocable, and
cannot be impugned, except when it was made
through any of the causes that vitiate consent, or
when an unknown will appears.
ART 1057. Within thirty days after the court has
issued an order for the distribution of the estate
xxxx, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall signify
to the court having jurisdiction whether they
accept or repudiate the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are
deemed to have accepted the inheritance.
Guy v. CA
There was no waiver of hereditary rights herein. Considerin
the document did not specifically mention private respon
hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be con
as a waiver of successional rights.
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiat
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. T
because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property
must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the inte
the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Relea
Waiver of Claim in the instant case is VOID and will not bar p
respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the decea
4. Collation
1. Concept
ART 1061. Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of
the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
ART 1062. Collation shall NOT take place among
compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donee should
repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious.
When Compulsory Heirs Will Not Collate. IN these two
cases, the donation shall be charged to the free portion:
1) If the donor expressly provides.
2) If the donee should REPUDIATE the inheritance.
2. Purpose
ART 1067. Expenses for
a) support,
 b) education,
c) medical attendance, even in extraordinary
illness,
d) apprenticeship,
e) ordinary equipment, or
f) customary gifts
are NOT subject to collation.
GR: Advance of the free portion.
EXC: If parents so provide that it be considered an
advance of the legitime.
ART 1069. Any sums paid by a parent
a) in satisfaction of the debts of his
children,
b) election expenses,
c) fines, and
d) similar expenses
shall be brought to collation.
ART 1070. Wedding gifts by parents and
ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing, and
outfit, shall NOT be reduced as inofficious except
insofar as they may exceed one-tenth of the
sum which is disposable by will (free
disposal).
ART 1071. The same things donated are not to be
brought to collation and partition, but only their
value at the time of the donation, even
though their just value may not then have been
assessed.
Their subsequent increase or deterioration and
even their total loss or destruction, be it
accidental or culpable, shall be for the benefit or
account and risk of the donee.
If REAL property ★ Presumed NO debts if within 2 years
1) Get property of same kind; from death, no creditor has petitioned
for letters of administration.
2) If none, get cash or securities;
3) The heirs and liquidators are of age, or duly
3) If none, sell property at public auction.
represented if minors;
If PERSONAL property
4) Partition was made by means of a public
1) Get property of same kind;
instrument or affidavit duly registered with the
2) If none, get equivalent personal property in value. Register of Deeds.
Arellano v. Pascual 2010
ART 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation,
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a meredivision and assignment of a thing held in
mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donationscommon among those to whom it may belong.
made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and
second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of propertyThe thing itself may be divided, or its value.
disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of
Partition may be done
its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion.
If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be1) Judicially, or
safeguarded.
a) May be done in the order of distribution
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled made by the court, and can be based on a
to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even draft or project of partition.
if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit.
There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is b) Partial distribution may be made by the
not subject to collation. court, as when the heirs need money.
c) If properties have already been distributed,
5. Partition and Distribution of Estate creditors can still demand recovery from
heirs.
1. Partition
d) While administration proceedings are
ART 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the
pending, a separate action for partition is
whole estate of the decedent is, before its IMPROPER.
partition, owned in common by such heirs,
e) Judicial partition is binding only upon those
subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. parties to the case.
2) Extrajudicially
For a partition to be valid, the following must concur: a) Made by the testator;
1) Decedent left no will; b) Made by the decedent in an act inter vivos;
2) Decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left c) Made by the heirs themselves;
all had been paid;
d) Made by a third person entrusted by the
decedent.
ART 1080. Should a person make partition of his
estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family,
desires to keep any agricultural,
industrial, or manufacturing enterprise
intact, may avail himself of the right granted him
in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the
other children to whom the property is not
assigned, be paid in cash.
ART 1081. A person may, by an act inter vivos or
mortis causa, intrust the mere power to make the
partition after his death to any person who is
not one of the co-heirs.
The provisions of this and of the preceding article
shall be observed even should there be among
the co-heirs a minor or a person subject to
guardianship; but the mandatary, in such case,
shall make an inventory of the property of the
estate, after notifying the co-heirs, the creditors,
and the legatees or devisees.
Mandatary is the person entrusted to make the
partition and should not be a co-heir. His partition
may be approved or rejected by the heirs.
If rejected, the probate court decides.
ART 1082. Every act which is intended to put an
end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a
a) sale,
b) an exchange,
c) a compromise, or
Requisites for Legal Redemption by Co-heirs
d) any other transaction.
ART 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the
division of the estate unless the testator should
have expressly forbidden its partition, in which
case the period of indivision shall not exceed
twenty years as provided in article 494. This
power of the testator to prohibit division
applies to the legitime.
xxxx.
ART 1086. Should a thing be indivisible, or
would be much impaired by its being divided, it
may be adjudicated to one of the heirs, provided
he shall pay the others the excess in cash.
Nevertheless, if any of the heirs should demand
that the thing be sold at public auction and that
strangers be allowed to bid, this must be done.
ART 1087. In the partition the co-heirs shall
reimburse one another for
a) the income and fruits which each one
of them may have received from any
property of the estate,
b) for any useful and necessary
expenses made upon such property,
and
c) for any damage thereto through malice
or neglect.
ART 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.
1) At least 2 heirs;
2) One must sell his hereditary rights;
3) Buyer is a stranger;
4) Sale made before partition;
5) At least 1 co-heir demands redemption;
6) Demand must be made within 1 month from the
time of notification in writing; AND
7) Redemptioner must reimburse the price of sale.
ART 1089. The titles of acquisition or ownership
of each property shall be delivered to the co-heir
to whom said property has been adjudicated.
ART 1090. When the title comprises two or more
pieces of land which have been assigned to two or
more co-heirs, or when it covers one piece of land
which has been divided between two or more co-
heirs, the title shall be delivered to
a) the one having the largest interest
xxxx.
If the interest of each co-heir should be the same,
b) the oldest shall have the title.
2. Effects of Partition
ART 1092. After the partition has been made, the
co-heirs shall be reciprocally bound to
warrant
a) the title to, and
b) the quality of,
each property adjudicated.
ART 1093. The reciprocal obligation of warranty
referred to in the preceding article shall be
proportionate to the respective hereditary
shares of the co-heirs, but if any one of them
should be insolvent, the other co-heirs shall be
liable for his part in the same proportion,
deducting the part corresponding to the one who
should be indemnified.
Those who pay for the insolvent heir shall have a
right of action against him for reimbursement,
should his financial condition improve.
ART 1094. An action to enforce the warranty
among heirs must be brought within ten (10)
years from the date the right of action accrues.
ART 1095. If a credit should be assigned as
collectible, the co-heirs shall not be liable for the
subsequent insolvency of the debtor of the estate,
but only for his insolvency at the time the
partition is made.
The warranty of the solvency of the debtor
can only be enforced during the five (5) years
following the partition.
Co-heirs do NOT warrant bad debts, if so known
to, and accepted by, the distributee. But if such
debts are not assigned to a co-heir, and should be
collected, in whole or in part, the amount
collected shall be distributed proportionately
among the heirs.
ART 1096. The obligation of warranty among co-
heirs shall CEASE in the following cases:
1) When the testator himself has made the
partition, unless it appears, or it may be
reasonably presumed, that his intention
was otherwise, but the legitime shall
always remain unimpaired;
2) When it has been so expressly
stipulated in the agreement of
partition, unless there has been bad faith;
3) When the eviction is due to a cause
subsequent to the partition, or has
been caused by the fault of the
distributee of the property.
3. Rescission and Nullity of Partition
ART 1098. A partition, judicial or extrajudicial,
may also be rescinded on account of lesion,
when any one of the co-heirs received things
whose value is less, by at least one-fourth, than
the share to which he is entitled, considering the
value of the things at the time they were
adjudicated.
ART 1099. The partition made by the testator
CANNOT be impugned on the ground of lesion,
except
a) when the legitime of the compulsory
heirs is thereby prejudiced, or
b) when it appears or may reasonably be
presumed, that the intention of the
testator was otherwise.
ART 1100. The action for rescission on account of
lesion shall prescribe after four (4) years from
the time the partition was made.
ART 1101. The heir who is sued shall have the
option of
a) indemnifying the plaintiff for the loss, or
b) consenting to a new partition.
Indemnity may be made by
a) payment in cash or
b) by the delivery of a thing of the same
kind and quality as that awarded to the
plaintiff.
If a new partition is made, it shall affect neither
a) those who have not been prejudiced nor
b) those have not received more than their
just share.
ART 1102. An heir who has alienated the whole
or a considerable part of the real property
adjudicated to him CANNOT maintain an action
for rescission on the ground of lesion, but he shall
have a right to be indemnified in cash.
ART 1104. A partition made with preterition of
any of the compulsory heirs shall NOT be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was
bad faith or fraud on the part of the other
persons interested; but the latter shall be
proportionately obliged to pay to the person
omitted the share which belongs to him.
ART 1105. A partition which includes a person
believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be
VOID only with respect to such person.
OBLIGATIONS
A. General Provisions
Sources
Law
Contracts
Quasi-Contracts
Delict
Quasi-delict
B. Nature and Effects of Obligations
1. Compliance with Obligations
2. Breach of Obligations and Grounds for Liability
3. Effects of Fortuitous Events in Obligations
4. Usurious Transactions; Interests
5. Presumptions
6. Remedies of Creditors for Breach of Obligations
C. Kinds of Obligations
Pure and Conditional
With a Period
Alternative and Facultative
Joint and Solidary
Divisible and Indivisible
 With Penal Clause Bautista v. F.O. Borromeo, Inc.
Source Definition Examples
D. Extinguishment of Obligations Borromeo paid the widow of its employee, Quintin
Payment or Performance Law (Art Imposed by the law itself Art 195 Civil Code - Delgado, compensation (death benefit) and funeral
1158) support expenses for the latter's death while in the course of
Application of Payments employment. This obligation arises from law - Section
Payment by Cession Contracts Arise from stipulation of Obligation to repay a2loan
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It arises by
(Art 1159) parties (Art 1306); by virtue of an agreement
virtue of its subrogation to the right of Quintin Delgado
Tender of Payment and Consignation
to sue the guilty party. Such subrogation is sanctioned
Loss of The Thing Due Quasi- Arise from lawful, Return money paid by by the Workmen's Compensation Law.
contracts voluntary and unilateral mistake (Art 2154)
Condonation or Remission of Debt
acts and which are Pelayo v. Lauron
Confusion or Merger of Rights enforceable to the end
that no one shall be If every obligation consists in giving, doing, or not doing
Compensation something, and spouses are mutually bound to support
unjustly enriched (Art
Novation 2142). each other, there can be no question but that, when
either of them by reason of illness should be in need of
A. General Provisions Acts or Arise from civil liability Restitution, medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable
omissions which is the indemnification, obligation to furnish the necessary services of a
1. Concept and Birth of Obligation punished consequence of a reparation. physician in order that health may be restored, and he
by law criminal offense (Art or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is
ART 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is
give, to do or not to do. 1161)
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the
Obligation is a legal relation established between one Quasi- Torts; Arise from medical expert for his professional services. This
Art 2193 - head of the
party and another, whereby the latter is bound to the delicts damage caused to liability originates from the mutual obligation which
family liable for damage
fulfillment of a prestation which the former may demand another through an act the law expressly established between the married
caused by things thrown
of him. or omission, there being couple.
or falling from building in
fault or negligence, but which he resides;
2. Elements of Obligation
no contractual relation Art 2183 - Possessor of 2) Contracts
a) An active subject — the obligee or creditor; exists between the an animal to pay for
parties. (Art 2176) damages which it may
b) A passive subject — the obligor or debtor; ART 1159. Obligations arising from contracts
cause.
have the force of law between the contracting
c) The object or prestation; parties and should be complied with in good faith.
ART 1157. Obligations arise from:
The subject matter of an obligation — and may Perez v. Pomar
consist of giving a thing, doing or not doing a 1) Law;
certain act. It does not appear that any written contract was entered
2) Contracts; into between the parties for the employment of the
d) The efficient cause — the vinculum or juridical 3) Quasi-contracts; plaintiff as interpreter, or that any other innominate
tie. contract was entered into; but whether the plaintiff's
4) Delicts — Acts or omissions punished services were solicited or whether they were offered to
3. Kinds of Obligation according to subject matter
by law; and the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these
a) Real — the obligation to give; services were accepted and made use of by the latter,
5) Quasi-delicts.
b) Personal — the obligation to do or not to do. we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual
1) Law consent as to the rendition of the services. This gives
Sources rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the
ART 1158. Obligations derived from law are not services to make compensation therefor, since the
4. Sources of Obligations presumed. Only those expressly determined in bilateral obligation to render service as interpreter, on
this Code or in special laws are demandable xxxx. the one hand, and on the other to pay for the services
rendered, is thereby incurred. An innominate contract
of facio ut des was implicitly established.
Maritime Company of the Philippines v. Reparations
Commission
It is a fundamental requirement that the contract
entered into must be in accordance with, and not
repugnant to, an applicable statute. Its terms are
embodied therein. The contracting parties need not
repeat them. They do not even have to be referred to.
Every contract thus contains not only what has been
explicitly stipulated, but the statutory provisions that
have any bearing on the matter.
The rule is that the law forms part of, and is read into,
every contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in
those cases where such exclusion is allowed.
3) Quasi-Contracts
ART 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-
contracts shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book.
A quasi-contract is that juridical relation resulting from
a lawful, voluntary, and unilateral act, and which has for
its purpose the payment of indemnity to the end that no
one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense
of another. It could either be:
a) Negotiorum gestio — the voluntary management
of the property or affairs of another without the
knowledge or consent of the latter (Art 2144).
This does not apply when
i) property or business is not neglected, in
which case provisions on unauthorized
contracts shall govern, and
ii) the manager has been tacitly authorized
by the owner, in which case the rules on
agency shall govern.
b) Solutio indebiti — created when something is
received when there is no right to demand it and
it was unduly delivered through mistake (Art
2154). Whether the payment was made by
mistake is a judicial matter. General presumption:
“money paid by one to another was due to the
latter”.
c) Other cases — Arts 2164 - 2175. Recovery may
be allowed in view of the peculiar circumstances
or factual environment to the end that a recipient
of benefits or favors resulting from lawful,
voluntary and unilateral acts of another may not
be unjustly enriched at the expense of the latter.
Cruz v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
A presumed quasi-contract cannot emerge as against
one party when the subject matter thereof is already
covered by an existing contract with another party.
In the case at bar, since appellant has a clearer and more
direct recourse against the Deudors with whom he had
entered into an agreement regarding the
improve-ments and expenditures made by him on the
land of appellees, it cannot be said, in the sense
contemplated in Article 2142, that appellees have been
enriched at the expense of appellant.
National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia v. CA
Solutio indebiti applies where:
1) a payment is made when there exists no
binding relation between the payor, who has no
duty to pay, and the person who received the
payment, and
2) the payment is made through mistake, and not
through liberality or some other cause.
In the case at bar, PBC and NCBSA were bound by their
contract, the letter of credit, under which NCBSA obliged
itself to pay PBC, subject to compliance by the latter
with certain conditions provided therein. As such, the
cause of action was based on a contract, and the
prescriptive period is ten, not six years.
Siga-an v. Villanueva
Under Article 1960, if the borrower of loan pays interest
when there has been no stipulation therefor, the
provisions of the Civil Code concerning solutio indebiti
shall be applied.
4) Delict
ART 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal
offenses shall be governed by the penal laws,
subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of
the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,
Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of
Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Velez
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for
damage caused, and indemnification of consequential
damages.
Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action
for damages on account of the fraud committed against
Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed
independently even if there was no reservation as to its
filing.
Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi
The civil action based on delict may, however, be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
5) Quasi-delict
ART 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-
delicts shall be governed by the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special
laws.
A quasi-delict is a fault or act of negligence or omission
of care which causes damage to another, there being no
pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.
There must be:
1) An act or omission by the defendant;
2) Fault or negligence by the defendant;
3) Damage caused to the plaintiff;
4) Direct relation or connection of cause and effect
between 1 and 3; and
5) No pre-existing contractual relations between
the parties.
Lasam v. Smith
In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to
contracts, a caso fortuito presents the following
essential characteristics:
1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be
independent of the human will.
2) It must be impossible to foresee the event
which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can
be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
3) The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. and
4) The obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
Elcano v. Hill
The defendant could have been prosecuted in a criminal
case because his negligence causing the death of the
child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action
with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or
of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act
for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted
and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has
not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Virata v. Ochoa
The principal issue is whether or not the petitioners,
heirs of the deceased Virata, can prosecute an action for
damages based on quasi-delict against Borilla and
Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively of the passenger
jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases, the aggrieved
parties may choose between an action under the
RPC or for quasi-delict under Article 2176. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 is to recover twice for the
same negligent act.
Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso
Deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the
civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil
liability ex delicto), but NOT those liabilities from quasi-
delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a
civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability
in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended
party may — subject to the control of the prosecutor —
still intervene in the criminal action in order to protect
such remaining civil interest therein. By the same token,
the offended party may appeal a judgment in a criminal
case acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but
only in regard to the civil liability ex delicto.
B. Nature and Effects of Obligations
1. Compliance with Obligations
1) In Obligations to Give
ART 1163. Every person obliged to give something
is also obliged to take care of it with the proper
diligence of a good father of a family, unless the
law or the stipulation of the parties requires
another standard of care.
ART 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of
the thing from the time the obligation to deliver it
arises. However, he shall acquire no real right
over it until the same has been delivered to him.
Kinds of delivery
a) Actual or tradition;
b) Constructive or Implied:
i) Traditio simbolica — as when the
keys of a bodega are given.
ii) Traditio longa manu — delivery by
mere consent or the pointing of an
object.
iii) Traditio brevi manu — a possessor
of a thing not as an owner, becomes
the possessor as owner. E.g. a tenant
who buys the house he is renting.
iv) Traditio constitutum possessorium
— opposite of brevi manu.
v) Tradition by the execution of legal
forms and solemnities.
ART 1165. When what is to be delivered is a
determinate thing, the creditor, in addition to
the right granted him by article 1170, may
compel the debtor to make the delivery.
If the thing is indeterminate or generic, he may
ask that the obligation be complied with at the
expense of the debtor.
If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver
the same thing to two or more persons who do
not have the same interest, he shall be
responsible for any fortuitous event until he has
effected the delivery.
Duties of debtor in obligation to give a determinate
thing
1. Preserve or take care of the thing due;
2. Deliver the fruits of the thing (Art 1164);
3. Deliver its accessions and accessories (Art 1166);
4. Deliver the thing itself (Arts 1163, 1233, 1244; as
to kinds of delivery, Arts 1497-1501); and
5. Answer for damages in case of non-fulfillment or
breach (Art 1170).
Duties of debtor in obligation to deliver a generic
thing
1. Deliver a thing which is of the quality
intended by the parties considering the
purpose of the obligation and other
circumstances (Art 1246); and
2. Be liable for damages in case of fraud,
negligence, or delay, in the performance of
 his obligation, or contravention of the tenor
thereof (Art 1170).
Remedies of creditor when debtor fails to comply.
Demand
a) Specific performance;
b) Rescission or cancellation; or
c) Damages.
ART 1166. The obligation to give a determinate
thing includes that of delivering all its accessions
and accessories, even though they may not have
been mentioned.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Wilson
The delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and
indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the
ownership of the same by virtue of a contract. The
ownership, the property right, is only derived from
the delivery of a thing.
Therefore, by reason of the nondelivery, Terrell did not
acquire the ownership of the property transferred to
him by Wilson. It is only the jus ad rem, and not the jus in
re, that was acquired by Terrell by virtue of the transfer,
made by the consent of the transferor and the transferee
but not consummated by the delivery which never
came to pass and which delivery was the object of such
transfer.
But if Terrell could not be considered as the owner of
said funds in question, it is undeniable that he had rights
with regard to the same as a creditor by virtue of that
transfer.
Pornellosa v. Land Tenure Administration
The deed of sale is a mere private document and does
not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of
land. While it is valid and binding upon the parties with
respect to the sale of the house erected thereon, yet it is
not sufficient to convey title or any right to the
residential lot in litigation. Acts and contracts which
have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property must appear in a public document.
Caleon v. Agus Development Corp
Whether or not the lease of an apartment includes a
sublease of the lot on which it is constructed.
The lease of a building naturally includes the lease of the
lot, and the rentals of the building includes those of the
lot.
2) In Obligations to Do
ART 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails
to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.
This same rule shall be observed if he does it in
contravention of the tenor of the obligation.
Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has
been poorly done be undone.
Remedies of creditor if debtor fails to do
a) To have the obligation performed by himself
or by another at debtor’s expense.
b) Plus damages.
Chavez v. Gonzales
It is clear that the defendant-appellee contravened the
tenor of his obligation because he not only did not
repair the typewriter but returned it "in shambles." For
such con-travention, he is liable under Article 1167 of
the Civil Code, jam quot, for the cost of executing the
obligation in a proper manner.
In addition, the defendant-appellee is likewise liable,
under Article 1170, for the cost of the missing parts for
in his obligation to repair the typewriter he was bound,
but failed or neglected, to return it in the same condition
it was when he received it.
Tanguilig v. CA
Whether petitioner is under obligation to reconstruct the
windmill after it collapsed.
YES. In a long line of cases this Court has consistently
held that in order for a party to claim exemption from
liability by reason of fortuitous event under Art 1174,
the event should be the sole and proximate cause of the
loss or destruction of the object of the contract.
Petitioner failed to show that the collapse of the
windmill was due solely to a fortuitous event.
Interestingly, the evidence does not disclose that there
was actually a typhoon on the day the windmill
collapsed. Petitioner merely stated that there was a
"strong wind." But a strong wind in this case cannot be
fortuitous — unforeseeable nor unavoidable.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay
if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in
a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him.
When the windmill failed to function properly it became
incumbent upon petitioner to institute the proper
repairs in accordance with the guaranty stated in the
contract. Thus, respondent cannot be said to have
incurred in delay; instead, it is petitioner who should
bear the expenses for the reconstruction of the
windmill. Article 1167 is explicit on this point that if a
person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same
shall be executed at his cost.
Vil-Rey Planners and Builders v. Lexber, Inc. 2016
Breach of contract is the failure of a party, without
legal reason, to comply with the terms of a contract or
perform any promise that forms either a part or the
whole of it.
The reciprocal obligation in this case was Lexber's
payment of the 50% balance upon Vil-Rey's completion
of the works on or before 15 January 1997. However,
despite the grant of extension until 31 January, and even
after the lapse of another five-day grace period, Vil-Rey
failed to finish the works under the third contract.
The law provides that the obligation of a person who
fails to fulfill it shall be executed at that person's
cost. Thus, Vil-Rey should be held liable for the amount
paid by Lexber to another contractor to complete the
works.
Article 1169 provides that in reciprocal obligations,
delay by one of the parties begins from the moment the
other fulfills the obligation.
3) In Obligations Not to Do
ART 1168. When the obligation consists in not
doing, and the obligor does what has been
 forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his
expense.
As a rule, the remedy of the obligee is the undoing of
the forbidden thing plus damages (Art 1170). If it is
not possible, physically or legally, or because of the
rights acquired by third persons who acted in good
faith, the remedy is an action for damages caused by
the violation.
2. Breach of Obligations and Grounds for Liability
ART 1170. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Areola v. CA
Respondent insurance company is liable by way of
damages for the fraudulent acts committed by
Malapit that gave occasion to the erroneous cancellation
of subject insurance policy. Its earlier act of reinstating
the insurance policy can not obliterate the injury
inflicted on petitioner-insured.
1) Fraud
ART 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is
demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an
action for future fraud is void.
Fraud (deceit or dolo) — deliberate or intentional
evasion of the normal fulfillment of an obligation.
a) Includes any act, omission or concealment
involving some kind of malice or dishonesty. It is
synonymous to bad faith. Moral damages may be
recovered.
b) Art 1170 refers to incidental fraud (dolo
incidente) committed in the performance of an
obligation already existing because of contract. It
is different from causal fraud (dolo causante) or
fraud employed in the execution of a contract
under Art 1338, which vitiates consent and makes
the contract voidable.
c) Employed to evade the normal fulfillment of an
obligation and its existence merely results in
breach giving rise for the innocent party to
recover damages.
2) Negligence
ART 1172. Responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability
may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances.
ART 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor
a) consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the
obligation and
b) corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence
which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family
shall be required.
Picart v. Smith
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of
the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of
a prudent man in a given situation must of course
always be determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
The proper criterion for determining the existence
of negligence in a given case is this — Conduct is said
to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant
his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Layugan v. IAC
Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.
Here, three or four meters from the rear of the parked
truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed. But despite
this sufficient warning, the truck driven by Serrano still
bumped the rear of the parker cargo truck. Thus, the
absence or want of care of Serrano has been established
by clear and convincing evidence.
PNB v. CA
Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant
at the expense of the defendant, and there is no hard-
and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a
fair amount of moral damages since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar facts. The yardstick
should be that it is not palpably and scandalously
excessive.
Samson v. CA
Bad faith is essentially a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of ill-
will. It does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. Bad faith
is thus synonymous with fraud and involves a design
to mislead or deceive another, not prompted by an
honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some
interested or sinister motive.
In contracts, the kind of fraud that will vitiate consent is
one where, through insidious words or machinations of
one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to
enter into a contract which, without them, he would not
have agreed to. This is known as dolo causante or
 Culpa Criminal — that which results in the
causal fraud which is basically a deception employed commission of a crime.
on the part of the mas-ter or employer either in
by one party prior to or simultaneous to the contract in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
order to secure the consent of the other. supervision over him after the selection, or
Contractual Aquiliana Criminal both; and
PNCC v. CA
Negligence is Direct, substantive and independent 2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not
The petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence merely of a contract juris et de jure, and consequently may be
in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted incidental rebutted. It follows that if the employer shows
cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the There’s a pre- No pre-existing obligation, except and supervision he has exercised the care and
ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and existing the duty to do no harm. diligence of a good father of a family, the
sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should obligation presumption is overcome and he is relieved
have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway from liability.
would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the Preponderance of evidence required Proof beyond
wee hours of the morning. reasonable Vinluan v. CA
doubt
PASUDECO's negligence in transporting sugarcanes In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of
without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in Defense of a Defense of a The employee’s the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the
removing the emergency warning devices, were two good father of a good father of a guilt is driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the
successive negligent acts which were the direct and family family is a automatically owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally
proximate cause of Latagan's injuries. As such, inapplicable. proper and the employer's liable for damages.
PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. Respondeat complete civil guilt if the
superior defense. former is Baliwag Transit v. CA
Prudential Bank v. Rapanot, et al. 2017 applies. insolvent. The proximate cause of the death of Mario Dionisio was
In loan transactions, banks have the particular the negligence of driver Juanito Fidel when he failed to
Presumption of Ordinarily, Prosecution has take the necessary precaution to prevent the accident.
obligation of ensuring that clients comply with all the
negligence arises complainant burden to prove
documentary requirements pertaining to the approval He boarded his bus, sat on the driver's seat and was at
upon proof that must prove the the negligence of the steering wheel when the bus moved, pinning down
of their loan applications and the subsequent release of
there was a negligence of accused. the deceased who was repairing the defective brake
their proceeds.
contract and that defendant. system below.
If only the Bank exercised the highest degree of it was not
diligence required by the nature of its business as a carried out.
Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. CA
financial institution, it would have discovered that (i)
Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris
Golden Dragon did not comply with the approval
requirement imposed by Section 18 of PD 957, and (ii) familias in the selection and supervision of employees
In order that the defen-dant may be considered as
that Rapanot already paid a reservation fee and had through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to
having exercised all diligence of a good father of a
made several installment payments in favor of Golden buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
family, he should not be satisfied with the mere
Dragon. The Bank's failure to exercise the diligence documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased
possession of a professional driver's license; he should
required of it constitutes negligence, and negates its nature of the testimony.
have carefully examined the applicant for employment
assertion that it is a mortgagee in good faith. as to his qualifications, his experience and record of
Calalas v. CA
service.
a. Kinds of Negligence as Ground for Liability In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
From Article 2180, two things are appa-rent: established because it is the basis of the action, whereas
Culpa Contractual — that which results from in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
breach of contract; 1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence merely by proving the existence of the contract and the
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
Culpa Aquiliana — tort or quasi-delict; presumption of law that there was negligence failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only
in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving
breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it
is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and
the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation
thus created.
negligence; especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved.
2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
3) The possibility of contributing conduct which
would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
There exists a fourth requisite, that the defendant fails
to offer any explanation tending to show that the injury
was caused by his or her want of due care.

Air France v. Carrascoso Sps Santos v. Pizarro

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless
"the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort".
Barredo v. Garcia
A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity
all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for causi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e.,
1) Civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of
the RPC; and
2) Independent civil liabilities, such as those
a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from
law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and
34, and culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code; or

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. IAC
The principle about the 'last clear chance' would call
for application in a suit between the owners and drivers
of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to
enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
Macalinao v. Ong
Under local jurisprudence, the following are the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur:
1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of someone's
b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in
this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the
remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation,
i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so
because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to
EXC:
enforce the civil liability arising from crime
3) Delay
ART 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do
something incur in delay from the time the
obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands
from them the fulfillment of their obligation. xxx
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in
delay if the other does not comply or is not ready
to comply in a proper manner with what is
incumbent upon him. From the moment one of
the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the
other begins.
GR: Demand is necessary to put debtor in
default or mora.
Art 1169(2)
 1) When the law so provides;
2) When the obligation expressly so provides;
3) When time is of the essence;
4) When demand would be useless, as when the
debtor has rendered it beyond his power to
perform;
5) When debtor has expressly acknowledged that he
really is in default.
Kinds of Mora
1) Mora solvendi — on the part of debtor;
2) Mora accipiendi — on the part of creditor;
3) Compensatio morae — both are in default; as if
neither is in default.
Mora solvendi
Requisites
1) The obligation must be due, enforceable, and
already liquidated or determinate in
amount;
2) There must be non-performance;
3) There must be a demand, unless not
required;
4) The demand must be for the obligation that is
due.
Effects
1) If the debtor is in default, he may be liable for
interest or damages;
2) He may also have to bear the risk of loss;
3) He is liable even for a fortuitous event,
subject to mitigation.
Mora accipiendi
When creditor unjustifiably refuses to accept payment
or performance at the time it can be done.
Bayla v. Silang Traffic Co.
The provision regarding interest on deferred
payments would not have been inserted if it had been
the intention of the parties to provide for automatic
forfeiture and cancelation of the contract. Moreover,
the contract did not expressly provide that the failure of
the purchaser to pay any installment would give rise to
forfeiture and cancelation without the necessity of any
demand from the seller.
Aerospace Chemical Industries, Inc. v. CA
Whether damages have been properly awarded against
petitioner for its unjustified delay in the performance of
its obligation under the contract. YES.
Private respondent required petitioner to ship out or lift
the sulfuric acid as agreed, otherwise petitioner would
be charged for the consequential damages owing to any
delay.
Records reveal that a tanker ship had to pick-up sulfuric
acid in Basay, then proceed to get the remaining stocks
in Sangi, Cebu. A period of three days appears to us
reasonable for a vessel to travel between Basay and
Sangi. Logically, the computation of damages arising
from the shipping delay would then have to be from
December 15, 1986, given said reasonable period after
the December 12th letter.
The general rule that before delivery, the risk of loss is
borne by the seller who is still the owner, is not
applicable in this case because petitioner had incurred
delay in the performance of its obligation as per
Article 1504 of the Civil Code.
Binalbagan Tech, Inc. v. CA
A party to a contract cannot demand performance of
the other party’s obligations unless he is in a
position to comply with his own obligations.
Similarly, the right to rescind a contract can be
demanded only if a party thereto is ready, willing and
able to comply with his own obligations thereunder (Art
1191, Civil Code).
Petitioner was evicted from the subject subdivision lots
in 1974 by virtue of a court order and reinstated to the
possession thereof only in 1982. During the period,
therefore, from 1974 to 1982, seller private respondent
Echaus’ warranty against eviction given to buyer
petitioner was breached though, admittedly, through no
fault of her own. It follows that during that period,
Echaus was not in a legal position to demand
compliance of the prestation of petitioner to pay the
price of said subdivision lots. In short, her right to
demand payment was suspended during that period.
Agcaoili v. GSIS
GSIS sold a house to Agcaoili, and required him to
immediately occupy it under pain of cancellation of the
sale. There would be no sense to require the awardee to
immediately occupy and live in a shell of a house, a
structure consisting only of four walls with openings,
and a roof. Since GSIS did not fulfill that obligation, and
was not willing to put the house in habitable state, it
cannot invoke Agcaoili's suspension of payment of
amortizations as cause to cancel the contract between
them. It is axiomatic that "in reciprocal obligations,
neither party incurs in delay if the other does not
comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him."
Bricktown Development Corp. v. Amor Tierra
Development Corp.
A grace period is a right, not an obligation, of the
debtor. When unconditionally conferred, the grace
period is effective without further need of demand
either calling for the payment of the obligation or for
honoring the right. The grace period must not be likened
to an obligation, the non--payment of which, under
Article 1169 of the Civil Code, would generally still
require judicial or extrajudicial demand before “default”
can be said to arise.
Verily, in the case at bench, the sixty-day grace period
under the terms of the contracts to sell became ipso-
facto operative from the moment the due payments
were not met at their stated maturities. On this score,
the provisions of Article 1169 would find no relevance.
The cancellation of the contracts to sell by petitioner
corporation accords with the contractual covenants of
the parties, and such cancellation must be respected.
Note that in a contract to sell, the non-payment of the
purchase price can prevent the obligation to convey
title from acquiring any obligatory force.
While petitioner corporation acted within its legal right
to declare the contracts to sell rescinded or cancelled, it
would be unconscionable to sanction the forfeiture
by petitioner of payments made to it by private
respondent.
Leaño v. CA
On the issue of whether Leaño was in delay in paying
the amortizations, we rule that while the contract
provided that the total purchase price was payable
within a ten-year period, the same contract specified
that the purchase price shall be paid in monthly
installments for which the corresponding penalty shall
be imposed in case of default. Leaño cannot ignore the
provision on the payment of monthly installments by
claiming that the ten-year period within which to pay
has not elapsed.
Respondent Fernando performed his part of the
obligation by allowing Leaño to continue in possession
and use of the property. Clearly, when Leaño did not pay
the monthly amortizations, she was in delay and liable
for damages. However, we agree with the trial court that
the default committed by Leaño in respect of the
obligation could be compensated by the interest and
surcharges imposed upon her under the contract in
question.
Lee v. De Guzman, Jr.
It is well-settled that when after a judgment has become
final and executory, facts and circumstances transpire
which render its execution impossible or unjust, the
interested party may ask a competent court to stay its
execution or prevent its enforcement.
Unfortunately it is not possible for Motorcars to comply
with the writ of execution since admittedly, the then
Delta Motors who manufactured 1983 models of Toyota
Liftback had already closed shop, but be this as it may,
there is no question that indeed there was a perfected
contract of sale between Lee and Motorcars.
The relief left for Lee is that found under Article 1170.
There was therefore delay in the delivery of the subject
vehicle which entitles petitioner to be awarded
damages.
Vermen Realty v. CA
Article 1191 provides the remedy of rescission in
(more appropriately, the term is “resolution”) in case of
reciprocal obligations, where one of the obligors fails to
comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The general rule is that rescission of a contract will
not be permitted for a slight or causal breach, but
only for such substantial and fundamental breach as
would defeat the very object of the parties in
executing the agreement.
Petitioner would never be able to fulfill its obligation in
allowing respondent to exercise the option to transfer
from Phase I to Phase II, as the construction of Phase II
has ceased and the subject condominium units will
never be available.
The impossibility of fulfillment of the obligation on
the part of petitioner necessitates resolution of the
contract for indeed, the non-fulfillment of the obligation
aforementioned constitutes substantial breach of the
Offsetting Agreement.
Heirs of Luis Bacus v. CA
Obligations under an option to buy are reciprocal
obligations. Only upon petitioners' actual execution and
delivery of the deed of sale were they required to pay.
In Nietes v. CA, we held that notice of the creditor's
decision to exercise his option to buy need not be
coupled with actual payment of the price, so long as this
is delivered to the owner of the property upon
performance of his part of the agreement. Consequently,
since the obligation was not yet due, consignation in
court of the purchase price was not yet required.
Corollary, private respondents did not incur in delay
when they did not yet deliver payment nor make a
consignation before the expiration of the contract.
Nacar v. Gallery Frames 2013 modified by ⭐Lara’s Gift
and Decors v. Midtown Industrial Sales 2019 En Banc
The guidelines on the imposition of interest as provided
in Eastern Shipping Lines and Nacar are further
modified for clarity and uniformity, as follows:
With regard to an award of interest in the concept of
actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest,
as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists
in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan
or forbearance of money, goods, credits or
judgments, the interest due shall be that which
is stipulated by the parties in writing, provided
it is not excessive and unconscionable.
2. In the absence of stipulated interest, in a loan or
forbearance of money, goods, credits or
judgments, the rate of interest on the principal
amount shall be the prevailing legal interest
prescribed by the BSP.
For both Nos 1 and 2, the interest shall be
computed from default, i.e., from extrajudicial
or judicial demand in accordance with Article
1169 of the Civil Code, UNTIL FULL PAYMENT,
without compounding any interest unless
compounded interest is expressly stipulated by
the parties, by law or regulation.
Interest due on the principal amount accruing
as of judicial demand shall SEPARATELY earn
legal interest at the prevailing rate prescribed
by the BSP, from the time of judicial demand
UNTIL FULL PAYMENT.
3. When the obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, goods, credits or
judgments, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed in
the discretion of the court at the prevailing
legal interest prescribed by the BSP.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages until the
demand can be established with reasonable
certainty.
Accordingly, where the amount of the claim or
damages is established with reasonable
certainty, the prevailing legal interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made
extrajudicially or judicially UNTIL FULL
PAYMENT, but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date of the judgment of the trial
court UNTIL FULL PAYMENT. The actual base
 for the computation of the interest shall, in any
case, be on the principal amount finally
adjudged, without compounding any interest
unless compounded interest is expressly
stipulated by law or regulation.
University of Pangasinan, Inc. v. Fernandez 2014
The CA properly imposed a legal interest upon the total
monetary award reckoned from the Entry of Judgment
until full satisfaction thereof, but the Court modifies the
rate indicated in the assailed decision to conform to the
doctrine in Nacar.
Republic v. Hon. Mupas 2015 En Banc
Interest in eminent domain cases “runs as a matter of
law and follows as a matter of course from the right of
the landowner to be placed in as good a position as
money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.”
The Government’s initial payment of just compensation
does not excuse it from avoiding payment of interest
on the difference between the adjudged amount of just
compensation and the initial payment.
The initial payment scheme as a prerequisite for the
issuance of the writ of possession under RA 8974 only
provides the Government flexibility to immediately take
the property for public purpose or public use pending
the court’s final determination of just compensation.
Contrary to the Government’s opinion, the interest
award is not anchored either on the law of contracts
or damages; it is based on the owner’s constitutional
right to just compensation. The difference in the
amount between the final payment and the initial
payment – in the interim or before the judgment on just
compensation becomes final and executory – is not
unliquidated damages which do not earn interest until
the amount of damages is established with reasonable
certainty. The difference between final and initial
payments forms part of the just compensation that the
property owner is entitled from the date of taking of the
property.
Republic v. CA ruled that just compensation is effectively
a forbearance of money, and not indemnity for
damages.
Odiamar v. Valencia 2018
The Court notes that there are two (2) types of interest,
namely, monetary interest and compensatory
interest.
Monetary interest is the compensation fixed by the
parties for the use or forbearance of money. On the
other hand, compensatory interest is that imposed
by law or by the courts as penalty or indemnity for
damages.
Anent monetary interest, it is an elementary rule that
no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in writing. In this case, no monetary interest
may be imposed on the loan obligation, considering that
there was no written agreement expressly providing for
such. This notwithstanding, such loan obligation may
still be subjected to compensatory interest, following
Nacar.
Heirs of Jarque v. Jarque 2018
Since the obligation of P950.00 is a forbearance of
money, the amount shall earn interest from the time of
demand in the counterclaim. The awards of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the time they
became determinable, i.e., date of the MCTC Decision,
until finality of this judgment. The total amount shall
thereafter earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from such finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
1) Contravention of Tenor of Obligations
Pacmac v. IAC
The parties’ contract of exclusive distributorship
arrangement was still in existence on August 3, 1965
when VULCAN decided to stop deliveries of its products
to PACMAC. VULCAN's unilateral act of terminating
the contract without legal justification makes it
liable for damages suffered by PACMAC pursuant to
Article 1170.
FGU Insurance Corp. v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking
A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured
party a valid cause for recovering that which may have
been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the
interests of the promisee that may include his
a) “expectation interest,” which is his interest
in having the benefit of his bargain by being put
in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed, or his
b) “reliance interest,” which is his interest in
being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on
the contract by being put in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract not
been made; or his
c) “restitution interest,” which is his interest in
having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.
The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty,
that is, to make recompense to the one who has been
injured by the failure of another to observe his
contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence
or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him
from his ensuing liability.
3. Effects of Fortuitous Events in Obligations
ART 1174. Except
a) in cases expressly specified by the law, or
b) when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
or
c) when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring
Whether nor not the collision of appellant's barge with
the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law
caused by fortuitous event or force majeure. NO.
Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable,
"events that could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, were inevitable." It is, therefore, not enough
that the event should not have been fore-seen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The very measures
adopted by appellant prove that the pos-sibility of
danger was not only foreseeable, but actually
foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.
Luzon Stevedoring Corpora-tion, knowing and
appreciating the perils posed by the swollen stream and
its swift current, voluntarily entered into a situation
in-volving obvious danger; it therefore assumed the
risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because
the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient.
Austria v. CA
Whether in a contract of agency (consignment of goods
for sale) it is necessary that there be prior conviction for
robbery before the loss of the article shall exempt the
consignee from liability for such loss. NO.
To avail of the exemption granted in the law, it is NOT
necessary that the persons responsible for the
occurrence should be found or punished; it would only
be sufficient to establish that the unforeseeable event,
the robbery in this case, did take place without any
concurrent fault on the debtor's part, and this can be
done by preponderant evidence. To require in the
present action for recovery the prior conviction of the
culprits in the criminal case, in order to establish the
robbery as a fact, would be to demand proof beyond
reasonable doubt to prove a fact in a civil case.
Tugade v. CA
The accident was caused either by defects in the
automobile or else through the negligence of its driver.
That is not a caso fortuito.
Southeastern College, Inc. v. CA
Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private
respondents resulting from the impact of the falling
portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the
strong winds of typhoon “Saling”, was, within legal
contemplation, due to fortuitous event. YES.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a
fortuitous event. In order to be exempt from liability
arising from any adverse consequence engendered
thereby, there should have been no human
participation amounting to a negligent act.
Here, petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault
regarding the construction and maintenance of its
school building in question and that typhoon “Saling”
was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by
private respondents’ house.
Mindex Resources Development v. Morillo
Petitioner claims that the burning of the truck was a
fortuitous event, for which it should not be held liable
pursuant to Article 1174.
Here, the negligence of petitioner makes it responsible
for the loss. Article 1667 of the Civil Code holds lessees
responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing
leased, unless they prove that it took place without their
fault.
Witness Roxas testified how petitioner fell short of
ordinary diligence in safeguarding the leased truck
against the accident, which could have been avoided in
the first place.
Herbosa v. CA
In order that fortuitous event may exempt PVE from
liability, it is necessary that it be free from negligence.
The record shows, however, that the alleged
malfunctioning of the video tape recorder occurred at
the beginning of the video coverage at the residence of
the bride. The PVE crew miserably failed to detect the
defect in the video tape recorder and that they
discovered the same rather too late after the wedding
reception. There appeared to be no valid reason why the
alleged defect in the video tape recorder had gone
undetected.
FGU Insurance Corp v. CA
The barge D/B Lucio had no engine of its own and could
not maneuver by itself. Yet, the patron of ANCO’s
tugboat M/T ANCO left it to fend for itself
notwithstanding the fact that as the two vessels arrived
at the port of San Jose, Antique, signs of the impending
storm were already manifest.
The calamity which caused the loss of the cargoes was
not unforeseen nor was it unavoidable. To be exempted
from responsibility, the natural disaster should have
been the proximate and only cause of the loss. There
must have been no contributory negligence on the part
of the common carrier.
Schmitz Transport and Brokerage Corp. v. Transport
Venture, Inc.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely
by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be
excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result
of the participation of man, whether due to his active
intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is then humanized and removed from the
rules applicable to the acts of God.
That no tugboat towed back the barge to the pier after
the cargoes were completely loaded by 12:30 in the
morning is the proximate cause of the loss of the
cargoes. Had the barge been towed back promptly to the
pier, the deteriorating sea conditions notwithstanding,
the loss could have been avoided. The loss thus falls
outside the “act of God doctrine.”
TVI’s failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not
only increase the risk that might have been
reasonably anticipated during the shipside
operation, but was the proximate cause of the loss.
Sps Poon v. Prime Savings Bank 2016
The Civil Code uses rescission in two different contexts,
namely:
1) rescission on account of breach of contract
under Article 1191; and
2) rescission by reason of lesion or economic
prejudice under Article 1381.
Resolution is a principal action based on a breach by a
party, while rescission under Article 1383 is a

subsidiary action limited to cases of rescission for
lesion under Article 1381.
The closure of respondent's business was neither a
fortuitous nor an unforeseen event that rendered the
lease agreement functus officio.
The period during which the bank cannot do business
due to insolvency is NOT a fortuitous event, unless it is
shown that the government's action to place a bank
under receivership or liquidation proceedings is tainted
with arbitrariness, or that the regulatory body has acted
without jurisdiction.
As an alternative justification for its premature
termination of the Contract, respondent lessee invokes
the doctrine of unforeseen event under Article
1267. Tagaytay Realty Co., Inc. v. Gacutan lays down
the requisites for the application of Article 1267, as
follows:
1. The event or change in circumstance could not
have been foreseen at the time of the execution
of the contract.
2. It makes the performance of the contract
extremely difficult but not impossible.
3. It must not be due to the act of any of the
parties.
4. The contract is for a future prestation.
The difficulty of performance should be such that the
party seeking to be released from a contractual
obligation would be placed at a disadvantage by the
unforeseen event.
The first and the third requisites here are lacking. It
must be noted that the lease agreement was for 10
years. The closure of respondent's business was not an
unforeseen event. As the lease was long-term, it was not
lost on the parties that such an eventuality might occur,
as it was in fact covered by the terms of their Contract.
Besides, the event was not independent of respondent's
will.
4. Usurious Transactions; Interests
ART 1175. Usurious transactions shall be governed
by special laws.
Security Bank and Trust Co. v. RTC of Makati
WON the 23% rate of interest per annum agreed
upon by petitioner bank and respondents is allowable
and not against the Usury Law.
The rate of interest was agreed upon by the parties
freely. We find no valid reason to impose a 12% rate of
interest on the principal balance owing to petitioner by
respondent in the presence of a valid stipulation. In a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should
be that stipulated in writing, and in the absence thereof,
the rate shall be 12% per annum. Hence, only in the
absence of a stipulation can the court impose the
12% rate of interest.
Sps Solangon v. Salazar
In the case at bench, petitioners are required to pay the
stipulated interest rate of 6% per month or 72% per
annum which is definitely outrageous and inordinate.
Surely, it is more consonant with justice that the said
interest rate be reduced equitably. An interest of 12%
per annum is deemed fair and reasonable.
Cuaton v. CA
Whether the 8% and 10% monthly interest rates imposed
on the one-million-peso loan obligation of petitioner to
respondent Rebecca Salud are valid.
NO. The reduction of said rates to 12% per annum is fair
and reasonable.
Integrated Realty Corp. v. PNB
We find nothing illegal in the interest of one and one-
half percent (1 1/2%) imposed by PNB pursuant to the
resolution of its Board which presumably was done in
accordance with ordinary banking procedures.
David v. CA
Article 2212 contemplates the presence of
stipulated or conventional interest which has accrued
when demand was judicially made. In cases where no
interest had been stipulated by the parties, as in the case
of Philippine American Accident Insurance, no accrued
conventional interest could further earn interest upon
judicial demand.
When the judgment sought to be executed ordered the
payment of simple “legal interest” only and said nothing
about payment of compound interest, but the
respondent judge orders payment of compound
interest, then, he goes beyond the confines of a
judgment which had become final.
PNB v. CA
When an obligation arises "from a contract of purchase
and sale and not from a contract of loan or mutuum,"
the applicable rate is "6% per annum as provided in
Article 2209 of the NCC and not the rate of 12% per
annum as provided in (CB) Cir. No. 416."
Almeda v. Cariño
In accordance with our decision in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. CA, when the judgment of the court
awarding the sum of money becomes final and
executory, a 12% legal interest per annum shall also be
imposed from such finality until satisfaction thereof, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Siga-an v. Villanueva, supra
Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary
interest, specifically mandates that no interest shall be
due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
Thus, payment of monetary interest is allowed only if:
1) there was an express stipulation for the
payment of interest; and
2) the agreement for the payment of interest was
reduced in writing.
There are instances in which an interest may be
imposed even in the absence of express stipulation,
verbal or written, regarding payment of interest.
1) Article 2209 states that if the obligation
consists in the payment of a sum of money, and
the debtor incurs delay, a legal interest of 12%
per annum may be imposed as indemnity for
damages if no stipulation on the payment of
interest was agreed upon.

2) Article 2212 provides that interest due shall
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded, although the obligation may be
silent on this point.
All the same, the interest under these two instances may
be imposed only as a penalty or damages for breach
of contractual obligations. It cannot be charged as a
compensation for the use or forbearance of money. In
other words, the two instances apply only to
compensatory interest and not to monetary interest.
The case at bar involves petitioner's claim for monetary
interest.
Asiatrust Development Bank v. Tuble 2012
Assuming that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract
subsists, we rule that the dragnet clause therein does
not justify the imposition of an 18% annual interest
on the redemption price.
In addition to the 18% annual interest, the bank also
claims a 12% interest per annum on the consumption
loan. A default must exist before the bank can collect the
compensatory legal interest of 12% per annum. Here,
the obligation of Tuble had already been settled by
paying the redemption price. Thus, Tuble is NOT in
default.
Sps Bonrostro v. Sps Luna 2013
Article 1191 cannot be applied to sales of real property
on installment since they are governed by the Maceda
Law.
Tender of payment is the manifestation by the debtor
of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If
refused without just cause, the tender of payment will
discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but only
after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have been
made with the proper court.
Consignation is the deposit of the proper amount with
a judicial authority in accordance with rules prescribed
by law, after the tender of payment has been refused or
because of circumstances which render direct payment
to the creditor impossible or inadvisable.
The spouses Bonrostro erroneously assumed that their
notice to pay would excuse them from paying interest.
Their claimed tender of payment did not produce any
effect whatsoever because it was not accompanied by
actual payment or followed by consignation. Hence, it did
not suspend the running of interest. The spouses
Bonrostro are therefore liable for interest on the subject
installments from the date of default until full payment.
5. Presumptions
ART 1176. The receipt of the principal by the
creditor without reservation with respect to the
interest, shall give rise to the presumption that
said interest has been paid.
The receipt of a later installment of a debt
without reservation as to prior installments, shall
likewise raise the presumption that such
installments have been paid.
Ledesma v. Realubin
Invoking Article 1176, petitioner claims that in as much
as she admittedly paid her October, 1956 purchase, it is
to be presumed that her prior purchases were likewise
paid, because her account with the respondent was a
running account. We cannot agree. Realubin proved as a
fact that the prior purchases were not paid, and that the
October purchases were for cash.
Therefore, the presumption of payment of prior
obligations assuming its applicability for argument's
sake cannot prevail. Between a proven fact and a
presumption pro tanto, the former stands, and the latter
falls.
6. Remedies of Creditors for Breach of Obligations
1) Extrajudicial Remedies;
2) Judicial Remedies
a. Principal Remedies —
1. Specific Performance, Substitute
Performance; Equivalent Performance
(1165; 1167; 1168; 1170)
2. Rescission (Resolution) (1191)
b. Subsidiary Remedies —
1. Acción subrogatoria;
2. Accion pauliana.
c. Ancillary Remedies (replevin, attachment,
garnishment, etc.)
Accion Subrogatoria
ART 1177. The creditors, after having pursued the
property in possession of the debtor to satisfy
their claims, may exercise all the rights and bring
all the actions of the latter for the same purpose,
save those which are inherent in his person; they
may also impugn the acts which the debtor may
have done to defraud them.
Accion Pauliana — see Rescissible Contracts
Siy v. CA
Breach of contract entitles the complainant the right to
rescind the contract OR to ask for its specific
per-formance, in either case with right to demand
damages. In the case at bar, respondents chose to
rescind the contracts after the petitioner repeatedly
failed to pay not only the balance but the initial amount
as downpayment in consideration of which the
contracts or agreements were executed.
Molina v. CA
The contract of sale remains but the payment of the
price is a resolutory condition, and the remedy of the
seller is to exact fulfillment or, in case of a
substantial breach, to rescind the contract under
Article 1191.
Lim v. CA
Whether as a result of private respondent’s failure to eject
the squatters from the land, petitioners lost the right to
demand that the land be sold to them. We hold that they
did not and that the appellate court erred in holding
otherwise.
Private respondent fails to distinguish between a
condition imposed on the perfection of the contract
and a condition imposed on the performance of an
obligation. Failure to comply with the first condition
results in the failure of a contract, while failure to
comply with the second condition only gives the other
party the option either to refuse to proceed with the
sale or to waive the condition.
In this case, there is already a perfected contract. The
condition was imposed only on the performance of the
obligation. Hence, petitioners have the right to choose
whether to demand the return of earnest money or to
proceed with the sale. They have chosen to proceed with
the sale and private respondent cannot refuse to do so.
In any case, private respondent’s action for rescission is
not warranted. She is not the injured party. The right
of resolution of a party to an obligation under
Article 1191 of the Civil Code is predicated on a
breach of faith by the other party that violates the
reciprocity between them. It is private respondent who
has failed in her obligation under the contract.
Deiparine, Jr. v. CA
Deiparine did not deal with the Carungays in good faith.
His breach of this duty constituted a substantial
violation of the contract correctible by judicial
rescission.
The construction contract falls squarely under the
coverage of Article 1191 because it imposes upon
Deiparine the obligation to build the structure and upon
the Carungays the obligation to pay for the project upon
its completion.
Article 1191, unlike Article 1385, is not predicated on
economic prejudice to one of the parties but on
breach of faith by one of them that violates the
reciprocity between them. The violation of reciprocity
between Deiparine and the Carungay spouses, to wit,
the breach caused by Deiparine's failure to follow the
stipulated plans and specifications, has given the
Carungay spouses the right to rescind or cancel the
contract. When the structure failed, the Carungay
spouses were left with no other recourse than to
rescind their contract.
Sps Velarde v. CA
A substantial breach of a reciprocal obligation, like
failure to pay the price in the manner prescribed by
the contract, entitles the injured party to rescind the
obligation. Rescission abrogates the contract from
its inception and requires a mutual restitution of
benefits received.
The breach committed by petitioners was the
nonperformance of a reciprocal obligation, not a
violation of the terms and conditions of the mortgage
contract. Therefore, the automatic rescission and
forfeiture of payment clauses stipulated in the contract
does not apply. Instead, Civil Code provisions shall
govern and regulate the resolution of this controversy.
Considering that the rescission of the contract is based
on Article 1191, mutual restitution is required to
bring back the parties to their original situation prior to
the inception of the contract.
Campos Assets Corp. v. Club X.O. Company
Jurisprudence supports the view that when parties to a
contract expressly reserve an option to terminate or
rescind a contract upon the violation of a resolutory
condition, notice of resolution must be given to the
other party when such right is exercised.
PNCC v. Mars Construction Enterprises, Inc.
Unilateral rescission of a contract is subject to
judicial determination. Contractual stipulations
should be interpreted together. Ambiguous ones
should be construed to conform to the sense that
would result when all the provisions are
comprehended jointly. Moreover, doubts should be
settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of
interests.
By saying that the quantity specified in the letter was its
last order, petitioner unilaterally amended its Contract
with the respondent. The act of treating a contract as
cancelled or rescinded on account of infractions by the
other contracting party is always provisional; that is,
contestable and subject to judicial determination.
Judicial action is necessary for its rescission in
order to afford the other party an opportunity to be
heard and to determine if the rescission was proper.
When the herein petitioner resolved or rescinded the
Agreement without previous court action, it proceeded
at its own risk. Only the final judgment of a court will
conclusively and finally settle whether such recourse
was correct in law.
DBP v. CA
Rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a
slight or casual breach, but only such substantial
and fundamental breach as would defeat the very
object of the parties in making the agreement.
Private respondents made regular payments to
petitioner DBP. Their fault consisted only of their failure
to pay the installments on the dates stipulated in the
contract, for which they were charged additional
interests and penalty charges.
Central Bank v. Bichara
The law speaks of the right of the "injured party" to
choose between rescission or fulfillment of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case.
The deed of sale expressly stipulated that the vendors
were to undertake, at their expense, the filling up of the
lots with escombro free from waste material compacted
to the street level. It was not shown that the same were
in a condition suitable for the construction of
petitioner's regional office.
Heirs of the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes v. CA
The crux of the case is whether there was a need for
judicial rescission of the contract of lease before
respondent MMB, Inc. may be compelled to move out of
the leased premises.
We rule that there is no need for a judicial rescission
of the lease contract. There is nothing wrong if the
parties to a lease contract agreed on certain mandatory
provisions concerning their respective rights and
obligations, such as the procurement of the insurance
and the rescission clause. This is what petitioners and
respondent entered into, a lease contract with
stipulation that the contract is rescinded upon violation
of its substantial provisions, which MMB, Inc. does not
deny they violated.
Sps Pangilinan v. CA
 knowledge determines whether to obligation will
Article 1592, requiring demand by suit or by notarial act date it received notice of rescission from petitioner up
arise or not.
in case the vendor of realty wants to rescind, does not to the date of the return or payment.
apply to a contract to sell but only to contract of sale. 3. It must not be impossible (Art 1183).
C. Kinds of Obligations a) Classification of Conditions
The applicable provision of law in instant case is Article
1191. There is nothing in this law which prohibits the
Pure and Conditional
parties from entering into an agreement that a violation Its happening gives rise to the
Suspensive
of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation obligation
even without court intervention. Where such propriety Pure obligations Effect
is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely Its happening extinguishes the
ART 1179. Every obligation whose performance Resolutory
obligation
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not itself the does not depend upon a future or uncertain
revocatory act. event, or upon a past event unknown to the
parties, is demandable at once. Express Is clearly stated
Sps Lim v. CA Form
Every obligation which contains a resolutory
We have held that in proper cases, a party may take it condition shall also be demandable, without Implied Merely inferred
upon itself to consider the contract rescinded and act prejudice to the effects of the happening of the
accordingly albeit subject to judicial confirmation, event. Capable of fulfillment, legally an
which may or may not be given. It is true that the Possible
physically
rescinding party takes a risk that its action may not be Pure obligation is one which is not subject to any Possibility
approved by the court. condition and no specific date is mentioned for its Not capable of fulfillment, legally
fulfillment and is, therefore, immediately demandable. Impossible
physically
Goldenrod, Inc. v. CA
Obligation immediately demandable when it is:
In the absence of a specific stipulation, may the seller of Depends upon the will of one of
1. Pure (Art 1179[1]); Potestative
real estate keep the earnest money to answer for contracting parties
damages in the event the sale fails due to the fault of the 2. Subject to a resolutory condition (Art 1179[2]);
prospective buyer? or Cause/ Depends upon chance or upon th
Casual
Origin of a third person
Under Art. 1482 of the Civil Code, whenever earnest 3. Subject to a resolutory period (Art 1193[2]).
money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be Conditional obligations Depends partly upon chance and
Mixed
considered as part of the purchase price and as proof of partly upon the will of a 3rd per
the perfection of the contract. Hence, the parties could ART 1181. In conditional obligations, the
not have intended that the earnest money or advance acquisition of rights, as well as the Positive Consists in the performance of a
payment would be forfeited when the buyer should fail extinguishment or loss of those already acquired,
Mode
to pay the balance of the price, especially in the absence shall depend upon the happening of the event
which constitutes the condition. Negative Consists in the omission of an ac
of a clear and express agreement thereon. By reason of
its failure to make payment, petitioner informed private
A condition is a future and uncertain event, upon the There are several conditions and
respondents that it would no longer push through with Conjunctive
happening of which, the effectivity or extinguishment of must be fulfilled
the sale. In other words, petitioner resorted to
an obligation (or rights) subject to it depends. Number
extrajudicial rescission of its agreement with private
respondents. 1. It may refer to a past event unknown to the There are several conditions and
Disjunctive
parties. If it refers to a future event, its very least one must be fulfilled
By virtue of the extrajudicial rescission of the contract occurrence and the time must be uncertain;
to sell by petitioner without opposition from private otherwise, it is not a condition. Divisible Susceptible of partial performan
respondents who, in turn, sold the property to other
2. What is contemplated here is the knowledge to be Divisibility
persons, private respondent had the obligation to
return the earnest money plus legal interest from the acquired in the future of a past event which at the Indivisible Not susceptible of partial perfor
moment is unknown to the parties. This
b) Kinds of conditional obligations b) Legally — when they are contrary to law, morals, ART 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled
good customs, public order, or public policy. when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
1) Suspensive and resolutory
Effects fulfillment.
Suspensive Resolutory a) Conditional obligation VOID — Obligor has no This provision refers to the constructive fulfillment of a
(precedent or (subsequent) intention to comply with his obligation knowing it suspensive condition, whose application calls for two
antecedent) requisites, namely:
cannot be fulfilled. Rule is different in conditional
testamentary dispositions. a) the intent of the obligor to prevent the fulfillment
Its fulfillment will give rise Its fulfillment will of the condition, AND
to an obligation extinguish an obligation b) Conditional obligation VALID — If negative
already existing. condition, i.e. not to do, it is disregarded, b) the ACTUAL prevention of the fulfillment.
rendering the obligation pure and valid. Mere intention of the debtor to prevent the happening of
If it does not take place, If it does not take place, tie
c) Only the affected obligation VOID — If divisible the condition, or to place ineffective obstacles to its
the tie of law does not of law is consolidated
compliance, without actually preventing the fulfillment, is
appear obligation, the part not affected by the impossible
insufficient.
condition is valid.
Acquisition of rights - Loss of rights already d) Fulfillment of obligations
Until it takes place, acquired - Its effect flow, d) Only the condition VOID — If the obligation is pre-
existence of obligation a but over it, hovers the existing, and, therefore, does not depend upon the ART 1187. The effects of a conditional obligation
mere hope possibility of termination. fulfillment of the impossible condition, for its to give, once the condition has been fulfilled,
existence, only the condition is void. shall retroact to the day of the constitution of
Demandability of the the obligation. Nevertheless, when the obligation
obligation is suspended 4) Positive and negative conditions imposes reciprocal prestations upon the parties,
until its happening the fruits and interests during the pendency of
ART 1184. The condition that some event happen the condition shall be deemed to have been
2) Potestative, casual and mixed at a determinate time shall extinguish the mutually compensated. If the obligation is
obligation as soon as unilateral, the debtor shall appropriate the fruits
ART 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition and interests received, unless from the nature
a) the time expires or
depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the and circumstances of the obligation it should be
conditional obligation shall be VOID. If it depends b) if it has become indubitable that the inferred that the intention of the person
upon chance or upon the will of a third person, event will not take place. constituting the same was different.
the obligation shall take effect in conformity with
the provisions of this Code. ART 1185. The condition that some event will not In obligations to do and not to do, the courts
happen at a determinate time shall render the shall determine, in each case, the retroactive
1. Potestative — Suspensive in nature and which obligation effective from effect of the condition that has been complied
depends upon the sole will of one of the
a) the moment the time indicated has with.
contracting parties.
elapsed, or e) Preservation of Rights
2. Casual — If the suspensive condition depends
b) if it has become evident that the event
upon chance or upon the will of a third person, ART 1188. The creditor may, before the fulfillment
the obligation subject to it is VALID. cannot occur.
of the condition, bring the appropriate actions for
3. Mixed — VALID if the suspensive condition If no time has been fixed, the condition shall be the preservation of his right.
depends partly upon chance and partly upon the deemed fulfilled at such time as may have
The debtor may recover what during the same
will of a third person. probably been contemplated, bearing in mind the
time he has paid by mistake in case of a
nature of the obligation.
3) Impossible conditions — Kinds: suspensive condition.
c) Constructive fulfilment
a) Physically — when they, in the nature of things, f) Rules in case of Loss, Deterioration, or
cannot exist or cannot be undone; and Improvement
 ⭐ART 1189. When the conditions have been
imposed with the intention of suspending the
efficacy of an obligation to give, the following
rules shall be observed in case of the
improvement, loss or deterioration of the thing
during the pendency of the condition:
1) If the thing is lost without the fault of the
debtor, the obligation shall be
extinguished;
2) If the thing is lost through the fault of the
debtor, he shall be obliged to pay
damages;
It is understood that the thing is lost
when
a) it perishes, or
b) goes out of commerce, or
c) disappears in such a way that its
existence is unknown or it cannot be
recovered;
3) When the thing deteriorates without the
fault of the debtor, the impairment is to
be borne by the creditor;
4) If it deteriorates through the fault of the
debtor, the creditor may choose between
the rescission of the obligation and its
fulfillment, with indemnity for damages
in either case;
5) If the thing is improved by its nature, or
by time, the improvement shall inure to
the benefit of the creditor;
6) If it is improved at the expense of the
debtor, he shall have no other right than
that granted to the usufructuary
Requisites for Art 1189 to apply
1. Real obligation;
2. Object is specific or determinate;
3. Obligation subject to suspensive condition;
4. Condition is fulfilled; and
5. There is loss, deterioration, or improvement of give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said
the thing during the pendency of the happening conditions, shall return to each other what they
on one condition. have received.
Kinds of loss In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement
of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to
1. Physical — when a thing perishes, i.e. house is
the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article
burned; or
shall be applied to the party who is bound to
2. Legal — a thing goes out of commerce or when it return.
heretofore legal becomes illegal; or
As for the obligations to do and not to do, the
3. Civil — it disappears in such a way that its provisions of the second paragraph of article
existence is unknown; or even if known, it cannot 1187 shall be observed as regards the effect of
be recovered, whether as a matter of fact or of the extinguishment of the obligation.
law (e.g. a property is lost through prescription). Effect of fulfillment of resolutory condition
(Art 1262).
a) In obligations to give — Obligation is extinguished
Deterioration occurs when the value of a thing is reduced
and both parties are obliged to return to each
or impaired with or without the fault of the debtor.
other what they have received under the
Improvement occurs when the value of a thing is obligation.
increased or enhanced by nature or time, or at the
expense of the debtor or creditor (Art 1187). i. There is a return to status quo. Thus, the
effect is retroactive.
without Obligation is extinguished; debtor ii. Mutual restitution of the thing and its
debtor’s fault not liable. fruits absolute.
Lost
with debtor’s Creditor entitled to demand iii. In case the thing to be returned is legally
fault damages (Art 1170) in possession of a third person acting in
good faith (Art 1384[2]), the remedy of
without the party entitled to restitution is against
Creditor suffers the impairment.
debtor’s fault
the other (not the third person).
Deteriorates
Creditor may choose between iv. If subject to suspensive condition,
with debtor’s
rescission or fulfillment of the retroactive only when the nature and
dault
obligation, with damages. circumstances in unilateral obligation
infer it to be so.
By nature or Shall inure to the benefit of the
time creditor. v. If the condition is not fulfilled, the rights
acquired by a party become vested.
Debtor will have the right granted
Improves
to a usufructuary with respect tob) In obligations to do or not to do — Courts shall
At debtor’s determine the retroactive effect of the fulfillment
improvements made on the thing
expense
held in usufruct. (see Arts 562, of the condition, may it be resolutory or
579, 580). suspensive.
h) Rescission in Reciprocal Obligations
g) Resolutory Conditions
ART 1190. When the conditions have for their ART 1191. The power to rescind obligations is
purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
 obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the
fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation,
with the payment of damages in either case. He
may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become
impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed,
unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing
of a period.
ART 1192. In case both parties have committed a
breach of the obligation, the liability of the first
infractor shall be equitably tempered by the
courts.
If it cannot be determined which of the parties
first violated the contract, the same shall be
deemed extinguished, and each shall bear his
own damages.
Kinds of obligation according to the person obliged
1) Unilateral — only one party is obliged with a
prestation.
2) Bilateral — Both parties are mutually bound to
each other. Both are creditors and debtors.
a) Reciprocal — arise from the same cause. The
performance of one party of his obligation is
the equivalent and the condition to the
performance by the other of his own
obligation. General rule: to be performed
simultaneously. Non-fulfillment gives a party
the right to demand rescission even if it is not
provided in the agreement.
b) Non-reciprocal — do not impose
simultaneous and correlative performance on
both parties. Performance of one party is not
dependent upon the simultaneous
performance by the other.
Choice of remedy in reciprocal obligations
1) Should there be breach of the obligation, the
aggrieved party may choose between an action
for rescission or for specific performance, with
damages.
2) Breach is the obligor’s failure to comply with an
existing obligation, not a failure of a condition to
render binding the obligation.
3) GR: Previous demand required before the obligor
can be considered in default.
Remedy of Rescission
1. To put an end to the contract in all its parts as
though it never were.
2. When a party demands rescission he, in effect,
treats the non-fulfillment by the other party of his
obligation as a resolutory condition.
Breach of obligation on part of plaintiff
Breach of obligation — failure or refusal without
justifiable excuse or reason to perform, in whole or in
part, the obligation or undertaking which is incumbent
upon him. Its existence is a factual matter.
1) Guilty party not entitled to sue — Under the rule
exceptio non adimpleti contractus, the party who
has not performed his part is not entitled to sue.
2) Injured party entitled to rescind even in absence of
stipulation — Only the injured party can rescind a
contract without violating the principle of
mutuality of contracts (Art 1308).
Existence of economic prejudice not required
★ Effect of rescission predicated on breach of faith
by one of the parties.
Effects of Rescission
1) Contract abrogated from its inception;
2) Mutual restitution of benefits received by each
party required;
Court may grant guilty party term for performance
1. Applies only where the guilty party is willing to
comply with his obligation but needs time to do
so and not where he refuses to perform.
2. Breach must not be substantial and in bad faith,
and there should be just cause for grant of
additional period.
Remedies are alternative
1. Aggrieved party may only choose ONE remedy,
except when the fulfillment should become
impossible. Then, he may also seek rescission,
though he initially chose performance. But should
he choose rescission, he cannot thereafter
demand fulfillment.
2. An alternative prayer in the complaint for either
fulfillment or rescission is permissible as it
cannot be said that plaintiff is availing of both
remedies.
Where contract resolved by non-
fulfillment or violation of resolutory
condition
1) Without option to demand fulfillment —
a) Collin Capitant believes the creditor retains
his right of option.
b) Manresa says that the stipulated resolution of
the contract in case one of the parties does
not comply is produced by force of law, but
the option of the injured party disappears.
c) Tolentino says that if the creditor could still
demand fulfillment, in spite of resolution ipso
jure of the contract, then the resolution
would produce its effect when the creditor
notified the debtor of his decision. The
creditor may waive any right that might have
accrued to him by virtue of the resolution of
the contract.
d) Jurisprudence supports the view that when
parties expressly reserve an option to
terminate or rescind upon the violation of a
resolutory condition, notice of resolution
must be given to the other party when such
right is exercised.
2) With option to demand fulfillment —
 a) In a contract of sale, the non-payment of the
price is a resolutory condition with the seller
entitled to either remedies.
b) In a sale of immovable property, Art 1191
must be read together with Art 1592 which
applies to instances where no stipulation for
automatic rescission is made because it says
“even though”.
Damages recoverable
1) In contract of sale, seller is entitled to
repossession of the thing and its fruits should the
same have been already delivered. If he elects
specific performance, he is entitled to the price
with interest if it has not been paid.
2) In case of rescission due to non-delivery,
purchaser is entitled to interest on the amount he
has paid.
3) Where the conditional obligation is deemed not to
have existed by reason of the non-fulfillment of
the suspensive condition, the award of damages
under Art 1191 is unwarranted.
Limitations on right to demand rescission
The right to rescind is not absolute and is always
provisional, contestable, subject to scrutiny and review
by the courts.
1) Resort to the courts —
a) A counterclaim or cross-claim found in
the Answer could constitute a judicial
demand for rescission.
b) If such party does not oppose
extrajudicial rescission, the same
produces legal effects.
c) Proof of violation by a party of the
contract is a condition precedent to
resolution or rescission.
d) The directive to take “legal steps” does
not necessarily equate to “legal action”.
e) The law does not require the injured
party to first file suit and wait for
judgment before taking extrajudicial Procedure where extrajudicial rescission contested
steps to protect his interest; otherwise, 1) With stipulation for automatic revocation —
he will have to passively sit and watch his judicial intervention is necessary to determine
damages accumulate during the whether rescission was proper. Where the other
pendency of the suit until final judgment party does not contest extrajudicial rescission,
of rescission is rendered when the law
the same shall produce legal effect though subject
itself requires that he should exercise to judicial invalidation unless barred from
due diligence to minimize his own acquiescence, estoppel, or prescription.
damages.
2) Without stipulation for automatic revocation —
2) Right of third persons — If the thing subject to Notwithstanding absence thereof, a contracting
restitution be in the hands of a third person who party has the power to extrajudicial rescind a
has acted in good faith, rescission is not a contract, subject to judicial inquiry from the
remedy. Injured party may recover damages other.
from the person responsible for the transfer.
Action for rescission not
3) Waiver of right — Right to rescind may be required upon breach of
waived, expressly or impliedly. compromise agreement
4) Sales of real property and of personal property in A compromise is an agreement between two or more
installments — On real property, Art 1592, as persons who, for preventing or putting an end to a
amended by RA 6552 governs the right of lawsuit, adjust their respective positions by mutual
rescission. On personal property, Art 1484, 1485 consent in the way they feel they can live with.
and 1486 apply.
The aggrieved party by the breach of a compromise
5) Arbitration clause in a contract — The act of agreement (Art 2028) may, enforce or, if he chooses,
treating a contract as rescinded on account of bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original
infractions by the other contracting party is valid demand, as if there had been any compromise
albeit provisional as it can be judicially assailed. agreement, without bringing an action for rescission
The right cannot be exercised where there is a thereof.
valid stipulation on arbitration. Neither party
Rescission and Termination distinguished
can unilaterally treat the contract as rescinded.
Rescission of contract without previous judicial decree Rescission Termination
1) Where automatic rescission expressly stipulated —
Unmaking of a contract, or
parties may validly stipulate for automatic End in time or existence; a
its undoing from the
rescission should there be violation of the terms close, cessation or
beginning. May be effected
of the contract. Hence, Art 1191 becomes conclusion
mutually or unilaterally
inapplicable. Simply put, resolution of reciprocal
Agreement is deemed
obligations may be made extrajudicially unless
inexistent and the parties Agreement deemed valid
impugned in court.
are returned to their at its inception.
2) Where contract still executory — In the absence of status quo ante.
a stipulation, the right to rescind must be invoked
judicially. There is mutual restitution Prior to termination,
of benefits. parties are bound to the
 provisions of the contract.
Consequences may be
anticipated and provided
in the contract.
Where both parties guilty of breach
1) First infractor known — Under this provision, the
second infractor is not liable for damages at all.
Art 1192 does not really exculpate the second
infractor from liability, as the second infractor is
actually punished for his breach by mitigating the
damages to be awarded to him from the previous
breach of the other party. (Ong v. Bogñalbal)
2) First infractor cannot be determined — Contract
shall be deemed extinguished and both bear the
damages sustained.
Pay v. Vda. De Palanca
Whether a creditor is barred by prescription in his
attempt to collect on a promissory note executed more
than fifteen years earlier with the debtor sued promising
to pay either upon receipt by him of his share from a
certain estate or upon demand, the basis for the action
being the latter alternative. YES. The prescriptive period
for a written contract is 10 years.
Rillo v. CA
The respondent court did not err when it did not apply
Articles 1191 and 1592 on rescission to the case at bar.
The contract between the parties is not an absolute
conveyance of real property but a contract to sell. In a
contract to sell real property on installments, the full
payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition, the failure of which is not considered a
breach, casual or serious, but simply an event which
prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title
from acquiring any obligatory force.
It was held in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime
Building Co., Inc. that there can be no rescission of an
obligation that is still non-existent, the suspensive
condition not having happened.
Davies, Inc. v. CA
The enumerated "basic terms and conditions" were
prescriptions on how the obligation was to be
performed and implemented. They were far from being
conditions imposed on the perfection of the contract.
Baluran v. Navarro
A resolutory condition is one which extinguishes
rights and obligations already existing. The right of
"material possession" granted in the agreement ends if
and when any of the children of Obedencio would reside
in the municipality and build his house on the property.
Inasmuch as the condition imposed is not dependent
solely on the will of one of the parties to the contract —
the spouses Paraiso — but is partly dependent on the
will of third persons — Obedencio and any of her
children — the same is VALID.
Trillana v. Quezon Colleges
The need for express acceptance on the part of the
Quezon College, Inc. becomes the more imperative, in
view of the proposal of Damasa Crisostomo to pay the
value of the subscription after she had harvested
fish, a condition obviously dependent upon her sole will
and, therefore, facultative in nature, rendering the
obligation VOID.
The condition solely is void, because it would have
served to create the obligation to pay, unlike a case,
exemplified by Osmeña v. Rama, wherein only the
potestative condition was held void because it referred
merely to the fulfillment of an already existing
indebtedness.
Central Philippine University v. CA
When the obligation does not fix a period but from its
nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a
period was intended, the general rule provided in Art.
1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides that the
courts may fix the duration thereof because the
fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded
until after the court has fixed the period for compliance
therewith and such period has arrived.
This general rule however cannot be applied
considering that more than a reasonable period of fifty
(50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail
of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if
it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor
forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so.
Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a
term of the obligation when such procedure would be a
mere technicality and formality and would serve no
purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and
expensive multiplication of suits. Moreover, under Art.
1191 of the Civil Code, when one of the obligors cannot
comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee
may seek rescission and the court shall decree the
same unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of
a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to
determine the period of the compliance, there is no
more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission
claimed.
Sps Santos v. CA No Rescission in Contracts to Sell
In view of our finding in the present case that the
agreement between the parties is a contract to sell, it
follows that the appellate court erred when it decreed
that a judicial rescission of said agreement was
necessary. This is because there was no rescission to
speak of in the first place. As we earlier pointed out, in a
contract to sell, title remains with the vendor and does
not pass on to the vendee until the purchase price is
paid in full.
Casiño, Jr. v. CA
The breach petitioner committed cannot, by any
measure, be considered as "slight or casual". For sure,
petitioner's failure to make complete delivery and
installation way beyond the time stipulated despite
respondent's demands, is doubtless a substantial and
fundamental breach, more so when viewed in the light
of the large amount of money respondent had to pay
another contractor to complete petitioner's unfinished
work.
Respondent thus acted well within its rights in
unilaterally terminating its contract with petitioner and
in entering into a new one with a third person in order
to minimize its losses, without prior need of resorting to
judicial action.
F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp. 2012
The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in
reciprocal obligations. The right to rescind, however,
may be waived, expressly or impliedly.
HRCC had no right to rescind the Subcontract
Agreement in the guise of a work stoppage, the latter
having waived such right. Hence, in spite of the existence
of dispute or controversy between the parties during
the course of the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC had
agreed to continue the performance of its obligations
pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. In view of the
provision of the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC is
deemed to have effectively waived its right to effect
extrajudicial rescission of its contract with FFCCI.
International Hotel Corporation v. Joaquin, Jr. & Suarez
2013
To avoid unjust enrichment to a party from resulting out
of a substantially performed contract, the principle of
quantum meruit may be used to determine his
compensation in the absence of a written agreement for
that purpose. The principle of quantum meruit justifies
the payment of the reasonable value of the services
rendered by him.
Wellex Group, Inc. v. U-Land Airlines Co., Ltd. 2015
Leonen, J
Petitioner Wellex and respondent U-Land bound
themselves to negotiate with each other within a 40-day
period to enter into a share purchase agreement. If no
share purchase agreement was entered into, both
parties would be freed from their respective
undertakings.
At the lapse of the 40-day period, the parties failed to
enter into a share purchase agreement. This lapse is the
first circumstance provided for in Article 1185 that
gives rise to the obligation. Applying Article 1185, the
parties were then obligated to return to each other all
that they had received in order to be freed from their
respective undertakings.
U-Land correctly sought the principal relief of rescission
or resolution under Article 1191. The obligations of the
parties gave rise to reciprocal prestations, which arose
from the same cause: the desire of both parties to enter
into a share purchase agreement that would allow both
parties to expand their respective airline operations in
the Philippines and other neighboring countries.
Nolasco v. Cuerpo, et al. 2015
Here, it cannot be said that petitioners' failure to
undertake their obligation under paragraph 7 defeats
the object of the parties in entering into the subject
contract, considering that the same paragraph provides
respondents contractual recourse in the event of
petitioners' non-performance of the aforesaid
obligation, that is, to cause such transfer themselves in
behalf and at the expense of petitioners.
Fong v. Dueñas 2015
The ultimate effect of rescission is to restore the
parties to their original status before they entered
into a contract. Thus, Fong’s prayer for the return of his
contribution did not automatically convert the action to
a complaint for a sum of money. The mutual restitution
of the parties’ original contributions is only a necessary
consequence of their agreement’s rescission.
The Court notes that Fong also breached his obligation
in the joint venture agreement. Fong’s diminution of his
capital share to P5 Million also amounted to a
substantial breach which occurred before Fong decided
to rescind his agreement with Dueñas.
As both parties failed to comply with their
respective reciprocal obligations, we apply Article
1192.
Dueñas must therefore return the P5 Million that Fong
initially contributed since rescission requires mutual
restitution. After rescission, the parties must go back to
their original status before they entered into the
agreement. Dueñas cannot keep Fong’s contribution as
this would constitute unjust enrichment.
No damages shall be awarded to any party in
accordance with the rule under Article 1192 that in
case of mutual breach and the first infractor of the
contract cannot exactly be determined, each party shall
bear his own damages.
Osmeña III v. PSALM 2016
The award of the NPPC-LLA to TPVI further finds
justification under Arts. 1181 and 1185. PSALM's
obligation to award the contract in TPVI's favor was
dependent on the non-occurrence of an event: SPC's
legal and valid exercise of its Right to Top.
It has become apparent, however, that such event will
never occur. SPC can never legally and validly invoke its
Right to Top in view of its nullity. The condition,
therefore, is deemed complied with by operation of law,
and the obligation to execute the purchase contracts in
favor of TPVI, due and demandable.
PEZA v. Pilhino Sales Corp 2016 Leonen, J
Jurisprudence has long settled that the restoration of
the contracting parties to their original state is the very
essence of rescission. Mutual restitution under Article
1191 is, however, no license for the negation of
contractually stipulated liquidated damages.
When courts are, thereafter, confronted with the need to
award damages in tandem with rescission, courts must
not lose sight of how the parties have explicitly stated,
in their own language, these consequences. To uphold
both Article 1191 and the parties' will, contractually
stipulated liquidated damages must, as a rule, be
maintained.
DBP v. Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products 2017 Leonen, J
A condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the
obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfilment and a
debtor loses the right to make use of the period
when a condition is violated, making the obligation
immediately demandable.
The failure to execute the share purchase agreement
was brought about by NDC's delay in reviewing the
financial accounts submitted by Galleon's stockholders.
Article 1186 is categorical that a "condition shall be
deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents
its fulfilment." Considering NDC's delay, the execution of
the share purchase agreement should be considered
fulfilled with NDC as the new owner of 100% of
Galleon's shares of stocks.
With a Period ART 1195. Anything paid or delivered before the 1. When the loan is without interest; Generally
arrival of the period, the obligor being unaware of for the benefit of debtor only. NOTE: This is
the period or believing that the obligation has not absolute. For even if the creditor receives
A period is a future and certain event upon the become due and demandable, may be recovered, no interest, still he may have entered into the
arrival of which the obligation subject to it either with the fruits and interests. contract to protect himself against the
arises or is extinguished. sudden decline in the purchasing power of
1. Applies only to obligations to give. Similar to Art the currency.
When the debtor binds himself to pay when his means 1188[2].
permit him to do so, the obligation shall be deemed to 2. When payment is to be made “within” a
be one with a period, subject to the provisions of Art 2. Debtor presumed aware of period certain period from date of contract.
1197. (Art 1180) a. He has the burden of proving that he was c) Both
Period and condition distinguished unaware of the period. Where the
duration of the period depends upon the 1. When there is interest stipulated;
As to Period Condition will of the debtor (Art 1197[3]), payment 2. When the creditor is interested in keeping his
by him amounts, in effect, to his money safely invested, or when he wants to
Certain to happen sooner or determination of the arrival of the protect himself from the dangers of currency
later at a date known period. depreciation.
Fulfillment Uncertain
beforehand, or at an b. The obligor may no longer recover the 2) Effects
indeterminate time thing or money once the period has
arrived but he can recover the fruits or Acceleration by debtor of time of payment
May refer to past interests thereof from the date of ★ Unless the creditor consents, the debtor has no
Time Refers only to the future events unknown to premature performance to the date of
the parties right to accelerate the time of payment even if the
maturity of obligation.
premature tender included an offer to pay
Merely fixes the time for the 3. No recovery in personal obligations. principal and interest in full. Thus, the creditor
efficaciousness of the could not be obliged to accept payments before
Benefit of Period
obligation. If suspensive, the expiration of the agreed period.
Influence on
cannot prevent birth of Causes an obligationART 1196. Whenever in an obligation a period is
the Effect of acceptance by creditor of partial payment
obligation in due time; if to arise or to cease. designated, it is presumed to have been
obligation
resolutory, does not annul, established for the benefit of both the creditor ★ Amounts to a waiver of the period agreed upon
even in fiction, the fact of its and the debtor, unless from the tenor of the same during which payment should not be made.
existence. or other circumstances it should appear that the
period has been established in favor of one or of 3) Presumption — Art 1196
Empowers the court to fix Invalidates the the other.
When left to 1. Obligation subject to a fixed period — The period
the duration thereof (Art obligation (Art
debtor’s will 1) For whose benefit is presumed to have been established to benefit
1197[2]). 1182).
a) Creditor both parties.Before the expiration of the period,
As to debtor may not fulfill his obligation and neither
Effects do not retroact, Has retroactive 1. Usually, this only exists if there is no
retroactivity may the creditor demand its fulfillment without
unless agreed. effect. stipulation to this effect, as when the contract
of effects the consent of the other.
provides that no payment should be made till
ART 1194. In case of loss, deterioration or after a certain given period. 2. Reciprocal contract — Presumed to benefit both,
improvement of the thing before the arrival of the 2. Acceptance of partial payment even before absent language showing that the term was
day certain, the rules in Article 1189 shall be the expiration of the period means a waiver deliberately set to benefit only either party.
observed. on the part of the creditor of his right to
When Court May Fix Period
Effect of Payment in Advance refuse payment before the end of said period.
b) Debtor ART 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period,
but from its nature and the circumstances it can
 be inferred that a period was intended, the courts
may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period
when it depends upon the will of the debtor.
In every case, the courts shall determine such
period as may under the circumstances have
been probably contemplated by the parties. Once
fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed
by them.
Court generally without power to fix a period
1. Period is implied
No period fixed but a period intended
★ If the period fixed is extended by agreement, to be
valid the same must be for a definite time,
although if no precise date is fixed, it is sufficient
that the time can readily be determined. In case
extension is not precise, Art 1197 applies.
Examples
1) Debt payable in installments without fixing the
period for payment.
2) Donation is subject to a condition for the
fulfillment of which no period is fixed.
2. Period depends solely on will of debtor
Legal effect where suspensive
period/condition depends upon will of
debtor
1) Existence of obligation — Not affected; It is only
the performance with respect to time that is left
to the will of the debtor.
2) Validity of obligation — Conditional obligation
VOID.
Action to fix duration of period
1) Separate action for that express purpose — The
only action that can be maintained is to ask the
court first to determine the term within which the
obligor must comply with his obligation for the
reason that fulfillment of the obligation itself
cannot be demanded until after the court has
fixed the period for its compliance and such has
arrived.
2) Where separate action would be a mere formality
— Action brought for that express purpose
separate from action to enforce payment; but may
not be adhered to when a prior and separate
action would be a mere formality and would
serve no other purpose than to delay.
Ultimate facts to be alleged in the complaint
1) That a contract was entered into, imposing on one
of the parties an obligation/s in favor of another;
and
2) From which an inference may reasonably be
drawn, that a period for performance was
intended by the parties.
Period fixed cannot be changed by the courts.
1) Period agreed upon by the parties;
2) Period fixed by the court;
3) Period fixed in a final judgment — Becomes res
judicata.
★ However, parties may modify the term by a
new agreement.
When debtor loses the right to make use of the period
ART 1198. The debtor shall lose every right to
make use of the period:
1) When after the obligation has been
contracted, he becomes insolvent, unless
he gives a guaranty or security for the
debt;
2) When he does not furnish to the
creditor the guaranties or securities
which he has promised;
3) When by his own acts he has impaired
said guaranties or securities after their
establishment, and when through a
fortuitous event they disappear, unless he
immediately gives new ones equally
satisfactory;
4) When the debtor violates any
undertaking, in consideration of which
the creditor agreed to the period;
5) When the debtor attempts to abscond.
Gaite v. Fonacier
The shipment or local sale of the iron ore is not a
condition precedent (or suspensive) to the payment of
the balance of P65,000, but was only a suspensive
period or term. What characterizes a conditional
obligation is the fact that its efficacy or obligatory force
(as distinguished from its demandability) is
subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain
event; so that if the suspensive condition does not take
place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed.
Radiowealth Finance Company v. Del Rosario
The act of leaving blank the due date of the first
installment did not necessarily mean that the debtors
were allowed to pay as and when they could. If this was
the intention of the parties, they should have so
indicated in the Promissory Note. However, it did not
reflect any such intention.
On the contrary, the Note expressly stipulated that the
debt should be amortized monthly in installments for
twelve consecutive months. While the specific date on
which each installment would be due was left blank, the
Note clearly provided that each installment should be
payable each month. We are convinced neither by their
avowals that the obligation had not yet matured nor by
their claim that a period for payment should be fixed by
a court.
Alternative and Facultative
ART 1199. A person alternatively bound by
different prestations shall completely perform
one of them.
The creditor cannot be compelled to receive part
of one and part of the other undertaking.
Kinds of obligation according to prestation
1) Simple — there is only one prestation;
 2) Compound — at least two prestations. It may be:
a) Conjunctive — all are due;
b) Distributive — one of two or more is due. May
be alternative (Art 1199) or facultative (Art
1206).
An alternative obligation is one wherein various
prestations are due but the performance of one of them is
sufficiently determined by the choice which, as a general
rule, belongs to the debtor.
Right of Choice
ART 1200. The right of choice belongs to the
debtor, unless it has been expressly granted to
the creditor.
The debtor shall have no right to choose those
prestations which are impossible, unlawful or
which could not have been the object of the
obligation.
Limitations to the right of choice rule given to the debtor
1. Prestations that are
a) Impossible,
b) unlawful, or
c) those which could not have been the
object of the obligation, are VOID.
2. When only one prestation is practicable. The
obligation thus becomes simple. ONLY the debtor
can exercise this right of choice.
3. Cannot choose parts of different prestations.
Effect of Notice of Choice
ART 1201. The choice shall produce no effect
except from the time it has been communicated.
1) Effect of notice — Until the choice is made and
communicated, the obligation remains alternative.
a) Obligation then becomes simple.
b) Such choice is irrevocable and cannot be
renounced. Creditor not required to concur with
it.
c) It produces legal effects.
2) Proof and form of notice — Burden of proof incumbent
upon him who made the choice. May be written, or
oral; expressed, or implied.
3) Requisites for The Making of the Choice:
a) Made properly so that the creditor and his agent
will actually know;
b) With full knowledge that a selection is indeed
being made.
c) Voluntarily and freely;
d) In due time, that is, before or upon maturity;
e) To all the proper persons, i.e. in case of joint
creditors;
f) Without conditions unless agreed to by the
creditor;
g) That it may be waived, expressly or impliedly.
Effect of loss or impossibility of one or all prestations
ART 1202. The debtor shall lose the right of choice
when among the prestations whereby he is
alternatively bound, only one is practicable.
1. The impossibility of the other prestations,
however, must not be due to the creditor’s acts,
for in such case, Art 1203 applies.
2. This applies only when the debtor has the right to
choose. Should the creditor be granted the right
to choose, Art 1205 will apply when only one
prestation remains practicable, either due to
fortuitous event or due to debtor’s fault.
ART 1203. If through the creditor's acts the debtor
cannot make a choice according to the terms of
the obligation, the latter may rescind the contract
with damages.
★ Based on principles of justice. Debtor may also
elect to perform that which remains, because
rescission is not automatic, but at his option.
ART 1204. The creditor shall have a right to
indemnity for damages when, through the fault of
the debtor, all the things which are alternatively
the object of the obligation have been lost, or the
compliance of the obligation has become
impossible.
The indemnity shall be fixed taking as a basis the
value of the last thing which disappeared, or that
of the service which last became impossible.
Damages other than the value of the last thing or
service may also be awarded.
Effects of loss or becoming impossible of objects of
obligation
1) Some of the objects — Debtor is not liable, even
through his fault, since he has the right of choice
and the obligation can still be performed. This is
an exception to Art 1170, regarding liability for
damages arising from negligence.
2) All of the objects — Creditor shall have the right to
indemnity for damages.
★ “Or the compliance of the obligation has become
impossible” = obligations to do.
Basis of indemnity
1. Value of the last thing which disappeared, or that
of the service which last became impossible. In
case of disagreement, it is incumbent upon the
creditor to prove such value, or the
aforementioned. Other damages may also be
awarded.
Effect of fortuitous event
1. If all became impossible due to caso fortuito,
obligation extinguished.
2. If one or more became impossible due to caso
fortuito, and the last also then becomes
impossible due to debtor’s fault, Art 1204 applies:
debtor is liable for damages equivalent to the
value of the last prestation.
3. How about if one or more became impossible due
to debtor’s fault, and the last due to caso fortuito?
Tolentino is of the view that debtor is liable to
damages equivalent to the last prestation he
caused to become impossible.
 ART 1205. When the choice has been expressly accept, in the alternative, at the reditor’s option,
Nullity of the princ
given to the creditor, the obligation shall cease to with resultant damages if any. invalidates the
be alternative from the day when the selection Nullity of one prestation
Arco Pulp v. Lim 2014 Leonen, J obligation, and the
has been communicated to the debtor. Nullity does not invalidate the
creditor cannot dem
In an alternative obligation, there is more than one obligation.
Until then the responsibility of the debtor shall be the substitute even
governed by the following rules: object, and the fulfillment of one is sufficient, it is valid.
determined by the choice of the debtor who generally
1) If one of the things is lost through a has the right of election.” The right of election is May be given to the Only the debtor can
fortuitous event, he shall perform the extinguished when the party who may exercise that Choice
creditor choose the substitu
obligation by delivering that which the option categorically and unequivocally makes his or her
creditor should choose from among the choice known. Only the impossibility of
remainder, or that which remains if only all prestations due Impossibility of the
one subsists; When Arco Pulp and Paper tendered a check to Effect of
without fault to the principal is sufficie
respondent in partial payment for the scrap papers, they loss
debtor extinguishes the extinguish the oblig
2) If the loss of one of the things occurs exercised their option to pay the price. The obligation
through the fault of the debtor, the memorandum declared in clear terms that the delivery
creditor may claim any of those of Arco Pulp and Paper’s finished products would be to a Effect of loss
subsisting, or the price of that which, third person, thereby extinguishing the option to deliver
through the fault of the former, has 1) Before substitution — If the principal is lost due
the finished products of equivalent value to respondent.
disappeared, with a right to damages; to caso fortuito, the obligation is extinguished;
Facultative Obligations otherwise, the debtor is liable for damages. The
3) If all the things are lost through the fault loss of the intended substitute with or without
of the debtor, the choice by the creditor ART 1206. When only one prestation has been the fault of the debtor does not render him liable.
shall fall upon the price of any one of agreed upon, but the obligor may render another
them, also with indemnity for damages. in substitution, the obligation is called 2) After substitution — If the principal is lost, the
facultative. debtor is not liable whatever may be the cause,
Simply put
The loss or deterioration of the thing intended as because it is no longer due. If the substitute is
Only one becomes a substitute, through the negligence of the lost, liability is dependent on the existence of fault
All become impossible obligor, does not render him liable. But once the on the part of the debtor.
impossible
substitution has been made, the obligor is liable
Supposing loss is due to malice or bad faith
Fortuitous Any of the remaining for the loss of the substitute on account of his
Obligation extinguished delay, negligence or fraud. ★ Tolentino opines that such is immaterial as the
Event item
debtor could not have been compelled to perform
A facultative obligation is one where only one
Any of the item + the substitute even if it were possible. To hold the
Debtor’s Creditor demands the
damages; or Price of lostprestation has been agreed upon but the obligor may debtor liable in this case would contravene the
Fault price of any + damages render another in substitution.
item + damages
very essence of facultative obligations.
Distinguished from Alternative Obligation
Alternative obligations and remedies distinguished
Effect if creditor delays in making the choice As to Alternative Facultative
Alternative obligations Alternativ
1. Debtor cannot be held in default, notwithstanding Only the principal remedies
There are various
the lapse of maturity. Debtor does not yet know prestation constitutes the
prestations, all of which
what to deliver. Creditor is considered to have Contents obligation, the accessory
Mere choice categorically made and then Choice generally
constitute parts of the
waived the period through his inaction. of the only a means to facilitate
communicated concludes the parties. becomes conclus
obligation. Creditor must
obligation payment. Creditor mayCreditor may not thereafter exercise any only upon the ex
2. If the debtor wants to relieve himself, he may demand all leaving the
only demand the other option, unless the alternative of the remedy.
debtor to choose.
petition the court to compel the creditor to principal prestation.proves to be ineffectual due to no fault on
his part
When substitution effective
★ Analogous with respect to alternative obligations,
thus, from the time the debtor communicates to
the creditor he elects to perform the substitute
prestation.
Joint and Solidary
Kinds of obligation according to the number of parties
1) Individual — only one obligor and one obligee;
and
2) Collective — there are at least two obligors, as
well as obligees. May be joint or solidary. There
are two relations: that between the opposite
parties, and that among the members of same
party.
A. Joint Obligations mancomunada simple, pro rata
1. Concept — One where the whole obligation is to
be paid or fulfilled proportionately by the
different debtors and/or is to be demanded
proportionately by the different creditors. (Art
1208)
2. Presumption - Art 1207, 1208
B. Solidary Obligations mancomunada solidaria, joint
When there is no expressed provision in the
contract, joint obligation is presumed.
3. Effects - Art 1207, 1208
a) Extent of liability of debtor;
b) Extent of right of creditor;
c) In case of novation, compensation, confusion
(Art 1277), remission.
Does not extinguish or modify the obligation
except with respect to the creditor or debtor
affected, without extending its operation to any
other part of the debt or of the credit.
Effects of Joint liability
1) Demand by one creditor upon one debtor,
produces the effects of default only with
respect to the creditor who demanded and
the debtor on whom the demand was made, 3) Basis has something of a legal fiction, i.e., that
but not with respect to the others. it is a mutual agency among those interested
2) The interruption of prescription by the in the same obligation.
judicial demand of one creditor upon a a) Requisites
debtor, does not benefit the other creditors 1) Obligation expressly so states; or
nor interrupt the prescription as to the other
2) Law requires solidarity, i.e. tort,
debtors. On the same principle, a partial
quasi-contracts, obligations of
payment or acknowledgment made by one of
devisees and legatees, liability of
several joint debtors does not stop the
principal, accomplices, and
running of the statute of limitations as to the
accessories of a felony, bailees in
others.
commodatum; or
3) The vices of each obligation arising from the
3) Nature of the obligation requires
personal defect of a particular debtor or
solidarity, i.e. liability under Arts 19-
creditor does not affect the obligation or
22 of NCC. - Common element:
rights of the others.
morally wrong; and a moral wrong
4) The insolvency of a debtor does not increase cannot be divided into parts; hence,
the responsibility of his co-debtors, nor does it should be solidary.
it authorize a creditor to demand anything
b) Words used to indicate solidary
from his co-creditors.
obligations
5) In the joint divisible obligation, the defense of
➔ mancomunada solidaria, joint and several,
res judicata is not extended from one debtor
in solidum, juntos o suparadamente.
to another.
2. Kinds
and several, in solidum a) As to source — Art 1208
1. Concept — One where each of the debtors is 1) Legal — Art 1915, 1945, 2194; Art 119
bound to render, and/or each one of the creditors RPC; Imposed by law.
has a right to demand entire compliance with the Examples:
prestation (Art 1207).
a. Art 927; Liability for loss or destruction
Characteristics, essence, and basis of a thing in possession of the estate;
1) Unity of object and plurality of ties. b. Art 911; When agent exceeded authority
2) Essence is that each and every creditor can but the principal allowed him to act as
demand and each of the debtors must satisfy though he had full powers;
the same prestation, with the resulting duty c. Arts 1822-1824; Crime or quasi-delict
on the part of the creditor who received committed by a partner in a partnership;
payment to pay to each of his co-creditors
d. Art 1915; Two or more persons
what belongs to him, and the resulting right
appointing an agent;
on the part of the debtor who made payment
to claim from his co-debtors the share which e. Art 1945; Two or more bailees to whom a
corresponds to each (Art 1217). thing is loaned in the same contract;
 f. Art 2146[2]; Two or more officious
managers;
g. Art 2157; Two or more payees, when
there has been a payment of what is not
due;
h. Art 2194; Quasi-delict;
i. Arts 143, 146 Family Code; Spouses
whose property regime is separate;
j. Art 1723; Engineer or architect with the
contractor for damages for any
construction defect;
k. Art 110 RPC; Principals, accomplices,
accessories, within their respective class.
l. Arts 106, 107, 109 Labor Code; Employer
with contractor.
2) Conventional — Agreed upon by the
parties (Art 1306).
3) Real — Imposed by the nature of the
obligation.
b) As to parties bound
1) Active — Solidarity on the part of
creditors, where anyone of them can
demand the fulfillment of the entire
obligation. Mutual agency. Juridical
effects are as follows:
a) Since it is a reciprocal agency, death
of a creditor does not transmit the
solidarity to each of his heirs but to
all of them taken together.
b) Each creditor represents the others
in the act of receiving payment, and
in all other acts which tend to secure
the credit or make it more
advantageous.
c) One creditor, however, does not
represent the others in such acts as
novation, compensation and
remission. Even if the debtor is
released, the other creditors can still
enforce their rights against the
creditor who made the novation,
compensation or remission.
d) The credit and its benefits are
divided equally among the creditors,
unless there is an agreement among
them to divide differently.
e) The debtor may pay to any solidary
creditor, but if a judicial demand is
made on him, he must pay only to the
plaintiff.
f) Each creditor may renounce his right
even against the will of the debtor,
and the latter need not thereafter
pay the obligation to the former.
2) Passive — Solidarity on the part of
debtors, where anyone of them can be
made liable for the fulfillment of the
entire obligation. It is in the nature of a
mutual guaranty. Its effects are as
follows:
a) Each debtor can be required to pay
the entire obligation; but after
payment, he can recover from the co-
debtors their respective shares.
b) The debtor who is required to pay
may set up by way of compensation
his own claim against the creditor, in
this case, the effect is the same as
that of payment.
c) The total remission of the debt in
favor of a debtor releases all the
debtors; but when this remission
affects only the share of one debtor,
the other debtors are still liable for
the balance of the obligation.
d) All the debtors are liable for the loss
of the thing due, even if such loss is
caused by the fault of only one of
them, or by caso fortuito after one of
the debtors has incurred in delay.
e) The interruption of prescription as to
one debtor affects all the others; but
the renunciation by one debtor of
prescription already had does not
prejudice the others, because the
extinguishment of the obligation by
prescription extinguishes also the
mutual representation among the
solidary debtors.
f) The interests due by reason of the
delay of one of the debtors are borne
by all of them.
3) Mixed — Solidarity on the part of the
debtors and creditors, where each one
of the debtors is liable to render, and
each one of the creditors has a right to
demand, entire compliance with the
obligation.
c) As to uniformity — Kinds of solidary
obligation according to the legal tie
1) Uniform — Parties are bound by the
same stipulations or clause; or
2) Varied/Non-uniform - Art 1211 —
Parties are not subject to the same
stipulations or clauses;
3. Effects
ART 1216. The creditor may proceed against any
one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of
them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so
long as the debt has not been fully collected.
Right of creditor to proceed against any solidary debtor
1. Since the liability is solidary, the other, solidary
debtors are not indispensable parties in a suit
filed by the creditor.
 2. The bringing of an action against a solidary
debtor to enforce payment of the obligation is not
inconsistent with and does not preclude the
bringing of another to compel others to fulfill
their obligations. A solidary debtor is also a
surety.
3. In case of death of one of the solidary debtors, the
creditor may proceed against the estate of the
deceased solidary debtor alone or against any or
all of the surviving solidary debtors whose
liability is independent of and separate from the
deceased debtor, instead of instituting a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.
4. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce
collection.
Prejudicial Acts Prohibited
ART 1212. Each one of the solidary creditors may
do whatever may be useful to the others, but not
anything which may be prejudicial to the latter.
Beneficial Acts Prejudicial Acts
Interrupt The acts of extinguishment, i.e. remission, acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall be
prescription; novation, compensation and merger or
constitute debtor confusion, which are prejudicial to the co- corresponding to them.
in default; bring creditors, will be valid so as to extinguishLiability
suit so that the claim against the debtors, but not with compensation, confusion, or remission — Creditor who
obligation may respect to the co-creditors whose rights executed any of these acts should be liable to the others
produce interest subsist and can be enforced against the for their corresponding shares. (Art 1212).
creditor who performed the act alone.
Assignment of rights not allowed
ART 1213. A solidary creditor cannot assign his
rights without the consent of the others.
GR: Solidary creditor cannot assign his rights.
EXC: Allowed if all the others consent.
Reason: A solidary obligation implies mutual
agency and mutual confidence. Should the
assignee or substitute do acts which would
prejudice the others, there is no doubt that the
other creditors’ rights are endangered, hence, the
necessity of their consent.
ART 1214. The debtor may pay any one of the
solidary creditors; but if any demand, judicial or
extrajudicial, has been made by one of them,
payment should be made to him.
1. The demand has the effect of terminating the
mutual agency among the solidary creditors.
2. Applicable in active and mixed solidarity. In case
of the latter, the debtor upon whom no demand
has been made, may pay any one of the solidary
creditors.
Demand by Several Creditors — If all or several creditors
demand payment separately, the debtor should pay to the
one who first notified him. If they demand at the same
time or collectively, the debtor preserves his right to
choose and may pay anyone of those demanding payment.
ART 1215. Novation, compensation, confusion or
remission of the debt, made by any of the solidary
creditors or with any of the solidary debtors,
shall extinguish the obligation, without prejudice
to the provisions of article 1219.
The creditor who may have executed any of these
liable to the others for the share in the obligation
the
of solidary creditor in case of novation,
Effect of extension of time given by creditor to a solidary
debtor
1. Does not amount to novation that will discharge
the other solidary debtors. The latter shall be
liable for the whole debt less the share of the
debtor granted the extension (Art 1211).
2. Upon the expiration of the term, the creditor can
demand payment of the unpaid share from any of
the solidary debtors.
ART 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary
debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or
more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor
may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his
co-debtors only the share which corresponds to
each, with the interest for the payment already
made. If the payment is made before the debt is
due, no interest for the intervening period may be
demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because
of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the
debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be
borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the
debt of each.
Effects of payment by a solidary debtor
1) Between the solidary debtor and creditor(s)
— Extinguishes the obligation. Creditor is given
the right to choose which offer to accept should
there be more than one offer to pay.
2) Among the solidary debtors — Does not create
a real case of subrogation. Merely entitles the
payer to claim reimbursement.
a) The other debtors do not become by
virtue of such payment solidary debtors
of the debtors of the debtor-payer. Their
liability is not based on the original
obligation which has been extinguished,
but upon the payment made by the co-
debtor which creates a joint obligation of
reimbursement on the part of the others
(Art 1208). In case of insolvency, the
others assume the share of the insolvent
one pro rata (pars 2, 3).
b) Reimbursement is not automatic and
shall only be recovered in so far as
payment exceeded his share of the
obligation.
3) Among the solidary creditors — The receiving
creditor is jointly liable to the others for their
corresponding shares (Art 1208).
ART 1218. Payment by a solidary debtor shall not
entitle him to reimbursement from his co-debtors
if such payment is made after the obligation has
prescribed or become illegal.
Two cases paying debtor may not be reimbursed — b. If with fault — there is liability (also for
When the obligation has damages and interest). Only guilty debtor
should be liable, not shared with co-debtors.
1) Prescribed (Art 1231[2]; Art 1424); or
c. Due to caso fortuito AFTER default — there
2) Become illegal (Art 1266). will be liability because of the default.
ART 1219. The remission made by the creditor of 4. Defenses available to a solidary debtor against the
the share which affects one of the solidary creditor
debtors does not release the latter from his
responsibility towards the co-debtors, in case the ART 1222. A solidary debtor may, in actions filed
debt had been totally paid by anyone of them by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses which
are derived from the nature of the obligation and
before the remission was effected.
of those which are personal to him, or pertain to
1. If payment is made first, the remission or waiver his own share. With respect to those which
is of no effect. personally belong to the others, he may avail
2. If remission is made previous to the payment and himself thereof only as regards that part of the
the payment is made, solutio indebiti arises. debt for which the latter are responsible.
3. Purpose: forestall fraud whereby the debt having a) Types
been paid, the creditor, who does not stand to 1) Those derived from the nature of the
suffer any loss or damage, remits the share of a obligation — Constitutes TOTAL defense:
particular debtor.
a. Lack of consideration or cause;
4. Secures equality and justice to the paying debtor
inasmuch as the payment benefits his co-debtors. b. Absolute simulation;
ART 1220. The remission of the whole obligation, c. Illegal consideration;
obtained by one of the solidary debtors, does not d. Extinguishment of the obligation
entitle him to reimbursement from his co-
debtors. e. Non-fulfillment of the suspensive
condition;
ART 1221. If the thing has been lost or if the
prestation has become impossible without the f. Statute of Frauds;
fault of the solidary debtors, the obligation shall g. When ALL the debtors were
be extinguished.
incapacitated to give consent;
If there was fault on the part of any one of them,
h. When there are VICES OF CONSENT on
all shall be responsible to the creditor, for the the part of ALL the debtors
price and the payment of damages and interest,
without prejudice to their action against the 2) Personal defenses — COMPLETE defense:
guilty or negligent debtor. a. Vitiated consent;
If through a fortuitous event, the thing is lost or b. Incapacity to give consent;
the performance has become impossible after one
of the solidary debtors has incurred in delay 3) Defenses pertaining to his share — PARTIAL
through the judicial or extrajudicial demand upon defense:
him by the creditor, the provisions of the
a. Non-fulfillment of condition imposed
preceding paragraph shall apply. regarding his share;
Effect of Loss or Impossibility
b. Non-arrival of term
a. If without fault — no liability.
4) Those personally belonging to the other co-
debtors — Partial defense. Debtor-defendant
may also set up defenses which are personal
to his co-debtors.
b) Effects — Exempts debtor-defendant from
payment of the portions of the obligation
corresponding to the other debtors who have
such personal defenses.
C. Joint Indivisible Obligations
1. Concept — Obligation is joint because the parties
are merely proportionately liable. It is indivisible
because the object is not physically divisible into
parts.
2. Indivisibility distinguished from solidarity
ART 1210. The indivisibility of an obligation does
not necessarily give rise to solidarity. Nor does
solidarity of itself imply indivisibility.
3. Effects
ART 1209. If the division is impossible, the right of
the creditors may be prejudiced only by their
collective acts, and the debt can be enforced only
by proceeding against all the debtors. If one of the
latter should be insolvent, the others shall not be
liable for his share.
a. No creditor can do an act prejudicial to the
others;
b. No debtor can be made to answer for the
others.
Characteristics
a. The creditor must proceed against ALL the
joint debtors, for compliance is possible only
if all the joint debtors would act TOGETHER.
b. Demand must, therefore, be made on ALL the
joint debtors;
c. If any one of the debtors does not comply
with his monetary obligation for damages.
(Art 1224)
d. If any of the joint debtors be insolvent, the
others shall not be liable for his share.
 e. If there be joint creditors, delivery must be Sps. Ibañez v. James 2017
legal tie
made to all, and not merely to one, unless
Solidary obligations cannot be inferred lightly. They
that one be specifically authorized by the
must be positively and clearly expressed. Only the debtor guilty of All of the debtors are
others.
breach is liable for liable for the breach
f. Each joint creditor is allowed to renounce his In this case, given that solidarity could not be inferred damages, thereby committed by a co-debtor
proportionate credit. from the agreement, the presumption under the law terminating the agency (Art 1221)
applies—the obligation is joint.
4. Liability for damages in case of breach Can exist although there is There must be at least two
ART 1224. A joint indivisible obligation gives rise only one debtor and debtors and creditors.
Divisible and Indivisible creditor
to indemnity for damages from the time anyone
of the debtors does not comply with his Divisibility of things
undertaking. The debtors who may have been Others are not liable in Others are
ready to fulfill their promises shall not contribute Juridically, a thing is considered indivisible when, if case of insolvency of one proportionately liable
to the indemnity beyond the corresponding divided by parts, its value is diminished debtor.
portion of the price of the thing or of the value of disproportionately. A thing is divisible when each one Kinds
the service in which the obligation consists. of the parts into which it is divided forms a
a) Natural - Art 1225, par.1 — Nature of the object
a. Obligation transformed into one for damages homogeneous and analogous object to the other parts
— The creditor cannot ask for specific or prestation does not admit of division.
as well as to the thing itself.
performance or rescission because there is b) Legal - Art 1225, par. 3 — Provision of law
no cause of action against the debtors who Factors which determine divisibility
declares a naturally divisible object as indivisible.
are willing to fulfill their promises. 1) Will or intention of the parties, expressed or
c) Conventional - Art 1225, par. 3 — The will of the
b. Contribution of innocent debtors limited to implied;
parties makes a naturally divisible object as
their respective shares. — Obligation becomes 2) Objective or purpose of the stipulated prestation; indivisible.
divisible.
3) Nature of the thing; Presumptions
Lafarge Cement Phils. v. Continental Cement Corp., et al.
4) Provisions of law affecting prestation. a) of indivisibility — Art 1225, par. 1
Obligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always
solidary. Kinds of Division 1) Obligations to give definite things;
1) Qualitative — based on quality. 2) Obligations not susceptible to partial
The fact that the liability sought against the CCC is for
specific performance and tort, while that sought against 2) Quantitative — based on number. performance;
the individual respondents is based solely on tort does 3) Ideal or intellectual — exists only in the minds of 3) As provided by law, though naturally
not negate the solidary nature of their liability for the parties divisible;
tortuous acts alleged in the counterclaims. Article 1211
of the Civil Code is explicit on this point. A. Divisible Obligations — The object of which, in its 4) Intended by the parties, though naturally
delivery or performance, is capable of partial divisible.
International Finance Corporation v. Imperial Textile fulfillment. b) of divisibility - Art 1225, par.2 — Obligations
Mills, Inc.
B. Indivisible Obligation — The object of which, in its which:
While referring to ITM as a guarantor, the Agreement delivery or performance, is not capable of partial 1) Have for their object the execution of a
specifically stated that the corporation was "jointly and fulfillment.
severally" liable. To put emphasis on the nature of that certain number of days of work.
liability, the Contract further stated that ITM was a Distinguished from solidary obligations 2) Have for their object the accomplishment of
primary obligor, not a mere surety. Those stipulations work by metrical units.
Indivisibility Solidarity
meant only one thing: that at bottom, and to all legal
intents and purposes, it was a surety. 3) By their nature are susceptible of partial
Refers to prestations Refers to the juridical or
performance.
 Divisibility and indivisibility of obligations not to do - damages which may be suffered should there be
articles involved are physically separable and capable of
Art 1225, par. 3 — Character of the prestation in each being paid for and delivered individually. As per the last breach.
particular case shall determine their divisibility. paragraph of Art 1225 — even though the object or 2. When the purpose is punishment — damages may
Effects of partial performance — Debtor who fails to service may be physically divisible, an obligation is be recovered in addition to the penalty.
indivisible if so provided by law or intended by the
fully perform the work agreed upon, but abandons the NB: Obligations with penal clauses strictly
parties.
same after performing a part, cannot recover on construed.
quantum meruit for the work already finished,
because in indivisible obligations, partial performance With Penal Clause Distinguished from Conditional Obligations
is equivalent to non-performance. Obligations with penal Conditional Obligations
1. An obligation with a penal clause is one which
Exceptions: contains an accessory undertaking to pay a clause

a) where the obligation has been substantially previously stipulated indemnity in case of breach There is already an There is no obligation
performed in good faith, the debtor may of the principal prestation intended primarily to existing obligation (the before the happening of a
recover as if there had been complete induce its fulfillment. principal) from the very suspensive condition.
performance, minus the damages suffered by beginning.
2. A penal clause is an accessory undertaking
the creditor (Art 1234); and
attached to an obligation to assume greater It is the accessory The principal obligation is
b) when the creditor accepts performance, liability on the part of the obligor in case of
knowing its incompleteness, and without obligation which is dependent upon an
breach of the obligation. dependent upon non- uncertain event.
protest, the obligation is deemed fully
Purposes of penal clause performance of the
performed (Art 1235).
principal.
Nazareno v. CA 1) Generally, to Insure their performance by
creating an effective deterrent against breach, Distinguished from Alternative Obligations
An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly
performed in parts, whatever may be the nature of the making the consequences of such breach as
Obligations with penal Alternative Obligations
thing which is the object thereof. The indivisibility onerous as it may be possible; and clause
refers to the prestation and not to the object thereof. 2) To substitute a penalty for the indemnity for
damages and the payment of interests in case of There is only one Two or more obligations
In the present case, the Deed of Sale supposedly prestation. Only when it is due, performance of either
conveyed the six lots to Natividad. The obligation is non-compliance; or
not performed shall the is sufficient.
clearly indivisible because the performance of the 3) To punish the debtor for the non-fulfillment or penalty be enforceable.
contract cannot be done in parts, otherwise the value of
violation of his obligation.
what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are Impossibility of the Impossibility of one of the
therefore mistaken in basing the indivisibility of a Principal vs. Accessory Obligation principal extinguishes the obligations, not due to
contract on the number of obligors. penalty. debtor, still leaves the
1. Principal obligation is one which can stand by
itself and does not depend for its validity and other subsisting.
Sps Lam v. Kodak Philippines 2016 Leonen, J
existence upon another obligation.
The intention of the parties to bind themselves to an Debtor cannot choose to Debtor can choose which
2. Accessory obligation is one which is attached to a pay the penalty to relieve prestation to fulfill.
indivisible obligation can be discerned through their
direct acts in relation to the package deal. There was principal obligation and, therefore, cannot stand himself of the principal,
only one agreement covering all three (3) units of the alone. unless that right is
Minilab Equipment and their accessories. Penalty generally resolves question of damages expressly granted to him.
1. When the purpose is reparation or compensation Distinguished from Facultative Obligations
Through the specified terms and conditions, the tenor of
the Letter Agreement indicated an intention for a single — penalty an anticipated valuation of the
transaction. This intent must prevail even though the Obligations with penal Facultative Obligations
 a) Punitive - punishment for breach; the part of the debtor, the creditor may
clause
b) Reparatory or compensatory - penalty recover the penalty as well as damages
Payment of the penalty in Power of the debtor to takes place of damages for non-fulfillment (Art 1226).
lieu of the principal can be make the substitution is 4. Creditor cannot collect other damages in
made only by express absolute. B. Demandability of Penalty — Art 1226, par. 2
addition to penalty - Art 1226
stipulation. 1. Enforcement of the penalty can be demanded
by the creditor only when the non- EXC: Damages besides penalty
Creditor may demand Creditor can never
both principal and penalty. demand both prestations. performance is due to the fault or fraud of the 1. When there is an express provision;
debtor. 2. When the debtor refuses to pay the
Distinguished from Guaranty 2. Non-performance gives rise to the penalty; and
Obligations with penal Guaranty presumption of fault. 3. When the debtor is guilty of fraud in
clause 3. To avoid payment of penalty, debtor has the non-fulfillment of the obligation.
burden of proof against fault or fraud. When penalty may be reduced by the courts
Both intended to insure performance of the principal
obligation. C. Effects of Penal Clause 1) When there is partial or irregular performance -
1. Substitute for indemnity for damages and First refers to extent, the latter, the
Both accessory and subsidiary obligations.
payment of interest manner.Penalty should be more or less
Generally, penalty takes place of the proportionate with the extent of the breach or of
Obligation to pay the Object of the principal the damages suffered. It is to be presumed that
penalty is different from debtor and guarantor the indemnity for damages and the payment of
interests in case of non-compliance. Proof of the parties contemplate only a total breach of
the principal. same.
actual damages suffered by the creditor is not contract; or
Principal and penalty can Principal debtor cannot be necessary in order that the penalty may be 2) When the penalty agreed upon is iniquitous or
be assumed by the same the guarantor of the same enforced (Art 1228). unconscionable - NOT VOID, but subject merely to
person. obligation equitable reduction (Art 2227). Factors to be
2. Not exempt debtor from performance - Art
Penalty is extinguished by Subsists even when the 1227 considered are:
the nullity of the principal principal obligation is a) type, extent, and purpose of the penalty,
EXC: Only when the right has been
obligation, except when voidable or unenforceable
the penal clause is or is a natural one. expressly reserved for the debtor. b) the nature of the obligation,
assumed by third persons. 3. Creditor cannot demand both performance c) the mode of breach and its consequences,
and penalty at the same time - Art 1227 d) the supervening realities,
A. Kinds of Penal Clause
a) Where there is performance — Generally, e) the standing and relationship of the
1. As to effect
penal clause is subsidiary and not joint. parties,
a) Subsidiary or alternative - only the
b) Where there is no performance — f) the extent of the prejudice to the plaintiff,
penalty can be enforced;
Creditor may ask for either the penalty or among others.
b) Complementary - both principal and specific performance. Remedies are
penalty can be enforced. Construction of penal clause
alternative and not cumulative or
where performance partial
2. As to source successive, except that the penalty may or irregular
a) Conventional - stipulated by the parties; be enforced, if after the creditor has
1) Where penalty is punitive — Strict construction
decided to require fulfillment, the same
b) Legal - provided for by law; against the enforcement in its entirety of the
should become impossible without his
penalty, where it is clear from the terms of the
3. As to purpose fault (Art 1191[2]). If there was fraud on
 contract the amount or character of the
indemnity is fixed without regard to the probable
damages which might be anticipated as a result of
the breach of the terms of the contract.
2) Where penalty is compensatory — Courts will be
slow in applying Art 1229 where it appears that
in fixing the indemnity the parties had in mind a
fair and reasonable compensation for actual
damages anticipated as a result of the breach of
the contract.
Nullity of Principal Obligation or Penal Clause
a) Effects - Art 1230
★ Generally, nullity of the principal nullifies the
penalty. Except:
1) When the penalty is undertaken by a third
person precisely for an obligation which is
unenforceable, voidable, or natural, in which
case it assumes the form of a guaranty valid
under Art 2052;
2) When the nullity of the principal obligation
itself gives rise to liability of the debtor for
damages, which may be due to the fault of the
debtor who acted in bad faith. (Arts 10, 19,
20, 21).
b) Rationale — Principal obligation can stand alone,
and the void penal clause can just be disregarded.
SSS v. Moonwalk Development and Housing
Corporation
A penalty is demandable in case of non performance or
late performance of the main obligation. In other words
in order that the penalty may arise there must be a
breach of the obligation either by total or partial non
fulfillment or there is non fulfillment in point of time
which is called mora or delay.
The demand made after the extinguishment of the
principal obligation which carried with it the
extinguishment of the penal clause being merely an
accessory obligation, was an exercise in futility.
Ligutan v. CA
A penalty stipulation is not necessarily preclusive of
interest, if there is an agreement to that effect, the two
being distinct concepts which may separately be
demanded. What may justify a court in not allowing the
creditor to impose full surcharges and penalties, despite
an express stipulation therefor in a valid agreement,
may not equally justify the non-payment or reduction of
interest. Indeed, the interest prescribed in loan
financing arrangements is a fundamental part of the
banking business and the core of a bank's existence.
Palmares v. CA
The penalty charge of 3% per month and attorney’s fees
equivalent to 25% of the total amount due are highly
inequitable and unreasonable.
It must be remembered that from the principal loan of
P30K, the amount of P16,300.00 had already been paid
even before the filing of the present case. Article 1229
provides that the court shall equitably reduce the
penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor. And, even if
there has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced if it is iniquitous.
Filinvest Land, Inc. v. CA
Courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the
contract in two instances:
1) If the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied; and
2) even if there has been no compliance if the
penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable in
accordance with Article 1229.
As it is settled that the project was already 94.53%
complete and that Filinvest did agree to extend the
period for completion of the project, which extensions
Filinvest included in computing the amount of the
penalty, the reduction thereof is clearly warranted.
There has been substantial compliance in good faith on
the part of Pecorp which renders unconscionable the
application of the full force of the penalty especially if
we consider that in 1979 the amount of P15,000.00 as
penalty for delay per day was quite steep indeed.
Louh, Jr., et al. v. BPI 2017
Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if
there was no express contract thereon. Hence, courts
may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity
demand. The same is true with respect to the penalty
charge.
D. Extinguishment of Obligations
ART 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
1) By payment or performance;
2) By the loss of the thing due;
3) By the condonation or remission of
the debt;
4) By the confusion or merger of the
rights of creditor and debtor;
5) By compensation;
6) By novation.
Other causes of extinguishment of obligations,
such as annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a
resolutory condition, and prescription, are
governed elsewhere in this Code.
Payment or Performance
Elements of payment.
1) Persons, who may pay and to whom payment
may be made; quis
2) Thing or object in which payment must consist;
quinam, quid
3) The cause thereof; causa
4) The mode or form thereof; quo modo
5) The place and time in which it must be made;
ubi, quando
6) The imputation of expenses occasioned by it;
expensae and
7) The special parts which may modify the same
and the effects they generally produce. Pacta
adjunta
Kinds of payment
1. Normal when the debtor voluntarily performs the
prestation.
2. Abnormal when he is forced by means of a judicial
proceeding, either to comply with the prestation
or to pay indemnity.
Burden of proving payment
1. Burden of proof is the duty of a perty to present
evidence of the facts in issue necessary to prove
the truth of his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law.
2. Devolves upon the debtor.
3. When debtor has introduced evidence that the
obligation has been extinguished, burden then
shifts to the creditor.
4. A receipt of payment is deemed to be the best
evidence of payment. A voucher is not proof of
payment.
Person to whom payment shall be made (Art 1240)
1) Creditor or obligee — at the time payment is to
be made, not at the constitution of the obligation.
2) Successor-in-interest;
3) Any authorized person — either by the creditor
or by law, i.e. guardian, executor or administrator
of the estate of a deceased, and assignee or
liquidator of a partnership or corporation.
Effects of payment to an incapacitated person (Art
1241 par 1)
1. INVALID, unless such person
1) kept the thing paid or delivered, or
2) was benefited by the payment.
2. In the absence of said benefit, debtor may be
asked to pay again by the creditor’s guardian, or
by the incapacitated person himslef when he
recovers his capacity.
3. Proof of such benefit is incumbent upon the
debtor who paid.
4. If payment is impossible to be made to a legal
representative, debtor may relieve himself
through consignation (Art 1256 par 1).
Effect of payment to a third person (Art 1241 par 2)
1. INVALID, except insofar as it has redounded to the
benefit of the creditor.
2. Immaterial if debtor acted in good faith and by
mistake, or through error induced by fraud of a
third person if the creditor is without fault or
negligence.
3. Proof of benefit to the creditor must be duly
established.
4. Absence of such proof, the payment thereof in
error and in good faith will not deprive the
creditor from demanding payment.
When benefit to creditor need not be proved
by debtor (Art 1241 par 3)
1) Subrogation of the payer in the creditor's rights;
2) Ratification by the creditor;
3) Estoppel on the part of the creditor.
★ The debtor who, before having knowledge of the
assignment of a credit to a third person, pays the
original creditor, shall be released from the
obligation (Art 1626).
Payment to the third person in possession of credit (Art
1242)
1. Possession of credit itself, and not a mere
instrument thereof.
2. Payer must act in good faith, which is presumed,
that is, in the honest belief that he is making a
valid payment and that the payee is the owner of
the credit.
Examples
1. An heir who enters upon the hereditary estate
and collects the credits thereof, but who is later
deprived of the inheritance because of incapacity
to succeed;
2. Assignee of a credit who collects it, but later the
assignment is rescinded or annulled;
3. Holder of an instrument payable to bearer, who
merely found it.
When debt considered paid
1) Integrity of the prestation — complete
fulfillment thereof.
2) Identity of the prestation — the very thing or
service due must be delivered or performed.
Time of payment — Generally understood to be on the
date stipulated, regardless if such falls on a Sunday or
legal holiday.
Substitution of prestation
1. Can be made if the obligee consents, i.e. in
facultative obligations (Art 1206).
2. There may be dation in payment (Art 1245) or
novation (Art 1291), in case of waiver by the
creditor or substitution is allowed by stipulation
with the consent of the creditor.
Waiver of defects — If creditor expressly so declares, or
if, with knowledge thereof, he accepts the thing without
protest or disposes of it or consumes it.
Rule of the medium quality — A principle of equity
wherein the court steps in whenever there is
disagreement whether the contract to deliver an
indeterminate thing has been complied with.
Legal Tender in PH
1. Legal tender is that currency which a debtor can
legally compel a creditor to accept in payment of
a debt in money when tendered by the debtor in
the right amount.
2. In PH, all coins and notes issued by the BSP
constitute legal tender.
3. Under BSP Circular No 537 (July 18, 2006) which
took effect on August 11, 2006, the maximum
amount of coins to be considered legal is adjusted
as follows:
 1) P1,000.00 for 1, 5, and 10 peso coins;
2) P100.00 for 1, 5, and 25 centavo coins.
Payment by means of instruments of credits
1) Right of creditor to refuse or accept. — Promissory
notes, checks, bills of exchange and other
commercial documents are not legal tender and,
therefore, the creditor can not be compelled to
accept them.
a) Creditor may choose to accept them,
without it producing the effect of
payment. Demandability is suspended in
the meantime until the payment is
actually realized.
b) Art 1245 applies when what is involved
is the payment of a judgment obligation.
2) Payment for purpose of redemption — The right to
redeem is not an obligation but he exercise of a
right; nor is it intended to discharge a pre-
existing debt. A mere tender of checks is sufficient
to compel redemption.
3) Effect on obligation — Payment by means of
mercantile documents does not extinguish the
obligation —
a) Until they have been cashed, by either
debtor or a third person; or
b) Unless they have been impaired through
the fault of the creditor, executed by a
third person. (par 2)
Applicability of impairment clause
1) Instruments executed by third persons or debtor
himself. — Par 2 is applicable to both instruments
executed by third persons and notes executed by
the debtor himself.
2) Only to instruments executed by third persons —
The clause relative to impairment of the
negotiable character of commercial paper by the
fault of the creditor is applicable only to the first
class of instruments, i.e., those executed by third
persons.
3) Duty of payee accepting a check — Due diligence
on the part of the payee in presenting it for
payment. If no such presentment was made, the
drawer cannot be held liable irrespective of loss
or injury sustained by the payee.
Meaning of inflation and deflation
Inflation Deflation
Sharp sudden increase of Reduction in volume and
money or credit or both circulation of the available
without a corresponding money or credit.
increase in business
transactions.
Causes a drop in the value Decline of the general
of money, resulting in the price level.
rise of the general price
level.
ART 1250. In case an extraordinary inflation or
deflation of the currency stipulated should
supervene, the value of the currency at the time
of the establishment of the obligation shall be the
basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to
the contrary.
Requisites for application of Art 1250
1) Official declaration of extraordinary inflation or
deflation from BSP;
2) Obligation is contractual; and
3) Parties expressly agreed to consider the effects
of the extraordinary inflation or deflation.
How payment to be made
A debt shall not be understood to have been paid
unless the thing or service in which the obligation
consists has been completely delivered or rendered,
as the case may be. (Art 1233)
GR: Partial Payment NOT allowed; (Art
1248)
EXC: Unless there is an express stipulation to
that effect.
When the debt is in part liquidated and in part
unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the
debtor may effect the payment of the former
without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.
(Art 1248 par 2)
Other instances where partial performance allowed:
a) When the different prestations are subject to
different conditions or different terms;
b) When a joint debtor pays his share or the creditor
demands the same;
c) When a solidary debtor pays only the part
demandable because the rest are not yet
demandable;
d) In case of compensation, when one debt is larger
than the other;
e) When work is to be done in parts.
Substantial Performance in Good Faith
ART 1234. If the obligation has been substantially
performed in good faith, the obligor may recover
as though there had been a strict and complete
fulfillment, less damages suffered by the obligee.
★ Applies only when an obligor admits breaching
the contract after honestly and faithfully
performing all the material elements thereof
except for some technical aspects that cause no
serious harm to the obligee. (IHC v. Joaquin, Jr.)
Estoppel
ART 1235. When the obligee accepts the
performance,
a) knowing its incompleteness or
irregularity, and
b) without expressing any protest or
objection,
the obligation is deemed fully complied with.
Where payment is to be made
a) If there is a stipulation — the place designated;
b) If there is NO stipulation
 i) If obligation to deliver a determinate
specific thing — where the thing is
usually or habitually placed at the time
the obligation was constituted.
ii) For any other obligation — domicile of
debtor.
Special Forms of Payment
1) Application of payments;
2) Dation in payment or adjudicacion en pago, datio
in solutum (Art 1245);
3) Assignment in favor of creditors or cession;
4) Tender of payment and consignation.
Application of Payments
It is the designation of the debt to which should be applied
a payment made by a debtor who owes several debts in
favor of the same creditor.
Requisites
a) There must be two or more debts;
b) The debts must be of the same kind;
c) The debts are owed by the same debtor in favor of
the same creditor;
d) All the debts must be due except:
i) If the parties so stipulate; or
ii) When the application of payment is made
by the party for whose benefit the term
has been constituted.
e) The payment is not enough to extinguish all the
debts.
Preferential Right of the Debtor — subject to limitations:
a) If there was a valid prior but contrary agreement,
the debtor cannot choose;
b) The debtor cannot choose to pay part of the
principal ahead of the interest, unless the creditor
consents.
How Made
a) The debtor makes the designation at the time
when payment is made;
b) If not, the creditor makes it, by so stating in the Requisites for Voluntary Assignment
receipt that he issues, “unless there is cause for
a) More than one debt;
invalidating the contract;”
b) More than one creditor;
c) If no one made the application or it is invalid,
then application is made by operation of law: c) Complete or partial insolvency of debtor;
i) If the debt produces interest, payment of d) Abandonment of all debtor’s property not exempt
the principal shall not be deemed to have from execution;
been made until the interests have
e) Acceptance or consent on the part of creditors.
been covered. (Art 1253)
Effect of Voluntary Assignment
ii) The debt which is most onerous to the
debtor, among those due, shall be a) Creditors are merely assignees with authority to
deemed to have been satisfied. sell;
If the debts due are of the same nature b) Debtor is released up to the amount of the net
and burden, the payment shall be applied proceeds of the sale, unless there is a contrary
to all of them proportionately. (Art 1254) stipulation. The balance remains collectible;
Samples of More Onerous Debts c) Creditors will collect credits in the order of
preference agreed upon.
a) Older ones in case of running accounts;
Cession distinguished from Dacion en pago
b) Interest-bearing debts, even if the non-interest
bearing is older; Dacion en pago Cession
c) That which charges the higher interest;
a) Does not affect ALL a) Generally affects ALL
d) Debts secured by mortgage or pledge; properties; properties of the
e) Debts with a penalty clause; debtor;
b) Does not require
f) Advances for subsistence are more onerous than plurality of creditors; b) Requires more than
cash advances; c) Only the specific one creditor;
creditor’s consent is c) Requires the consent
g) Where the debtor is in mora; required; of ALL creditors;
h) An exclusive debt as compared to a solidary one.
d) May take place during d) Requires full or partial
the solvency of insolvency;
Payment by Cession debtor; e) Does not transfer
ownership;
ART 1255. The debtor may cede or assign his e) Transfers ownership
property to his creditors in payment of his debts. upon delivery; f) NOT an act of
This cession, unless there is stipulation to the f) More of an act of novation.
contrary, shall only release the debtor from novation.
responsibility for the net proceeds of the thing
assigned. The agreements which, on the effect of
the cession, are made between the debtor and his
Tender of Payment and Consignation
creditors shall be governed by special laws. 1. Tender of payment is the act of offering the creditor
what is due him together with a demand that the
Cession is the process by which a debtor transfers all the
properties not subject to execution in favor of his creditors creditor accept the same.
so that the latter may sell them, and thus apply the If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been
proceeds to their credits. made refuses without just cause to accept it, the
 debtor shall be released from responsibility by the
consignation of the thing or sum due.
2. Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due
with the court or judicial authorities whenever the
creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment.
Prior tender of payment is generally required.
However, Consignation alone shall produce the same
effect in the following cases:
1) When the creditor is absent or unknown, or
does not appear at the place of payment;
2) When he is incapacitated to receive the
payment at the time it is due;
3) When, without just cause, he refuses to give
a receipt;
4) When two or more persons claim the same
right to collect;
5) When the title of the obligation has been lost.
(Art 1256)
When Creditor Justified in Refusing Tender of Payment
— if the tender is invalid. To be valid, the following
requisites must concur:
1) Must be made in legal tender;
2) Must include whatever interest is due;
3) Must generally be unconditional;
4) Obligation must already be due.
Essential Requisites for Consignation
1) Existence of a valid debt;
2) Valid prior tender, unless excused;
3) Prior notice of consignation (before deposit) —
may be accomplished simultaneously with tender
of payment.
4) Actual consignation (deposit);
5) Subsequent notice of consignation.
Effects if Consignation Has Been Duly Made
a) The debtor may ask the judge to order the
cancellation of the obligation;
b) The running of interest is suspended;
c) Creditor bears the loss if
i) Consignation is judicially approved;
ii) All the essential requisites are present; or
iii) Creditor has signified his acceptance.
Effects of Withdrawal by Debtor
After Consignation Has Been
Made
a) Obligation remains;
b) The creditor who authorized the withdrawal
loses any preference over the thing;
c) The co-debtors, guarantors, and sureties are
released unless they consented.
Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Philippine Acetylene Co.
The mere return of the mortgaged motor vehicle by the
mortgagor to the mortgagee does not constitute dation
in payment or dacion en pago in the absence, express or
implied of the true intention of the parties.
In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the
debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts
it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The
undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of
sale.
Golez v. Camara
Even the delivery of bills of exchange—and hence, of
checks, shall—pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 1249—"produce the effect of payment xxxx
when they have been cashed".
In right of redemption, no judicial consignation is,
however, necessary. A bona fide tender of payment
suffices.
New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. v. Seneris
Considering that the whole amount deposited by the
petitioner consisting of Cashier's Check of P50,000.00
and P13,130.00 in cash covers the judgment obligation
of P63,000.00 as mentioned in the writ of execution,
then, We see no valid reason for the private respondent
to have refused acceptance of the payment of the
obligation in his favor. The auction sale, therefore, was
uncalled for.
Singson v. Caltex
Here, the inflation rate rose to 50.34% in 1984. We hold
that there is no legal or factual basis of the existence of
extraordinary inflation during this period. We are hard
put to treat this as an "extraordinary inflation" within
the meaning and intent of Article 1250.
"Erosion" is indeed an accurate description of the trend
of decline in the value of the peso in the past three to
four decades. Unfortunate as this trend may be, it is
certainly distinct from the phenomenon contemplated
by Article 1250. Moreover, this Court has held that the
effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied
without an official declaration thereof by competent
authorities.
CF Sharp and Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
Obligations in foreign currency may be discharged in
Philippine currency based on the prevailing rate at the
time of payment.
The rule that the value of the currency at the time of the
establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of
payment finds application only when there is an official
pronouncement or declaration of the existence of an
extraordinary inflation or deflation.
Lantion v. NLRC
The effects of extraordinary inflation are NOT to be
applied
1. without an agreement between the parties and
2. without an official declaration thereof by
competent authorities.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. IAC
A finding that the private respondent had sufficient
available funds on or before the grace period for the
payment of its obligation does not constitute proof of
tender of payment by the latter for its obligation within
the said period. Tender of payment involves a positive
and unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal
tender currency as payment to the obligee for the

former's obligation and demanding that the latter accept
the same. Thus, tender of payment cannot be
presumed by a mere inference from surrounding
circumstances. At most, sufficiency of available funds is
only affirmative of the capacity or ability of the obligor
to fulfill his part of the bargain.
Further, respondent used a certified personal check
which is not legal tender nor the currency stipulated,
and therefore, can not constitute valid tender of
payment. A check, whether a manager's check or
ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a
check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of
payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or
creditor.
Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) v. Diaz Realty, Inc.
For a valid tender of payment, it is necessary that there
be a fusion of intent, ability and capability to make
good such offer, which must be absolute and must cover
the amount due. Though a check is not legal tender, and
a creditor may validly refuse to accept it if tendered as
payment, one who in fact accepted a fully funded check
after the debtor's manifestation that it had been given to
settle an obligation is estopped from later on
denouncing the efficacy of such tender.
Aquintey v. Tibong
Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of
ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an
accepted equivalent of the performance of the
obligation. The requisites for dacion en pago are:
1) there must be a performance of the prestation
in lieu of payment (animo solvendi) which may
consist in the delivery of a corporeal thing or a
real right or a credit against the third person;
2) there must be some difference between the
prestation due and that which is given in
substitution (aliud pro alio); and
3) there must be an agreement between the
creditor and debtor that the obligation is
immediately extinguished by reason of the
performance of a prestation different from that
due.
Telengtan Brothers & Sons, Inc. v. United States Lines,
Inc.
Even if the price index of goods and services may have
risen during the intervening period, this increase,
without more, cannot be considered as resulting to
"extraordinary inflation" as to justify the application of
Article 1250.
International Hotel Corporation v. Joaquin, Jr. & Suarez
2013
Article 1234 applies only when an obligor admits
breaching the contract after honestly and faithfully
performing all the material elements thereof except for
some technical aspects that cause no serious harm to
the obligee. IHC correctly submits that the provision
refers to an omission or deviation that is slight, or
technical and unimportant, and does not affect the real
purpose of the contract.
Sps. Bonrostro v. Sps. Luna 2013 supra
When a tender of payment is made in such a form that
the creditor could have immediately realized payment if
he had accepted the tender, followed by a prompt
attempt of the debtor to deposit the means of payment
in court by way of consignation, the accrual of interest
on the obligation will be suspended from the date of
such tender.
But when the tender of payment is not accompanied
by the means of payment, and the debtor did not
take any immediate step to make a consignation,
then interest is not suspended from the time of such
tender.
NPC v. Ibrahim, et al. 2015
Mangondato—being the judgment creditor in Civil Case
No. 605-92 and Civil Case No. 610-92 as well as the
registered owner of the subject land at the time—may
be considered as a “possessor of credit” with respect to
the rental fees and expropriation indemnity adjudged
due for the subject land in the two cases, if the Ibrahims
and Maruhoms turn out to be the real owners of the
subject land. Hence, petitioner’s payment to
Mangondato of the fees and indemnity due for the
subject land as a consequence of the execution of the
Civil Cases could still validly extinguish its obligation
to pay for the same even as against the Ibrahims and
Maruhoms.
Sinamban v. China Banking Corporation 2015
A co-maker of a PN who binds himself with the maker
"jointly and severally" renders himself directly and
primarily liable with the maker on the debt, without
reference to his solvency.
It is settled that when the obligor or obligors undertake
to be "jointly and severally" liable, it means that the
obligation is solidary. In this case, the spouses
Sinamban expressly bound themselves to be jointly and
severally, or solidarily, liable with the principal makers
of the PNs, the spouses Manalastas.
Marquez v. Elisan Credit Corporation 2015
There is a need to analyze and harmonize Article 1176
and Article 1253 of the Civil Code to determine
whether the daily payments made after the second
loan's maturity should be credited against the interest
or against the principal. Correlating the two provisions,
the rule under Article 1253 that payments shall first be
applied to the interest and not to the principal shall
govern if two facts exist:
1) the debt produces interest; and
2) the principal remains unpaid.
Since the doubt in the present case pertains to the
application of the daily payments, Article 1253 shall
apply. Only when there is a waiver of interest shall Article
1176 become relevant.
Sps. Tan, et al. v. China Banking Corporation 2016
The right of the debtor to apply payment is merely
directory in nature and must be promptly exercised,
lest such right passes to the creditor.
Osmeña-Jalandoni v. Encomienda 2017
Jalandoni greatly benefited from the purportedly
unauthorized payments. Thus, even if she asseverates
that Encomienda's payment of her household bills was
without her knowledge or against her will, she cannot

deny the fact that the same still inured to her benefit
and Encomienda must therefore be consequently
reimbursed for it. Also, when Jalandoni learned about
the payments, she did nothing to express her objection
to or repudiation of the same, within a reasonable time.
Even when she claimed that she was prepared with her
own money, she still accepted the financial assistance
and actually made use of it.
Loss of The Thing Due
Effect of Loss on an Obligation to Deliver Specific Thing
GR: Obligation EXTINGUISHED;
EXC: Not extinguished in the following cases:
1) The debtor is at fault;
2) The debtor is made liable for a fortuitous
event.
Effect of Loss on an Obligation to Deliver Generic Thing
GR: Obligation NOT EXTINGUISHED — genus
never perishes;
EXC: Extinguished in the following cases:
1) If the generic thing is delimited;
2) Has already been segregated or set aside, in
which case, it has become specific.
Effect of Loss Through a Fortuitous
Event in Reciprocal Obligations
GR: The obligation that was not extinguished
remains;
EXC: Extinguished in the following cases:
1) In the case of lease — if the object is
destroyed, both the lease and obligation to
pay rent are extinguished (Art 1655);
2) In contracts for piece of work — If the thing
is lost prior to delivery, the worker cannot
ask for the price.
Rebus sic stantibus (Art 1267)
1. This refers to the moral impossibility or
impracticability due to change of certain
conditions.
2. When the service has become so difficult as to be
manifestly beyond the contemplation of the
parties, the obligor may also be released
therefrom, in whole or in part.
3. It speaks of personal obligations and is thus
inapplicable to real obligations.
4. The following requisites must concur:
1) The service must become so difficult that
it was manifestly beyond the
contemplation of both parties;
2) One of the parties must ask for relief;
3) The object must be a future service with
future unusual change in conditions.
Naga Telephone Co., et al. v. CA, supra
Article 1267 speaks of “service” which has become so
difficult. Taking into consideration the rationale behind
this provision, the term “service” should be understood
as referring to the “performance” of the obligation. In
the present case, the obligation of private respondent
consists in allowing petitioners to use its posts in Naga
City, which is the service contemplated in said article.
It is not a requirement thereunder that the contract be
for future service with future unusual change. The
allegations in private respondent’s complaint and the
evidence it has presented sufficiently made out a cause
of action under Article 1267.
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v.
Eastern Telecoms Employees Union 2012
The parties to the contract must be presumed to have
assumed the risks of unfavorable developments. It is,
therefore, only in absolutely exceptional changes of
circumstances that equity demands assistance for the
debtor by applying Art 1267. In the case at bench, the
Court determines that ETPI’s claimed depressed
financial state will not release it from the binding effect
of the 2001-2004 CBA.
Tagaytay Realty Co., Inc. v. Gacutan 2015
The installment buyer of a subdivision lot has the right
to withhold payment of his amortizations for the
duration that the subdivision developer has not
complied with its contractual undertaking to build the
promised amenities in the subdivision.
Considering that the petitioner's unilateral suspension
of the construction of the amenities was intended to
save itself from costs, its plea for relief from its
contractual obligations was properly rejected because it
would thereby gain a position of advantage at the
expense of the lot owners like the respondent. Its
invocation of Article 1267 was factually unfounded.
Mere inconvenience, or unexpected impediments, or
increased expenses did not suffice to relieve the debtor
from a bad bargain.
Condonation or Remission of Debt
Condonation or remission is the abandonment by the
creditor of his right.
Essential Requisites
1) There must be an agreement;
2) The parties must be capacitated and must
consent;
3) There must be a subject matter;
4) The cause or consideration must be liberality;
5) The obligation remitted must have been
demandable;
6) Must not be inofficious;
7) Formalities of a donation are complied with in
case of express remission;
8) They must be clearly and convincingly shown
as they are not to be presumed generally.
Presumptions
1) Of Remission — The delivery of a private
document evidencing a credit, made voluntarily
by the creditor to the debtor. (Art 1271);
 2) Of Voluntary Delivery — Whenever the private
document in which the debt appears is found in
the possession of the debtor. (Art 1272);
3) Of Remission of Pledge — When the thing
pledged, after its delivery to the creditor, is found
in the possession of the debtor, or of a third
person who owns the thing. (Art 1274)
Confusion or Merger of Rights
Confusion or merger is the meeting in one person of
the qualities of creditor and debtor with respect to the
same obligation.
Essential Requisites
1) It should take place between the principal debtor
and creditor;
2) Must be clear and definite;
3) The very obligation involved must be the same or
identical.
Compensation
Compensation is the extinguishment in the concurrent
amount of the obligations of those persons who are
reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other.
Essential Requisites for Legal Compensation
ART 1279. In order that compensation may be
proper, it is necessary:
1) That each one of the obligors be bound
principally, and that he be at the same
time a principal creditor of the other;
2) That both debts consist in a sum of
money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind,
and also of the same quality if the latter
has been stated;
3) That the two debts be due;
4) That they be liquidated and
demandable;
5) That over neither of them there be any
retention or controversy, commenced
by third persons and communicated in
due time to the debtor.
ART 1290. When all the requisites xxx are present,
compensation takes effect by operation of law,
and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent
amount, even though the creditors and debtors
are not aware of the compensation.
Compensation of Following are Prohibited
1) Debts arising from a depositum (Art 1287);
2) Debts arising from the obligations of a depositary
(Art 1287);
3) Debts arising from the obligations of a bailee in
commodatum (Art 1287);
4) Debts arising from a claim for future support due
by gratuitous title (Art 1287);
5) Debts arising in civil liability arising from a penal
offense (Art 1288);
6) Damages suffered by a partnership through the
fault of a partner vis-a-vis profits and benefits the
erring partner may have earned for the
partnership by his industry (Art 1794).
Judicial Compensation or Set-off
ART 1283. If one of the parties to a suit over an
obligation has a claim for damages against the
other, the former may set it off by proving his
right to said damages and the amount thereof.
Effect of Assignment on Compensation of Debts (Art
1285)
1) If made with consent of debtor — Compensation
CANNOT be set up except if the right thereto is
reserved.
2) With knowledge but without consent or against
the will of debtor — compensation can be set up
regarding debts previous to the assignment.
3) Without knowledge of debtor — Debtor can set
up compensation as a defense for all debts
maturing prior to his knowledge of the
assignment.
Gullas v. PNB
As a general rule, a bank has a right of set off of the
deposits in its hands for the payment of any
indebtedness to it on the part of a depositor.
As to a depositor who has funds sufficient to meet
payment of a check drawn by him in favor of a third
party, it has been held that he has a right of action
against the bank for its refusal to pay such a check in the
absence of notice to him that the bank has applied the
funds so deposited in extinguishment of past due claims
held against him.
Thus, the action of the bank was prejudicial to Gullas.
Gullas should be awarded nominal damages because of
the premature action of the bank against which Gullas
had no means of protection.
Garcia v. Lim Chiu Sing
A share of stock or the certificate thereof is not an
indebtedness to the owner nor evidence of
indebtedness and, therefore, it is not a credit.
Stockholders, as such, are not creditors of the
corporation. Therefore, Lim Chu Sing not being a
creditor of the Mercantile Bank of China, although the
latter is a creditor of the former, there is no sufficient
ground to justify a compensation.
Union Bank v. DBP 2014
Since DBP’s assumed obligations to Union Bank for
remittance of the lease payments are contingent on the
prior payment thereof by [FW] to DBP, it cannot be said
that both debts are due. Also, any deficiency that DBP
had to make up for the full satisfaction of the assumed
obligations “cannot be determined until after the
satisfaction of Foodmasters’ obligation to DBP.” In this
regard, it cannot be concluded that the same debt had
already been liquidated, and thereby became
demandable.
Novation
ART 1291. Obligations may be modified by:
1) Changing their object or principal
conditions;
 2) Substituting the person of the debtor;
3) Subrogating a third person in the rights
of the creditor.
Novation is understood as the substitution or change of
an obligation by another, which extinguishes or modifies
the first, either changing its object or principal condition,
or substituting another in place of the debtor, or
subrogating a third person in the right of the creditor.
Essential Requisites
1) The old obligation must be valid;
2) The intent to extinguish or modify the old
obligation by a substantial difference;
3) The capacity and consent of all parties except in
expromision.
4) The new obligation must be valid.
How Implied Novation Made — by making substantial
changes
1) In the object or subject matter;
2) In the cause or consideration;
3) In the principal terms or conditions
a) If a debt subject to a condition is made an
absolute one;
b) Reduction of the term or period;
c) When, without consent of some
subscribers, the capital stock of a
corporation is increased.
Instances Where there was NO Extinctive Novation
1) When there are only slight alterations or
modifications;
2) When the new contract merely contains
supplementary agreement;
3) When additional interest is agreed upon;
4) When additional security is given;
5) A contract was entered into providing a method
of payment;
6) When a guarantor also becomes a principal
debtor;
7) When the creditor in the meantime refrains from
suing the debtor, or extends the term of payment;
8) When the place of payment is changed or there is
a variation in the amount of partial payments;
9) When a public instrument is executed to confirm
a valid contract.
Substitution of Debtor (Art 1293)
a) Expromision — the initiative comes from a third
person; (Art 1294)
b) Delegacion — the initiative comes from the
debtor. Here the three parties must agree. (Art
1295)
Requisites for Expromision
1) Initiative must come from a third person who will
be the new debtor;
2) The new debtor and creditor must consent;
3) The old debtor must be excused or released from
his obligation.
Requisites for Delegacion
1) The initiative comes from the old debtor;
2) All parties concerned must consent or agree;
Effect of Insolvency of New Debtor
1) In expromision — If the substitution is without
the knowledge or against the will of the debtor,
the new debtor's insolvency or non-fulfillment of
the obligations shall not give rise to any liability
on the part of the original debtor. (Art 1294)
2) In delegacion — shall not revive the action of the
creditor against the original obligor,
EXC: when said insolvency was already
existing and of public knowledge, OR
known to the debtor, when he
delegated his debt. (Art 1295)
Subrogation
Extinctive subjective novation by change of creditor is the
transfer to a third person of all the rights appertaining to
the creditor.
ART 1301. Conventional subrogation of a third
person requires the consent of the original
parties and of the third person.
ART 1302. It is presumed that there is legal
subrogation:
1) When a creditor pays another creditor
who is preferred, even without the
debtor's knowledge;
2) When a third person, not interested in
the obligation, pays with the express or
tacit approval of the debtor;
3) When, even without the knowledge of
the debtor, a person interested in the
fulfillment of the obligation pays, without
prejudice to the effects of confusion as to
the latter's share.
Uraca, et al. v. CA
Novation is effected only when a new contract has
extinguished an earlier contract between the same
parties.
Petitioners and the Velezes clearly did not perfect a new
contract because the essential requisite of consent was
absent, the parties having failed to agree on the terms of
the payment.
Reyes v. CA, et al.
Well settled is the rule that novation by substitution of
creditor requires an agreement among the three parties
concerned - the original creditor, the debtor and the
new creditor. It is a new contractual relation based on
the mutual agreement among all the necessary parties.
Hence, there is no novation if no new contract was
executed by the parties.
Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Rodriguez
An obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated, in a
new instrument wherein the old is ratified, by changing
only the terms of payment and adding other
obligations not incompatible with the old one, or
wherein the old contract is merely supplemented by the
new one. The mere fact that the creditor receives a
guaranty or accepts payments from a third person who
has agreed to assume the obligation, when there is no
agreement that the first debtor shall be released from
responsibility, does not constitute a novation, and the
creditor can still enforce the obligation against the
original debtor.
Pascual v. Lacsamana
If the second instrument was accepted by plaintiff so
that the period for the payment was intended to be
postponed, there would still be no novation because
mere extension of payment and the addition of
another obligation not incompatible with the old one is
not a novation thereof.
Dungo v. Lopeña
It is not enough that the juridical relation of the parties
to the original contract is extended to a third person; it
is necessary that the old debtor be released from the
obligation, and the third person or new debtor takes his
place in the new relation. Without such release, there
is no novation; the third person who has assumed the
obligation of the debtor merely becomes a co-debtor or
surety.
Kabankalan Sugar Co. v. Pacheco
When an easement of right of way is one of the principal
conditions of a contract, and the duration of said
easement is specified, the reduction of said period in a
subsequent contract, wherein the same obligation is one
of the principal conditions, constitutes a novation
and to that extent extinguishes the former contractual
obligation.
GSIS v. CA
Consent of the creditor is indispensable for a valid
novation consisting of a change of debtor.
Cochingyan, Jr. v. R & B Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
Absent an unequivocal declaration of extinguishment of
a pre-existing obligation, a showing of complete
incompatibility between the old and the new obligation
would sustain a finding of novation by implication. But
where, as in this case, the parties to the new obligation
expressly recognize the continuing existence and
validity of the old one, where in other words, the
parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old
obligation, there can be no novation.
Babst v. CA
Due to the failure of BPI to register its objection to the
take-over by DBP of ELISCON's assets, it is deemed to
have consented to the substitution of DBP for ELISCON
as debtor. Hence, there was a valid novation which
resulted in the release of ELISCON from its obligation to
BPI, whose cause of action should be directed against
DBP as the new debtor.
Philippine Savings Bank v. Manalac, Jr.
There was no agreement to form a new contract by
novating the mortgage contracts of the Mañalacs and
the Galicias. In accepting the check, the bank only
acceded to Mañalac’s instruction on whose loan
accounts the proceeds shall be applied but rejected the
other condition that the 4 parcels of land be released
from mortgage. Clearly, there is no mutual consent to
replace the old mortgage contract with a new
obligation.
Neither can Mañalac be deemed substitute debtor
within the contemplation of Article 1293. Mañalac has
not shown that they were expressly taking the place of
Galicia as debtor, or that the latter were being released
from their solidary obligation. Nor was it shown that the
obligation of the Galicias was being extinguished and
replaced.
Odiamar v. Valencia 2016
The fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third
person, who has assumed the obligation, will result
merely in the addition of debtors and not novation.
Ever Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of
Communications 2016
Under the terms of the agreement, Vicente is an
additional person who would ensure that the loan of
Ever to PBCom would be paid. Under the rules of
novation, the mere act of adding another person to be
personally liable, who in this case is Vicente, did not
constitute novation since there was no agreement to
release Ever from its responsibility to PBCom.
Figuera v. Ang 2016
Figuera based her claim on the third type of
subrogation. She claims that as the EIDC's new owner,
she is interested in fulfilling Ang's obligation to pay the
utility bills. These utilities are obviously necessary for
the continuation of Figuera's business transactions.
A person interested in the fulfilment of the obligation
is one who stands to be benefited or injured in the
enforcement of the obligation. The Court agrees with
Figuera that it became absolutely necessary for her to
pay the bills since Ang did not do so when the obligation
became due.
The consent or approval of the debtor is required only if
a third person who is not interested in the fulfilment of
the obligation pays such. On the other hand, no such
requirement exists in cases of payment by a creditor to
another creditor who is preferred, and by a person
interested in the fulfilment of the obligation.
Therefore, legal subrogation took place despite the
absence of Ang's consent to Figuera's payment of the
EIDC bills. Figuera is now deemed as Ang's creditor by
operation of law.
Liam v. UCPB 2016
The transaction between UCPB and PPGI was an
assignment of credit and not subrogation.
The crucial distinction between assignment and
subrogation actually deals with the necessity of the
consent of the debtor in the original transaction. In an
assignment of credit, the consent of the debtor is not
necessary. Only notice is required.
Meanwhile, subrogation requires an agreement among
the three parties concerned — the original creditor, the
debtor, and the new creditor. The MOA and the Deed of
Sale/Assignment clearly state that UCPB became an
assignee of PPGI's outstanding receivables of its
condominium buyers.
SM Systems Corporation v. Camerino, et al. 2017
The compromise agreements executed by and A. General Provisions
between SMS and four of the farmers are valid, thus, a
novation of the judgment in the redemption case. ART 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself,
SMS' obligation to allow redemption of the three parcels with respect to the other, to give something or to
of land was superseded by the terms of the compromise render some service.
agreements executed with the four farmers. Novation,
1) Binding force — Has the force of law and neither
thus, arose as the old obligation became incompatible
of the parties may without the consent of the
with the new.
other, renege therefrom. It should not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
CONTRACTS public policy. (Art 1306).
a) Mere proof of existence of a contract and the
A. General Provisions failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
1. Principles corresponding right of relief.
Liberty or Autonomy of Contracts b) Although a contract is law between the
Mutuality of Contracts parties, provisions of positive law which
regulate such contracts are deemed
Relativity of Contracts
included and shall limit and govern the
Consensuality of Contracts
relations between the parties.
Obligatory Force of Contracts
2) Requirements of a valid contract — Must be
2. Stages valid and enforceable (Art 1403), with all the
3. Classification essential elements (Art 1318) and is not contrary
4. Essential Requisites to law, morals, good customs, public order, and
public policy. A void contract does not exist. A
Consent
contract may be valid but unenforceable (Arts
Object
1317, 1403).
Cause
3) Where contract requires approval by the
B. Form of Contracts government — Such contract becomes the law
C. Reformation of Instruments between the parties only when approved and its
D. Interpretation of Contracts validity must be sustained.
E. Defective Contracts 4) Compliance in good faith — No party is
permitted to change his mind or disavow or go
1. Rescissible Contracts
back upon his own acts, or proceed contrary
2. Voidable Contracts
thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.
3. Unenforceable Contracts
5) Liability for breach of contract — Our law on
4. Void or Inexistent Contracts contracts recognizes the principle that actionable
5. Distinguish: resolution and rescission of
injury inheres in every contractual breach (Arts
contracts 1170, 1191).
6) Unreasonable delay in demanding
performance — May render the contract
ineffective where it does not provide for the
period within which performance may be
demanded but the parties did not contemplate
that the same could be made indefinitely.
7) Preservation of interest of promisee — The
effect of every infraction is to create a new duty,
that is, to make recompense to the one who has
been injured by the failure of another to observe
his contractual obligation unless he can show
extenuating circumstances.
Sps Pascual v. Ramos
The interest rate of 7% per month was voluntarily
agreed upon by RAMOS and the PASCUALs. There is
nothing from the records and, in fact, there is no
allegation showing that petitioners were victims of
fraud when they entered into the agreement with
RAMOS. Neither is there a showing that in their
contractual relations with RAMOS, the PASCUALs were
at a disadvantage on account of their moral dependence,
ignorance, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, which would entitle them to the vigilant
protection of the courts as mandated by Article 24 of the
Civil Code.
Cuizon v. CA
It is well settled that in construing a written agreement,
the reason behind and the circumstances surrounding
its execution are of paramount importance to place the
interpreter in the situation occupied by the parties
concerned at the time the writing was executed.
1. Principles
a) Freedom to Stipulate or Autonomy or Liberality
— The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. (Art 1306)
b) Mutuality — The contract must bind both
contracting parties; its validity or compliance
cannot be left to the will of one of them. (Art
1308)
 c) Relativity — Contracts take effect only between
the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law. (Art 1311)
d) Consensuality — Contracts are perfected by
mere consent xxx (Art 1315)
e) Obligatory Force — xxx Parties are bound not
only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all the consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. (Art 1315)
Liberty or Autonomy of Contracts
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Navarro
The contractual stipulation states that the interest rate
may be increased "in the event a law should be enacted
increasing the lawful rate of interest that may be
charged on this particular kind of loan." The Escalation
Clause was dependent on an increase of rate made by
"law" alone. CIRCULAR No. 494, although it has the
effect of law, is not a law.
Cui v. Arellano University
In order to declare a contract void as against public
policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some
established interest of society, or is inconsistent with
sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly to
undermine the security of individual rights.
Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to
keep outstanding students in school to bolster its
prestige. In the understanding of that university
scholarships award is a business scheme designed to
increase the business potential of an educational
institution. Thus, it is not only inconsistent with sound
policy but also good morals.
Capitol Medical Center v. CA
The contract between the college and a student who is
enrolled and pays the fees for a semester, is for the
entire semester only, not for the entire course. The law
does not require a school to see a student through to the
completion of his course. If the school closes or is closed
by proper authority at the end of a semester, the student
has no cause of action for breach of contract against the
school.
Tee v. Tacloban Electric and Ice Plant Co.
The agreement herein is contrary to good customs and
public order, for public interest demands that
applications for foreign exchange be considered, acted
upon and disposed of strictly on the basis of the merits
and demerits of each case.
Under the principles relating to the doctrine of public
policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of
justice will not recognize or uphold any transaction
which, in its object, operation, or tendency, is calculated
to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound
morality, or to civic honesty. The test is whether the
parties have stipulated for something inhibited by
the law or inimical to, or inconsistent with, the
public welfare. An agreement is against public policy if
it
a) is injurious to the interests of the public,
b) contravenes some established interest of
society,
c) violates some public statute,
d) is against good morals,
e) tends to interfere with the public welfare or
safety, or
f) is at war with the interests of society and
g) is in conflict with the morals of the time.
Industrial Personnel and Management
Services, Inc. v. De Vera, et al. 2016
The general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to
overseas employment contracts. As an exception, the
parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the
employment contract subject to the following requisites:
1. That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas
employment contract that a specific foreign law
shall govern;
2. That the foreign law invoked must be proven
before the courts pursuant to the Philippine
rules on evidence;
3. That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas
employment contract must not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy of the Philippines; and
4. That the overseas employment contract must
be processed through the POEA.
Further, these strict terms are pursuant to the
jurisprudential doctrine that "parties may not contract
away applicable provisions of law especially
peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily
impressed with public interest," such as laws relating to
labor.
Mutuality of Contracts
Garcia v. Rita Legarda, Inc.
There must be mutuality between the parties based on
their essential equality to which is repugnant to have
one party bound by the contract leaving the other free
therefrom Its ultimate purpose is to render void a
contract containing a condition which makes its
fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled
will of one of the contracting parties.
The questioned stipulation merely gives the vendor "the
right to declare this contract cancelled and of no effect"
upon fulfillment of the conditions therein set forth. It
does not leave the validity or compliance of the contract
entirely "to the will of one of the contracting parties."
Allied Banking Corporation v. CA
Whether a stipulation in a contract of lease to the effect
that the contract "may be renewed for a like term at the
option of the lessee" is void for being potestative or
violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts under
Art. 1308.
NO. The fact that such option is binding only on the
lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not
render it void for lack of mutuality. After all, the lessor is
free to give or not to give the option to the lessee.
Mutuality obtains in such a contract and equality exists

between the lessor and the lessee since they remain
with the same faculties in respect to fulfillment.
PNB v. CA
We cannot countenance petitioner bank's posturing that
the escalation clause at bench gives it unbridled right to
unilaterally upwardly adjust the interest on private
respondents' loan. That would completely take away
from private respondents the right to assent to an
important modification in their agreement, and would
negate the element of mutuality in contracts.
Buenaventura v. MBTC 2016
A contract of adhesion is so-called because its terms
are prepared by only one party while the other party
merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion
thereto. As a rule, it is no different from any other
contract. Its interpretation still aligns with the literal
meaning of its terms and conditions absent any
ambiguity, or with the intention of the parties. The
terms and conditions of the promissory notes involved
herein, being clear and beyond doubt, should then be
enforced accordingly. It does not exempt the parties
from compliance with what was mutually agreed upon
by them.
Relativity of Contracts
Exceptions
a) Where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature,
or by stipulation or by provision of law;
b) Stipulation pour autrui — if a contract should
contain some stipulation in favor of a third
person;
c) Tortious interference — Where a third person
induces another to violate his contract, he shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party;
(Art 1314)
So Ping Bun v. CA laid out the elements of tortious
interference:
1) existence of a valid contract;
2) knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of contract; and
3) interference of the third person is
without legal justification or excuse. (see
Excellent Essentials v. Extra Excel
2018)
d) Where third persons may be adversely affected
by a contract where they did not participate;
e) Accion directa — Where the law authorizes the
creditor to sue on a contract entered into by his
debtor.
Florentino v. Encarnacion
A stipulation pour autrui is a stipulation in favor of
a third person. The requisites are:
1) there must be a stipulation in favor of a third
person.
2) the stipulation must be a PART, not the whole
of the contract.
3) the contracting parties must have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon a third
person, not a mere inciden-tal benefit or
interest.
4) the third person must have communicated his
acceptance to the obligor before its revocation.
5) neither of the contracting parties bears the legal
representation or authorization of the third
party.
While a stipulation in favor of a third person has no
binding effect in itself before its acceptance by the party
favored, the law does not provide when the third person
must make his acceptance. As a rule, there is no time
limit; such third person has all the time until the
stipulation is revoked. Here, We find that the Church
accepted the stipulation in its favor before it is sought to
be revoked by some of the co-owners.
Coquia v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co.
The policy under consideration is typical of contracts
pour autrui, this character being made more manifest by
the fact that the deceased driver paid fifty percent
(50%) of the corresponding premiums, which were
deducted from his weekly commissions. Under these
conditions, it is clear that the Coquias have a direct
cause of action against the Company, and, since they
could have maintained this action by themselves,
without the assistance of the Insured, it goes without
saying that they could and did properly join the latter in
filing the complaint herein.
Sps Pontigon, et al v. Heirs of Sanchez 2016
The principle of relativity of contracts dictates that
contractual agreements can only bind the parties who
entered into them, and cannot favor or prejudice third
persons, even if he is aware of such contract and has
acted with knowledge thereof.
As a general rule, the heirs of the contracting parties are
precluded from denying the binding effect of the valid
agreement entered into by their predecessors-in-
interest. This is so because they are not deemed "third
persons" to the contract within the contemplation of
law. It is then immaterial that the Extrajudicial
Settlement executed by Flaviana was not properly
notarized for the said document to be binding on her
heirs.
Consensuality of Contracts
ABS-CBN v. CA, et al.
Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected
upon mere meeting of the minds.
A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new
proposal, constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection
of the original offer. Consequently, when something is
desired which is not exactly what is proposed in the
offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate
consent because any modification or variation from the
terms of the offer annuls the offer.
Palattao v. CA, et al.
While it is true that private respondent informed
petitioner that he is accepting the latter’s offer to sell
the leased property, it appears that they did not reach
an agreement as to the extent of the lot subject of the
proposed sale.
Private respondent’s acceptance of petitioner’s offer
was not absolute, and will consequently not generate
consent that would perfect a contract.
DBP v. Perez
There was no evidence showing that the respondents
signed the new promissory note through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. The
respondents merely alleged that they were forced to
restructure their loan for fear of having their mortgaged
properties foreclosed. However, it is axiomatic that this
would not amount to vitiated consent. The last
paragraph of Article 1335 specifically states that a
threat to enforce one’s claim through competent
authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate
consent. Foreclosure of mortgaged properties in case of
default in payment of a debtor is a legal remedy
afforded by law to a creditor. Hence, a threat to
foreclose the mortgage would NOT, per se, vitiate
consent.
Archbishop Capalla v. Comelec 2012 En Banc
In this jurisdiction, public bidding is the established
procedure in the grant of government contracts. The
award of public contracts, through public bidding, is a
matter of public policy. The parties are, therefore, not at
full liberty to amend or modify the provisions of the
contract bidded upon. The three principles of public
bidding are:
1) the offer to the public;
2) an opportunity for competition; and
3) a basis for the exact comparison of bids.
A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or
amending certain provisions of the contract bidded
upon. However, such changes must not constitute
substantial or material amendments that would alter
the basic parameters of the contract and would
constitute a denial to the other bidders of the
opportunity to bid on the same terms.
Obligatory Force of Contracts 3. Classification
Laguna Tayabas Bus v. Manabat a) According to perfection or formation
Where a person by his contract charges himself with i) Consensual;
an obligation possible to be performed, he must
perform it, unless the performance is rendered ii) Real — perfected by delivery.
impossible by the act of God, by the law, or by the other 1) Depositum;
party, it being the rule that in case the party desires to
be excused from the performance in the event of 2) Pledge;
contingencies arising, it is his duty to provide therefor in 3) Commodatum. (Art 1316)
his contract.
iii) Formal or Solemn — where special
formalities are essential before
2. Stages
perfection.
A contract undergoes three stages: 1) Donation inter vivos of real
a) preparation, conception, or generation, which is property requires for its validity
the period of negotiation and bargaining, a public instrument.
ending at the moment of agreement of the b) According to cause or equivalence of the value
parties; of prestations
b) perfection or birth of the contract, which is the i) Onerous — there is an interchange of
moment when the parties come to agree on the equivalent valuable consideration;
terms of the contract; and
ii) Gratuitous or lucrative — one party
c) consummation or death, which is the receives no equivalent prestation;
fulfillment or performance of the terms agreed
iii) Remunerative — one prestation is given
upon in the contract.
for a service or benefit that had been
Metro Rail Transit v. Gammon Philippines 2018 rendered previously.
Leonen, J
c) According to importance or dependence of one
To determine when the contract was perfected, the upon another
acceptance of the offer must be unqualified,
i) Principal — the contract may stand
unconditional, and made known to the offeror. Before
alone, e.g. sale, lease;
knowing of the acceptance, the offeror may withdraw
the offer. Moreover, if the offeror imposes the manner of ii) Accessory — depends for its existence
acceptance to be done by the offeree, the offeree must upon another contract, e.g. mortgage;
accept it in that manner for the contract to be binding. If
iii) Preparatory — not an end by itself but
the offeree accepts the offer in a different manner, it is
as a means for future transactions or
not effective, but constitutes a counter-offer, which the
contracts, e.g. agency, partnership.
offeror may accept or reject.
d) According to the parties obligated
In bidding contracts, this Court has ruled that the award
of the contract to the bidder is an acceptance of the i) Unilateral — only one party has an
obligation, e.g. commodatum;
bidder's offer. Its effect is to perfect a contract between
the bidder and the contractor upon notice of the award ii) Bilateral — both parties are required to
to the bidder. Thus, the award of a contract to a bidder render reciprocal prestations.
perfects the contract. Failure to sign the physical
contract does not affect the contract's existence. e) According to their name or designation
 i) Nominate;
ii) Innominate — shall be regulated by the
stipulations of the parties, by the
provisions on Obligations and Contracts,
by the rules governing the most
analogous nominate contracts, and by the
customs of the place. (Art 1307)
1) Do ut des — I give that you may
give;
2) Do ut facias — I give that you
may do;
3) Facio ut des — I do that you may
give;
4) Facio ut facias — I do that you
may do.
f) According to the risk of fulfillment
i) Commutative — real fulfillment is
contemplated;
ii) Aleatory — the fulfillment is dependent
upon chance, e.g. insurance contract.
2) Object certain which is the subject It is a separate agreement distinct from the contract which
matter of the contract; the parties may enter into upon the consummation of the
option. (Carceller v. CA)
3) Cause of the obligation which is
established. Option Money distinguished from Earnest Money
Option Money Earnest Money
Consent
Given as a distinct Part of purchase price
Requisites of Consent
consideration
1) There must be two or more parties;
Applies to a sale not yet Given only where there is
2) The parties must be capable or capacitated;
perfected already a sale
3) There must be no vitiation of consent;
Not required to buy When given, buyer is
4) There must be no conflict between what was bound to pay the balance
expressly declared and what was really intended;
5) The intent must be declared properly. Persons Incapacitated to Give Consent (Art 1327)
Requisites for the Meeting of the Minds a) Unemancipated minors;
1) An offer that must be certain; and b) Insane or demented persons, unless entered into
during lucid intervals (Art 1328);
2) An acceptance that must be unqualified and
absolute. c) Deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
Offer Ineffective Persons Specially Disqualified

g) According to the time of performance or ART 1323. An offer becomes ineffective upon the 1. Here, the transaction is VOID because the right itself
fulfillment death, civil interdiction, insanity, or is restricted.
insolvency of either party before acceptance is 2. However, if there is mere legal incapacity, such as
i) Executed — obligations are all complied
conveyed. when only the exercise of the right is restricted, then
with;
Option Contracts the transaction is merely VOIDABLE.
ii) Executory — the prestations are to be
complied with at some future time. a) Generally, spouses cannot sell to each other (Art
ART 1324. When the offerer has allowed the
1490), nor can they donate to each other (Art
h) According to subject matter — contracts offeree a certain period to accept, the offer may
134). Transactions are VOID, but only those
involving be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by
prejudiced can assail the validity of the
communicating such withdrawal, except when the
i) Things — e.g. sale; transaction.
option is founded upon a consideration, as
ii) Rights or credits — e.g. usufruct, something paid or promised. b) Insolvents before they are discharged cannot
assignment of credits; make payments.
An option is a preparatory contract in which one party
iii) Services — e.g. agency, lease of services, grants to the other, for a fixed period and under specified c) Persons disqualified because of fiduciary
common carriage. conditions, the power to decide whether or not to enter relationship. (Art 1491)
into a principal contract.
4. Essential Requisites ART 1491. The following persons cannot acquire
It binds the party who has given the option, not to enter by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
ART 1318. There is no contract unless the into the principal contract with any other person during either in person or through the mediation of
following requisites concur: the period designated, and, within that period, to enter another:
into such contract with the one to whom the option was
1) Consent of the contracting parties; granted, if the latter should decide to use the option.
 1) The guardian, the property of the
person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
2) Agents, the property whose
administration or sale may have been
intrusted to them, unless the consent of
the principal has been given;
3) Executors and administrators, the
property of the estate under
administration;
4) Public officers and employees, the
property of the State or of any
subdivision thereof, or of any GOCC or
institution, the administration of which
has been intrusted to them; this
provision shall apply to judges and
government experts who, in any manner
whatsoever, take part in the sale;
5) Justices, judges, prosecuting
attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise
their respective functions;
This prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply
to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession;
6) Any others specially disqualified by law.
Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy
Yao King Ong's telegram simply says "we agree to buy
property". It does not necessarily connote acceptance
of the price but instead suggests that the details were to
be subject of negotiation. Instead of "absolutely"
accepting the "certain" offer - if there was one - of the
petitioners, respondents still insisted on further
negotiation of details.
Sanchez v. Rigor
Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or
consideration, the promisor is not bound by his promise
and may, accordingly, withdraw it. Pending notice of its
withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of
the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in
a perfected contract of sale.
Parties and Capacity
Hermosa v. Zobel
The sale of real estate, effected by minors who have
already passed the ages of puberty and adolescence and
are near the adult age when they pretend to have
already reached their majority, while in fact they have
not, is VALID, and they cannot be permitted afterwards
to excuse themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or to seek their annulment.
De Braganza v. De Villa Abrille
From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in
the same promissory note they signed, it does not
follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be
permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical
duty to disclose their inability.
Being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could
not be legally bound by their signatures. Their promise
to pay P10,000 can not be enforced since they were
minors incapable of binding themselves.
Frias v. Esquivel
Inasmuch as Perpetua P. Zaragoza does not appear to
have been appointed a judicial guardian of her minor
children with the power to sell their property, the
aforesaid deed of conveyance is, therefore,
unenforceable.
With regard to Ricardo Esquivel, the CA found him to be
insane at the time of the execution of the deed of
conveyance. This finding shows that the said deed is
VOID as to him for there was lack of authority on the
part of his mother Perpetua to sell his portion, she not
having been appointed judicial guardian of said Ricardo
Vices of Consent (Arts 1330-1344)
ART 1330. A contract where consent is given
through mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence, or fraud is VOIDABLE.
Requisites for MISTAKE to Vitiate Consent
1) The error must be substantial regarding
a) The object of the contract;
b) The conditions which principally moved
or induced one of the parties;
c) Identity or qualifications if such were the
principal cause.
2) The error must be excusable and not caused by
negligence;
3) The error must be a mistake of fact, and not of
law.
Requisites for MUTUAL ERROR to Vitiate Consent
1) There must be mutual error;
2) The error must refer to the legal effect of the
agreement;
3) The real purpose of the parties is frustrated.
Requisites for VIOLENCE to Vitiate Consent
1) Employment of serious or irresistible force;
2) It must have been the reason why the contract
was entered into.
Requisites for INTIMIDATION to Vitiate Consent
1) Reasonable and well-grounded fear
2) Of an imminent and grave evil
3) Upon his person, property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants or
ascendants
4) It must have been the reason why the contract
was entered into
5) The threat must be of an unjust act, an actionable
wrong.
Requisites for UNDUE INFLUENCE to Vitiate Consent
1) Improper advantage;
2) Power over the will of another;
 3) Deprivation of the latter’s will of a reasonable
freedom of choice.
Requisites of Dolo Causante under Art 1338
1) The fraud must be material and serious that it
really induced the consent. (Art 1344)
2) The fraud must have been employed by only one
of the parties.
3) There must be a deliberate intent to deceive or to
induce. (Art 1343)
4) The other party must have relied on the untrue
statement and must himself not be guilty of
negligence in ascertaining the truth.
Failure to Disclose Facts
ART 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is
a duty to reveal them, as when the parties are
bound by confidential relations, constitutes
fraud.
Caveat Emptor
ART 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when
the other party had an opportunity to know the
facts, are NOT in themselves fraudulent.
Mere Expression of an Opinion
ART 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does
not signify fraud, unless made by an expert
and the other party has relied on the former's
special knowledge.
Misrepresentation
ART 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person
does not vitiate consent, unless such
misrepresentation has created substantial
mistake and the same is mutual.
ART 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith
is not fraudulent but may constitute error.
Requisites for FRAUD to Vitiate Consent
1) The fraud must be serious;
2) The parties must NOT be in pari delicto.
Pangadil v. CFI
Assuming that the execution of the deed of ratification
was attended by fraud, such circumstance would only
make the contract voidable or annullable (Art. 1309),
and not an inexistent and void contract in accordance
with Article 1409. The action to annul a voidable
contract is not imprescriptible, unlike in the case of an
inexistent contract.
Constantino v. CA
When respondents affixed their signatures on the deed,
it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to
be prepared left several spaces blank, more particularly
as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold.
The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only
upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque,
pursuant to their understanding, would be present
when the property would be surveyed after obtaining
permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the
supposed understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner
to induce respondents to sign the deed without which
the latter would not have given their conformity thereto.
Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling
the blank spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed
and subdivided, and then causing the issuance of
transfer certificates of title without their knowledge,
much less consent.
Rural Bank of Caloocan City v. CA
A contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent if deceit by a third person, even without
connivance or complicity with one of the contracting
parties, resulted in mutual error on the part of the
parties to the contract.
Tankeh v. DBP 2013 Leonen, J
There are two types of fraud contemplated in the
performance of contracts: dolo incidente or incidental
fraud and dolo causante or fraud serious enough to
render a contract voidable.
Causal fraud referred to in Article 1338, are those
deceptions or misrepresentations of a serious character
employed by one party and without which the other
party would not have entered into the contract.
Dolo incidente, or incidental fraud referred to in
Article 1344, are those which are not serious in
character and without which the other party would still
have entered into the contract.
In order to constitute fraud that provides basis to annul
contracts, it must fulfill two conditions.
1. First, the fraud must be dolo causante or it
must be fraud in obtaining the consent of the
party.
2. Second, this fraud must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence.
The misrepresentation constituting the fraud must be
established by full, clear, and convincing evidence,
and not merely by a preponderance thereof. The deceit
must be serious. The fraud is serious when it is
sufficient to impress, or to lead an ordinarily prudent
person into error; that which cannot deceive a prudent
person cannot be a ground for nullity.
Simulation of Contracts (Arts 1345-1346)
It is the process of intentionally deceiving others by
producing the appearance of a contract that really
does not exist (absolute) or which is different from
the true agreement (relative).
Requisites for Simulation
1) An outward declaration of will different from the
will of the parties;
2) The false appearance must have been intended by
mutual agreement;
3) The purpose is to deceive third persons.
Kinds of Simulated Contracts
a) Absolute — parties do not intend to be bound;
VOID
b) Relative — parties conceal their true agreement.
They are then bound to the real or true
agreement except
i) If the contract should prejudice third
persons; or
 ii) If the purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public
policy.
Sps Ladanga v. CA
A contract of sale is void and produces no effect
whatsoever where the price, which appears therein as
paid, has in fact never been paid by the purchaser to the
vendor. Such a sale is inexistent and cannot be
considered consummated.
Object
Requisites
1) The thing or service must be within the
commerce of man;
2) Must be transmissible;
3) Must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy;
4) Must not be impossible (Art 1348);
5) Must be determinate as to its kind or
determinable without the need of a new contract
or agreement (Art 1349).
De Belen Vda De Cabalu v. Tabu & Laxamana 2012
Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract
entered into upon future inheritance as VOID. The law
applies when the following requisites concur:
1) the succession has not yet been opened;
2) the object of the contract forms part of the
inheritance; and
3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an
expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary
in nature.
In this case, at the time the deed was executed,
Faustina’s will was not yet probated; the object of the
contract, the 9,000 square meter property, still formed
part of the inheritance of his father from the estate of
Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary
right therein.
Cause stated in the preceding number; (Art
1381[2])
A consideration, in the legal sense of the word, is
some right, interest, benefit, or advantage conferred iii) In partition, when any one of the co-
upon the promisor, to which he is otherwise not heirs received things whose value is less,
lawfully entitled, or any detriment, prejudice, loss, or by at least one-fourth, than the share to
disadvantage suffered or undertaken by the promisee which he is entitled. (Art 1098)
other than to such as he is at the time of consent Liguez v. CA
bound to suffer.
While motive differs from cause, still a contract that is
Requisites conditioned upon the attainment of an immoral notice
1) Must be present at the time the contract was should be considered VOID, for here motive may be
entered into; regarded as cause when it predetermines the purpose of
the contract.
2) Must be true;
3) Must be lawful. Vda de Rodriguez v. Rodriguez
The consideration need not be paid at the time of the
Motive distinguished from Cause
promise. What would invalidate the conveyances now
Motive Cause under scrutiny is the fact that they were resorted to in
order to circumvent the legal prohibition against
donations between spouses.
May vary although he Always the same
enters into the same
contract Phil. Banking Corp. v. Lui She
The case involves a scheme to circumvent the
May be unknown to the Always known
Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of land of
other
aliens. The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal cause
rendering the contracts VOID.
Difficult to separate from Its absence cannot be
cause cured by presence of
Mactal v. Melegrito
motive
The consideration for the promise was, therefore, the
Lesion — It is the inadequacy of cause. aforesaid pre-existing debt of Melegrito, not the
GR: Lesion does NOT invalidate a contract. dismissal of the estafa case
EXC: Ong v. Ong
a) When there has also been fraud, mistake or Assuming that said consideration of P1.00 is suspiciou
undue influence; circumstance, alone, does not necessarily justify the inferen
b) In cases expressly provided by law: Reyes and the Abellas were not purchasers in good faith a
value. Neither does this inference warrant the conclusion t
i) Those which are entered into by sales were null and void ab initio. Indeed, bad fait
guardians whenever the wards whom inadequacy of the monetary consideration do not ren
they represent suffer lesion by more conveyance inexistent, for the assignor's liberality m
than one-fourth of the value of the sufficient cause for a valid contract.
things which are the object thereof; (Art
1381[1]) Cojuangco, Jr. v. Republic 2012
ii) Those agreed upon in representation of The presumption that a contract has sufficient
absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion

consideration cannot be overthrown by the bare
uncorroborated and self-serving assertion of petitioners
that it has no consideration. To overcome the
presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of
consideration must be shown by preponderance of
evidence.
Inadequacy of the consideration, however, does not
render a contract void under Article 1355. While one
may posit that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement puts PCA
and the coconut farmers at a disadvantage, the facts do
not make out a clear case of violation of any law that will
necessitate the recall of said contract.
While consideration is usually in the form of money or
property, it need not be monetary. This is clear from
Article 1350.
Sta. Fe Realty Inc., et al. v. Sison 2016
Gross inadequacy of price does not even affect the
validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a defect in
the consent or that the parties actually intended a
donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of cause
will not invalidate a contract unless there has been fraud,
mistake or undue influence.
Petitioners are assailing the deeds of sale for being
absolutely simulated and for inadequacy of the price.
However, these two grounds are incompatible. If
there exists an actual consideration for transfer
evidenced by the alleged act of sale, no matter how
inadequate it be, the transaction could not be a
simulated sale.
B. Form of Contracts
Form for Convenience
ART 1358. The following must appear in a
public document:
1) Acts and contracts which have for their
object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real
rights over immovable property; sales
of real property or of an interest therein
are governed by articles 1403, No. 2, and
1405;
2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation
of hereditary rights or of those of the
conjugal partnership of gains;
3) The power to administer property, or
any other power which has for its object
an act appearing or which should appear
in a public document, or should prejudice
a third person;
4) The cession of actions or rights
proceeding from an act appearing in a
public document.
All other contracts where the amount involved
exceeds Php 500 must appear in writing, even a
private one. But sales of goods, chattels or things
in action are governed by articles, 1403, No. 2 and
1405
Dauden-Hernaez v. De los Angeles
In general, contracts are valid and binding from their
perfection regardless of form, whether they be oral or
written. This is plain from Articles 1315 and 1356.
Article 1356 establishes only two exceptions, to wit:
a) Solemn Contracts. — Contracts for which the
law itself requires that they be in some
part-icular form (writing) in order to make
them valid and enforceable.
b) Contracts that the law requires to be proved
by some writing (memorandum) of its terms,
as in those covered by the old Statute of Frauds,
now Article 1403(2).
The contract sued upon by petitioner herein,
compensation for services, does not come under either
exception. It is true that it appears included in Article
1358, last clause, providing that "all other contracts
where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos
must appear in writing, even a private one". But Article
1358 nowhere provides that the absence of written
form in this case will make the agreement invalid or
unenforceable. On the contrary, Article 1357 clearly
indicates that contracts covered by Article 1358 are
binding and enforceable by action or suit despite the
absence of writing.
PNB v. IAC
While Article 1358 requires that the revocation of
Alcedo's Special Power of Attorney to mortgage his
property should appear in a public instrument,
nevertheless, a revocation embodied in a private writing
is valid and binding between the parties.
Manotok Realty v. CA
The alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero should have
been embodied in a public instrument in accordance
with Article 1358 and should have been duly registered
with the Register of Deeds to make it binding against
third persons.
C. Reformation of Instruments
1. Reformation is that remedy in equity by means
of which a written instrument is made or
construed so as to express or conform to the real
intention of the parties.
2. An action for reformation is in personam, not in
rem, xxx even when real estate is involved.
3. May prosper only upon the concurrence of the
following requisites:
1) there must have been a meeting of the
minds of the parties to the contact;
2) the instrument does not express the
true intention of the parties; and
3) the failure of the instrument to express
the true intention of the parties is due to
mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident.
4. The onus probandi is upon the party who insists
that the contract should be reformed.
5. The prescriptive period for actions based upon a
written contract and for reformation of an
instrument is ten (10) years under Article
1144.
6. Under Section 1, Rule 64, an action for the
reformation of an instrument is instituted as a
special civil action for declaratory relief. It
may be entertained only before the breach or
 violation of the law or contract to which it
refers.
When Instrument may be Reformed
1) When a mutual mistake of the parties causes the
failure of the instrument to disclose their real
agreement; (Art 1361)
2) If one party was mistaken and the other acted
fraudulently or inequitably in such a way that the
instrument does not show their true intention;
(Art 1362)
3) When one party was mistaken and the other
knew or believed that the instrument did not
state their real agreement, but concealed that
fact; (Art 1363)
4) When through the ignorance, lack of skill,
negligence or bad faith on the part of the person
drafting the instrument or of the clerk or typist,
the instrument does not express the true
intention of the parties; (Art 1364)
5) If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge
of real or personal property, but the instrument
states that the property is sold absolutely or with
a right of repurchase. (Art 1365)
When Reformation NOT Allowed
1) Simple donations inter vivos wherein no
condition is imposed;
2) Wills;
3) When the real agreement is VOID; (Art 1366)
4) When one of the parties has brought an action to
enforce the instrument; (Art 1367)
City of Cabanatuan v. Lazaro
Every party to a contract has a clear interest that the
instrument embodying its terms should conform to the
actual and true agreement had by and between the
con-tracting parties. Hence, if by accident or mistake, as
expressly pleaded in the complaint, the document does
not conform to or reflect the actual agreement, either
party can ask for the reformation of the instrument as
provided by Article 1359.
Huibonhoa v. CA
Huibonhoa having failed to discharge that burden of
proving that the true intention of the parties has not
been accurately expressed in the lease contract sought
to be reformed, the trial court correctly held that no
clear and convincing proof warrants the reformation
thereof.
By bringing an action for the reformation of subject
lease contract, Huibonhoa chose to reform the
instrument and not the contract itself. She is thus
precluded from inserting stipulations that are not extant
in the lease contract itself lest the very agreement
embodied in the instrument is altered.
Sarming v. Dy, et al.
There was a meeting of the minds between the parties
to the contract but the deed did not express the true
intention of the parties due to mistake in the
designation of the lot subject of the deed. There is no
dispute as to the intention of the parties to sell the land
to Alejandra Delfino but there was a mistake as to the
designation of the lot intended to be sold.
Bentir v. Leanda
Whether the complaint for reformation of instrument has
prescribed.
YES. Respondent corporation had ten (10) years from
1968, the time when the contract of lease was executed,
to file an action for reformation. Sadly, it did so only on
May 15, 1992 or twenty-four (24) years after the cause
of action accrued, hence, its cause of action has become
stale, hence, time-barred.
D. Interpretation of Contracts
The "interpretation" of a contract is the
determination of the meaning attached to the words
written or spoken which make the contract.
Kasilag v. Rodriguez
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to
the effect that the intention of the contracting parties
should always prevail because their will has the force
of law between them.
The terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law,
morals and public order should be separated from the
valid and legal contract when such separation can be
made because they are independent of the valid contract
which expresses the will of the contracting parties.
UP v. Gabriel
The stipulation in the sub-contract is clear and leaves no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties.
Consequently, the literal meaning of the stipulation
shall control.
Sy v. CA
In order to judge the intention of the parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.
Angeles v. Calasang
The contract to sell, being a contract of adhesion, must
be construed against the party causing it.
Century Properties, Inc. v. Babiano, et al 2016
The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain
and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined
without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The
intention of the parties must be gathered from that
language, and from that language alone.
Thus, in the interpretation of contracts, the Court must
first determine whether a provision or stipulation
therein is ambiguous. Absent any ambiguity, the
provision on its face will be read as it is written and
treated as the binding law of the parties to the contract.
Werr International Corporation v. Highlands Prime,
Inc. 2017
Deemed incorporated into every contract are the
general provisions on obligations and interpretation of
contracts found in the Civil Code.
In previous cases, we applied Articles 1234 and 1376 in
construction agreements to determine whether the
project owner is entitled to liquidated damages.
Substantial completion of the project equates to
 3. Rescission implies a contract which, even if 3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors
achievement of 95% project completion which excuses
initially valid, produces a lesion or pecuniary when the latter cannot in any other
the contractor from the payment of liquidated damages.
damage to someone that justifies its invalidation manner collect the claims due them;
As expressly stated under Articles 1234 and 1376, and for reasons of equity.
4) Those which refer to things under
in jurisprudence, the construction industry's prevailing 4. The action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot litigation if they have been entered into
practice may supplement any ambiguities or omissions be instituted except when the party suffering by the defendant without the knowledge
in the stipulations of the contract. damage has no other legal means to obtain and approval of the litigants or of
reparation for the same. (Art 1383) competent judicial authority; xxxx
E. Defective Contracts 5. The acquisition by a third person of the property Requisites for an Accion Pauliana to Accrue (Par 3 of
subject of the contract is an obstacle to the Art 1381)
The Four Kinds of Defective Contracts in decreasing
action for its rescission where it is shown that 1) That the plaintiff asking for rescission has a
validity
such third person is in lawful possession of the credit prior to the alienation, although
Validity Reason for Defect Ratifiable subject of the contract and that he did not act in demandable later;
bad faith. (Art 1385)
Rescissible Valid until Extrinsic, consisting of ✘ 2) That the debtor has made a subsequent contract
rescinded economic damage or 6. The kinds of rescissible contracts, according to conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third
lesion the reason for their susceptibility to rescission, person;
are the following:
Voidable Valid until Intrinsic, as in vitiated 3) That the creditor has no other legal remedy to
✔ first, those which are rescissible because of satisfy his claim, but would benefit by rescission
annulled consent lesion or prejudice; of the conveyance to the third person;
Unenforceable Has no Lack of authority; second, those which are rescissible on account of
✔ fraud or bad faith; and
4) That the act being impugned is fraudulent;
effect for Failure to comply with
now Statute of Frauds; 5) That the third person who received the property
third, those which, by special provisions of law, conveyed, if by onerous title, has been an
Both parties lack are susceptible to rescission.
consent accomplice in the fraud.
Requisites for Rescission An accion pauliana presupposes the following:
Void or No effect Various, see Art 1409 ✘ 1) There must be at the beginning either a valid or
Inexistent at all 1) A judgment;
voidable contract;
2) the issuance by the trial court of a writ of
2) But there is an economic prejudice to a party or execution for the satisfaction of the judgment, and
1. Rescissible Contracts third person;
3) the failure of the sheriff to enforce and satisfy the
1. Rescission is a remedy granted by law to the 3) Requires mutual restitution. (Art 1385) judgment of the court.
contracting parties and even to third persons, to Enumeration of Rescissible Contracts The following successive measures must be taken by a
secure reparations for damages caused to them
ART 1381. The following contracts are rescissible: creditor before he may bring an action for rescission of an
by a contract, even if this should be valid, by
allegedly fraudulent sale:
means of the restoration of things to their 1) Those which are entered into by
condition at the moment prior to the celebration guardians whenever the wards whom 1) exhaust the properties of the debtor through
of said contract. they represent suffer lesion by more levying by attachment and execution upon all the
than one-fourth of the value of the property of the debtor, except such as are exempt
2. It is a relief allowed for the protection of one of
things which are the object thereof; from execution;
the contracting parties and even third persons
from all injury and damage the contract may 2) Those agreed upon in representation of 2) exercise all the rights and actions of the debtor,
cause, or to protect some incompatible and absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion save those personal to him (accion subrogatoria);
preferent right created by the contract. stated in the preceding number; and
 3) seek rescission of the contracts executed by the
debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana).
Premature Payments Made in a State of Insolvency (Art
1382)
Two requisites must concur:
1) The debtor-payer must have been insolvent;
2) The debt was not yet due and demandable.
Presumptions of Fraud (Art 1387)
a) In case of gratuitous alienations — when the
debtor did not reserve sufficient property to pay
all debts contracted before the donation.
b) In case of onerous alienations — when made by
persons against whom
i) some judgment has been rendered in any
instance; or
ii) some writ of attachment has been issued.
The decision or attachment need not refer to the
property alienated, and need not have been
obtained by the party seeking the rescission.
Badges of Fraud
In the early case of Oria v. Mcmicking, the Supreme Court
considered the following instances as badges of fraud:
1. The fact that the consideration of the conveyance
is fictitious or is inadequate.
2. A transfer made by a debtor after suit has begun
and while it is pending against him.
3. A sale upon credit by an insolvent debtor.
4. Evidence of large indebtedness or complete
insolvency.
5. The transfer of all or nearly all of his property by
a debtor, especially when he is insolvent or
greatly embarrassed financially.
6. The fact that the transfer is made between father
and son, when there are present other of the
above circumstances.
7. The failure of the vendee to take exclusive
possession of all the property.
Rosencor Development Corporation v. Inquing, et al.
May a contract of sale entered into in violation of a third
party's right of first refusal be rescinded in order that
such third party can exercise said right? YES. But not in
this case.
The acquisition by Rosencor of the property subject of
the right of first refusal is an obstacle to the action for its
rescission where, as in this case, it was shown that
Rosencor is in lawful possession of the subject of the
contract and that it did not act in bad faith. (Art 1385)
Respondents’ remedy is not an action for the rescission
of the Deed of Absolute Sale but an action for damages
against the heirs of the spouses Tiangco for the
unjustified disregard of their right of first refusal
Khe Hong Cheng v. CA
When did the four (4) year prescriptive period as
provided for in Article 1389 for Philam to file its action for
rescission of the subject deeds of donation commence to
run?
Philam only learned about the unlawful conveyances
made by Khe Hong Cheng in January 1997 when its
counsel accompanied the sheriff to Butuan City to attach
the properties of petitioner Khe Hong Cheng. There they
found that he no longer had any properties in his name.
It was only then that respondent Philam's action for
rescission of the deeds of donation accrued because
then it could be said that Philam had exhausted all legal
means to satisfy the trial court's judgment in its favor.
Since Philam filed its complaint for accion pauliana
against petitioners on February 25, 1997, barely a
month from its discovery that Khe Hong Cheng had no
other property to satisfy the judgment award against
him, its action for rescission of the subject deeds clearly
had not yet prescribed.
Guzman, Bocaling and Co., Inc. v. Bonnevie
The respondent court correctly held that the Contract of
Sale was not voidable but rescissible. Under Article
1380 to 1381(3) of the Civil Code, a contract otherwise
valid may nonetheless be subsequently rescinded by
reason of injury to third persons, like creditors. The
status of creditors could be validly accorded the
Bonnevies for they had substantial interests that were
prejudiced by the sale of the subject property to the
petitioner without recognizing their right of first
priority under the Contract of Lease.
Ada v. Baylon 2012
The rescission of a contract under Article 1381(4) only
requires the concurrence of the following:
1) first, the defendant, during the pendency of the
case, enters into a contract which refers to the
thing subject of litigation; and
2) second, the said contract was entered into
without the knowledge and approval of the
litigants or of a competent judicial authority.
Here, at the time they were gratuitously conveyed by
Rita, Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 are among
the properties that were the subject of the partition
case then pending with the RTC. Rita did not inform nor
sought the approval from the petitioners or of the RTC
with regard to the donation inter vivos.
Rescission under Article 1381(4) is not preconditioned
upon the judicial determination as to the ownership of the
thing subject of litigation.
2. Voidable Contracts
ART 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties:
1) Those where one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to a
contract;
2) Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are
annulled by a proper action in court. They are
susceptible of ratification.
Rescission distinguished from Annulment
Rescission Annulment
Basis is lesion
Defect is external or
intrinsic
Subsidiary action
Remedy
Private interest governs
Equity predominates
Plaintiff may be a party or
third person
There must be damage to
plaintiff
If plaintiff indemnified,
cannot prosper
Compatible with the
perfect validity of contract
Ratification is NOT
required to prevent
rescission
Prescriptive Period (Art 1391)
The action for annulment shall be brought within four
years. This period shall begin:
Ground
In cases of intimidation,
violence or undue
influence
In case of mistake or fraud
Entered into by minors or
other incapacitated
persons
Basis is vitiated consent or
incapacity to consent
Defect is intrinsic
Principal action
Sanction
Public interest governs
Law predominates
Plaintiff must be a party
whether bound principally
or subsidiarily
Damage to plaintiff
immaterial
Indemnity is no bar to
action
A defect is presupposed
Ratification required to
prevent annulment
From the time
the defect of the consent
ceases
of discovery of same
the guardianship ceases
Ratification; Effects
a) The action to annul is extinguished (Art 1392);
b) Cleanses the contract from all its defects from the
moment it was constituted. (Art 1396)
Ratification; Requisites
1) The contract must be voidable;
2) The person ratifying must know the reason for
the contract being voidable;
3) The cause must not exist or continue to exist
anymore at the time of ratification;
4) Must have been made expressly or by an act
implying a waiver of the action to annul;
5) The person ratifying must be the injured party.
There Must be Mutual Restitution, Except
ART 1399. When the defect of the contract
consists in the incapacity of one of the parties,
the incapacitated person is not obliged to make
any restitution
Exception to the exception
except insofar as he has been benefited by the
thing or price received by him.
Bael v. IAC
Under Article 1391, the prescriptive period for
annulment of contracts based on intimidation, violence,
undue influence is four (4) years from the time the
defect of the consent ceases while in case of mistake or
fraud, the period of prescription commences to run from
the discovery of the same.
3. Unenforceable Contracts
Kinds of Unenforceable Contracts
a) Unauthorized contracts;
b) Those that fail to comply with the Statute of
Frauds;
c) Those where both parties are incapable of giving
consent to a contract.
ART 1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
1) Those entered into in the name of
another person by one
a) who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or
b) who has acted beyond his powers;
2) Those that do not comply with the
Statute of Frauds as set forth in this
number. xxxx:
a) An agreement that by its terms is not
to be performed within a year
from the making thereof;
b) A special promise to answer for the
debt, default, or miscarriage of
another;
c) An agreement made in
consideration of marriage, other
than a mutual promise to marry;
d) An agreement for the sale of goods,
chattels or things in action, at a price
not less than five hundred pesos,
unless the buyer accept and receive
part of such goods and chattels, or
the evidences, or some of them, of
such things in action or pay at the
time some part of the purchase
money; xxxx;
e) An agreement for the leasing for a
longer period than one year, or for
the sale of real property or of an
interest therein;
f) A representation as to the credit of a
third person.
3) Those where BOTH parties are
incapable of giving consent to a
contract.
General Rules of Application Concerning Statute of
Frauds
1) Applies only to executory contracts where no
performance has yet been made.
 2) Cannot apply if the action is neither 2) Those which are absolutely simulated
Voidable Void
or fictitious;
a) for damages because of the violations of
an agreement nor May be ratified Cannot be ratified 3) Those whose cause or object did not
exist at the time of the transaction;
b) for the specific performance of said Produces effects until Generally, effects are not
agreement. annulled produced at all 4) Those whose object is outside the
commerce of men;
3) Exclusive — applies only to the agreements or
contracts enumerated above. Defect is due to incapacity Ordinarily, public policy is 5) Those which contemplate an impossible
or vitiated consent militated against service;
4) The defense of the Statute of Frauds may be
waived. Valid until annulled Generally, no action 6) Those where the intention of the parties
required to set aside, relative to the principal object of the
5) A personal defense — a contract infringing it
unless has already been contract cannot be ascertained;
cannot be assailed by third persons. (Art 1408)
performed 7) Those expressly prohibited or declared
6) Concerns itself with the admissibility of evidence
void by law.
and not its credibility or weight. May be cured by Cannot be cured by
prescription prescription These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can
7) Does not apply if it is claimed that the contract
the right to set up the defense of illegality be
does not express the true agreement of the
Defense may be invoked Defense may be availed of waived.
parties.
only by the parties or their by anybody whose
Lone Instance Where Recovery
Ratification of Contracts Infringing the Statute of successors in interest and interest is directly affected
Can Be Had Even in the Presence
Frauds (Art 1405 privies (Art 1421)
of Pari Delicto
a) By the failure to object to the presentation of oral
Relative or conditional Absolute nullity ART 1414. When money is paid or property
evidence to prove the same, or
nullity delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract
b) By the acceptance of benefit under them. may be repudiated by one of the parties
Unenforceable distinguished from Void Contracts
Rosencor Development Corporation v. Inquing, et al, a) before the purpose has been
supra Unenforceable Void accomplished, or
A right of first refusal is NOT among those listed as b) before any damage has been caused to a
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. third person.
May be ratified Cannot be ratified
Carbonell v. Poncio In such case, the courts may, if the public interest
There is a contract but No contract at all will thus be subserved, allow the party
The Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory cannot be enforced by a repudiating the contract to recover the money or
contracts, not to contracts that are totally or partially court action property.
performed.
Cannot be assailed by Can be assailed by Contracts Merely Prohibited
Western Mindanao Lumber Co. v. Medalle third parties anybody directly affected 1. Those forbidden because of private interests, as
An agreement creating an easement of right-of-way is opposed to those that are illegal per se that are
Enumeration of Void Contracts forbidden due to public interests.
NOT one of those contracts covered by the statute of
frauds since it is not a sale of real property or of an ART 1409. The following contracts are inexistent 2. Recovery is permitted, provided that:
interest therein. and void from the beginning:
a) The contract is not illegal per se;
1) Those whose cause, object or purpose
is contrary to law, morals, good customs, b) The prohibition is designed for the
4. Void or Inexistent Contracts protection of the plaintiff; and
public order or public policy;
Voidable distinguished from Void Contracts
 c) Public policy would be enhanced by
allowing the recovery.
Angel Jose Warehousing v. Chelda Enterprises
As stated in Article 1411, the rule of pari delicto applies
where a contract's nullity proceeds from illegality of the
cause or object of said con-tract. However, appellants
fail to consider that a contract of loan with usurious
interest consists of principal and ac-cessory
stipulations; the principal one is to pay the debt; the
accessory stipulation is to pay interest thereon.
The illegality lies only as to the prestation to pay the
stipulated interest; hence, being separable, the latter
only should be deemed void, since it is the only one that
is illegal.
Ras v. Sua
Considering that the aim of the government in allowing
the distribution or sale of disposable public lands to
deserving applicants is to enable the landless citizens to
own the land they could work on, and the reversion of
these lands to the government is penal in character,
reversion cannot be construed to be implied from the
provision making certain acts prohibited.
ART 1416, as an exception to the pari delicto rule,
provides that when the agreement is not illegal per se
but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law
is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if
public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has
paid or delivered.
Marin v. Adil
It is evident from the deed of exchange that the
intention of the parties relative to the lots, which are
the objects of the exchange, cannot be definitely
ascertained. We hold that this circumstance renders
the exchange VOID or inexistent (Art. 1378, 2nd par.
and Art. 1409[6], Civil Code). The instant rescissory
action may be treated as an action to declare void the
deed of exchange.
Razon, Inc. v. PPA
The transfer of the control of petitioner E. Razon, Inc.
from petitioner Enrique Razon to Alfredo “Bejo”
Romualdez, which We have resolved to be null and void,
Under Article 1409, contracts which are expressly
served as the direct link to petitioner company's
obtaining the Management Con-tract. Being the direct prohibited or declared void by law are considered
consequence and result of a previous illegal contract, inexistent and void from the beginning. There is no
need to bring a separate action for the declaration of the
the Management Contract itself is null and void as
subject deeds of conveyance as void.
provided in Article 1422 of the Civil Code.
Elementary in the law of contracts is the principle that Guillermo, et al. v. PIA 2017 Leonen, J
no judicial action is necessary for the annulment of a
The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits
void contract. Any such action would be merely
the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of
declaratory. Thus, it was well within the rights of
public funds unless two prior requirements are
respondent PPA to unilaterally cancel and treat as
satisfied. First, there must be an appropriation law
avoided the Management Contract and no arbitra-riness
authorizing the expenditure required in the contract.
may be attached to its exercise of this right.
Second, there must be attached to the contract a
certification by the proper accounting official and
Homena v. Casa
auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and
The plaintiffs’ supposed cause of action rests upon the such funds are available. Failure to comply with any of
deed of sale executed by defendants in their favor these two requirements renders the contract VOID.
wherein the latter sold a two-hectare portion of the
homestead which they were applying for to the plaintiffs 5. Distinguish: resolution and rescission of
on the understanding that the actual conveyance of the
contracts
said portion to plaintiffs would be made only after the
lapse of the five-year period during which, under the Resolution is a principal action based on a breach by a
Public Land Act, the homestead owner was prohibited party under Article 1191, while rescission under Article
from transferring his rights. The agreement is clearly
1383 is a subsidiary action limited to cases of rescission
illegal and void ab initio; it is intended to circumvent
for lesion under Article 1381. (Sps Poon v. Prime Savings
and violate the law. As parties to a void contract, the
Bank 2016)
plaintiffs have no rights which they can enforce and the
court can not lend itself to its enforcement.
Rescission Resolution
Sps Abella v. Sps Abella 2015 Leonen, J
Based on lesion or fraud Based on non-
The imposition of an unconscionable interest rate is upon creditors performance or non-
void ab initio for being "contrary to morals, and the fulfillment of obligation
law."
Instituted by either of the Instituted only by injured
Sps Jonsay, et al. v. Solidbank Bank Corp 2016 parties or by third persons party
An escalation clause in a loan agreement granting the
Courts cannot grant a Courts may grant a term
lending bank authority to unilaterally increase the
period or term within
interest rate without prior notice to and consent of the
which to comply
borrower is VOID.
Non-performance of other Non-performance of other
Peña v. Delos Santos, et al 2016 party is immaterial party is important
The judicial action over the subject lots was still in the
appellate proceedings stage when they were conveyed
to Jesus and Rosita's counsel, Atty. Robiso.

NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
1. Natural obligations, not being based on
positive law but on equity and natural law, do not
grant a right of action to enforce their
performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by
the obligor, they authorize the retention of what
has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof.
4.
(Art 1423)
2. Voluntary fulfillment means that the debtor
complied with the same even if he knew that he
could not have been legally forced to do so.
3. Natural Obligations in Wills and Succession:
a. When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily
pays a debt of the decedent exceeding the
value of the property which he received by
will or by the law of intestacy from the estate
of the deceased, the payment is valid and
cannot be rescinded by the payer. (Art 1429)
b. When a will is declared void because it has
not been executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law, but one of the
intestate heirs, after the settlement of the
debts of the deceased, pays a legacy in
compliance with a clause in the defective will,
the payment is effective and irrevocable. (Art
1430)
5.
ESTOPPEL
1. Estoppel is a bar which precludes a person from
denying or asserting anything to the contrary of
that which has, in contemplation of law, been
established as the truth, either by the acts of
6.
judicial or legislative officers or by his own deed
or representation, either expressed or implied.
2. May be in pais or by deed (Art 1433).
3. Estoppel in pais or Equitable Estoppel arises
when one, by his
7.
a. acts,
b. representations or admissions, or
c. by his silence when he ought to speak
out,
intentionally or through culpable negligence,
induces another to believe certain facts to exist,
and such other rightfully relies and acts on such
belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former
is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
Estoppel by laches or the unreasonable delay in
bringing a court action requires four elements
a. conduct on the part of the defendant, or
of one under whom he claims, giving rise
to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complaint seeks
a remedy;
b. delay in asserting the complainant's
rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendant's
conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit;
c. lack of knowledge or notice on the part
of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases
his suit; and
d. injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.
Estoppel by deed or Technical Estoppel is a
bar which precludes a party to a deed and his
privies from asserting as against the other and his
privies any right or title in derogation of the deed,
or from denying the truth of any material fact
asserted in it.
Sale of After-acquired Property. When a person
who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates
and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor
acquires title thereto, such title passes by
operation of law to the buyer or grantee. (Art
1434)
Estoppel by Record. Only applies as between the
same parties or their privies and can neither be
used against strangers.
Estoppel by record, to the extent that they bind
parties, will also bind their privies; but they can
exist only as between the same parties or those
in legal privity with them, and can be used
neither by nor against strangers. (Beltran v.
Escudero)
8. Agency by Estoppel. For an agency by estoppel to
exist, the following must be established:
1) the principal manifested a representation
of the agent's authority or knowingly
allowed the agent to assume such
authority;
2) the third person, in good faith, relied
upon such representation;
3) relying upon such representation, such
third person has changed his position to
his detriment.
An agency by estoppel, which is similar to the
doctrine of apparent authority, requires proof
of reliance upon the representations, and that, in
turn, needs proof that the representations
predated the action taken in reliance. (Litonjua, Jr.
v. Eternit Corporation)
SPECIAL CONTRACTS
A. SALES
1. General provisions
2. Parties
3. Obligations of the vendor
4. Obligations of the vendee
5. Transfer of ownership
6. Risk of loss
7. Documents of title
8. Warranties
9. Breach of contract
10. Performance of contract
11. Extinguishment
B. TRUSTS
 C. AGENCY Elements 5. Things subject to a resolutory condition may be
D. COMPROMISE the object of the contract of sale. (Art 1465)
1) Essential —
E. LOAN Provisions as to Price
a) Consent or Meeting of the Minds;
1. Loan 1. If the consideration of the contract consists partly
b) Determinate subject matter;
in money, and partly in another thing, the
2. Commodatum transaction shall be characterized by the manifest
c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
3. Simple loan intention of the parties.
2) Natural —
4. Interests on loan If such intention does not clearly appear, it shall
a) Warranty against eviction;
F. DEPOSIT be considered a barter if the value of the thing
b) Warranty against hidden defects; exceeds the amount of the money or its
G. LEASE equivalent; otherwise, it is a sale. (Art 1468)
3) Accidental — those which may be present or
absent in the stipulation. 2. In order that the price may be considered
A. SALES certain, it shall be sufficient that it be so with
Provisions as to Subject Matter
reference to another thing certain, or that the
1. General provisions 1. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have determination thereof be left to the judgment of a
a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the special person or persons. (Art 1469)
Definition
time it is delivered. (Art 1459)
The price must be certain; otherwise, there is no
ART 1458. By the contract of sale one of the The seller must be the owner of the subject sold. true consent between the parties.
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer Nemo dat quod non habet. But the seller only
the ownership and to deliver a determinate thing, 3. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a
needs to be the owner upon delivery, and not
and the other to pay therefor a price certain in contract of sale, except as it may indicate a defect
necessarily upon perfection of the contract of
money or its equivalent. in the consent, or that the parties really intended
sale.
a donation or some other act or contract. (Art
A contract of sale may be absolute or 2. A thing is determinate if at the time the contract 1470)
conditional. is entered into, the thing is capable of being made
4. If the price is simulated, the sale is VOID, but the
Essential Characteristics determinate without the necessity of a new or
act may be shown to have been in reality a
further agreement between the parties. (Art
a) Consensual; donation, or some other act or contract. (Art
1460)
1471)
b) Bilateral reciprocal; 3. Goods may be existing or future goods. Future
5. The fixing of the price can never be left to the
c) Onerous; goods are those still to be
discretion of one of the contracting parties.
d) Generally, commutative; a. Manufactured or printed; However, if the price fixed by one of the parties is
accepted by the other, the sale is perfected. (Art
e) Principal; b. Raised, or future agricultural products; 1473)
f) Nominate; c. Acquired by seller after perfection of 6. Where the price cannot be determined, the
contract, or after-acquired property; contract is inefficacious. However, if the thing or
g) Title and not Mode — A mode is the legal means
by which dominion or ownership is created, d. Things whose acquisition depends upon any part thereof has been delivered to and
transferred or destroyed, but title is only the legal a contingency that may or may not appropriated by the buyer he must pay a
basis by which to affect dominion or ownership. happen. (Art 1462) reasonable price therefor. (Art 1474)
Sale by itself does not transfer or affect 4. An undivided interest in a thing may be sold by Formation of the Contract of Sale
ownership; the most that sale does is to create the the sole owner which results in a co-ownership.
obligation to transfer ownership. It is tradition 1. Letter of Intent to Buy and Sell is just that—a
(Art 1463) manifestation of offeror’s intention to sell the
(delivery as a consequence of sale) that actually
transfers ownership. [San Lorenzo Dev. Corp. v. The full owner may sell the usufruct of his land, property and offeree’s intention to acquire the
CA] leaving the naked ownership to himself. same—which is neither a contract to sell nor a
 conditional contract of sale. [Muslim and Christian
Urban Poor Assn. v. BRYC-V Dev’t Corp.]
2. Option Contract. An option imposes no binding
obligation on the person holding the option aside
from the consideration for the offer. Until
accepted (exercised), it is not treated as a sale.
If the option is without any consideration, the
offeror may withdraw his offer by
communicating such withdrawal to the offeree at
any time before acceptance. If it is founded upon a
consideration, the offeror cannot withdraw his
offer before the lapse of the period agreed upon.
[Tuazon v. Del Rosario-Suarez 2010]
3. Right of First Refusal. A right of first refusal
cannot be the subject of specific performance, but
breach on the part of the promissor would allow a
recovery of damages.
Right of first refusal contained in a Contract of
Lease, when breached by promissor allows
enforcement by the promisee by way of
rescission of the sale entered into with the third
party, pursuant to Arts. 1381(3) and 1385. But
not against a purchaser for value and in good
faith.
A right of first refusal in a lease in favor of the
lessee cannot be availed of by the sublessee.
A right of first refusal simply means that should
lessor decide to sell the leased property during
the term of the lease, such sale should first be
offered to the lessee; and the series of negotiations
that transpire between lessor and lessee on the
basis of such preference is a compliance even when
no final purchase agreement is perfected between
the parties. The lessor was then at liberty to offer
the sale to a third party who paid a higher price,
and there is no violation of the right of the lessee.
Right of first refusal clause does not apply to this
situation where the owner ejects the tenant on
the ground that the former needs the premises
for residential purposes. [Estanislao v. Gudito
2013]
4. Policitacion is a unilateral promise to buy or to
sell which is not accepted. It produces no juridical
effect, and creates no legal bond. It is a mere offer,
and has not yet been converted into a contract.
5. Mutual Promises to Buy and Sell in Art 1479.
Mutual promises to buy and sell a certain thing
for a certain price gives parties a right to demand
from the other the fulfillment of the obligation;
even in this case the certainty of the price must
also exist, otherwise, there is no valid and
enforceable contract to sell.
A contract of sale is consummated only upon
delivery and payment, whereas in a bilateral
promise to buy and sell gives the contracting
parties rights in personam, such that each has the
right to demand from the other the fulfillment of
their respective undertakings. Cause of action
under a mutual promise to buy and sell is 10
years.
6. Sale by Auction. Owner’s terms and conditions
for the sale of property under auction are binding
on all bidders, whether or not they knew of them.
An auction sale is perfected by the fall of the
hammer or in other customary manner and it
does not matter that another was allowed to
match the bid of the highest bidder. [Province of
Cebu v. Heirs of Rufina Morales]
7. Earnest Money in Art 1482. Earnest money given
by the buyer shall be considered as part of the
price and as proof of the perfection of the
contract. It constitutes an advance payment to be
deducted from the total price.
In a potential sale transaction, prior payment of
earnest money even before the owner can agree
to sell his property is irregular, and cannot be
used to bind the owner to the obligations of a
seller under an otherwise perfected contract of
sale. Property owner/prospective seller may not
be legally obliged to enter into a sale with a
prospective buyer through the latter's
employment of questionable practices which
prevent the owner from freely giving his consent
to the transaction. [First Optima Realty Corp. v.
Securitron Security Services 2015]
Where parties merely exchanged offers and
counter-offers, there being no perfection of a
contract of sale yet, money given as deposit
cannot be considered earnest money since such
term applies only to a perfected sale. [Starbright
Sales Enterprises v. Philippine Realty Corp. 2012]
Application of Statute of Frauds
1. Sale of Real Property – Cannot be proven by
means of witnesses, but must necessarily be
evidenced by a written instrument, duly
subscribed by party charged, or by secondary
evidence of the contents of such document.
2. Agency to Sell or to Buy – As contrasted from
sale, agency to sell does not belong to any of the
categories of contracts covered by Arts. 1357 and
1358 and not one enumerated under the Statutes
of Frauds in Art. 1403. [Lim v. CA]
3. Rights of First Refusal – Are not covered since
Art. 1403(2)(e) presupposes the existence of a
perfected, albeit unwritten, contract of sale; a
right of first refusal, is not by any means a
perfected sale. [Rosencor Dev. Corp. v. Inquing]
4. Right to Repurchase – Deed and verbal
agreement allowing the right of repurchase
should be considered as an integral whole; the
deed of sale is itself the note or memorandum
evidencing the contract. [Mactan Cebu Int’l
Airport Authority v. CA]
5. Equitable Mortgage – Statute does not stand in
the way of treating an absolute deed as a
mortgage, when such was the parties’ intention,
although the agreement for redemption or
defeasance is proved by parol evidence.
Simulated Sales
1. Badges of Simulation
a. Non-payment of the stipulated
consideration, absence of any attempt by
the buyers to assert their alleged rights
over the subject property. [Villaflor v. CA]
b. Failure of alleged buyers to collect
rentals from alleged seller. [Santiago v.
CA]; but not when there appears a
legitimate lessor-lessee relationship
between the vendee and the vendor.
[Union Bank v. Ong]
 c. Although agreement did not provide for
absolute transfer ownership of the land
to buyer, that did not amount to
simulation, since delivery of TCT and
execution of deed of absolute sale were
expressly stipulated as suspensive
conditions, which gave rise to the
corresponding obligation on part of
buyer to pay the last installments.
[Villaflor v. CA, supra]
d. When signature on a deed of sale is a
forgery, [Fidel v. CA] but bare assertions
that the signature appearing on the
Deeds of Sale is not enough to allege
simulation, since forgery is not
presumed; it must be proven by clear,
positive and convincing evidence. [R.F.
Navarro & Co. v. Vailoces]
e. Simulation of contract and gross
inadequacy of price are distinct legal
concepts, with different effects – the
concept of a simulated sale is incompatible
with inadequacy of price. [Bravo-Guerrero
v. Bravo]
2. When Motive Nullifies the Sale – In sale,
consideration is, as a rule, different from the
motive of parties, and when the primary motive is
illegal, such as when the sale was executed over a
land to illegally frustrate a person's right to
inheritance and to avoid payment of estate tax,
the sale is void because illegal motive
predetermined purpose of the contract.
[Olegario v. CA]
Where the parties to a contract of sale agreed to a
consideration, but the amount reflected in the
final Deed of Sale was lower, their motivation
being to pay lower taxes on the transaction, the
contract of sale remains valid and enforceable
upon the terms of the real consideration.
Although illegal, the motives neither determine
nor take the place of the consideration. [Heirs of
Spouses Balite v. Lim]
2. Parties
1. Sales by and between Spouses. Under Art. 124 of
Family Code, sale by husband of a conjugal
property without the wife’s consent is VOID, not
merely voidable, since the resulting contract lacks
one of the essential elements of “full consent”.
[Guiang v. CA]
A wife affixing her signature to a Deed of Sale as a
witness is deemed to have given her consent.
[Pelayo v. Perez]
As an exception, husband may dispose of conjugal
property without wife’s consent if such sale is
necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities
mentioned in Articles 161 and 162. [Abalos v.
Macatangay, Jr.]
Sales between spouses who are not governed by
a complete separation of property regime are
VOID, not just voidable. [Medina v. Collector]
Since the spouses cannot validly sell property to
one another under Art. 1490, then policy
consideration and the dictates of morality require
that the prohibition should apply also to
common-law relationships. [Matabuena v.
Cervantes]
Sale by husband of conjugal land to his
concubine is VOID for being contrary to morals
and public policy and “subversive of the stability
of the family, a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects.” [Calimlim-
Canullas v. Fortun]
The in pari delicto doctrine would not apply to the
spouses-parties under Art. 1490, since only the
heirs and the creditors can question the sale’s
nullity [Modina v. CA]; nevertheless, when the
property is re-sold to a third-party buyer in good
faith and for value, reconveyance is no longer
available. [Cruz v. CA]
There are two instances under Art 1490 that
spouses can sell property to each other:
1) When a separation of property was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements;
or
2) When there has been a judicial
separation of property.
2. Relative Incapacity under Art 1491. Contracts
entered into in violation of Arts. 1491 and 1492
are not merely voidable, but are NULL AND VOID.
The relative prohibition applies to sales in legal
redemption, compromises and renunciations. (Art
1492)
3. Obligations of the vendor
a) To transfer ownership;
b) To deliver with fruits and accessories;
c) To warrant the object sold; (waivable since this
is not an essential element)
d) To preserve the thing from perfection to
delivery, otherwise he can be held liable for
damages.
4. Obligations of the vendee
1. Pay the Price (Art 1582)
When seller cannot show title to the subject
matter, then he cannot compel the buyer to pay
the price. [Heirs of Severina San Miguel v. CA]
Mere sending of a letter by the buyer expressing
the intention to pay without the accompanying
payment is not considered a valid tender of
payment and consignation of the amount due are
essential in order to extinguish the obligation to
pay and oblige the seller to convey title.
[Torcuator v. Bernabe]
When Buyer May Suspend the Payment of the
Price
a) If there is a well-grounded fear.
b) The fear is because of:
i) A vindicatory action or action to
recover, or
ii) A foreclosure of mortgage. (Art
1590)
2. Accept Delivery of the Subject Matter (Arts
1582-1585)
a. Buyer’s Right to Inspect Before
Acceptance (Arts 1481 and 1584[1]);
 Except: When Carrier Delivers under COD
Terms
b. When Buyer Refuses to Accept (Art
1588) — Since delivery of subject matter
is an obligation on the part of the seller,
the acceptance thereof by the buyer is
not a condition for the completeness
of delivery. [La Fuerza v. CA]
If the refusal is justified, the buyer has no
duty to return the goods to the seller;
mere notice to seller of the refusal will
suffice. The buyer may make himself a
voluntary depositary. (Art 1587)
c. When There is Acceptance (Art 1585)
i. Express acceptance;
ii. When buyer does an act which
only an owner can do;
iii. Failure to return after
reasonable lapse of time.
5. Transfer of ownership
ART 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.
ART 1478. The parties may stipulate that
ownership in the thing shall not pass to the
purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
Notes on Tradition Doctrines
1. Nemo Potest Nisi Quod De Jure Potest — “No
man can do anything except what he can do
lawfully.” — When the sale is void, even when
there is delivery, no valid title over the subject
matter can be conveyed to the buyer.
2. Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet — “No man can give
that which he does not have.” Even when the sale
is valid, if the seller had no ownership over the
subject matter at the time of delivery, no valid
title can pass in favor of the buyer.
A tax declaration by itself is not considered
conclusive evidence of ownership; it is merely an
indicium of a claim of ownership. [Daclag v.
Macahilig]; nevertheless, when at delivery there
is no proof that seller had ownership and
property’s tax declaration was in the name of
another person, then there was no transfer of
ownership by delivery. [Heirs of Severina San
2) Constructive or legal —
Miguel v. CA]
One can sell only what one owns or is authorized
to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than
what the seller can transfer legally. [Daclag v.
Macahilig]
A contract to sell, or a conditional contract of sale
where the suspensive condition has not
happened, even when found in a public
document, cannot be treated as constituting
constructive delivery, especially when from the
face of the instrument it is shown that the seller
“was not yet the owner of the property and
was only expecting to inherit it.” [Heirs of
Arturo Reyes v. Socco-Beltran]
Notes on Delivery
1. Delivery contemplates the absolute giving up of
the control and custody of the property on the
part of the vendor, and the assumption of the
same by the vendee.
Non nudis pactis sed traditione dominia rerum
transferantur. There is delivery if and when the
thing sold “is placed in the control and possession
of the vendee.”
3) Quasi-tradition — delivery of rights, credits, or
2. “Delivery” in sales refers to the concurrent
transfer of two things:
a. possession and
b. ownership.
If the vendee is placed in actual possession of the
property, but by agreement of the parties
ownership of the same is retained by the vendor
until the vendee has fully paid the price, the mere
transfer of the possession of the property subject
of the sale is not the “delivery” contemplated in
the Law on Sales or as used in Art 1543 of the
Civil Code. [Cebu Winland Dev. Corp. v. Ong Siao
Hua]
Customary Steps in Selling Immovables
Kinds of Delivery or Tradition
1) Actual or real — when the thing sold is placed in
the control and possession of the vendee. (Art
1497)
a) Legal formalities — execution of public
instrument is deemed delivery. (Art 1498
par 1);
Issuance of an acknowledgment receipt of
partial payment, when it is not a public
instrument does not convey title. [San
Lorenzo Dev. Corp. v. CA]
b) Tradition simbolica — delivery of the keys
of the place or depository where movable
property is stored or kept. (Art 1498 par 2);
c) Traditio longa manu — by the mere
consent or agreement of the contracting
parties, if the thing sold cannot be transferred
to the possession of the vendee at the time of
the sale. (Art 1499);
d) Traditio brevi manu — if the buyer already
had the possession of the object even before
the purchase. (Art 1499);
e) Traditio constitutum possessorium —
possession as owner changed to possession
as a lessee, for example.
incorporeal property, made by:
a) placing of the titles of ownership in the
possession of the vendee or
b) the use by the vendee of his rights, with the
vendor's consent. (Art 1501)
In the sale of shares of stock, delivery of a stock
certificate is one of the essential requisites for the
transfer of ownership of the stocks purchased.
Seller’s failure to deliver the stock certificates
representing the shares of stock amounted to a
substantial breach which gave rise to a right to
rescind the sale. [Raquel-Santos v. CA]
Customarily, in the absence of a contrary agreement, the
submission by an individual seller to the buyer of the
following papers would complete a sale of real estate:
1) owner’s duplicate copy of the Torrens title;
2) signed deed of absolute sale;
3) tax declaration; and
4) latest realty tax receipt.
Special Rules on Completeness of Delivery
1. In Case of Movables (Arts 1522 and 1537, 1480)
When the contract does not provide for the
measuring or weighing of a sold specific mass,
and the price agreed upon was not based on such
measurement, then the subject matter of the sale
is, therefore, a determinate object, the mass, and
not the actual number of units or tons contained
therein, so that all that is required of seller was to
deliver in good faith to his buyer all of those
found in the mass, notwithstanding that the
quantity delivered is less than the amount
estimated in the contract. [Gaite v. Fonacier]
a. Sale on Approval, Trial or Satisfaction (Art
1502)
In a “sale or return,” the ownership passes to
the buyer on delivery pursuant to a perfected
contract of sale; and the subsequent return of
the goods reverts ownership back to the
seller. In such case, tradition as a mode of
acquiring ownership must be in consequence
of a contract.
In a “sale on approval” (also called “sale on
acceptance, “sale on trial” or “sale on
satisfaction”), the delivery of the object does
not transfer ownership to the buyer since the
delivery was not for purposes of transferring
ownership, since the prestation to effect a
meeting of the minds to give rise to a valid
contract is incumbent on the buyer.
b. Sale by Description and/or Sample (Art
1481)
There is a sale by sample
a) when a small quantity is exhibited by
the seller as a fair specimen of the
bulk,
b) which is not present and there is no
opportunity to inspect or examine
the same; and
c) the parties treated the sample as the
standard of quality and
d) that they contracted with reference
to the sample
e) with the understanding that the
product to be delivered would
correspondent with the sample.
When the machine delivered is in accordance
with the description stated in the sales
contract, the buyer cannot refuse to pay the
balance of the purchase price and the cost of
installation if it proves that the machine
cannot be used satisfactorily for the purposes
for which he bought it when such purpose
was not made known to the seller.
6. Risk of loss
Loss of Object Before Sale
ART 1493. If at the time the contract of sale is
perfected, the thing which is the object of the
contract has been entirely lost, the contract
shall be without any effect.
But if the thing should have been lost in part
only, the vendee may choose between
a) Rescission — withdrawing from the
contract and
b) Specific Performance — demanding the
remaining part, paying its price in
proportion to the total sum agreed upon
Loss of Specific Goods
ART 1494. Where the parties purport a sale of
specific goods, and the goods without the
knowledge of the seller have perished in part or
have wholly or in a material part so deteriorated
in quality as to be substantially changed in
character, the buyer may at his option treat the
sale:
1) As avoided; or
2) As valid in all of the existing goods or in
so much thereof as have not
deteriorated, and as binding the buyer to
pay the agreed price for the goods in
which the ownership will pass, if the sale
was divisible.
Risk of Loss
ART 1504. Unless otherwise agreed, the goods
remain at the seller's risk until the ownership
therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the
ownership therein is transferred to the buyer the
goods are at the buyer's risk whether actual
delivery has been made or not, except that:
1) Where delivery of the goods has been
made to the buyer or to a bailee for the
buyer, in pursuance of the contract and
the ownership in the goods has been
retained by the seller merely to secure
performance by the buyer of his
obligations under the contract, the goods
are at the buyer's risk from the time of
such delivery;
2) Where actual delivery has been delayed
through the fault of either the buyer or
seller the goods are at the risk of the
party in fault.
7. Documents of title
1. What document of title includes
a. any bill of lading,
b. dock warrant,
c. "quedan," or
d. warehouse receipt or order for the
delivery of goods, or
e. any other document used in the ordinary
course of business in the sale or transfer
of goods, as proof of the possession or
control of the goods, or authorizing or
purporting to authorize the possessor of
 the document to transfer or receive,
either by indorsement or by delivery,
goods represented by such document.
(Art 1636)
2. Through a document of title, seller is allowed by
fiction of law to deal with the goods described
therein as though he had physically delivered
them to the buyer; and buyer may take the
document as though he had actually taken
possession and control over the goods described
therein.
3. Negotiable Document of Title — document is
negotiable if
a. The goods are deliverable to bearer; or
b. If the goods are deliverable to the order
of a certain person.
4. How Negotiated
a. Mere delivery;
i. If deliverable to bearer;
ii. If deliverable to the order of a
certain person and that person
has indorsed it in blank or
indorsed it to bearer.
b. Indorsement + Delivery.
5. Warranties in Negotiation or Transfer
a. That the document is genuine;
b. That he has a legal right to negotiate or
transfer it;
c. That he has knowledge of no fact which
would impair the validity or worth of the
document; and
d. That he has a right to transfer the title
to the goods and that the goods are
merchantable or fit for a particular
purpose, whenever such warranties
would have been implied if the contract
of the parties had been to transfer
without a document of title the goods
represented thereby. (Art 1516)
8. Warranties
1. Conditions. Failure to comply with condition
imposed upon perfection of the contract results in
failure of a contract, while the failure to comply
with a condition imposed on the performance of
an obligation only gives the other party the option
either to refuse to proceed with sale or waive the
condition. [Laforteza v. Machuca]
The condition in the contract of sale of buyer’s
assumption of the mortgage constituted on the
subject matter is deemed fulfilled when the seller
prevented its fulfillment by paying his outstanding
obligation to the bank and taking back the
certificates of title without even notifying the
buyer. [De Leon v. Ong 2010]
2. Express Warranty. A warranty is a statement or
representation made by the seller of goods,
contemporaneously and as part of the contract of
sale, having reference to the character, quality or
title of the goods, and by which he promises or
undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall
be as he then represents them. [Ang v. CA]
Breach of an express warranty makes seller liable
for damages. The following requisites essential
to establish an express warranty:
a. it must be an affirmation of fact or any
promise by the seller relating to the
subject matter of the sale;
b. natural tendency of such affirmation or
promise is to induce the buyer to
purchase the thing; and
c. buyer purchases the thing relying on
such affirmation or promise thereon.
[Carrascoso, Jr. v. CA]
3. Implied Warranties
a. That seller has the right to sell;
b. Against Eviction (Arts 1548 - 1560)
Seller must be summoned in the suit for
eviction at the instance of the buyer (Art
1558), and be made a co-defendant or a
third-party defendant (Art 1559)
A dacion en pago is governed by the law of
sales, and contracts of sale come with
warranties, either express or implied. The
implied warranty in case of eviction is
waivable and cannot be invoked if the buyer
knew of the risks or danger of eviction and
assumed its consequences. [Luzon Dev. Bank
v. Enriquez 2011]
No Warranty Against Eviction When
Execution Sale — In voluntary sales, vendor
can be expected to defend his title because of
his warranty to the vendees but no such
obligation is owed by the owner whose land
is sold at execution sale. [Santiago Land Dev.
Corp. v. CA]
However, under Art 1552, the judgment
debtor is also responsible for eviction in
judicial sales, unless it is otherwise decreed in
the judgment. Also in Art 1570, the judgment
debtor in judicial sales shall not be liable for
damages in view of the compulsory nature of
the sales.
The prescriptive period to file a breach
thereof is six (6) months after the delivery.
Mere notification not sufficient.
A breach of this warranty requires the
concurrence of the following circumstances:
1) The purchaser has been deprived of
the whole or part of the thing sold;
2) This eviction is by a final judgment;
3) The basis thereof is by virtue of a
right prior to the sale made by the
vendor; and
4) The vendor has been summoned and
made co-defendant in the suit for
eviction at the instance of the
vendee.
c. Against Non-Apparent Servitudes (Art
1560)
Remedy is rescission + damages if made
within one year from execution of deed.
 But if one year has already lapsed, remedy is
only for damages.
d. Against Hidden Defects (Arts 1561, 1566-
1580)
Requisites to recover because of Hidden
Defects:
1) Defect must:
a) be hidden;
b) exist at perfection of contract;
c) ordinarily have been excluded
from the contract; and
d) be important to render the thing
unfit or considerably decreases
fitness; and
2) Action must be instituted within the
statute of limitations.
Redhibitory Defect — a defect that renders a
thing useless or so diminishes its usefulness
or value that it must be presumed that the
buyer would not have bought it or would
have paid a lesser price if aware of the defect.
Remedies:
1) Withdrawal or rescission (accion
redhibitoria) + damages;
Prescriptive period generally 6
months from delivery except if
involving defects of animals, 40
days.
2) Proportionate reduction in the price
(accion quanti minoris) + damages.
4.
3) If due to the hidden defect the the
thing sold should be lost:
a) If seller aware — Return the
price + refund expenses of
contract + damages;
b) If not aware — same except for
damages.
e. As to Fitness or Quality of Goods (Arts 1562,
1565, 1599)
In order to enforce the implied warranty that
the goods are reasonably fit and suitable to
be used for the purpose which both parties
contemplated, the following must be
established:
1) that the buyer sustained injury
because of the product;
2) that the injury occurred because the
product was defective or
unreasonably unsafe; and finally
3) the defect existed when the product
left the hands of the petitioner.
Merchantable Quality — Fit for the general
purpose of a thing, and not necessarily the
particular purpose for which it has been
acquired.
f. Sale of Goods by Sample (Art 1565) — there
is a warranty of merchantability.
g. Additional Warranties for Consumer
Products in RA 7394
Warranties in Supply of Services. —
a) There is an implied warranty that the
service will be rendered with due
care and skill.
b) Where the consumer, expressly or by
implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for
which the services are required,
there is an implied warranty that the
services will be reasonably fit for
that purpose.
Effects and Prescription of Warranties (Art
1599) – A breach in the warranties of the seller
entitles the buyer to a proportionate reduction
of the purchase price. [PNB v. Mega Prime Realty
and Holding Corp.]
The prescriptive period for instituting actions
based on a breach of
a) express warranty is that specified in the
contract, and in the absence of such
period, the general rule on rescission of
contract, which is 4 years, while for
b) implied warranty, the prescriptive
period is 6 months from the date of the
delivery of the thing sold. [Ang v. CA]
9. Breach of contract
Remedies of Seller
1. If Buyer Refuses to Pay — maintain an action
against buyer for the price of the goods. (Art
1595)
2. If Buyer Refuses to Accept and Pay — action for
damages, measured as the estimated loss directly
and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of
events from the buyer's breach. (Art 1596)
3. When Seller May Totally Rescind — Where
a. the goods have not been delivered to the
buyer, and
b. the buyer
i. has repudiated the contract of
sale, or
ii. has manifested his inability to
perform his obligations
thereunder, or
iii. has committed a breach thereof.
(Art 1597)
Unpaid Seller of Goods (Arts 1524-1535)
1. A seller is unpaid
a. When the whole of the price has not been
paid or tendered;
b. When a bill of exchange or other
negotiable instrument has been received
as conditional payment, and the
condition on which it was received has
been broken by reason of the dishonor of
the instrument, the insolvency of the
buyer, or otherwise. (Art 1525)
2. Rights of an Unpaid Seller
a. Possessory lien, in the nature of a pledge
— while still in possession.
b. Right of stoppage in transitu — if seller
has parted with the possession;
 c. To Resale;
d. To Rescind the sale.
3. Possessory Lien.
a. Where the goods have been sold without
any stipulation as to credit;
b. Where the goods have been sold on
credit, but the term of credit has expired;
c. Where the buyer becomes insolvent.
5.
The seller may exercise his right of lien
notwithstanding that he is in possession of the
goods as agent or bailee for the buyer. (Art 1527)
The unpaid seller of goods loses his lien thereon:
1) When he delivers the goods to a carrier
or other bailee for the purpose of
transmission to the buyer without
reserving the ownership in the goods or
the right to the possession thereof;
2) When the buyer or his agent lawfully
obtains possession of the goods;
3) By waiver thereof. (Art 1529)
Although possessory lien may be lost, lien is still
maintained where the unpaid seller is considered
a preferred creditor with respect to the price of
the specific goods sold.
4. Right of Stoppage in Transitu. — available to the
unpaid seller if
a. He has parted with the possession of
goods; and
b. If the buyer is or becomes insolvent. (Art
1530 par 1)
How Exercised
6.
1) Obtaining actual possession;
2) Giving notice of the claim. — either to
a) The person in actual possession;
or
b) His principal.
The consequential effects are
Remedies of Buyer in case of Breach of Warranty
1) The goods are no longer in transitu;
2) The contract of carriage ends; the carrier
now becomes a bailee;
3) The carrier should not deliver anymore
to the buyer; otherwise, he will be liable
for damages;
4) The carrier must deliver to, or according
to the directions of, the seller.
Right of Resale.
a. Where the goods are of perishable
nature, or
b. where the seller expressly reserves the
right of resale in case the buyer should
make default, or
c. where the buyer has been in default in
the payment of the price for an
unreasonable time,
an unpaid seller having a right of lien or having
stopped the goods in transitu may resell the
goods.
He shall not thereafter be liable to the original
buyer upon the contract of sale or for any profit
made by such resale, but may recover from the
buyer damages for any loss occasioned by the
breach. (Art 1533)
Is notice of an intention to resell essential? NO. But
where the right to resell is not based on the
perishable nature of the goods or upon an express
provision of the contract of sale, the giving or
failure to give such notice shall be relevant in any
issue involving the question whether the buyer
had been in default for an unreasonable time
before the resale was made.
Right to Rescind. Applies in case there has been
a. Express stipulation or reservation;
b. Unreasonable default.
There must be notice to the buyer or there must
be an overt act showing an intention to rescind.
(Art 1534)
The buyer may, at his election:
1) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the
seller, the breach of warranty by way of
recoupment in diminution or extinction of the
price;
2) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an action
against the seller for damages for the breach of
warranty;
3) Refuse to accept the goods, and maintain an
action against the seller for damages for the
breach of warranty;
4) Rescind the contract of sale and refuse to
receive the goods or if the goods have already
been received, return them or offer to return
them to the seller and recover the price or any
part thereof which has been paid. (Art 1599)
Recto Law (Articles 1484 - 1486)
ART 1484. In a contract of sale of personal
property the price of which is payable in
installments, the vendor may exercise any of the
following remedies:
1) Specific Performance — Exact
fulfillment of the obligation, should the
vendee fail to pay;
2) Rescission — Cancel the sale, should the
vendee's failure to pay cover two or
more installments;
3) Foreclosure — Foreclose the chattel
mortgage on the thing sold, if one has
been constituted, should the vendee's
failure to pay cover two or more
installments.
In this case, he shall have no further action
against the purchaser to recover any unpaid
balance of the price. Any agreement to the
contrary shall be VOID.
1. Recto Law prevents mortgagee from seizing
mortgaged property, buying it at foreclosure sale
for a low price and then bringing the suit against
the mortgagor for a deficiency judgment. [Magna
Financial Services Group v. Colarina]
 2. When is there “Installment Sale”? At least two
(2) stipulated payments in the future, whether or
not there is a downpayment.
3. When rentals in a “lease” are meant to be
installment payments to an underlying sale
contract, despite the nomenclature given by the
parties, it is a sale by installments and governed
by Recto Law. [Filinvest Credit Corp. v. CA]
4. In a case, mortgagor-buyer never bought the
subject vehicle from the financing company but
from a third party, and merely sought financing
from the mortgagee for its full purchase price.
Consequently, Art 1484 does not apply against
financing company. [Equitable Savings Bank v.
Palces 2016]
5. Purported Lease with Option to Buy. Where a
lease agreement over equipment is without an
express option to purchase, but nevertheless
3.
when a final demand is given prior to suit, the
demand letter indicates clearly it was within the
option of the lessee to fully pay the balance of the
unpaid rentals and would be able to keep the
equipment, then the real contract between the
parties was a sale of movable on installment
disguised as a lease agreement. [PCI Leasing and
Finance v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging]
6. Generally, mutual restitution is required in case
of rescission. As a way of exception, a stipulation
that the installments or rents paid shall not be
returned to the vendee or lessee shall be valid
insofar as the same may not be unconscionable
under the circumstances. (Art 1486)
Maceda Law: Sales of Residential Realty on
Installments
1. Maceda Law recognizes in conditional sales of all
kinds of real estate seller’s right to cancel the
contract upon non-payment of an installment by
the buyer, which is simply an event that prevents
the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring binding force.
2. How Cancellation of Contract Can Be Effected.
The cancellation of the contract under the Maceda
Law must follow the following steps:
a. First, seller should extend the buyer a
grace period of at least 60 days from
the due date of the installments.
b. Second, at end of grace period, seller shall
furnish buyer with a notarial notice of
cancellation or demand for rescission,
effective 30 days from buyer’s receipt
thereof; a mere notice or letter, would
not suffice. [McLaughlin v. CA]
c. Third, for contracts covering more than
two years of payments, there must be a
return to the buyer of the cash
surrender value. [Villdara, Jr. v. Zabala]
d. Until and unless seller complies with
these mandatory requirements, contract
to sell remains valid and subsisting.
[Communities Cagayan v. Nanol 2012]
Important Features.
a. After having paid installment for at least
two (2) years, the buyer is entitled to a
mandatory grace period of one month
for every year of installment payments
made, to pay the unpaid installments
without interest.
If the contract is cancelled, the seller
shall refund to the buyer the cash
surrender value equivalent to 50% of
the total payments made, and after five
years of installments, an additional 5%
every year but not to exceed 90% of total
payment made. Thus, if installment paid
1) 2 – 5 years — 50%;
2) > 5 years — 50% + 5% for every
year.
3) But in no case shall exceed 90%.
b. In case the installments paid were less
than two years, the seller shall give the
buyer a grace period of not less than 60
days.
If the buyer fails to pay the installments
due at the expiration of the grace period,
the seller may cancel the contract after
30 days from receipt by the buyer of the
notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission by notarial act.
4. Formal letter demand upon buyer to vacate the
premises is not the same as the notice of
cancellation or demand for rescission by a
notarial act required by R.A. No. 6552.
[Pagtulunan v. Dela Cruz Vda. De Manzano]
5. The buyers cannot use the second sentence of
Section 4 of the Maceda Law against the sellers’
alleged failure to give an effective notice of
cancellation or demand for rescission because the
sellers merely sent the notice to the address
supplied by the buyers in the Contract to Sell. [Sps
Garcia v. CA 2010]
6. Under the Maceda Law, the right of the buyer to
refund accrues only when he has paid at least
two years of installments. [Manuel Uy & Sons v.
Valbueco, Inc. 2013]
10. Performance of contract
Sale Per Unit of Measure (Arts 1539 and 1540)
In a unit price sale, the statement of the area of
immovable is not conclusive and the price may be
reduced or increased depending on the area actually
delivered.
If the vendor delivers less than the area agreed upon,
the vendee may
a) oblige the vendor to deliver all that is stated
in the contract or
b) demand for the proportionate reduction of
the purchase price if delivery is not possible.
If the vendor delivers more than the area stated in the
contract, the vendee has the option
a) to accept only the amount agreed upon or
b) to accept the whole area, provided he pays
for the additional area at the contract rate.
[Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. CA]
Where parties agreed at a rate of a certain price per
unit of measure and not one for a lump sum, it is Art.
1539 and not Art. 1542 which is the applicable law—
buyer is entitled to the relief afforded to him under
 Article 1539, that is, either a proportional reduction
of the price or the rescission of the contract. [Cebu
Winland Dev. Corp. v. Ong Siao Hua]
EXC: A buyer of land, when sold in gross or with
the description “more or less” or similar
words in designating quantity, covers only a
reasonable excess of deficiency. In the case at
bar an area of “644 square meters more” is
not reasonable excess or deficiency, to be
deemed included in the deed of sale. [Roble v.
Arbasa]
EXC to EXC:
When buyer, who has been occupying the
land for two years as lessee, actually is
deemed to take risk on the actual size of the
property bought at lump sum. [Garcia v.
Velasco]
Sale for a Lump Sum
(“A cuerpo cierto or por precio alzado”) (Art 1542) –
In a sale of land in a mass, the specified boundaries
must control over any statement with respect to the
area contained within its boundaries. [Salinas v.
Faustino]
The actions arising from Arts 1539 and 1542 shall
prescribe in six (6) months, counted from the day
of delivery. (Art 1543)
Double Sales under Art 1544
ART 1544. If the same thing should have been sold
to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first
taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership
shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
Notes
1. Rules of Preference
a. Personal property — possessor in good
faith;
b. Real property —
i. Registrant in good faith;
ii. Possessor in good faith;
iii. Person with the oldest title in
good faith.
2. Requisites for Double Sale Rule to Apply
a. There Must Be Two Different Valid
Sales;
Applies even if one of the sales is an
auction sale. [Gopiao v. Metrobank 2014]
But not to contracts to sell.
b. Exact Same Subject Matter;
c. Exact Same Seller for Both Sales.
3. Registration in Good Faith. — The annotation of
adverse claim can qualify as the registration
mandated under the rules on double sale.
4. Possession in Good Faith in the Absence of
Registration.
a. possession mentioned in Art. 1544
includes not only material but also
symbolic possession;
b. possessors in good faith are those who
are not aware of any flaw in their title or
mode of acquisition;
c. buyers of real property that is in the
possession of persons other than the
seller must be wary – they must
investigate the rights of the possessors;
and
d. good faith is always presumed, upon
those who allege bad faith on the part of
possessors rests the burden of proof.
5. Purchaser in Good Faith Must Have Paid Price
in Full — A purchaser in good faith is one who
buys property without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such
property, and pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of claim or interest of some other
person in the property. [Locsin v. Hizon 2014]
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys with
the well-founded belief that the person from
whom he receives the property had title to it and
had the capacity to convey it. In this case, the
buyers bought. [Heirs of Soliva v. Soliva 2015; Bliss
Dev. Corp. v. Diaz 2015]
A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and
then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor. [Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco
2011]
6. Instances When There is No Good Faith
a. Being In Business on Realty — A mortgagee
who eventually ended buying the property at
the public auction, cannot claim to be a buyer
in good faith when his business in the
constructing and selling townhouses and
extending credit to the public, including real
estate loans; for he is charged with greater
diligence that ordinary buyers or
encumbrances for value. [Expresscredit
Financing Corp. v. Velasco]
A bank is expected to exercise due diligence
before entering into a mortgage contract, and
the ascertainment of the statute or condition
of a property offered to it as security for a
loan must be a standard and indispensable
part of operations; and it cannot simply rely
upon reviewing the title to the property
offered for mortgage. [Tio v. Abayata]
b. Close Relationship — The sale to one’s
daughter and sons will give rise to the
conclusion that the buyers, not being really
third parties, knew of the previous sales and
cannot be considered in good faith. [Pilapil v.
CA]
c. Gross Inadequacy of Price — Mere inadequacy
of price is not ipso facto a badge of lack of
good faith—to be so, the price must be
 grossly inadequate or shocking to the
conscience such that the mind revolts against
it and such that a reasonable man would
neither directly or indirectly be likely to
consent to it.
d. Obligation to Investigate or To Follow Leads
— A purchaser who is aware of facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard
cannot turn a blind eye and later claim that
he acted in good faith.
e. Land in Adverse Possession — Where land
sold is in the possession of a person other
than vendor, purchaser must go beyond the
certificate of title and make inquiries
concerning the actual possessor. Without
such inquiry, the buyer cannot be said to be
in good faith and cannot have any right over
the property. [Tio v. Abayata]
f. Existence of Lis Pendens or Adverse Claim —
Registration of an adverse claim places any
subsequent buyer of the registered land in
bad faith. [Kings Properties Corp. v. Galido]
However, when knowledge of lis pendens was
acquired at the time there was order to have
it cancelled [Po Lam v. CA], a buyer cannot be
in bad faith when it was shown that at the
time of purchase the notice of lis pendens
was already being ordered cancelled and the
cancellation of the notice terminated the
effects of such notice. [Pudadera v.
Magallanes 2010]
g. Annotation of Lien in Settlement of Estate —
An annotation on CTC issued pursuant to the
distribution and partition of a decedent’s real
properties is a warning to third persons on
the possible interest of excluded heirs or
unpaid creditors in these properties—where
a buyer purchases the real property despite
the annotation, he must be ready for the
possibility that the title be subject to the
rights of excluded parties. [Tan v. Benolirao]
h. Banks Are Vested with Public Interest and
Obligation to Exercise Extraordinary
Diligence — When financial institutions
exercise extraordinary diligence in
determining the validity of the certificates of
title to property being sold or mortgaged to
them and still fail to find any defect or
encumbrance upon the subject properties
after said inquiry, they should be protected
like any other innocent purchaser for
value if they paid a full and fair price at the
time of the purchase or before having notice
of some other person’s claim on or interest in
the property. [Ty v. Queen’s Row Subdivision,
607 SCRA 324 (2009)]
11. Extinguishment
Conventional Redemption
Notes
1. Conventional redemption shall take place
when the vendor reserves the right to
repurchase the thing sold. (Art 1601)
2. When a Pacto de Retro Sale Presumed an
Equitable Mortgage.
a. When the price of a sale with right to
repurchase is unusually inadequate;
b. When the vendor remains in
possession as lessee or otherwise;
c. When upon or after the expiration of the
right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or
granting a new period is executed;
d. When the purchaser retains for himself a
part of the purchase price;
e. When the vendor binds himself to pay
the taxes on the thing sold;
f. In any other case where it may be fairly
inferred that the real intention of the
parties is that the transaction shall
secure the payment of a debt or the
performance of any other obligation. (Art
1602)
3. Equitable Mortgage. — two requisites must
concur:
1) that the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a sale; and
2) the intention was to secure an existing
debt by way of mortgage.
Equitable mortgage favors the least transmission
of rights and interest over a property in
controversy, since the law seeks to prevent
circumvention of the law on usury and the
prohibition against pactum commissorium
provisions.
An equitable mortgage is a voidable contract. It
may be annulled within four (4) years from the
time the cause of action accrues. [Ayson, Jr. v.
Paragas]
Although Art 1605 which allows for the remedy
of reformation, nothing therein precludes an
aggrieved party from pursuing other remedies to
effectively protect his interest and recover his
property, such as an action for declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale and specific
performance.
4. Pactum Commissorium (Art 2088) — A
stipulation which enables the mortgagee to
acquire ownership of the mortgaged properties
without need of any foreclosure
proceedings—it is a nullity, [Lumayag v. Heirs of
Jacinto Nemeño]; and has been repeatedly
declared as contrary to morals and public policy,
[Solitarios v. Jaque 2014]
In a pactum commissorium there should be:
1) a property mortgaged by way of security
for the payment of the principal
obligation, and
2) a stipulation for automatic
appropriation by the creditor of the
thing mortgaged in case of non-payment
of the principal obligation within the
stipulated period.
That the questioned contracts were freely and
voluntarily executed by the parties is of no
moment, pactum commissorium being VOID for
being prohibited by law. [Ong v. Roban Lending
Corp.]
5. The right of redemption, in the absence of an
express agreement, shall last four years from the
date of the contract.
Should there be an agreement, the period cannot
exceed ten years.
However, the vendor may still exercise the right
to repurchase within thirty days from the time
final judgment was rendered in a civil action on
the basis that the contract was a true sale with
right to repurchase. (Art 1606)
Sellers in a sale judicially declared as pacto de
retro may not exercise the right to repurchase
within the 30-day period under Art 1606,
although they have taken the position that the
same was an equitable mortgage, if it is shown
that there was no honest belief thereof since none
of the circumstances under Art 1602 were shown
to exist.
If they truly believed the sale to be an equitable
mortgage, as a sign of good faith, they should have
consigned with the amount representing their
alleged loan, on or before the expiration of the
right to repurchase. [Abilla v. Gobonseng]
6. How Is Redemption Effected? (Art 1616)
In order to exercise the right to redeem, only
tender of payment is sufficient; consignation
is not required after tender is refused. When
tender is not possible, consignation should be
made.
A formal offer to redeem accompanied by a
tender of redemption price is not essential where
the right is exercised through a judicial action
within the redemption period and simultaneously
depositing the redemption price. [Lee Chuy Realty
Corp. v. CA]
7. Redemption Price (Art 1616)
A stipulation in a sale a retro requiring as part of
the redemption price interest for the cost of
money, is not in contravention with Art 1616,
since the provision is not restrictive nor exclusive,
and does not bar additional amounts that the
parties may agree upon, since the article itself
provides “and other stipulations which may have
been agreed upon.”
8. Fruits – Article 1617 on the disposition of fruits
of property redeemed applies only when the
parties failed to provide a sharing arrangement
thereof; otherwise, the parties contractual
stipulations prevail. [Almeda v. Daluro]
9. Effect When No Redemption Made (Art 1607) —
Consolidation
If the vendee succeeds in proving that the
b.
transaction was indeed a pacto de retro, the
vendor is still given a period of thirty days from
the finality of the judgment within which to
repurchase the property.
Once vendor fails to redeem the property within
the stipulated period, irrevocable title shall be
vested in the vendee by operation of law. [Vda.
de Rigonan v. Derecho]
Under a sale a retro, failure of buyer to
consolidate his title under Art 1607 does not
impair such title and ownership because the
method prescribed thereunder is merely for the
purpose of registering and consolidating titles to
the property. [Cadungog v. Yap]
Legal Redemption
Notes
1. Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege
created by law partly for reasons of public policy
and partly for the benefit and convenience of the
redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what
might be a disagreeable or an inconvenient
association into which he has been thrust.
It is intended to minimize co-ownership. (Art
1619)
2. Under the Civil Code
a. Among Co-Heirs (Art 1088)
When heirs have partitioned the estate among
themselves and each have occupied and treated
definite portions thereof as their own, co-
ownership has ceased even though the property
is still under one title, and sale by one of the heirs
of his definite portion cannot trigger the right of
redemption in favor of the other heirs. [Vda. De
Ape v. CA]
Heirs who actually participated in the execution
of the extrajudicial settlement, which included the
sale to a third person of their pro indiviso shares
in the property, are bound by the same; while the
co-heirs who did not participate are given the
right to redeem their shares pursuant to Art
1088. [Cua v. Vargas]
Among Co-Owners (Art 1620)
When seller a retro dies, right to redeem cannot
be exercised by a co-heir alone, since the right
belonged in common to all the heirs. [De Guzman
v. CA]
The right of redemption may be exercised by a co-
owner only when part of the community property
is sold to a stranger, not when sold to another
co-owner because a new participant is not added
to the co-ownership. [Fernandez v. Tarun]
For the right of redemption to be exercised, co-
ownership must exist at the time the conveyance
is made by a co-owner and the redemption is
demanded by the other co-owner or co-owners.
[Avila v. Barabat]
Redemption by co-owner redounds to the benefit
of all co-owners; and 30-day redemption
period, begins from written notice served by seller
to the party entitled to exercise such redemption
right, [Guillen v. CA]
The requisites for the exercise of legal
redemption are as follows:
1) there must be co-ownership;
2) one of the co-owners sold his right to a
stranger;
3) the sale was made before the partition
of the co-owned property;
4) the right of redemption must be
exercised by one or more co-owners
within a period of thirty days to be
counted from the time he or they were
 notified in writing by the co-owner
vendor; and
5) the vendee must be reimbursed the price
of the sale. [Calma v. Santos]
c. Among Adjoining Owners (Arts 1621 and
1622)
Right of redemption covers only “resale” and does
not cover exchanges or barter of properties [De
d.
Santos v. City of Manila]
When there is no issue that adjoining lands
involved are both rural lands, right to redeem
can be exercised and the only exception is when
the buyer cannot show that he did not own any
other rural land. [Primary Structures Corp. v.
Valencia]
a) Rural Land — The owners of adjoining lands
shall also have the right of redemption when
a piece of rural land, the area of which does
not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless
the grantee does not own any rural land.
If two or more adjoining owners desire to
exercise the right of redemption at the same
time,
1) the owner of the adjoining land of
smaller area shall be preferred; and
2) should both lands have the same
area, the one who first requested
the redemption. (Art 1621)
b) Urban Land — Whenever a piece of urban
3. When Period of Legal Redemption Begins (Art
land which is
1623)
1) so small and
2) so situated that a major portion
thereof cannot be used for any
practical purpose within a final and executory court decision, does not begin
reasonable time,
3) having been bought merely for
speculation,
4) is about to be re-sold,
the owner of any adjoining land has a right of
pre-emption at a reasonable price.
If the resale has been perfected, the owner of
the adjoining land shall have a right of
redemption, also at a reasonable price.
When two or more owners of adjoining lands
wish to exercise the right of pre-emption or
redemption, the owner whose intended use
of the land in question appears best
justified shall be preferred.
Sale of Credit in Litigation (Art 1634) — 30
Days from Notice of Demand to Pay.
For debtor to be entitled to extinguish his credit
by reimbursing the assignee under Art 1634, the
following requisites must concur:
a) there must be a credit or other incorporeal
right;
b) the credit or other incorporeal right must be
in litigation;
c) credit or other incorporeal right must be sold
to an assignee pending litigation;
d) assignee must have demanded payment from
the debtor;
e) debtor must reimburse the assignee for the
price paid, judicial costs incurred and interest
on the price from the day on which the same
was paid; and
f) reimbursement must be done within 30 days
from the date of the assignee’s demand. [Situs
Dev. Corp. v. Asiatrust Bank 2012]
The 30-day period for the commencement of the
right to exercise the legal redemption right, even
when such right has been recognized to exist in a
from the entry of judgment, but from the written
notice served by the seller to the party entitled
to exercise such redemption right. [Guillen v. CA]
Interpretation of Art 1623 where there is a need
for notice in writing, should always tilt in favor of
redemptioner and against buyer, since the
purpose is to reduce the number of participants
until the community is terminated. [Hermoso v.
CA]
Written notice of sale is mandatory,
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-
owner, in order to remove all uncertainties about
the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its
efficacy and status. [Verdad v. CA]
Notice required under Art 1623 is deemed to
have been complied with when other co-owner
has signed Deed of Extrajudicial Partition which
embodies the disposition of part of the property
owned in common. [Fernandez v. Tarun]
Francisco v. Boiser, summarized the case-law on
Art. 1623, and with definitiveness declared:
1. For the 30-day redemption period to
begin to run, notice must be given by
seller;
2. When notice is given by the proper party
(seller), no particular form of written
notice is prescribed under Art 1623, so
that the furnishing of the copies of the
deeds of sale to the co-owner would be
sufficient.
3. Affirmed ruling in Alonzo v. IAC, that
filing of suit for ejectment or collection
of rentals against a co-owner actually
dispenses with the written notice, and
commences running of period to exercise
the right of redemption, since filing of the
suit amounted to actual knowledge of the
sale.
Rare Exceptions — When sale to the buyer was
effected through the co-owner acting as broker,
and never indicated that he would exercise his
right to redeem. [Distrito v. CA]
When buyers took possession of the property
immediately after the execution of the deed of
sale in their favor and lived in the midst of the
other co-owners who never questioned the same.
[Pilapil v. CA]

B. TRUSTS
1. Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of
property, the legal title to which is vested in
another.
It is a fiduciary relationship concerning property
which obliges the person
2. Trusts are either express or implied.
a. Express trusts are created by the intention
of the trustor or of the parties.
b. Implied trusts come into being by operation
of law. (Art 1441) There are two kinds:
i. Resulting trust — There is an intent
to create a trust but it is not effective
as an express trust.
ii. Constructive trust — No intention
to create a trust is present. i.e.
If property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining
it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the
property comes. (Art 1456)
3. Instances of Implied Trust
a. When property is sold, and the legal estate is
granted to one party but the price is paid by
another for the purpose of having the
beneficial interest of the property. (Art 1448)
[Resulting Trust]
However, if the person to whom the title is
conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate,
of the one paying the price of the sale, no
trust is implied by law, it being disputably
presumed that there is a gift in favor of the
child.
b. When a donation is made to a person but it
appears that although the legal estate is
transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is
either to have no beneficial interest or only a
part thereof. (Art 1449) [Resulting Trust]
c. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or
paid by one person for the benefit of another
and the conveyance is made to the lender or
payor to secure the payment of the debt. (Art
1450) [Constructive Trust]
d. When land passes by succession to any
person and he causes the legal title to be put
in the name of another. (Art 1451) [Resulting
Trust]
e. If two or more persons agree to purchase
property and by common consent the legal
title is taken in the name of one of them for
the benefit of all. (Art 1452) [Resulting Trust]
f. When property is conveyed to a person in
reliance upon his declared intention to hold it
for, or transfer it to another or the grantor.
(Art 1453) [Resulting Trust]
g. If an absolute conveyance of property is
made in order to secure the performance of
an obligation of the grantor toward the
grantee. (Art 1454) [Constructive Trust]
h. When any trustee, guardian or other person
holding a fiduciary relationship uses trust
funds for the purchase of property and causes
the conveyance to be made to him or to a
third person. (Art 1455) [Constructive Trust]
i. If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud. (Art 1456) [Constructive Trust]
4. How Trust be Proven
a. No express trusts concerning an immovable
or any interest therein may be proved by
parol evidence. (Art 1443)
b. An implied trust may be proved by oral
evidence. (Art 1457)
5. Prescription of Trusts
a. Express trusts are IMPRESCRIPTIBLE unless
there has been repudiation of the trust.
The same rule applies for Resulting
trusts.
b. Constructive trusts do prescribe.
C. AGENCY
General Provisions
1. Definition; Parties in an Agency Relationship
Under Article 1868, a contract of agency is one
whereby “a person binds himself to render some
service or to do something in representation or on
behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the
latter.”
2. Objective. Its aim is to extend the personality of the
principal or the party for whom another acts and from
whom he or she derives the authority to act.
[Westmont Investment Corp. v. Francis, Jr. 2011]
3. Elements of the Contract of Agency
a) Consent, express or implied, of the parties to
establish the relationship;
b) Object, which is the execution of juridical acts
in relation to third parties;
c) Agent acts as a representative and not for
himself; and
d) Agent acts within the scope of his authority.
4. Subject Matter — Service – Execution of Juridical
Acts in Behalf of Principal and Within the Scope of
Authority
No contract of agency exists where a common carrier
leases the trucks of another carrier, for there is no
power of representation by one with respect to the
other and neither was there any authority to
represent the other by the terms of the arrangements.
[Loadmasters Customs Services v. Glodel Brokerage
Corp. 2011)]
5. Essential Characteristics of Agency
a. Nominate and Principal
Acts done by one person in behalf of another who
authorized such acts is the essential nature one of
agency—it will be an agency whether or not
parties understood the exact nature of the
relation. interments spaces, it covers an agency
arrangement.
b. Unilateral and Primarily Onerous (Art 1875)
 Agency is presumed to be for compensation;
when agent performs services for principal at
latter’s request, principal’s intent to compensate
the agent will be inferred from the principal's
request for the agent’s service. [Urban Bank v.
Peña 2011]
c. Consensual (Arts 1869 and 1870)
Such a relationship can only be effected with the
consent of the principal, which must not, in any
way, be compelled by law or by any court.
An agency may be expressed or implied from
the principal’s act, from his silence or lack of
action, or failure to repudiate the agency.
[Litonjua, Jr. v. Eternit Corp]
d. Personal, Representative and Derivative (Art
1868)
The authority of the agent emanates from the
powers granted to him by his principal; his act is
the act of the principal if done within the scope of
the authority. Consequently, agency is
extinguished by the death of the principal or
agent. [Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corp.]
Basis for agency is representation, and therefore
every person dealing with an agent is put upon
inquiry and must discover upon his peril the
authority of the agent. [Safic Alcan & Cie. v.
Imperial Vegetable Oil Co., Inc.]
Consequently:
Art. 1897 reinforces the doctrine that an agent is
not personally liable to the party with whom he
contracts; it is the principal who is liable on the
contracts of the agent. [Eurotech Industrial
Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon]
When an agent purchases the property in bad
faith, the principal is deemed a purchaser in bad
faith. [Caram, Jr. v. Laureta]
Under the principle that knowledge of agent is
knowledge by principal, spouses cannot
contend lack of knowledge of the rules upon
which they received their tickets from the airline
company since their travel agent, who handled
their travel arrangements, was duly informed by
the airline representatives. [Air France v. CA]
e. Fiduciary and Revocable
The relations of an agent to his principal are
fiduciary and in regard to the property forming
the subject matter thereof, he is estopped from
acquiring or asserting a title adverse to that of the
principal.
Agency is generally revocable as it is a personal
contract of representation based on trust and
confidence reposed by the principal on his agent.
[Republic v. Evangelista]
f. Agency Is a “Preparatory Contract.”
6. Doctrine of “Efficient Procuring Cause” — In
agencies to sell where the entitlement of the
commission is subject to the successful
consummation of the sale with the buyer located by
the agent, said agent would still be entitled to the
commission on sales consummated after the
expiration of his agency when the facts show that the
agent was the “efficient procuring cause in bringing
about the sale”. [Pratts v. CA]
7. Agency Distinguished from Agricultural Tenancy.
There is no agency relationship existing in a tenancy
arrangement over agricultural land. [Jusayan v.
Sombilla 2015]
8. How Agency May be Constituted (Art 1869)
a. From Side of the Principal (Art 1869)
Where the principal has acquiesced in the act of
his agent for a long period of time, and has
received and appropriated to his own use the
benefits resulting from the acts of his agent,
9. Kinds of Agency
courts cannot declare the acts of the agent null
and void.
b. From Side of the Agent (Arts 1870, 1871 and
1872)
Whether or not an agency has been created is
determined by the fact that one is representing
and acting for another. The law makes no
presumption of agency; proving its existence,
nature and extent is incumbent upon the person
alleging it. [Urban Bank v. Peña 2011]
c. From Side of Third Parties (Arts 1873, 1408,
1921, 1922)
i. Agency Is Not Presumed to Exist
Persons dealing with an agent must ascertain
not only the fact of agency, but also the
nature and extent of the agent’s authority. A
third person with whom the agent wishes to
contract on behalf of the principal may
require the presentation of the power of
attorney, or the instructions as regards the
agency. According to Article 1990, insofar as
third persons are concerned, an act is
deemed to have been performed within the
scope of the agent’s authority, if such is
within the terms of the power of attorney, as
written. [Salvador v. Rabaja 2015]
ii. Agency by Estoppel With Respect to Third
Parties
When the law firm has allowed for quite a
period the messenger of another office to
receive mails and correspondence on their
behalf, an implied agency had been duly
constituted, specially when there is no
showing that counsel had objected to such
practice or took steps to put a stop to it.
[Equitable PCI-Bank v. Ku]
An agency by estoppel, which is similar to
the doctrine of apparent authority,
requires proof of reliance upon the
representations, and that, in turn, needs
proof that the representations predated the
action taken in reliance. [Country Bankers
Insurance v. Keppel Cebu 2012]
a. Based on Business or Transactions
Encompassed (Art 1876): General or Universal
vs Special or Particular
i. Universal agent is authorized to do all acts
for his principal which can lawfully be
delegated to an agent; such an agent may be
said to have universal authority.
ii. General agent is authorized to do all acts
pertaining to a business of a certain kind or at
a particular place, or all acts pertaining to a
business of a particular class or series.
 iii. Special agent is authorized to do some
particular act or to act upon some particular
occasion; he acts usually in accordance with
specific instructions or under limitations
necessarily implied from the nature of the act
to be done.
b. Whether It Covers Legal Matters: Attorney-at-
Law vs Attorney-in-Fact
An attorney cannot, without a client’s
authorization, settle the action or subject matter
of the litigation, even when he believes that such
a settlement will best serve his client’s interest.
[Phil. Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. FASGI Enterprises,
Inc.]
10. General Powers of Attorney (Art 1877)
Agency couched in general terms comprises only acts
of administration, even if the principal should state
that he withholds no power or that the agent may
execute such acts as he may consider appropriate, or
even though the agency should authorize a general
and unlimited management. [Yoshizaki v. Joy Training
Center of Aurora, Inc. 2013]
“Acts of Administration” means to perform acts
which the principal himself may pursue in the
ordinary course of the business, thus:
a. When agent has been given general control and
management of the business, he is deemed to
have power to employ such agents and employees
as are usual and necessary in the conduct of the
business, and needs no SPA for such purpose.
b. A co-owner who is made an attorney-in-fact, with
the same power and authority to deal with the
property which the principal might or could have
had if personally present, may retain the services
of legal counsel to preserve the ownership and
possession of the principal’s property.
c. Power of administration does not include
dispositions or encumbrances which are acts of
strict ownership. [Sps Aggabao v. Parulan Jr.
2010]
11. Special Powers of Attorney
Although the document is entitled “Special Power of
Attorney,” its wordings show that it sought only to
establish an agency that comprises all the business of
the principal within the designated locality, but
couched in general terms, and consequently was
limited only to acts of administration. [Dominion
Insurance Corp. v. CA]
Even when the instrument's title is “General Power of
Attorney,” but its operative clause contains an
authority to sell, it constituted the requisite SPA to
sell a piece of land. Thus, there was no need to
execute a separate and special power of attorney.
[Veloso v. CA]
12. Cases Where SPA Necessary (Art 1878)
As long as the mandate is express, such authority may
be either oral or written. [Patrimonio v. Gutierrez
2014]
a. With Respect to Matters Involved in Litigation
Involving the Principal
a) To Compromise;
b) To Submit Questions to Arbitration;
c) To Renounce the Right to Appeal from a
Judgment;
d) To Waive Objections to the Venue of an
Action;
e) To Abandon a Prescription Already
Acquired.
Power to Compromise Excludes Power to Submit to
Arbitration; Vice Versa (Art 1880)
b. With Respect to Money or Funds of the
Principal
a) To Make Payments that “Are Not Usually
Considered as Acts of Administration”
The payment of claims by the area manager
of an insurance company is not an act of
administration. Thus, the amounts paid by
the area manager to settle such claims cannot
be reimbursed from the principal insurance
company. [Dominion Insurance Corp. v. CA]
b) To Collect or Receive Payments on Behalf
of the Principal
A salesman with authority to collect money
for his principal does not have the implied
authority to indorse checks received in
payment. [Insular Drug v. PNB]
c) To Loan or Borrow Money
EXC: Agent may borrow money when it is
urgent and indispensable for the
preservation of the things which are
under administration. [Yasuma v.
Heirs of Cecilio S. De Villa]
Entrusting by the principal of blank pre-
signed checks to the agent does not give the
agent the implied authority to enter into a
loan in the name of the principal. [Patrimonio
v. Gutierrez]
c. With Respect to Obligations Due to/From the
Principal
a) To Effect Novations Which Put an End to
Obligations Already in Existence at the Time
the Agency Was Constituted;
b) To Waive Any Obligation Gratuitously;
c) To Ratify or Recognize Obligations
Contracted Before the Agency.
d. With Respect to Immovable Properties
a) To enter into any contract by which
ownership of an immovable is transmitted or
acquired, gratuitously or for a valuable
consideration.
b) Sale of a Piece of Land or Interest Therein
(Art 1874)
The compromise agreement is void for the
power to sell by way of compromise could
not be implied to protect the interests of the
principal to secure possession of the
properties. [Cosmic Lumber v. CA]
Any sale of real property by one purporting
to be the agent of the registered owner
without any authority therefore in writing
from the said owner is null and void.
[Litonjua v. Fernandez]
 However, we apply the estoppel principle to
enforce the sale with respect to the principal.
[Pahud v. CA]
As a general rule, an agency may be oral;
however, Art 1874 provides that the contract
of agency must be written for the validity of
the sale of a piece of land or any interest
therein; otherwise, the sale shall be void. Art
1878 states that SPAs are necessary to
convey real rights over immovable
properties. [Yoshizaki v. Joy Training Center of
Aurora, Inc. 2013]
c) Agents Cannot Buy Property of Principal
Unless Authorized (Art 1491[2])
d) Power to Sell Excludes Power to Mortgage,
Vice Versa (Art 1879)
e) To Lease Real Property for More Than One
Year
Such is considered not merely an act of
administration but an act of strict dominion
or of ownership. [Shopper’s Paradise Realty v.
Roque]
e. With Respect to Specific Contracts “Deemed
Personal” to the Principal
a) To Accept or Repudiate an Inheritance;
b) To Make Gifts;
c) To Bind the Principal to Render Some
Service Without Compensation;
d) To Bind the Principal in a Contract of
Partnership;
e) To Obligate the Principal as a Guarantor
or Surety.
A power of attorney authorizing agent to bind
principal to a surety bond to a particular
entity, cannot be relied upon as sufficient
authority to a surety bond issued to other
persons or entity. [Country Bankers Insurance
v. Keppel Cebu 2012]
f. Any Other Act of Strict Dominion
13. Doctrine of Implied Powers Emanating from
Express Powers
Specific grants of “Powers of Dominion” necessarily
includes those implied powers or those necessary to
fulfill those powers of ownership granted, thus:
a. Empowering the agent to sell hemp in a foreign
country, carries with it implied power to make
and enter into the usual and customary contract
for its sale, which may provide for settlement of
issues by arbitration. [Robinson Fleming v. Cruz]
b. An SPA to make an assignment of credits, hire
lawyers to take charge of actions necessary or
expedient for principal’s interests, and defend
suits brought against principal, necessarily
implies authority to pay for professional services.
[Municipal Council of Iloilo v. Evangelista]
c. SPA to sell “for such price or amount” is broad
enough to cover exchange in the Deed of
Assignment between the properties and the
corresponding corporate shares in a corporation,
with the latter replacing the cash equivalent of
the option money initially agreed to be paid by
the corporation under the MOA. [Hernandez-
Nievera v. Hernandez 2011]
14. Express Power of Attorney Excludes Powers of
Administration (e.g., General Power of Attorney)
Being SPAs, they must be strictly construed. [Pineda
v. CA]
Powers and Duties of the Agent
1. General Obligation of Agent Who Accepts the
Agency
Agent is bound to carry agency to its completion for
the benefit of principal (Art 1884); otherwise, the
agent will be liable for damages which the principal
may suffer due to non-performance.
Agent who withdraws from the agency (Art 1929)
must continue to act until principal takes necessary
steps to meet the situation.
In the event of death of principal (Art 1919[3]), agent
must finish business already begun should delay
entail any danger – even if the principal's death
extinguishes the agency.
2. Obligation of Agent Who Declines Agency Who Has
Custody of Goods
Agent must observe due diligence in the custody and
preservation of the goods until new agent appointed
(Art 1885).
3. Duty of Obedience
a. Agent Must Act “In the Name of the Principal,
Within the Scope of His Authority” (Art 1881)
i. Act deemed to have been performed within
the scope of agent’s authority, if such act is
within the terms of the written power of
attorney, even if in fact the agent exceeded
the limits of the authority according to the
private understanding with the principal. (Art
1900)
ii. Authority of agent shall not be deemed
exceeded if performed in a manner more
advantageous to principal. (Art 1882)
b. Primary Obligation of Agent Is to Carry Out
Agency in Accordance with Principal’s
Instructions (Art 1887)
If agent followed instructions, principal cannot
set-up agent’s ignorance or circumstance which
principal was/ought to have been aware of. (Art
1899)
c. Effects of Acts Done Within the Scope of
Agent’s Authority:
Valid, and Principal Is the One Liable; Agent Is
Not Personally Liable (Art 1881)
Under Art 1881, when agent acts within the scope
of authority, principal is bound by acts effected in
his behalf, whether or not third person dealing
with the agent believes that the agent has actual
authority. [Sargasso Const. & Dev. Corp. v. PPA
2010]
The legal impact of Art 1881 is that the agent is
granted the right “to affect the legal relations of
his principal by the performance of acts
effectuated in accordance with the principal's
manifestation of consent.” [Pacific Rehouse Corp.
v. EIB Securities, Inc. 2010]
d. Effects When Agent’s Act Beyond the Scope of
His Authority:
 Unenforceable, Not Void; Unless Principal
Ratifies (Arts 1317, 1403 and 1898)
When third person knows that the agent was
acting beyond his power or authority, the
principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the
agent. He is not entitled to recover damages from
the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure
the principal’s ratification.
Even when an attorney-at-law in forging a
compromise agreement, had exceeded his
authority in inserting a penalty clause, same is
not void but merely unenforceable. Client’s failure
to question the inclusion of the penalty clause
despite several opportunities was tantamount to
ratification. [Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.]
e. Effects When Agent Acts in His Own Name (Art
1883):
5. Duty of Loyalty
➔ Principal has no right against third person
contracting with agent;
➔ Agent is directly bound to third person as if
the transaction were his own;
EXC: When contract involves things
belonging to principal.
Agent is directly bound in favor of the person
with whom he has contracted, as if the
transaction were his own, except when the
contract involves things belonging to the
principal. [Marimperio Cia. Naviera, S.A. v. CA]
If the principal can be obliged to perform his
duties under the contract, then it can also demand
the enforcement of its rights arising from the
contract. [NFA v. IAC]
4. Duty of Diligence
a) Agent Must Exercise Due Diligence in the
Pursuit of the Principal’s Business;
b) Agent Should Not Act If It Would Manifestly
Result in Damage to Principal; (Art 1888)
c) Agent Also Liable Personally (with the
Principal) for Fraud and Negligence
Committed in Pursuit of the Principal’s Affairs
(Arts 1884 and 1909)
What Shall Aggravate or Mitigate Liability
Arising Out of Negligence — Whether Agency
Was for a Compensation or Was Gratuitous
Where holder of an exclusive and irrevocable power
of attorney to make collections, failed to collect the
sums due to principal and thereby allowed the
allotted funds to be exhausted by other creditors, such
agent has failed to act with the care of a good father of
a family required under Art 1887 and became
personally liable for the damages which the principal
may suffer through his non-performance. [PNB v.
Manila Surety]
Well-settled is the rule that an agent is also
responsible for any negligence in the performance of
its function (Art 1909) and is liable for the damages
which the principal may suffer by reason of its
negligent act. (Art 1884) [British Airways v. CA]
a. Agent Shall Be Liable for Damages Sustained
by the Principal Where in Case of Conflict-of-
Interests Situations, He Should Prefer His Own
Interest (Art 1889)
b. Agent Is Prohibited from Buying Property
Entrusted to Him for Administration or Sale
Without Principal’s Consent (Art 1491[2]).
When an agent is involved in the perpetration of
fraud upon his principal for his extrinsic benefit,
he is not really acting for the principal but is
really acting for himself, entirely outside the
scope of his agency. [Cosmic Lumber v. CA]
c. Agent Obliged to Render an Accounting to the
Principal of All Matters Relating Agency (Art
1891)
An agent can assert, as against his own principal,
an independent, autonomous, right to retain
money or goods received in consequence of the
agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse
him for advances he has made, and indemnify him
for damages suffered without his fault. [Chua-
Burce v. CA] Consequently:
i. An insurance agent is guilty of estafa for
failing to deliver sums of money paid to him
as agent for the account of his employer.
ii. A travelling sales agent who misappropriated
or failed to return to his principal the
proceeds of the things or goods he was
commissioned or authorized to sell, is liable
for estafa.
iii. Whereas, a bank teller or cash custodian,
being merely an employee of the bank, cannot
be held liable for estafa, but rather for theft.
Chua-Burce v. CA, infra.
Submission by administrator of four letter
reports during the entire 18 years that he was
administering the property can hardly be
considered as sufficient to keep the principal
informed and updated of the condition and status
of the latter’s properties. [Sazon v. Vasquez-
Menancio 2012]
d. Rule If Agent Is Empowered to Borrow/Lend
Money (Art 1890)
i. If Empowered to Borrow Money, He May Be
the Lender at Current Interest Rates;
ii. If Empowered to Lend Money, He Cannot
Borrow Without Principal’s Consent.
e. Agent Is Liable to the Principal For Interests
(Art 1896)
i. On Sums He Applied to His Own Use (from
the Time He Used Them)
ii. On Sums Owing the Principal (from the Time
Agency Is Extinguished)
6. Agent Has No Obligation to Advance Funds (Art
1886)
It is principal’s obligation to advance the funds, but
principal to pay interest on advances made by agent
from day advances made. (Art 1912)
EXC:
1) If Stipulated in the Agency Agreement;
2) Principal Is Insolvent; Insolvency
Extinguishes the Agency (Art 1919[3])
7. Power of Agent to Appoint a Sub-Agent (Art 1892)
 a. GR: Agent must act himself, but may appoint a
not-prohibited substitute. Agent is responsible
for acts of substitute when:
i. Agent was not expressly given the power to
appoint a substitute;
ii. Agent was given the power, but without
designating the person and the substitute
was notoriously incompetent or was
insolvent.
The appointment of a sub-agent and delivery of
the jewelry, in the absence of a prohibition, does
not amount to conversion or misappropriation as
to constitute estafa; but the agent remains civilly
liable for the value of the jewelry to the principal.
[Serona v. CA]
b. All Acts of Substitute Appointed Against
Principal’s Prohibition Are VOID as to the
Principal.
Where the SPA to sell a piece of land contains a
prohibition to appoint a substitute, but agent
appoints a substitute who executes the deed of
sale in name of the principal, while the agent may
have acted outside the scope of his authority, that
did not make the sale void, but merely
unenforceable under the second paragraph of
Art 1317. Acceptance of the proceeds thereof are
tantamount to ratification thereof. [Escueta v.
Lim]
8. Liability When Two Or More Agents Appointed by
the Same Principal: Responsibility of Agents NOT
Solidary (Art 1894)
EXC: Where Two or More Agents Agree to Be
Solidarily Bound (Art 1895)
Compare: Two Principals with Common Agent –
Principals Solidarily Liable (Art 1915).
9. Rule on Liability Rules to Third Parties: Agent Not
Bound to Third Parties; It Is the Principal Who Is
Bound by the Contracts Entered Into By the Agent
(Art 1897)
A resident agent, as a representative of the foreign
insurance company, is tasked only to receive legal
processes on behalf of its principal and not to answer
personally for the any insurance claims. [Smith Bell v.
CA]
Where buyer effects payment of part of purchase
price to one of seller’s creditors pursuant to the terms
of the deed of sale, there is no subrogation that takes
place, as the buyer then merely acts as an agent of
seller effecting payment that was due to the seller in
favor of a third-party creditor. [Chemphil Export v. CA]
Agents who have been authorized to sell parcels of
land cannot claim personal damages in the nature of
unrealized commission where the buyer refuses to
proceed with the sale. [Uy v. CA]
A person acting as a mere representative of another
acquires no rights whatsoever, nor does he incur any
liabilities arising from the said contract between his
principal and another party. [Angeles v. PNR]
a. Except When Agent Expressly Binds Himself
(Art 1897)
But the doctrine is not applicable vice–versa,
since everything agreed upon by the principal to
be binding on himself is not legally binding
personally on the agent. Thus, when the previous
agent of the union bound itself personally liable
on the contracts of the union, the new agent is not
bound by the assumption undertaken by the
original agent. [Benguet v. BCI Employees]
b. Except When Agent Exceeds Authority
Without Giving Notice of Limited Powers (Art
1897) – Only the Agent Is Liable, Principal Is
Not Liable Unless He Ratifies.
Where an agent defies the instructions of its
principal in New York not to proceed with the
sale due to non-availability of carriage, it has
acted without authority or against its principal’s
instructions and holds itself personally liable for
the contract it entered into with the local
company. [National Power v. NAMARCO]
c. Except When Agent Acts with Fraud or
Negligence: Solidarily Bound with Principal
Every principal is subject to liability for loss
caused to another by the latter’s reliance upon a
deceitful representation by an agent in the course
of his employment
1) if the representation is authorized;
2) if it is within the implied authority of the
agent to make for the principal; or
3) if it is apparently authorized, regardless
of whether the agent was authorized by
him or not to make the representation.
[Pahud v. CA]
d. Agent Is Criminally Liable for Crime
Committed in the Pursuit of the Agency
The Law on Agency has no application in criminal
cases, and no man can escape punishment when
he participates in the commission of a crime upon
the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any
party. [People v. Chowdhury]
10. Obligation Rules for Commission Agents: Sales on
Consignment Arrangements
a. Commission Agent Responsible for Goods
Received According to Terms and Conditions
and as Described in Consignment (Art 1903)
EXC: When Has Made Written Statement of
Damage/ Deterioration (Art 1903)
In sale on consignment, as a form of agency,
consignee-agent is relieved from his liability to
return the goods received from the consignor-
principal when it is shown by preponderance of
evidence that the goods were taken from the
custody of the consignee by robbery, and no
separate conviction of robbery is necessary to
avail of the exempting provisions under Art 1174
for force majeure. [Austria v. CA]
b. Agent Handling Various Goods for Different
Owners (Art 1904): He Must Distinguish Them by
Countermarks If Goods of Same Kind and Mark
c. Commission Agent Cannot Sell on Credit
Without Principal’s Consent (Art 1905)
Otherwise: Considered as Cash Sales.
Under Art 1905, without the express or implied
consent of principal, commission agent cannot
sell on credit; should it do so principal may
demand from him payment in cash. [Green Valley
v. IAC]
 d. When With Principal’s Authority to Sell on
Credit (Art 1906)
i. Inform the Principal with Statement of
Buyer’s Names;
ii. Effect of Non-Compliance – Considered Cash
Sale.
e. Effect When Agent Receives Guaranty or Del
Credere Commissions (Art 1907)
i. He Shall Bear the Risk of Collection;
ii. He Shall Pay Principal the Proceeds on Same
Terms Agreed with Purchaser.
f. Liability for Failure to Collect Principal’s
Credit When Due (Art 1908)
i. Liability for Damages;
ii. Unless Due Diligence Proven.
Obligations of the Principal
1. Obligations of Principal With Third Parties with
Whom the Agent Contracts
a. The Principal Is Bound By the Contracts
Entered Into by the Agent:
Where authorized agent failed to indicate in the
mortgage that she was acting for and on behalf of
her principal; and the REM explicitly shows on its
face that it was signed by agent in her own name
and in her own personal capacity. Thus,
consistent with the law on agency, the principal
cannot be bound by the acts of the agent. The
third-party bank has no one to blame but itself.
[Bucton v. Rural Bank of El Salvador, Inc. 2014]
b. Agent’s Written Power of Attorney, Insofar as
Concerns Third Persons, Governs on
Questions Whether Agent Acted Within Scope
of Authority Even if it Exceeds Authority
According to Understanding Between
Principal and Agent (Art 1900)
As far as third persons are concerned, an act is
deemed to have been performed within the scope
of the agent’s authority, if such is within the terms
of the power of attorney, as written, even if the
agent has in fact exceeded the limits of his
authority according to an understanding between
the principal and his agent. [Eugenio v. CA]
Consequently:
i. Spouses Rabaja required her presentation of
the power of attorney before they transacted
with her principal. And when Gonzales
presented the SPA to Spouses Rabaja, the
latter had no reason not to rely on it.
[Salvador v. Rabaja 2015]
ii. Any arrangement, term or condition outside
of those provided in the form do not bind the
principal, since the same were made
obviously outside the agent’s authority.
[Manila Memorial Park Cemetery v.
Linsangan]
iii. Where a bank accepted a letter of guarantee
signed by a mere credit administrator on
behalf of the finance company, the burden
was on the bank to satisfactorily prove that
the credit administrator with whom they
transacted acted within the authority given to
him by his principal. [BA Finance v. CA]
iv. When one knowingly deals with the sales
representative of a car dealer company, it is
incumbent upon such person to know the
extent of the sales representative’s authority
as an agent in respect of contracts to sell the
vehicles. [Toyota Shaw, Inc. v. CA]
v. Mere representation or declaration of one
that he is authorized to act on behalf of
another cannot of itself serve as proof of his
authority to act as agent or of the extent of
his authority as agent. [Yu Eng Cho v. PANAM]
vi. A person who deliberately ignores a
significant fact that could create suspicion in
an otherwise reasonable person is not an
innocent purchaser for value. [Bank of
Commerce v. San Pablo, Jr.]
vii. Undue haste in granting the loan without
inquiring into the ownership of the subject
properties being mortgaged, as well as the
authority of the supposed agent to constitute
the mortgages on behalf of the owners, bank
accepting the mortgage cannot be deemed a
mortgagee in good faith. [San Pedro v. Ong]
c. Principal Not Bound to Contracts Entered Into
By Agent Outside of His Authority (Arts 1898
and 1910)
i. When Principal Ratifies, Expressly or
Impliedly (Art 1901)
For ratification to take place, it is required
that the principal must have full knowledge
at the time of ratification of all the material
facts and circumstances relating to the
unauthorized act of the person who assumed
to act as agent.
Nevertheless, this principle does not apply if
the principal’s ignorance of the material facts
and circumstances was willful, or that the
principal chooses to act in ignorance of
the facts. [Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc. v. Linsangan]
Even when the agent exceeds his authority,
the principal is still solidarily liable together
with the agent if the principal allowed the
agent to act as though the agent had full
powers. [Filipinas Life Assurance Co. v.
Pedroso]
Under Arts 1898 and 1910, agent’s act done
beyond the scope of authority may bind
principal if he ratifies them, whether
expressly or tacitly. Only the principal, and
not the agent, can ratify the unauthorized
acts, which the principal must have
knowledge of. [Country Bankers Insurance v.
Keppel Cebu 2012]
ii. Third Person Cannot Set-up Facts of Agent’s
Exceeding Authority Where Principal
Ratified or Signified Willingness to Ratify
Agent’s Acts (Art 1901)
In an expropriation proceeding, the State
cannot raise the alleged lack of authority of
the counsel of the owner to bind his client in
a compromise agreement because such lack
of authority may be questioned only by
the principal or client. [Commissioner of
Public Highways v. San Diego]
 iii. Where Agent Acts in Excess of Authority,
But the Principal Allowed Agent to Act as
Though Agent Had Full Powers (Art 1911)
Doctrine of Apparent Authority
Where bank, by its acts and failure to act, has
clearly clothed its manager with apparent
authority to sell a piece of land in the normal
course of business, it is legally obliged to confirm
the transaction by issuing a board resolution to
enable the buyers to register the property in their
names. [Rural Bank of Milaor v. Ocfemia]
The doctrine of apparent authority focuses on
two factors:
1. first the principal’s manifestations of the
existence of agency which need not be
expressed, but may be general and
implied; and
2. second, is the reliance of third persons
upon the conduct of the principal or
agent.
Under the doctrine, the question in every case is
whether the principal has by his voluntary act
placed the agent in such a situation that a person
of ordinary prudence, conversant with business
usages and the nature of the particular business, is
justified in presuming that such agent has
authority to perform the particular act in question.
[Professional Services, Inc. v. CA]
Easily discernible from the foregoing is that
apparent authority is determined only by the
acts of the principal and not by the acts of the
agent. The principal is, therefore, not responsible
where the agent’s own conduct and statements
have created the apparent authority. [Sargasso
Const. & Dev. Corp. v. PPA 2010]
There is no basis to apply the doctrine where
there is no evidence showing manner by which
the supposed principal has “clothed” or “held out”
its branch manager as having the power to enter
into an agreement, as claimed by petitioners.
[Banate v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank
2010]
Agency by Estoppel
By opening a branch office with the appointment
of its branch manager and honoring several
surety bonds issued in its behalf, insurance
company induced the public to believe that its
branch manager had authority to issue such
bonds. Insurance company was estopped from
pleading against a regular customer thereof, that
the branch manager had no authority. [Central
Surety & Insurance Co. v. C.N. Hodges]
Even when an agent of real estate company acts
unlawfully and outside the scope of authority, the
principal can be held liable when by its own act it
accepts without protest the proceeds of the sale
of the agents. In such case the liabilities of both
the principal and the agent is solidary. [Manila
Remnants v. CA]
For one to successfully claim the benefit of
estoppel on the ground that he has been misled
by the representations of another, he must show
that he was not misled through his own want of
reasonable care and circumspection. [Country
Bankers Insurance v. Keppel Cebu 2012]
2. Rights of Persons Who Contracted for Same Thing,
One With Principal and the Other With Agent (Art
1916)
i. That of Prior Date Is Preferred;
ii. If a Double Sale Situation – Art. 1544 Governs.
3. Liability of Principal to Third Persons for Acts of
the Agent’s Employees
That the employee of the airline company’s agent has
committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline
company liable—there is no vinculum juris between
the airline company and its agent's employees.
Article 2180 does not make the principal vicariously
liable for the tort committed by its agent’s employees
and the principal-agency relationship per se does not
make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the
need to prove the principal’s own fault or
negligence. [Sps Viloria v. Continental Airlines, Inc.
2012]
cf: As far as the dealer was concerned with regard to
the terms of the dealership contract, acts of Villaruz
and his employees are also acts of Petron. [Petron
Corp. v. Sps Jovero 2012]
4. Obligations of the Principal Within the Agency
Arrangement
a. Obligation to Pay Agent’s Compensation (Art
1875)
b. Obligation to Advance Sums Requested for
Execution of Agency (Art 1912)
i. Agent has right to reimbursement for
expenses advanced including interest from
the day it was advanced.
Compare: Where Agent Consents and Is
Bound to Advance the Sums as Stipulated
(Art 1886)
ii. Where principal not liable to agent for
expenses incurred (Art 1918)
c. Obligation to Indemnify Agent for Damages
Sustained in Pursuing Agency (Art 1913)
Compare: Liability for Damages for Non-
Performance of Agency (Art. 1884)
d. Agent’s Right To Retain Object as Pledge for
Advances and Damages (Art 1914)
i. Agent bound to deliver to principal
everything received, even if not due the
principal (Art 1891).
ii. Thing pledged may be sold only after demand
of amount due (Art 2122):
5. Two or More Principals Appoint Agent for Common
Transactions (Art 1915)
a. Obligation of the Principals Is Solidary
Because of Their Common Interest;
b. Any of the Principal May Validly Revoke
Agent’s Authority (Art 1925)
When the law expressly provides for solidarity of
the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in
a contract of agency, each obligor may be
compelled to pay the entire obligation. [De Castro
v. CA]
Extinguishment Damages are generally not awarded to the agent c. Unjustified Removal of a Managing Partner —
for the revocation of the agency, and the case at Revocation Needs the Vote of Controlling
1. How and When Agency Extinguished (Art 1919) bar is not one falling under the exception Partners (Art 1800)
a. By Principal’s Revocation (Express or Implied) mentioned, which is to evade the payment of
5. Effects of Revocation on Third Parties
of the Agency; the agent’s commission. [CMS Logging v. CA]
a. Agency Created With Reference to Specified
b. By Agent’s Withdrawal from the Agency; c. General Power of Attorney Is Revoked by a
Third Parties, Revocation Affects Such Third
Special One Granted to Another Agent, As
c. By Death, Civil Interdiction, Insanity or Parties Only When So Notified (Art 1921)
Regards the Special Matter Involved in the
Insolvency of the Principal or the Agent; Latter (Art 1926) b. Revocation of Agent’s General Powers
Effective Against Third Persons (Art 1922)
d. By Dissolution of the Juridical Entity Which 4. Cases of Irrevocable Agencies (Art 1927): “Agency
Entrusted or Accepted the Agency; Coupled with Interest” i. Refers to agency created to deal with the
general public;
e. By the Accomplishment of the Object or Purpose a. When a Bilateral Contract Depends Upon the
of the Agency; Continued Existence of the Agency ii. Revocation will not prejudice third persons
who deal with the agent in good faith and
f. By the Expiration of the Period for Which An exception to the revocability of a contract of without knowledge of revocation;
Agency Was Constituted. agency is when it is coupled with interest, i.e., if a
bilateral contract depends upon the agency. iii. However, notice of revocation in a newspaper
2. Express Revocation: The Principal May Revoke an
[Republic v. Evangelista] of general circulation is sufficient warning;
“Agency at Will”
b. When It Is the Means of Fulfilling an 6. Right of Agent to Withdraw from Agency (Art 1928)
a. In which case, principal may compel agent to
return the document evidencing the agency (Art Obligation Already Contracted a. By giving due notice to principal;
1920). Unlike simple SPAs, an agency coupled with b. Agent to indemnify principal should he suffer any
b. In case of multiple principals, any of the interest cannot be revoked at will, since it had damage;
principals can revoke the authority of their been created for the mutual interest of the agent
and the principal. [Sevilla v. CA] Unless, withdrawal is due to impossibility of
common agent, without the consent of the others
continuing agency without grave detriment to
(Art 1925). There may be cases in which if the authority is agent.
3. Implied Revocation withdrawn, the agent will be exposed to personal
loss or liability. [Valenzuela v. CA] c. Even if agent withdraws from the agency for a
a. Appointment of New Agent for Same valid reason, he must continue to act until the
Business/ Transaction (Art 1923) NASUTRA/SRA executed promissory notes in principal has had reasonable opportunity to take
favor of PNB every time it availed of the credit necessary steps to meet the situation (Art 1929)
i. Impliedly Revoked as to Agent Only; line. The agency established is one coupled with
interest which cannot be revoked at will by any of 7. Death of the Principal Extinguishes the Agency
ii. As to Third Persons, Notice to Them
the parties. [National Sugar Trading v. PNB] (Arts 1919[3], 1931)
Necessary (Art 1922)
Although the revocation was done in bad faith, a. When the Agency Continues Despite Death of
b. Principal Directly Manages Business
respondents did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, Principal (Art 1930):
Entrusted to Agent (Art 1924)
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. They i. If It Was Constituted for Common Interest of
Even if purported agent is considered to have revoked the SPA because they were not satisfied Principal and Agent; or
been constituted as an agent to sell the fire truck, with the amount of the loan approved. Thus,
such agency would have been deemed revoked petitioners are not entitled to exemplary ii. In Favor of Third Person Who Accepted
upon resumption of direct negotiations damages. [Ching v. Bantolo 2012] Stipulation in His Favor.
between seller-principal and the municipality,
Indeed, even an agency coupled with interest The death of the principal-debtor did not
the purported agent having in the meantime
may indeed be revoked on the ground of fraud extinguish the power of the Bank to sell the
abandoned all efforts to secure the deal in the
committed by the agent, which is really an act of property at a public sale; the power to foreclose is
seller’s behalf. [Guardex v. NLRC]
rescission, the same must be proven. [Bacaling v. not an ordinary agency that contemplates
Muya] exclusively the representation of the principal by
 the agent but is primarily an authority conferred
upon the mortgagee for the latter’s own
protection. [Perez v. PNB]
b. Acts Done by Agent Without Knowledge of
Principal’s Death (Art 1931) — Acts Are Valid
Provided:
i. Agent Does Not Know of Death or Other
Cause of Extinguishment of Agency;
ii. Third Persons Must Also Be in Good Faith
(Not Aware of Death or Other Cause).
8. Death of the Agent Extinguishes the Agency (Art
1932): Obligation of Agent’s Heirs in Case of
Agent’s Death:
i. Notify Principal;
ii. Adopt Measures as Circumstances Demand in
Principal’s Interest.
D. COMPROMISE
ART 2028. A compromise is a contract whereby
the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.
ART 2030. Every civil action or proceeding shall
be suspended:
1) If willingness to discuss a possible
compromise is expressed by one or both
parties; or
2) If it appears that one of the parties,
before the commencement of the action
or proceeding, offered to discuss a
possible compromise but the other party
refused the offer.
xxxx
Generally No Compromise on Criminal Aspect
ART 2034. There may be a compromise upon the
civil liability arising from an offense; but such
compromise shall not extinguish the public action
for the imposition of the legal penalty.
1. In some crimes, however, such as in crimes
against chastity and violations of the NIRC,
compromise may be entered into but must be
made PRIOR to the filing of information in court.
Compromise Prohibited
ART 2035. No compromise upon the following
questions shall be valid:
1) The civil status of persons;
2) The validity of a marriage or a legal
separation;
3) Any ground for legal separation;
4) Future support;
5) The jurisdiction of courts;
6) Future legitime.
Res Judicata Effect of Compromise
ART 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the
effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall
be no execution except in compliance with a
judicial compromise.
Effect of Discovery of Documents
ART 2039. When the parties compromise
generally on ALL differences which they might
have with each other, the discovery of documents
referring to one or more but not to all of the
questions settled shall not itself be a cause for
annulment or rescission of the compromise,
unless said documents have been concealed by one
of the parties.
But the compromise may be annulled or
rescinded if it refers only to ONE thing to which
one of the parties has no right, as shown by the
newly-discovered documents.
Compromise Entered Into in Ignorance of a Final
Judgment
ART 2040. If after a litigation has been decided by
a FINAL judgment, a compromise should be
agreed upon, either or both parties being
unaware of the existence of the final judgment,
the compromise may be rescinded.
Ignorance of a judgment which may be revoked
or set aside is not a valid ground for attacking a
compromise.
Effect if Compromise Agreement Not Fulfilled
ART 2041. If one of the parties fails or refuses to
abide by the compromise, the other party may
either
a) enforce the compromise or
b) regard it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand.
1. There is no need for a judicial rescission.
2. A party to a compromise cannot ask for rescission
after it has enjoyed its benefits.
E. LOAN
1. Loan
By the contract of LOAN, one of the parties delivers
to another a non-consumable or consumable thing
upon the condition that it be returned or that the
same amount of the same kind and quality be paid.
Kinds of Loan
A. Commodatum — where one of the parties
(bailor) delivers to another (bailee) something
not consumable so that the latter may use the
same for a certain time and thereafter returns it.
B. Mutuum — where money or other consumable
thing is delivered by the lender to the borrower
subject to the condition that the same amount of
the same kind and quality shall be paid.
Characteristics
1) Real — perfected upon delivery and not by mere
consent.
2) Unilateral — the borrower has the obligation to
return either the same thing or its equivalent.
Distinctions
As to Commodatum Mutuum
 c) Gratuitous — if any compensation is payable for
Subject Non-consumable, must Money or consumable,Thus, the loan contract was perfected when petitioners
use of thing, it ceases to be commodatum.
matter be returned the equivalent is toreceived
be the P1 million loan, which was the object of
returned both the promissory note and the real estate mortgage d) Personal — consequently
executed by petitioners in favor of the bank.
i) Death of either party extinguishes the
Nature Essentially gratuitous May be onerous, as
when interest is agreed contract;
2. Commodatum
upon Commodatum is essentially gratuitous ii) Bailee can neither lend nor lease the
object of the contract to a third person.
Purpose For use or temporary For consumption A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If
possession the breeding fee be considered a compensation, However, the members of the bailee's
then the contract would be a LEASE of the bull. household may make use of the thing
Property Any Only personal (Republic v. Bagtas) loaned, unless

Risk of loss Bailor retains Kinds

Ownership transmitted 1) there is a stipulation to the
ownership to bailee contrary, or
1) Ordinary — the bailor can not just demand the
return of the thing at will because there is a 2) the nature of the thing forbids
Time of Returnable before end Not returnable until end such use.
payment of period in case of of period period agreed upon.
urgent need 2) Precarium — bailor may demand return of thing Obligations of the Bailee (Arts 1941-1945)
loaned at will under the following conditions: 1) To pay for the ordinary expenses for the use and
Character of Purely personal Not personal preservation of the thing loaned.
contract a) If neither the duration of the contract nor
the use to which the thing loaned should 2) Liable for the loss of the thing, even if it should be
As to Loan Deposit be devoted, has been stipulated; or through a fortuitous event:
b) If the use of the thing is merely tolerated a) If he devotes the thing to any purpose different
Purpose Use of thing Safekeeping; generally,
by the owner. from that for which it has been loaned;
depositary cannot use
the thing Pactum de commodando (Art 1934) b) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated,
An accepted promise to deliver something by way of or after the accomplishment of the use for which
Time of Generally, at the end of Can demand return at the commodatum has been constituted;
payment period any time commodatum or simple loan is binding upon parties,
but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be c) If the thing loaned has been delivered with
Compensation Compensation of Not applicable to thingsperfected until the delivery of the object of the appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulation
credits applicable deposited contract. exempting the bailee from responsibility in case
Requisites of a fortuitous event;
Juridical One of lender and One of depositor and
relations borrower; creditor and depositary a) Capacity; d) If he lends or leases the thing to a third person,
debtor who is not a member of his household;
b) Object;
e) If, being able to save either the thing borrowed or
Sps Palada v. Solidbank 2011 c) Consideration;
his own thing, he chose to save the latter.
Under Article 1934 of the Civil Code, a loan contract is d) Form.
i. The bailee does not answer for the deterioration of
perfected only upon the delivery of the object of the Characteristics the thing loaned due only to the use thereof and
contract.
a) Real — perfected upon delivery of thing by the without his fault.
In this case, although petitioners applied for a P3 million bailor to the bailee. ii. The bailee cannot retain the thing loaned on the
loan, only the amount of P1 million was approved by the ground that the bailor owes him something, even
b) Principal — its existence does not depend upon
bank because petitioners became collaterally deficient. though it may be by reason of expenses. However, the
another contract.
 bailee has a right of retention for damages due to b) Claim of the lender — Lender has urgent need of
As to Mutuum Barter
hidden defects. the thing loaned, in which case, he may demand
iii. When there are two or more bailees to whom a thing its Subject Money or other fungible Non-fungible thin
is loaned in the same contract, they are liable i) Return, or matter things
solidarily. ii) Temporary use — commodatum is
Nature May be onerous Always onerous
Effect of failure to return suspended.
Catholic Vicar v. CA (1988) c) Destruction of the thing Effect There is transfer of In effect a mutual
d) Death of parties ownership, but no sale
➔ The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of
commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse e) Ingratitude of the borrower Return of Same thing after No return after m
possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee
i) If the bailee should commit some thing expiration of period. exchange
held in trust the property subject matter of
offenses against the person, honor or
commodatum.
property of the bailor or of his wife or
De los Santos v. Jarra (1910) children under his parental authority. Mutuum vs Lease
➔ The carabaos delivered to be used not being returned ii) If the bailee imputes any criminal As to Mutuum Lease
by the defendant upon demand, there is no doubt that offense, or any act involving moral
she is under obligation to indemnify the owner turpitude, even though he should prove Ownership Transferred to No transfer, only
thereof by paying him their value. it, unless the crime or the act has been borrower temporary
Obligations of the Bailor (Arts 1946 - 1952) committed against the bailee himself, his relinquishment o
wife or children under his authority; and possession to less
a) To pay extraordinary expenses of
preservation. iii) If the bailee unduly reuses the bailor
Nature Unilateral Bilateral
support when the bailee is legally or
If the extraordinary expenses arise on the
morally bound to do so. Subject Consumable Non-consumable
occasion of the actual use of the thing by the
bailee, even though he acted without fault, they 3. Simple loan Matter
shall be borne equally by both the bailor and the Mutuum vs Commodatum
bailee, unless there is a stipulation to the Juridical Lender and Borrower Lessor and Lessee
Chee Kiong Yam v. Malik (1979) relations
contrary.
➔ It can be readily noted that in simple loan (mutuum),
b) To answer for damages to the borrower
as contrasted to commodatum, the borrower acquires Mutuum vs Agency
The bailor who, ownership of the money, goods or personal property Liwanag v. CA (1997)
1) knowing the flaws of the thing loaned, borrowed.
➔ Liwanag could not dispose of the money as she
2) does not advise the bailee of the same, Producers Bank v. CA pleased because it was only delivered to her for a
shall be liable to the latter for the damages which ➔ Thus, if consumable goods are loaned only for single purpose, namely, for the purchase of cigarettes,
he may suffer by reason thereof. purposes of exhibition, or when the intention of the and if this was not possible then to return the money
i) The bailor cannot evade liability by parties is to lend consumable goods and to have the to Rosales. Since in this case there was no transfer of
abandonment of the thing. very same goods returned at the end of the period ownership of the money delivered, Liwanag is liable
agreed upon, the loan is a commodatum and not a for conversion under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Termination mutuum. Penal Code.
a) Expiration of time or use stipulated Mutuum vs Barter Kinds of Mutuum
1) Gratuitous;
 2) Onerous — with interest.
Requisites
1) Consent of parties;
2) Object certain; and
3) Cause of the obligation
4) Delivery - for perfection.
Accepted promise to deliver something by way of
simple loan
Saura v. DBP (1972)
➔ There was undoubtedly an offer and acceptance in
this case: the application of Saura, Inc. for a loan of
P500K was approved by resolution of the defendant,
and the corresponding mortgage was executed and
registered.
Obligation of the Borrower
a) To return the thing or amount borrowed
Equitable PCI v. Ng Sheung Ngor (2007)
➔ For extraordinary inflation (or deflation) to affect an
obligation, the following requisites must be proven:
1. that there was an official declaration of
extraordinary inflation or deflation from the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP);
2. that the obligation was contractual in nature; and
3. that the parties expressly agreed to consider the
effects of the extraordinary inflation or deflation.
i) If not money
1) The debtor owes another thing of the same
kind, quantity and quality, even if it should
change in value.
2) In case it is impossible to deliver the same
kind, its value at the time of the perfection of
the loan shall be paid.
b) To pay interest
Requisites
Pan Pacific Service v. Equitable PCI (2010)
➔ Payment of monetary interest is allowed only if:
1) there was an express stipulation for the
payment of interest; and
2) the agreement for the payment of interest was
reduced in writing.
➔ We agree with petitioners' interpretation that in case
of default, the consent of the respondent is not needed
in order to impose interest at the current bank
lending rate.
4. Interests on loan
Stipulation for legal interest but higher rate is charged
Espiritu v. Landrito (2007)
The omission of the Spouses Espiritu in specifying in
the contract the interest rate which was actually
imposed, in contravention of the law, manifested bad
faith.
The debt due is to be considered without the
stipulation of the excessive interest. A legal interest of
12% per annum will be added in place of the
excessive interest formerly imposed.
Liability for contractual/monetary interest after
maturity of note
Jardenil v. Solas (1942)
➔ Defendant has clearly agreed to pay interest only up
to the date of maturity. As the contract is silent as to
whether after that date, in the event of non-payment,
the debtor would continue to pay interest, we cannot,
in law, indulge in any presumption as to such interest.
Effect if interest is paid even if not stipulated
If the borrower pays interest when there has been no
stipulation therefor, the provisions of this Code
concerning solutio indebiti, or natural obligations,
shall be applied, as the case may be.
1) If there was a mistake in payment of interest,
return the interest paid.
2) If borrower deemed it an obligation to pay
interest, even if not stipulated, the payment
of interest is valid.
Interest payable in kind
In the determination of the interest, if it is payable in
kind, its value shall be appraised at the current price
of the products or goods at the time and place of
payment.
Compounding of interest
GR: Interest due and unpaid shall not earn
interest. However, the contracting parties may by
stipulation capitalize the interest due and unpaid,
which as added principal, shall earn new interest.
Under Article 1959 of the Civil Code, unless there
is a stipulation to the contrary, interest due
should not further earn interest.
Effect of usurious/unconscionable interest
Carpo v. Chua (2005)
➔ A usurious loan transaction is not a complete nullity
but defective only with respect to the agreed interest.
F. DEPOSIT
Bank Deposits
Nature of bank deposits
Serrano v. Central Bank (1980)
➔ Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular
deposits. They are really loans because they earn
interest.
Liability for failure to return savings deposit
Guingona v. City Fiscal of Manila (1984)
➔ The failure of the Bank to return the amount
deposited will not constitute estafa through
misappropriation, but it will only give rise to civil
liability.
Bank as proper party in complaint for qualified theft
People v. Puig (2008)
➔ The Bank acquires ownership of the money deposited
by its clients; and the employees of the Bank, who are
entrusted with the possession of money of the Bank
due to the confidence reposed in them, occupy
positions of confidence. The Informations, therefore,
 sufficiently allege all the essential elements 1. A deposit is a gratuitous contract, except when
may limit its liability to some extent by agreement or
constituting the crime of Qualified Theft. there is an agreement to the contrary, or unless
stipulation.
1. Deposit in General and its Different Kinds the depositary is engaged in the business of
SBTC was aware of the floods of 1985 and 1986; it also storing goods.
knew that the floodwaters inundated the room where
Characteristics 2. In extra-judicial deposits.
the Safe Deposit Box was located. In this respect, it
1) Real; failed to exercise the reasonable care and prudence 2. Voluntary Deposit
expected of a good father of a family, thereby
2) Naturally gratuitous;
becoming a party to the aggravation of the injury or Kinds
3) Primarily for custody. loss. 1) Deposit by will of depositor;
Nature of rental of safety deposit box 2) Deposit by two or more claimants.
4) Either unilateral or bilateral
CA Agro-Industrial v. CA (1993) Requisites
5) Non-use by depositary of the thing deposited
Is the contractual relation between a commercial bank 1) Capacity of the parties;
6) Object of contractual deposit.
and another party in a contract of rent of a safety deposit 2) Object;
box with respect to its contents placed by the latter one of Kinds
bailor and bailee or one of lessor and lessee? 3) Formalities — may be entered into orally or in
1) Extrajudicial - may either be voluntary or writing.
The contract for the rent of the safety deposit box is not necessary
an ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article Obligations of the Depositary (Arts 1972-1991)
or Judicial - brought about by the attachment or
1643 of the Civil Code. However, the same is NOT a seizure of a property by court order. 1) To preserve the thing;
contract of deposit, but a special kind of deposit.
2) Regular - thing deposited can not be used by a. The depositary is liable for the loss of the thing
Here, no competent proof was presented to show depositary through a fortuitous event:
that respondent Bank was aware of the agreement
or Irregular - thing may be used by depositary. 1. If it is so stipulated;
between the petitioner and the Pugaos to the effect
that the certificates of title were withdrawable from the 3) Voluntary - by the will of the parties 2. If he uses the thing without the
safety deposit box only upon both parties' joint or Necessary - it is made in compliance with a depositor's permission;
signatures, and that no evidence was submitted to legal obligation OR takes place on the occasion of 3. If he delays its return;
reveal that the loss of the certificates of title was any calamity.
due to the fraud or negligence of the respondent 4. If he allows others to use it, even though
Deposit vs Commodatum and Mutuum he himself may have been authorized to
Bank.
use the same.
As to Deposit Commodatum Mutuum
Sia v. CA (1993) 2) To return the thing.
Purpose Principally for Use of thing Consumption of
The company, in renting safe-deposit boxes, cannot safekeeping thing Set off
exempt itself from liability for loss of the contents by its Right of a bank to apply a deposit to the debt of a
own fraud or negligence or that of its agents or Nature May be onerous1 Always May be onerous
depositor
servants, and if a provision of the contract may be gratuitous
construed as an attempt to do so, it will be held Associated Bank v. Tan (2004)
ineffective for the purpose. Although it has been held Object Only movables2 Any Money or
While banks are granted by law the right to debit the
that the lessor of a safe-deposit box cannot limit its fungible thing
value of a dishonored check from a depositor’s account,
liability for loss of the contents thereof through its own they must do so with the highest degree of care, so
negligence, the view has been taken that such a lessor Demand At will Lapse of period Lapse of period

as not to prejudice the depositor unduly.
Whether or not the petitioner, which is acting as a
collecting bank, has the right to debit the account of its
client for a check deposit which was dishonored by the
drawee bank.
Right of Setoff
Here, purportedly as an act of accommodation to a
valued client, petitioner allowed the withdrawal of the
face value of the deposited check prior to its clearing.
That act certainly disregarded the clearance
requirement of the banking system.
Earnest Money
Obligation if sale did not materialize
Compania Maritima v. CA (1985)
The return of P15,000.00 was but just and proper. That
sum was tendered to REPUBLIC which together with its
(PAN-ORIENTAL's) alleged expenses already made on
the vessel, cover 25% of the cost of the vessel, as
provided in the option granted in the bareboat contract.
This amount was accepted by the Administration as
deposit x x x ." Since the purchase did not eventually
materialize for reasons attributable to REPUBLIC, it
is but just that the deposit be returned. Courts may
issue such orders of restitution as justice and equity
may warrant.
Obligations of the Depositor (Arts 1992-1995)
1) If the deposit is gratuitous, the depositor is
obliged to reimburse the depositary for the
expenses he may have incurred for the
preservation of the thing deposited.
2) To pay the compensation agreed upon as
consideration for the deposit.
3) The depositor shall reimburse the depositary for
any loss arising from the character of the thing
deposited, unless at the time of the constitution of
the deposit the former was not aware of, or was
not expected to know the dangerous character of
the thing, or unless he notified the depositary of
the same, or the latter was aware of it without
advice from the depositor.
Security of the Depositary. The depositary may retain
the thing in pledge until the full payment of what may be
due him by reason of the deposit.
Extinguishment
a) General causes
i) Loss or destruction of thing;
ii) Death of party, in case of gratuitous
deposit.
b) Other causes
i) Expiration of period agreed upon;
ii) Demand at will of depositor;
iii) Mutual withdrawal from contract;
iv) Fulfillment of the purpose of deposit;
v) Fulfillment of resolutory condition.
3. Necessary Deposit
Kinds
1) In compliance with legal obligations;
2) On the occasion of a calamity;
3) By transients.
YHT Realty v. CA
Whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items
left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these
guests execute written waivers holding the establishment
or its employees free from blame for such loss in light of
Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers.
NO.
Art 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself
from responsibility by posting notices to the effect
that he is not liable for the articles brought by the
guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper
and the guest whereby the responsibility of the
former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is
suppressed or diminished shall be VOID.
Rules Regarding Hotels and Inns
1. The hotel-keeper is liable for the vehicles, animals
and articles which have been introduced or
placed in the annexes of the hotel.
2. The responsibility shall include the loss of, or
injury to the personal property of the guests
caused by the servants or employees of the
keepers of hotels or inns as well as strangers; but
not that which may proceed from any force
majeure.
3. The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the
hotel is NOT deemed force majeure, unless it is
done with the use of arms or through an
irresistible force.
4. The hotel-keeper is not liable for compensation if
the loss is due to the acts of the guest, his family,
servants or visitors, or if the loss arises from the
character of the things brought into the hotel.
5. The hotel-keeper has a right to retain the things
brought into the hotel by the guest, as a security
for credits on account of lodging, and supplies
usually furnished to hotel guests.
Durban Apartments v. Pioneer Insurance and Surety
2011
A contract of necessary deposit existed between the
insured See and petitioner.
The insured See deposited his vehicle for safekeeping
with petitioner, through the latters employee,
Justimbaste. In turn, Justimbaste issued a claim stub to
See. Thus, the contract of deposit was perfected from
See's delivery, when he handed over to Justimbaste the
keys to his vehicle, which Justimbaste received with the
obligation of safely keeping and returning it. Ultimately,
petitioner is liable for the loss of See’s vehicle.
4) In common carriers.
4. Sequestration or Judicial Deposit Must be Lessor need not be the Seller must be the tacita reconduccion
owner owner owner at the time the which is by law.
Judicial Deposit (Arts 2005-2009) property is delivered
Cause More or less ACTIVE More or less PASS
Takes place when an attachment or seizure of property in
Price of Distinguished from rent, Usually mentioned
litigation is ordered. object usually not mentioned Usufructuary has
Lessee generally has no
Distinguished from Extra-judicial Deposit Repairs duty to make ordi
duty to pay for repairs
Lease Mutuum repairs
As to Judicial Extra-judicial
Loses Usufructuary pays
✘ ✔ Lessee generally pays
Source By court order Will of parties ownership Taxes annual charges an
NO taxes
taxes on the fruits
Purpose To secure owner’s For safekeeping Relationship Lessor-Lessee Obligor-Obligee
rights Lessee cannot
Usufructuary may
Governed by Other things constitute a usufruct on
✘ ✔ the property to an
Object Any Personal Property Usury Law the property leased

Cause Remuneratory Generally gratuitous If what is leased is real 4. In the lease of things, one of the parties binds
Statute of
property for more than ✘ himself
Possession For benefit of owner Frauds
For benefit of depositor one year
a. to give to another the enjoyment or use
Termination When controversy Generally, when Property Real and Personal Personal only of a thing
ends depositor claims back b. for a price certain, and
Lease Commodatum
Principles CC + Rules of Court Civil Code c. for a period which may be definite or
applicable indefinite.
Onerous ✔ ✘
However, no lease for more than ninety-nine
Personal ✘ ✔ (99) years shall be valid. (Art 1643)
G. LEASE
5. In the lease of work or service, one of the
1. Lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous, and Consensual ✔ ✘ parties binds himself
commutative contract by which one person binds
Lease Usufruct a. to execute a piece of work or
himself to grant temporarily the use of a thing or
the rendering of some service to another who b. to render to the other some service
undertakes to pay some rent, compensation, or Only a particular or Covers all fruits and
Extent c. for a price certain,
price. specific use uses
d. but the relation of principal and agent
2. The contract of lease may be of things, or of work Personal, unless it does not exist between them. (Art 1644)
and service. (Art 1642) pertains to lease of real
Nature of
3. Distinctions between Lease and other contracts property which is Always a real right Lease of Services Contract for a Piece of W
right
registered, or is for
Lease Sale more than one year. The important object here is the The important object here
labor performed for the lessor. work done, the result of
What is Only use or enjoyment Ownership Creator of May or may not be the Owner, or by his duly
labor
transferred right owner authorized agent

Created only by The

By law, contract, will, orresult is generally NOT The result is generally
Transfer is Temporary Permanent Origin
contract, except as to prescription. important important; the price is no
 the sublease, at the time of the extrajudicial demand a. to make the necessary repairs or
payable until the work is
by the lessor. (Art 1652)
completed. b. to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate
6. Obligations of Lessor. The lessor is obliged: enjoyment of the property leased. (Art 1658)
Laborer is entitled to be paid Price cannot generally be a. To deliver the thing which is the object of the 10. In case of non-fulfillment of duties, aggrieved party
even if there is destruction of lawfully demanded if the work contract in such a condition as to render it fit for may seek
the work through a fortuitous is destroyed before it is finished the use intended;
a. Rescission + Damages; or
event. and accepted.
b. To make on the same during the lease all the
b. Damages only, leaving the contract in force —
necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for
Lease of Rural and Urban Lands specific performance. (Art 1659)
the use to which it has been devoted, unless there
is a stipulation to the contrary; 11. Should there be a need for urgent repairs, the lessee
1. Those disqualified to buy are also disqualified to
may ask for proportionate reduction of rent only if
become lessees of things. (Art 1646) c. To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and
adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire the repairs last 40 days or more. (Art 1662)
2. If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property,
duration of the contract. (Art 1654) 12. If lessor fails to make urgent repairs. Lessee may
the following persons cannot constitute the same
without proper authority: 7. Effect of Total or Partial Destruction. If the thing a. Order the repairs at the lessor’s cost, in order to
leased is totally destroyed by a fortuitous event, the avoid imminent danger;
a. the husband with respect to the wife's
lease is extinguished.
paraphernal real estate, b. Sue for damages;
If the destruction is partial, the lessee may choose
b. the father or guardian as to the property of the c. Suspend payment of rent;
between
minor or ward, and
a. a proportional reduction of the rent and d. Ask for rescission, in case of substantial damage.
c. the manager without special power. (Art 1647)
b. a rescission of the lease. (Art 1655) 13. Trespass in fact — perturbación de mere hecho.
3. Sublease vs Assignment When an intruder or trespasser claims no right
8. Obligations of Lessee. The lessee is obliged: whatsoever, the lessor is not liable to the lessee. The
Sublease Assignment lessee instead has a direct action against the intruder.
a. To pay the price of the lease according to the
terms stipulated; (Art 1664)
Lessee retains an interest in the Lessee makes an absolute
lease; he remains a party to the transfer of his interest; he thus b. To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a 14. Tacita Reconduccion — Implied New Lease. If at the
family, devoting it to the use stipulated; and in end of the contract the lessee
contract dissociates from the original
contract the absence of stipulation, to that which may be a. should continue enjoying the thing leased for
inferred from the nature of the thing leased, fifteen days
Sublessee does not have any Assignee has direct action according to the custom of the place;
b. with the acquiescence of the lessor, and
direct action against lessor against lessor c. To pay expenses for the deed of lease. (Art 1657)
c. unless a notice to the contrary by either party has
Allowed even without Requires consent of lessor NB: This is different from a contract of sale previously been given,
wherein it is the seller who generally pays the
permission of lessor, unless it is understood that there is an implied new
expenses for the deed of sale.
there is an express prohibition lease, not for the period of the original contract,
d. To notify lessor in case of usurpation or need for but for the time established in Articles 1682 and
4. Accion Directa. Lessor may directly bring an action repairs; otherwise, lessee will be liable for 1687.
against a sublessee even though the latter is not a damages which the lessor would suffer. (Art
1663) The other terms of the original contract shall be
party to the lease contract. revived. (Art 1670)
5. Subsidiary Liability of Sublessee. However, the e. To return the thing leased, upon the termination
of the lease, as he received it. (Art 1665) Acceptance of rentals beyond the original term does
sublessee shall not be responsible beyond the amount NOT signify acquiescence. There is thus no implied
of rent due from him, in accordance with the terms of 9. When Lessee May Suspend Rental Payment. In case renewal of lease. [Torres v. CA]
the lessor fails
15. Causes for Judicial Ejectment.
a. When the period agreed upon, or that which is
fixed for the duration of leases under Articles
1682 and 1687, has expired;
b. Lack of payment of the price stipulated;
c. Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in
the contract;
d. When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any
use or service not stipulated which causes the
deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe
the requirement in No. 2 of Article 1657, as
regards the use thereof. (Art 1673)
16. Rules on Useful Improvements and Ornamental
Expenses.
a. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful
improvements
i. which are suitable to the use for which the
lease is intended,
ii. without altering the form or substance of the
property leased,
the lessor upon the termination of the lease
shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of
the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee
i. may remove the improvements,
ii. even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby.
He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary.
b. With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee
shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he
may remove the ornamental objects, provided no
damage is caused to the principal thing, and the
lessor does not choose to retain them by paying
their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
(Art 1678)
17. Special Provisions for Lease of Rural or Product-
Producing Land.
a. When does the lessee have the right to a reduction
of rent?
In case of the loss of more than one-half of the
fruits through extraordinary and unforeseen
fortuitous events.
Extraordinary fortuitous events are understood
to be: fire, war, pestilence, unusual flood, locusts,
earthquake, or others which are uncommon, and
which the contracting parties could not have
reasonably foreseen.
b. Instances where lessee has no right to a
reduction:
i. on account of the sterility of the land leased,
or
ii. by reason of the loss of fruits due to ordinary
fortuitous events.
iii. if the fruits are lost after they have been
separated from their stalk, root or trunk. (Art
1681)
c. Duration of Rural Lease. When duration has not
been fixed, period is understood to have been for
i. all the time necessary for the gathering of the
fruits which the whole estate leased may
yield in one year, or
ii. which it may yield once, although two or
more years have to elapse for the purpose.
(Art 1682)
QUASI-CONTRACTS
Quasi-contracts are lawful, voluntary, and
unilateral acts which generally require a person to
reimburse or compensate another in accordance with
the principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefited at the expense of another.
Unjust Enrichment
For the rule on unjust enrichment to apply, two conditions
must concur:
1) A person is unjustly benefited; and
2) Such benefit is derived at another’s expense or
damage.
Included in the Concept of Implied Contracts
Quasi-contracts fall within the concept of implied
contracts that must be included in the claims required
to be filed with the judicial settlement of the
deceased’s estate under Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. (MBTC v. Absolute Management 2013)
A. Negotiorum Gestio
ART 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of
the agency or management of the business or
property of another, without any power from the
latter, is obliged to continue the same until the
termination of the affair and its incidents, or to
require the person concerned to substitute him, if
the owner is in a position to do so. xxxx
Essential Requisites
1) No meeting of the minds;
2) Taking charge of another’s business or property;
3) The property or business must have been
abandoned or neglected;
Otherwise, the rule on unauthorized contracts
would apply.
4) The officious manager must NOT have been
expressly or implicitly authorized;
Otherwise, the rules on agency would apply.
5) The officious manager must have voluntarily
taken charge.
Notes
1. The officious manager shall perform his duties
with all the diligence of a good father of a family.
(Art 2145)
GR: The responsibility of two or more
officious managers shall be solidary
EXC: Unless the management was assumed to
save the thing or business from imminent
danger. (Art 2146)
2. The ratification of the management by the owner
of the business produces the effects of an
express agency, even if the business may not
have been successful. (Art 2149)
 3. Generally, the owner should have been benefited
for him to be liable to the gestor. There are
instances when there is still liability even if there
have been no benefit derived:
a. When the management had for its purpose
the prevention of an imminent and manifest
loss; (Art 2150 par 2) and
b. Even though there has been no imminent and
manifest danger to the property or business:
i. The officious manager has acted in
good faith, and
ii. The property or business is intact,
ready to be returned to the owner.
(Art 2151)
Liability for Fortuitous Events
The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous
event:
1) If he undertakes risky operations which the
owner was not accustomed to embark upon;
2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the
owner;
3) If he fails to return the property or business after
demand by the owner;
4) If he assumed the management in bad faith; (Art
2147)
5) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the
management;
6) If by his intervention he prevented a more
competent person from taking up the
management.
For 5 and 6, except when the management was
assumed to save property or business from
imminent danger. (Art 2148)
Extinguishment of Officious Management
1) When the owner repudiates it or puts an end
thereto;
2) When the officious manager withdraws from the
management;
3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or
insolvency of the owner or the officious
manager.
B. Solutio Indebiti
Solutio indebiti is the quasi-contract that arises
when a person is obliged to return whatever was
received by him through error or mistake or received
by him although there was no right to demand it.
The responsibility of two or more payees is solidary.
(Art 2157)
If payee is in bad faith, he shall be liable for interests,
or fruits and for fortuitous events. (Art 2159)
Essential Requisites
1) Receipt of something;
2) There was no right to demand it; (Art 2154)
3) The undue delivery was because of mistake,
either of fact, or of law, which may be doubtful or
difficult. (Art 2155)
Liability of a Payee in Good Faith
a) In case of impairment or loss — only to the extent
of benefit;
A. TORRENS SYSTEM
b) In case of alienation — price to be reimbursed;
c) In case of credit — the same should be assigned
When Mistake Presumed
ART 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake
in the payment if something which had never
been due or had already been paid was delivered;
but he from whom the return is claimed may
prove that the delivery was made out of liberality
or for any other just cause.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
A. TORRENS SYSTEM
1. Concept and background
2. Certificate of title
B. AGRARIAN TITLES AND ANCESTRAL LANDS AND
DOMAINS
1. Concept and registration of agrarian titles
2. Concept and registration of ancestral lands and
domains
C. CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
1. Individuals
2. Corporations
D. ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
1. Who may apply
2. Registration process and requirements
3. Remedies
4. Cadastral registration
E. SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
1. Voluntary dealings
2. Involuntary dealings
F. NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
G. DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LANDS
Torrens System is a system of registration of land
under which, upon the landowner’s application, the
court may, after appropriate proceedings, direct the
issuance of a certificate of title.
Torrens Title is a certificate of ownership issued
under the Torrens System, through the Register of
Deeds, naming and declaring the owner of the real
property described therein, free from all liens and
encumbrances except such as may be expressly noted
there or otherwise reserved by law.
Title in fee simple — such title in real property as
belongs to a person who has full and unconditional
ownership in fact. Analogous to absolute title.
Ownership signifies proprietorship, dominion or
exclusive control. It is a complete title.
Whereas Title refers to the evidence of a person’s
right or the extent of his interests.
1. Concept and background
Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands
throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall
be based on the generally accepted principles
underlying the Torrens system.
Purpose and Meaning of the Torrens System of
Registration
Legarda v. Saleeby [1915]
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to
land; to put a stop forever to any question of the
legality of the title, except claims which were noted at
the time of registration, in the certificate, or which
may arise subsequent thereto.
Bishop v. CA [1992]
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private
respondents have a right to eject any person illegally
occupying their property. This right is
imprescriptible.
MCIAA v. Ijordan 2016
A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner
without the express authority of the others is
unenforceable against the latter, but valid and
enforceable against the seller.
1) Registration does not vest title. It is merely a
procedure to establish evidence of title over realty.
Registration merely confirms and thereafter
protects the title already possessed.
2) Registration under the Torrens system does not
create nor vest title if title was based on a forged
deed. (Heirs of Dumaliang v. Serban)
3) The system merely confirms ownership and does
not create it. Where such an illegal transfer is made,
as in the case at bar, the law presumes that no
registration has been made and so retains title in the
real owner of the land. (Heirs of Doronio v. Heirs of
Doronio)
2. Certificate of title
a. Original Certificate of Title — the first title
issued in the name of the registered owner by the
Register of Deeds (RoD) covering a parcel of Land
which has been registered under the Torrens
system by virtue of a judicial or administrative
proceeding. It consists of:
1. One original copy filed in the RoD; and
2. The owner’s duplicate certificate
delivered to the owner.
b. Transfer Certificate of Title — issued by the
RoD in favor of a transferee to whom the
ownership of a registered land has been
transferred by any legal mode of conveyance (e.g.
sale, donation).
Key Concepts
1. Best Evidence of Ownership — Certificate of
Title is the best evidence of ownership of the land
described therein. (Lee Tek Sheng v. CA)
2. Constructive Notice — A Torrens title binds the
whole world. (People v. Reyes)
The issuance of a torrens certificate of title is
constructive notice to the whole world that the
person in whose name it is issued has become the
owner of the lot described therein. (Sps Borbe v.
Calalo)
No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
(Jacob v. CA)
3. Curtain Principle — Unregistered Claims — A
Torrens title bars all prior claims not registered
on the title. (Republic v. Umali)
All claims and liens of whatever character
existing against the land prior to the issuance of
certificate of title are barred, if not noted on said
certificate. (Id.)
The registered owner of a Torrens Certificate of
Title and the subsequent purchaser for value and
in good faith of registered land shall hold the
certificate, free from all liens and encumbrances,
except those noted in said certificate and those
specified by law. (Secs 44 and 46 PD 1529)
4. Indefeasibility — A Torrens certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. (Ortegas v. Hidalgo)
Title to the property covered by a Torrens
certificate becomes incontrovertible or
indefeasible after one year from the entry of the
decree of registration. (Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs
of Santiago)
A certificate of title cannot be defeated by
adverse, open and notorious possession by third
persons. (D’Oro Land Realty & Dev’t Corp. v.
Claunan)
5. Imprescriptible —
Section 47. Registered land not subject to
prescriptions. — No title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
Bishop v. CA held that even if it be supposed that
the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the
other persons' occupation of the property,
regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return
of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated,
if at all. (Supapo v. Sps De Jesus 2015)
Note that Section 47 of P.D. No. 529 covers
acquisitive prescription. In a case, however, it
was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive
prescription, which barred the action of
petitioners. (Pangasinan v. Almazora 2015)
 An action for reconveyance can indeed be barred
by prescription if based on implied or
constructive trust and must perforce prescribe in
ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. An exception to this rule is
when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to
be reconveyed. (Tiongco v. Tiongco 2011)
6. Integrity of Titles — Insurance Principle — An
innocent purchaser for value, relying on a
Torrens title issued, is protected. (Nazareno v. CA)
7. Not Subject to Collateral Attack — A certificate
of title shall not be the subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
(Vda de Retuerto v. Barz)
The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of
sale is not the direct proceeding required by law
to attack a Torrens certificate of title. (Taparuc v.
Vda de Mende [2007])
8. Fraudulent Registration — The person in
whose name the land is fraudulently registered
holds it as a mere trustee, with the legal
obligation to reconvey the property and the title
thereto in favor of the true owner. (Caro v. CA)
9. Forgery — A fraudulent or forged document of
sale may become the root of a valid title if the
certificate of title has already been transferred
from the name of the true owner to the name of
the forger or the name indicated by the forger.
(Reyes v. Borbon)
However, the doctrine that a forged instrument
may become the root of a valid title cannot be
applied where the owner still holds a valid and
existing certificate of title covering the same
interest in a realty. (Torres v. CA)
10. Loss — As between two innocent persons, the
one who made it possible for the wrong to be
done should be the one to bear the resulting loss.
(Traders Royal Bank v. CA)
As between two persons, both of whom are in
good faith and both innocent of any negligence,
the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder
of registered title over the transfer of a vendor
bereft of any transmissible rights. (Torres v. CA)
11. Presumption: Regular and Valid — A Torrens
title is presumed to have been issued regularly
and legally, unless contradicted and overcomed
by clear, convincing, strong and irrefutable proof.
More than merely preponderant evidence is
required. (Ramos v. Rodriguez)
12. Double Titles — Where two certificates of title
include the same land, the certificate of title that
is earlier in date prevails. (Garcia v. CA)
13. Priority of Rights — “Prior tempura potior jure”.
He who is first in time is preferred in right.
(Santiago v. CA)
14. Reliance on the Title — Mirror Principle —
The minimum requirement for one to be a good
faith buyer for value is that the vendee at least
sees the owner's duplicate copy of the title and
relies upon the same.
EXCEPTION: This principle does not apply when
the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry or when the
purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of
title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status
of the title of the property in litigation. (Domingo
v. Roces)
The registered owner of realty cannot be
deprived of her property through fraud, unless a
transferee acquires the property as an innocent
purchaser for value.
A transferee who acquires the property covered
by a reissued owner's copy of the certificate of
title without taking the ordinary precautions of
honest persons in doing business and examining
the records of the proper Registry of Deeds, or
who fails to pay the full market value of the
property is not considered an innocent purchaser
for value. (Sps Cusi v. Domingo 2013)
15. Titles derived from a void title — If a certificate
of title is void, all subsequent certificates of title
derived therefrom are also void because of the
truism that the “spring cannot rise higher than its
source”. This truism is in accord with the Latin
maxim “Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre
quam ipse habet.” No one can transfer a greater
right to another than he himself has. (Mathay v.
CA)
B. AGRARIAN TITLES AND ANCESTRAL
LANDS AND DOMAINS
1. Concept and registration of agrarian titles
Taar v. Lawan 2017 Leonen, J
There are four (4) modes of disposition of agricultural
lands under Section 11 of the Public Land Act, namely:
1) for homestead settlement;
2) by sale;
3) by lease; or
4) by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
Homestead — The applicant of a homestead must
a) be a "citizen of the Philippines over the age of
eighteen years, or the head of a family."
b) prove compliance with the residency and
cultivation requirements.
Sales patents —
a) The applicant must be a citizen of the
Philippines who is of legal age or a head of the
family.
 b) The land must first be appraised before it can
be sold through public bidding.
c) The purchaser must "have not less than one-
fifth of the land broken and cultivated within
five years after the date of the award."
d) The purchaser must also show "actual
occupancy, cultivation, and improvement of at
least one-fifth of the land applied for until the
date on which final payment is made" before
the issuance of a sales patent.
Under the present Constitution, private corporations
and associations can only lease agricultural lands.
Lease —The third mode of disposition of agricultural
lands of the public domain is through a lease.
a) The government can only award the right to
lease through an auction, the procedure of
which shall be the same as that prescribed for
sales patents.
b) An inherent condition of the lease is that the
lessee should have cultivated 1/3 of the land
"within five years after the date of the approval
of the lease."
Confirmation of Imperfect Title — Either through
judicial legalization or through administrative
legalization. The second sub-category refers to the
grant of free patents.
a) In judicial legalization or judicial
confirmation, the applicant "already holds an
imperfect title to an agricultural land of the
public domain after having occupied it from
June 12, 1945 or earlier."
b) On the other hand, the applicant of a free
patent does not claim that the land is his or
her private property but acknowledges that
the land is still part of the public domain.
Under Section 44 of the Public Land Act as amended by
Republic Act No. 6940, they are required
a) to prove continuous occupation and cultivation
for 30 years prior to April 15, 1990 and
b) payment of real estate taxes
c) while the land has not been occupied by other
persons.
Republic v. Noval 2017 Leonen, J
The burden of proving that the property is an alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
falls on the applicant, not the State. The OSG, however,
has the correlative burden to present evidence of the
public character of the land.
When the State has no effective opposition, except
for a pro forma opposition, to controvert an
applicant's convincing evidence of possession and
occupation, presumptions are tilted to this
applicant's favor.
The burden of evidence lies on the party who asserts an
affirmative allegation. Therefore, if the State alleges
that lands belong to it, it is not excused from providing
evidence to support this allegation.
This Court's previous rulings imposing the burden of
overcoming the presumption that a land is public
should only be strictly applied when a manifestly
unregistrable land is in danger of fraudulent titling —
not when it will promote unfairness and violation of
due process.
Republic v. Bacas 2013
1. The Republic can question even final and executory
judgment when there was fraud.
The Chabons did not make any mention of the
ownership or occupancy by the Philippine Army.
They also did not indicate any efforts or searches
they had exerted in determining other occupants of
the land. Such omission constituted fraud and
deprived the Republic of its day in court.
2. The Republic can also question a final and executory
judgment when the LRC had no jurisdiction over the
land in question;
3. Prescription or estoppel cannot lie against the
government;
4. The subject lands, being part of a military
reservation, are inalienable and cannot be the
subjects of land registration proceedings.
The necessary requirements for the grant of an
application for land registration are the following:
1. The applicant must, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, have been in
possession and occupation of the subject land;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application; and
4. The subject land must be an agricultural land
of the public domain.
Sps Fortuna v. Republic 2014
In judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title, the period of possession should commence, at
the latest, as of May 9, 1947
In other words, applicants must prove that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8,
1947.
2. Concept and registration of ancestral lands and
domains
Cruz v. Sec of DENR [2000]
The Regalian theory does not negate native title to
lands held in private ownership since time immemorial,
adverting to the landmark case of Carino v. Insular Govt.
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the
existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by
Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of

ownership since time immemorial independent of any
grant from the Spanish Crown as an exception to the
theory of jure regalia.
C. CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
On the basis of their capacity to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain, who may acquire private lands?
1) Filipino citizens;
2) Filipino corporations and associations as defined
in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and by
exception:
3) Aliens, but only by hereditary succession; and
4) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his citizenship under the terms of Section 8.
Filipino citizens can both “acquire” or otherwise “hold”
lands of the public domain.
Filipino corporations cannot acquire lands of the public
domain but they can “hold” such lands by “lease”.
§3. ART XII. Lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural
lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease,
a) for a period not exceeding 25 years,
b) renewable for not more than 25 years,
and
c) not to exceed 1K hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may
a) lease not more than 500 hectares, or
b) acquire not more than 12 hectares
thereof, by purchase, homestead, or
grant.
Acquisition of Lands by Aliens
GR: Aliens are NOT qualified to own land.
EXC:
1. Save in cases of intestate succession (Sec 7 Art
XII)..
2. P.D. 713 (American Parity Rights);
3. B.P. 185 — Any natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
may be a transferee of a private land to be used
by him as his residence.
4. R.A. No. 9225 – Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 — Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship.
D. ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
1. Who may apply
1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Ong v. Republic [2008]
Even if we were to tack petitioner’s claim of ownership
over the subject lot to that of their alleged
predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and
Eufrosinia Bautista in 1971, still this would fall short of
the required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Further, possession alone is not sufficient to acquire
title to alienable lands of the public domain because the
law requires possession AND occupation.
Republic v. Vega 2011
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529 requires that the property
sought to be registered is already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration is
filed.
In Republic v. Serrano, the Court held that a DENR
Regional Technical Director's certification, which is
annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in
evidence, constitutes substantial compliance with the
legal requirement.
It must be emphasized that the present ruling on
substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. To
establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable public land, the general
rule remains: all applications for original registration
under the Property Registration Decree must include
both
1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and
2) a certified true copy of the original
classification made by the DENR Secretary and
3) certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records.
As an exception, however, the courts — in their sound
discretion and based solely on the evidence presented
on record — may approve the application, pro hac vice,
on the ground of substantial compliance showing that
there has been a positive act of government to show the
nature and character of the land and an absence of
effective opposition from the government. This
exception shall only apply to applications for
registration currently pending before the trial court
prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all
future applications.
2) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic 2009 and 2013 En Banc
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative

to the disposition of public land or lands of the public
domain, namely:
1) As a general rule, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable.
2) The following are excepted from the general
rule, to wit:
a) Agricultural lands of the public domain
are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public
Land Act.
If the mode is judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of
the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of
the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
b) Lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as
no longer intended for public use or for
the development of national wealth are
removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private
ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership.
3) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
Republic v. Abrille [1976]
Certainly, the step taken in petitioning the court for the
approval of their Subdivision Plan to include the
questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is
unwarranted and irregular.
In order to bring this increase in area, proceedings in
registrations of land title should have been filed instead
of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
Mayor of Parañaque v. Ebio 2010
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was
formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually
settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. The law that
governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article
84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which
remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil
Code.
Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not
form part of the public domain as the alluvial
property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the same under the
Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
Here, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Parañaque in its corporate or private
capacity sought to register the accreted portion.
Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have
acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription.
4) Those who have acquired ownership of
land in any other manner provided for by
law.
2. Registration process and requirements
STEPS in bringing a land under the Torrens system
1) Survey of land by the Lands Management Bureau
or a duly licensed private surveyor;
2) Filing of application for registration by the
applicant;
3) Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the
application;
4) Transmittal of the application and the date of
initial hearing to the Land Registration
Commission;
5) Publication of a notice of the filing of the
application and date and place of the hearing in
the Official Gazette;
6) Service by mailing of notice upon those known
to have interests in the property;
7) Posting of the notice in a conspicuous place on
the land.
8) Filing of answer to the application;
9) Hearing of the case by the Court;
10) Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
11) Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring
the decision final and instructing the LRC to issue
a decree of confirmation and registration;
12) Entry of the decree of registration in the LRC;
13) Sending of copy of the decree of registration to
the corresponding Register of Deeds; and
14) Transcription of the decree of registration in the
registration book and the issuance of the owner's
duplicate original certificate of title to the
applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment
of the prescribed fees.
Amendments of boundaries or area — which shall
consist
a) in a substantial change in the boundaries or
b) an increase in area of the land applied for or
c) which involve the inclusion of an additional land
shall be subject to the same requirements of publication
and notice as in an original application.
Republic v. Guerrero [2006]
Only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and

is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or
reopen a decree of registration.
The remedy of reversion can ONLY be availed of in
cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land
in patents or certificates of title.
Dream Village v. BCDA 2013
While property of the State or any of its subdivisions
patrimonial in character may be the object of
prescription, those “intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth” are
considered property of public dominion and therefore
not susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Republic v. Nicolas 2017 re Survey of the Land
None of the documents submitted by respondent to the
trial court indicated that the subject property was
agricultural or part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. At most, the CENRO Report
and Certification stated that the land was not covered by
any kind of public land application.
To establish that the land subject of the application has
been converted into patrimonial property of the State,
an applicant must prove the following:
1. The subject property has been classified as
agricultural land.
2. The property has been declared alienable
and disposable.
3. There is an express government
manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial, or is no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth.
It must be emphasized that without the concurrence of
these three conditions, the land remains part of public
dominion and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription.
Carpo v. Ayala Land 2010
It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the
requirements for the issuance of decrees of
registration.
It is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less
prove, that its predecessor-in-interest complied with
the requirements for the original registration of the
subject property. A party dealing with a registered land
need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine
the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or
her interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond
what appeared in the TCT in the name of its immediate
transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued for the
subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to
go behind the certificate of title to determine the
condition of the property.
Publication, Opposition of and Default
Heirs of Regalado v. Republic
If what is sought to be registered are sublots of a bigger
lot, the publication must contain the technical
descriptions of the smaller lots since the adjoining
owners of the mother lot are not the adjoining owners
of the smaller lots.
Notice of initial hearing
Director of Lands v. CA and Abistado [1997]
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing
in an original land registration case mandatory or
directory? Mandatory.
Publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court.
Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity
of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law
included such requirement in its detailed provision.
Proof Required in Registration Proceedings
Recto v. Republic
The belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does
not necessarily mean that possession by the previous
owners thereof did not commence in 1945 or earlier.
As long as the testimony supporting possession for the
required period is credible, the court will grant the
petition for registration. A duly certified blue print
copy of the tracing cloth with the technical
description is sufficient compliance and the
submission of the survey plan on tracing cloth may be
dispensed with.
Azana v. Lumbo
Non-declaration of property for tax purposes does not
necessarily negate ownership.
Republic v. Barandiaran
It is settled that tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for tax purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership; they only become evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property.
Republic v. Sta. Ana Burgos and Buenaventura v.
Republic
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an
act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.
Republic v. dela Paz 2010
The surveyor's annotation presented by respondents
is NOT the kind of proof required by law to prove that
the subject land falls within the alienable and
disposable zone.
Republic v. CA and Lapina [1994]
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over

a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still
a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has
complied with the requirements for registration under
CA 141?
Even if private respondents were already Canadian
citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties were already
private lands; consequently, there could be no legal
impediment for the registration thereof by respondents
in view of what the Constitution ordains.
Republic v. Espinosa 2012
Even if Espinosa’s application may not be dismissed
due to his failure to present the original tracing cloth
of the survey plan, there are numerous grounds for its
denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced survey
plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and
location of the subject property if:
a) it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic
engineer;
b) it proceeded officially from the Land
Management Services (LMS) of the DENR; and
c) it is accompanied by a technical description of
the property which is certified as correct by
the geodetic surveyor who conducted the
survey and the LMS of the DENR.
However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan
may be offered as evidence of the identity, location
and the boundaries of the property applied for, the
notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of
alienability and disposability.
Hearing; Judgment; Issuance of Decree
Republic v. San Lorenzo
Respondent should not be faulted if the initial hearing
that was conducted was outside the 90-day period set
forth under Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, and that respondent
might have substantially complied with the requirement
thereunder relating to the registration of the subject
land.
Factor v. Mariel, Jr. [2008]
A writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a
decree of registration in original land registration
proceedings not only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case but also against anyone
adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof
during the proceedings up to the issuance of the decree.
Heirs of Tama Tan Buto v. Luy
A previous final and executory judgment awarding the
lot in favor of a party bars the losing party from later
filing an application for registration of title covering the
same lot.
Republic v. Nillas [2007]
The rule is that “neither laches nor the statute of
limitations applies to a decision in a land
registration case.”
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within
which the court may order or issue a decree. The
reason is xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in
character and does not need to be asserted or enforced
against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance
of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and
of the LRC.
PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution
of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and
applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need
for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of
execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 is
not applicable to land registration cases in the first
place.
Ting v. Heirs of Lirio [2007]
In a registration proceeding instituted for the
registration of a private land, with or without
opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the
title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be,
and ordering its registration in his name constitutes,
when final, res judicata against the whole world. It
becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and
registration.
Republic v. Claro Yap 2018
Section 39 of PD No. 1529 provides that the original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of
registration. There is, therefore, a need to cancel the old
decree and a new one issued in order for the decree
and the OCT to be exact replicas of each other.
Correct Procedure
1. Petition for cancellation of old decree;
2. Re-issuance of decree;
3. Issuance of OCT pursuant to the re-issued
decree.
Section 39 of PD 1529 states that: "The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of
registration."
This provision is significant because it contemplates an
OCT which is an exact replica of the decree. Ostensibly,
therefore, the cancellation of the old decree and the
issuance of a new one is necessary.
When OCT Takes Effect
Manotok Realty v. CLT Realty [2007 and 2009]
The OCT is issued on the date the decree of registration
is transcribed. What stands as the certificate of title is
the transcript of the decree or registration made by the
registrar of deeds in the registry.
Angeles v. Sec of Justice 2010
Whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to
perform their duties by their refusal to issue the
questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and
her co-plaintiffs or have unlawfully excluded petitioner
from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as
would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus

against said public respondents.
It was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse
compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being
requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence,
mandamus does not lie and the petition must be
dismissed.
Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to
refuse to grant petitioner's request?
The issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of
registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases
where they find that such would result to the
double titling of the same parcel of land.
3. Remedies
Remedies Available to the Losing Party in
Registration Case
1) Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration under
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court ;
2) Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38
of the Rules of Court;
3) Appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, in the same manner as in ordinary actions.
Remedies under the Property Registration Decree
available to the aggrieved party in cases of fraudulent
registration
1) Petition for Review of Decree (Sec 32)
2) Action for Reconveyance (Secs 53 and 96)
3) Action for Damages (Sec 32)
4) Claim Against the Assurance Fund (Sec 95)
Other Remedies Available
1) Action for cancellation or reversion instituted by
the government through the Solicitor General
(Sec 101 of the Public Land Act);
2) Annulment of Judgment (Rule 47, Rules of Court);
3) Criminal Prosecution under the RPC.
Notes
1) Petition for Review — When the petition for
review of decree is filed after the expiration of
one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of
registration, the certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears thereon.
When an original certificate of title is secured
fraudulently and in breach of trust, a direct
attack on the title is a petition for review of decree
of registration. (Ingusan v. Heirs of Reyes)
To avail of a petition for review, the following
requisites must be satisfied:
a. The petitioner must have an estate or
a interest in the land;
b. He must show actual fraud in the
procurement of the decree of registration;
c. The petition must be filed within one year
from the issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration Authority; and
d. The property has not yet passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. (Eland
Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia 2010)
2) Reconveyance — The real owner has the right to
sue for reconveyance (an action in personam) of a
property. The action is imprescriptible if the land
wrongfully registered is still in the name of the
person who caused the registration. (Heirs of
Dumaliang v. Serban)
Reconveyance is available not only to the legal
owner of a property but also to the person with a
better right than the person under whose name
said property was erroneously registered.
(Gasataya v. Mabasa)
Although Asotigue is not the titled owner of the
disputed lot, he apparently has a better right than
Pacete, the latter not being in good faith when he
obtained his title to the said property. (Pacete v.
Asotigue 2012)
An action for reconveyance based on an implied
or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years. All
that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2)
facts:
1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the
land and,
2) that the defendant had illegally
dispossessed him of the same (Sanjorjo v.
Quijano)
It is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show
that he has a legal claim on the property superior
to that of the registered owner and that the
property has not yet passed to the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value. (Sps Roque v.
Aguado 2014)
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title
does not seek to question the contract which
allowed the adverse party to obtain the title to the
property. What is put on issue in an action for
reconveyance and cancellation of title is the
ownership of the property and its registration.
Thus, an action for reconveyance and cancellation
of title prescribes in 10 years from the time of
the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. (Sps Aboitiz v. Sps Po 2017 Leonen, J)
3) Reversion — The objective of an action for
reversion of public land is the cancellation of the
certificate of title and the resulting reversion of
the land covered by the title to the State. Only the
State, through the OSG, can institute reversion
proceedings. (Cawis v. Cerilles 2010)
It is proper when public land is fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations, or even by oversight. (Republic v.
Espinosa 2017)
4) Laches — Although a registered owner may lose
his right to recover possession of his registered
property by reason of laches, the equitable
defense is unavailing to one who has not shown
any color of title to the property such as a
squatter. (D’Oro Land Realty & Development
Corporation v. Claunan)
5) Damages — If the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for
damages. (Reyes v. Montemayor)
6) Recovery from Assurance Fund — A person
who,
a. without negligence on his part,
b. sustains loss or damage, or
c. is deprived of land or any estate or interest
therein
d. in consequence of the bringing of the land
under the operation of the Torrens system or
e. arising after original registration of land,
through fraud or in consequence of any error,
omission, mistake or misdescription in any
certificate of title, and
f. who by the provisions of this Decree is
barred or otherwise precluded under the
provision of any law from bringing an action
for the recovery of such land or estate or
interest therein,
may bring an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction for the recovery of damage to be paid
out of the Assurance Fund.
7) Annulment of Judgments, Final Orders or
Resolutions (Rule 47) — An action for
annulment of free patents and certificates of title
also seeks for the cancellation and nullification of
the certificate of title, but once the same is
granted, it does not operate to revert the property
back to the State, but to its lawful owner.
In such action, the nullity arises not from fraud or
deceit, but from the fact that the director of the
Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to
bestow title; hence, the issued patent or
certificate of title was void ab initio. (Narcise v.
Valbueco 2017)
4. Cadastral registration
Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty [2007]
Such jurisdiction is limited to the necessary correction
of technical errors in the description of the lands,
provided such corrections do not impair the substantial
rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction
cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title.
It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz that the limited
jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such lands even
extends to the determination of “which one of the
several conflicting registered titles shall prevail, as such
power would seem to be necessary for a complete
settlement of the title to the land, the express purpose of
cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be
considered to be within the jurisdiction of the court in
such proceedings.”
Republic v. Espinosa 2017
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece
of evidence, the land classification map prepared in
1986. The records show, however, that LC Map No.
2978 was not formally offered in evidence. The
reclassification of the area where the property is
located in 1986 should not prejudice Espinosa and her
successor-in-interest.
To grant the reversion based on a subsequent
reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would
amount to taking of private property without just
compensation and due process of law.
E. SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
1. Voluntary dealings
Registration Requirements
a) Compliance with the essential requisites of a
contract;
b) Observance of the formal requirements of public
instruments;
c) Performance of the jurisdictional requisites for
registration.
In cases of voluntary registration of documents, an
innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes
the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the
holder of a certificate of title, the moment he
1. presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed
of sale;
2. and the same is entered in the day book;
3. and at the same time he surrenders or presents
the owner's duplicate certificate of title covering
the land sold;
4. and pays the registration fees,
because what remains to be done lies not within his
power to perform
Primary Entry Book
1. Entry alone produces the effect of registration.
(DBP v. RD of Nueva Ecija, Autocorp Group v. CA)
The Primary Entry of a Void Contract does not
produce the effect of registration. (Ballesteros v.
Abion)
Registration must be done in the proper registry
in order to bind the land. (Sps. Abrigo v. de Vera)
2. The prevailing rule is that there is effective
registration once the registrant has fulfilled
all that is needed of him for purposes of entry
and annotation, so that what is left to be
 accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds.
(NHA v. Basa 2010)
3. In voluntary registration, such as a sale,
mortgage, lease and the like, if the owner's
duplicate certificate be not surrendered and
presented or if no payment of registration fees be
made within 15 days, entry in the day book of the
deed of sale does NOT operate to convey and
affect the land sold. (Durawood v. Bona 2012)
4. Whether the entry of a notice of lis pendens in the
primary entry book or day book of the Register of
Deeds serves as notice to third persons of the
existence of such claim against a registered land.
YES. An involuntary instrument such as an
attachment, a lien, a notice of lis pendens, and the
like, are adverse to the claims of the registered
owner. Thus, he cannot be expected to provide all
the necessary documents such as his owner's
duplicate copy of the title.
The mere recording of the involuntary
instrument in the primary entry book or day
book is sufficient to bind the registered land and
affect third persons dealing with it. (Mendoza v.
Garaan 2015)
5. Documents, like the certificates of title do not
effect a conveyance of or encumbrances on a
parcel of land. Registration is the operative act
that conveys ownership or affects the land
insofar as third persons are concerned. (Saberon
v. Ventanilla 2014)
Double Sales
1. Act 3344 provides for the system of recording of
transactions or claims over unregistered real
estate without prejudice to a third party with a
better right. But if the land is registered under the
Land Registration Act (and therefore has a
Torrens Title), and it is sold and the sale is
registered not under the Land Registration Act
but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not
considered registered. (Melencion v. CA)
Buyers and Mortgagees in Good Faith
1. To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and
titled land need only show that he relied on the
face of the title to the property.
Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is
sufficient only when the following conditions
concur:
a. first, the seller is the registered owner
of the land;
b. second, the latter is in possession
thereof; and
c. third, at the time of the sale, the buyer
was not aware
i. of any claim or interest of some other
person, or
ii. of any defect or restriction in the title of
the seller or
iii. in his capacity to convey title to the
property. (Uy v. Fule 2014)
2. A bank whose business is impressed with public
interest is expected to exercise more care and
prudence in its dealings than a private individual,
even in cases involving registered lands. (LBP v.
Poblete 2013)
3. If the land purchased is in the possession of a
person other than the vendor, the purchaser must
be wary and must investigate the rights of the
actual possessor. Without such inquiry, the
purchaser cannot be said to be in good faith and
cannot have any right over the property.
(Gabutan v. Nacalaban 2016)
4. A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser
for value by merely relying on the TCT of the
seller while ignoring all the other surrounding
circumstances relevant to the sale. (Nobleza v.
Nuega 2015)
5. Not in Good Faith. Nor was it safe for them to
simply rely on the face of Sy’s TCT in view of the
fact that they were aware that her TCT was
derived from a duplicate owner’s copy reissued
by virtue of the loss of the original duplicate
owner’s copy. That circumstance should have
already alerted them to the need to inquire
beyond the face of Sy’s TCT. (Sps Cusi v. Domingo
2013)
6. The doctrine of mortgagee in good faith
assumes that the title to the subject property had
already been transferred or registered in the
name of the impostor who thereafter transacts
with a mortgagee who acted in good faith. In the
case at bench, it must be emphasized that the title
remained to be registered in the name of
Bernardo, the rightful and real owner, and not in
the name of the impostor. (Ruiz v. Dimailig 2016
Special En Banc)
Sale Invoicing Real Estate
1. In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally
obligated to deliver all the land covered within
the boundaries, regardless of whether the real
area should be greater or smaller than that
recited in the deed. However, in case there is
conflict between the area actually covered by the
boundaries and the estimated area stated in the
contract of sale, he/she shall do so only when the
excess or deficiency between the former and the
latter is reasonable.
Declaring Ingram as the owner of the whole
12,000 sqm when what was only agreed upon is
6,200 sqm is NOT reasonable. (Arcaina v. Ingram
2017)
Caveat Emptor
How to conduct Due Diligence Verification of Title
 1. Verify the origin, history, authenticity and
validity of the title with the Register of Deeds and
Land Registration Authority;
2. Engage the services of a competent and reliable
geodetic engineer to verify the boundary, metes
and bounds of the lot subject of said title based
on the technical description in the said title and
the approved survey plan in the Land
Management Bureau;
3. Conduct an actual ocular inspection;
4. Inquire from the owners and possessors of
adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal
ownership of the lot in question;
5. Put up signs that say lot is being purchased,
leased or encumbered;
6. Undertake such other measures to make the
general public aware that said lot will be subject
to alienation, lease or encumbrance by the parties
(Domingo Realty Inc. v. CA, Locsin v. Hizon 2014)
2. Involuntary dealings
Attachments
1. An auction or execution sale retroacts to the date
of levy of the lien of attachment. The earlier
registration of a levy on preliminary attachment
will give it superiority and preference in rights
over the attached property as against all other
claims.
Adverse Claims
1. Essential Requisites
a. The claimant must have an interest in the
land adverse to the registered owner;
Enforcement of Liens
b. The right or interest must arise
subsequent to the original registration of
the land;
c. The registration of such interest or right
is not otherwise provided by P.D. 1529;
d. The claim must be in writing, signed and
sworn to by the adverse claimant, and
must comply with formal requirements.
2. An attorney’s lien may be annotated on the
delinquent client’s title only after it has become
judicially settled and the execution thereof
ordered by the court. Where the interest of a
lawyer by way of attorney’s fees consists of a
share in the property recovered by the client,
such interest may be the basis of an adverse
claim.
3. Cancellation of an adverse claim is still necessary
even after the lapse of thirty days to render it
ineffective. (Sajonas v. CA)
4. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
designated to protect the interest of a person over
a piece of real property where the registration of
such interest or right is not otherwise provided
by the Land Registration Act, and such serves as
a notice and warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an
interest on the same or better right than the
registered owner thereof.
It was not shown in this case that there was a
justifiable reason why the deed could not be
registered. Hence, adverse claim cannot
substitute for registration. (Rodriguez v. CA)
5. Although the notice of adverse claim pertained to
only one lot and Filinvest wanted to acquire
interest in some other lots under the same title,
the notice served as warning to it that one of the
owners was engaged in double selling. (Golden
Haven Memorial Park v. Filinvest 2010)
1. The fact of levy and sale constitutes execution,
and not the action for the issuance of a new title.
(Padilla, Jr v. Phil. Producer’s Cooperative)
2. Section 107 of PD 1529 contemplates the filing of
a separate and original action before the RTC,
acting as a land registration court, and not a mere
motion. (Reyes v. Tang Soat Ing 2011)
Lis Pendens
1. A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to
the whole world that a particular real property is
in litigation, serving as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at
his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of
the litigation over the said property.
2. It has a twofold effect:
a. to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court
until the entry of the final judgment to
prevent the defeat of the final judgment
by successive alienations; and
b. to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of
the land subject of the litigation to the
judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently. (De La Merced
v. GSIS, et al 2011)
3. Requisites of a Valid Lis Pendens
a. There must be an action or proceeding
affecting the title of real property on the
possession thereof;
b. The court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the property;
c. That the property is sufficiently
described in the complaint.
4. Villanueva v. CA declared that the rule of lis
pendens applied to suits brought "to establish an
equitable estate, interest, or right in specific real
property or to enforce any lien, charge, or
encumbrance against it x x x." (Viewmaster
Construction v. Maulit, et al)
 5. The doctrine of lis pendens has NO application
to a proceeding in which the only object sought is
the recovery of a money judgment, though the
title or right of possession to property be
incidentally affected. (Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v.
Herbal Cove Realty)
6. A notice of lis pendens, once duly registered, may
be cancelled by the trial court before which the
action involving the property is pending.
The power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is
exercised only under exceptional circumstances,
such as:
a. where such circumstances are imputable
to the party who caused the annotation;
b. where the litigation was unduly
prolonged to the prejudice of the other
party because of several continuances
procured by petitioner;
c. where the case which is the basis for the
lis pendens notation was dismissed for
non prosequitur on the part of the
plaintiff; or
d. where judgment was rendered against
the party who caused such a notation.
In such instances, said notice is deemed ipso facto
cancelled. (Casim Construction Supplies v. RoD of
Las Piñas 2010)
7. An administrative remedy under Section 77 of
PD 1529 provides the appropriate measure to
have a notice of lis pendens cancelled out from the
title, that is by presenting to the Register of
Deeds, after finality of the judgment rendered in
the main action, a certificate executed by the clerk
of court before which the main action was
pending to the effect that the case has already
been finally decided by the court, stating the
manner of the disposal thereof.
Levies on Execution
1. Procedure
a. Registration of the Levy on Execution;
b. Registration of the Certificate of Sale;
c. Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale;
d. Petition for Issuance of a New Certificate
of Title pursuant to Sec. 75 of P.D. 1529.
(Padilla v. Philippine Producers
Cooperative)
2. A levy on execution registered takes preference
over a prior unregistered sale — a registered lien
is entitled to preferential consideration.
An exception to the preference given to a
registered lien is the case where a party has
actual knowledge of the claimant’s actual, open,
continuous and notorious possession of the
disputed property at the time the levy or
attachment is registered. (Pineda v. Arcalas)
F. NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Republic
A certificate of title is VOID when it covers property of
public domain classified as forest or timber or
mineral land; any title issued covering non-disposable
lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser
for value shall be cancelled.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore
and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and
waters of the public domain.
Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural
resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the
government and classified as agricultural lands of the
public domain. These lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
the government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government
can sell to private parties government reclaimed lands
of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law
authorizing such sale.
In the hands of the government agency tasked and
authorized to dispose of alienable lands of the public
domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Chavez v. National Housing Authority
The NHA is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands.
The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the
special patents are transferred to the NHA by the
Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to
patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold
to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of
which are owned by Filipinos.
Santulan v. Executive Secretary [1977]
The regulations give Santulan a preferential right to
lease the land as a riparian owner.
In the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the
encroachments of the sea should gain by its
recession.
Cantoja v. Lim 2010
Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore
area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who
has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as
provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1 s. 1936.
Enriquez v. Director of Lands 2017
The subject lands may still be declared public lands
notwithstanding the Director of Lands' failure to appeal
from the RTC decision.
Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to
appeal foreclose the appellate court from declaring the
land in question to be public land, since the oppositors
and the herein petitioners are both seeking the
registration of their title pursuant to the provisions of

Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law.
G. DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED
LANDS
Radiowealth v. Palileo [1991]
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments
affecting unregistered lands is "without prejudice to a
third party with a better right". Mere registration of a
sale in one's favor does not give him any right over the
land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the
land having previously sold the same to somebody else
even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
The purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff's
execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment
debtor, and merely acquires the latter's interest in
the property sold as of the time the property was levied
upon.
Thus, the execution sale of the unregistered land in
favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no
longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time
of the said execution sale.
MCIAA v. Tirol [2009]
Registration of instruments must be done in the
proper registry in order to effect and bind the land.
Prior to the Property Registration Decree of 1978, Act
No. 496 (or the Land Registration Act) governed the
recording of transactions involving registered land, i.e.,
land with a Torrens title. On the other hand, Act No.
3344, as amended, provided for the system of recording
of transactions over unregistered real estate without
prejudice to a third party with a better right.
Consequently, the fact that MCIAA was able to register
its Deed of Absolute Sale under Act No. 3344 is of no
moment, as the property subject of the sale is
indisputably registered land.
Sabitsana v. Muertegui 2013
Article 1544 does not apply to sales involving
unregistered land.
The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on
September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale,
while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized
document only on October 17, 1991, or ten years
thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a
better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to
petitioners is null and void, because when it was made,
the seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot.
Nemo dat quod non habet.
Quick Survey of Latest Jurisprudence
Bernas v. Estate of Yu Han Yat 2018
Action for quieting of title may or may not be a
collateral attack on certificate of title.
Filipinas Eslon Manufacturing v. Heirs of Llanes 2019
An action for quieting of title is not a proscribed
collateral attack on a certificate of title if its primary
purpose is to nullify a certificate of title.
Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez 2019 En Banc
In accion publiciana case, affirmative defenses (1) that
plaintiff’s OCT was obtained by fraud and (2) of
acquisitive prescription, amounts to a collateral attack
on OCT. RTC is without jurisdiction to order
reconveyance and effectively nullify the OCT.
Oño v. Lim 2010
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title
when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby
challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title
was decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is
to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief,
an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.
Heirs of Sumagang v. Aznar Enterprises 2019
A cross-claim is a direct attack.
Aquino v. Estate of Aguirre 2019
Petition for reconstitution not proper to cancel TCT
since a proscribed collateral attack. The proper remedy
is R47 Annulment of Judgment.
Pen Development v. Martinez Leyba, Inc 2017
Prescription as well as laches do not apply to registered
land per §47 of PD 1529.
Heirs of Delfin v. NHA 2016 Leonen, J
That land is alienable and disposable may be the subject
of a judicial admission.
Republic v. Tongson, Sr 2020
In order for CENRO and DENR certifications to prove
accretion, the certifying officer, the land surveyor, or
any similarly competent officer of the said agency
should have been presented in court to provide the
factual bases of their findings.
Republic v. Heirs of Cabrera 2017
In reversion suit, the State must show that the land was
inalienable at the time it was decreed to the defendant.
Republic v. Heirs of Daquer 2018 En Banc Leonen, J
Homestead patent issued in 1936 nullified where
holder unable to show law or proclamation declaring
such land to be alienable and disposable. The fact that
land was unclassified does not mean that it is alienable
and disposable.
Melendres v. Catambay 2018
Where petitioners claim that they have possessed the
land for more than 30 years, the land ipso facto becomes
private. Thus they can file action for reconveyance. CA
erred in saying that reversion suit is the only proper
proceeding.
Republic v. Sps Alforte 2018
A legal easement of right-of-way exists in favor of the
Government over land that was originally a public land
awarded by free patent even if the land is subsequently
sold to another.
Heirs of Mariano v. City of Naga 2018 3. Interference with relations
Registered owner of land not barred by res judicata
City’s unregistered claim based on donation cannot give from filing second petition for issuance of new owner’s G. NEGLIGENCE
better right of possession as against registered owner. duplicate certificate of title. The reason is the 1. Concept
indefeasibility of the Torrens Title.
Jurado v. Sps Chai 2019 2. Good father of a family or reasonably prudent
person
Persons dealing with administratively reconstituted TORTS 3. Standard of care; emergency rule
titles should conduct inquiry or investigation.
4. Unreasonable risk of harm
Princess Rachel Development v. Hill View Marketing A. PRINCIPLES
5. Evidence
2020 En Banc 1. Abuse of right; elements
6. Presumption of negligence
Property developer guilty of substantial encroachment 2. Unjust enrichment
was a builder in bad faith. 7. Defenses
3. Liability without fault
H. SPECIAL LIABILITY IN PARTICULAR ACTIVITIES
Onstott v. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Association 4. Acts contrary to law
2016 1. In general; concepts
5. Acts contrary to morals
2. Products liability; manufacturers or processors
Wife not an indispensable party if land is registered as B. CLASSIFICATION OF TORTS
“Husband, married to Wife.” 3. Violation of constitutional rights; violation of
1. According to manner of commission
civil liberties
Sps Anastacio v. Heirs of Coloma 2020 2. According to scope
4. Violation of rights committed by public officers
Where property shown to have been acquired during C. THE TORTFEASOR
5. Provinces, cities and municipalities
marriage, it remains to be conjugal property even if 1. Direct tortfeasor
registered as owned by “Husband, married to Wife.” 6. Owner of motor vehicle
2. Persons made responsible for others
Hence sale by husband without wife’s consent was 7. Proprietor of building or structure or thing
nullified. 3. Joint tortfeasors
8. Head of family
D. PROXIMATE CAUSE
First Sarmiento Property Holdings v. PBCom 2018 En 9. Violations of data privacy
Banc Leonen, J 1. Concept
I. STRICT LIABILITY
An action for annulment of a REM is incapable of 2. Cause in fact
1. Animals; possessor and user of an animal
pecuniary estimation even if the realty had been 3. Efficient intervening cause
foreclosed if the action was filed before the registration 2. Nuisance
4. Cause as distinguished from condition
of the certificate of sale. 3. Products liability; Consumer Act
5. Last clear chance
Logarta v. Mangahis 2016 E. LEGAL INJURY A. PRINCIPLES
Adverse claim not proper to register a claim based on a 1. Concept 1. Abuse of right; elements
contract to sell.
2. Elements of right
ART 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
Heirs of Ramirez v. Abon 2019 3. Violation of right or legal injury
rights and in the performance of his duties,
In a petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate 4. Classes of injury
1) act with justice,
certificate of title, notice to heirs of the registered F. INTENTIONAL TORTS
owner is mandatory. Otherwise, judgment is null and 2) everyone his due, and
void. 1. General
3) observe honesty and good faith.
2. Interference with rights to persons and
PBCom v. RD of Benguet 2020 property Its elements are the following:
 1) There is a legal right or duty;
2) which is exercised in bad faith;
3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
2. Unjust enrichment
ART 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
Requisites for an Accion in rem verso
1) Defendant has been enriched;
2) Plaintiff suffered a loss;
3) Enrichment of defendant is without just or legal
ground; and
4) Plaintiff has NO other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict.
3. Liability without fault
ART 23. Even when an act or event causing
damage to another's property was not due to the
fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter
shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or
event he was benefited.
4. Acts contrary to law
ART 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
5. Acts contrary to morals
ART 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
following elements:
1) There is an act which is legal;
2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order, or public policy; and
3) it is done with intent to injure.
B. CLASSIFICATION OF TORTS
Tort is broadly defined as a breach of legal duty. It
essentially consists in the violation of a right given or
omission of statutory duty imposed by law.
1. According to manner of commission
1) Intentional Tort. — includes conduct where the
actor desires to cause the consequences of his act
or believe the consequences are substantially
certain to result from it. It includes
a) Assault;
b) Battery;
c) False imprisonment;
d) Defamation;
e) Invasion of privacy;
f) Interference of property.
2) Negligent Tort. — involves voluntary acts or
omissions that result in injury to others, without
intending to cause the same. The tortfeasor fails
to exercise due care in performing such acts or
omissions.
2. According to scope
3) Strict Liability Tort. — where the person is made
liable independent of fault or negligence upon
submission of proof of certain facts.
The conduct is generally not wrongful in itself but
the wrong consists in causing harm by engaging
in certain types of risky activities.
Under the Civil Code, strict liability is imposed by
the following provisions:
1) Art 1314; Against inducers. Or Tortious
Interference.
2) Art 1711; Against employers. Owners of
enterprises and other employers are obliged
to pay compensation for the death of or
injuries to their employees, even though the
event may have been purely accidental or
entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death
or personal injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment.
3) Art 1712; Against fellow workers with
solidary liability against employers. If the
death or injury is due to the negligence of a
fellow worker, the latter and the employer
shall be solidarily liable for compensation. .
4) Art 1723; Against engineers and architects.
The engineer or architect who drew up the
plans and specifications for a building is
liable for damages if within fifteen (15)
years from the completion of the structure,
the same should collapse by reason of a
defect in those plans and specifications, or
due to the defects in the ground. xxxx
The action must be brought within 10 years
following the collapse of the building.
5) Art 2183; Against animal possessors. The
possessor of an animal or whoever may make
use of the same is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it may escape or
be lost.
This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damage should come
a) from force majeure or
b) from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
6) Art 2184; Against drivers with solidary
liability against motor vehicle owners. In
motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use
of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune.
7) Art 2187; Against manufacturers and
processors. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries
caused by any noxious or harmful substances
 used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.
8) Art 2189; Against LGUs. Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or
supervision.
9) Art 2190; Against building owners. The
proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from
its total or partial collapse, if it should be due
to the lack of necessary repairs.
10) Art 2191; Against other owners. Proprietors
shall also be responsible for damages caused:
1. By the explosion of machinery which
has not been taken care of with due
diligence, and the inflammation of
explosive substances which have not
been kept in a safe and adequate
place;
2. By excessive smoke, which may be
harmful to persons or property;
3. By the falling of trees situated at or
near highways or lanes, if not caused
by force majeure;
4. By emanations from tubes, canals,
sewers or deposits of infectious
matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place.
11) Art 2192; Against owners, vis-a-vis
engineers and architects.
12) Art 2193; Against family heads. The head of
a family that lives in a building or a part
thereof, is responsible for damages caused by
things thrown or falling from the same.
C. THE TORTFEASOR
1. Direct tortfeasor
a. Natural persons
2) Vicarious liability of Guardians. — Guardians
ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
b. Juridical persons
3) Vicarious liability of Owners and Managers of
1) Close corporation and Corporation by estoppel
— The stockholders who are personally involved
in the operations of a close corporation may be
personally liable for corporate torts.
When a corporation by estoppel is sued on any
tort committed by it as such, it shall not be
allowed to use as a defense its lack of corporate
personality.
2) Partnerships — Arts 1823 and 1824 provide that
the partnership is solidarily liable with the
partner if the latter commits tortious acts while
acting in the pursuit of partnership business.
3) The State — Subject to rules regarding waiver of
immunity from suits, defendants may include the
State, its political subdivisions, and GOCCs.
2. Persons made responsible for others
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176
4) Vicarious liability of Employers. — Employers
is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
1) Vicarious liability of Parents. — The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.
When the law simply refers to "all the diligence of
a good father of the family to prevent damage," it
implies a consideration of the attendant
circumstances in every individual case, to
determine whether or not by the exercise of such
diligence the damage could have been prevented.
(Cuadra v. Manfort)
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a
minor child is the relationship existing between
the parents and the minor child living with them
and over whom, the law presumes, the parents
exercise supervision and control. (Tamargo v. CA)
are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their
authority AND live in their company. (Art 217
Family Code)
Establishments. — Article 2180 does not make
the principal vicariously liable for the tort
committed by its agent’s employees and the
principal-agency relationship per se does not
make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the
need to prove the principal’s own fault or
negligence. (Sps Viloria v. Continental Air 2012)
A manager of a corporation is a mere employee
and is not vicariously liable under this provision.
The term "managers of an establishment or
enterprise" is used in the sense of "employer."
(Phil Rabbit Bus v. Phil-Am Forwarders)
Acts done within the scope of the employee’s
assigned tasks includes "any act done by an
employee in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at
the time of the infliction of the injury or
damages." (Castilex Industries v. Vasquez)
shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
Where the security agency recruits, hires and
assigns the work of its watchmen or security
guards, the agency is the employer of such guards
and watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to the clients or
customers of such agency. (Mamaril v. Boy Scouts
of the Philippines 2013)
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee there instantly arises a presumption of
the law that there was negligence on the part of
the employer either in the selection of his
employee or in the supervision over him after
such selection. The presumption however may be
rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the
employer that it had exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee.
(Baliwag Transit v. CA)
Before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission
which caused damage or prejudice must have
occurred while an employee was in the
performance of his assigned tasks. (St Francis HS
v. CA)
A working scholar is not an employee of the
learning institutions in which they work for the
privilege of a free education. (Filamer Christian
Institute v. CA)
For an employer to have exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family, he should not be
satisfied with the applicant's mere possession of a
professional driver's license; he must also
carefully examine the applicant for employment
as to his qualifications, his experience and record
of service. (Yambao v. Zuñiga)
The employer must not merely present
testimonial evidence to prove that he observed
the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee, but he
must also support such testimonial evidence with
concrete or documentary evidence. (Syki v.
Begasa)
In an action based on quasi-delict, the liability of
the employer is direct and primary, subject to
the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. (Aguila v. Baldovizo)
To sustain claims against employers for the acts
of their employees, the following requisites must
be established:
1) That the employee was chosen by the
employer personally or through another;
2) That the service to be rendered in
accordance with orders which the
employer has the authority to give at all
times; and
3) That the illicit act of the employee was on
the occasion or by reason of the functions
entrusted to him. (Sps Jayme v. Apostol)
Vis-a-vis Registered Owner Rule — In cases
where both the registered-owner rule and Article
2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that
the employer is the registered owner of the
vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully
proves ownership, there arises a disputable
presumption that the requirements of Article
2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show
that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
(Caravan Travel and Tours v. Abejar 2016 Leonen,
J)
To prove due diligence in the supervision of
employees, it is not enough for an employer to
emptily invoke the existence of rules. What is
more important is the actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the
rules. Thus, there must be proof of diligence in
the actual supervision of the employees' work.
(Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital v. Sps Capanzana)
5) Vicarious liability of Vehicle Owners. —
(a) If owner in the vehicle — the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could
have, by the use of the due diligence,
prevented the misfortune.
(b) If not in the vehicle — Article 2180
applies.
An owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an
accident involving the said vehicle if the same
was driven without his consent or knowledge and
by a person not employed by him. (Duavit v. CA)
ART 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
This article’s applicability is expressly qualified to
motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to
presume that the law intended a broader
coverage. (Añonuevo v. CA)
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he
had already sold it to someone else, is primarily
responsible to the public for whatever damage or
injury the vehicle may cause. (Cadiente v. Macas)
6) Vicarious liability of the State. — The State is
responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
A special agent is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official. (Merritt v. GPI)
BPI v. Central Bank 2020
The State in the performance of its governmental
functions is liable only for the tortuous acts of its special
agents. On the other hand, the State becomes liable as an
ordinary employer when performing its proprietary
functions.
Both Valentino and Estacio are not considered as special
agents of CBP during their commission of the fraudulent
acts against BPI as they were regular employees
performing tasks pertaining to their offices, namely,
bookkeeping and janitorial-messenger. Thus, CBP
cannot be held liable for any damage caused to BPI by
reason of Valentino and Estacio's unlawful acts.
7) Vicarious liability of Teachers. — Teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.
The provision should apply to ALL schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the
 first part of the provision. This is the general
rule.
In the case of establishments of arts and trades,
it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be
held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for
the acts of their students except where the school
is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. (Amadora v. CA
modifying Exconde v. Capuno)
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the
person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while
under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
(St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos)
3. Joint tortfeasors
1. The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (Art 2194)
2. There is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both
of them are liable for the total damage.
(Loadmasters Customs Services v. Glodel Brokerage
2011)
D. PROXIMATE CAUSE
To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur:
1. damage suffered by the plaintiff;
2. fault or negligence of defendant; and
3. connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff.
1. Concept
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
or loss, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
The proximate legal cause is that
1) acting first and producing the injury,
2) either immediately or by setting other
events in motion,
3) all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events,
4) each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor,
5) the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first
acted,
6) under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result
therefrom.
Some cases
1. A causal connection must exist between the injury
received and the violation of the traffic regulation.
It must be proven that the violation of the traffic
regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
(Tison et al. v. Sps. Pomasin 2011)
2. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an
act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case that the act or omission
played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the injury or damage, and that
the injury or damage was either a direct result or
a reasonably probable consequence of the act or
omission. (Ocean Builders v. Sps. Cubacub 2011)
3. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of
each case, upon a combined consideration of
logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
The care required must be commensurate with
the danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the
business which the law demands. (Mercury Drug
v. Baking)
2. Cause in fact
The initial step in determining proximate cause is to
determine if the negligent act or omission of the
defendant is the cause-in-fact or the actual cause of
plaintiff’s damage or injury. Two main tests are being
applied:
1) Sine Qua Non or the But-For Test. — Defendant’s
conduct is the cause in fact of the injury if the
damage would not have resulted had there been
no negligence on the part of the defendant.
Conversely, defendant’s negligent conduct is not
the cause in fact if the accident could not have
been avoided in the absence thereof.
2) Substantial Factor Test. — In order to be a
substantial factor in producing the harm, the
causes set in motion by the defendant must
continue until the moment of the damage or at
least down the setting in motion of the final active
injurious force which immediately produced or
preceded the damage.
3. Efficient intervening cause
An efficient intervening cause is one that
destroys the causal connection between the negligent
act and injury and thereby negatives liability. It is
sometimes called, novus actus interviens.
An intervening cause will be regarded as the
proximate cause and the first cause as too remote,
where the chain of events is so broken that they
become independent and the result cannot be said to
be the consequence of the primary cause. There is no
efficient intervening cause if the force created by the
negligent act or omission have either:
1) remained active itself or
2) created another force which remained active
until it directly caused the result, or
3) created a new active risk of being acted upon
by the active force that caused the result.
The test of the sufficiency of an intervening cause to
defeat recov- ery for negligence is not to be found in
the mere fact of its existence, but rather in its nature
and manner in which it affects the continuity of
 operation of the primary cause or the connection
between it and the injury. Such intervening cause
must be
a) new and independent,
b) not under the control of the original
wrongdoer, or
c) one which by the exercise of reasonable
foresight and diligence, he should have
anticipated and guarded against it.
The efficient intervening cause may be the negligence
of the defendant.
A cause is NOT an intervening cause if it is already in
operation at the time the negligent act is committed.
The rule in this jurisdiction is to the effect that
foreseeable intervening causes cannot be
considered sufficient intervening causes. Under this
same principle, a tortfeasor is liable for the conse-
quence of negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of a
5. Last clear chance
physician or surgeon whose treatment aggravated the
original injury.
The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected
cause, is NOT sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
consequences of negligence, if such negligence
directly and proximately cooperates with the inde-
pendent cause in the resulting injury. (Africa v. Caltex)
4. Cause as distinguished from condition
Courts distinguish “cause” from “condition”,
maintaining that the defendant’s act or omission is
not considered the cause if it merely created a
“passive static condition.”
The Supreme Court explained in Manila Electric Co. v.
Remoquillo, et al. that a prior and remote cause cannot
be made the basis of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or give
rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of
the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
Thus, even if the defendant had only created a
condition, he may be held liable for damages if such
condition resulted in harm to either person or
property. The most common examples of dangerous
conditions are:
1) Those that are inherently dangerous;
2) Those where a person places a thing which is
not dangerous in itself, in a dangerous
position; and
3) Those involving products and other things
which are dangerous because they are
defective.
Even if the plaintiff was guilty of antecedent
negligence, the defendant is still liable because he had
the last clear chance of avoiding injury. The law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
The doctrine of last clear chance means that
even though a person’s own acts may have placed him
in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured
person is entitled to recovery.
The doctrine is being applied for the purpose of
determining the proximate cause of the accident.
The Supreme Court does not relate the doctrine of the
last clear chance to the rule on contributory
negligence or comparative negligence. In most cases,
the Supreme Court used the doctrine in determining if
the negligence of the defendant was the proximate
cause and that of the plaintiff as contributory.
Cases where the doctrine is INAPPLICABLE
a) If the plaintiff was not negligent, that is, only the
defendant was negligent. (PNR v. Vizcara)
b) Where the defendant is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered;
at least in cases in which any previous negligence
of the party charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury.
c) If defendant’s negligence is a concurrent cause
and which was still in operation up to the time
the injury was inflicted. In other words, it cannot
be applied in the field of joint tortfeasors and it
cannot be invoked as between defendants who
are concurrently negligent.
d) Where the plaintiff, a passenger, filed an action
against a carrier based on contract.
e) If the actor, though negligent, was not aware of
the danger or risk brought about by a prior fraud
or negligent act
E. LEGAL INJURY
1. Concept
An injury is a harm suffered by a person due to some
act or omission done by another person, and can
generally give rise to a civil tort claim or a criminal
prosecution.
An injury or harm done is also an essential element of
unintentional torts.
2. Elements of right
1) The person of inheritance — There must be a
person who is the owner of the right. He is the
subject of the legal right. He is sometimes
described as the person of inheritance.
2) The person of incidence or Subject of the Duty
— A legal right occurs against another person or
persons who are under a corresponding duty to
respect that right. Such a person is called the
person of incidence or the subject of the duty.
3) Subject matter or Contents of legal rights —
deals with the subject matter of the legal rights. It
relates to some act to do or not to do any act or
forbearance. It obliges a person to act or forbear
in favor of the person who is entitled to the rights.
 4) Object of the legal rights — The thing or an object
over which the right is exercised.
5) Title — a process, by which the right is vested or
conferred.
3. Violation of right or legal injury
There is legal injury if a legal right has been violated.
Legal injury refers to a harm caused by the
infringement of a legal right.
4. Classes of injury
1) A permanent injury is a type of personal injury
of a nature that has a lasting, adverse effect on
employment potential.
2) An irreparable injury is a type of harm that
cannot be cured or reversed by monetary
compensation.
3) Injuries are divided into public and private; and
they affect the person, or property.
F. INTENTIONAL TORTS
1. General
a. Concept
The expanded coverage of tort finds resonance in
Articles 19, 20 and 21. Under any of these three (3)
provisions of law, an act which causes injury to
another may be made the basis for an award of
damages. There is a common element under Articles
19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional.
However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may
be done either “willfully,” or “negligently.”
b. Classes
1) Principle of Abuse of Rights under Art 19; and
2) Acts Contra Bonus Mores under Art 21.
Metroheights Subdivision HOA v. CMS Construction
2018
Considering that respondents would disconnect and
change petitioner's existing water line tapped from
Visayas Avenue to another tapping source, good faith
and prudence dictate that petitioner should be informed
or notified of such actions, as respondents admitted that
prior notice to affected areas is a standard operating
procedure.
Here, it was established that there was no notice, not
even a generalized notice, given by respondents to
petitioner regarding the rehabilitation project.
Respondents' actions were done in total disregard of the
standards set by Article 19 of the New Civil Code which
entitles petitioner to damages.
Northern Mindanao Industrial Port and Services v.
Iligan Cement 2018
Under Article 1326 of the Civil Code, ''advertisements
for bidders are simply invitations to make proposals,
and the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or
lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears."
As the discretion to accept or reject bids and award
contracts is of such wide latitude, courts will not
interfere, unless it is apparent that such discretion is
exercised arbitrarily, or used as a shield to a fraudulent
award. The exercise of that discretion is a policy
decision that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation,
comparison, evaluation, and deliberation.
Lomarda v. Fudalan 2020
While it appears that petitioners were engaged in a legal
act, i.e., exacting compliance with the requirements for
the installation of respondent's electricity in his
farmhouse, the circumstances of this case show that the
same was conducted contrary to morals and good
customs, and were in fact done with the intent to cause
injury to respondent. Petitioners did not only fail to
apprise respondent of the proper procedure to expedite
compliance with the requirements, they also misled him
to believe that everything can be settled, extorted
money from him when only a meager amount was due,
and worse, publicly humiliated him in front of many
people which ended up in the disconnection of his
electricity altogether.
Chevron Philippines v. Mendoza 2019
There was no abuse of right committed by Chevron in
denying an award of dealership in favor of Mendoza.
The one who got the dealership was chosen because of
their qualifications as well as the location.
Navarro-Banaria v. Banaria 2020
There is no question that as legal wife and guardian of
Pascasio, who is physically and mentally infirm,
Adelaida has the principal and overriding decision when
it comes to the affairs of her husband including the
celebration of the latter's 90th birthday.
Glaring is the fact that long before the scheduled date of
Pascasio's 90th birthday celebration, Adelaida was
already informed about the event. Adelaida intentionally
failed to bring Pascasio to the birthday celebration
prepared by the respondents thus violating Article 19 of
the Civil Code on the principle of abuse of right. Her
failure to observe good faith in the exercise of her right
as the wife of Pascasio caused loss and injury on the part
of the respondents, for which they must be
compensated by way of damages pursuant to Article 21.
Mercado v. Ongpin 2020 Leonen, J
The RTC was in error when it held that the mere
contracting of a second marriage despite the existence
of a first marriage is, by itself, a ground for damages
under Article 19 in relation to Article 20 or Article 21.
As correctly stressed by the CA, the bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do a wrongful act, of the
bigamous spouse must be established.
Here, it was not convincingly shown that appellant
deliberately contracted a second marriage despite
knowledge of the subsistence of his first marriage. He
believed in good faith that the divorce decree given to
his first wife was valid and binding in the Philippines
because he thought all along that his first wife at that
time was already an American citizen.
2. Interference with rights to persons and property
ART 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief:
 1) Prying into the privacy of another's
residence;
xxx
4) Vexing or humiliating another on account
of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
1. Violation of the constitutional right to privacy
that causes damage to another makes the actor
liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The claim
for damages may be anchored on deprivation of
due process, violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure or the privacy
of communication and correspondence and other
related rights specified in Article 32.
2. Generally, the right to privacy can be invoked
only by natural persons. Juridical persons cannot
invoke such right because the entire basis of the
right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party; a corporation would
have no such ground for relief.
3. The right against unreasonable searches and
seizure can, how- ever, be invoked by a juridical
entity. A corporation also has the right to be
secure in its papers and effects. Thus, violation
thereof will entitle the corporation to damages
under Article 32.
4. The right is purely personal in nature and it may
be invoked only by the person whose privacy is
claimed to have been violated.
5. The following types of tort of violation of privacy
are recognized in this jurisdiction:
a. Intrusion;
b. Publication of private facts;
c. Making one appear before the public in
an objectionable false light; and
d. Commercial appropriation of likeness of
another.
Sps Hing v. Choachuy, Sr 2013
The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s
residence,” covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers as private. And as long as
his right is recognized by society, other individuals may
not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore,
erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code only to residences.
Sps Padalhin v. Laviña 2012
Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the
pictures of Laviña’s residence without the latter’s
knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so
sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestor’s
surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. If
it were true that Laviña kept ivories in his diplomatic
residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation.
However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor
violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning
the privacy of one’s residence and he cannot hide
behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions
to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages
and attorney’s fees in Laviña’s favor is proper.
3. Interference with relations
2) Meddling with or disturbing the private
life or family relations of another;
3) Intriguing to cause another to be
alienated from his friends;
Kane v. Roggenkamp 2020 Leonen, J
An acquittal from a charge of physical violence against
women and their children is not a bar to the filing of a
civil action for damages for physical injuries under
Article 33 of the Civil Code if an acquittal was due to
reasonable doubt, without any declaration that the facts
upon which the offense arises are nonexistent.
Reservation of the right to separately file a civil action
for damages under Article 33 need not even be made.
The civil action under Article 33 may be pursued before
the filing of the criminal case, during the pendency of
the criminal case, or even after the criminal case is
resolved. The only limitation is that an offended party
cannot "recover damages twice for the same act or
omission" of the defendant.
G. NEGLIGENCE
1. Concept
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.
Picart v. Smith laid out the following test of
negligence: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinary person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Degrees of negligence
a) SLIGHT negligence. Failure to exercise great
or extraordinary care.
b) ORDINARY negligence. The want of ordinary
care and diligence.
c) GROSS negligence. Consists of an entire
absence of care or an absence of even slight
care or diligence; a thoughtless disregard for
the consequences or an indifference to the
rights or welfare of others.
Nature of the concept of negligence. It is RELATIVE
and COMPARATIVE. It is dependent upon the
situation of the parties and the care and vigilance
which the circumstances reasonably impose.
2. Good father of a family or reasonably prudent
person
Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct
that is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of the person,
time and place. The most common standard of
conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a
reasonably prudent person. To determine the
diligence which must be required of all persons, we
use as basis the abstract average standard
corresponding to a normal orderly person.
What would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man? It must be determined
 a) in the light of human experience and
b) in view of the facts involved in the particular
case.
Foreseeability of the harm is therefore an
INDISPENSABLE requirement.
3. Standard of care; emergency rule
The degree of care required to be exercised must
vary with the capacity of the person endangered to
care for himself.
A HIGH degree of care and diligence is required if it
involves:
a) Functions imbued with public interest, i.e.
banking business;
b) Objects that are dangerous, i.e. electricity;
c) An instrumentality extremely dangerous in
character, i.e. dangerous weapons or
substances.
Factors to be considered. In considering negligence,
the following are to be factored in:
a) Employment or occupation;
b) Degree of intelligence;
c) Physical condition;
d) Other circumstances reg persons, time, and
place.
EMERGENCY RULE. An individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act
without much time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence. (Valenzuela v. CA)
INAPPLICABLE. One who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about
by his own negligence. (Orix Metro Leasing v.
Mangalinao 2012)
4. Unreasonable risk of harm
An act may be negligent if it is done without the
competence that a reasonable person in the position
of the actor would recognize as necessary to prevent
it from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to
another.
5. Evidence
The presence of negligence may be established by
testimonial, documentary or real evidence that are
deemed acceptable under the Rules of Court.
Res Ipsa Loquitur as Evidentiary Rule
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where
1. the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant's
negligence;
2. the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the
person charged with the negligence
complained of; and
3. the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured.
The REQUISITES of the applicability of res ipsa
loquitur are:
1) the occurrence of an injury;
2) ⭐ the thing which caused the injury was
under the control and management of the
defendant;
3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things, would not have happened if
those who had control or management used
proper care; and
4) the absence of explanation by the defendant.
This is NOT a rule of substantive law but for mere
procedural convenience. It can only be invoked
when direct evidence is absent and not readily
available. It is applicable only in cases of pure tort and
NOT in culpa contractual cases.
The doctrine rests on inference and not on
presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant
the supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct
evidence is lacking.
Doctrine of Common Knowledge
In cases where res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court
is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper
proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of
expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper
standard of care. (Solidum v. People 2014 also
Borromeo v. Family Care Hospital 2016)
Doctrine of Informed Consent
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must
prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine
of informed consent:
1. the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks;
2. he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks;
3. as a direct and proximate result of the failure
to disclose, the patient consented to
treatment she otherwise would not have
consented to; and
4. plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment. (Rosit v. Davao Doctors Hospital
2015)
Burden of Proof
The party alleging the negligence of the other as the
cause of injury has the burden to establish the
allegation with competent evidence. If the action
based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof
 required is preponderance of evidence. (BJDC
Construction v. Lanuzo 2014)
The parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent. (Alano v. Magud-Logmao)
6. Presumption of negligence
a) Art 2184. xxxx a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice
within the next preceding two months.
b) Art 2185. xxxx a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation.
c) Art 2188. There is prima facie presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant if the
death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as
firearms and poison, except when the possession
or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation
or business.
Notes
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation
of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the
injury.
A causal connection must exist between the injury
received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It
must be proven that the violation of the traffic
regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
(Tison v. Sps Pomasin 2011)
7. Defenses
1) COMPLETE Defenses
a) Plaintiff’s Own Negligence;
ART 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. xxx
Exception Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance
One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child
is technically a trespasser in the premises. Note
however that this generally
is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or
artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location. (Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan)
b) Assumption of Risk;
The defense of assumption of risk presupposes:
1. that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the danger;
2. that he understood and appreciated the risk
from the danger; and
3. that he voluntarily exposed himself to such
risk.
The knowledge must be of the SPECIFIC risk that
caused the harm to the plaintiff. (Abrogar v. Cosmos
Bottling 2017)
When Inapplicable
1. A person is excused from the force of the rule,
that when he voluntarily assents to a known
danger he must abide by the consequences, if an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or
property of another is in peril, or when he seeks
to rescue his endangered property. (Ilocos Norte
Electric Company v. CA)
2. A passenger boarding an overloaded vehicle does
not amount to an implied assumption of risk.
(Calalas v. CA)
c) Doctrine of Last Clear Chance;
Already discussed above; additional note:
Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but
failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences
arising therefrom. (Greenstar Express v. Universal
Robina 2016)
d) Emergency Rule;
Already discussed above.
e) Prescription.
Actions based on quasi-delict shall prescribe 4 years
from the day that they may be brought.
The institution of a criminal action cannot have the
effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action
based on a quasi-delict. (Capuno v. Pepsi Cola Bottling)
Henson, Jr v. UCPB General Insurance 2019 En Banc
reiterated in Filcon Ready Mixed v. UCPB General
Insurance 2020
Following the principles of subrogation, the insurer only
steps into the shoes of the insured and therefore, for
purposes of prescription, inherits only the
remaining period within which the insured may file
an action against the wrongdoer. To be sure, the
prescriptive period of the action that the insured may
file against the wrongdoer begins at the time that the
tort was committed and the loss/injury occurred against
the insured.
2) PARTIAL Defense
a) Doctrine of Contributory Negligence.
ART 2179. xxx But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendant's lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
1. Contributory Negligence is the act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of
the person injured, which, concurring with the
defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of
the injury. (Cayao-Lasam v. Sps Ramolete)
2. A collecting bank is guilty of contributory
negligence when it accepted for deposit a post-
dated check notwithstanding that said check had
been cleared by the drawee bank which failed to
 return the check within the 24-hour reglementary
period. (Allied Banking v. BPI 2013)
3. It must be shown that plaintiff performed an act
that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs of an impending danger to
health and body. (Napocor v. Casionan)
H. SPECIAL LIABILITY IN PARTICULAR
ACTIVITIES
1. In general; concepts
There is strict liability if one is made liable
independent of fault, negligence or intent after
establishing certain facts specified by law. Strict
liability tort can be committed even if reasonable care
was exercised and regardless of the state of mind of
the actor at that time.
2. Products liability; manufacturers or processors
ART 2187. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused
by any noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists between
them and the consumers.
Nutrimix Feeds Corporation v. CA provides that the
following must be present before a manufacturer or
seller may be held liable for any damage caused by the
product:
1. first, proof that the product in question was
defective; (Coca-Cola Bottlers v. Meñez 2017)
2. second, the defect must be present upon
the delivery or manufacture of the product;
or when the product left the seller's or
manufacturer's control; or when the product
was sold to the purchaser; and
3. third, the product must have reached the user
or consumer without substantial change in
the condition it was sold. (Pascual v. Ford
Motors 2016)
3. Violation of constitutional rights; violation of
civil liberties
ART 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages: xxxx
Good faith not a defense in action for damages founded
on violation of constitutional rights. Under Article 32
and 2219, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral
damages from the public officer or employee responsible
therefore. In addition, exemplary damages may also be
awarded. To be liable under Article 32 it is enough that
there is a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should
have acted with malice or bad faith.
4. Violation of rights committed by public officers
ART 34. When a member of a city or municipal
police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life
or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor.
5. Provinces, cities and municipalities
ART 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision.
6. Owner of motor vehicle
ART 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the
due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent,
if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.
7. Proprietor of building or structure or thing
ART 2190. The proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damages resulting
from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs.
ART 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible
for damages caused:
1) By the explosion of machinery which has
not been taken care of with due
diligence, and the inflammation of
explosive substances which have not
been kept in a safe and adequate place;
2) By excessive smoke, which may be
harmful to persons or property;
3) By the falling of trees situated at or near
highways or lanes, if not caused by force
majeure;
4) By emanations from tubes, canals,
sewers or deposits of infectious matter,
constructed without precautions suitable
to the place.
8. Head of family
ART 2193. The head of a family that lives in a
building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling from
the same.
9. Violations of data privacy
Effect of Lawful Performance of Duty. — The Privacy
Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioners, or any
person acting on their behalf or under their direction,
shall not be civilly liable for acts done in good faith in
the performance of their duties: Provided, that they
shall be liable for willful or negligent acts, which are
contrary to law, morals, public policy, and good
customs, even if they acted under orders or instructions
of superiors.
Extent of Liability. — If the offender is a corporation,
partnership or any juridical person, the penalty shall
be imposed upon the responsible officers, as the case
may be, who participated in, or by their gross
negligence, allowed the commission of the crime.
 Where applicable, the court may also suspend or
revoke any of its rights under this Act.
I. STRICT LIABILITY
1. Animals; possessor and user of an animal
ART 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damage should come from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 is not based on
the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the
possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is
based on natural equity and on the principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which
such animal may cause. (Vestil v. IAC)
2. Nuisance
There is strict liability on the part of the owner or
possessor of the property where a nuisance is found
because he is obliged to abate the same irrespective of
the presence or absence of fault or negligence.
2) Liability for Defective Services. — The service
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that every
successive owner or possessor of property who fails
or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started
by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in
the same manner as the one who created it. (Art 696)
3. Products liability; Consumer Act
See Secs 97-102 Consumer Act of the Philippines
1) Liability for Defective Products. — Any Filipino
or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any
importer, shall be liable for redress,
independently of fault, for damages caused to
consumers by defects resulting from design,
manufacture, construction, assembly and
erection, formulas and handling and making up,
presentation or packing of their products, as well
as for the insufficient or inadequate information
on the use and hazards thereof.
A product is defective when it does not offer the
safety rightfully expected of it.
A product is not considered defective because
another better quality product has been placed in
the market.
The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer
shall not be held liable when it evidences:
a) that it did not place the product on the
market;
b) that although it did place the product on
the market such product has no defect;
c) that the consumer or a third party is
solely at fault.
The tradesman/seller is likewise liable when:
a) it is not possible to identify the
manufacturer, builder, producer or
importer;
b) the product is supplied, without clear
identification of the manufacturer,
producer, builder or importer;
c) he does not adequately preserve
perishable goods.
supplier is liable for redress, independently of
fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects
relating to the rendering of the services, as well as
for insufficient or inadequate information on the
fruition and hazards thereof.
The service is defective when it does not provide
the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of
it.
A service is not considered defective because of
the use or introduction of new techniques.
The supplier of the services shall not be held
liable when it is proven:
a) that there is no defect in the service
rendered;
b) that the consumer or third party is solely
at fault.
3) Ignorance of Quality Imperfection. — The
supplier's ignorance of the quality imperfections
due to inadequacy of the products and services
does not exempt him from any liability.
4) Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation. — The
stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing,
exonerating or reducing the obligation to
indemnify for damages effected is hereby
prohibited, if there is more than one person
responsible for the cause of the damage, they
shall be jointly liable for the redress.
However, if the damage is caused by a component
or part incorporated in the product or service, its
manufacturer, builder or importer and the person
who incorporated the component or part are
jointly liable.
DAMAGES
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Classification
2. Kinds of damages
3. When damages may be recovered
B. DAMAGES IN CASE OF DEATH
C. GRADUATION OF DAMAGES
1. Duty of injured party
2. Rules
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Classification
Damages is the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or
as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences
which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or
violation of some rights.
There is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
 Damnum absque injuria. Thus, there can be damage
with- out injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount
to a legal injury or wrong.
If damage results from a person exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
Damages to property or person are either general or
special.
1) General damages are such as naturally and
necessarily result from the wrong. They are such
as might accrue to any person similarly situated.
General damages need NOT be specially pleaded
and may be embraced in the general plea for
“such other relief as may be deemed just and
equitable under the premises.”
2) Special damages are such as do in fact accrue
to the particular individual by reason of the
particular circumstances of the case. Special
damages are such as have proximately resulted
but do not always immediately result from the
breach and will not therefore be implied by law.
Special damages must be specifically prayed for.
2. Kinds of damages
a. Actual and Compensatory
Actual and compensatory damages are those
recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business,
trade, property, profession, job or occupation.
Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not
only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the
profits which the obligee failed to obtain.
To seek recovery for actual damages, it is necessary to
prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of
loss.
Actual or compensatory damages under the prevailing
law may be classified into two.
1. One is the loss of what a person already
possesses (daño emergente), and
2. the other is the failure to receive as a benefit
that would have pertained to him (lucro
cesante).
Attorney’s Fees
In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered, except:
1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
2) When the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;
3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution
against the plaintiff;
4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
5) Where the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable
claim;
6) In actions for legal support;
7) In actions for the recovery of wages of
household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer's liability laws;
9) In a separate civil action to recover civil
liability arising from a crime;
10) When at least double judicial costs are
awarded;
11) In any other case where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such
damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of
the court, according to the circumstances of each case.
(Art 2216)
b. Moral
Moral damages are meant to enable the injured party
to obtain the means, diversions or amusements in
order to alleviate the moral suffering.
Moral damages may be awarded if the contractual
breach is found to be wanton and deliberately
injurious, or if the one responsible acted fraudulently
or with malice or bad faith.
The principle that, in an action for breach of contract
of carriage, moral damages may be awarded only in
case
1) an accident results in the death of a
passenger; or
2) the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith,
is pursuant to Article 1764, in relation to Article
2206(3) of the Civil Code, and Article 2220 thereof.
(Darines v. Quiñones)
Case law establishes the following requisites for the
award of moral damages:
1) there must be an injury clearly sustained by
the claimant, whether physical, mental or
psychological;
2) there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established;
3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant
is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by the claimant; and
4) the award for damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Article 2219.
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts;
4) Adultery or concubinage;
 5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
6) Illegal search;
7) Libel, slander or any other form of
defamation;
8) Malicious prosecution;
9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Rule as to Juridical Persons. — A juridical person is
generally not entitled to moral damages because,
unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical
suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
However, where the claim for moral damages falls
under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be recovered. This provision expressly
authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of
libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article
2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a
natural or juridical person.
c. Nominal
Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal
right is technically violated and must be vindicated
against an invasion that has produced no actual
present loss of any kind or where there has been a
breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual
damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.
(Seven Brothers v. DMC Construction)
d. Temperate
Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for
loss of earning capacity may be awarded where
earning capacity is plainly established but no
evidence was presented to support the allegation of
the injured party's actual income.
It is wrong to award, along with nominal damages,
temperate or moderate damages. The two awards
are incompatible and cannot be granted
concurrently.
e. Liquidated
Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the
parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach
thereof.
When the breach of the contract committed by the
defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties
in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall
determine the measure of damages, and not the
stipulation.
f. Exemplary
Exemplary damages are designed to permit the
courts to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious
in its consequence by creating negative incentives or
deterrents against such behavior.
Requisites:
1. May be imposed as way of example in
addition to compensatory damages, and only
after the claimant’s right to them has been
established;
2. Cannot be recovered as a matter of right,
always based on amount of compensatory
damages;
3. The act must be accompanied by bad faith, or
done in wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
3. When damages may be recovered
Damages may be recovered:
1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in
cases of temporary or permanent personal
injury;
2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing
or commercial credit.
B. DAMAGES IN CASE OF DEATH
When death occurs due to a negligent act or a crime, the
following damages may be recovered:
1) Civil indemnity ex delicto;
2) Actual or compensatory damages;
3) Moral damages;
4) Exemplary damages;
5) Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation;
6) Interest, in proper cases; and
7) Temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages in
proper cases.
Death indemnity. The amount of damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least Php50K,
even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter;
such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity
at the time of his death;
2) If the deceased was obliged to give support
according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the
decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from
the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be
fixed by the court;
3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased.
Loss of Earning Capacity.
Where:
( );
 GAI = Gross Annual Income;
NLE = Necessary Living Expense.
GR: Must be established through
documentary proof.
EXC:
1) Self-employed earning less than minimum wage;
2) Daily wage earner earning less than MW.
C. GRADUATION OF DAMAGES
1. Duty of injured party
Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences. The party
suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question. (Art
2203)
2. Rules
a. In crimes
The damages to be adjudicated may be respectively
increased or lessened according to the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.
The defendants shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of, whether or not such
damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
This is referred to as the eggshell skull rule (or thin-
skull rule) which makes an individual responsible for
all the conse- quences of his act, whether foreseen or
unforeseen.
b. In quasi-delicts
Actual damages include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.
The contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall
reduce the damages that he may recover.
References and Sources:
c. In contracts and quasi-contracts 2. Agency & Trusts, Partnerships & Joint Ventures
Outline by Dean Villanueva, et al, 2018;
The damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and 3. Notes and Case Updates in Land Titles and
probable consequences of the breach of the Deeds by Atty. Gimarino, 2017-18;
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time the 4. Torts and Damages by Aquino, 2013;
obligation was constituted.
5. Civil Code Annotated Vol 1-5 by Paras, 2016.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude,
the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance
of the obligation. (Art 2201)
In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the
court may equitably mitigate the damages under
circumstances other than the case referred to in the
preceding article, as in the following instances:
1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the
terms of the contract;
2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as
a result of the contract;
3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be
awarded, that the defendant acted upon the
advice of counsel;
4) That the loss would have resulted in any
event;
5) That since the filing of the action, the
defendant has done his best to lessen the
plaintiff's loss or injury.
d. Liquidated damages
Liquidated damages, whether intended as an
indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if
they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
e. Compromise
A release or compromise for personal injury
sustained by negligence was held a bar to an action
for the recovery of further damages.
1. Law on Sales Outline by Dean Villanueva, 2017-
18;