Honorable Judges, /your lordships,

I stand before you today to address the maintainability of the Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed
by my client, Mr. Rohan Mehra, under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This article
empowers the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, or
order in any matter or cause passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

Key Points of Argument:

1. *Substantial Question of Law:*

- The High Court's judgment raises substantial questions of law that require the Supreme
Court's intervention. In *Pritam Singh v. The State (1950) SCR 453*, the Supreme Court
emphasized that SLPs should be entertained when there is a significant question of law or gross
miscarriage of justice.

- The interpretation of consent under Section 375 of the IPC in the context of a promise of
marriage involves complex legal questions that merit consideration by this Honorable Court.

2. *Gross Miscarriage of Justice:*

- The High Court's decision to convict Mr. Mehra for rape on the pretext of marriage, despite
substantial evidence of consensual relations, constitutes a gross miscarriage of justice. The
principles laid down in *Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh (1955) 1 SCR 267*
and *State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384* underscore the necessity of intervening
where lower courts have committed manifest errors.

- The trial court acquitted Mr. Mehra, recognizing the consensual nature of the relationship.
The High Court's reversal, without adequate consideration of the trial court's findings, demands
scrutiny.

3. *Exceptional Circumstances:*

- The discretionary power of this Court under Article 136 is meant for exceptional cases, as
reiterated in *Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2013) 2 SCC 398*. This case
presents exceptional circumstances where the legal interpretations and factual findings of the
High Court need careful re-examination.

- In *Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675*, the Supreme Court held that a
genuine promise of marriage, which does not materialize, does not constitute rape unless it is
proven to be deceitful from the outset. This principle is directly applicable to our case and
warrants the Supreme Court's intervention to ensure justice.

4. *Correcting Substantial Legal Errors:*

- The judgment of the High Court involves substantial errors in the application of legal
principles regarding consent and the implications of promises of marriage. As held in *Bihar
Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India (1986) 4 SCC 767*, the Supreme Court must
step in to correct such errors to prevent injustice.

- The case of *Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 7 SCC 171* highlights that
mere breach of a promise to marry does not amount to rape unless there was an intention to
deceive at the time of obtaining consent. This critical legal point was overlooked by the High
Court.

Conclusion:

In light of these arguments, it is evident that the SLP raises substantial questions of law and
involves a gross miscarriage of justice. The principles laid down in landmark cases such as
*Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (1962) 1 SCR 450, **Khoday
Distilleries Ltd. v. Mahadeshwara S.S.K. Ltd. (2019) 4 SCC 376, and **Hari Vishnu
Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (1955) 1 SCR 1104* strongly support the maintainability of this
petition.

Therefore, we respectfully submit that the SLP should be admitted, and the High Court's
judgment should be reviewed to ensure justice is served and legal principles are correctly
applied.

Thank you. Your lordships ,