GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

SILVASSA CAMPUS

SUBJECT: Legal Methods

Case Brief

Submitted to: Ms. Nandita Gugnani

Submitted by: Jayani Tiwari

Ajay pal

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Table of Content

Case brief 1: Sahoo v. state of Uttar Pradesh……………………………………………………….

Case brief 2: Vishaka v. state of

Rajasthan………………………………………………………….

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CASE TITLE. SAHOO VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

CITATION .1966 AIR 40,1965 SCR (3) 86

COURT: .IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. SHAH, J.C. BACHAWAT, R.S.

NAME OF THE PARTIES. PETITIONER: SAHOO

Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/02/1965

Facts:
The appellant, Sahoo had lost his wife years ago and had two sons Badri and Kirpa Sanker.
His elder son Badri married a woman named Sunderpatti. Badri had taken up employment in
Lucknow and hence his wife lived with his father, the appellant. It was commonly believed
that Sunderpatti and Sahoo shared an illegitimate relationship which was intimate in nature.
during one such quarrel, to the house of a neighbor Muhmamad Abdullah. When she
returned to their house a verbal quarrel ensued, after which they both slept in the only room
of the house. The appellant’s second son, Kirpa Shanker, an 8-year-old boy was the only other
resident of the house. The next morning Sunderpatti was found severely injured and was
rushed to the hospital however she died soon after. Early on the same morning, the appellant
was seen out muttering to himself, the fact that as he had finished Sunderpatti he had put an
end to the daily quarrels.
Sahoo, the appellant, is a resident of Pachperwa in the District of Gonda. He has two sons, Badri
and KirpaShanker. He lost his wife years ago. His eldest son, Badri, married one Sunderpatti.
Badri was employed in Lucknow, and his wife was residing with his father. It is said that
Sunderpatti developed illicit intimacy with Sahoo; but there were incessant quarrels between
them. On August 12, 1963, during one of those quarrels, Sunderpatti ran away to the house of
one Mohammed Abdullah, a neighbor of theirs. The appellant brought her back, and after some

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wordy altercation between them they slept in the only room of their house. The only other inmate
of the house was the appellant's second son, KirpaShanker. On the morning of August 13, 1963,
when Kripa Shanker returned home after attending nature calls, he found Sunderpatti with
serious injuries in the room of the house where she was sleeping, and the appellant was not in the
house. Meanwhile two prosecution witnesses heard Sahoo muttering to himself “finished
Sunderpatti, finished the daily quarrels”. Later, Sunderpattiwas admitted in the Sadar Hospital
Gonda, at 5.25 p.m. on that day and she died on August 26, 1963 at 3 p.m. Thereafter Sahoo was
sent up for trial before the Court of Sessions, Gonda, on a charge under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code.

Issues:

Whether muttering by the accused amounts to confession under the Indian Evidence Act, if so, is
it admissible evidence under Section 17 of the Act?

Provision of law:

17. Admission defined. An admission is a statement, 1 [oral or documentary or contained in

electronic form], which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which
is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned

24. Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal

proceeding A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the
making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or
2 promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in
authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which
would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or
avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.

25. Confession to police-officer not to be proved. No confession made to police- officer, shall
be proved as against a person accused of any offence.

26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him. No
confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-officer, unless it be made

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in the immediate presence of a Magistrate shall be proved as against such person. 5 [Explanation:
In this section “Magistrate” does not include the head of a village discharging magisterial
functions in the Presidency of Fort St. George 6 or elsewhere, unless such headman is a
Magistrate exercising the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 18827
(10 of 1882).]

27.How much of information received from accused may be proved. ––Provided that, when any
fact is deposed to as discovered inconsequence of information received from a person accused of
any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts
to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved

. 28. Confession made after removal of impression caused by inducement, threat or

promise, relevant. If such a confession as is referred to in section 24 is made after the
impression caused by any such inducement, threat or promise has, in the opinion of the Court,
been fully removed, it is relevant.

29. Confession otherwise relevant not to become irrelevant because of promise of secrecy,
etc.––If such a confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant merely because it
was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception practiced on the accused
person for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk, or because it was made in answer
to questions which 1. Ins. by Act 21 of 2000, s. 92 and the Second Schedule (w.e.f. 17-10-2000).
2. For prohibition of such inducements, etc., see the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act of
1974), s. 316. 3. As to statements made to police-officer investigating a case, see s. 162, ibid. 4.
A coroner has been declared to be a Magistrate for the Purposes of this section, see the coroners
Act, 1871(Act 4 of 1871), s. 20. 5. Ins. by Act 3 of 1891, s. 3. 6. The words “or in Burma” rep.
by the A.O. 1937. 7. See now the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). 22 he need
not have answered, whatever may have been the form of those questions, or because he was not
warned that he was not bound to make such confession, and that evidence of it might be given
against him.

30. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under
trial for same offence. When more persons than one is being tried jointly for the same offence,
and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons
is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as

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well as against the person who makes such confession. 1 [Explanation. “Offence,” as used in this
section, includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit, the offence.]

Contentions of the Appellant:

Mere muttering cannot be considered as confession. Confession needs to be made by the

offender to someone else. Further the circumstantial evidences were not sufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused as there were no direct evidences.

Contentions of the Respondent:

Confession need not be made to someone else, mere muttering is sufficient. Further the series
of circumstantial evidences point towards the guilt of the accused. The incident of Sunderpatti
running into her neighbor’s household seeking help clearly establishes the enmity between the
appellant and the deceased. Moreover, Kripa Shanker witnessed the appellant leaving the house
murmuring something.

Judgement:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: “The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Subba Rao, J. Sahoo, the appellant, is a resident of Pachperwa in the District of Gonda. He has
two sons, Badri and Kirpa Shanker. He lost his wife years ago. His eldest son, Badri, married
one Sunderpatti. Badri was employed in Lucknow, and his wife was residing with his father. It
is said that Sunderpatti developed illicit intimacy with Sahoo; but there were incessant quarrels
between them. On August 12, 1963, during one of those quarrels, Sunderpatti ran away to the
house of one Mohammed Abdullah, a neighbor of theirs. The appellant brought her back, and
after some wordy altercation between them they slept in the only room of their house. The only
other inmate of the house was the appellant’s second son, Kirpa Shanker, a lad of about 8 years.
On the morning of August 13, 1963 Sunderpatti was found with serious injuries in the room of
the house where she was sleeping and the appellant was not in the house. Sunderpatti was
admitted in the Sadar Hospital Gonda, at 5.25 p.m. on that day and she died on August 26, 1963
at 3 p.m. Sahoo was sent up for trial before the Court of Sessions, Gonda, on a charge under s.
302 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge, on a consideration of the entire
evidence came to the conclusion that Sahoo killed Sunderpatti. On that finding, he convicted the

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accused under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to death. On appeal, a Division
Bench of the High Court at Allahabad confirmed both the conviction and the sentence. Hence the
appeal. Except for an extra-judicial confession, the entire evidence in the case is circumstantial.
Before we advert to the arguments advanced in the appeal it will be convenient to narrate the
circumstances found by the High Court, which are as follows: (1) The accused had illicit
connections with the deceased; (2) the deceased and the accused had some quarrel
on the Janmashtami day in the evening and the deceased had to be persuaded through the
influence of them

(3) neighbors Mohammed Abdullah and his womenfolk, to go back to the house of the accused;
the deceased was seen in the company of the accused for the fast time when she was alive;
during the fateful night 3 persons, namely. the accused. The deceased and the accused’s second
son, Kirpa Shanker slept in the room inside the house; on the early morning of next day, was
asked by his father to go out to attend to calls of nature, and when he came back to the verandah
of the house, he heard some gurgling sound and he saw his father going out of the house
murmuring something; and (6) P. Ws. 9, 11, 13 88 and 15 saw the accused going out of the
house at about 6 a.m. on that day soliloquizing that he had finished Sunderpatti and thereby
finished the daily quarrels. This Court in a series of decisions has reaffirmed the following well-
settled rule of “circumstantial evidence". The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be in the first instance fully established. "All the facts so established
should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and the circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and tendency that they should be such as to exclude other
hypotheses but the one proposed to be proved." Before we consider whether the circumstances
narrated above would stand the said rigorous test, we will at the outset deal with the contention
that the soliloquy of the accused admitting his guilt was not an extra-judicial confession as the
Courts below held it to be. If it was an extra-judicial confession, it would really partake the
character of direct evidence rather than that of circumstantial evidence. It is argued that it is
implicit in the concept of confession, whether it is extra-judicial or judicial, that it shall be
communicated to another. It is said that one cannot confess to himself: he can only confess to
another. This raises an interesting point, which fails to be decided on a consideration of the
relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act deal with the
admissibility of confessions by accused persons in criminal cases. But the expression
"confession" is not defined. The Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayana v. R. (1) has defined
the said expression thus”: "A confession is a statement made by an accused ‘which must either
admit in terms the offence. or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence."

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A scrutiny of the provisions of ss. 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act discloses, as one learned author
puts it, that statement is a genus. admission is the species and confession are the sub-species.
Shortly stated, a confession is a statement made by an accused admitting his guilt. What does the
expression “statement" mean? The dictionary meaning of the word "statement" is "the act of
stating, reciting or presenting verbally or on paper. “The term "statement" therefore, includes
both oral and written statements. Is it also a necessary ingredient of the term that it shall be
communicated to another? The dictionary meaning of the term does not warrant any such
extension; nor the reason of the rule underlying the doctrine of admission or confession demands
it. Admissions and confessions are exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Evidence Act places them
in the category of relevant evidence, presumably on the ground that, as they are declarations
against the interest of the person making them, they are probably true. The probative value of 89
an admission or a confession does not depend upon its communication to another, though, just
like any other piece of evidence, it can be admitted in evidence only on proof. This proof in the
case of oral admission or confession can be offered only by witnesses who heard the
admission or confession, as the case may be. The following illustration pertaining to a written
confession brings out the said idea: A kills B; enters in his diary that he had killed him, puts
it in his drawer and absconds. When he places his act on record, he does not communicate to
another; indeed, he does not have any intention of communicating it to a third party. Even so, at
the trial the said statement of the accused can certainly be proved as a confession made by him.
If that be so in the case of a statement in writing, there cannot be
any difference in principle in the case of an oral statement. Both must stand on the same footing.
This aspect of the doctrine of confession received some treatment from well-known authors
on evidence, like Taylor, Best and Phipson. In "A Treatise on the Law of Evidence" by Taylor,
11th Edn., Vol. I, the following statement appears at p. 596:"What the accused has
been overheard muttering to himself, or saying to his wife or to any other person in confidence,
will be receivable in evidence." In "The Principles of the Law of Evidence" by W.M. Best, 12th
Edn., at p. 454, it is stated much to the same effect thus: “Words addressed to others, and writing,
are no doubt the most usual forms; but words uttered in soliloquy seem equally receivable. “We
also find the following passage in "Phipson on Evidence", 7th Edn., at p. 262: "A statement
which the prisoner had been overheard muttering to himself, if otherwise than in his sleep, is
admissible against him, if independently proved." These passages establish that communication
to another is not a necessary ingredient of the concept of "confession". In this context a decision
of this Court in Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya v The State of Bombay 1959 AIR 356

(1) may usefully be referred to. There the question was whether a former statement made by a
witness within the meaning of $. 157 of the Evidence Act should have been
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communicated to another before it could be used to corroborate the testimony of another witness.
This Court, after considering the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and the case-law on the
subject came to the conclusion that the word "statement" used in s.157 meant only "something
that is stated" and the element of communication was not necessary before “something that is
stated" became a statement under that section. If, as we have said, statement is the genus
and confession is only a sub-species of that genus, we do not see any reason why the statement
implied in the confession should be given (1) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 310. 90 a different meaning.
We, therefore, hold that a statement, whether communicated or not, admitting guilt is a
confession of guilt. But there is a clear distinction between the admissibility of an evidence and
the weight to be attached to it. A confessional soliloquy is a direct piece of evidence. It may be
an expression of conflict of emotion; a conscious effort to stifle the pricked conscience; an
argument to find excuse or justification for his act; penitent or remorseful act of exaggeration of
his part in the crime. The tone may be soft and low; the words may be confused; they may be
capable of conflicting interpretations depending on witnesses, whether they are biased or honest,
intelligent or ignorant, imaginative or prosaic, as the case may be. Generally, they are mutterings
of a confuse mind. Before such evidence can be accepted, it must be established by
cogent evidence what were the exact words used by the accused. Even if so much was
established, prudence and justice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of
conviction. It may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. The circumstances found
by the High Court, which we have stated earlier, lead to the only conclusion that the accused
must have committed the murder. No other reasonable hypothesis was or could be
suggested. Further, in this case, as we have noticed earlier, P.W. s 11,13 and 15 deposed that
they clearly heard the accused say when he opened the door of the house and came out at 6
0’clock in the morning of the fateful day that he had "finished Sunderpatti, his daughter-in-law,
and thereby finished the daily quarrels”. We hold that this extra- judicial confession is relevant
evidence: it certainly corroborates the circumstantial evidence adduced in the case. In the result,
we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court both in regard to the conviction
and the sentence. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed

Ratio decidendi:

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The Court was satisfied with the series of circumstantial evidences and held that the extra
judicial confession made by the appellant was proved beyond doubt by the prosecution. The oral
statement made by the accused was admissible under Section 17 of the Evidence Act

Application of the laws:

Indian penal code section 302

Indian evidence acts 17, 24 to 30

Code of criminal procedure warrant trail

Result:
in the result, a Division Bench of the High Court at Allahabad confirmed both the conviction and
the sentence. we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court both in regard to the
conviction and the sentence. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

References:
[1] https://blog.ipleaders.in/confessions-under-the-indian-evidence-act/

[2] https://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1547/Confession-under-Indian-Evidence-Act.html

[3] https://www.legalauthority.in/

[4] Indian evidence act,1872

[5] Indian penal code,1860

[6] online sources

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NAME OF THE CASE: VISHAKA AND ORS. V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

CITATION:1997 SC 3011

DATE OF THE JUDGEMENT:13 AUGUST 1997

PETITIONER: VISHAKA & ORS.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF RAJASTHAN

BENCH: J.S. VERMA (CHIEF JUSTICE), SUJATA V. MANOHAR, B.N. KIRPAL

STATUETES: CONSTITUTION INVOLVED INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 &

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

IMPORTANT ARTICLES: ARTICLE 14, 19 & 21

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Facts of the case:

It is crucial to provide the case's facts in-depth at the beginning in order to facilitate a better
understanding. First, this campaign for gender justice was immediately sparked by the reported
horrifying gang rape of a lady in a village in the Indian state of Rajasthan. Bhanwari Devi, a
social worker, was gang-raped as payment for her dedicated efforts to prevent child marriage.
Sadly, this criminal case was dropped [1] because there wasn't enough evidence to prove the
offence. However, given that there is now gender equality, this episode garnered support from a
number of NGOs and social activists, highlighting the necessity for specific legislation for
workplace sexual harassment of women. Following then, this writ suit was filed under Article 32
on the grounds of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.

Issues:

1. Does sexual harassment in the workplace violate Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution's
Fundamental Rights?

2. Can an international convention be used where there are no suitable domestic laws?

3. Is it necessary to establish laws that must be followed in light of workplace sexual

harassment?

Petitioners’ arguments:

The 'Vishaka' group, which was made up of a number of women's rights activists, NGOs, and
other social activists, filed a writ petition asking for the writ of mandamus. They make the claim
that sexual harassment of women at work violates their fundamental rights as guaranteed by
Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The petitioners called the Hon'ble
court's attention to a gap in the law that pertains to the establishment of a safe workplace for

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women. They asked the Supreme Court to establish rules to stop sexual harassment in the
workplace.

Respondent’s arguments:

The learned Solicitor General backed the petitioners in this case when he appeared on behalf of
the respondents (with their consent). The respondent helped the honorable court develop the
rules for sexual harassment prevention and come up with an efficient way to stop it. Along with
Ms. Naina Kapur and Ms. Meenakshi, Fali S. Nariman, the honorable court's amicus curiae,
helped the court with the aforementioned case.

Provision of law:

A blatant violation of Articles 14 and 15, as well as Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, was
discovered by the court, first. The court also cited a few additional pertinent clauses, most
notably Articles 42 (Law on Fair and Humane Working Conditions and Maternity Allowance)
and 51A (Fundamental Obligations of Citizens).

The court also addressed the issue of applying international agreements in the absence of the
necessary national law. The Court emphasized that the objective of the constitutional guarantee
stated in Article 51 can be furthered by applying a substantial international agreement that is
compatible with both fundamental rights and its scope. and Article 253. Parliament to enact
legislation to carry out international treaties and standards) read with Entry 14 of the Union List
of the 7th Schedule to the Indian Constitution. The court also emphasized Article 73 (the scope
of the Union's executive power). Thirdly, the court emphasis ed the significance of international
treaties and norms, recognizing the need for rules to implement gender equality and the
universality of the right to a decent wage.

The Beijing Declaration on the Principles of Judicial Independence in the LAVASIA Region,
which establishes the minimal requirements that must be followed to ensure the independence

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 and efficient operation of the judiciary, was taken into consideration by the Court. Regarding the
issue at hand, the court referred to The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women's Articles 11 and 24. Later, the court cited Nilabati Behera v.
and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teohof the High Court of Australia. The
State of Orissa applies international norms once more to gain a gender-based understanding of
the fundamental rights that are specifically mentioned in the Constitution.

Before the Bhanwari Devi case, women had encountered sexual harassment at workplace
however, in the absence of a law, were dealt with under

Sections 354 IPC (Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty).
509 IPC Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman
294 IPC obscene acts in any public place, or Sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad words,
in or near any public place.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court of India's historic decision in the Vishakha and Others v. State of Rajasthan
case established standards for how to handle workplace sexual harassment of women. In
response to a public interest lawsuit brought by the Vishakha Committee, a group of women's
rights campaigners, the judgement was handed down on August 13, 1997.

According to the ruling, sexual harassment of women at work violates their fundamental rights
as guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Indian Constitution. According to the court,
sexual harassment includes "unwanted sexually determined behavior (whether directly or
indirectly) including physical contact and approaches, a demand or request for sexual favors,
sexually charged statements, showing pornography, or any other unwelcome physical, sexually
explicit language or behavior’s court subsequently published standards for sexual harassment
prevention and reparation that must be followed by every employer, including those in the public
and private sectors. These recommendations include:

the creation of a complaints committee to look into and decide on sexual harassment claims.

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Ratio decidendi:

Although it is a fundamental right to be able to pursue any line of work, this freedom is heavily
reliant on the availability of a safe workplace. The protection of the right to life in the Indian
Constitution also includes the right to a life of dignity.

In order to ensure such safety and protection of dignity, the legislature and executive branch must
pass the relevant legislation and put the required safeguards in place.

The court came to the conclusion that gender equality is incorporated in the Indian Constitution and
that the avoidance of sexual harassment is a crucial aspect of gender equality after considering a
number of legal judgements and the relevant Constitutional Article.

Absent any particular laws, the court must follow Article 32 has the power to enforce any
fundamental rights.

Present status:

First and foremost, it's important to recognition the Honourable Supreme Court's work. When
taken seriously, this case deals with one of the most important and delicate topics for women,
and it has definitely brought the subject to light. Additionally, recognizing regulatory gaps and
the need for the judiciary to provide a necessary response to societal ills improves the
fundamentals of democracy. Unquestionably, the Court's decision to convert a foreign treaty into
domestic law is finished. If we compare the current to the past, sexual harassment still puts
women in danger. A woman's life is negatively impacted by one of these events in a variety of
ways. Many instances of sexual harassment have been recorded already eight years after the
Sexual Harassment of Women in the Workplace Act went into force in 2013, but many others go
undetected.

High hopes for a measure that has been pending for more than 16 years have not been released
by the law. Numerous passages are harmful and invalid, and several crucial functions are absent.
Important mechanisms including the availability of legal counsel, clinical counselling services,
health insurance for victims of violence, employer's compensation, etc. The law, which was
meant to be extremely victim-friendly, creates difficulties for the victim at each stage. Laws
should be updated to reflect cultural changes, particularly in cases of sexual abuse and violence.

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In many instances, the failure to connect social and legal advancement says eloquently about
how deeply offensive behaviors like sexual harassment are seen. The law must be carefully
examined by the legislator, and any errors must be fixed. The legislature must work hard and
seriously to confront and solve this issue in a highly afflicted society like India. Since
independence, social progress has been made in boosting women's influence, although there are
still a number of areas where progress is needed. This enormous disparity can have its roots in
society's gender-biased mentality. The ultimate solution is a real change in the mindset of society
to establish gender equality. Only then can one proudly display the pen of Women's
Empowerment.

Vishaka Guidelines:

The Court decided that a set of standards are required in order to meaningfully dispose of the
case since sexual harassment causes victims to become depraved and is a grave breach of their
fundamental rights as guaranteed by Articles 14, 19, and 21. In addition to promising to develop
a women's policy that would ensure that women's rights are respected and give them a safe
environment to thrive in many spheres of life, the Union of India also offered its approval for the
guidelines through the Solicitor General.

Sexual harassment was characterized by the court as any unwanted physical contact or activity,
pornographic display, and requests for any form of sexual favors.

 It was decided that information about workplace sexual harassment should be created,
published, and disseminated. Every instance of harassment must be handled properly,
which may entail legal action as well as disciplinary measures.
 Workplaces should have a reliable procedure in place for the prompt and efficient
resolution of grievances.
 A complaints committee should be established, with a female head of state and at least
half of its members being female.
 A third party, such as an NGO, ought to be involved in order to avoid any pressure from
the higher-ups at the company.
 Additionally, actionable actions must be done to educate employees about sexual
harassment in the workplace and how to report it.

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  harassed at the workplace.

Result:

As more women enter the workforce, India is achieving its development goals in a significant
way. The protection of women's human rights includes acknowledging their right to protection
from sexual harassment. All of this is a step towards ensuring women's independence, equality of
opportunity, and the right to respectable employment. Workplace sexual harassment is a social
issue that requires attention. The awareness of employers and workers of the many forms of
sexual harassment at work, as well as regarding preventative methods and legal frameworks for
the prevention and treatment of sexual harassment, should be increased. It goes without saying
that this event will prove to be one of the pivotal moments in the society needs to be changed in
light of the empowerment of women. It is important to recognize the court's efforts in this case to
resolve a comprehensible issue in a straightforward manner. This judgement will definitely stand
as a significant precedent even today. In 2013, the Law on Sexual Harassment of Women in the
Workplace finally went into effect, bringing forth a number of essential laws. However, despite
the existence of such laws, sexual harassment in the workplace remains a social issue. On the
other hand, males might experience sexual harassment in a variety of ways. All of this will result
in the passage of crucial laws addressing every facet of this problem. Expectant and deliberate
efforts should be made, and they should be evaluated frequently, to Create best practices for
handling sexual harassment in the workplace, and inform and warn potential victims so they can
prevent it. Women may fight it by improving sexual harassment education programs and
adhering to sexual harassment prevention recommendations. A country's state can be determined
by how well off its women are. - Jawaharlal Nehru, Pandit

Reference:

[1] Vishakha and others v State of Rajasthan, 2021) [2] (Last accessed on 27 July 2021) Beijing
Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the Lawasia
Region, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Beijing-Statement.pdf

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[2] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/

[3]High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, HCA 20,
(1995) 183 CLR 273 [7] Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1993, SC 1960

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