JCHAS 737 1–9

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Presenting of failure probability

assessment pattern by FTA
in Fuzzy logic (case study:
Distillation tower unit of oil
refinery process)
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is an appropriate tool for failure analysis and failure rate determination. In some
cases, it is difficult or even impossible to determine the relationships among the main factors of system
failure. Moreover manual calculation of subsystem failure probability rate is hard or impossible. Also, in
some situation for the lack of information about the process and main event obtained results are uncertain.
This is where fuzzy tool can be best exploited. In this study with matching of FTA and fuzzy for
determination of failure probability, we can obtain accurate and certain results. Refinery industry is one
of the most dangerous industries in Iran and in some places it is located near the crowded cities. The
distillation unit, as one of the most dangerous units in this industry, was evaluated by Fuzzy Fault tree
analysis (FFTA) tool. The findings of this study can be used in risk management method.

Q1 By M. Omidvari,
S.M.R. Lavasani,
S. Mirza
INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment is performed in order
to achieve an appropriate decision for
two following items: (A) accepting the
Q3 M. Omidvari is Assistant Professor af-
filiated with the Industrial and Me-
chanical Engineering Faculty, Qazvin
Branch, Islamic Azad University, Qaz-
vin, Iran (Tel.: 281 3670051;
fax: 281 3670051;
e-mail: Omidvari88@yahoo.com).
S.M.R. Lavasani is affiliated with the
Environmental and Energy Faculty,
Science and Research Branch, Islamic
Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
S. Mirza is Graduate student affiliated
with the HSE Department, Environ-
mental and Energy Faculty, Science
and Research Branch, Islamic Azad
University, Tehran, Iran.
existing condition or deciding to extol
to a higher level. (B) Different between
important risks and the risks which are
less important.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a logical
and diagrammatic method of evaluat-
ing the probability of an accident that
results from sequences of faults and
failure events. FTA is useful for under-
standing the mode of an accident’s
occurrence logically. Furthermore, giv-
en the failure probabilities of system
components, the probability of the fi-
nal event can be calculated. The sim-
plest way in formulating a reliability
problem is to use the standard Boolean
operators AND, OR and NOT.
In conventional FTA, the failure
probabilities of system components
are treated as exact values. However,
for many systems, it is sometimes very
difficult to estimate the precise failure
rates or probabilities of individual
components or failure events in the
quantitative FTA from the past occur-
rences. In other words, the crisp ap-
proach tends to have difficulty in
conveying imprecision or vagueness
nature in system modeling to represent
the failure rate of system component.1
Fuzzy set analysis happens under a
dynamically changing environment
or in systems where available data
are incomplete or insufficient for sta-
tistical inferences. In the absence of
exact data, it may be necessary to work
with rough estimations of probabili-
ties. Under these conditions, it may
be inappropriate to use the conven-
tional FTA for computing the system
failure probability. It is necessary to
develop a new kind of formalism to
capture the subjectivity and the impre-
cision of failure data for use in FTA.
Instead of the probability of failure, it
will be more appropriate to propose
the possibility of failure.2
By recognizing all amounts of events
probability from first to last, mount of
happening likelihood of a final and
most of the time unpleasant phenome-
na would be specified for the system.
Therefore, the analysis of fault tree is
one of the best quantitative methods of
measuring dangers. Sometimes, exact
estimation of defeat from portions
or probability of unwanted events
happening is difficult because of inad-
equate information. Moreover, be-
cause of the lack of accuracy of

1871-5532 ß Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society 1
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003 Published by Elsevier Inc.

Please cite this article in press as: Omidvari, M., et al., Presenting of failure probability assessment pattern by FTA in Fuzzy logic (case
study: Distillation tower unit of oil refinery process), J. Chem. Health Safety (2014), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003
JCHAS 737 1–9
information and lack of data in base
events (BE), Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis
(FFTA) could be used. In FTA methods
need to accurate and enough data of
base events for calculating probability
of system. Usually, there is not accu-
rate or enough incident data in indus-
tries. FFTA is suggested for solving this
problem. Zadeh extended the notion
of binary membership to accommo-
date various degrees of membership
on the real continuous interval 0 or
1, where the endpoints of 0 and 1
conform to no membership and full
membership respectively.3 Amrozo-
wicz and his colleagues suggested a
systematic approach must be under-
taken to effectively identify accident
risks and consequences based on
FTA. So they can be minimized by
appropriate safety measures. The ap-
proach utilizes fault trees and event
trees and incorporates The Human Er-
ror Rate Prediction (THERP) data to
quantify individual errors.4 Moreover
frequency estimation can be per-
formed at varying levels of detail and
sophistication5:
 Knowledge-based processes, in
which expert opinion is used to esti-
mate the frequencies of events,
based on the experience of knowl-
edgeable operators, inspectors, etc.
 Data-based processes, in which
event frequencies are derived from
the documented operating history
(in the form of incident reporting
system, maintenance histories, etc.)
 Logic-based processes which are of-
ten used when insufficient operating
data exists to estimate directly the
frequencies of very rare events.
The cause-consequence diagram
method is based on the occurrence
of critical event, which for example
may be an event, involving the failure
of components or subsystems that are
likely to produce hazardous conse-
quences.6 The hazards associated with
Major Accident Hazard (MAH) indus-
tries are fire, explosion and toxic gas
releases. Among these hazards, toxic
gas release is the worst as it has the
potential to cause extensive fatalities.
Qualitative and quantitative hazard
analysis is essential for the identifica-
tion and quantification of these
2 Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, July/August 2014
Please cite this article in press as: Omidvari, M., et al., Presenting of failure probability assessment pattern by FTA in Fuzzy logic (case
study: Distillation tower unit of oil refinery process), J. Chem. Health Safety (2014), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003
Qualifying studied system's dangers
Does entrance probability
rate exist?
Are they inspect
able?
Equation 2 would be used
Equation 1 would be used
Qualifying BE probability
Qualifying Top Event (TE) probability
Recognizing and qualifying the most critical MCS
Figure 1. The procedure of the study.
hazards related to chemical industries.
FTA is an established technique in
hazard identification. This technique
can be both qualitative and quantita-
tive if the probabilities and frequencies
of the basic events are known.
As fuzzy logic is extremely efficient
for ejecting lack of finality, it is
attempted in this article to cover lack
of finality by using expert’s opinion for
defuzzification which may increase
lack of finality against center of gravity
formula. So in this study, we used the
accuracy of failure analysis, and a com-
bination of FTA and fuzzy and with the
exploitation of center of gravity formu-
la and defuzzification. We have to bear
in mind that distillation towers in pe-
troleum industry are one of the most
potential dangerous and are viewed as
a threat to populations if located in
urban area.
METHODOLOGY
This study is of descriptive retrospec-
tion model solving type that uses FTA
method for measuring failure probabil-
ity of distillation system of petroleum
refinery. The algorithm of research is
shown in Figure 1.
In order to increase the accuracy
and ejecting lack of finality, the fuzzy
logic technique has been applied.
For failure rate counts, center of gravi-
ty formula (trapezoidal formula)
and Onisawa formula has been used.
Using fuzzy logic
Choosing experts
Qualifying weight
Consensus of experts
Diffuzyfy
Using probable to probability formula
Moreover this article assumes that
some basic events are examinable,
and other ones are not. For measuring
the probability of basic events, if it is
not examinable, formula number 1 is
exploited, and if it is examinable for-
mula number 2 would is used. This
methodology is applied level by level
on distillation towers of petroleum dis-
tillation refinery.
In this study, according to Hazard
and Operability (HAZOP) informa-
tion which is done in refinery, check
list of reactor’s hazard performed and
its fault tree illustrated. In Table 1 the
analysis of the check list and fault tree
of reactor’s hazard are shown.
The Fault Tree (FT) graph of refinery
distillation tower is shown in Figure 2.
FT is illustrated by HAZOP results
which are the main base for failure
rate’s counts.
The fact that the information exist in
basic events or not must be checked at
this level by using performed fault tree
and considering basic events, if it is
exists, formula number 1 or 2 would
be used (if it is non-examinable formu-
la number 1 would be used. If it is
examinable formula number 2 would
be used):
PðtÞ ¼ 1  elt ; l  0:1 (1)
PðtÞ ¼ lt =2; lt > 0:1 (2)
If the essential information for mea-
suring failure probability is not present,
fuzzy logic would be used for measuring
JCHAS 737 1–9

Table 1. The Results of HAZOP for the System Under Study.

Primary Factor Secondary Factor Root Factor
The Failure rates A.1 Pressure increase
of reactor A
A.1.1 Increase in the flow A.1.1.1 Too much increase in the size of the pump
of pressure A.1.1.2 Malfunctioning of the control valve
A.1.1.3 Malfunctioning in the food flow monitoring

A.2 Corrosion increase A.2.1 The lack of suitable control over procedure
A.2.2 Inappropriate flux of the flow or lack of
A.2.3 The existence of appropriate performance
corrosive substance A.2.3.1 Internal corrosive substance
A.2.3.2 External corrosive substance

A.3 Temperature increase A.3.1 The lack of control over the temperature of the food
A.3.2 The obstruction of the catalyst
A.3.3 The failure of the reactors
A.4 The increase in the
flow of food
A.4.1 The increase in the A.4.1.1 Malfunctioning in the food flow monitoring
size of pump A4.1.2 Switching malfunction
A4.1.3 The failure of the electrical circuit

A: Reactor failure heterogeneous group of experts (e.g.

A.1
A.1.1 A.1.2 A.2.1
A.1.1.1
A.1.1.2
Figure 2. The analysis graph of refinery distillation tower.
probability rate. According to per-
formed probabilities rate and lack of
information, five fuzzy levels have been
used for the rest of performance. The
Choosing expert
Quality weight of expert
Consensus of experts
Diffuzyfy
Converting fuzzy failure possibility to
fuzzy failure Probability by Onisawa
Figure 3. Five phases of fuzzy logic for
qualifying events rate.
A.2 A.3 A.4
A.2.3 A.4.1
A.2.2 A.3.1 A.3.2 A.3.3
A.4.1.1 A.4.1.2
A.2.3.1 A.2.3.2
phases of fuzzy logic for qualifying
events rate are shown in Figure 3.
For specifying final events condition,
it is essential for each event to be spec-
ified according to fuzzy and probabili-
ty. The results are shown in Table 2. In
this table it is shown that which basic
event has probability rate and which
has fuzzy rate.
Expert Elicitation
Expert elicitation is one of the methods
for evaluating probability of events.
This method provides some useful in-
formation for assessing risks. It
includes delphi method and Nominal
Group Techniques and the like.7 An
important consideration in the selec-
tion of experts is whether to use a
both scientists and workers) or a ho-
mogenous group of expert (e.g. both
scientists and engineers). The effect of
difference in personal experience on
expert judgment is assumed to be smal-
ler in homogenous group compared to
heterogeneous group. A heteroge-
A.4.2
neous group of experts can have an
advantage over a homogenous group
by considering different view.8 Hetero-
geneous group of experts is selected for
evaluating the probability of vague
events and human error rates. Accord-
ingly, for qualifying measuring, the im-
portance of expert was measured. In
which using indices of quality of ex-
pert, the most important of quality in-
dices of expert were: title, experience,
education, and age.9 The quality expert
indices were shown in Table 3.
Qualifying Expert’s Measurement
After recognition of the expert’s evalu-
ation index, experts are qualified by
indices (The expert is who was known
FTA Method, Refinery process and
Fuzzy logic). In this study, an expert
is the one who has adequate informa-
tion about evaluating system and who
is familiar to FTA. For vague events
and human error dominated events,
it is often difficult to estimate the oc-
currence rate of an event by using
single probability. The concept of

Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, July/August 2014 3

Please cite this article in press as: Omidvari, M., et al., Presenting of failure probability assessment pattern by FTA in Fuzzy logic (case
study: Distillation tower unit of oil refinery process), J. Chem. Health Safety (2014), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003
JCHAS 737 1–9

Table 2. Type of Final Events in Fault Tree According to Their Fuzzy or Probability Condition.
Primary Factor Secondary Factor Root Factor (final) Probabilities-Fuzzy
The Failure rates of A.1 Pressure increase A.1.1.1 Too much increase in the size of the pump Fuzzy
reactor A.1.1 Increase in the A.1.1.2Malfunctioning of the control valve Probabilities
flow of pressure A.1.1.3 Malfunctioning in the food flow monitoring Probabilities
A.2 Corrosion increase A.2.1 The lack of suitable control over procedure Fuzzy
A.2.2 Inappropriate flux of the flow or lack of Fuzzy
appropriate performance

A.2.3 The existence of A.2.3.1 Internal corrosive substance Fuzzy

corrosive substance A.2.3.2 External corrosive substance Fuzzy

A.3 Temperature A.3.1 The lack of control over the temperature Fuzzy
increase of the food
A.3.2 The obstruction of the catalyst Fuzzy
A.3.3The failure of the reactors Probabilities
A.4 The increase in
the flow of food A.4.1.1 Malfunctioning in the food flow Probabilities
A.4.1The increase in monitoring Probabilities
the size of pump A.4.1.2 Switching malfunction Probabilities
A.4.1.3The failure of the electrical circuit

linguistic variable is very useful in deal-
ing with situations which are too com-
plex or too ill-defined to be reasonably
described in conventional quantitative
expressions.
A linguistic value can be represented
by approximate reasoning of fuzzy
number. A linguistic variable is a vari-
able whose values are words or sen-
tences in natural or artificial language.
Chen and Hwang provided eight dif-
ferent conversion scales.10 Linguistic
terms used in the conversion scales
and corresponding representations of
fuzzy numbers are given in Table 4.
It is often difficult to estimate the
precise failure probability of the final
events due to insufficient data
Very Low
1
low
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
and vague characteristics of them. using Equation. Table 5 demonstrates
Therefore, the linguistics value can all linguistic terms of conversion scale
be used for assessing the vague final 6 into the form trapezoidal fuzzy num-
events. As noted, the typical estimate bers.
of humans working memory capacity
is seven plus–minus two chunks, Expert’s Consensus of Opinion
which means the suitable number for Upon group evaluation, it is necessary
comparisons for human being to judge to aggregate different expert opinions
at a time is between 5 and 9.11,12 There- into one. There are many methods
fore, Chens conversion scale 6 (Table available to aggregate the expert opi-
4) which contains six different linguis- nions, e.g. voting, arithmetic averaging
tic terms is used for assessing the vague operation, fuzzy preference rela-
events. Figure 4 represents the Chens tions,13 max–min Delphi method,
conversion scale 6. and fuzzy Delphi method.14 However,
The next step is the transformation no firm theoretical guidance can be
of linguistic value into corresponding used to choose the most suitable one.
fuzzy numbers and aggregate experts’ As mentioned before there are many
opinion into Fuzzy possibility (FPS) by methods available to aggregate the
fuzzy numbers, yet an appealing ap-
proach is linear opinion pool7:
Medium High Very high X
m
Mi ¼ W j Ai j ; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n (3)
i¼1
where Mi is the ‘‘fuzzy error possibility’’
indicating the aggregated fuzzy value
of Event i, Aij is the linguistic value
assessed by j to Event i, m is the total
number of events, n is the total number
of experts and Wj is the weighting score
of Expert j.

Defuzzification
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Defuzzification is the process of pro-
Figure 4. Chens conversion scale 6. ducing a quantifiable result in fuzzy

4 Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, July/August 2014

Please cite this article in press as: Omidvari, M., et al., Presenting of failure probability assessment pattern by FTA in Fuzzy logic (case
study: Distillation tower unit of oil refinery process), J. Chem. Health Safety (2014), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003
JCHAS 737 1–9

Table 3. Table of Rating According to Expert’s Traits. Table 5. Fuzzy Numbers of Conversion
Scale6.
Score Classify Condition Row
Linguistic Terms Fuzzy Numbers
4 Professor Title 1
3 Controller Very Low (VL) (0,0,0.1,0.2)
2 Workers Head Low (L) (0.1,0.23,0.25,0.4)
1 Operator Medium (M) (0.3,0.5,0.5,0.7)
4 More than 30 Experience 2 High (H) (0.6,0.75,0.75,0.9)
3 20–30 Very High (VH) (0.8,0.9,1,1)
2 10–20
1 5–10 number à ¼ ða1 ; a2 ; a3 Þ is [Eq. (5)]:
5 PHD Education 3 8
4 MA > 0; x < a1
>
> x  a1
3 Graduated from high school >
< ; a1  x  a2
2 Technical license mà ðxÞ ¼ aa23 

a1
x ; X
>
> ; a2  x  a3
1 Under high school >
>
: a3  a2
4 More than 50 Age 4 0; x > a3
3 40–50 Za2 Za3
2 30–40 xa a3 x
a2 a1 xdx þ a3 a2 xdx
1 Less than 30
a1 a2
¼
Za2 Za3
xa1 a3 x
a2 a1 dx þ a3 a2 dx
* a1 a2
logic. Defuzzification problems where X is the defuzzified output;
emerge from the application of fuzzy mi(x) is the aggregated membership 1
¼ ða1 þ a2 þ a3 Þ
control to the industrial processes.15 function; x is the output variable. 3
Fuzzy numbers defuzzification is an The above formula can be shown as (5)
important procedure for decision mak- follows for triangular and trapezoidal
Defuzzification of trapezoidal fuzzy
ing in fuzzy environment. The central fuzzy numbers. Defuzzification fuzzy
number à ¼ ða1 ; a2 ; a3 ; a4 Þ can be
area of defuzzification technique is se-
obtained by Eq. (6).
lected here. This method is also known
8
as center of gravity or center of area > 0; x < a1 Za2 Za3 Za4
>
>
defuzzification. This technique was de- > x  a xa1
xdx xdx a4 x
> þ þ a4 a3 xdx
1
>
> ; a1  x  a2 a2 a1
veloped by Sugeno in 1985. This is the < a2  a1
a a2 a3
most commonly used technique and is mà ðxÞ ¼ 1; a2  x  a3 X ¼ 1 a2
>
> a 4  x Z Za3 Za4
very accurate. This method can be >
> ; a3  x  a4
>
>
> a  a3
xa1
a2 a1 dx þ dx þ aa44ax
dx
expressed as [Eq. (4)]16: : 4 0; x > a
3

R 4 a1 a2 a3
m ðxÞx dx
X ¼ Ri

(4) 2 2
1 ða4 þ a3 Þ  a4 a3  ða1 þ a2 Þ þ a1 a2
mi ðxÞ ¼  (6)
3 ða4 þ a3  a1  a2 Þ

Table 4. Linguistic Terms and Their Corresponding Fuzzy Numbers [10].

Linguistic terms Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 Scale 5 Scale 6 Scale 7 Scale 8
None (0,0,0.1)
Very low (0,0,0.2) (0,0,0.1,0.2) (0,0,0.1,0.2) (0,0,0.2) (0,0.1,0.2)
Low-Very Low (0,0,0.1,0.3) (0.1,0.2,0.3)
Low (0,0,0.2,0.4) (0.1,0.2,0.3) (0,0,0.3) (0,0.2,0.4) (0.1,0.25,0.4) (0,0.2,0.4) (0.1,0.3,0.5)
Fairly low (0,0.25,0.5) (0.2,0.4,0.6) (0.2, 0.35,0.5) (0.3,0.4,0.5)
Mol. Low (0.4,0.45,0.5)
Medium (0.4,0.6,0.8) (0.2,0.5,0.8) (0.3,0.5,0.7) (0.3,0.5,0.7) (0.3,0.5,0.7) (0.3,0.5,0.7) (0.3,0.5,0.7)
Mol. High (0.5,0.55,0.6)
Fairly High (0.5,0.75,1) (0.4,0.6,0.8) (0.5,0.65,0.8) (0.5,0.6,0.7)
High (0.6,0.8,1) (0.6,0.8,1,1) (0.6,0.8,1) (0.7,1,1) (0.6,0.75,0.9) (0.6,0.75,0.9) (0.6,0.8,1) (0.5,0.7,0.9)
High-Very High (0.7,0.9,1,1) (0.7,0.8,0.9)
Very High (0.8,1,1) (0.8,0.9,1,1) (0.8,0.9,1,1) (0.8,1,1) (0.8,0.9,1)
Excellent (0.9,1,1)
Mol.: More or less.

Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, July/August 2014 5

Please cite this article in press as: Omidvari, M., et al., Presenting of failure probability assessment pattern by FTA in Fuzzy logic (case
study: Distillation tower unit of oil refinery process), J. Chem. Health Safety (2014), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003
JCHAS 737 1–9

Table 6. Weight of Linguistic Terms and Expert’s Opinion in Each Vague Event.
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 13
Weight of linguistic terms 0.366667 0.333333 0.3
Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2
Low 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.4
Medium 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7
High 0.6 0.75 0.75 0.9
Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1

Table 7. Weight of Chosen Experts.

Weight of expert Title Experience Education Age Experts
11/30 = 0.366 3 2 4 2 Expert1
10/30 = 0.333 2 2 4 1 Expert2
9/30 = 0.3 2 2 3 2 Expert3
10:1881=3 1FPS1=3 1 1 1 ¼ 0:00018
Probablity ¼ 3:7442:301  0:188 ¼ 2:301  k ¼ Probablity ¼ ¼ ¼ 5549
FPS 10k 103:744

Using Conversion of Possibility information bank the Top event (TE) The results of the selected expert’s
Formula to Probability rate is counted using formula 7. After measurement are shown in Table 7 and
Onisawa (1998) has proposed a func- that according to the calculated TE by accordingly the measure of first expert
tion which can be used for converting Fussell–Vesely formula (number 8), is 0.336, measure of second expert is
fuzzy failure possibility to fuzzy failure the most crises MCS can be achieved 0.333 and measure of third expert is
probability. This function is derived by according to Table 6. 0.3. Ordered results in Table 7 can help
addressing some properties such as the to experts to qualifying the measures of
proportionality of human sensation to TE ¼ 1 basic events.
the logarithmic value of a physical  ðð1  MCS1 . . . . . . According to relation 6 and the
quantity. The fuzzy probability rate resulted numbers from trapezoidal for-
can be obtained from fuzzy possibility  ð1  MCS12 ÞÞ (9) mula it is concluded that the defuzzify-
 
rate as follows.17–19,20FP: Fuzzy Prob- MCSi ing number is 0.188. This number is
FVI ¼ (10)
ability, FPS: Fuzzy Possibility TE considered as fuzzy possibility (FPS)
8 and by placing it in formulas 7 and 8, its
< 1
; FPS 6¼ 0 corresponding probabilities numbers
FP ¼ 10k (7)
: would are attained:
0; FPS ¼ 0 RESULTS
  
1  FPS 1=3 Probability
K¼  2:301 (8) In order to clarify the exploited meth-  
FPS 1  0:188 1=3
od, the details of one of the numeric ¼ 3:7443:301 
After qualifying basic event’s proba- problems of the basic events are illus- 0:188
bilities rate and by the help of gain trated.  
1  FPS 1=3
¼ 2:301  k ¼
FPS
Table 8. Probability Rate of Basic Events. 1 1 1
Probability ¼ k ¼ 3:744 ¼
Code of Basic Events Rate of Basic Events Kind of Basic Events 10 10 5549
A1.1.1 0.00018 Fuzzy ¼ 0:00018
A1.1.2 4  104 Probabilities After performing attained levels and
A1.3 4  104 Probabilities conversing fuzzy root reasons to prob-
A2.1 0.00073 Fuzzy abilities according to Table 2, number
A2.3.1 0.005 Fuzzy of the total basic events is 13, of which
A2.3.2 0.002 Fuzzy 7 are fuzzy (they are ordered in 5
A2.2 0.015 Fuzzy phases in Fig. 3), and six other basic
A3.1 0.008 Fuzzy events would are examinable or non-
A3.2 0.056 Fuzzy examinable, documented to formulas 1
A3.3 0.0009 Probabilities and 2, for example Malfunctioning in
A1.3 4  105 Probabilities the material flow monitoring is one of
A4.1.1 4  104 Probabilities the root probabilities which is ranged
A4.1.2 5  104 Probabilities as 103 and Its review period would be

6 Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, July/August 2014

Please cite this article in press as: Omidvari, M., et al., Presenting of failure probability assessment pattern by FTA in Fuzzy logic (case
study: Distillation tower unit of oil refinery process), J. Chem. Health Safety (2014), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003
JCHAS 737 1–9
Table 9. Qualifying rate of TE, Minimal Cut Set (MCS) probability.
MCs Possibiliy Probability
A.1.1.1  A.1.1.2 0.188 0.00018  0.00004
A.1.3 0.00004
A.2.1 0.282
A.2.2 0.675
A.2.3.1 0.508
A.2.3.2 0.425
A.3.1 0.583
A.3.2 0.863
A.3.3 0.0009
A.4.1.1 0.00004
A.4.1.2 0.0004
A.4.2 0.0005
attained according to it. By qualifying
probability rate and placing it in
Table 8, probability rate of Top Event
(TE) could be computed.22
According to the root reasons and
attained results, the FTA is shown in
Table 8. As it is obvious in this table the
most failure rate relates to A.3.2 which
is related to catalysts clogging.
The ordered methodology, which
was applied phase by phase and its
related results about reactor are shown
completely in Table 9. Then the
remarked results analyses are per-
formed, which are suitable solutions
and can prevent tensional Minimal
Cut Set (MCS) events.
DISCUSSION
Risk Assessment for Health and Safety
(RAH&S) of workers is a complex task
that entails the consideration of many
parameters which are, more often than
not, difficult to quantify. RAH&S in
industry is rampant with inadequate
data and/or imprecise and incomplete
information, particularly in the design
stage, for which traditional quantita-
tive approaches do not give adequate
answers. In this work we outline the
basic aspects for a Qualitative Risk
Assessment Model (QRAM) based on
elicited data and using a fuzzy logic
approach.23,24
Research in conventional fault tree
analysis (FTA) is based mainly on fail-
ure probability of basic events, which
uses classical probability distributions
for the failure probability of basic
events. In the present paper, the prob-
abilistic consideration of basic events
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, July/August 2014
Please cite this article in press as: Omidvari, M., et al., Presenting of failure probability assessment pattern by FTA in Fuzzy logic (case
study: Distillation tower unit of oil refinery process), J. Chem. Health Safety (2014), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003
Probabilities TE Probability
7.2E08
0.00004 0.086434695
0.00073
0.015
0.005
0.002
0.008
0.056
0.0009
0.00004
0.0004
0.0005
is replaced by probabilities, thereby
leading to fuzzy fault tree analysis. Tri-
angular fuzzy numbers are used to rep-
resent the failure possibility of basic
events. Since a system may have to
go through different operating condi-
tions during the design or testing
phase. Thus, the failure possibility of
a basic event will be assigned more
than one fuzzy numbers by different
experts under various operating con-
ditions. It is also well established that
the selection of a fuzzy number to
represent a basic event is vital in
FTA. Here we developed an algorithm
to find a single fuzzy number for a basic
event; where in more than one fuzzy
number is assigned to that particular
event. Using this algorithm, we obtain
a single fuzzy number, having least
variance from all fuzzy numbers
assigned to the concerned event. The
adequate and appropriate means and
procedure for the detection of basic
events having key role in the occur-
rence of top event in system analysis
become essential.
Here we have put forward an ap-
proach to rank the basic events in
accordance with their importance in
the occurrence of top event. This ap-
proach can be widely used to improve
the reliability and to reduce the oper-
ating cost of a system. The reasons
exploited in this article for using defin-
itive and quantitative models in mea-
suring risk, is as same as used reasons
in this study.
Tyagi and his colleagues about anal-
ysis of FT were showed that studying
refraction probability of basic events is
the main base of fault tree analysis
which would be quantified by fuzzy
MCs Ranking Critical MCs
8.32999E07 11
0.000462777 9
0.008445683 7
0.173541423 2
0.057847141 4
0.023138856 5
0.092555425 3
0.647887978 1
0.010412485 6
0.000462777 9
0.004627771 10
0.005784714 8
logic (triangular formula). Using fuzzy
logic in fault tree can make measure-
ments easy and also increase the accu-
racy.25 This problem is harmonious
with the result which is attained in this
research. According to the studies
done in this area, failure probability
of basic events with help of fuzzy num-
bers by different experts would be het-
erogeneous in different conditions,
and correction of fuzzy number is sig-
nificant for showing chosen vague
events.
Finally the results of this research
can increase reliability and decrease
system’s cost. Moreover the exploited
methods in those researches are har-
monious with the ones in this study.
The bilateral fuzzy method attained
measures to experts and by defuzzifi-
cation of final events weight; weight of
each event was examined. Differential
aspects method used in this article is
the strongest point of the article. 5
indexes which were specific to quanti-
fying and increasing accuracy of com-
puting each final event’s were
introduced.
CONCLUSION
According to qualifying and rating
Critical Minimal Cut Set (MCS) and
range of model sensitivity, analysis tree
Critical MCS was in 1–3 rating. Ini-
tially by eliminating each of them, the
increase of reliability was studied and
each tree Critical MCS eliminated co-
incidently was studied and the attained
TE failure probability was 0.086 and
reliability equalled 0.914. For the pur-
pose of increasing reliability system the
7
JCHAS 737 1–9
Table 10. The Rate Reliability TE, Failure Possibility TE, Before and After the Critical
Elimination of MCS.
Critical MCs
Without eliminating MCs
A.3.2
A.2.2
A.3.1
A.3.2 & A.2.2& A.3.1
most Critical MCS was eliminated, so
that eliminating (A.3.2), the reliability
measured 0.968, by eliminating of
(A.2.2) the reliability was 0.928, and
eventually by eliminating the third
Critical MCS (A.3.1) reliability became
0.991.
With this structure illustrated, fault
tree of next MCS, does not have a great
impact on reliability system. So, con-
trolling them for investigating is not
recommended for system. This issue
is shown in Table 10.
For eliminating each MCS a related
control factor should be settled, e.g.
(MCS: A.3.2) is catalyst clogging and
it is also the most MCS. Its failure
probability rate is 0.056, for solving
this issue a catalyst could be designated
parallel to another catalyst. As pre-
venting most of basic events could be
related to most of preconditions like
design, repairs, preservation and train,
destroying these basic events could be
related to designing. For reaching to
this goal, another catalyst should be
paralleled in designing. So that failure
probability in this condition would be-
come more efficient from 0.056 to
0.004. Indeed it approaches to zero
and it can be claimed that MCS is
banned.
Definition of computing in this prob-
lem is shown below:
R¼1Q RþQ¼1
1  0:056 ¼ 0:946
R ¼ 1  ½ð1  R1 Þð1  R2 Þ . . . ð1  Rn Þ
1  ð1  0:946Þð1  0:946Þ ¼ 0:004
According to the structure of fault
tree, second failure MCS (A.2.2) does
not have suitable performance. For
solving this problem and decreasing
our system’s failure probability flow
control systems should be used and
also essential trains are needed.
According to structure of fault
tree, third tensional MCS (A.3.1) it is
8 Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, July/August 2014
Please cite this article in press as: Omidvari, M., et al., Presenting of failure probability assessment pattern by FTA in Fuzzy logic (case
study: Distillation tower unit of oil refinery process), J. Chem. Health Safety (2014), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003
Failure Probability TE Reliability TE
0.086 0.914
0.032 0.968
0.074 0.928
0.079 0.921
0.009 0.991
non-controlled temperature of entrant
feed to reactor and for decreasing its
failure rate, system of entrance control
temperature should be improved and
essential recommendations and train-
ings to personnel is a must.
Performance of this study helps us to
have a new and innovative approach
to fault tree FTA. Common methods
need a data state for basic events but
synthesizing of FTA with fuzzy logic,
lack of data existence, relatively obvi-
ated information, and the help of fuzzy
logic qualified basic events could be
quantified and lack of finality could
be relatively obviated. By this method
the main rate of event would be com-
puted and moreover by quantifying the
basic events, the range of each basic
event participation rate would be
attained in range of main event and
eventually according to probability
and priority of each basic event it could
be obviated by suitable renovation
actions. Although in this study the ba-
sic events have been classified, consid-
ering examinable events or events
which can occur for lots of reasons,
but they could not be examined must
be kept in mind.
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Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, July/August 2014 9

Please cite this article in press as: Omidvari, M., et al., Presenting of failure probability assessment pattern by FTA in Fuzzy logic (case
study: Distillation tower unit of oil refinery process), J. Chem. Health Safety (2014), doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2014.06.003