Modern Russian History A Textbook

ＳＵＪＫＸＴ＆Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ＮＯＹＺＵＸ＿＠＆Ｇ＆ＺＫ＾ＺＨＵＵＱ＆
With respect and gratitude
To Professor Shin Gyonggu,
who inspired the writing of this book about Russian History in English
via his great multi-cultural project of the International Summer Session at
Chonnam National University.
ＳＵＪＫＸＴ＆Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ＮＯＹＺＵＸ＿＠＆Ｇ＆ＺＫ＾ＺＨＵＵＱ

Ⓒ＆８６７８＆ｈ｡＆Ｏ｜ｇｔ＆Ｙ４＆Ｑ｛｢ｔｋｚｙｕ｜２＆Ｋｒｋｔｇ＆＼４＆Ｑｇｚ｡ｙｎｋ｜ｚｙｋ｜ｇ２＆Ｐｇｓｋｙ＆Ｊｕ｛ｍｒｇｙ＆Ｙｚ｛ｈｋｘ
Ｇｒｒ＆ｘｏｍｎｚｙ＆ｘｋｙｋｘ｜ｋｊ
ＩＮＵＴＴＧＳ＆ＴＧＺＯＵＴＧＲ＆［ＴＯ＼ＫＸＹＯＺ＿＆ＶＸＫＹＹ

Ｍ］ＧＴＭＰ［＆；６６３＝；＝
ＸＫＶ［ＨＲＯＩ＆ＵＬ＆ＱＵＸＫＧ
ＯＹＨＴ＆＆？＝＞３＞？３？＝＜８６３；８３：＆．６９？８６／＆
Ｌｏｘｙｚ＆Ｖｘｏｔｚｏｔｍ＠＆Ｙｋｖｚｋｓｈｋｘ＆８６７８

ＳＵＪＫＸＴ＆Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ＮＯＹＺＵＸ＿＠＆Ｇ＆ＺＫ＾ＺＨＵＵＱ＆
Ivan S. Kuznetsov
Professor, Novosibirsk State University, Russia
Elena V. Katyshevtseva (Nikulina)

Associate professor, Izhevsk State Technical University, Russia
James Douglas Stuber

Assistant professor, Chonnam National University, South Korea
Translated from Russian by

Liudmila I. Katyshevtseva
Student, Chonnam National University, South Korea
：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Contents
Introduction ―――― ？
Part 1. The Wave of Russian Revolutions and Lenin’s Period of Soviet

History
Topic 1. The February Revolution. The social and political situation after
the downfall of Tsarism ―――― ７８＆
Preconditions and the beginning of the revolution. The downfall of monarchy. The
political situation after the downfall of monarchy
Topic 2. Russia in 1917: from February to October ―――― ７？

Three crises. The increase of the All-National crisis. Strengthening of Bolsheviks’
positions. The Bolshevik seizure of power
Topic 3. The establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship ―――― ８＜

Bolsheviks in power. The Constituent Assembly and the Brest-Litovsk Peace. The
internal policy of Bolsheviks. Socio-economic measures
Topic 4. Сivil war ―――― ９：＆

Escalation of civil war. Measures for strengthening the Bolshevik regime. The
main periods of civil war. 1918. The decisive period of civil war. The end of civil
war. Its results and consequences
Topic 5. The ‘War Communism’ Policy ―――― ：８＆

Essential core and prerequisites of War Communism. Bolshevik food-supplying
policy. The other components of civil car. War Communism significance and results
Topic 6. Russia during the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP)
―――― ；６
Reasons for implementation of the NEP. The essence of the New Economic Policy.
Main directions and results of the NEP. Contradictions of the NEP and its significance
Contents ；
Topic 7. Formation of the USSR ―――― ；？＆

The theory and practice of Bolsheviks concerning the ethnic issue. National
Republics at the beginning of the 1920s. Controversy in the Bolshevik governing
body concerning the ways of uniting the republics. Formation of the USSR and
its significance
Topic 8. Foreign policy of the Soviet State in the years of the civil war
and the NEP ―――― ＜＜
Foreign policy in the first years of the Bolshevik rule. The beginning of Russian
withdrawal from International isolation. The Genoese conference and ‘the Streak
of general acceptance’. Continuation of the ‘export of revolution’ policy. International
conflicts
Part 2. The ‘Revolution from Above’ and the Establishment of Stalinism
Topic 9. Industrialization of the USSR ―――― ＝：

Prerequisites of the industrialization. The main phases of industrialization. The
First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932). The Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937). The
results of industrialization
Topic 10. Collectivization of agriculture ―――― ＞８＆

Historical prerequisites for collectivization. ‘The great turning point’ (Stalin). The
results and consequences of mass collectivization
Topic 11. Socio-political life in the USSR in the 1930s ―――― ＞？＆
The main tendencies of political development. ‘The Great Terror’. The Socio-political
character of Stalin’s regime
Topic 12. Russian culture in the 1920s – 1930s ―――― ？＞＆

General characteristics of the cultural processes. Reforms of education and science.
Literature and Art
＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Topic 13. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 1930s - the beginning of the
1940s ―――― ７６；＆
Relations with the Western countries at the beginning of the 1930s. Foreign policy
in the Far East. Relations with the Western countries after 1933. International
relations in the last prewar years. Territorial annexations of the USSR
Part 3. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Nazi
Germany and the First Post-War Years
Topic 14. The initial period of the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 –
November 1942) ―――― ７７８
Defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the War and their causes.
Organization of defense. The Moscow battle. The Failures of 1942. Establishment
of the Anti-Hitler Coalition
Topic 15. The crucial break in the course of the Great Patriotic War ―― ７７＞＆
The defensive period of the Stalingrad battle. From defensive to offensive. The
Kursk battle. The completion of the crucial break. The All-National Struggle.
Strengthening of the Anti-Hitler Coalition
Topic 16. Victorious ending of the Great Patriotic War ―――― ７８：
‘Stalin’s Ten Blows’. Crushing defeat of Nazi Germany. The end of World War
II. The significance and the cost of Victory
Topic 17. The USSR in the post-war years ―――― ７８＞

The international position of the country. Restoration and development of industry.
The situation in the countryside. Social policy. Political life after the Great Patriotic
War
Part 4. From the Red Banner to the Two Headed Eagle
Topic 18. The USSR in the period of ‘Thaw’ (1953-1964) ―――― ７９＜＆
The beginning of changes. The Twentieth Congress and the process of ‘de-
Stalinization’. Contradictions of economic policy. Contrasts of the ‘Thaw’ and its
finale
Topic 19. International policy of the USSR in the years of ‘Thaw’ ―――― ７：：＆
Softening of international tension. Relations with the Communist and Developing
Countries. Contradictions of Khrushchev’s foreign policy
Topic 20. The USSR in the middle 1960s – first half of the 1980s ―――― ７：？＆
The main characteristic peculiarities and the phases of the period. Socio-economic
development. Political and spiritual life of the Soviet society
Contents ＝
Topic 21. Foreign policy of the USSR during the period of ‘Developed
Socialism’ ―――― ７；；
Soviet foreign policy in the second half of the 1960s. Détente of international
tension. Worsening of international affairs
Topic 22. The USSR in the years of ‘Perestroika’ (reconstruction) (1985-

1991) ―――― ７＜６
Launching reforms. Political polarization. Contradictions of Perestroika. Aggravation
of political Crises. August 1991 events and the end of the USSR
Topic 23. Post-Soviet Russia ―――― ７＝９

The social and economic situation after 1991. Political development of the country
Part 5. The Course of Revival of the Country
Topic 24. Consolidation and modernization of the society: V.V. Putin and
his team ―――― ７＞８
The heritage. Stability. National Welfare. Sovereign democracy
Conclusion ―――― ７＞？＆＆
Bibliography ―――― ７？７＆

ＯＴＺＸＵＪ［ＩＺＯＵＴ
Is it urgent to learn modern Russian history?

If so, what are the aspects of the urgency?
The urgency of learning Russian modern history is connected with
a number of factors. One of them is the great interest in it from within
Russian historiography and from the international point of view. The
th st
history of Russia in the 20 and the beginning of the 21 century became
the theme of a number of fundamental researches of Western scholars
during the last decade. The most interesting instances are ‘The
Cambridge History of Russia. Volume III - The Twentieth Century’
st
(Cambridge, 2006); Steven Rosefielde. ‘Russia in the 21 century. The
prodigal superpower’ (Cambridge, 2005); Geoffrey A. Hosking ‘Russia
and the Russians: a History’ (Harvard, 2001) and there are others. The
publication of these profound investigations shows that the question
of the historical development of Russia during the modern period is
a priority in contemporary social scientific discussions. This is not by
chance. Trying to understand the development of Post-Soviet Russia,
Western scholars have analyzed the influences, traditions and contra-
dictions, stemming from the Soviet past. They are answering a cluster
of new and debatable questions.
In what direction will contemporary Russia go? What ideology is
it influenced by? Is it influenced by the Western idea of a liberal,
democratic, humanitarian enterprise? Or is it influenced by the traditional
‘Muscovite’ idea of an authoritarian mold? Can these two forms of
political determination, that is democratization and elements of authori-
tarianism, be combined in a Russian way of modernization? Why is
it possible and why may it be necessary? Thus, there are many urgent
and not easy questions in contemporary Russian research that are diffi-
cult to answer without understanding the Soviet history (See, for exam-
ple: Suny, p. 61; Rosefielde, p. 3).
Every century in every country and every history has its own specifics,
− ？＆ −
７６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
originality and distinctiveness. The special time in modern Russian history

belongs to the 20th century. This century in Russia, which went through
a number of revolutions, formation of the first-in-the-world Socialist
state, the temptations of totalitarianism, enormous sufferings and great
victories has been especially outstanding and unique. In order to under-
stand this and answer different questions of historical analysis, let’s
delve into modern Russian history, doing this through the spectrum
of different points of view, evaluations and interpretations.
Part 1.
ＺＮＫ＆］Ｇ＼Ｋ＆ＵＬ＆Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ＸＫ＼ＵＲ［ＺＯＵＴＹ＆

ＧＴＪ＆ＲＫＴＯＴＹ＆ＶＫＸＯＵＪ＆
ＵＬ＆ＹＵ＼ＯＫＺ＆ＮＯＹＺＵＸ＿＆
Topic 1
Ｚｎｋ＆Ｌｋｈｘ｛ｇｘ｡＆Ｘｋ｜ｕｒ｛ｚｏｕｔ４＆Ｚｎｋ＆ｙｕｉｏｇｒ＆ｇｔｊ＆ｖｕｒｏｚｏｉｇｒ＆

ｙｏｚ｛ｇｚｏｕｔ＆ｇｌｚｋｘ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｊｕ｝ｔｌｇｒｒ＆ｕｌ＆Ｚｙｇｘｏｙｓ
1.1 Preconditions and the beginning of the revolution
1.2 The downfall of monarchy
1.3 The political situation after the downfall of monarchy
1.1 Preconditions and the beginning of the revolution

In February of 1917 the most prominent event in Russian history
took place – autocracy collapsed. The Romanov dynasty, having been
on the throne since 1613, was overthrown.
Historians and political scholars debate the problem of the historical
nature of the 1917 February revolution. The first point of view argues
the logical nature of the revolution. In Soviet literature this event was
estimated as ‘the second bourgeois-democratic revolution’, which as
it was supposed, was the natural result, appearing out of the existing
contradictions and became the first step to ‘the socialist revolution’
(See: Gorodetsky, 1981).
The second point of view, introduced in the 1930s by Sergey Melgunov
(1931), argues the chance nature of the revolution, which appeared to
be a result of underhanded plotting of the enemies of Russia, for example,
the Masonic conspiracy, and opened the way to anarchy and then
Bolshevik Dictatorship. Nowadays the chance nature of the revolution
is often put forth. It is said for example that the freemason organization,
‘The Supreme Council of the Peoples of Russia’ was the group that
elaborated a plan of abdication of Nikolas II in favor of his son Alexei.
Of course, the underlying preconditions of the February revolution
were burning contradictions of social, economic and political develop-
ment, aggravated by World War I, which began in 1914. It was the
First Global War, which brought death and destruction on a previously
unimagined scale. At the end of 1916 the situation in Russia became
too contradictory and difficult. The army suffered great defeats and
− ７８＆ −
February Revolution＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆７９
losses on the Western and South-Western fronts. The summer of 1915

retreat of the Russian Army was a military catastrophe. The Chief com-
mand of the army was demoralized for a while. Nikolas II, who was
the Commander-in-Chief, even cried in his headquarters (Grand Duke
Nicolai wrote in his memoirs). At the beginning of 1917 more than
two million people were killed, five million people were wounded, two
million were taken prisoner. The great majority of the career officers
were killed.
The situation was aggravated by the evident corruption of the
government. The Army supply of weapons, ammunition, food and heavy
clothes was awfully bad. The army was not ready for a big war, though
the Military minister said that everything was ready. Widespread rumors
about betrayal, corruption, and theft began to appear.
Impoverishment of the people increased, and dissatisfaction in the
rear grew rapidly. The question of the food supply of towns and cities
became very sharp, but it was not solved by the government. Inflation
grew and eroded wages. The purchasing power of a ruble was only
a quarter of its original value. The countryside suffered from the lack
of hands, because more than 15 million people were mobilized in the
army.
The so-called ‘Rasputenshina’ was a symbol of annihilation of tsarism.
This phenomenon, connected with an anti-social man Grigory Rasputin,
who had great power in the Tsar’s court, promoted the growth of mass
indignation. Rasputin influenced greatly the Empress, who believed,
that he would cure her beloved son Alexei, who was a hemophiliac.
In December, 1916 Rasputin was killed, but the prestige of the monarchy
continued to fall.
Thus at the beginning of 1917 there was a deep crisis of power
in Russia. The essence of the political crisis of the tsarist regime revealed
itself in a loss of people’s trust in authority.
At the same time such a course of events, probably, was not the
best one and not the only possible one. There was also the possibility
of solving the problems by implementing certain reforms, and, probably,
it would have been the most optimal one for the country. Loss of such
a chance was also connected to the mistakes of the managerial class,
due to their inability to implement the necessary reforms on time. The
activity of the opponents of the regime should be evaluated ambiguously
as well. The matter is not only about revolutionaries but also about
the liberals, who were doing everything possible in order to discredit
７：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
the government, not having the possible consequences in mind.

How did the events develop? The events of 1917 started spontaneously,
reflecting widespread discontent with the protracted war and the ensuing
concentrated impoverished conditions. The outburst of dissatisfaction
was caused by irregular delivery of bread to the capital. At that moment
the shortage of bread was caused not by the general lack of it, but
with its ill-timed baking. According to one of the versions, on the eve
before outbreak of unrest several hundreds of Petrograd bakers were
recruited into the army. It was one example of the thoughtlessness of
the government.
In some parts of the city in front of empty shelters of stores mass
rd th
disturbances broke out and on the 23 of February (the 8 of March
in the new calendar) a mass demonstration under anti-government slogans
in Petrograd took place. The workers proclaimed: ‘Down with the War!’
and ‘Down with the Tsarist Government!’ This time the authorities con-
fined themselves to only posting advertisements, confirming to people
about the possession of reserves of grain. It was the next example of
the thoughtlessness of the government.
The next day almost all the plants went on a strike. Carrying red
flags and singing ‘Marseillaise’ the workers were gathering at the centre
of the city. Several cruel skirmishes with horse police took place.
th
On the 24 of February followed the infamous telegram of Tsar Nikolas
II to the chief of the Petrograd garrison General S. Habalov with the
order “to put an end to the disturbance”. What followed after that
indicated a complete loss of the government’s prestige. According to
the evidence of the famous monarchist V. Shulgin, “the matter was
that in that giant city it was impossible to find several hundreds of
people, who sympathized with the authorities”.
th
On the 26 of February the columns of workers moved to the centre
of the city again. The soldiers, exposed by the government into cordons
refused to shoot at the demonstrators. The break in the course of events
began with conversion of the troops to the side of the demonstrators:
th th
on the night of the 26 to the 27 the soldiers of several guard regiments
(Pavlovsky, Volynsky, Preobragensky) rose up against their officers;
th
in the morning of the 27 of February they started fraternizing with
the demonstrators.
th
On the 27 of February consolidation of the political opposition took
place: it was trying to take control over the spontaneous movement.
February Revolution＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆７；
On that day in different parts of the Tavrida Palace simultaneously

the liberals created the temporary Committee of the Government Duma,
and Socialists (Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries) created the
Temporary Executive Committee of Worker’s deputies.
1.2 The downfall of monarchy

On the 28th of February, 1917 the resistance of the government troops
was broken, the rebels occupied the Winter Palace and other governmental
buildings, and the Tsar’s ministers were arrested. On the same day the
last attempt of suppressing the rebellion failed. The detachment of the
St. George Cross holders commanded by General N. I. Ivanov arrived
from the front. It was exposed to revolutionary agitation, therefore it
was withdrawn urgently.
st
On the 1 of March M. D. Rodzyanko on the behalf of the Temporary
Committee of the Government Duma and commander of the North front
general N. V. Ruzsky sent a telegram to Nikolas II, who was in Pskov
at that time, informing him of the desperate situation and necessity
nd
of abdication. On the 2 of March the emperor declared his readiness
to abdicate in favor of the heir to the thrown Alexei. But that night,
rd
just before the 3 of March he passed the manifesto of abdication in
rd
favor of his brother Michael. On the 3 of March Michael, being aware
of general hatred toward the monarchy, declined his claim to the throne.
The issue concerning the form of government was postponed until the
th
Constituent Assembly. On the 8 of March the Soviet made the decision
to arrest Nikolas II and his family.
1.3 The political situation after the downfall of monarchy

The important peculiarity of the political situation after the downfall
of Tsarism was, as it is usually told in historical literature, the occurrence
th
of a diarchy or ‘dual power’. On one side, on the 27 of February
at the call of the Temporary Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Worker’s Deputies the delegates were elected to the Petrograd Soviet.
In the evening of the same day Menshevik N.S. Chkheidze became
a chief of the Soviet. Then local Soviets were created.
nd
On the other side, on the 2 of March The Temporary Committee
of the Government Duma created The Provisional Government, where
the majority was presented with the Octyabrist Party (the party of the
estate landowners) and the Cadet Party (Constitutional Democratic Party
７＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
organized by liberals). The first chief of the Government became Prince

G. E. Lvov (as it was considered, he was close to the Cadets, as before
used to be a member of this party). The minister for foreign affairs
was a chief of the Cadet Party P. N. Miliukov, the minister for war
- a chief of the Octyabrist Party A.I. Guchkov, the minister for commerce
- ‘the textile king’ and the member of the Progressist Party (the party
of the propertied classes, industrialists, first of all) A. I. Konovalov.
The only representative from socialists in the Government was
Attorney-General A. F. Kerensky (enrolled in the Party of Socialist
Revolutionaries that is SRs). The Provisional Government sent its com-
missars to different departments and localities.
But real power at that moment was possessed by the Petrograd Soviet
as it was supported by the armed forces. Later Prince Lvov said: “the
Soviets were strength without power, the government – power without
strength”.
What was the position of the Soviets after the February Revolution?
It was determined by prevalence in the Petrograd Soviet of ‘moderate
socialists’ – Mensheviks and SRs (Lenin called them ‘compromisers’).
Soviet historians used to pay much attention to the predominance of
these parties in the post-February Soviets and named the following
reasons for this issue. They pointed out the weakness of Bolshevik
forces at that time as many Bolsheviks were in exile or in the process
of emigrating by February, 1917. They criticized the order of election
to the Soviet, in particular the same quota of representation from all
the plants, no matter its size. Since the influence of Mensheviks in
small enterprises was stronger, and the number of those enterprises
was bigger, the number of Mensheviks in the Soviets was also bigger
than the number of Bolsheviks, who prevailed in bigger enterprises.
They said that there were negative changes in the qualitative structure
of the Petrograd working class in the war years: representatives of
petty bourgeois sections of society joined workers, including, as it was
said at that time ‘self-seekers’, escaping from mobilization (at military
plants there was a right to miss mobilization). According to Lenin’s
definition, a ‘petty bourgeois wave’ occurred: a general feeling of eupho-
ria, caused by the victories at the beginning of the war and gullibility
of the masses.
Because of that the Menshevik-SRs Petrograd Soviet focused on
cooperation with the Provisional Government, considering the problem
of strengthening the democratic order and democracy in Russia to be
February Revolution＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆７＝
the main point.

What were the prospective of democracy in Russia at that time?
When considering about the prospects for further political development,
we should emphasize that there were some significant obstacles to
strengthening democracy in Russia at that period. The downfall of the
Emperor’s regime caused loss of prestige of any kind of power, fragmen-
tation of state authority and therefore the occurrence of anarchy in the
society. As it is often written nowadays, in particular, the order №
1 of the Petro-Soviet, which imposed the elective governing body of
the army, played an important role in that. Sometimes it also may be
heard, that in reality at that moment a multiple authority regime rather
than dual power was established (meaning any armed group disposed
real power). For example, Japanese historian T. Hasegawa (1981) cast
doubt on the adequacy of the ‘dual power’ formulation, correctly point-
ing out that at that stage real power was held by non-organized armed
workers and peasants.
Moreover the vast masses, without taking into consideration real
opportunities, were striving more and more insistently for immediate
realization of their main requirements – first of all peace and land.
“Peasants, who consisted of 85 per cent of all the population”, writes
the British historian Stephen Smith, The University of Essex, “believed,
that the revolution would redress the historic wrong done to them at
the time of emancipation of the serfs by transferring gentry, Church
and state lands into the hands of those who worked them… but the
Provisional Government had no stomach for carrying out a massive
land reform at a time of war” (S. A. Smith, p. 127).
At the same time the government of liberals displayed inconsistency,
indecision, and an inability to solve difficult problems, that were urgent
for the country. The Provisional Government was neither able to satisfy
requirements of the masses nor to restore prestige of power. All these
points created preconditions for rapid strengthening of the extreme politi-
cal forces’ influence, first of all of the Bolsheviks. “Liberty and democ-
racy were the watchwords of the February Revolution. … But from
the first, the scope of the democratic revolution was in dispute”, S.
A. Smith writes. “For the privileged classes, the overthrow of autocracy
had been an act of self–preservation necessitated by the need to bring
victory in the World War and engender a renaissance of the Russian
people on the basis of a constitution, a democratic republic, civil and
political rights. For the lower classes, liberty and democracy were princi-
７＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
pally about solving their pressing socio-economic problems and only

secondarily about questions of law and political representation” (S.
A. Smith, p. 120).
As for the position of Bolsheviks, at the beginning they behaved
with restraint, keeping in mind ‘relative support’ of the Provisional
Government in accordance with the formula ‘so far as’, exposed the
tactic of ‘pressing’ on it. The editors of ‘The Pravda’ headed by I.
V. Stalin and G. E. Zinoviev kept following this line of conduct. But
rd
on the 3 of April, 1917, V. I. Lenin returned to Russia from Switzerland.
th
On the 4 of April Lenin made a speech at the meeting of the Petrograd
Soviet with ‘the April Theses’: ‘the program of conversion of the bour-
geois-democratic revolution into a socialist one’. Lenin advanced the
slogans: ‘No support for the Provisional Government!’ and ‘All power
to the Soviets!’ Up until the July events he considered “peaceful transition
of power to the working class” to be possible: using their strength,
the Soviets could take power, and then Bolsheviks would have won
within them.
Thereby after the February of 1917 different variants of political devel-
opment were opening up for Russia. The choice among them depended
on the socio-economic situation, mentality and feelings of the masses,
orientations of the political and intellectual elite.
Marina Tsvetaeva
Out of the orderly and dainty temple
You strolled out toward disturbing squeals….
- Freedom! – the beautiful Russian Madam
Worshiped by dukes and leading the Prince.
The sinister singing is almost heard, -

The liturgy is awaited!
- Freedom! – she is a wanton girl
On the soldier’s breast, being ecstatic.
(26 May 1917)
(from ‘Swans Haven’ Trans. L. Katyshevtseva, 2012)

Topic 2
Ｘ｛ｙｙｏｇ＆ｏｔ＆７？７＝＠＆ｌｘｕｓ＆Ｌｋｈｘ｛ｇｘ｡＆ｚｕ＆Ｕｉｚｕｈｋｘ

2.1 Three crises
2.2 The increase of the All-National crisis
2.3 Strengthening of Bolsheviks’ positions
2.4 The Bolshevik seizure of power
The main tendencies in the political development from February to

October, 1917 were the following: political polarization, decline of the
moderate socialist parties influence and strengthening of the extreme
forces along with the increase of anarchy. According to Lenin’s proposi-
tions, the Soviet historians pointed out the two main historical periods
in the political life of 1917; the border line within them was the so
called July events. As it was considered, the ‘dual power’, which existed
before July of 1917, gave the opportunity for the peaceful transition
of power to the Soviets.
2.1 Three crises

According to the “April Theses,” the main goal of Bolsheviks at
the ‘peaceful phase’ of the revolution was the winning of people’s
minds. This process was contributed to by the three political crises
– April, June and July of 1917.
The first of them occurred after the infamous note of the minister
of foreign affairs, Pavel Miliukov, was sent to the Allies. The note
spoke of prosecution of war to ‘decisive victory’, supported the terms
of secret treaties, which included annexations and indemnities. That
unpopular decision resulted in a wave of indignation among the ordinary
people. Soldiers and workers came out onto the streets of the capital
to demand Miliukov’s resignation, and Bolsheviks bore banners declaring
‘Down with the Provisional Government!’ In order to quiet the masses,
six members of the Soviet Executive Committee were taken in the coali-
tion government. Socialists accepted six places in the new government,
alongside eight ‘bourgeois’ representatives. It proved to be a ruinous
− ７？＆ −
８６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
decision, since in the eyes of masses it identified the moderate socialists

with unpopular government policies.
In June, 1917, at the First Congress of Soviets, the leader of the
Bolsheviks, Lenin, said that his party was ready to take power. In a
response to the assertion of Mensheviks that there was not any party
that was ready to take and hold power in Russia, Lenin answered: “There
is such a party!”
The cause for the second crisis was the military offensive of the
Russian Army against the Germans, undertaken by Kerensky on the
th
18 of June, 1917. “The offensive was motivated by the desire of
Kerensky to see Russia honor her treaty obligations to the Allies and
be guaranteed a place in the comity of democratic states. Kerensky
toured the fronts, frenetically whipping up support for an offensive.
th th
On the 18 -19 of June only forty-eight battalions refused to go into
battle, but most had rallied for the last time. The offensive was a fiasco
and led to about 150,000 losses and a larger number of deserters. In
its wake the Russian army unraveled as soldiers desperate to see an
end to the bloodshed, grew angry about the unequal burden of sacrifice
and determined to lay hands on gentry estates” (S. A. Smith, pp. 125-126).
The offensive was entailed by the great mass demonstration of protest
against the war in Petrograd. It was held under anti-government slogans
and with the total domination of Bolsheviks.
The cause for the third crisis was the attempt of the government
to strengthen the order and discipline in the army by sending the
rd
revolutionary units of the Petrograd garrison to the front. On the 3
of July from 60,000 to 70,000 armed soldiers and workers had sur-
rounded the Tavrida Palace in Petrograd to demand that the Central
Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK) take power. The soldiers of
the first machine-gun detachment and the sailors from Kronstadt were
at the vanguard with the demand to overthrow the ‘counter-revolutionary’
government. Although lower-level Bolshevik organizations were in-
volved in the demonstration, party leaders considered this attempted
uprising premature. Lenin argued that taking power on the scale of
the whole country at that time was impossible, though it might be
possible to take control in the capital. After the armed clashes between
the demonstrators and the troops, the insurgents were dispelled with
great cruelty. Estimates of the total dead and wounded in the two days
of rioting ran up to 400 people.
Russia in 1917: from February to October ＆８７
2.2 The increase of the All-National crisis

After the July events different means of repression were organized
by the government with the help of the Petrograd Soviet. Kerensky
issued orders for the arrest of leading Bolsheviks and for the closure
of their newspapers (‘Pravda’). The detachments that took part in the
rd th
riot on the 3 of July were disarmed. On the 12 of July the death
penalty was restored by the initiative of the new Commander-in-Chief
General L. G. Kornilov, who was appointed to the position held by
General A. A. Brusilov. A week later military censorship was restored.
Kerensky hoped to use the reactionary General Kornilov to improve
his image as a strong man and to restore worsened relations with the
Cadets, many of whom talked openly about the need for military dictator-
ship to save Russia from anarchy.
But all these measures were far from a resolution. Lenin escaped
from Russia to Finland, where he continued to run the struggle for
th
power. At the end of July - beginning of August, 1917 the 6 Congress
of the Bolshevik party was held. It confirmed the end of the so called
‘peaceful phase’ of the revolution and the concept of ‘dual power’ was
also abolished. The slogan ‘All Power to the Soviets!’ was temporally
withdrawn, because, as Lenin said, the Soviets at that time had become
‘the appendage of the counter-revolutionary dictatorship’. The Congress
took the course of an armed overthrow of the government.
The conditions for the realization of those plans were more than
favorable. “By summer of 1917 the economy was buckling under the
strain of war, the general discontent rose. In the first half of 1917 pro-
duction of fuel and raw materials fell by over a third and gross factory
output during the year fell by 36.5 per cent compared to 1916. The
real wages of workers were cut in half compared to 1913. Enterprises
closed and by October nearly half a million workers had been laid
off. The government debt rose to an astronomical 49 billion rubles,
of which 11.2 billion was owed on foreign loans. The budget deficit
was made up by the mass printing of depreciated paper money – the
so called ‘kerenki’- further fuelled inflation. Between July and October
prices rose fourfold and in Moscow and Petrograd the real value of
wages halved again in the second half of the year.
As the economic crisis deepened, class conflict intensified. Between
February and October, 2.5 million workers went on strike, stoppages
increased in scale as the year wore on, but strikes were becoming ever
harder to win. … From the late spring to the autumn the struggle between
８８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
the peasants and landlords gained the character of a peasant revolution.

… By autumn the agrarian movement was in full swing, with peasants
increasingly seizing gentry land, equipment and livestock and distributing
them outright. According to the official information only, in June 1,777
riots in the countryside were recorded, but in September- October the
number consisted of 5,140 conflicts and uprisings in the villages. The
peasant movement was fiercest in the overcrowded Black Earth and
Middle Volga provinces and also in the Ukraine” (S. A. Smith, pp.
128-129).
nd
The Provisional Government, headed from the 22 of July by
Kerensky, was unable to solve the urgent social and economic problems,
primarily the issues of peace and land. Previously the prosecution of
war until ‘decisive victory’ was proclaimed, but now the government
was leading under the compromise slogan of ‘revolutionary defensism.’
The solving of the agrarian problem was postponed until the victory
in the War was accomplished, or until the convening of the Constituent
Assembly. So everything that was promised by the Provisional
Government appeared to be ‘too little and too late’ (See: S. A. Smith,
p. 131).
It should be pointed out, that disagreement and dissatisfaction of
the masses were rightful and understandable. But it is sure that the
optimal way of solving the sharp socio-economic problems laid in the
sphere of national agreement and consensus. The tragedy of Russia
was connected with the orientation of the masses toward the immediate
and violent way to satisfy their demands, entailing hostility and hatred
among the different classes.
2.3 Strengthening of the Bolsheviks’ positions

Being unable to govern the country effectively, the opponents of
the Bolsheviks lacked unity and were full of separateness and mutual
contradictions. These facts were brightly exposed in the events of the
so-called ‘Kornilov’s plot ’or ‘Kornilovshina’. Attempting to fulfill the
th
plan of ‘establishing order’ in the country, on the 26 of August
Commander-in-Chief Kornilov directed the military corps of General
A. M. Krymov to go to Petrograd. That day Kerensky received what
he took to be an ultimatum from Kornilov demanding that all military
and civil authority be placed in the hands of a dictator. Accusing him
of conspiring to overthrow the government Kerensky sent a telegram
th
on August 27 relieving Kornilov of his duties. The latter ignored it,
Russia in 1917: from February to October ＆８９
ordering his troops to advance on Petrograd. Kerensky had no option

but to turn to the Soviet to prevent Kornilov’s troops from reaching
the capital.
In the fight against the Kornilovshina the Provisional Government
used the support from all the leftists, from all the parties of the left-wing,
in particular from Bolsheviks. During several hours, without having
any support from ‘above’ or from ‘below’ Kornilov’s mutiny was
suppressed. General Krymov committed a suicide, and Kornilov was
arrested.
As a result of these events the political situation changed greatly.
All the ‘right’ forces in the country, in particular the liberal party of
Cadets, were discredited immediately. The word ‘Cadet’ became from
that time the synonym of such words as the ’enemy’ or ‘counter-revolu-
tionary’. The only party which profited by this battle for power was
the party of Bolsheviks, who headed the suppression of Kornilov. Its
political success revealed itself in the process of ‘Bolshevising’ the
Soviets, which started in less than a week. On the night between the
st nd
1 and the 2 of September Bolsheviks gained the majority in the
Petrograd Soviet, its chairman became Lenin’s comrade Leon Trotsky.
th
On the 5 of September an equal change of power took place in the
Moscow Soviet. So Lenin put forward again the slogan ‘All Power
to the Soviets!’ In the first half of September, eighty Soviets in large
and medium towns backed the call for a transfer of power to the Soviets.
2.4 The Bolshevik seizure of power

“Seeing the surge in popular support for the Bolsheviks, Lenin became
convinced that nationally as well as internationally the time was ripe
for the Bolsheviks to seize the power in the name of the Soviets. In
the middle of September he blitzed the Central Committee with letters
from Finland in which he gave his plan for the immediate overthrow
of the Provisional Government. The majority of the leadership was un-
enthusiastic, remembering the hard July events and being afraid of defeat.
The majority of the leadership believed that it would be better to allow
power to pass democratically and peacefully to the Soviets at the Second
th
Congress of Soviets, scheduled to open on the 25 of October” (S.A.
Smith, p. 134).
th
But on the 29 of September Lenin wrote the letter-ultimatum, threat-
ening to resign and to appeal to the masses, if the Central Committee
wouldn’t support his demands. In his letter ‘The Bolsheviks Must
８：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Assume Power’ Lenin wrote: “History will not forgive us if we do

not assume power now.” Having returned in secret to Petrograd, Lenin
th
on the 10 of October persuaded the Central Committee to commit
itself to the overthrow of the Provisional Government. The decision
under the pressure of Lenin was accepted. The only two who opposed
the decision were Zinoviev and Kamenev, believing as Mensheviks,
that the conditions for socialist revolution were not yet ripe and that
an insurrection was likely to be crushed. They stood for the convening
of the Constituent Assembly as a base of a future government consisting
of all the Socialist Parties. They published their opinion in the legal
th
press on the 16 of October that was on the eve of the Bolshevik’s
uprising. But their suggestions, having the variant of the development
of Russia via democracy, were rejected.
The legal organ of the Bolshevik insurrection was the Military-
Revolutionary Committee (MRC), organized by the Petrograd Soviet
th
on the 9 of October for the purpose of defense against the possible
aggression of Germany.
In the view of such historians as M. Geller and A. Nekrich the seizure
st
of power began on the 21 of October, when the Military-Revolutionary
Committee issued an edict that declared all instructions of the government
invalid unless sanctioned by the approval of the Committee (See: Utopia
in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present. -
London, 1982). Moreover it prohibited the distribution of arms without
its own order. In a reaction to this edict the government tried to close
Bolshevik papers and printing presses; it also attempted to take the
members of the Committee to court.
In response to that the Military-Revolutionary Committee ordered
its commissars and small armed units to take control of the government
establishments, bridges, railway stations, telegraph and telephone offices,
etcetera. Everything was done without any serious armed conflict. By
th
the morning of the 25 of October only the Winter Palace remained
to be taken. That afternoon Lenin appeared for the first time in public
since July, proclaiming to the Petrograd Soviet and the citizens of Russia
that the Provisional Government was overthrown. He said: “In Russia
we must now set about building a proletarian socialist state”. The 1917
October Revolution became a historical fact.
From that time the problem of the nature of the October 1917
Revolution became one of the most controversial questions of the Soviet
history. Richard Pipes and Martin Malia, the supporters of the political
Russia in 1917: from February to October ＆８；
personality approach in American historiography determined the October

Revolution as a Bolshevik conspiratorial coup without popular support
and argued its accidental nature. For example, Pipes wrote: “Lenin and
Trotsky seized power by force, overthrowing an ineffective, but demo-
cratic government. The government they founded, in other words, derives
from a violent act carried out by a tiny minority” (See: Suny (2), p.
46).
Representatives of the socio-economic approach came to a conclusion
that “the October events revealed a deep and deepening social polarization
between the top and the bottom of Russian society and undermined
the Provisional Government. … Yet most Western specialists writing
on the revolution considered the thesis that the revolution was popular,
both in the sense of involving masses of people and of broad support
for the Soviet power incontrovertible” (Suny (2), p. 47).
The point of view of the well-known British historian S.A. Smith
is of great importance in this respect: “The Bolshevik seizure of power
is often presented as a conspiratorial coup against a democratic
government. It had all the elements of a coup – except for fact that
a coup implies the seizure of a functioning state machine. Arguably,
Russia had not had this since February 1917” (S. A. Smith, p. 138).
Topic 3
Ｚｎｋ＆ｋｙｚｇｈｒｏｙｎｓｋｔｚ＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆Ｈｕｒｙｎｋ｜ｏｑ＆ｊｏｉｚｇｚｕｘｙｎｏｖ

3.1 Bolsheviks in power
3.2 The Constituent Assembly and the Brest-Litovsk Peace
3.3 The internal policy of Bolsheviks
3.4 Socio-economic measures
3.1 Bolsheviks in power

th
On the 25 of October, 1917 at 10:40 p.m. the Second Congress
of Soviets finally opened, with artillery bombardment of the Winter
Palace audible in the distance. Mensheviks and right Socialist
Revolutionaries (SRs) denounced the insurrection as a ‘military plot’
and a provocation to civil war and walked out. “You are miserable
bankrupts; your role is played out. - Trotsky threw at their back. -
Go where you ought to be: into the dustbin of history” (See: S. A.
Smith, p. 135).
The Congress consisted now of Bolsheviks and left SRs. It adopted
Lenin’s resolution about the transfer of all the power to the Soviets
and constituted a Council of People’s Commissars ('Sovnarkom') as
a Workers’ and Peasants’ government. The government consisted of
the Bolsheviks only, it was headed by Lenin; Trotsky was appointed
the commissar of international affairs, of internal affairs – Alexei I.
Rykov, education – Anatoly V. Lunacharsky and nationalities – Joseph
V. Stalin.
The Congress adopted the first resolutions issued by the new power
– Peace and Land Decrees. The Peace Decree called on all the belliger-
ent powers to begin peace talks on the basis of no annexations or
indemnities and self-determination for national minorities. The Land
Decree provided confiscating all gentry, church and crown lands without
compensation and transferring them to peasant use. The issuing of these
decrees gave Bolsheviks mass support of the people during the first
days of their rule that allowed them to rout all the opponents of the
new regime at that time.
− ８＜＆ −
The establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship ＆８＝
Immediately after the Second Congress of Soviets ratified the

Bolshevik decree on land and the declaration of peace, armed opposition
to the Council of People’s Commissars arose. By the initiative of
Kerensky the offensive of troops under General Pyotr N. Krasnov com-
mand was deployed, but soon it was defeated.
Just as before the October insurrection, Lenin’s policy was opposed
by several of his comrades. When the All-Russian Executive Committee
of the Railway Trade Union (‘Vikzhel’) demanded a government estab-
lished to include all socialist parties, the so called ‘homogeneous socialist
government’, and threatened Sovnarkom with a general strike of railway
workers, the Bolshevik leadership split. A delegation of the Central
Committee of the Bolshevik Party in the absence of Lenin agreed with
the demand of Vikzhel to form a coalition government, consisting of
18 members, but without Lenin and Trotsky. When Lenin rejected this
plan, five Bolshevik leaders, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Rykov among
them, resigned from the Central Committee and Sovnarkom, but had
to submit to Lenin’s authority. By then, some historians argue, the chance
of democratic development in Russia was lost.
Soviet power was established with surprising ease, a reflection of
the popularity of the idea of devolving power to the toilers. So Lenin
called this process the ‘triumphal march’ of Soviet power. In towns
and regions with a relatively homogeneous working class, such as the
Central Industrial Region or the mining settlements of the Urals,
Bolsheviks and their Left SR allies asserted Soviet power quickly, with
little opposition. In Moscow fighting was held for only eight days. In
the distant regions of the country, in particular in Siberia, the process
of power-changing was more protracted and ended in the first months
of the 1918. Staunch armed resistance to the Soviet power was organized
by moderate socialists and Ukrainian nationalists in the Cossack regions
of Russia (Don, Kuban, and Orenburg) and Ukraine, but in January,
1918 they were defeated.
3.2 The Constituent Assembly and the Brest-Litovsk Peace

Final establishment of the new regime required a decision about the
problem of the Constituent Assembly, convening of which was still
envisioned by the Provisional Government.
What was the Constituent Assembly? The All-Russian Constituent
Assembly was a constitutional body. Its main goal was to make the
choice of which form of a social system to adopt and to form a new
８＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Constitution of Russia after the February revolution. The Provisional

Government was responsible for convening the Constituent Assembly,
but the process was postponed until December, 1917, so it was convened
only after the October revolution of 1917. By then, Bolsheviks already
had seized power, but nevertheless they decided to allow elections, re-
membering that in February the Constituent Assembly “symbolized the
people’s power in the heart of the revolution” (S. A. Smith, p. 115).
On the second day of the work of the newly elected Constituent
Assembly, it was broken up by the Bolsheviks.
From that time the problem of the Constituent Assembly and its break-
th
ing by Bolsheviks, which took place on the 6 of January, 1918, became
one of the most difficult and perplexing questions of post-revolutionary
Russia in historiography. What was the role of the Constituent Assembly
in the post-revolutionary period? Was the convening of the Constituent
Assembly a real alternative to civil war? How should we evaluate the
actions of Bolsheviks? Historians have debated these questions and events
for more than 90 years.
The elections in the Constituent Assembly were held only in
December, 1917. The number of electors who took part in voting was
48.4 million, which is less than 50 per cent of all the potential voters.
Among all the valid votes cast, the SRs gained 40.4 per cent, the
Bolsheviks 24 per cent, all the bourgeois parties - 16.4 per cent, including
4.5 given to the Cadets. Thus over 70 per cent of all the votes were
given to the socialist parties.
th
On the 5 of January, 1918 the Assembly opened, the delegates elected
Victor Chernov as a chairman and voted to discuss the SRs’ agenda.
They rejected the sanctioning of the new power and the ‘Declaration
of Rights of Working and Exploited People’, so it was closed down
th
early in the morning on the 6 of January, when the sailor’s leader,
anarchist A. G. Zheleznyakov announced that “the guard is getting tired”
and put an end to its proceeding forever. The Third Congress of Soviets
ratified the ‘Declaration of Rights of Working and Exploited People’,
which became the first constitution of the new regime.
Left SRs, headed by Maria A. Spiridonova, helped Bolsheviks greatly
in solidifying their power. They supported the breaking up of the
Constituent Assembly, entered the Soviet government in March, 1918,
and so gave a ‘multiparty’ image to the new regime.
What are the main points of view in historiography connected to
these events? The first point of view argues the Constituent Assembly
The establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship ＆８？
was a real alternative to the Soviets, and Bolshevik’s dictatorship, because

it could establish the multi-political state system and save the nation
from the civil war, while installing a democracy (See: Protasov, 1997).
The second point of view argues that in the course of the development
of revolutionary process two forms of representative power had appeared
in Russia. One of them was the Soviets and another was the Constituent
Assembly. Perhaps they could have coexisted, but the first form showed
to be closer to the masses of people and their desires. Soviets had
political, moral, powerful superiority over the Constituent Assembly,
so they had a chance to gain a victory over it and they took advantage
of this chance. Moreover, the forces of democracy, including the
Constituent Assembly, were very weak and slow in Russia. So democracy
as a political power and institutional system was not possible in Russia
in 1917-1918. The only alternative for development was a dictatorship,
whether left (Bolsheviks), or right (the White army) (See for example:
Polyakov, 1997).
As for the British expert in this problem S. A. Smith, he writes the
following: “Many argue that democratic government was a non-starter
in Russia in 1917”. Acknowledging that “the dissolution of the assembly
doomed the chances of democracy in Russia for seventy years”, he
underscores that peasants, 70 per cent of which voted for the Constituent
Assembly, took its dissolution indifferently. “They did so less out of
enthusiasm for parliamentary politics than out of a desire to see the
assembly legalize their title to the land. Once it became clear that they
had no reason to fear on that score, they acquiesced in the assembly’s
dissolution. The grim fact is that by 1918 the real choice facing the
Russian people was one between anarchy of some form of the dictator-
ship” (S. A. Smith, p. 139).
The most difficult problem of the new government was the issue
of ending the war. The Peace Decree suggested an armistice for three
months in order to develop the conditions of peace as a first step to
it. The Soviet government appealed to Germany and the countries of
Entente (Great Britain, France, the USA) to begin peace talks, but the
latter rejected all contacts with the Soviet government. The rejection
by the Entente of all the Soviet proposals led Bolsheviks to sue for
a separate peace with Germany. Peace negotiations began in December,
1917 in the town of Brest-Litovsk. “German terms proved to be tough,
they included subjugation of Poland, Lithuania, a part of Latvia and
Belorussia. Lenin insisted on the immediate acceptance of these terms
９６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
and making peace, because the army had broken down, and the country
couldn’t defend itself. The so-called ‘Left Communists’ led by Nikolai
I. Bukharin, who looked for a quick beginning of a ‘world revolution’,
were decisively against making peace on such conditions. Trotsky, who
headed the Bolshevik delegation at the negotiation, put forward a formula
th
‘No war, no peace’. On the 18 of February the German high command
lost patience with Trotsky’s stalling tactics and sent 700,000 troops
into Russia where they met virtually no resistance.
rd
On the 23 of February Germany proffered terms even more draconian,
but Lenin insisted on their acceptance, threatening his resignation if
they were rejected. It was one of the deepest schisms ever experienced
by the Bolshevik Party. At the crucial meeting of the Central Committee
rd
on the 23 of February, opponents of peace gained 4 votes against
7 in favor of acceptance, while four supporters of Trotsky abstained.
rd
The peace treaty, signed on the 3 of March, was massively punitive;
Lenin named it ‘smutty’” (S. A. Smith, p. 136). According to this treaty
Russia lost over 800,000 square kilometers and with it, over 26 per
cent of all the population of Russia. The Baltic provinces, a large part
of Belorussia, the whole of Ukraine, and several Transcaucasia’s towns
were excised from the former empire to Germany and Turkey in return
to an end of hostilities.
In August, 1918 Soviet Russia signed with Germany the so-called
Additional Treaty, in order to determine a line of demarcation within
the Soviet and German territories, as Germany continued to occupy
the new and new lands of Russia. Moreover, the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was made to pay Germany six billion marks
as a compensation for upkeep of captives and the losses of Germany
after annulment of loans and nationalization of German ownership in
Russia.
The evaluations of the Brest-Litovsk Peace were very different. For
example, ratifying of the treaty sundered the alliance of the Bolsheviks
with the Left SRs, who withdrew from the Lenin government in protest,
and also sparked heated controversy within the Communist Party. Some
Post-Soviet historians argue that the treaty became the catalyst of the
so-called ‘democratic counter-revolution’, that revealed itself in establish-
ment of the SRs’ and Mensheviks’ governments in Siberia and in towns
along the Volga. It appeared to be the casus belly of the left SRs in-
surrection in July of 1918 in Moscow.
In the Soviet historiography the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was traditionally
The establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship ＆９７
seen as an embodiment of a wise government, and flexibility and realism

of Lenin’s policy. Anyway, we are sure of the pragmatism and foresight
of Lenin’s policy, who foresaw the short life of the Brest-Litovsk Peace
Treaty. After the November Revolution of 1918 in Germany, which
overthrew the monarchy and established a Parliamentary Republic, and
after the defeat of Germany in World War I, the Brest-Litovsk Peace
Treaty was annulled by the All-Russian Executive Committee on the
th
13 of November, 1918.
3.3 The internal policy of Bolsheviks

The main goal of the internal policy of the Bolshevik regime was
the smashing of all the foundations of the old society and, in the first
place, according to the Marxist theory, the ‘smashing of the bourgeois
state machine’. All the former state institutions such as the courts, law-en-
forcement agencies, and the old army were abolished. By the decree
th
issued on the 20 of January, 1918 the church was separated from
the state, and schools were separated from the church, priests and believers
were prosecuted. Some scholars point out that the process of liquidation
of the former machinery of State led to further collapse of law and
order, and the growth of criminality.
The second task of the new power was the suppression of opponents.
One of the first actions of such kind was the closing of the seven most
popular newspapers. The cause for the escalating of repression was
the general strike of the state office workers, which began after the
October insurrection. The strike was seen as sabotage, and was organized
th
by Cadets. By the decree issued on 28 of November, 1917 the Cadet
Party was outlawed and its members were named the ‘people’s enemies’.
th
By the decree issued on the 7 of December, 1917 the main repressive
institute of the new regime – The Extraordinary Commission to Combat
Counter-revolution and Sabotage (‘Cheka’) was set up. It was headed
by Felix E. Dzerzhinsky, one of the most dedicated comrades of Lenin.
Soon Cheka became a really all-powerful organization, which conducted
the functions of inquest, trail, and carrying out of sentences. By the
st
decree issued on the 21 of February, 1918, the death penalty was restored.
3.4 Socio-economic measures

In the socio-economic policy the main efforts of the new regime
were concentrated with the implementation of a slogan of ‘expropriation
９８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
of the expropriators’. In common speech it sounded as ‘steal the stolen’.

Confiscation of property, imposing of ‘indemnities’ (great financial ex-
actions), ‘uplotnenie’ (reduction of space per person in living accom-
modation by settling the poor in the flats and houses of bourgeoisie)
were only the few measures to achieve the so-called equality and justice.
The most complicated task was to rule the economy. In the industrial
sphere the new power tried at first to act by means of ‘worker’s control’,
th
adopted by the decree of the 14 of November, 1917. But the hopes
of the workers’ self-government proved to be utopian very soon. So
Bolsheviks began to constitute administrative organs for managing
industry.
In December, 1917 the Soviet Government created the Superior State
Institution for Management of the economy of the RSFSR (‘Vesenkha’).
The Vesenkha was formed by a Decree of the Council of the People’s
Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (‘VTsIK’)
of the RSFSR and was subordinated to the Sovnarkom. Its purpose
was to supervise and control the newly nationalized industries. It had
rights of confiscation and expropriation. It consisted of the chief in-
dustrial branch administrations (‘glavki’), such as Sugarglavk, Oilglavk,
Metalglavk and others. Local Soviets were obliged to establish the same
provincial councils (‘sovnarkhozy’) and glavki.
In the first months after the October revolution most enterprises be-
longed to their owners. Nationalization (passing enterprises to the owner-
ship of the government) was used only as means of punishment for
the refusal to collaborate with the new power or for sabotage. Mass
nationalization named the ‘Red Army attack on the capital’ began in
the summer of 1918.
It was more difficult to devise an effective agrarian policy. Peasants
didn’t want to sell bread for depreciated money and fixed prices, so
starvation came in towns. The collapse of industrial production was
accompanied by growing food shortages. Because of that, the grain
monopoly and ‘food dictatorship’ were implemented by Bolsheviks.
Finally the ‘food dictatorship’ was adopted by the decree issued in
th
May, 1918. On the 27 of May, 1918 the Food Supply Commissariat
(‘Narkomprod’) was set up by the Soviet government. The owners of
bread were forced to sell it according to a stable, fixed price. Those
who didn’t obey were considered to be ‘speculators’ and the ‘people’s
enemies’. In order to control bread delivery into towns, to abolish selling
of bread for free and to implement grain procurements Narkomprod’s
The establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship ＆９９
Food Army (‘Prodarmiya’), comprised of industrial workers, was or-

ganized in the summer and autumn of 1918.
The struggle with famine was accompanied by class struggle in the
villages. The peasants’ reluctance to hand over grain convinced
Bolsheviks to foment class war in the countryside by introducing commit-
tees of the village poor (‘kombedy’). In order to undermine the influence
of the village bourgeoisie, called ‘kulaks’ (prosperous peasants), kulak
property was confiscated. According to ‘revolutionary justice’ the mem-
bers of ‘kombedy’ (the poor) were to get a share of bread confiscated
from kulaks. All these events entailed a wave of peasants’ riots.
What were the results of the first months of the Bolshevik rule?
First of all, disenchantment of the former supporters of Bolsheviks,
in particular peasants, increased. Secondly, the Bolshevik policy led
to consolidation of their opponents, who offered weak resistance after
the October insurrection. Mutual hostilities within the different groups
of Russian society entered their highest form. So the country became
ripe for civil war.
Topic 4
Сｏ｜ｏｒ＆｝ｇｘ
4.1 Escalation of civil war

4.2 Measures for strengthening the Bolshevik regime
4.3 The main periods of civil war. 1918
4.4 The decisive period of civil war
4.5 The end of civil war. Its results and consequences
There are different viewpoints about the beginning of the civil war
in Russia. Many historians date the event to October, 1917, because
the armed opposition to Sovnarkom arose immediately as the Second
Congress of Soviets ratified the Bolshevik decree on land and declaration
of peace. “The civil war in industry”, writes a well-known American
historian Donald J. Raleigh, the Center for Slavic, Eurasian & East
Europian Studies at UNC Chapel Hill, “started immediately after October,
1917, when the Bolsheviks limited private property and the market,
encouraging workers’ control and nationalizing banks”. (Raleigh, p. 157).
At the same time officers of the imperial army formed the first coun-
ter-force known as a volunteer army, based in southern Russia (See:
Zimina, p. 98).
Some of the scholars (for example, the Soviet academician U. A.
Poliakov) date the civil war to February, 1917, connecting it to the
great confrontation of all the classes in Russia, which started with the
overthrow of the monarchy. (See: Polyakov, 1997).
Another point of view, represented by the Russian academician A.
N. Sakharov, dates the beginning of the civil war to the summer of
1918. He wrote in his course of modern Russian history, published
by the Moscow University Press, that “from the middle of 1918 Russian
society came into a specific period of its history – the period of civil
war. The formal beginning of it dates to the February events of 1917,
when tens of people were killed and thousands were wounded. The
coercive overthrow of the Provisional Government and the seizure of
power by Bolsheviks in October increased confrontations in Russia.
But armed conflicts of different social and class forces still had a local
− ９：＆ −
Civil war ＆９；
character. So only in the summer of 1918 did the armed hostilities

within different social groups came to a large-scale” (Sakharov, Vol.2.
p. 501).
Thus civil war in a wide meaning – as the armed confrontation within
different groups of population of one country – began in Russia in
February, 1917. But civil war in a narrow sense of the word – as armed
operations of armies on a scale of the whole country – began in the
middle of 1918.
Who were the main belligerents in the civil war? “During the civil
war the Bolsheviks or Reds, renamed Communists in 1918, waged war
against the Whites, a term used to refer to all factions that took up
arms against the Bolsheviks. The Whites were a more diverse group
than the Bolshevik label of ‘counter-revolution’ suggests. Those who
represented the country business and the landowning elite often expressed
monarchist sentiments. Historically guarding the empire's borders,
Cossack military units enjoyed self-government and other privileges
that made them a conservative force. But many White officers had opposed
autocracy and some even harbored reformist beliefs. Much more compli-
cated were the Bolsheviks' relations with Russia’s moderate socialists,
Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries (SRs) and numerous offshoots
of the both parties. Their attempts to establish the Soviet power and
government without Bolsheviks led to an internecine struggle within
the socialist camp throughout civil war” (Raleigh, p. 143).
4.1 Escalation of civil war

The internal prerequisite of escalation of the civil war in 1918 was
exacerbation of contradictions within different social groups and con-
solidation of the anti-Bolshevik opposition.
An important external factor that promoted the war was the interna-
tional intervention, which bolstered the Whites. In January, 1918 Romania
occupied and then annexed Bessarabia. In April German troops invaded
the Crimea and in May, Georgia. In March, 1918, Allied intervention
began: English troops encroached upon Murmansk, Japanese and then
American troops invaded the Far East in the spring and the summer
of 1918. In August English troops occupied Transcaucasia, where they
took down a Bolshevik government in Baku. Twenty-six commissars
from Baku were executed. French troops, located in Odessa, gave help
to the Army of general Anton Denikin.
９＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
The first great event of the civil war is usually connected to the
rebellion of Czechoslovak legionnaires. The corps of the so called White
Czechs included from 3,500 to 5,000 soldiers. The special train with
Czechoslovakians aboard stretched from the city of Perm to Vladivostok.
th
So after the clash of legionnaires with Bolsheviks on the 25 of May,
1918, the Soviet Power in the vast territory from Perm to Vladivostok
was overthrown.
The internal opponents of Bolsheviks, the SRs in the first instance,
activated at that time. In July of 1918, under the leadership of SRs
anti-Bolshevik rebellions took place in 23 towns of Central Russia. A
range of terrorist acts was organized against the Bolshevik leaders, in
particular a member of the Socialist Revolution Party, Fanny Kaplan,
th
made an attempt on Lenin’s life on the 30 of August. Even the former
th
Bolshevik allies, the left SRs, opposed them. On the 6 of July in
Moscow they assassinated German Ambassador Count Mirbach and tried
to overthrow the Soviet Power.
Anti-Bolshevik forces made several attempts to consolidate. Under
the leadership of SRs the anti-Bolshevik government, the Committee
to Save the Constituent Assembly (‘Komuch’) was set up in the Volga
city of Samara in June, 1918. Governments of the same kind appeared
in the Ural town of Yekaterinburg and the Siberian town of Omsk,
where the Cadets established the Provisional Siberian Government. The
rivalry between Samara and Omsk resulted in a conference that took
place in the town of Ufa in September, the last attempt to form from
below a national force to oppose Bolshevism. Drawing representatives
from disparate bodies, the Ufa Conference set up a compromise five-
member Directory. They tried to find the so called ‘third way’, which
opposed both Bolsheviks and the most reactionary forces. In the sub-
sequent Soviet historical literature these SRs and Menshevik governments
were named the ’democratic counter-revolution’. In November of 1918
the most resolute opponents of the Bolsheviks led by Admiral Kolchak
removed the anti-Bolshevik socialist government in Omsk and established
a military dictatorship in Siberia.
4.2 Measures for strengthening the Bolshevik regime

Thus, in the middle of 1918 the Bolshevik regime was encircled
by enemies and fronts. It was actually on the precipice of downfall.
And what about Lenin and his partisans? They showed enormous
energy and resolution, and proved to be ready to do what was
Civil war ＆９＝
impossible. On the 2nd of September, 1918 the RSFSR was proclaimed

the ‘united military camp’, so the life of the country was subordinated
th
to the problems of the war. On the 30 of November all power in
the country was concentrated in the hands of the extraordinary organ
– the Soviet of Workers and Peasants Defense, led by Lenin.
The central goal of the new regime was the building of a new army.
th
Because of ineffectiveness of the volunteer army, on the 9 of June,
compulsory military service was introduced. So the number of the Red
Army increased from 360,000 people in 1918 to 5.5 million at the
end of 1920. The famous role in building the Red Army and in the
struggle with the Whites belonged to Leon Trotsky, who became the
Military Commissar and the Chief of the Revolutionary Military Council
(‘Revvoensoviet’). Trotsky used a variety of violent measures to increase
the fighting efficiency of the Red Army. He executed deserters, im-
prisoned members of their families, and organized special ‘blocking
detachments’ behind the lines to shoot with machine-guns those who
retreated without orders. But he promoted a number of important and
useful initiatives. He recruited 50,000 ex-tsarist officers to command
the Reds, appointing political commissars to each unit to monitor officers
and carry out the ideological education of recruits.
Both the Whites and the Reds turned to terror in the second half
of 1918 as a substitute for popular support. As for the Bolsheviks, they
applied terror systematically, in order to eliminate not only their political
opponents within the civilian population, but also targeted the entire
class of bourgeoisie. The Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-
revolution and Sabotage carried out terror. For example, with Lenin’s
approval, local Bolsheviks in Yekaterinburg executed Tsar Nicholas II
th
and his family on the 16 of July, 1918.
“Although the Whites never applied terror as systematically as the
Bolsheviks, the White terror was equally horrifying and arbitrary. They
put to death not only Communists and their sympathizers, but also Jews
in Ukraine and elsewhere” (Raleigh, p. 146).
Of course, successful struggle for preservation of the regime was
impossible without mobilization of all the economic resources of the
country. This consolidation was promoted by a specific economic policy
– it was the so-call “War Communism”. The core of this policy was
the obligatory grain quota assessment or razverstka, which was introduced
in January, 1919. We will talk about this problem in detail in the next
topic.
９＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
4.3 The main periods of civil war. 1918

Historians usually differentiate three main periods in the Russian civil
war: the second half of 1918; 1919 and 1920.
In the first period the Whites didn’t have enough forces to inflict
a resolute blow on the Reds. Hostilities at that time were at the border
areas of the Red Russia – in the south and in the east of the country.
In the summer and autumn of 1918 the main danger for Bolsheviks
came from the east, in particular, from the Volga region, occupied by
the Whites. The capture of the Volga city of Kazan by the Whites
opened a gateway for them to the centre of the country. So in June
the Eastern front under the former Tsar officer Sergei Kamenev was
formed, in September his troops assumed the offensive and took Kazan,
Simbirsk (the future Ulyanovsk), Samara and some other towns in the
Ural region.
But in November, after installation of Admiral Alesandr Kolchak
to power, the Whites assumed the offensive on the Ural town of Perm
and captured it (the so-called ‘Perm catastrophe’), but at the end of
1918 and at the beginning of 1919 they were repelled by the Reds.
Thus, the plan of consolidating the White forces located in the north
and the east was not accomplished.
As for the southern direction, the main hostilities were around the
Volga town of Tsaritsyn (the future Stalingrad, later Volgograd), the
administrative centre of the grain region of Russia. In August and
September the Cossack troops of General Pyotr Krasnov made two at-
tempts to seize the town, but failed. Thus, the plan of consolidating
the White forces located in the south and the east was ruined by the
Reds. For the first time Joseph Stalin played a noticeable role in the
course of events.
4.4 The decisive period of civil war

In the second period of hostilities (1919) the White forces got stronger
than ever, so they assumed a decisive offensive in the centre of Russia,
controlled by the Reds. In March of 1919 Kolchak opened a large-scale
offensive from the Urals to the Volga. After the first successful oper-
ations instead of joining the armies of general Anton Denikin, who
was coming to Saratov, Kolchak decided to charge ahead to be the
man to capture Moscow, but he failed. Bolsheviks had moved the capital
th
from Petrograd to Moscow in March, 1918. Meanwhile on the 28
Civil war ＆９？
of April the counter-offensive of the Reds under the command of Michael

Frunze began, the division of Vasilii Chapaev became famous in these
hostilities.
At the beginning of August, 1919 the Whites surrendered the Ural
region. In October the Reds under the command of Michael
th
Tukhachevsky opened a decisive offensive in Siberia. On the 14 of
November Kolchak’s capital – the city of Omsk – fell, the rest of the
Whites were finished off by peasant partisans, who rebelled in a great
mass against the Kolchak military dictatorship. As for Admiral Kolchak,
th
he was betrayed by his former Czechoslovak allies, and on the 7 of
February, 1920 he was executed by shooting according to the sentence
of the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee.
The second resolute attempt to rout Bolsheviks was made by General
Anton Denikin. In June, 1919 with 150,000 army soldiers he opened
an offensive and had an initial success. In October he seized Voronezh,
Kursk, and Orel. But in October-November, 1919 the counter-offensive
of the Red Southern front under the command of a former Tsar Officer
Aleksandr Egorov began. The First Red Cavalry Army under Semen
Budenny played an important role in these hostilities. At the beginning
of 1920 the Whites were routed by Red forces in the south and the
rest of the Whites (over 40 thousand) under the command of General
Pyotr Wrangel retreated to Crimea.
In May, 1919 two unsuccessful attempts to capture Petrograd were
made by the troops of General Nikolai Judenich.
4.5 The end of civil war. Its results and consequences

The third, final period of the civil war was in 1920, after a short
peace break. At that time the main enemy of the Reds was the force
of the newly resurrected Polish state. In April Poles moved to the offen-
st
sive in Ukraine, and on the 1 of May they captured Kiev. But at
the beginning of June after the blow of the First Red Cavalry Army
the counter-offensive of the Reds began. The successful march under
the command of Egorov and Tukhachevsky resulted in revolutionary
euphoria among the Bolshevik leaders. They thought that ‘liberation’
of Poland from bourgeoisie and Polish landowners would be a signal
for the revolution in Germany and even for the ‘world revolution’.
But in autumn the Reds were defeated near Warsaw; Poles have named
this event the ‘marvel on the Vistula’. As the conflict ended in stalemate,
：６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
the belligerent parties signed an armistice in October, 1920, followed

by the Treaty of Riga in March, 1921, which transferred the Western
Ukraine and the Western Belorussia to Poland.
At the same time as the invasion of Russia by Polish forces, the
Whites opened their final offensive in June, 1920, the troops of Wrangel
th
struck a blow from Crimea. But on the 28 of November the Reds
under Frunze launched their famous march through the cold waters
of the Sivash bay, assaulted the fortifications of Perekop and Chongar,
and then occupied Crimea as a whole.
Thus the main struggles of the civil war were ended. But at the
beginning of the 1920s peasant rebellions, named in the Soviet historiog-
raphy as ‘kulak riots’, took place. The most powerful among them were
peasant movements in the Tambov province, named ‘Antonovshina’,
and in Western Siberia, known as the Petropavlovsk-Ishimsk rebellion.
Moreover, the civil war dragged on because of the Japanese intervention
at the Far East, which ended after the Reds captured Vladivostok on
th
the 25 of October, 1922.
What were the reasons the Bolsheviks won the civil war, despite
the fact that the great majority of the population was dissatisfied with
them, and the Whites were supported by the international intervention
and disposed of ample economic and military means? The point of
view of the Western historian Donald J. Raleigh is of great importance
in this respect.
Organizational and political superiority of Bolsheviks

“In accounting for the Bolshevik victory in the civil war, historians
emphasized the self-sacrifice, relative discipline and centralized nature
of the Bolshevik Party; its control over the Russian heartland and its
resources; the military and political weakness of the Whites, particularly
their failure to promote popular social policies; the subaltern nature
of Green opposition; the inability of the Bolsheviks’ opponents to over-
come their differences; … the effectiveness of Bolshevik propaganda
and terror; and, during the initial stage of the conflict, the support of
many workers and peasants” (Raleigh, p. 166).
Political weakness of the White movement

“It is hard to imagine how the Whites might have prevailed in the
ordeal: the Constituent Assembly election made clear that over 80 per
cent of the population had voted for socialist parties. … Concentrated
Civil war ＆：７
on the periphery, the Whites relied on Allied bullets and ordnance to

fight the Reds. True, a more determined intervention might have tipped
the scales in the Whites’ favor in the military conflict, but their failure
was as much political as it was military. Recent scholarship reaffirms
the ineptitude and corruption of the White forces, emphasizing that their
virtual government misunderstood the relationship between social policy
and military success” (Raleigh, pp. 146-147).
What can we say in conclusion?
First of all, opponents of Bolsheviks did not put forward the goals
that could be understood and acceptable among a majority of the people.
As the Provisional Government used to do, they postponed solving the
key problems, in particular the issue of land and the state structure
until the victory over Bolsheviks. The general mass of inhabitants
- peasants - was dissatisfied with ‘razverstka’ or the obligatory grain
quota assessment. But they became alienated from the Whites because
they were afraid that in case the Whites were victorious, they would
return the land to previous landowners. Basing their ideology on the
principle ‘One, Great, and Indivisible Russia!’ the Whites antagonized
nationalist movements, because they did not want to give autonomy
to Non-Russian people, as Bolsheviks declared the ‘right of nations
for self-determination’.
The civil war became the great tragedy for Russia. “The Russian
civil war caused wide-scale devastation, economic ruin, loss of life
through military operations and disease and the emigration of an estimated
one to two million middle- and upper-class Russians. Most estimates
of human losses during the ordeal range from seven million to eight
million, of which more than five million were civilian casualties of
fighting, repression and disease. These figures do not include the estimated
five million who died from the famine of 1921-1923” (Raleigh, p. 166).
By the estimates of some Russian historians the human losses of the
civil war, including the losses of military operations, terror and epidemics
were over 20 million people.
The political and psychological results of the civil war were very
hard. The devastation also caused a strengthening of the tradition of
coercion, violence and arbitrary action, which led to the spreading re-
pressive policies in the 1930s.
Topic 5
Ｚｎｋ＆］ｇｘ＆Ｉｕｓｓ｛ｔｏｙｓ＆Ｖｕｒｏｉ｡
5.1 Essential core and prerequisites of War Communism

5.2 Bolshevik food-supplying policy
5.3 The other components of civil car
5.4 War Communism significance and results
5.1 Essential core and prerequisites of War Communism

The Bolshevik socio-economic policy of the civil war period is usually
called ‘War Communism’. For the first time this category was used
by the famous Bolshevik Aleksandr Bogdanov, prominent Soviet scholar,
one of the forerunners of cybernetics. The definition of the Soviet eco-
nomic policy of the civil war as a ‘peculiar War communism’ was
given by Lenin after the end of the civil war in his report to the Tenth
Congress of the Communist Party (RCP(b)) in March, 1921.
The essence of War Communism was the total subjection of the econo-
my and society as a whole to the party-state control, that was appreciated
by some of the Bolsheviks as a form of the movement towards socialism
and communism.
There are three main understandings of the introduction of War
Communism. The Soviet historians argued that War Communism was
forced by the war hardship and the economic breakdown, so it was
the only possible answer to the historical challenge. It means that the
Bolshevik policy was forced by war, and so, it had a forced character.
Perhaps Donald J. Raleigh, who compares the war time Bolshevik policy
with the war time tsarist policy, supports this point of view. “The
Bolshevik state policy and economic practice during the civil war were
influenced greatly by the tsarist wartime economic model, which appeared
since 1915, and in which state intervention and control played a major
role” (Raleigh, p. 157).
Some political scholars explained this policy as implementation of
the ideas of Marx and Lenin, who were sure in the dying off of market-
able production under socialism, “presumed an inherent hostility in class
− ：８＆ −
The ‘War Communism’ Policy ＆：９
relations and superiority of socialist principles”. According to this point

of view, War Communism was a utopian ideological concept, far from
being able to solve any real problem, but capable of making new
problems. In this regard, the desire of Bolsheviks to eliminate market
relations led to the final decline of the economy and contributed to
the manufacturing of the civil war. This view was offered, for example,
in the study of the English historian Geoffrey Alan Hosking (1991,
pp. 75-76). Some Russian historians, for example S. Pavliuchenkov
(1997), support this position and argue that from October, 1917 the
process of state intervention was increasing uninterruptedly, so
‘razverstka’ (the extraordinary tax) and other similar measures were
the continuation of the previous line only.
The most acceptable concept in contemporary scholarship combines
both of these approaches. According to this point of view, the Bolshevik
post-revolutionary economic policy should not be identified with War
Communism only. This policy included not only state intervention, but
readiness to combine different social and economic structures. Some
historians contend that it was a peculiar period in the Bolshevik policy
in the spring of 1918, when they held a more flexible line and even
tried to incorporate market and monetary relations. The supporters of
this point of view note Lenin’s work named ‘The Immediate tasks of
the Soviet Power’, written in March, 1918. In this work Lenin wrote
about the long preservation of the multi-structural economy and using
state capitalism. According to this reading only the civil war forced
Bolsheviks to give up the former more realistic approaches and put
War Communism into practice (Dmitrenko, 1986).
The third point of view is represented in a number of works of
Western historiography as well, written in the framework of a social
approach. According to their position, the Bolshevik civil war policy
was influenced greatly not only by the events of the civil war, but
also by the whole thousand-year-old traditions of Russian political and
economic culture: “To be sure, the cultural frame that defined the parame-
ters of Bolshevik civil-war practices was rooted in centuries of autocracy
characterized by Russia’s frail representative institutions; low levels of
popular participation in political life; centralization; a bureaucratic, au-
thoritarian government with broad powers; and highly personalized politi-
cal attachments” (Raleigh, p. 153). Perhaps both of the arguments contain
rational ideas.
：：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
5.2 Bolshevik food-supplying policy

As it was said, the basic aspect of the War Communism policy was
‘razverstka’ – the obligatory grain quota assessment, imposed on over
85 per cent of the rural population. ‘Razverstka’ became the most severe
and extraordinary form of compulsory requisitions and extraction of
surpluses from the rural population. It was based on the principle of
a mandatory quota of food procurement for every region and even every
village. Only after carrying out the procurement program were peasants
permitted to take part in the so called ‘tovaroobmen’ (the exchange
of the rest of their agricultural products for scarce manufactured goods).
Moreover, private trade was abolished.
According to the Bolshevik policy, ‘prodrazverstka’ was supposed
to solve two main problems. The first, to feed town and army, and,
the second, to solve an important social problem – liquidate market
relations and the bourgeoisie. The extraordinary organs exterminated
‘speculation’ and even used force patrols against grain dealers. There
were cases of execution by shooting. But the experience of War
Communism showed the impossibility of the liquidation of market
relations. Sixty per cent of the food was bought by people on the black
market. So from the first days of the Soviet power ‘the shadow economy’
appeared.
Donald J. Raleigh depicts the main periods in the Bolshevik food-sup-
plying policy. He writes, that the party launched its first annual grain
procurement program in August, 1918. The peasants’ reluctance to hand
over grain convinced the Bolsheviks to foment class war in the countryside
by introducing committees of the village poor (‘kombedy’). In the summer
and autumn of 1918 brigades of Narkomprod’s Food Army
(‘Prodarmiya’), comprising workers from the capitals and other industrial
cities, participated in the government’s procurement program.
Despite unfavorable sowing conditions in spring, 1919 and the dis-
ruption of the civil war, the government assessment in 1919 represented
a significant increase over the previous year. “Acknowledging that a
black market in just about everything undermined state procurement
efforts, the party justified the use of force to carry out requisitioning.
… In 1919 forced requisitioning replaced the hitherto haphazard approach
to obtaining grain deliveries. Discontent stemming from unfair quotas
and from confiscations surfaced immediately, as a result of which punitive
measures proved necessary to realize the state’s objectives. One illus-
trative episode from Saratov province involved an armed unit under
The ‘War Communism’ Policy ＆：；
the command of N. A. Cheremukhin in the summer of 1919, which

violently struck out against desertion and the brewing of illicit spirits.
Known in party circles for his ‘tact, experience . . . and devotion to
the interests of the Revolution’, Cheremukhin torched 283 households
in the village of Malinovka. Applying ‘revolutionary justice’, he con-
fiscated ‘kulak property,’ levied contributions on entire villages that
participated in anti-Soviet uprisings and shot ‘active opponents of Soviet
power, deserters, kulaks, and chronic brewers of moonshine’. Between
July and September his forces executed 139 people in an attempt to
break the spirit of those opposed to Soviet decrees. Party members,
non-Communists and Red Army units protested against Cheremukhin’s
repression. But local party boss V. A. Radus-Zen’kovich insisted that
Cheremukhin’s detachment ‘did not use force at all’. Such episodes
made certain that peasants would later welcome armed peasant bands
bent on overthrowing Bolshevik power” (Raleigh, p. 161).
These measures exacerbated the rift between town and country.
“Combined with mass mobilizations of peasant youth, abuses of power
in the countryside, the rupture of market relations and increase of havoc
in the traditional relations”, the food-supply policy in the countryside
led to peasants’ dissatisfaction and, as a result, to the so called peasants’
‘counter-revolution’. “As a result, peasant bands known as Greens com-
posed of deserters and others surfaced in 1918 and again in 1919. With
uprisings in Tambov, the Volga and Ural regions, Ukraine and Siberia,
the peasant revolt reached its peak in 1920 and 1921. At the same
time Lenin remarked that this “counter-revolution is without doubt more
dangerous than Denikin, Yudenich, and Kolchak taken together” (Raleigh,
pp. 161-162).
Centering on the extraordinary quota and procurement, the Bolshevik
economic policy and practices not only alienated peasants, but also con-
tributed to the famine of 1921-1923. This terrible tragedy led to an
estimated five million human losses in the Volga region and Ukraine.
“In the second half of 1921, a famine withered countless villages in
the Volga basin, all the way from the Chuvash Autonomous Region
and the Tatar Republic through Simbirsk, Samara, Saratov and Tsaritsyn
provinces down to Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. Beyond the Volga
region starvation extended as far as Vyatka province, as far as
Chelyabinsk and the Bashkir and Kirghiz Republics and west as far
as southern Ukraine. Severe drought that year, combined with the legacy
of protracted warfare, led to catastrophic results. Obviously much more
people would have perished if there were no foreign relief (notably,
：＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Administration)” (Raleigh, pp.

171-172).
Some contemporary Ukrainian nationalist historians try to show this
tragedy as man-made annihilation of the Ukrainian peasant. But the
majority of historians and political scientists do not think so. They draw
attention to the fact that the famine of 1920-1923 spread to many countries,
which took part in the First World War – Finland, Poland, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, Austria-Hungary. But, of course, this war–time econom-
ic policy contributed to this process. Supporting this point of view,
Donald J. Raleigh writes in his investigation: “Moscow did not knowingly
allow the famine to develop, but it ignored local reports until late spring
1921, when mass discontent and chilling news on the magnitude of
the potential human suffering put an end to any doubts about the gravity
of the crises” (Raleigh, p. 162).
5.3 The other components of War Communism

In the industrial sphere the result of the War Communism policy
was the total nationalization of all the enterprises. The crash course
of nationalization of the great industrial plants (with capital more than
th
500,000 rubles) began with a decree issued on the 28 of June, 1918.
But at the end of the civil war even the smallest manufacturers and
workshops were nationalized. What was the aim of this policy? Not
only to concentrate all the resources in state power, but also to eradicate
the economic basis for the bourgeoisie in order to eliminate it as a
class.
In order to submit all the labor forces to the interests of war and
to feed workers the Soviet government militarized the industrial labor
process and co-opted the process of consumption. In 1918 labor con-
scription was introduced for all the citizens, including the schoolchildren,
and in 1920 actually, everyone who was able to work was mobilized.
The Communist party stepped up its campaign to involve citizens in
unpopular volunteer workdays (‘subbotniki’). The party’s carrot and
stick measures to the workers included, along with labor conscription,
disciplinary courts and ration cards according to the class principle,
piece-rate wages, and labor books to control movement (See: Raleigh.
pp. 165-166).
th
According to the decree issued on the 16 of March, 1919, all the
people were forcibly co-opted into unpopular consumer co-operatives,
The ‘War Communism’ Policy ＆：＝
responsible for distributing salary, food and other items. As a result,

wage-leveling was implemented and the salary was paid not in money
but in different products.
What were the immediate results of the total nationalization and milita-
rization of the economy?
The coercive methods of ruling were established in the course of
the War Communism policy. “Although previous tsarist state policy
shaped economic practices during the civil war”, emphasizes Donald
J. Raleigh, “Bolshevik ideology transformed practices of state intervention
by justifying coercion” (Donald J. Raleigh, pp. 157-158).
The total nationalization of the economy entailed consolidation of
state bureaucracy with a great number of different administrative organs.
The symbols of the epoch became the Extraordinary Commission to
Combat Typhus, The Extraordinary Commission for Storing Boots for
the Red Army. So one of the most widespread problems of that time
was corruption combined with arbitrary administration known as
’chrezvychaishina’ or the extraordinary forms of government based on
arrests and terror, constituting the extraordinary organs of running the
system.
So in April, 1919 the party had to broaden the activities of the State
Control Commission to do something about the problem of corruption.
During its work the commission found malfeasance, theft, speculation
and other forms of corruption in virtually all the Soviet institutions.
As a part of a national campaign to curb abuses of power the party
replaced the State Control Commission in 1920 with the Peasant-workers’
Inspectorate (‘Rabcrin’). But it also failed to remedy the problem because
of deep cultural patterns and the unbelievably awful functioning of essen-
tially all institutions and organizations. As a remedy for corruption the
party used purging (‘chistka’). During the purge of 1920, 28.6 per cent
of the party’s members were expelled, and in 1921, 24.8 per cent (See:
Raleigh, pp. 154-155).
The War Communism policy couldn’t stop or change the logical devel-
opment of an economy that suffered through six years of hostilities,
including three years of the civil war. But War Communism exacerbated
the process of deterioration of the economy and life conditions. Industrial
production fell to less than 30 per cent of the pre-1914 level and monetary
circulation fell into disarray. It was a financial collapse. So because
of the final depreciation of money in 1920 the party had to abolish
all fares and rents for transport, flats, and public utilities.
：＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
The collapse of the economy resulted in factory closures and unem-

ployment. Wages did not keep up with prices. The industrial breakdown
was accompanied by growing food shortages. To survive, workers were
forced to rely on the black market and on other survival strategies such
as pilfering, absenteeism, shirking responsibilities. Growing indifference
toward work and a drop in labor discipline among the workers increased
in 1918 and 1919.
The situation deteriorated in 1919, when fuel shortages shut down
factories. All these events provoked civil unrest in Russia, uniting
workers. War Communism contributed to mass dissatisfaction of work-
ers and the party couldn’t hold back the workers strikes in Petrograd,
Moscow and some other cities. Combined with the soldiers-sailors revolt
at Kronstadt in March, 1921 the labor unrest as well as the peasants’
discontent convinced the Communist Party to replace War Communism
with a New Economic Policy (NEP).
5.4 War Communism significance and results

The War Communism policy was sharply conflicting. It helped
Bolsheviks to concentrate all the resources on the war aims and to
rout the Whites.
At the same time, the policy undermined economic incentives, con-
tributed to the whole breakdown of the economy and to the increase
of general dissatisfaction. The War Communism policy led to the general
socio-economic and political crisis of the Bolshevik regime. The civil
war together with the Soviet policies resulted in “a large extent of
de-urbanization, created a transient problem of enormous proportions,
militarized civilian life, ruined infrastructures, turned towns into breeding
grounds for disease, increased the death rate and victimized children.
Furthermore, War Communism strengthened the authoritarian streak
in Russian political culture by creating an economic order characterized
by centralization, state ownership, compulsion, the extraction of surpluses,
forced allocation of labor and the distribution system that rhetorically
privileged the toiling classes. Six years of hostilities of wartime production
that exhausted supplies, machinery, and of ideologically inspired and
circumstantially applied economic policies had shattered the state’s infra-
structure, depleted its resources, brutalized people, and brought them
to the brink of physical exhaustion and emotional despair. In political
terms, the party’s economic policies contributed to consolidation of a
The ‘War Communism’ Policy ＆：？
one-party state and repression of the civil society as the population

turned its attention to honing basic survival strategies.In practical terms,
the price of survival was the temporary naturalization of economic life,
famine and entrenchment of the black market and applying a system
of privileges for party members” (Raleigh, p. 167).
The consequence of War Communism in the long run was the change
in the mass psychology of people. Some members of the Bolshevik
leadership evaluated this policy as a real transition to socialism and
communism. These aspirations revealed themselves in the ideas of the
so called ‘left opposition’, headed by N. Bukharin, in particular in his
book ‘The Economy of the Transient Period’. Traditions and methods
of War Communism (egalitarianism, commanding style) were accumu-
lated by youth and ordinary communists. These aspirations were reflected
by literary types such as Makar Nagulnov and Pavel Korchagin, and
in the novels ‘Virgin Soil Upturned’ by Mikhail Sholokhov and ‘How
the Steel was Tempered’ by Nickolay Ostrovsky. This situation in the
mass psychology promoted the suspicious attitude of a great part of
the communist leadership toward the NEP which culminated in the re-
jection of this policy.
Topic 6
Ｘ｛ｙｙｏｇ＆ｊ｛ｘｏｔｍ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｖｋｘｏｕｊ＆

ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆Ｔｋ｝＆Ｋｉｕｔｕｓｏｉ＆Ｖｕｒｏｉ｡＆．ＴＫＶ／
6.1 Reasons for implementation of the NEP. The essence of the New Economic Policy
6.2 Main directions and results of the NEP
6.3 Contradictions of the NEP and its significance
6.1 Reasons for implementation of the NEP. The essence of the

New Economic Policy
After the end of the civil war the country fell into economic decay.
According to different estimates of historians industrial production at
the beginning of 1921 shrank five to seven times in comparison with
the level of 1913. The agricultural production was only two thirds of
the pre-war period.
“Millions of city residents had perished, emigrated or returned to
the villages. Russia became less an urban society than it had been at
the end of the nineteenth century. Metropolises tended to experience
the largest proportional declines. Moscow and Petrograd lost more than
half of a combined population that had reached 4 million by 1917.
The nation’s industrial workforce shrank even more rapidly than the
general urban population during the civil war, gutting the workers the
Bolsheviks depended on most for support. By 1922 only 1.6 million
people were counted as workers. It was less than two-thirds of the
number shortly before the First World War. Demobilization reduced
the Red Army’s ranks from 4.1 million to 1.6 million in 1921, worsening
overpopulation in the hungry countryside which boosted migration to
cities. The cities offered less work, the countryside was starving, almost
as quickly as the population fled to the country to find food, the ebb
and flow found migration back to the cities, jobs or no jobs” (Ball,
p. 170).
Dissatisfaction within the population became menacing. “By February
1921, in Tambov province alone, tens of thousands of peasant fighters
− ；６＆ −
Russia during the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) ；７
faced Bolshevik commanders who could not be certain of the loyalty

of their own troops. Similar peasant violence gripped many other regions,
and some areas, notably Volga and Siberia, which were not pacified
until the summer of 1922. In Moscow, Petrograd and other principal
cities, diminished food rations in the winter of 1920-1921 sparked strikes
among workers who backed Bolsheviks during the civil war. The mutiny
at the Kronstadt naval base in March of 1921 delivered the severest
shock to the Bolshevik regime, given that the sailors’ support for the
Bolsheviks reached back to 1917” (Ball, p. 168).
The general economic and political crisis in 1921 threatened to force
the Bolsheviks from power. Their reaction was to change edicts toward
the direction of what soon became known as the New Economic Policy
(NEP). “The New Economic Policy (NEP) emerged neither as a single
decree nor a planned progression but as a label pinned eventually on
a series of measures, which began in the spring of 1921. The NEP
was ‘new’ – that is, a departure from the practices of the civil-war
era – in a number of ways” (Ball, p. 169).
In March of 1921, following Lenin’s suggestion, the Tenth Party
Congress approved of the main measure of the NEP - to replace grain
requisitions by a fixed tax in kind (‘prodnalog’). It was much lower
than the grain requisition or the obligatory grain quota assessment. For
example, “the new grain tax for 1921/2 was set at 57 per cent of the
requisition target for the previous year, and only a fraction of this was
actually collected” (Ball, p. 178). So the tax was fixed strictly, and
was let known to peasants every spring - at the beginning of an agricul-
tural year. As for the surplus production, peasants were given a free
hand to use it, so labor incentives were revived. Soon peasants were
also allowed to sell at free-market prices, any produce left after their
taxes had been paid, so legal small-scale free trade was permitted.
There are two main view-points on the problem of the NEP essence
found in the historiography. The Soviet historians usually underlined
the idea, that the NEP was implemented as a policy of long duration.
Keeping in mind Lenin’s words that “the NEP had been adopted seriously
and for a long time”, they understood the NEP as a realistic policy
based on a compromise toward the private sector (See, for example:
Polyakov, 1967; Gushchin, 1983).
Some post-Soviet Russian historians argue that the NEP was a forced
policy, a tactical maneuver implemented by Bolsheviks in order to keep
their power. This version is suggested in the text-book edited by A.
；８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Sakharov (Vol.2, p.506).

As for Western historians, they widely support the first approach.
The authors who share this point of view, belong to the group of historians
of the older generation well known in Russia – J. Boffa ‘The History
of the Soviet Union’ (1994. Vol.2, p. 164) and N. Vert ‘The History
of the Soviet State, 1900-1991’ (1995, p. 159). The first point of view
is also supported in historical works of contemporary Western historiog-
raphy written in a frame of socio-economic approach, for instance, in
the encyclopedic ‘Cambridge History of Russia, Volume III – The
Twentieth Century’ (Cambridge, 2006). In a chapter, corresponding to
the NEP Alan Ball, Marquette University, Wisconsin, the USA, writes:
“Lenin wanted to strengthen a union or bond between workers and
peasants called ‘smychka’, which was symbolized by the hammer-
and-sickle emblem. It was not only essential for the survival of his
government but also represented the key for building socialism in Russia.
Lenin dreamed about the peaceful way of building socialism on the
basis of cooperation. As the country industrialized, the proletariat would
supply the peasants with manufactured household goods and agricultural
equipment (especially tractors) through such channels as rural
co-operatives. As for peasants, they would deliver food to the co-oper-
atives for shipment to their urban comrades. Such an exchange, it was
hoped, would breathe life into the smychka and convince peasants to
join (or form) co-operatives. Peasants would not be forced. Lenin and
other Bolshevik defenders of the NEP believed that the advantages of
mechanization and other modern techniques demonstrated on model col-
lective farms would convince peasants to drop their attachment to the
unproductive practices of bygone generations and to join some form
of co-operative. Then, as collective farms gained members at an accel-
erating pace without coercion, Bolsheviks would witness the triumph
of socialism in the countryside. So ran official hopes during Lenin’s
period of the NEP” (Ball, pp. 178-179).
6.2 Main directions and results of the NEP

After the abolition of grain requisitions the Bolshevik state abandoned
the other elements of War Communism. Partial privatization in industry
began, this entailed the development of a legal private economic sector
along with state-run factories and stores. Many enterprises were rented
by private entrepreneurs. Some of them were rented in concession to
Western capitalists in order to attract foreign capital investments.
Russia during the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) ；９
Lenin put forward the idea of the necessity to learn from private
entrepreneurs, who could increase the flow of goods between cities
and the countryside and thus could help to build socialism: “Anyone
who increased the flow of goods between cities and countryside helped
to build socialism, Lenin wrote in 1921, and this included private traders”.
“It may seem a paradox: private capitalism in the role of socialism’s
accomplice? It is in no way a paradox, but rather a completely incon-
testable economic fact”. “The idea of building communism with commu-
nist hands is childish, completely childish,” he lectured the Eleventh
Party Congress in March, 1922. “Communists are only a drop in the
sea of people… We can direct our economy if communists can build
it with bourgeois hands, while learning from bourgeoisie and directing
it down the road we want it to follow” (See: Ball, pp. 181-182).
The strongest position was acquired by the private sector in trade,
for instance, in 1923 it gripped 80 per cent of retail commodity turnover.
The currency reform which introduced the stable exchange rate of a
golden ruble (‘chervonets’) was an important factor in the improvement
of the economy. Currency reform eliminated inflation. So by fiscal year
1923/4 the government had managed to produce a balanced budget,
with a surplus following in 1924/5 (See: Ball, pp. 170-171).
“Large-scale industry, retained by the state, also found its place with
a new footing. Enterprises could no longer expect to receive raw materials
and other resources from Moscow. They could not expect the state
to absorb their output regardless of cost or demand for products. In
other words, thousands of factories were placed on a cost-accounting
basis (‘khozraschet’). Individual enterprises were grouped into trusts,
organized most often according to activity – the State association of
Metal Factories, for instance, or the Moscow Machine Building Trust.
Whether subordinated directly to the Supreme Economic Council in
Moscow or to local economic councils, trust’s factories were now in-
structed to cut expenses and produce goods that could be marketed
successfully to other state customers or, in some instances, to private
entrepreneurs” (Ball, p. 169).
Thus, the distinctive mixed economy was constituted, where the
‘commanding heights’ of the economy belonged to the state and were
combined with the legal private economic sector and trade-monetary
relations.
What were the main results of the NEP?
The main historical result of the NEP was rapid restoration of the
；：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
economy. Receiving the labor incentives the peasantry rapidly overcame

the difficulties of the post-war period and terrible consequences of the
famine of 1921-1922. “After 1922 the rural population grew rapidly
until the end of the decade and in 1926 approached 120 million people
(over 80 per cent of the nation’s total). In the same year, the grain
harvest exceeded the best return of the tsarist era, while the number
of cows, pigs, sheep, and goats had already climbed above pre-war
levels. At last the peasantry closed a decade of calamities that had
begun in 1914 and had extinguished as many as 15-20 million lives”
(Ball. p. 178).
Industry was reviving on the same basis of incentives: according
to the present-day data the pre-war level in industry was restored during
the second half of the 1920s. “Industrial production, both heavy and
light, as well as foreign trade improved far above the abysmal levels
of the civil war and the beginning of the NEP. Rail transport recovered
so impressively that in 1926 it surpassed the level of traffic in 1913,
to say nothing of 1921. As the number of workers increased, the improve-
ment in their standard of leaving seemed all the more striking when
measured against their plight just a few years before.” (Ball, pp. 170-171).
Positive shifts were also recorded in the social sphere. The country
was pacified, so mass arrests, shootings, and the institution of hostage
taking and emergency measures - all these phenomena - became past
history. Some important aspects of law and order were revived, for
instance, the public prosecutor inspectorate, and the institution of lawyers
were restored. New Civil codes, with legislation controlling the circum-
stances of women, family and children were also adopted.
“Less than a year after the revolution, a Code on Marriage, the Family
and Guardianship had proclaimed equal standing for men and women
regarding divorce and alimony, while removing legal stigmas attached
to ‘illegitimate’ children and their mothers. In 1926 a new Family Code
recognized de facto marriage, effectively eliminating the legal distinction
between common-law and officially registered unions. Modified alimony
and child-support provisions from the first code were joined by a declara-
tion that property acquired during marriage belonged jointly to husband
and wife. When a relationship turned sour, divorce could be obtained
as easily as sending a postcard of notification to one’s partner” (Ball,
p. 173).
It seemed that after enormous social calamities the life of the great
country was resuming a normal and civilian course.
Russia during the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) ；；
6.3 Contradictions of the NEP and its significance

Along with the great results, the period of the NEP was characterized
by a number of sharp contradictions which showed its limited nature.
Despite the concession to private initiative some contradictions in
the economy existed. The main one came from the remaining ideological
dictates and control over economy by the Bolshevik regime. Thus the
bureaucratic system of running industry remained. “The Bolshevik lead-
ership”, writes Alan Ball, “had not abandoned dreams of a centrally
planned system of state industry, just as the legalization of private trade
did not replace the long-term goal of socialism. In fact, the NEP’s initial
year witnessed not only the announcement of khozraschet and the con-
cessions to private enterprise, but also the formation of the state planning
agency (Gosplan)” (Ball, p. 169).
All the executives were communists or the ‘red directors’ as they
were called at that time. They were not competent enough, so their
activity contributed to descending efficacy of the state industry. Of course
this huge ruling apparatus was very expensive. In order to save the
workers’ support the Bolshevik government had to keep up a relatively
high wage level at the state enterprises despite the relatively low level
of their productivity. All these factors led to rise of production costs.
As a result, the discrepancy of prices, when prices for consumer
goods and industrial products were high, but prices for products of
agriculture were low, became a constant feature of the NEP economy.
Besides, the situation with the price disagreement had its socio-political
aspect, and led to the growth of the peasants’ dissatisfaction.
The second important contradiction laid in the social sphere. Private
entrepreneurs and traders, who were dubbed Nepmen, and who received
the opportunity for economic activity and enrichment, were discriminated
against in their political rights by being deprived of the right to vote.
The children of Nepmen were not allowed to get higher education.
The third sharp contradiction laid in the sphere of agriculture and
was connected with the social status of peasantry. Revival of the country-
side led to the economic stratification of peasants. According to the
Bolshevik stratification of the rural society out in the villages, three
distinct groups of peasants grew out of the NEP.
“The ‘poor peasants’ (roughly one-third of the total) possessed little
or no land and often worked as hired laborers. They were considered
by the party as a natural ally for its rural policy, so they (35 per cent
；＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
of all the peasants) were released from paying a fixed tax. A much
larger group (60 per cent), the ‘middle peasants,’ were described as
those with enough land and livestock to support meager existence.
Convincing them to join co-operatives and ultimately socialism was
the most ambitious goal of the Bolsheviks in the countryside during
the NEP. So the tax obligations for this category of villagers were a
little bit lower than the average. The third rural category was the so
called ‘kulaks’. In Soviet ideology these villagers were seen as rapacious
elite, perhaps three to five per cent of the peasant community. More
prosperous in terms of land, livestock and equipment, they were said
to fill the role of rural capitalists exploiting the hired labor of other
peasants in a manner suggested by their label kulak – a fist. Together
with Nepmen, peasants identified as kulaks, appeared to Bolsheviks
as the ‘new bourgeoisie’. Though, kulaks were tolerated during the NEP
and experienced less badgering than did urban private traders, they were
also stripped of their right to vote, and they were obliged to pay the
highest taxes, including the share shifted from the poor” (Ball, p. 179).
The result of such a policy was obviously sad. Evidently the greatest
commodity output was provided by big and effective peasant farms,
but its basis was undermined. Peasantry as a whole lost the incentive
for work, because every hard-working and skillful peasant could become
richer and then could be qualified as a ‘kulak’. Many of the peasants
came to a decision that it was better to be poor and to be assisted
in different ways by the regime. In order to avoid the hard tax burden,
many prosperous holdings, which gave the greatest commodity output,
were divided by their owners into the little ones, artificially becoming
poor. In the 1920s the speed of peasants’ holding divisions was twice
as fast as before the revolution. This fact became the main reason for
decline of the marketability in agriculture.
That fact led to the decline in the export of agricultural products.
And since that was the case, the possibilities of import of equipment
for industry, that is machines and technologies, declined also. In 1925
export of agricultural products, in particular of grain, fell in comparison
with 1909-1913 by 21.7 per cent. So in 1928 the USSR was able to
buy only one half of the number of foreign machines and technologies,
which were bought by tsarist Russia in 1913.
The fourth sharp contradiction laid in the realm of people’s psychology.
“Thus, while most peasants and other Soviet citizens doubtless welcomed
the NEP as a distinct improvement over the policies and misery of
Russia during the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) ；＝
War Communism, many Bolsheviks viewed the legalization of private

business activity with consternation. It seemed naive to speak of a brief,
orderly retreat when the doors were opening again to the ‘bourgeoisie’,
the class said to have been overthrown in the ‘Great October Socialist
Revolution’ of 1917. Such concerns surfaced regularly at party meetings,
forcing Lenin to argue time and again that a hostile peasantry would
doom the revolution in a country still overwhelmingly rural. The NEP
has been called a peasant Brest-Litovsk, and so it began – with con-
cessions unpalatable to Bolsheviks but indispensable, Lenin insisted,
for them to retain power….”
“In many respects the NEP embraced practices that revolutionaries
viewed with misgiving. More galling than private trade itself was an
atmosphere of extravagant consumption among newly wealthy en-
trepreneurs and others in the largest cities. In contrast to the egalitarian
dreams of War Communism, the Soviet Union’s principle urban centers
seemed to have joined the Roaring Twenties. ‘Moscow made merry’,
observed the Menshevik Fedor Dan in winter of 1921-1922, ‘treating
itself with pastries, fine candies, fruit, and delicacies. Theatres and con-
certs were packed, women were again flaunting luxurious apparel, furs,
and diamonds.’ The raucous nightlife seemed particularly unpalatable
to Bolsheviks because it flourished alongside extensive social misfortune,
especially during the years of starvation” (Ball, pp. 180-182).
Contradictions were also found in the political sphere. Making con-
cessions in the sphere of economy, the Bolshevik party inflexibly pre-
served its monopoly on political power, so all nonconformists were
persecuted in different ways – exiled, deported from the country or
were under supervision. There was the so called ‘Philosophy Ship’ in-
cident in 1922 when Lenin threw all the non-communist philosophers
out of Russia by putting them onto steamships and telling them not
to come home unless they wanted to be shot.
One of the most widespread problems in the party was its
bureaucratization. The Tenth Party Congress held in 1921 put an end
to factions in the party itself. The caste of party-state functionaries,
absolutely devoted to the leaders, appeared. The main problems of the
development of the country were solved in a narrow circle of the party
elite. Party infightings among different groups (‘Triumvirate’, ‘Trotsky’s
block’, ‘New Opposition’ (Zinoviev and Kamenev), ‘United Opposition’,
‘the Rights’) became very sharp in that period.
Thus, the significance and repercussions of the NEP are ambiguous.
；＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
This policy helped to save the country from total collapse and catas-
trophe; it helped to feed the nation and to overcome a deep economic
breakdown.
But the implementation of the NEP caused new contradictions to
emerge and accumulate. They led to a situation in which the mass pop-
ulation was dissatisfied with the NEP. Communists and the majority
of workers took the NEP as a betrayal of the revolution and its principles.
Peasants and Nepmen thought that the concessions to private capital
were very few, so they were also dissatisfied. Since that was the case,
the obvious contradictions as a whole were a fundamental reason for
the cardinal political change at the end of the 1920s. So when Stalin
liquidated the NEP he did not meet any serious opposition.
Topic 7
Ｌｕｘｓｇｚｏｕｔ＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ

7.1 The theory and practice of Bolsheviks concerning the ethnic issue
7.2 National Republics at the beginning of the 1920s
7.3 Controversy in the Bolshevik governing body concerning the ways of uniting the republics
7.4 Formation of the USSR and its significance
During the period of the NEP the Bolshevik leadership was concerned
not only with economic problems, but also with the problem of unifying
a nation of diverse ethnicities. “The Soviet Union took shape as an
assemblage of national or ethnic units, and the Kremlin advanced the
line that national identity was an inevitable feature of incipient socialism
as well as capitalism. Following Lenin, the party even stipulated that
past Russian oppression had indeed given rise to valid complaints among
numerous ethnic groups now inhabiting the Soviet Union. The proper
policy, then, was to accept national sentiment and steer it in healthy
directions, away from those who might fan such passions in opposition
to socialism and the Soviet state” (Ball. p. 176).
But first, before we delve into the nation’s relations in the 1920s,
we should examine the prehistory of the Bolshevik national policy.
7.1 The theory and practice of Bolsheviks concerning the ethnic

issue
The ethnic issue was of great significance for Russia as it was one
of the most multinational countries. At the beginning of the twentieth
century there were more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups in
Russia, covering just as wide a spectrum in their stages of economic
development. That is why various national movements exerted great
influence in the struggle of opposing social and political forces. As
it was told before, the White Guard governments were following the
principle of ‘One, Great and Indivisible Russia’; they didn’t conceal
their intention to liquidate independent states, which came into existence
after the October, 1917 victories in the territory of the former Russian
− ；？＆ −
＜６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Empire.
On the contrary, Bolsheviks always considered the national issue to
be subordinated to the main one – ‘struggle of the working class’, and
‘oppressed nations’ were supposed to be the allies in the struggle for
power. Political slogans were made in coordination with the introduced
point. Before the revolution Lenin initially didn’t support the idea of
dividing the multinational country, he was for a unitary state; all forms
of autonomy * were negated. This position concerning the problem
1)
changed on the eve of the First World War, when stirring up of the
national movement attracted much attention to this political factor. After
this time Bolsheviks admitted the possibility of the existence of national
autonomous states within the united state.
After the October Revolution in November, 1917 the Declaration
of Rights of Peoples of Russia was published; it provided “the right
of nations of Russia for free self-determination up to secession and
formation of independent states”. In accordance with it in December
of 1917 the independence of Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia
was declared. Such actions were supposed to provide new allies for
Bolsheviks, or, at least, provide neutrality of national outlying districts
in the expanding struggle. Also it was the acknowledgment of the real
state of things, actual disintegration of the former state territory (a number
of nations could not be prevented from it anyway).
At the same time ‘export of revolution’ was being put into effect;
most of all it concerned Ukraine. In 1917 the Ukrainian National Republic
(UNR) was proclaimed. Its government – the Central Rada – consisted
of representatives of socialist parties headed by the Ukrainian historian
Mikhail Grushevsky and the Ukrainian writer Vladimir Vinnichenko.
At the beginning of December, 1917 the Bolshevik government admitted
UNR and at the same time put forth an ultimatum toward the Central
Rada; it was required “to render assistance to the revolutionary forces
in the struggle with the counter-revolutionary Cadet-Kaledin rebellion”.
Soon there was opened the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, which
declared formatting the Ukrainian Soviet republic. After that the Red
offensive towards Kiev started. In January, 1918 the Central Rada declared
the independence of Ukraine, but its troops were split. In that month
* Autonomy (ôtŏn`əmē) [Gr.,=self-rule], in a political sense, limited self-government,

short of independence, of a political state or, more frequently, of a subdivision.
Autonomy as in the former Soviet autonomous republics and regions in Russia
provided local control over cultural and economic affairs.
Formation of the USSR ＜７
actually, Bolshevik rule was established over most of the territory of

Ukraine. Then in March of 1918 the Red forces retreated from Kiev
under pressure from the troops of the Central Rada, headed by Simyon
Petliura.
In January, 1918 having support of Russian Bolsheviks ‘the socialist
revolution’ occurred also in Finland. The Bolshevik regime was there
just until May and then was suppressed by German troops.
7.2 National Republics at the beginning of the 1920s

By the end of the civil war the political framework was codified
to create the system of national states of two types under Soviet Rule.
First of all, there were autonomies, remaining within the RSFSR (the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic). The first of them, the
Tatar-Bashkir republic, arose in March, 1918. Also different forms of
autonomy were given to Kyrgyz, Mari, Dagestan, Buryat, Mongol,
Kalmyk, the Crimean Tatar, and Germans of the Volga region.
Secondly, there were the sovereign Soviet republics (formally in-
dependent states). Except for the RSFSR, the same status the Ukrainian
Republic received (declared in December, 1917) and the Belorussian
Republic (declared in January, 1919). In 1920 and the beginning of
1921, with the help of the Red army, Soviet Rule was established in
Transcaucasia. Then new Soviet republics sprung up: in April, 1920
– Azerbaijan, in November – Armenia, in February, 1921 – Georgia.
In March they were united into the Transcaucasian Federation (ZSFSR).
In addition, in 1920 there were created the ‘national Hivin and Buchar
republics’ in Middle Asia (Turkestan), which were actually Russian
protectorates.
Independence of all these states was, of course, very relative. First
of all, the economic and military superiority of the RSFSR was obvious
and influenced the distribution of power. Secondly, concentration of
power in the hands of the central party leaders played a decisive role.
During the civil war, as it was considered, the military-political union
of republics was formed – they had the common military headquarters
and were following the same social and economic policies. After the
end of the civil war legalization of the system of two-sided agreements
between republics (‘the agreement federation*’) took place; it had already
2)
* A federation (Latin: foedus, foederis, ‘covenant’), also known as a federal state,

＜８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
restricted independence of the republics.

For example, the agreement between the RSFSR and Azerbaijan in
November 1920 provided the uniting of a number of important fields:
defense, economy, foreign trade, supply of provisions, transport, mail,
telegraph and finance. “Bilateral treaties signed between the Russian
Republic (RSFSR) and the other five created a confusing impression
that suggested both an understanding between independent nations and
an administrative reform of a single state, depending on the portion
of the document consulted. As Bolshevik leaders prevailed in the civil
war, they gained the opportunity to exert their will in outlying regions
and thereby address this unstable equilibrium. From 1920 to 1922, taking
advantage of the leading role played by the Russian Communist Party
in all six republics, Moscow transferred an ever-larger share of authority
to itself. Even the Commissariats for Foreign Affairs, symbolic bastions
of independence in the other five republics, yielded to the Kremlin
and allowed Russia to speak for all six at the Genoa Conference early
in 1922. This vexed Ukrainian officials in particular, but dismay over
evaporating sovereignty rang out most loudly in the republic of Georgia”
(Ball, pp. 174-175).
7.3 Controversy in the Bolshevik governing body concerning the

ways of uniting the republics
It goes without saying, that there was an objective interest of all
the nations of the former Russian Empire to consolidate relations among
each other, since they possessed a common economic territory, defense
alliances and so on. As was proven in earlier historical works, this
turned out to be the cause of the so called ‘uniting movement’ which
started at the beginning of the 1920s among these republics.
The difficulty of the issue of relations among republics was determined
with some contradictions among different groups of the Bolshevik elite.
Among the Bolshevik leaders there were two approaches toward this
problem. On the one hand, there were revivals of the imperial traditions.
It was the dictate of the center over outlying districts, which often led
to ignoring the interests of other nationalities and expressing arrogance
is a type of sovereign state characterized by a union of partially self-governing

states or regions united by a central (federal) government. In a federation, the
self-governing status of the component states is typically constitutionally entrenched
and may not be altered by a unilateral decision of the central government.
Formation of the USSR ＜９
of Russian officials toward the national districts. Lenin named it ‘Great

Russian chauvinism’ * and considered it to be the main danger in solving
3)
the national issue. On the other hand, the communist elite, who came
into existence in the republics, were against closer relations, being fearful
of the Moscow dictate. Such a movement was called ‘local nationalism’
and was the most active in Ukraine and Georgia.
Intensification of the struggle between the two tendencies became
especially apparent in 1922 during the so-called ‘Georgian incident’.
In the process of uniting the Transcaucasian republics into a federation
(ZSFSR) the conflict between the supporters of strengthening the central
power in Moscow and Georgian ‘local national’ activists, who stood
for more independence of the republic, occurred. The first group was
represented by Georgians Stalin and Ordzhonikidze (according to Lenin’s
determination they were the ‘Russified nationalists’, who were especially
disposed to ‘Great Russian chauvinism’) and Georgian ‘local nationalists’.
There was even a scuffle between them. This showed that further delay
in the solving of the national issue was unacceptable to Moscow. In
1922 the Politburo of the Central Committee of RCP(b) formed a commis-
sion headed by Stalin to prepare the project of uniting the republics.
Stalin was a decisive supporter of the centralized state. According to
the developed plan (the plan of ‘autonomization’) all the republics were
supposed to become parts of Russia, having the capacity of autonomies.
Lenin couldn’t partake in the process because of his state of health.
We should take into consideration that in May, 1922 the leader of the
Bolsheviks sustained a cerebral hemorrhage which was followed by
partial paralysis.
When Lenin learned about the project, worked out by Stalin, he vigo-
rously opposed it in his work ‘On the issue of nationalities and
‘autonomization’’. He saw the poorly covered expression of ‘Great
Russian chauvinism’ in Stalin’s variant of the project. Lenin suggested
another project, according to which all the republics, including Russia,
were supposed to form an alliance on the basis of the principle of equality
and federation. With considerable efforts Lenin made the Politburo turn
down Stalin’s idea.
* Chauvinism – in its original and primary meaning is an exaggerated and bellicose

patriotism and belief in national superiority. Lenin understood chauvinism as nation-
alism of the big, great and oppressor nation in comparison to the one of the
small, oppressed nation.
＜：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
7.4 Formation of the USSR and its significance

th
On the 30 of December, 1922 the First Congress of Soviets of the
USSR was opened; Stalin represented the new project of uniting the
republics, following Lenin’s directions. The establishment act of the
USSR was the agreement among Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and the
Transcaucasian Federation, which actually formed a new state. Later,
st
on the 31 of January, 1924 the Second Congress of Soviets of the
USSR approved the constitution of the state.
In accordance with the constitution the Soviet republics were declared
to be equal in rights, sovereign, possessing the right for withdrawal
from the USSR. They handed over the most important rights for interna-
tional representation, defense, and reconsideration of the borders, internal
security, foreign commerce, planning, transport, budget, communications,
and the finance system to the central Soviet organs.
The highest legislative organ was the Congress of Soviets, gathering
once every two years. It was elected on the basis of the indirect, not
general and disproportional electoral system (franchise). In the time
between the sessions of the Congress of Soviets the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviet Union held power, which consisted of two
chambers – the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.
The Central executive Committee gathered three times a year. In 1938
the Central Executive Committee was reorganized into the Supreme
Soviet.
In its turn, between the sessions of the Central Executive Committee
of the USSR its Presidium functioned in its stead. The position of the
Presidium chairman took one after another the chairmen of the National
Central Executive Committees of the four republics (at that time –
Mikhail Kalinin, Grigory Petrovsky, Aleksandr Chervyakov and Nariman
Narimanov).
The highest executive and administrative organ was the Council of
People’s Commissars; a number of the important Union national commis-
sariats were created early on, including the People’s Commissariat for
State Security (OGPU), known later as the KGB.
For a long time the USSR was considered to be a model of solving
the national issues. But the historical experience showed that the decision
that was implemented was not the best among all possibilities. On the
one hand, the ‘federal’ organization was just a fiction on many points,
as the main threads of power were actually remaining in the hands
Formation of the USSR ＜；
of the central party leaders. The real rights of the Soviet republics were
restricted.
On the other hand, the division of the organs according to the national
principle unavoidably gave rise to separatism *. The experience of other
4)
multi-state nations (for instance, the USA) shows preference for merely
an administrative - territorial division known as counties. Moreover,
equality of all the national groups is provided there regardless of where
the state was located. We could say that implementation of Lenin’s
project planted ‘the mine of delayed action’ in the multinational state.
When the power of the Communist party was unlimited, ethnic conflicts
could be avoided somehow. But, when the Party power weakened in
Gorbachev’s time, these contradictions came to the surface and led to
the collapse of the USSR.
* Separatism – striving for separation from the federal state.

Topic 8
Ｌｕｘｋｏｍｔ＆ｖｕｒｏｉ｡＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆Ｙｕ｜ｏｋｚ＆Ｙｚｇｚｋ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆｡ｋｇｘｙ

ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｉｏ｜ｏｒ＆｝ｇｘ＆ｇｔｊ＆ｚｎｋ＆ＴＫＶ
8.1 Foreign policy in the first years of the Bolshevik rule
8.2 The beginning of Russian withdrawal from International isolation
8.3 The Genoese conference and ‘the Streak of general acceptance’
8.4 Continuation of the ‘export of revolution’ policy
8.5 International conflicts
8.1 Foreign policy in the first years of the Bolshevik rule

The foreign policy of Bolsheviks in the first years of their rule was
being formed under the peculiar conditions of the civil war and the
foreign intervention, which caused specific challenges to it in comparison
with the next periods. Its main factor was the strong desire of the regime
to survive at any price. At the same time a few definite long-term
tendencies in the Soviet foreign policy began to develop; some of them
existed up to the end of the Soviet epoch.
One of the most important tendencies was its ‘two-floor’ character.
On the one hand, various peaceable initiatives were declared. On the
other hand, the ‘export of revolution’ policy was being implemented;
to some extent it was continuing the traditional directions of imperial
expansion.
During the civil war period the Bolshevik government put forward
a number of peace initiatives. In 1918 alone it made seven approaches
toward the countries of the Entente and the USA with peace suggestions;
it also happened a number of times in 1919.
In 1919 under the suggestion of US President Woodrow Wilson the
participants of the Paris peace conference addressed the opposing
Russian forces with the proposal to send their representatives to take
part in the negotiations concerning cessation of hostilities on the Prince
Islands (the Sea of Marmora). As it has been considered in the Soviet
historiography, it was a maneuver in favor of the Whites, as at that
moment the Red Army was successfully on the offensive. The Soviet
− ＜＜＆ −
Foreign policy of the Soviet State in the 1920s ＜＝
government did not get any official invitation and learned of it just
by radio. Nevertheless it consented to take part in the conference, but
the Whites turned down the invitation.
In March, 1919 on the initiative of Wilson and English prime Minister
D. Lloyd-George the American diplomat U. Bullet was sent to Moscow
to figure out how to make peace among Soviet Russia, the countries
of the Entente and the Whites. Some suggestions were hammered out,
including the take-and-give component; particularly, the RSFSR con-
sented to moderate its position toward previously refusing to pay off
the debts of the Tsar and Provisional Governments. However, when
Bullet came back to Paris, Lloyd-George declared that he knew nothing
of his mission and Wilson did not refute it. It seems that the West
turned down this idea as at that time Kolchak waged an attack and
the Entente counted on military defeat of the Reds.
8.2 The beginning of Russian withdrawal from International isolation

Victories of Red Russia over the Whites and the interventionists created
an opportunity to normalize its relations with neighbor countries. In
December, 1919 the agreement concerning cessation of hostilities with
Estonia was signed, in January, 1920, with Latvia. In February of the
same year in the city of Yuriev the peace treaty with Estonia was signed.
It was the first peace treaty of Soviet Russia with a European state.
In March also there was a trade agreement signed with Estonia. In
July, 1920 the peace treaty with Lithuania was signed, in August, with
Latvia. And finally in October the Yuriev peace treaty with Finland
followed. The most important event at that time became the removal
of a blockade from Soviet Russia. In January, 1920 the All-Russia Central
Executive Committee of the RSFSR admitted the resolutions for permis-
sion of goods to be exchanged among Russia, allied and neutral countries.
With the end of the civil war, opportunities for normalization of rela-
tions with the leading states occurred as well. They were promoted
by the following factors. The first one was connected with some specific
changes in the position of the Western countries, which came to the
conclusion that the Bolshevik rule turned out to be solid. So they expressed
greater interest in economic relations with Russia. As for the second
one, it revealed itself in connection with the introduction of the NEP
policy; as a result, realistic tendencies were intensified to some extent
not only in domestic policy but in foreign policy as well. Moreover,
the foreign policy was influenced by competent, sensible figures, first
＜＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
of all G. V. Chicherin (a nobleman by birth, he headed the foreign

policy department of Russia and the USSR from 1918 to 1928.).
8.3 The Genoese conference and ‘the Streak of general acceptance’

Nevertheless the leading countries abstained from establishing diplo-
matic relations with the Soviet country, demanding the paying off of
pre-revolutionary debts and recovery of losses, which occurred in con-
nection with nationalization of the property of foreign states and citizens.
The Bolshevik government, being interested in attaining help for restora-
tion of the economy, made a decision to acknowledge a part of the
debts of the pre-revolutionary Russia. At the same time the demands
for recovery of losses, caused by the intervention, political recognition
and credit granting were brought forward. The governments of European
countries made a decision to arrange an international economic conference
and invited Soviet Russia to participate in it.
The conference took place in the Italian city of Genoa in 1922. Lenin
was considered to be the head of the Russian delegation but actually
it was directed by Chicherin. At the conference the countries failed
to attain an agreement. However, in the course of its work the
Soviet-German agreement of cessation of mutual reproofs and establish-
ing diplomatic relations was concluded in the small town of Rapallo.
Germany became the first large country that acknowledged Soviet Russia.
In the following years the Rapallo policy – close connections between
Russia and Germany – was an important factor of international relations.
Russia and Germany also carried out economic and military cooperation.
Finally the leading Western countries started normalizing relations
with the USSR. 1924 was marked by a streak of diplomatic recognition
of the USSR. Relations with England, Italy, Austria, Greece, Mexico,
France, China, and later Japan (1925) were established. In general in
the middle 1920s the USSR supported official connections with more
than 20 countries of the world. Among the leading countries only the
USA refused to acknowledge the USSR (until 1933).
8.4 Continuation of the ‘export of revolution’ policy

Despite certain realistic tendencies and peaceful declarations, the
Bolshevik leaders kept on developing the ‘export of revolution’ policy,
in every possible way supporting the Western ‘left forces’ and protest
actions of colonies against imperialism (for example, the anti-colonial
Foreign policy of the Soviet State in the 1920s ＜？
movement in India under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi).

At the beginning of the 1920s the revolution in Germany was the
most significant example, since its defeat brought economic ruin and
humiliated the country, creating a corresponding volatile socio-political
atmosphere. It was supposed that this revolution would become a signal
for the “world revolution”. Already in 1920 at the time of the war
with Poland, the order by Mikhail Tukhachevsky was: ‘To Warsaw!
To Berlin!’ The instrument of “export of revolution” became known
as the Communist International (‘Comintern’), established in 1919 under
absolute control of Moscow. The executive committee headed by
Zinoviev was doing all the preparations for the revolution in Germany.
The culmination point of the policy became a risky venture in 1923,
when, with the Soviet support, the risings of workers in Saxony and
Thuringia were prepared. In order to support these actions all possible
recourses were used, the serious Bolshevik figure Karl Radek coordinated
the activities of communists. After defeat of these revolts hopes for
the German revolution diminished, however the Soviet interference was
continuing. The USSR helped to create ammunition depots, secret armed
groups, etc. The leader of the Communist Party of Germany, Ernst
Telman, implicitly fulfilled all the orders by Stalin, including the one
to carry on struggle with social-democrats. In their turn the thesis of
the ‘Red danger’, the threat of the Bolshevik revolution in Germany,
was widely used to bolster the course of the Nazis.
The USSR tried to urge England into revolution as well. This became
especially obvious in the course of the general strike of miners in 1926.
The Bolshevik government gave to the strikers 16 million rubles in
foreign currency in the short period from May, 1926 until May, 1927
through trade unions. The mass-media was full of projections that the
strike would develop into rebellion or revolution.
The special hopes were reposed toward the anti-colonial movement,
which was considered to be the most important ally in the struggle
against ‘imperialism’. Supporting any anti-colonial uprisings, even having
little in common with communist ideas, Bolsheviks were planning to
strike a blow toward capitalists in the most vulnerable place, from ‘the
rear’. In the period of the civil war Trotsky even suggested sending
the cavalry corps, as Paul the First did earlier, in order to support the
revolution in India.
The big success of the Soviet policy in Asia was establishing close
relations with the regime of Kemal Atatiurk in Turkey, despite his re-
＝６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
pression of Turkish communists. The USSR provided considerable sup-

port for Kemal Turkey. Having an intention to use all the ‘anti-imperialist
forces’, Moscow even started cooperation with the famous Turkish ad-
venturer Anvar-Pasha. With the consent of the Soviet government he
headed to Turkestan, however there he switched over to the Basmatch
side (Muslim anti-Bolshevik fighters in Central Asia during 1917-1926).
Serious attention was paid to the Soviet penetration and undermining
of English ascendency in Iran. In particular, a ‘trial attempt’ for armed
establishment of Soviet rule in the north of the country was made.
China was considered the main resting place for the struggle against
imperialism. In 1923 the USSR sent a group of counselors (including
Marshal V. K. Blukher) to China. They were sent in accordance with
the request of Sun Yat Sen, the leader of the Kuomintang, the Chinese
National Party, organized in 1912. The close relations with Kuomintang
were based on the fact, that Sun Yat Sen supported Chinese communists.
8.5 International conflicts

The ‘export of revolution’ policy caused natural opposition in other
countries; this provoked conflicts from time to time. It goes without
saying, anti-Soviet actions had multiple motivations: here the traditional
tendencies of Western policy, the intention to weaken Russia, became
apparent.
The first serious conflict in 1923 was caused by the memorandum
of English minister for foreign affairs Lord D. Cerzon toward the Soviet
government (in the Soviet propaganda it was called the ‘ultimatum by
Cerzon’). There were the demands to cease the Soviet interference in
Iran and Afghanistan, persecution of the Church in the USSR, and to
set free previously confiscated English trawlers, detained in Russian
waterways. In Russia considerable propaganda against ‘imperialist in-
trigues’ was developed, however the USSR made concessions on almost
all points.
The second serious conflict burst in 1926-1927 in connection with
the mentioned strike of English miners. In the course of rebuff to the
Soviet intervention English police performed a raid at the building of
ARKOS (the English-Russian Cooperative Group). In May, 1927 England
broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR; this became a cause for
unprecedented propagandist journalism in Russia. Besides the interna-
tional aspect, these events had an unexpected, and we could say, a
Foreign policy of the Soviet State in the 1920s ＝７
fatal influence on the Soviet domestic situation. Under the influence

of propaganda in wide masses an opinion of another war being close
at hand arose; as a result peasants started selling bread more reluctantly
than before. This factor, side by side with the economic motives, caused
the ‘crisis of grain procurements’.
The sharpest conflict at the borders of the USSR arose at the end
of the reviewed period in the Far East. In 1927 Chan Kai Shi, a military
conservative general, who succeeded Sun Yat Sen, broke off the alliance
with communists. As a result there was a serious confrontation with
the Soviet Union. At the end of 1929 hostilities on the Soviet-Chinese
border occurred.
Thus, the foreign policy of Bolsheviks during the years of the NEP
became more realistic; however its main goals remained invariable.
Part 2.
ＺＮＫ＆ＸＫ＼ＵＲ［ＺＯＵＴ＆ＬＸＵＳ＆ＧＨＵ＼Ｋ＆ＧＴＪ＆

ＺＮＫ＆ＫＹＺＧＨＲＯＹＮＳＫＴＺ＆ＵＬ＆ＹＺＧＲＯＴＯＹＳ＆
In Western historiography the period from the end of the 1920s to

the end of the 1930s is usually named the period of Stalinism.
The origin of the term and the understanding of the essence of
Stalinism in the Western historical studies is analyzed by an outstanding
contemporary American scholar Ronald Grigor Suny, the University
of Michigan. He writes: “The term ‘Stalinism’ has its own genealogy,
beginning in the mid-1920s even before the system that would bear
its name yet existed. Trotsky applied the word to the moderate ‘centrist’
tendencies within the party stemming from the ‘ebbing of revolution’
and identified with his opponent, Stalin. … By 1935 Trotsky’s use of
Stalinism gravitated closer to the Marxist meaning of ‘Bonapartism’
or ‘Thermidor’, ‘the crudest form of opportunism and social patriotism’.
Even before Trotsky’s murder in August 1940, Stalinism had become
a way of characterizing the particular form of social and political organ-
ization in the Soviet Union, distinct from capitalism but for Trotskists
and other radicals not quite socialist” (Suny (2), pp. 49-50).
According to the totalitarian model the term Stalinism was identified
with the Soviet political system in general. As for revisionists, they
“bring the term Stalinism into social science discussion as a socio-politi-
cal and economic formation to be analyzed in its own right. … Stalinism
was now a way of describing a stage of development of non-capitalist
statist regimes in developing countries dominated by a Marxist party,
as well as an indictment of undemocratic, failed socialist societies” (Suny
(2), p. 50).
Agreeing with the point of view that analyzes Stalinism as a statist
mobilizing system, let’s have a look at the main stages of development
of this socio-political phenomena. These stages were connected with
the process of Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’, including industrializa-
tion; collectivization of agriculture; and significant shifts in the socio-po-
litical life, first of all, the ‘Great terror’.
Topic 9
Ｏｔｊ｛ｙｚｘｏｇｒｏ｢ｇｚｏｕｔ＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ

9.1 Prerequisites of the industrialization
9.2 The main phases of industrialization. The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932)
9.3 The Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937)
9.4 The results of industrialization
9.1 Prerequisites of the industrialization

In the second half of the 1920s the idea of accelerated industrialization,
which could allow the Soviet Union ‘to catch up with and to leave
behind’ the developed countries became very popular in the governing
circles of the USSR.
Was it necessary for the country? Indeed, the events initiated in 1917
and the NEP left Soviet Russia still overwhelmingly a rural country,
as 80 per cent of the population worked in the countryside. So the
problem laid not in the sphere of the necessity of industrial development
of the country (it was necessary!), but in the problem of the methods
and the speed of accelerating economic growth in the USSR. Rapid
development of industry was recorded in some periods, when the Russian
Empire existed. The newness of the process in the late 1920s was con-
nected to the goal of industrializing the country as quickly as possible
and at any cost. This goal doomed the people to enormous sacrifices.
The party motivated the accelerated course for industrialization by
using the factor of external menace, which threatened the Soviet Union
via ‘world imperialism’. So the necessity of taking the course was linked
with the necessity to build a powerful defense potential. Of course,
the problem of defense was very important for minor industrial, poor,
but resource-rich Russia.
But there was one more significant problem which should be
underscored. First of all, the negative attitude of capitalist countries
to the Soviet Union was to some extent connected to the Bolshevik
policy of ‘exporting the revolution’. Secondly, as some historians think,
the hostile position of the opponents of Bolsheviks was not connected
− ＝：＆ −
Industrialization of the USSR＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＝；
to immediate military danger. They argue that the direct war menace
emerged only in 1933, when the Hitler regime in Germany was
established. But still we shouldn’t forget that the Beer Hall Putsch of
Hitler in Munich, which entailed the rise of Nazism, took place in
November, 1923. So the situation was quite predictable.
Thus, the military threat from abroad at the turn of the 1920s and
1930s, when the forced industrialization began, is one of the controversial
issues of historiography. Even nowadays historians argue if accelerated
industrialization was inevitable because of the military danger or the
exaggeration of this kind of danger was an intentional policy of the
party in order to urge people forward, close its ranks and find excuses
for enormous sufferings and sacrifices. As Peter Gatrell, The University
of Manchester, The UK, asks: “Why then did the Communist Party
commit itself to a new course?” (Gatrell, p. 395).
9.2 The main phases of industrialization. The First Five-Year Plan

(1928-1932)
Usually Soviet historians mark the beginning of the industrialization
th
from the decisions of the 14 Party Congress – the so called ‘Congress
of Industrialization’, which was held in 1925. In reality the decisive
phase of this process fell in the years of the pre-war ‘five-year plans’,
especially, in the years of the First Five-Year Plan, 1928-1932.
Implementation of the First Five-Year Plan began in 1928, though the
plan itself was adopted only in April of 1929 at the XVI Party
Conference.
What was the main feature of this plan?
The main feature of the First Five-Year Plan was accelerated, even
forced construction of heavy industrial projects. Among them were the
hydroelectric dam at Dneprostroi (DneproGES), metallurgical industrial
complexes (Magnitogorsk in the Urals and Kuznetsk in the Western
Siberia), tractor-building giants (Stalingrad, Chelyabinsk, Kharkov),
motor-car-building plants in Moscow and Nizhniy Novgorod.
The policy of industrialization, led by the Communist Party, was
based on the mass enthusiasm of people, especially of youth. A great
part of the population was carried away by the spirit of renovation
and was ready to do its best with all its might, in order to make the
country powerful and prosperous. The so called ‘socialist competition’
and the movement of shock-workers (‘udarniks’) became wide-spread.
＝＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
We should remember that nearly all the work was performed manually
by humans, who were sometimes half-starving. Such kind of mood could
not last for a long time. It could not substitute for the right economic
policy, organization and discipline. But the Stalinist leadership exploited
this enthusiasm and brutally took advantage of the national human
resources. Not satisfied with the unprecedented speed of industrial
growth, Stalin put forward the slogan ‘Five-Year Plan in Four Years!’
In order to get foreign currency to pay for the Western equipment,
grain, timber, oil, furs, and even the valuable art from museums was
exported from the country. Individual persons were forced, with the
help of the political police, to give gold to authorities for the purpose
of industrialization. The mechanism of forced convict labor of the victims
of collectivization played an important role in implementation of the
plans of accelerated industrialization.
What were the results of this “bacchanalian orgy of planning, spending
and construction, as economist Naum Jasny put in? The results were
dramatic, truly heroic on a historical scale, even though enormously
wasteful and costly in both human and financial terms” (Shearer (1),
p. 193).
The statistics of the First Five-Year Plan achievements are im-
pressive: 1,500 tractor, locomotive, and military weapons manufacturing
plants were constructed. The heavy industrial sector of the economy
increased 170 per cent in 1932 compared to the 1928 level. The whole
industrial output rose more than twice and a half (a factor of 2.7)
over the successful Russian economy of pre-war 1913 levels, and con-
sisted of 70 per cent of the gross national product in 1932, a vast
improvement over the 48 per cent that industrial output made up in
1928. Cast iron production increased from one million tons in 1928
to six million tons in 1932; energy generation jumped from 3,2 billion
kilowatt hours in 1928 to 13.5 billion kilowatt hours in 1932. The
results of the construction were a major feat of engineering and work.
But despite the unprecedented efforts and enormous sacrifices of the
people, the groundless First Five-year plan targets, which were too high,
were only partially completed. The planned growth of heavy industry
of 230 per cent, cast iron production to 17 million tons and energy
generation to 42 billion kilowatt hours, was not reached, showing great
problems and drawbacks in the planning strategy.
All the results of industrialization were achieved at the expense of
great economic peril and cost, which exceeded the pre-planned spending.
Industrialization of the USSR＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＝＝
The investments in the industrial sector of the economy were 23 billion

rubles, instead of the 16 billion rubles the plan had called for. The
quality of production became worse. Disproportions in the development
of different branches of industry (heavy and light) appeared and then
had an enduring historical character.
The First Five-Year Plan period also led to great changes in the
social structure of the country. Forced industrialization “went hand in
glove with a general assault on private trade and other remnants of
the NEP. The regime drove out private trade networks, at first through
increasingly heavy taxation, and then through decrees outlawing any
private sale of goods.... It forced the total liquidation of all forms of
private economic activity and non-socialist style of life in the countryside.
It was through the international sale of agricultural surplus that in-
dustrialization was financed, so Stalin launched the infamous collectiviza-
tion drive of the Five-Year plan period.... The state’s planning agency,
Gosplan, took on the expanding burden not only for industrial investment,
but of planning for all aspects of the Soviet economy. ...Gosplan estab-
lished prices and determined production and distribution quotas” (Shearer
(1), pp. 196-198).
The economy achieved a totally state-controlled character. Market
mechanisms were replaced with the elements of a planned, socialist
economy.
9.3 The Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937)

A new five-year plan began in the middle of a socio-economic crisis,
which strained the country and exposed all of its contradictions. The
efficiency of the plants and enterprises built in the previous five-year
period was very low because of economic disproportions, low discipline
and weak grounding of managers and workers, who were peasants in
their recent past. The situation in the countryside, gripped with the famine
of 1932-1933, was very hard. Agricultural production was severely dis-
rupted as a consequence of collectivization and a class war began in
the villages. Collective farms were on the brink of break-up.
The situation forced Stalin to choose more realistic tactics. It was
decided to slow down the growth rate of heavy industry and to accelerate
production of consumer goods. The main goal of the Second Five-Year
Plan was proclaimed to be learning how to handle the new machinery
in the enterprises that were built already, but not the construction of
new ones. More attention was paid to improving the level of the every-day
＝＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
life of ordinary people, for instance, the ration card system was abolished
and open trade was restored again in 1935.
The labor activities of people were thus increased through improvement
of their economic conditions that resulted in development of the so
called ‘Stakhanov movement’. What did it mean? In August, 1935 a
worker in one of the Donbass mines Aleksey Stakhanov over-fulfilled
the plan of producing coal per day; he increased his rate of output
of coal to 14 times the plan’s quota. His record was repeated in many
other branches of the economy by other workers, who became his
followers. They were: metallurgist Makar Mazay, engine-driver Pyotr
Krivonos, blacksmith Aleksandr Busygin, milling-machine operator Ivan
Gudkov, weavers Ekaterina and Maria Vinogradov. The latter for exam-
ple, made a world record in weave-machine servicing (284) in 1938
at Nogin’s textile factory. There were thousands of Stakhanovites all
over the country; they were talented, honest, and self-sacrificing people.
Their enthusiasm helped to raise labor productivity in industry, but with
a temporary effect. Their records could not compensate such a typical
phenomena as lack of material and financial interest within the great
masses of workers, low discipline and poor work organization.
By encouraging the Stakhanov movement, the authorities were eager
to widen the social pillars of the regime through formation of a stratum
of privileged workers. Soon Stakhanovites turned into a peculiar working
caste, which was distinguished greatly by the standards of their life
above rank-and-file workers. They had high wages, good flats, and some-
times automobiles. Their welfare could be characterized by the following
fact: during the Great Patriotic War a famous engine-driver Nikolay
Lunin presented to the front an entire squadron of airplanes.
9.4 The results of industrialization

Industrialization led to the general shifts in the development of
industry. “To Stalinist leaders, building socialism in one country meant
first and the foremost, modernizing and expanding the country’s basic
industrial sectors: iron and steel production, mining, metallurgy and
machine-building, energy generation and timber extraction on the basis
of agriculture. During the 1930s, but especially in the years of the First
Five-Year Plan, the Soviet State poured funds into the construction of
heavy industrial projects. Through great investments industrial production
had doubled, then tripled and quadrupled. By the beginning of the Second
World War, the Soviet Union had become an industrial military power
Industrialization of the USSR＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＝？
on the scale of the most advanced countries” (Shearer (1), pp. 192-193).
At the end of the 1930s the USSR was in second place just behind
the United States in terms of absolute volumes of industrial production,
in comparison to fifth place, which is where Imperial Russia stood in
1913. In the 1920s the USSR was 5-10 times behind the developed
countries in production per capita, at the end of 1930s – it was only
1.5-4 times behind. The Soviet Union became one of only three or
four developed countries capable of producing any kind of industrial
product. Entire new branches of industry appeared. They were the follow-
ing: production of motorcars, tractors, airplanes and some others. Edward
Hallett Carr, a British theorist of international relations, an advocate
of appeasement in the 1930s, a philosopher of history and the prolific
author of a multi-volume history of the Soviet Union (1917-1929), had
been sympathetic to the Soviet project and even called it ‘The Religion
of the Kilowatt and the Machine’ (See: Suny (2), p. 33).
General shifts in industry resulted in great changes in the social and
demographic structure of the Stalinist Soviet Union. “Industrialization
alone accounted for a significant growth in the number of urban centers
and urban population. In the years between the 1926 and the 1937
all-union censuses, the overall population of the Soviet Union increased
from 147 million to 162 million, about a nine per cent increase. But
the urban population in the country doubled during the same period,
from about 26 million to 52 million. Only 18 per cent of that increase
came from natural growth rates of the urban population, while about
two-thirds (63 per cent) resulted from in-migration to existing cities
and towns. Almost 20 per cent of the growth in urban populations resulted
from the industrial transformation of rural population centers into cities
and towns. In the Russian republic alone, the number of population
centers classified as cities increased from 461 to 571. The number of
cities with a population over 50,000 increased from 57 to 110. In the
country as a whole, the number of population centers classified as urban
centers increased in the years between 1926 and 1937 from 1,240 to
2,364” (Shearer (1), pp. 200-201).
“The greater Moscow and Leningrad urban areas experienced sig-
nificant growth, their populations doubled during the late 1920s and
1930s. Areas such as Eastern and Western Siberia, the Urals and the
Volga coal and industrial basin underwent rapid, almost unchecked
growth in their overall populations, and especially in their urban
populations. These were the areas of the country that the regime targeted
＞６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
for intensive industrial development and mineral and other natural re-
source extraction. During the 1930s, the population of the Far Eastern
administrative district soared 376 per cent. The population of Eastern
Siberia expanded by 331 per cent, Western Siberia by 294 per cent,
and the Urals by 263 per cent. The mining and industrial city of Kemerovo,
in western Siberia, saw a six-fold increase in its population; Chelyabinsk,
not far away, experienced a fourfold population increase, as did the
rail, river and manufacturing centre of Barnaul, south of Novosibirsk.
Cities such as Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk (the once and future Yekaterinburg),
Vladivostok and Khabarovsk (the administrative centre of the Eastern
Siberian district) saw their populations triple during the late 1920s and
1930s” (Shearer (1), p. 201).
“Fascinated by the upward social mobility into the elite that charac-
terized early Soviet society, Sheila Fitzpatrick in her book ‘Education
and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934’ (Cambridge, 1979)
introduced the ‘vydvizhentsy’ (those who moved upward from the work-
ing class) to Western audiences. In contrast to those Western scholars
who argued that the erosion of the working class was key to the eventual
evolution of the Bolshevik regime from a dictatorship of the proletariat
to a dictatorship of the bureaucracy, Fitzpatrick contended that the real
meaning of Stalin’s revolution from above was the coming to power
of former workers who occupied the key party and state positions in
significant numbers” (Suny (2), pp. 51-52).
Meanwhile all these great achievements were reduced by several
factors. First of all, the high rates of industrial growth were achieved
through an unprecedented high cost and through merciless exploitation
of all the resources of the country. As David R. Shearer wrote “Stalinist
modernizing revolution from above was one of the most remarkable
achievements of the twentieth century, and one of the costliest in human
lives. Stalin’s revolution was full of brutal and shocking contradictions,
even in such a shocking century as the twentieth” (Shearer (1), pp.
192-193).
Secondly, despite all of the sacrifices, a modern balanced economic
structure did not result. The main successes were in heavy industry,
in particular in the military industry. All other branches of the economy
only began to use machines in production.
The third factor that reduced the results of industrialization was in
the field of its social consequences. We mean the complete liquidation
of a ‘non-socialist economic sphere’ and construction of the economy
Industrialization of the USSR＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＞７
controlled by the state. The first endeavors to create such an economy

were made in 1917. So it was not by chance, that Stalin named these
transformations the ‘second revolution’ after the ‘Great October’ or the
revolution from above. He meant that the transformations of the country
in 1917 and the 1930s were very much alike as both cases were deep
and large-scaled. So he thought both of them could be described as
revolutions. But the latter was implemented by the regime itself.
Topic 10
Ｉｕｒｒｋｉｚｏ｜ｏ｢ｇｚｏｕｔ＆ｕｌ＆ｇｍｘｏｉ｛ｒｚ｛ｘｋ＆

10.1 Historical prerequisites for collectivization
10.2 ‘The great turning point’ (Stalin)
10.3 The Results and consequences of mass collectivization
10.1 Historical prerequisites for collectivization

The first attempts to liquidate private peasant households were taken
soon after the revolution, in the period of the civil war, when collective
farms were first inculcated by the Soviet regime. As far as peasants
did not want to lose their freedom, the Bolshevik leaders introduced
the NEP and rejected the plans of accelerated ‘socialist reorganization’
of the countryside. In 1923 Lenin’s article ‘About co-operation’, which
can be truly called his testament, was published. In this work Lenin
insisted on a gradual and voluntary way to attract peasants to collective
farms through co-operation. His plan was then rejected by Stalin who
followed the way of forced reorganization of the countryside through
harsh campaigns to collectivize agriculture. The Soviet historiography
has represented Stalin’s policy in the countryside as an embodiment
of ‘Lenin’s Co-operative Plan’.
The problem of the further ways of development of agriculture was
th
discussed at the 15 Congress of the Communist Party in December,
1927. The Congress headed by Stalin put forward collectivization of
agriculture as the “party’s main goal in the countryside”. Though the
Congress did not mean taking prompt actions, the strategic choice was
finalized at that congress.
Further developments were determined by the so-called grain crisis
of 1927 and 1928. Industrialization needed more and more funds, earned
mostly through grain exports. “Although the harvest in those years had
been reasonably good, state agencies experienced serious difficulties
meeting the procurement quotas. Peasant producers preferred to sell
to private buyers at higher prices than those offered by state buyers,
or they withheld their grain altogether from the urban markets. Stalin
− ＞８＆ −
Collectivization of agriculture 83
explained these difficulties as a kulak class struggle. In any case, the

procurement crisis of the late 1920s brought to a head the constraints
on state-sponsored modernization that faced the regime. Stalin and those
around him took an increasingly militant view. He argued for the right
to requisition grain at state prices and he instituted such methods during
personal visits to the Urals and Siberia in early 1928” (Shearer (1),
pp. 194-195). 1928 and 1929 became the years of forcibly wringing
th
grain out of peasants with the help of the 107 clause of the Criminal
Code of the USSR.
The harsh turn toward repressive measures was criticized by the moder-
ates within the party hierarchy such as Nikolai Bukharin, Mikhail Tomsky,
Aleksey Rykov. “They argued for tax and pricing mechanisms to coax
grain from the countryside. They warned against any forced or repressive
measures that would strain social and economic relations with private
producers. They repeated Lenin’s maxim that there be no third revolution
to threaten the NEP truce between workers and peasants, town and
countryside. They were taken aback by Stalin’s feudal-military ex-
ploitation of peasants, and they accused Stalin of taking unilateral action
against the party’s policy of conciliation” (Shearer (1), pp. 194-195).
Some historians, for example, the well-known American scholar
Stephen Cohen (Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History
Since 1917. New York and Oxford, 1985) spoke about the so called
‘Bukharin’s alternative’, which was, as he thought, the prolongation
of ‘Lenin’s line’ in the socialist construction, and a chance for optimal
relations with peasants. “Along with Tucker and Lewin, Cohen was
one of the major opponents of the view that saw Stalin as the logical
or even inevitable outcome of Leninism. While it had its roots in earlier
experiences, Stalinism was qualitatively different from anything that
went before or came after. In the years of the New Economic Policy
(1921-1928) Bolsheviks, far from united in their plans for the future
socialist society, presided over a far more tolerant and pluralistic social
order than would follow after Stalin’s revolution from above. Stalin’s
policies of 1929-1933 rejected the gradualist Bukharinist program of
slower but steady growth within the framework of the NEP” (Suny
(2), pp. 50-51).
As for Stalin, he had won over the majority of the members of the
party’s political bureau (the Politburo). He branded Bukharin and his
supporters as the ‘right deviation’ in the party. So in February, 1929
the General Secretary performed a humiliating showdown with the
＞：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
moderates in the Politburo and the party’s Central Committee. The moder-
ates were dismissed from their high posts. Removal of all the ‘doubting’
from the top of the ruling party, gave way to forced collectivization.
10.2 ‘The great turning point’

In November, 1929, at the Plenum of Central Committee of the
Communist Party, a conclusion was made about the so called ‘great
turning point’ in the minds of peasants. It was said that peasants became
sure of the advantages of the collective farms and were eager to improve
their lives by receiving tractors and combine harvesters from the Soviet
Power. The Plenum formed a special Politburo Commission, which
worked out the concrete plan of collectivization. It included the following
tasks: organization of peasants with the help of advanced workers, sent
from the big cities to the countryside and mechanization of the countryside
via the building of machine-tractor stations (MTS) for sowing the lands
of collective farms.
th
On January 5 , 1930 the ‘general mass collectivization drive’ and
the ‘liquidation of kulaks as a class’ (‘de-kulakization’) were adopted
by a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist party as
the main goal in the countryside.
David R. Shearer, The University of Delaware, the USA, vividly
depicts the process of Stalin's collectivization: “Citing claims of popular
support from workers and poor peasants, and with the backing of the
party elite, Stalin launched the infamous collectivization drive of the
First Five-Year Plan. Mass propaganda campaigns created an aura of
legitimacy, even as Stalinist leaders mobilized local party committees,
political police, internal security forces and even military units and volun-
teer gangs from urban factories. These were the shock troops that enforced
the order to collectivize. In the course of the ensuing several years,
using persuasion and propaganda, but often outright force, the regime
methodically destroyed the system of private land tenure in the country
and organized agricultural production into large, state-administered farm-
ing administrations. Peasants and villages were organized either into
collective farms, the ‘kolkhozy,’ or into state farm administrations called
‘sovkhosy’. Kolkhozy were supposedly voluntary co-operative farm or-
ganizations, whereas sovkhosy were farms owned outright by the state,
which paid peasant farmers as hired labor, a rural proletariat.
“The campaign to collectivize agriculture was harsh, often brutal,
and evoked strong peasant resistance. Official versions did not deny
the fact of resistance but depicted it as a part of a class struggle of

rich exploiting kulaks against socialism. Official versions claimed that
the majority of poor and slightly better off peasants supported the regime
and collectivization. The judgment of most scholars, however, is that
resistance was widespread; that there existed broad peasant solidarity
against the regime, and that collectivization amounted to a general war
against the countryside, not just a target class war against the kulak
class enemy. (See: Danilov V.P, Lynne Viola, N.A. Ivnitskii, Denis
Kozlov. The War Against The Peasantry, 1927-1930: The Tragedy of
the Soviet Countryside.Yale, 2005)”.
“The collectivization drive was horrific in its costs. Anyone who
resisted collectivization could be, and usually was, branded a kulak.
Police and party officials confiscated the property and livestock of those
individuals, arrested them and their families and exiled them to penal
colonies, or even executed them as class enemies. In 1930 and 1931,
the two most intense years of forced collectivization and ‘de-kulakiza-
tion’, authorities deported 1.8 million peasants (about 400,000 house-
holds) as class enemies who had resisted collectivization. The great
majority of these peasants were deported to penal farms of settlements
in remote areas of the country: Siberia, northern Russia and Central
Asia. Many others were dispossessed and resettled on special farms
in their home districts. By conservative estimates, well over 2 million
rural inhabitants were deported by the end of 1933, when the regime
ended the policy of forced mass collectivization. By 1932, the regime
had driven nearly 60 per cent of peasant households to join collective
farms” (Shearer (1), pp. 195-196).
The enormous peasants’ discontent with the collectivization policy
forced Stalin into a temporary retreat. In March, 1930 in his article
‘Dizziness from Success’ he condemned the distortions of the party’s
line in the countryside. “So in 1930 and 1931, in fact, when the regime
briefly relaxed coercive measures of collectivization, peasants streamed
out of collectives, reducing the overall proportion to a low of 21 per
cent. Only by offering a lucrative tax and other incentives could the
regime begin to reverse the decline in collectivization, and only by
allowing peasants the right to own plots was the regime able, finally,
to persuade peasants to return to collective farms in large numbers.
… By 1935, collectives encompassed about 83 per cent of peasant house-
holds, although by the end of the decade this number had declined
to 63 per cent. In the most significant grain areas, in Ukraine and Western
Siberia, the regime ensured that collectivization reached nearly 100 per
＞＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
cent.” (Shearer (2), pp. 195-196).

In 1933/34 the extraordinary organs, the political departments of MTS
and state farm administrations, were formed in the countryside. They
performed the functions of running the party and state control. With
different repressions they stopped chaos and disorganization in collective
farms.
10.3 The results and consequences of mass collectivization

Agricultural production was severely disrupted as a consequence of
the collectivization and the social war in the countryside. Gross agricul-
tural production came down to 69.9 million tons in 1932 from 78.3
million in 1928. The number of horses came down to 20 million in
1932 from 36 million in 1928, accordingly the number of cattle came
down to 30 million from 68 million. But, after achieving state-control
over the agrarian sector the Stalinist government could now easily take
grain for the interests of industrialization.
“The cost in human lives of collectivization was appalling, even above
and beyond the wrenching costs of the ‘de-kulakization’ campaigns.
In 1932, a combination of factors – poor harvests, agricultural disruptions
caused by collectivization and high state grain procurement quotas –
precipitated famine in areas in Ukraine, the North Caucasus and central
Russia, which left over five million people dead by the time the situation
eased in late 1933 and 1934. …Although the famine hit Ukraine hard,
it was not, as some historians, for example Robert Conquest, argue,
a purposeful genocidal policy against Ukrainians. Stalinist leaders used
the famine to break peasant resistance to collectivization, and very likely
to punish the Ukrainian countryside for having long resisted Soviet
power. Still no evidence has surfaced to suggest that the famine was
planned, and it affected broad segments of the Russian and other
non-Ukrainian populations both in Ukraine and in Russia” (Shearer
(1), p. 197).
Collectivization became the most important step in the Stalinist system.
First of all state control over the economy increased greatly: instead
of millions of ‘petty owners’ the ‘kolkhoz peasantry’ appeared.
Dispossessed of the means of production, dependent on the Soviet author-
ities, peasants turned into the state surfs. Their dependent position was
strengthened by introducing passports in 1932. The rural inhabitants
were obliged to receive passports necessary to travel within the country
and move from one location or place of work to another. So they were
forbidden to travel without the written permission of local authorities.
Collectivization bound peasants once again to the land in a way that
many people regard as a second serfdom.
Of course, there was a considerable part of the population that bene-
fited from collectivization. We mean the poor and half of the middle
peasants, who took part in sharing the kulak property, who entered
the party, and to gain real opportunities, entered the local organs of
government. The rural youth got an opportunity to study and to receive
prestigious professions, such as a tractor driver or combine operator.
During the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) the Soviet state was
forced to invest greater amounts of money and supplies in agriculture
that led to its stabilization to some extent. When the growth of production
began the conditions of the life of peasants got a little bit better. It
was connected to the compromise of Stalin toward his view on socialism.
Collective farm peasants were given the right to own plots or as they
were called private subsidiary economies, where they worked with all
their might. This subsidiary economy included five per cent of all the
area under crops, but it provided nearly all peasants’ requirements for
food and clothes and was also a considerable part of their agricultural
output. The improvement of conditions of life in the countryside led
to the growth of labor activities among peasants. Shock-workers (‘udar-
niks’) and Stakhanovites appeared in collective farms as in factories
and plants. The most popular among them was a female tractor driver
Pasha Angelina.
But most collective farms were badly managed and lacked discipline
because of the peasants’ low interest in collective work. Sometimes
their work was done for no pay because the lion’s share of the harvest
was taken by the state. Despite the draconian decree of 1932 ‘About
the protection of public property’, which provided severe measures,
even execution, for theft and embezzlement, this kind of offense against
the law was very widespread in the collective farm countryside. These
negative traits of the ‘kolkhoz system’ doomed the agrarian sector of
the USSR, creating a chronic lag in productivity compared to other
sectors of the economy.
The greatest tragic event in the Soviet history became an important
theme of Russian literature. The official version of the events was
depicted in a well-known novel by Mikhail Sholokhov ‘The Raised
Virgin Soil’.
＞＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
There is a great drive in the Post-Soviet historiography to reconstitute

and create the true history of collectivization. As an example, note the
work of well-known Russian historian Viktor Danilov ‘The Tragedy
of the Soviet Countryside. Collectivization and de-kulakization’. Five
volumes of this wide-scale work, published in Russia from 2000-2003
include formerly secret documents and materials, accurately depicting
the process of collectivization. The Post-Soviet State admitted the re-
pressions of peasants during the period of collectivization to be unlawful,
and gave the offspring of dispossessed peasants the right to return with-
drawn property.
Still the problem of collectivization has remained one of the most
debatable questions of Russian and Western historiography, dividing
historians into opposite camps. In this respect it is appropriate to recall
the discussion among English historians of the 1940s, depicted by Ronald
G. Suny, in the course of which an outstanding British historian Edward
H. Carr argued that “collectivization was unavoidable, given Russia’s
limited resources for industrialization, and on this issue he differed,
for instance, from his collaborator, R. W. Davies, who had become
convinced that industrialization at a modest pace had been possible
within the framework of the New Economic Policy” (Suny (2), p. 34).
Topic 11
Ｙｕｉｏｕ３ｖｕｒｏｚｏｉｇｒ＆ｒｏｌｋ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆７？９６ｙ

11.1 The main tendencies of political development
11.2 ‘The Great Terror’
11.3 The Socio-political character of Stalin’s regime
11.1 The main tendencies of political development

The main direction of the socio-political life in the USSR in the
1930s was the strengthening of repressive and bureaucratic order and
the private power of Stalin. The development of non-democratic tenden-
cies in the life of the society after 1917 was a protracted period, including
several stages. The initial steps in this direction were made during the
first years of the Bolshevik government, especially in the period of
War Communism. The decisive factor of this process took place during
the First Five-Year Plan period and was instituted via the collectivization
of agriculture. The submission of peasants to the state, and repressions
against different groups of inhabitants cemented the atmosphere of fear
and obedience. At the same time the ruling elite of the Soviet state
became comfortable using extraordinary methods of enforcement.
As for the formation of Stalin’s private power, it should be pointed
out, that he was eager to strengthen the obedience of people, on one
side, and to require absolute submissiveness of the top of the party,
on the other. Dissatisfaction with Stalin’s policies in the top circles
of the ruling party was discovered at the Seventeenth Party Congress
in 1934. During the elections of the central organs of the party the
name of Stalin was crossed off from several voting-papers. Some scholars,
for example, Dmitry Volkogonov (Vol.1, pp. 353-354), think that at
the Congress there was an attempt to push Stalin aside from power
and to substitute him with Sergey Kirov.
What happened then?
“In his major speech, Stalin proclaimed that the victory of socialism
had been won in the USSR. He declared that organized class opposition
− ＞？＆ −
？６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
had been broken and that the country had set the foundation for a
socialist economy and society. He warned of the continued threat of
enemies within the country, and of the difficult historical tasks that
still lay ahead. He cautioned that because of continuing dangers, the
party, the police and the state needed to remain strong and vigilant
against the enemies who would try to undermine the Soviet achievement”
(Shearer (1), p. 205). As it turned out, “the announcement of the victory
of socialism did not end the political repression, nor did it signal the
end of class struggle”. Indeed, “Stalin anticipated that the struggle against
the enemies of Soviet socialism would intensify as the socialist state
grew stronger and anti-Soviet ‘elements’ grew more desperate. Stalin
also anticipated that the character of the state’s struggle against enemies
would change as the nature of resistance also changed” (Shearer (1),
p. 212).
This meant the beginning of the new wave of repressions which
were aimed against anyone who was dissatisfied or had any doubt
about Stalin’s political course. Casus belli emerged very soon. On the
st
1 of December, 1934 Sergei Kirov, a member of the Politburo Central
Committee of the communist Party and the secretary of the Leningrad
Committee, was killed. This event gave Stalin cause to strengthen re-
pressions against his opposition in the Party. So the ‘Trotskysts’ were
blamed for the killing of Kirov. In time the circle of the ‘enemies of
the nation’ became wider. In 1936 the first open trial against the ‘enemies
of the nation,’ including old Bolsheviks Grigory Zinoviev and Leo
Kamenev, was held. They ‘confessed’ all their crimes and were sentenced
to execution.
th
In this oppressive atmosphere, on the 5 of December of 1936, the
Congress of the Soviets adopted a new Constitution of the USSR. The
new Constitution proclaimed the Soviet Union as a ‘Socialist state of
workers and peasants’, the Soviets were proclaimed as the political basis
of the socialist state and public property was proclaimed as its economic
basis. The Constitution pretentiously spoke about the wide democratic
rights of citizens – freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, liberty
of conscience. But all these declarations were only empty words.
11.2 ‘The Great Terror’

Repressions were continuously increasing after the murder of Kirov,
and reached their peak in 1937-1938. Perhaps by that time Stalin decided
to implement the idea of a general purge (‘chistka’) of the party’s
Socio-political life in the USSR in the 1930s 91
apparatus or of the so called ‘nomenklatura’ of undesirable elements.

It was called the cadres revolution. The head of the political police
and the Commissariat of the Interior Nikolai Ezhov became the main
executor of the Great Purge. This horrific event was named ‘Ezhovshina’.
In modern historiography the harsh punishments and massacres of the
second part of the 1930s are defined as ‘Great Terror’. This term started
to be widely used after the name of a book by the well-known American
historian Robert Conquest – ‘The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the
Thirties’ (London, 1968), written on this theme.
In February-March of 1937 the special Plenum of the Central commit-
tee of the Communist party was held. There at the Plenum Stalin put
forward a thesis about “uninterrupted sharpening of class struggle on
the way to socialism”. He argued that the country, the party, in particular
the leading cadres, were overcrowded by camouflaged ‘enemies’,
‘Trotskysts double-dealers’, ‘spies’ and others. The political way to mass
repressions was opened.
At the Plenum directly N. Bukharin and A. Rykov were expelled
from the party and arrested. Two days before Grigory (Sergo)
Ordzhenikidze committed suicide, perhaps in a protest against the
repressions. Authorities hid the real reason of his death and connected
it with a heart attack. In June, 1937 a large group of prominent Soviet
commanders headed by the vice-minister of the Commissariat of Defense
Mikhail Tukhachevsky were charged with plotting against Stalin and
were executed by shooting.
In late July, 1937 Ezhov issued the infamous operation order No.
447, which ordered that every region was obliged to catch a particular
number of ‘people’s enemies’. “That order began one of the most
bizarre, tragic and inexplicable episodes in Soviet history – the mass
repression of 1937-1938. By the decree of the Politburo, the political
police were obliged to begin mass shooting or imprisonment of several
categories of inhabitants which were considered by the regime as socially
harmful elements. The leaders regarded former kulaks, bandits, members
of anti-Soviet parties, White Guardists, returned émigrés, churchmen,
sectarians, gendarmes and former officials of the tzarist government
among the most dangerous of these groups. … But soon the wave of
repressions covered those within the party, economic and military cadres
and ordinary people. For instance, collective and state farmers, as well
as individual farmers were arrested in the tens of thousands. Yet, the
mass repression during the late 1930s was more than a second
？８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
de-kulakization. The repression of 1937-1938 also encompassed sig-

nificant numbers of national minorities, arrested under analogous opera-
tional orders” (Shearer (1), pp. 212-213).
What was the repressive system of the Great Purge?
It was the following. The Cheka (the ‘Chrezvychainaia Komissia’),
was reorganized into the political police, State Political Administration
(OGPU), in 1922. “The State Political Administration operated as the
main instrument of repression, and one of several coercive organs central-
ized under the NKVD, the Commissariat of the Interior. The NKVD
also included the infamous Gulag, or the labor camp administration,
the border guard force, the NKVD’s interior troops and the regular
members of the civil police, the ‘militsiia’. During the 1930s, reforms
took away local Soviet authority over the militsiia and subordinated
the civil police to the state’s centralized political administration. This
was a key part of Stalin’s statist revolution and carried important
consequences. Placing the civil police under control of the political
police led inevitably during the decade to the merging of the two in-
stitutions and their respective functions – maintaining social order and
protecting state security. As a result the civil police were drawn increas-
ingly into the business of mass repression, and the political police became
drawn more into coercive repression of day-to-day crimes and the reso-
lution, through administrative forms of repression, of the country’s major
problems” (Shearer (1), p. 215).
Prisons were over-crowded; the NKVD was officially permitted to
use tortures. Mass terror began to abate only at the end of 1938. Ezhov
was accused by Stalin of carrying the party’s policy too far, he was
dismissed from his place and then shot. The new head of NKVD became
Lavrenty Beria, under whom, in order to pacify people, some prisoners
were released.
In 1937-1938 as a whole 1,372,692 individuals had been caught up
in the police sweeps, 681,692 of those individuals had been shot (See:
Getty J. Arch, Rittersporn Gahor T, Zemskov Victor N. Victims of the
Soviet Penal System in the Pre-war Years; A First Approach on the
Basis of Archival Evidence // The American Historical Review, 1993
(October).Vol. 98. No. 4). Mass repressions inflicted enormous casualties:
a considerable part of economic, military and cultural cadres were
destroyed. Mass terror widened greatly the ‘labor camp empire’ and
strengthened to a large scale the role of forced labor in the economy.
“The huge influx of prisoners during the Great Purges in 1937-1938
swelled camp populations to 1.5 million by 1940. Similarly, the pop-

ulations of police-run prisons and colonies jumped during the 1930s,
reaching 254,354 in 1935, according to the official figures, and 887,635
by 1938. Most of them were located in the Urals, Central Asia and
Siberia” (Shearer (1), pp. 201-202).
There are at least three main judgments in the Russian historical
literature about the problems of reasons and nature of the ‘Great Terror’.
In the period of Khrushchev’s ‘exposures’ (after the XX Congress of
the Party in 1956) repressions during the period of the ‘cult of person-
ality’ were explained by the personal imperfections of Stalin’s character,
his aspirations to unlimited power, his ‘morbid suspiciousness’, and
so on. This judgment was reflected in a book by Dmitry Volkogonov
(Vol.1, p. 523).
Nowadays some historians explain the ‘Great terror’ with Stalin’s
aspiration to suppress opposition (even if it was weak) within the part
of ruling circles, represented by the ‘old Bolsheviks’, who were against
the absolute power of Stalin. This point of view is given in a manual
edited by Aleksey Sakharov (Vol.2, p. 615).
Some writers argue that Stalin’s terror was against the real ‘enemies
of the Soviet power’, “working with foreign agents and actively organiz-
ing socially disaffected populations into a fifth-column force” on the
eve of the Second World War. This point of view is represented lately
by Viktor Suvorov, a former officer of the Soviet Intelligence Agency,
who defected in 1978 from the Soviet Union to Britain.
As for the Western historiography, we should name two main points
of view: the totalitarian concept and the concept of revisionists.
The supporters of the T-model are divided into two main groups:
the first one connects repressions with the personality of Stalin. For
example, Robert C. Tucker (Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet
Russia: from Lenin to Gorbachev. New York, 1987) and Robert Conquest
saw the Great Purge as an effort “to achieve an unrestricted personal
dictatorship with a totality of power that Stalin did not possess in 1934.
Initiation of the purges came from Stalin, who guided and prodded
the arrests, show trails and executions forward, aided by the closest
members of his entourage” (Suny (2), p. 52).
The representatives of the second T-model group, for example
Zbigneiw K. Brzezinski (The Permanent Purge, politics in Soviet
Totalitarianism. Cambridge, 1956), were sure “that purging, including
？：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
the Great Terror, was a permanent and necessary component of totalitari-

anism in lieu of elections. Solzhenitsyn whose fiction and quasi-historical
writing on the Gulag Archipelago had enormous effect in the West,
saw the purges as simply the most extreme manifestation of the amorality
of the Marxist vision, and the Ezhovshina as an inherent and inevitable
part of the Soviet system” (Suny (2), p. 52).
Revisionists tried to rationalize the phenomenon of the purges in
two ways. On one hand “they explained the purges as a more extreme
form of a political infighting”. They asserted that “high-level personal
rivals, disputes over the direction of the modernization program, and
conflicts between the center and periphery were at the base of the killing”.
For example, J. Arch Getty argued that “the Ezhovshina was rather
a radical, even hysterical, reaction to bureaucracy. The entrenched office-
holders were destroyed from above and below in a chaotic wave of
voluntarism and revolutionary Puritanism” (Suny (2), p. 53).
On the other hand, they analyzed the phenomenon focusing “on the
effects of purges rather than their causes, implying that intentions may
be read into the results. A.L. Unger, Kendal E. Bailes and Sheila
Fitzpatrick showed how a new ‘leading stratum’ of Soviet-educated
‘specialists’ replaced the Old Bolsheviks and ‘bourgeois specialists’.
The largest numbers of beneficiaries were promoted workers and
rank-and-file, young technicians, who would make up the Soviet elite
through the post-Stalin period until Gorbachev took power. Stalin, wrote
Fitzpatrick, saw the old party bosses less as revolutionaries than ‘as
Soviet boyars (feudal lords) and himself as a latter-day Ivan the terrible,
who had to destroy the boyars to build a modern nation state and a
new service nobility’” (Suny (2), p. 53).
The ideas of revisionists were developed at the beginning of the
new millennium. For example, David R. Shearer paid attention to the
social basis of the Stalinist repressions. His book ‘Policing Stalin’s
Socialism: Repression and Social order in the Soviet Union, 1924-1953’
(Yale, 2009) became one of the first books to emphasize the importance
of social order repression by Stalin's Soviet regime in contrast to the
traditional emphasis of historians on political repression. “Based on
extensive examination of new archival materials, David R. Shearer
found that most repressions during the Stalinist dictatorship of the
1930s were against marginal social groups such as petty criminals,
deviant youth, sectarians, and the unemployed and unproductive” (See:
http://www.amazon.com/Policing-Stalins-Socialism-Repression-Yale-H
oover/dp/0300149255).
We can put forward the following supposition. Even if Stalin was
eager to suppress the elements of opposition or establish social order
and clean the society of marginal elements, the repressions far exceeded
the bounds of even such kind of expediency. Thus, Stalin gained complete
unlimited power and became an absolute dictator.
11.3 Socio-political character of Stalin’s regime

The social system, formed in the Soviet Union under Stalin, is judged
in the historiography from diametrically opposed positions both in
post-Soviet Russia and in the West. The Communists in Russia consider
this system to be socialism, anti-Communists call it totalitarianism.
In the West the supporters of the T-model conceptualize Stalinism
“as a terror-based, one-party ideological regime”, merging with the practi-
ces of Nazi Germany. Thus, in the social sense the Soviet society, accord-
ing to the T-model, was depicted as a conglomeration of atomized cowed
‘little screws’, where “an all powerful state rendered an atomized pop-
ulation completely impotent, not able to think independently or resist
the regime effectively” (Suny (2), p. 22, 49).
As for revisionists, in particular Sheila Fitzpatrick, (Cultural revolution
in Russia, 1928-1931. Bloomington and London, 1978) they evaluated
Stalinism “as a political excess, an extraordinary extremism and a back-
ward form of modernization”. Being “against the top-down, state-inter-
vention-into-society approach and looking primarily at society,... they
looked for initiative from below, popular resistance to the regime’s agen-
da, as well as sources of support for radical transformation” (Suny (2),
p. 51).
They came to the conclusion that “the Soviet power could never
rule by terror alone”, thus the regime needed to base itself “on consent
from the people”. So the revisionists pointed out a wide consensus between
the power and a large number of “promoted workers and party
rank-and-file and young technicians, who made up the Soviet elite through
the post-Soviet period until Gorbachev took power”(Suny (2), p. 53).
On the other hand, the revisionists argued that the ‘Soviet man’ was
not a ‘little screw’. They found out that he was able to display both
“enthusiasm and active discontent and bloody resistance”. ...“Lynne Viola
recorded over 13,700 peasant disturbances and more than 1,000 assassi-
nations of officials in 1930 alone. Jeffrey Rossman uncovered significant
？＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
worker resistance in the textile industry under Stalin, protests accom-

panied by the rhetoric of class struggle and commitment to the revolution.
Sarah Davies read through police reports (‘svodki’) to discover that
popular opinion in Stalin’s Russia was contradictory and multivalent.
Workers, for example, favored the measures during the First Five-Year
Plan that gave them and their families privileged access to education
but were dismayed by the conservative ‘Great Retreat’ of the mid-1930s.
… Class resentments and suspicion of those in power marched along
with patriotism and a sense of social entitlement” (Suny (2), pp. 53-54).
What approach is the most accurate? We can introduce the following.
The main trait of the Stalinist system was the predominance of the
state over the society on an enormous, even maximum level. The basis
of such form of society was total state-control over the economy and
concentration of all the resources in the hands of the state, which was
controlled in its own turn by the party leadership. A despotic and
military form of society in Russia in the 1930s led to establishment
of a repressive and bureaucratic order in the country. The personal power
of Stalin became the concentrated frame of this political regime.
Stalin’s system was based on a defined social structure. The top of
this society was represented by a numerous and rapidly-growing
‘nomenklatura,’ a special stratum that consisted of leading party, state,
economic, military cadres and the high layer of intelligentsia. The lifestyle
of society’s top stratum possessed big flats, automobiles and dachas
(houses in the countryside) and was very high compared to the prevalent
poverty of the grand majority of the population.
In order to strengthen its social pillars the regime formed the privileged
status among working people, something such as a ‘workers aristocracy’.
They were Stakhanovites and udarniks that were the shock-workers.
The base of this social pyramid was formed by a mass of workers
and collective farmers (‘kolkhozniks’), who did not have any privileges,
the lowest stratum were prisoners and the inhabitants of the special
penal settlements.
Characterizing the atmosphere in the country at that period it would
be too simplified to point out only poverty and terror. It should be
kept in mind that Stalin’s modernization encouraged millions of people
to take basic literacy classes. “By the end of the decade, nearly 75
per cent of the adult population could read compared with 28 per cent
before the revolution” (Shearer (1), p. 206). Liquidation of ‘land owners
and capitalists’, and the further mass purges paved the way into the
ruling class for a large number of people from the lower classes. So
a great number of former workers and peasants became the so called
‘vydvizhentsy’, who were thrust upward from the working class. As
Sheila Fitzpatrick wrote, “workers had become ‘masters’ of Russian
society by moving into the old masters jobs. She contended that ‘the
real meaning of the revolution was the coming to power of former
workers who occupied the key party and state positions in significant
numbers’. She even argued the idea that the revolution from above
was ‘upward social mobility that encompassed modernization (escape
from the backwardness), class (the good fate of workers) and revolu-
tionary violence (how the regime dealt with its enemies)’ ” (See: Suny
(2), p. 52).
Since this was the case, the Stalinist development brought about a
different outcome, its historical shape is often contradictory in the memory
of contemporaries. For some, it was a time of enthusiasm and great
achievements for the country. For the others it was a time of calamities,
meager existence and forced labor camps.
Topic 12
Ｘ｛ｙｙｏｇｔ＆ｉ｛ｒｚ｛ｘｋ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆７？８６ｙ３７？９６ｙ

12.1 General characteristics of the cultural processes
12.2 Reforms of education and science
12.3 Literature and Art
12.1 General characteristics of the cultural processes

The development of culture after the revolution, in the 1920s and
1930s has been examined by the Soviet historians through the prism
of the concept of the ‘cultural revolution’. This term was first used
by Lenin in his work ‘About cooperation’. The importance of a cultural
Renaissance in the post-revolution Russia was determined by two over-
riding factors:
• By the agricultural foundation of Russia, where 80% of the population
were yet illiterate;
• By the aspiration of the Soviet power to bring up the so called ‘new man’,
‘new human being’ with a new world outlook, which was sufficient to fulfill
the interests of the new power.
There were a number of sub-periods of culture-building, which had

their own peculiarities determined by the general situation in the country.
After the revolution and in the period of the civil war, the main peculiarity
of cultural building as well as in the other spheres of activities revealed
itself in the rapid forms of solving questions and in the ‘rushed work’,
exemplified in the use of extraordinary methods. After the introduction
of the NEP the extraordinary methods of cultural construction were
eliminated and certain pluralism in the cultural policy was established.
These positive changes in the NEP culture were accompanied by the
‘crisis of culture’ in the first years of the new economic policy, when,
by applying the accounting costs to every aspect of society, financial
difficulties at a number of cultural institutions occurred as soon as they
ceased getting financial support, and closed. By the end of the 1920s
extraordinary achievements in the performing and creative arts were
restored, even though the government was connecting the ideological
− ？＞＆ −
Russian culture in the 1920s - 1930s ＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆？？
dictates with repression of the intelligentsia.
12.2 Reforms of education and science

The characteristic feature of development of the post-revolutionary
schools were the numerous reforms including the abolition of compul-
sory lessons, introduction of pupils’ and students’ self-government, which
also gave the right for students to dismiss teachers, lecturers and
professors. From the beginning of the 1930s a number of measures
in order to normalize relations in school and the educational process
in general were implemented. At that time the Soviet schools were
reorganized in the spirit of the old pre-revolutionary high school
(gymnasium). An important step in that development was the decision
to restore the teaching of history in 1934. This discipline was excluded
from the school curriculum soon after the revolution. According to Stalin’s
requirements a series of manuals in history were released, and the main
principles of teaching were confirmed.
Because of mass illiteracy, education of the adult population was
of great importance. A special public voluntary organization ‘Down
with illiteracy!’ was organized. This organization financed thousands
of centers given the responsibility of raising literacy levels. In Russia
such form of education was named ‘likbez’.
A system of secondary and higher education was also reformed. In
1919 the so called ‘workers faculties’ (‘rabfak’) were adopted. These
faculties were aimed to accelerate the education of semi-illiterate workers
and peasant youth to the level of higher education. At the beginning
of the 1920s the teaching of social sciences in the universities was
reformed. Only the members of the Communist Party were trusted to
teach history, economics and law. Large purges of lecturers and students
took place at that time, and any people deemed to be socially extraneous
were banished from the educational system.
The 1930s were marked by a jump in the educational level of many
segments of the population. This achievement was connected with the
introduction, in the period of the First Five-Year Plan, of compulsory
elementary education. The illiteracy of adults was also eliminated on
the whole. In 1939 the number of literate people from nine to 49 years
old was more than 80 per cent, compared to 1926, when the same
index was only 43 per cent.
The great reduction of illiteracy was a monumental achievement of
７６６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
the new power. For millions of people, the gaining of elementary cultural
skills and knowledge became a unique and vital chance to improve
their social status. We should, however, keep in mind the reverse side
of this process. It was the emergence of a great mass of semi-literate
people who took for granted what was printed in official sources of
information. This situation became the main cultural and psychological
prerequisite of the propaganda campaigns of the authoritarian Stalinist
regime.
In order to satisfy requirements of accelerated industrialization with
qualified certificated specialists, their education was also accelerated
and was carried out by the method of ‘rushed work’. A number of
higher educational institutions (‘vuz’) were reformed into higher technical
educational institutions (‘vtuz’), where narrow specialists were prepared
in a few years. From 1931 to 1934 almost all universities were actually
liquidated. The majority of faculties were turned into institutes with
narrow specialized fields of education aimed at the accelerated education
of cadres.
The system of ‘vydvizhenchestvo’ became widespread at that time.
According to that system workers and peasants that were the most dedi-
cated to the regime were promoted to different high administrative posi-
tions, but only later were they given particular professional training.
A bright example in this regard was the biography of Nikita Khrushchev,
who had no more than two or four years of elementary education and
who studied only being a Party boss in a special educational institution
for Party functionaries named the Industrial Academy (‘Promacademia’).
It was not surprising that his lack of culture and education were evident
to everybody. Khrushchev was famous for his boorish behavior and
extravagant manner of speaking, which discredited him. Khrushchev’s
type of semi-illiteracy accompanied with upward social mobility into
the elite was a well-known phenomenon. So the great stratum of semi-in-
telligentsia with narrow world outlooks and limited education appeared.
This social stratum also became an important basis of Stalinism.
As for the policy of the Bolsheviks in the sphere of science, it also
had an ambiguous character. On the one hand, the persecution of dis-
sidents took place at that time. In 1919 the well-known historian Grand
Duke Nikolay Mikchailovich was executed by shooting; in 1921 a lawyer
and professor Nikolay Tagantsev and a poet Nikolaiy Gumilev were
also shot. In 1922 the infamous exile of the outstanding representatives
of Russian intellectual elite took place. Philosophers Nikolaiy Berdyaev
Russian culture in the 1920s - 1930s ＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆７６７
and Nikolay Losskyi, historian Leo Karsavin, and sociologist Pitirim

Sorokin were among more than 200 people sent away from Russia.
However, it was quite in the mood of the epoch. The same situation,
but earlier, took place in the United States. As Ronald G. Suny asserts,
- “To allay fears of domestic revolution the American government de-
ported over two hundred political radicals in December, 1919 to the
land of the Soviets on the Buford, an old ship dubbed ‘the Red Ark’”
(Suny (2), p. 9).
At the end of the 1920s a large number of trials of the engineering
and technical intelligentsia took place. There was also the so-called
‘Shakhtinsk Affair’ and ‘Academician Affair’, when a great number
of Russian professional historians were arrested; the process of
‘Industrial Party’ (‘Promparty’), also ensued, during which a well-known
inventor professor Leonid Ramzin and his colleagues were condemned
to 10 years in prison; the affair of the so called ‘Labor Peasant Party’,
condemned the world-renowned economists Nikolay Kondratiev and
Aleksandr Chayanov to prison and then to death.
In the late 1930s the persecution of genetics as a science began,
when a great scientist on an international level Nikolay Vavilov was
arrested and died in prison and pseudo-scientist Trophym Lysenko came
to power. Among numerous prisoners of the GULAG at time was the
future prominent designer of the Soviet spaceships Sergey Korolyov.
Intelligentsia were humiliated, academics were turned into the so called
‘specialists’ (‘spetsy’) and allowed to carry out their professional duties
only, without any right to take part in the public life of the country.
On the other hand, a number of branches of the national economy
and defense, significant for development of the country, were strongly
supported by the Party and the government. Some of the scientists were
provided with favorable conditions for work and life, which were even
better than before the revolution. In special scientific research institutes
(NII) the scientists received the right to conduct their scientific inves-
tigations during the entire day, without the necessity to earn money
by teaching at universities or institutes. As examples we can name the
Scientific Research Institute of Radium headed by Academician Abram
Ioffe, and the All-Union Research Institute of Plant-growing, initially
headed by Nikolay Vavilov. In the second part of the 1930s there were
867 NII, i.e. Science Research Institutes in the Soviet Union, with
37,600 scientists working in them.
These years were marked by a certain number of great scientific
７６８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
achievements of Soviet science. One of the most outstanding among

them was the invention by Sergei Lebedev of a process of extracting
synthetic caoutchouc. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Fridrikh Tsander and Yuri
Kondratiuk formed by their work a basis for the development of
space-rocket technology as well. In classical scholarship, in the sphere
of physiology, the Nobel-prize winner Ivan Pavlov and a well-known
scientist in the field of selective breeding, Ivan Michurin, continued
their successful scientific activities. Actually the main scientific designing
and engineering forces were concentrated in the sphere of defense. The
best models of military techniques, in particular, the T-34 tank and
missile mortar ‘Katiusha’ were created at this time.
12.3 Literature and Art

The development of literature and art during the end of the 1920s
was also ambiguous. In the period of the NEP there was a diversity
of tendencies, trends and groupings in literature and arts. As for the
Bolshevik elite it was involved in the discussions about the communist
policy in the sphere of culture.
On the one hand, there was an extremist tendency, which supported
the idea of the total break-up with the ‘old pre-revolutionary culture’.
This position was characteristic the organization ‘Proletcult’, which
means proletarian culture. This organization put forward a slogan ‘Throw
down Pushkin from the ship of modernity!’ Aleksandr Pushkin is consid-
ered to be the greatest poet of Russia and a symbol of Russian culture,
so the extremism of ‘Proletcult’ was punctuated by its demand that
the new writers take precedence over the old. Among the literary organ-
izations the so called RAPP, the Russian Association of Proletariat
Writers, was known for the hunting or persecuting of all the non-prole-
tariat, in particular bourgeois, writers. It jutted out of the pure ‘proletariat
literature’.
On the other hand, Lenin and the party leadership declared moderate-
ness in relations with the representatives of the old culture, the necessity
to utilize the legacy of the past and to ‘rehabilitate’ the old intelligentsia.
A special decision of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party
‘About the Policy in the Sphere of Fiction’, adopted in 1925, was
devoted to that problem.
In reality all the so called ‘class extraneous elements’ were under
suspicion. As newly published documents showed, even in the middle
Russian culture in the 1920s - 1930s ＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆７６９
of the 1920s, a great Russian writer Mikhail Bulgakov was under the
thorough shadowing of the State Political Administration (‘GPU’). Sergey
Yesenin, a prominent Russian poet, who glorified the revolution, was
also considered to be politically unreliable. His death in 1925 is
enigmatic. There is a version now that it had not been a suicide, as
it was declared earlier, but that the poet was killed by the agents of
the Interior police. As soon as the first chapters of the epic novel ‘The
Don Flows Quietly’ (‘Tikhii Don’) written by Mikhail Sholokhov, were
published at the end of the 1920s, the author began to be persecuted
for his loyalty to the White Guard. The fate of Vladimir Mayakovski,
‘the poet of revolution’, can be a clue to understanding the political
situation in the country. Being disillusioned with the results of the
revolution in public life, the great growth of red tape, and betrayal
of initial revolutionary principles, he committed suicide in 1930.
By the end of the 1920s, and especially in the 1930s the policy
of ‘standardization’ of literature and art, and suppressing of all forms
of dissidence and non-conformism became the main trend in the policy
of the party. In 1934 the Council of the Soviet Writers was established.
The members of this organization were given numerous privileges, but
they were obliged to be dedicated to and adhere to the way of the
method of the ‘Socialist realism’. A number of poets, writers and the
other representatives of culture, who were not devoted to the ‘Socialist
realism’, became the victims of repressions; the poets Nikolai Kluiev,
Osip Mandelstam, and theatre producer Vsevolod Meyerhold were
among them.
Being one of the classics of Russian literature, Anna Akhmatova,
was not published from the middle of the 1920s until the 1960s. Her
poems were exposed to censorship and her personality was the subject
of tormenting. She wasn’t in exile herself, and wasn’t imprisoned, but
three people, whom she loved, were repressed. They were her first
husband N. Gumilev, who was shot; her only son Leo Gumilev, who
was in prison in the 1930-1940s, and then by the end of 1940 to the
beginning of the 1950s; and her beloved fellow N. Punin, who was
arrested three times, then sent to the Gulag, where he died in 1953.
Her tragic cycle ‘Requiem’ documents her personal experience of this
time; as she writes, “one hundred million voices shout” through her
“tortured mouth”.
Seventeen months I’ve pleaded
for you to come home.
Flung myself at the hangman’s feet.
７６：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
My terror, oh my son.
And I can’t understand.
Now all’s eternal confusion.
Who’s beast, and who’s man?
How long till execution?
(from Requiem. Trans. A.S. Kline, 2005)
This sad plight of Russian literature was later used as the basis of
the book-memorizers in Ray Bradbury’s ‘Fahrenheit 451’ (the temper-
ature at which books burst into flames).
A number of other writers’ works deteriorated through serving the
regime; this retrogression is revealed in the fate of an outstanding Russian
writer, Aleksey Tolstoy. The unbearable position of literature in the
period of the party’s dictate was shown with enormous force in the
letter written before his death by Aleksandr Fadeev, who was an active
transmitter of such a policy and who committed suicide after the unmask-
ing of the cult of Stalin in 1956.
Thus, the development of culture in the 1920-1930s was characterized
by the same contradictions that were inherent in the development of
the whole Soviet society at that period.
Topic 13
Ｌｕｘｋｏｍｔ＆ｖｕｒｏｉ｡＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆７？９６ｙ

３＆ｚｎｋ＆ｈｋｍｏｔｔｏｔｍ＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆７？：６ｙ
13.1 Relations with the Western countries at the beginning of the 1930s.
13.2 Foreign policy in the Far East
13.3 Relations with the Western countries after 1933
13.4 International relations in the last prewar years
13.5 Territorial annexations of the USSR
Three main directions in the foreign policy of the USSR may be

demarcated from the 1930s until the beginning of the 1940s:
• Until 1933 – close contacts with Germany, but ‘unstable’ relationships

with the ‘democratic’ countries;
• From 1933 to 1938 – closer relations of the USSR with England, France
and the USA in counterbalance to Germany and Japan;
• In 1939 and 1940 – closer relations with Germany and Japan.
13.1 Relationships with the Western countries at the beginning of

the 1930s
The main peculiarity of the international position of the USSR at
the beginning of the 1930s was the relative stability at the western
borders, while myriad problems developed in the Far East. The best
relations at that time were with Germany via the Rapallo treaty. The
USSR was helping Germany to revive its military potential, including
teaching its pilots and tank men in the USSR. The trade between the
two countries was growing successfully: in 1931 the Soviet Union got
300 million marks from Germany for its further development. The portion
of Germany in Soviet imports reached almost 50 per cent and the USSR
accounted for 43 per cent of the German automobile exports. These
played an important role in the industrialization of the USSR.
The relations with other leading Western countries (the USA, England
and France) were characterized by instability at that time. In 1929 diplo-
matic ties with England, broken in 1927, were restored. However, in
− ７６；＆ −
７６＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
1933 new deterioration of relations followed; they were caused by the

arrest of the English specialists in the USSR. The relations with France
were aggravated dramatically because of support for French communists
provided by the Soviet Union. After diminution of this support the sit-
uation got better, and in 1932 a non-aggression agreement was signed.
The only great state that didn’t admit an embassy of the USSR because
of the problem of the tsar’s debts was the United States. However,
the two countries were carrying on considerable trade, the Soviet Union
was buying huge amounts of equipment for industrialization (the eco-
nomic crises and the Great Depression in the USA were conducive
to this: selling engineering tools was the only source of income for
some American businessmen). At the beginning of the 1930s serious
worsening of Soviet-American relations occurred. The United States
accused the USSR of interfering in their domestic affairs and began
measures against the Soviet Union’s exports, in its turn the USSR reduced
by eight times its imports from the USA.
13.2 Foreign policy in the Far East

Up to the end of the 1930s the Far East was the main region of
international tension due to the aggressive Japanese policy. In 1931
Japan occupied North–Eastern China (Manchuria), where a puppet state
Manchiou-go was created. Thereby, in the Far East, the seeds of war
were planted; there was a military springboard for Japan, which was
at the border of the Soviet Union. Naturally, it caused worsening of
Soviet-Japanese relations and in its turn closer relations of the USSR
and China. Diplomatic relations with China were restored but the talks
of concluding a non-aggression pact were unsuccessful as the USSR
supported Chinese communists, who were opposing Kuomintang (The
Chinese Nationalist Party).
In 1937 Japan started a wide-ranging war to occupy the whole of
China. As a result the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with
China at once, thus China was considerably supported; Soviet pilots
even participated in some of the battles. But support was abruptly reduced
after the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact which was
rd
completed on the 23 of August, 1939 and was completely ceased after
th
the Soviet-Japanese agreement, signed on the 13 of April, 1941.
At the end of the 1930s relations between the USSR and Japan
deteriorated to rock bottom. From June to August, 1938 battles took
place at the Soviet-Manchurian border by Lake Hasan. In August, 1939
Soviet Foreign policy in the 1930s - 1941 107
serious combat actions expanded at the Manchurian-Mongol border as

a result of the incursion of Japanese in the surroundings of the
Khalkhin-Gol River. Here Georgy Zhukov showed his worth for the
first time; it’s considered that the Soviet offensive operation was very
effective due to its strategies and implementation. The Japanese were
defeated; this probably, to some extent, predetermined the Japanese
wait-and-see attitude when the Soviet Union and Germany battled in
World War II.
13.3 Relations with the Western countries after 1933

After accession to power by A. Hitler (1933) a change of priorities
in the Soviet foreign policy took place. Already at the end of that year
the Comintern called fascist Germany the main warmonger in Europe.
th
In 1935 the 7 Congress of the Comintern declared fascism the main
danger and oriented communists to create the people’s front (including
participation of the bourgeois parties).
In 1933 the USSR initiated developing closer relations with the demo-
cratic countries in order to oppose Japan and Germany; it put forward
the idea of collective safety in Europe and the Far East. In this way
a number of successes were achieved. In 1933 diplomatic relations with
the USA were established. In 1934 the USSR was accepted into the
League of Nations. In 1935 the mutual help agreement with France
and Czechoslovakia was signed.
However, some serious impediments that arose in relations between
the Soviet Union and Western democracies led to the new warming
of relations between the USSR and Germany. The most important reason
for this was in the point that both democratic countries and the USSR
tried to provoke each other into a conflict with Germany. The West
started pursuing the policy of ‘appeasement’, hoping to improve the
relations with Germany by way of concessions and thereby influencing
Hitler’s expansion against the USSR.
All this became apparent in connection with the first aggressive
actions of the fascist states. In 1935 Italy attacked Ethiopia; Germany
restored general compulsory military service and brought its troops to
the demilitarized Rhine zone. The West denied supporting the ideas
of the Soviet Union that suggested collective measures for suppression
of these actions.
From 1936 to 1939 the Spanish civil war took place between
７６＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Republicans and Falangists; the latter were supported by Germany and

Italy. In its turn the Soviet Union provided considerable support for
Republicans and at the same time tried to establish communist rule
there. Soviet intelligence agents were quite active in Spain, dealing shortly
with the representatives of the non-communist opposition (this topic
is one of the issues in the Ernest Hemingway novel ‘For Whom the
Bell Tolls’; and because of that it was not published in the Stalin’s
USSR). In their turn the democratic countries declared the policy of
‘non-interference’. In fact they blocked Spain and contributed to the
victory of fascists.
In March, 1938 the USSR opposed the ‘Anschluss’ of Austria (its
annexation to Germany) and the Munich agreement (September, 1938).
However the West didn’t support these protests and at that time took
the stand of ‘appeasement’ of the aggressors.
13.4 International relations in the last prewar years

At the end of the 1930s the world was inexorably moving to a new
war. The international position of the Soviet Union at that time was
quite difficult: in the East the threat from Japan was obvious; in the
West the aggression of Germany was increasing. In 1939 Hitler seized
Czechoslovakia, which alarmed the governments of England and France,
causing them to develop a solution right away; that would be the last
attempt on the eve of the Second World War to arrange for joint actions
with the USSR against Germany.
In August, 1939 in Moscow the talks among delegations of the USSR,
England and France started; they continued for more than two months
without any results. In the USSR the failure of these talks was explained
by the attitude of the West. Now it is often told that both sides were
guilty, as they were unable to trust each other.
Under these conditions Hitler initiated improving relations with the
USSR, and Stalin responded positively. The main goal of Germany
at that stage was to avoid a war at two fronts when occupying Poland.
rd
At the initiative of Hitler on the 23 of August the minister of foreign
affairs of Nazi Germany Joachim von Ribbentrop came to Moscow;
on the same day the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed
(the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact). The pact was supplemented with a secret
protocol, existence of which was denied for a long time, and was acknowl-
edged only in Gorbachev’s time. The protocol determined the destiny
of the Polish State and established influence areas of the two countries
Soviet Foreign policy in the 1930s - 1941 109
in Europe; the Baltic countries were thus made part of the Soviet sphere.
After providing itself with safety in the East, Germany attacked Poland
st rd
on September 1 , 1939. On the 3 of September England and France
declared war on Germany – that is how the Second World War started.
th
On the 28 of September the USSR and Germany concluded the friend-
ship and border agreement. After that, a comprehensive approach of
the two regimes toward each other followed: declarations of friendship
took place, bulk deliveries of input materials and supply of provisions
from the Soviet Union to Germany and in the opposite direction – many
techniques of mutual enrichment were implemented.
Evaluations of the foreign policy of the USSR of this period are
contradictory. Soviet historians proved that the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact
was a forced measure, caused by the policy of the West, and the danger
of isolation of the Soviet Union. It was considered that this pact bought
time to strengthen the country’s defenses. Among the new works in
which this point of view is presented is the textbook by M. I. and
M.M. Shumilov (Shumilov, p. 283). Now many authors affirm that the
pact was Stalin’s mistake – it caused isolation of the USSR, and, worst
of all, Hitler profited from signing it.
Also there is an opinion that the agreement of 1939 became the ex-
pression of an approaching logical marriage of two totalitarian regimes.
Most of all this evaluation is advanced in the textbook edited by A.
N. Sakharov, where the corresponding part has a distinctive title ‘The
collusion of two dictators’ (Sakharov, pp. 624-626). This point of view
became the continuation of the totalitarian concept created in the West
in the period of the Cold War “in order to conceptualize these terror-based
one-party ideological regimes.... Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski
formulated the classic definition of totalitarianism with its six systemic
characteristics: a ruling ideology, a single party typically led by one
man, a terroristic police, a communications monopoly, a weapons mo-
nopoly and a centrally directed economy” (Suny (2), p. 22).
As for the modern Western historians of a younger generation working
within the frame of the social approach, they argue that the T-model
“exaggerated similarities and underestimated differences between quite
distinct regimes, ignoring the contrast between an egalitarian, internation-
alist doctrine (Marxism) that the Soviet regime failed to realize and
the inegalitarian, racist and imperialist ideology (fascism) that the Nazis
implemented only too well” (Suny (2), p. 24). If so, they support the
first point of view and could evaluate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
７７６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
as a forced measure from the perspective of the USSR.

Taking into consideration the international circumstances of that time
and the policy of the West, we should acknowledge that the pact was,
to a great extent, a forced and reasonable measure. However, the USSR
couldn’t use it to its full extent for improving its defense capabilities.
The following Friendship and Border Agreement, probably, should be
evaluated as an unforgivable rapprochement with fascist Germany.
13.5 Territorial annexations of the USSR

After Hitler attacked Poland, Stalin sent his troops into the eastern
regions of the country, Western Ukraine and Belorussia, this was declared
to be “the liberation campaign”. There was some historical justice in
it as earlier these lands were a part of the Russian Empire and were
seized by Poland in 1921 and its population was exposed to discri-
mination. However, in the annexed territories the Stalin orders were
put into practice: mass banishments of the ‘bourgeoisie’, ‘enemies’,
‘kulaks’ (wealthy peasants) to Siberia took place. About 10 per cent
of the population was deported. During the same time, in 1940, the
ultimatum of giving Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet
Union was put forward to the Romanian government (Bessarabia was
annexed by Romania in 1918). As a result Bessarabia became a part
of the USSR as the Moldavian SSR, and Northern Bukovina became
a part of Ukraine.
In November of 1939 the USSR declared war on Finland; it was
officially motivated by the necessity to move the border to the Karelian
Isthmus, further from Leningrad. The Karelian republic was urgently
turned into the Karelian-Finnish Soviet republic, the Finnish ‘workers-
peasant government’ headed by O. V. Kuusinen was declared.
Thereby a protracted war ensued because the Red Army was not
ready, according to evidence, to make war. Finally in February of 1940
Finnish fortifications (the Mannerheim line) were breached at the cost
of heavy sacrifice. In March, 1940 the Finnish government was forced
to sign the war agreement, according to which the USSR got considerable
territorial additions. The War with Finland strengthened the isolation
of the Soviet Union and showed the weakness of the Red Army; this
probably influenced Hitler’s final decision to attack the Soviet Union.
Part 3.
ＺＮＫ＆ＭＸＫＧＺ＆ＶＧＺＸＯＵＺＯＩ＆］ＧＸ＆ＵＬ＆ＺＮＫ＆

ＹＵ＼ＯＫＺ＆［ＴＯＵＴ＆ＧＭＧＯＴＹＺ＆ＴＧ｀Ｏ＆ＭＫＸＳＧＴ＿
＆ＧＴＪ＆ＺＮＫ＆ＬＯＸＹＺ＆ＶＵＹＺ３］ＧＸ＆＿ＫＧＸＹ
Three main periods of the Great Patriotic War that are often pointed
out in Russian historiography:
• June 1941 - November 1942 (the initial period of the War)

• November 1942 - 1943 (the crucial break in the course of the War)
• 1944 - 1945 (concluding battles)
Topic 14
Ｚｎｋ＆ｏｔｏｚｏｇｒ＆ｖｋｘｏｕｊ＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆Ｍｘｋｇｚ＆Ｖｇｚｘｏｕｚｏｉ＆］ｇｘ＆

．Ｐ｛ｔｋ＆７？：７＆ – Ｔｕ｜ｋｓｈｋｘ＆７？：８／＆
14.1 Defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the War and their causes
14.2 Organization of defense
14.3 The Moscow battle
14.4 The Failures of 1942
14.5 Establishment of the Anti-Hitler Coalition
14.1 Defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the War, and
their causes
nd
Early in the morning on the 22 of June, 1941 fascist Germany
and its allies Romania, Hungary and Finland began the War against
the USSR. It was the greatest invasion in world military history, in
which four million people, 3909 aircrafts, 4215 tanks were involved.
The invasion was implemented by three groups of armies –‘North’,
‘Center’ and ‘South’ according to the three main directions of the offen-
sive – toward Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The Soviet troops were,
from the first weeks of battles, divided into parts by German tank
wedges; they lost all communication with each other and were limited
by a short supply of weapons. Soviet aviation was destroyed at the
aerodromes, thus the aggressors achieved complete superiority in the
sky.
From the first hours of war the Soviet fighters offered a heroic
resistance. The most dramatic example of this was the staunch defense
of the Brest fortress in the first weeks of the invasion. All defenders
of the fortress fought to death, but did not surrender. One of the writings
on the walls of the Brest fortress says: “I am dying, but not retreating.
Farewell, Motherland! 20/VII-41”.
Great fame was achieved by the heroic deeds of N.F. Gastello and
V.V. Talalikhin, and their crews. The bomber-pilot Nikolai Gastello
was the first in the history of the Great Patriotic War to perform an
outstanding heroic deed, named fire ram. As a kamikaze pilot he aimed
− ７７８＆ −
The initial period of the Great Patriotic War ＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆７７９
his burning plane into the mechanized corps of the enemy. It was on
the 26th of June, 1941. The name of Gastello became the synonym
of military valor and heroism. On the 7th of August, 1941 the feat of
Gastello was repeated by Victor Talalikhin, who rammed his plane into
a plane of the enemy in the sky over the Moscow region. The sacrifices
of Gastello and Talalikhin were repeated by the Soviet pilots hundreds
of times. During the Great Patriotic War there were accomplished 595
‘classic’ air rams (plane to plane), 506 rams by planes onto ground
targets, and 16 marine occurrences when enemy ships were rammed
by the planes of Soviet pilots. All of them were awarded the title of
the Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.
But the German armies continued to go rapidly to the East. On the
second day of the War Kaunas and Vilnius were captured. At the begin-
ning of July Riga fell. At the end of July Minsk was captured. More
than four million Soviet soldiers were captured prisoner.
The first place where the German run met with organized resistance
was Smolensk. In July, 1941 Smolensk fought a bloody battle against
the German onslaught. Though the Red Army was defeated, the battle
showed that the German military machine could, at least, be slowed
down. At Smolensk - for the first time since the beginning of the Second
World War - the German Army was ordered to defend.
Since that time, the confounding problem of the causes of the heavy
defeats of the Red Army in 1941 has been debated. There are different
versions in the answering of this question. The first version was put
forward by Stalin. He explained the failures of the Red Army by the
‘suddenness of the invasion’ of Germany (Blitzkrieg). In his appeal
rd
to the Soviet people on the 3 of July, 1941 he said: “the war of fascist
Germany against the USSR began under conditions that were favorable
for the German forces and unfavorable for the Soviet forces. The fact
of the matter is that the troops of Germany, a country at war, were
already fully mobilized, and the 170 divisions brought up to the Soviet
frontiers and hurled by Germany against the USSR and were in a state
of complete readiness, only awaiting the signal to move into action;
whereas the Soviet troops had yet to effect mobilization and move up
to the frontiers. Of no little importance in this respect was the fact
that fascist Germany suddenly and treacherously violated the non-
aggression pact which she had concluded in 1939 with the USSR”
(Stalin’s Internet Archives).
Khrushchev, in his own turn, laid the blame of all the defeats on
７７：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Stalin, whose mistakes and crimes, as he argued, weakened the defensive

capability of the country. In 1956 he caricatured Stalin planning wartime
operations on a globe. This point of view has become widespread in
contemporary Russia. For example, it is consecutively argued in the
history textbook edited by M.I. and M.M. Shumilov (Shumilov, pp.
310-316). The following aspects of the Stalinist policy which led to
the defeats of the Red Army are pointed out: annihilation of a great
number of career military cadres in the course of purges (according
to some data, over 37,000 commanders and career officers were killed);
slow development of production of the newest military technologies,
for example the new T-34 tanks, and automatic small arms; liquidation
of the system of defensive buildings on the former Soviet-Polish border;
ignoring the intelligence office information about the data of the invasion
and the size of the German Army.
For example, Richard Sorge named the exact data of the invasion
of Hitler on Russia. But there was a special order to all Soviet forces
not to be provoked. Stalin waited for provocations not from Hitler (there
was a treaty between the USSR and Germany), but from the side of
the third actors of world affairs in order to involve the Soviet Union
in a big war.
14.2 Organization of defense

rd
On the 3 of July Stalin appealed by radio to the people. He named
the Soviet people “brothers and sisters”; he announced the war as the
Great Patriotic War and set forth the program of mobilization of all
the forces into the war with the aggressor. For guidance of the defense
a State Defense Committee was organized. It was invested with absolute
state power. Soon the State Defense Committee was headed by Stalin,
who became also the Commander-in-Chief and Defense Commissar.
The most urgent problem of that time became evacuation of people
and enterprises from the front-line regions. More than 2,600 industrial
enterprises and several million workers were relocated to the rear of
the country. In the shortest possible time, and in very hard conditions,
the plants were converted to work for the needs of defense.
Meanwhile, in July and August of 1941 the situation at the front
worsened. In the North the German army came to Leningrad, in the
South the enemy captured the entire left-bank of Ukraine including
the city of Kiev, while Odessa was blockaded, Crimea was invaded,
the city of Sevastopol was besieged and the enemy was beyond the
The initial period of the Great Patriotic War ＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆７７；
Rostov-on-Don river city. The way to the Caucuses was opened for
the fascists from there.
The only exclusion in this series of sad defeats became the struggle
under Yelnya at the end of July and beginning of August. Under
General Georgi Zhukov’s command, the Soviet troops undertook the
first successful counter-offensive there. The famous jet mortars ‘Katiusha’
were employed in the course of these actions. The Guards’ detachments
were established also during that time.
14.3 The Moscow battle

th
On the 30 of September, 1941 the first German offensive against
Moscow began. The Red Army suffered a number of defeats; in particular,
a great number of army battalions were encircled not far from the town
of Vyazma and the city of Briansk. The situation was so difficult that
it was decided in secret to evacuate Moscow. Many buildings were
mined, and secret arms and ammunition dumps were prepared for
underground fighting. A part of the Government apparatus was moved
to the city of Kuibyshev, situated on the Volga River, where a special
th
infrastructure had been created even before the war. On the 19 of
October, 1941, a state of siege was established in the capital.
But after the bloody combats with the Red Army the German offensive
began to wear out. The enemy was exhausted by uninterrupted, continuous
combats on the approaches to Moscow. The Germans had to take a
break in their offensive operations. The resolution of the Soviet people
to struggle with the enemy increased from hour to hour. The belief
in victory was reinforced by the fact that Stalin stayed in Moscow.
A wide public response was evoked by the parade of the Red Army
th
on the 7 of November, 1941 in which Stalin took place. He welcomed
fighters from the tribune of the Mausoleum of Lenin, and they went
to the front straight from the Red Square, where the parade was held.
In the middle of November the Germans resumed the offensive, eager
to take Moscow in pincers from the north and south. In these crucial
days it became known about the feat of the 28 fighters of the division
of the General Ivan Panphilov, who fought to the death not far from
the side of Dubosekovo. The entire country knew the words of the
officer of that division Vasisli Klochkov: “Russia is great, but there
is no place for retreat - Moscow is behind us! The whole country also
knew about the heroic deeds of the 18-year-old girl partisan Zoya
Kozmodemiynskaya. This young heroine was a true martyr: she was
７７＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
cruelly tortured by the fascists, they sawed her body with a band-saw,
and then they watered her naked in the street with the cold water at
frost over 40 degrees below zero. Standing over the gallows-tree she
condemned her executioners and called the people, who stood nearby,
to continue the struggle with the enemy.
At that time Stalin, based on the information of the Soviet secret-service
agent Richard Sorge, who reported that Japan would not join the war,
came to a decision to direct troops to the Western front; these troops
had been guarding the borders on the Far East. Fresh Siberian divisions
arrived in Moscow and strengthened the defense greatly. By the end
of November the German offensive had collapsed.
th
On the 5 of December the Red Army started its counter-offensive
which threw the Germans out of Moscow by 100 to 300 kilometers.
In January, 1942 the Moscow battle ended with the victory of the Red
Army. The historical significance of the Moscow battle was in its complete
crushing of the strategy of ‘Blitzkrieg’.
14.4 The Failures of 1942

After the Moscow battle the forces of Germany were still great. But
the General staff of the Red Army were planning military operations
founded on mistaken propositions of Stalin that the “the best divisions
of the enemy” were smashed already. It was proposed that 1942 would
become the year of the crushing defeat of Germany.
But the attempts of the Soviet troops to switch to offensive failed,
they brought great losses and sufferings. The attempt to raise the block-
ade from Leningrad was defeated. This entailed the destruction of the
Second Shocking Army, and its commander, General A.A.Vlasov was
taken prisoner. The position of the Leningrad inhabitants was cata-
strophic, more than a million people there died of starvation.
The attempt of the Soviet troops to liberate Crimea in May, 1942
led to the loss of 176,000 soldiers and officers in the region of Kerch.
As a result of an unsuccessful offensive on Kharkov in June and July,
1942, 240,000 servicemen were taken prisoner.
The second strategic mistake of Stalin was in an incorrect determi-
nation of the main direction that the Germans would strike in 1942.
It was guessed that the Germans would make a second offensive on
Moscow. So the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated there.
th
But on the 28 of June the German Army started an offensive in the
The initial period of the Great Patriotic War ＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆７７＝
direction of the Volga and the Caucasus. The Soviet front was broken
through, and a new, very hard retreat of the Red Army began.
14.5 Establishment of the Anti-Hitler Coalition

The invasion of Germany against the USSR created the preconditions
for the alliance of the Soviets with the democratic countries in the
nd
struggle against the fascist aggressors. Thus, on the 22 of June, 1941
the Prime Minister of Britain, Winston Churchill, declared his support
th
of the Soviet Union, and on the 12 of July the Soviet-Britain agreements
about the concentrated actions in the War with Germany were adopted.
From September to October, 1941, at the Moscow conference of the
USSR, Great Britain and the USA, about military supplies, the well-
st
known ‘lend-lease’ agreements took place. On the 1 of January, 1942
the Declaration of the United Nations condemning fascism was signed.
It was joined by 26 countries, being in a status of war with Germany,
Italy and Japan. Legalization of the Anti-Nazi Coalition was finalized
in 1942: in May when the Soviet-Britain treaty was signed and in June
when the Soviet-American agreement was adopted.
Thus, the first period of War was marked by enormous difficulties
and losses of the Soviet people in fighting with the enemy. The first
successes in the struggle with Nazi Germany were achieved and the
preconditions for the crucial break in the course of war were created.
Topic 15
Ｚｎｋ＆ｉｘ｛ｉｏｇｒ＆ｈｘｋｇｑ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｉｕ｛ｘｙｋ＆

ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆Ｍｘｋｇｚ＆Ｖｇｚｘｏｕｚｏｉ＆］ｇｘ
15.1 The defensive period of the Stalingrad battle
15.2 From defensive to offensive
15.3 The Kursk battle. The completion of the crucial break
15.4 The All-National Struggle
15.5 Strengthening of the Anti-Hitler Coalition
15.1 The defensive period of the Stalingrad battle

As it was pointed out, at the end of June, 1942 the new offensive
of the Germans began at the Eastern front. Soon the main direction
of the military stroke of the German forces became evident. It was
th
Stalingrad. Fighting started there on the 17 of July, 1942; this was
the beginning of the defensive period in the Stalingrad Battle.
In the middle of July, 1942 the Germans pushed to the Don River,
forced over the river and captured the town of Rostov. Following
th
military panic at Rostov-on-Don, on the 28 of July, 1942 Stalin signed
the famous order No. 227 (‘No Step Back’), which prohibited any retreat
without direct orders, and established execution through shooting of
‘alarmists and cowards’ without inquest or court. Penal battalions and
‘blocking detachments’ behind the lines were to shoot men retreating
without orders and officers who allowed their units to disintegrate. The
resistance of the Red Army became stronger, but it could not stop the
enemy yet.
In the middle of September Germans burst into Stalingrad. Simu-
ltaneously they captured the North Caucasus and hoisted their flag over
Elbrus. It was the moment of the greatest advance of the enemy. The
large territory, where more than 12 per cent of the population had lived
before the war, where one third of all the industrial production had
been produced, where 45 per cent of all the crop land had been situated,
had been lost.
− ７７＞＆ −
The crucial break in the course of the Great Patriotic War ＆＆７７？
Meanwhile, it was the time when the main prerequisites for the
crucial break in the course of war were maturing. At the end of 1942
conversion of the economy into a fully operational military industry
was finished. A coordinated and rapidly growing military economy
appeared. In autumn of 1942 a small superiority in forces of the Red
Army (6.5 million people) over the Germans (6.2 million) was reached.
Then the Soviet Union reached superiority over Germany in weapons
– tanks, airplanes and ordnance.
All the people were working with all their might, without any days
off or leave. Many labor campaigns and forms of competition were
put forward by workers. For example, the front and guard brigades
were organized by youths, which were working for 10-12 hours until
the complete carrying-out of the daily quotas were made. The people
lived in conditions of semi-starvation. In towns, rations for bread were
introduced, in the countryside the only source of food were the subsidiary
family plots. But people donated their last money and products to the
needs of the Red Army. The slogan ‘Everything for the front, everything
for Victory!’ became nationwide.
15.2 From defensive to offensive

Meanwhile military actions in Stalingrad were coming to a crucial
nd th
stage. The 62 Army of General Vasilii Chuikov and the 64 Army
of General Mikhail Shumilov were fighting there to the death. The
bitterest struggle was held for the predominant height, named the Mamai
mound, where the division of the General Aleksandr Rodimtsev became
glorious. The words of Lieutenant Vasilii Zaitsev “There is no land
for us behind the Volga!” became known to all of the Soviet citizens.
Heroism of the defenders of ‘Pavlov’s house’ in Stalingrad also became
a symbol of valor for the Soviet soldiers. It was an ordinary five-story
house, encircled by fascists, and it was defended by a handful of Soviet
soldiers during the entirety of the Stalingrad battle.
The enemy needed four months in order to seize a part of the city
and to gain access to the Volga, but at the beginning of November
their offensive lost its force. The German Army was exhausted during
the long and firm Soviet defensive operation. Moreover, the Soviet
Command deployed large military reserves to the East of Stalingrad.
So the prerequisites for the counter-offensive became mature.
The counter-offensive under the code-name ‘Uranus’ was elaborated
by Georgy Zhukov and Aleksandr Vasilevsky. The plan took advantage
７８６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
of the disposition of the German troops. The armies of the enemy were
deployed in the form of a wedge, where the top of the wedge had
the strongest German divisions, and the flanks were represented by weak
th th
Romanian, Italian and Hungarian troops. So on the 19 and 20 of
November, 1942 these divisions were attacked from the north and south
by the fronts under the commands of General Konstantin Rokossovsky,
General Andrei Yeremenko, and General Nikolai Vatutin.
As a result the whole Stalingrad Group of the German Army, which
consisted of 300,000 soldiers and officers, was encircled. The group
of armies of General Manshtein was sent by the Chief German command
to raise the blockade of the encircled German troops. But the army
nd
of General Rodion Malinovsky stopped its offensive. On the 2 of
February, 1943 the battle over Stalingrad ended with the total capitulation
of the German troops under General Von Paulus’ command.
The Stalingrad battle became the greatest battle not only of World
War II, but of the whole world military history. It was held for seven
months in the territory of more than 100,000 square kilometers. At
different periods of the battle more than 2 million people from both
sides took part in the fighting. More than 2,000 tanks, 2,000 airplanes,
and 26,000 artillery guns were used in a battle. The loss of Germans
were enormous. It consisted of five armies, including 1.5 million people.
Over 480,000 Russian soldiers and officers were killed fighting in the
Stalingrad battle.
Usually the offensive stage of this battle is considered to be the
beginning of the crucial break in the course of World War II. After
the Stalingrad battle the German army was not able to restore its forces
as it had been after the Moscow battle.
With the victory in the Stalingrad battle the great offensive of the
Soviet Army began. In January, 1943 the blockade of Leningrad was
run, and completely eliminated after a year. The enemy was driven
out from the North Caucasus. The cities of Belgorod, Kursk, and Kharkov
were liberated. Only in the city of Orel did the Soviet troops, tired
from uninterrupted fights, and suffering great losses, have to briefly
suspend their victory offensive.
15.3 The Kursk battle. The completion of the crucial break

The crucial break in the course of the war was strengthened with
the help of the Battle on the Kursk bulge (salient). It was at Kursk
The crucial break in the course of the Great Patriotic War ＆＆７８７
that the German command undertook the last of the war’s great
offensives. The Kursk bulge was created in the course of the offensive
of the Red Army. The German command decided to use its pincer
movements, breaking through the northern ranks, to achieve a great
encirclement of the Red Army forces. To break-through the defense
of the Red Army, Germans planned to use new weapons, mainly ‘Tiger’
and ‘Panther’ tanks. But the plans of the enemy were discovered in
advance. So the Red Army constructed a series of defense lines and
gathered large reserve forces for a strategic counter-attack.
th
On the night of the 5 of July, 1943, shortly before the enemy’s
attack, Soviet artillery rained down on the German troops in a massive
fire storm, which brought great losses to the enemy. Nevertheless
Germans assumed an offensive. The most bitter fighting was not far
from the village of Prokhorovka (the Battle of Prokhorovka), where
the largest-in-world-history tank battle was held.
For the attack the Wehrmacht used three armies and a large number
of their tanks on the Eastern front. The total number of tank soldiers
and officers was 777,907 men.
The Red Army used two Fronts (Army groups) for the defense and
one Front as a reserve, with the total of soldiers and officers consisting
of 1,910,361.
After five days of uninterrupted attacks the enemy could make an
advance only of ten kilometers. The losses of the enemy were enormous,
thus they couldn’t achieve success. The Red Army not only repelled
the monstrous, terrible blow of the enemy, but made conditions for
th
the counter-attack, which began on the 12 of July under the command
of General Rokossovsky and General Vatutin. The Germans resisted
desperately, but they could not stop the movement of the Red Army.
The new great offensive of the Red Army began.
The Battle of Kursk became the third decisive military operation
of the Great Patriotic War. The forces, which took part in it (more
than four million), outnumbered the forces, involved in the Battle of
Stalingrad. The completion of the crucial break in the course of World
War II after the Battle of Kursk revealed itself in fact that the Red
Army had been on an uninterrupted offensive, and the Wehrmacht had
been retreating. In a short time the Soviet troops liberated the whole
Left-bank of Ukraine and Donbass. In autumn of 1943 the Red Army
th
forced onward to the river Dnepr, and on the 6 of November Kiev
was liberated.
７８８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
15.4 Nation-wide struggle

The struggle against Nazi troops in the occupied Soviet territories
attained the highest point at that time. In May, 1942 the Central Staff
of the partisan movement was organized and attached to the General
Headquarters. There were from 800,000 to one million people, who
fought in the partisans’ detachments during the Great Patriotic War.
The role of partisans in destruction of German transport lines of
communication was especially significant. The most well-known in this
regard were the military operations held during the Kursk battle, named
the ‘Railway war’ and ‘Concert’. Partisan detachments under Sidor
Kovpak, Dmitrii Nikolaevich Medvedev and Aleksandr Saburov de-
served the nation’s glory for their courage and victories over fascists.
One of the most popular heroes of the Great Patriotic War was Nikolay
Kuznetsov, named a genius of reconnaissance. It was Kuznetsov, who
found out information about the German offensive at Kursk and about
preparation for attempts upon the lives of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt
in Teheran. A great number of Soviet pioneers (scouts) were young
partisans, among them was Lyonya Golikiv (1926-1943), who became
a Hero of the Soviet Union at the age of 16; when he was 17 he was
lost in an unequal fight. There was a whole organization of young
people ‘Youth Guards’ in the town of Krasnodon under Sergei Turkenich
and Oleg Koshevoy’s command, who struggled against fascists in
Donbass. When fascists seized Guards, they buried them alive. Aleksandr
Fadeev, a well-know Soviet writer wrote a novel about their heroic
life and struggle.
15.5 Strengthening of the Anti-Hitler coalition

The turning point in World War II led to strengthening of the Anti-
Hitler Coalition, which was revealed at the Teheran conference of the
so called ‘Great Threesome’ at the end of 1943. Stalin, Churchill and
Roosevelt took part in that conference. The main question of the confer-
ence was the opening of the Second front, which was postponed despite
the demands of the Soviet Union to open the Second Front as soon
as possible. Churchill insisted on opening the Second Front at the
Balkans, in order not to allow the Red Army to get there. But finally
the decision about the offensive of allies in France in the May of 1944
was taken. Along with that the frame of the post-war world was
projected. Moreover, following the request of allies, Stalin committed
himself to the war with Japan after the crushing defeat of Nazi Germany.
The crucial break in the course of the Great Patriotic War ＆＆７８９
We should underscore that during the war the USSR and the demo-
cratic countries collaborated successfully. War supplies were of the most
importance. Lend-lease consisted of five per cent of the whole Soviet
production, as for aircrafts, trucks and some other provisions it consisted
of 10 and some times more than 10 per cent. However the protracted
starting of operations on the Second Front showed the presence of
contradictions between the allies. This situation became the basis of
worsening relations after the war and the starting of the ‘Cold War’.
Topic 16
＼ｏｉｚｕｘｏｕ｛ｙ＆ｋｔｊｏｔｍ＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆Ｍｘｋｇｚ＆Ｖｇｚｘｏｕｚｏｉ＆］ｇｘ

16.1 ‘Stalin’s Ten Blows’
16.2 Crushing defeat of Nazi Germany
16.3 The end of World War II
16.4 The significance and the cost of Victory
16.1 ‘Stalin’s Ten Blows’

After the Kursk battle the strategic initiative completely passed into
the hands of the Red Army. The General Headquarters created a com-
plete program: a great offensive in 1944, which was named ‘Stalin’s
Ten Blows’. The offensive began simultaneously in the north (in the
region of Leningrad and Novgorod) and in the south (in Ukraine).
The first aim of the Soviet forces was the final raising of the blockade
of Leningrad, which took place in January of 1944. Then the main
theatre of the military activities became Ukraine. In January-February,
1944 the great ‘Korsun’- Shevchenko’ operation took place. More than
80,000 Nazi soldiers were encircled and annihilated. The liberation of
Ukraine ended with the expulsion of the invaders from Crimea in
April-May, 1944. In May, 1944 the Red Amy entered the region over
the river Prut at the governmental border with Romania.
th
On the 6 of July, 1944 the Anglo-American forces landed in
Normandy (France) – so the Second Front was opened. From then on
Hitler had to defend himself from the east and from the west. The
crucial defeat of Nazi Germany became obvious to everybody. In this
situation the Soviet command decided to begin the offensive in
Belorussia. The operation for liberation of Belorussia, named ‘Bagration’,
th rd
started on the 20 of June, 1944, and on the 23 of June the Red
Army approached the Soviet-Polish border.
th
On the 20 of August, 1944 the Soviet troops began an offensive
in the south. It ended via ‘the Yassy-Kishinev’ operation. As a result
of this military operation Romania changed the course of its policy,
and declared war against Nazi Germany. Great political changes in
− ７８：＆ −
Victorious ending of the Great Patriotic War ＆＆７８；
Romania opened the way to the Balkans for the Red Army. Thus, in
autumn of 1944 the Red Army liberated all the territory of the Soviet
Union with the exception of a little piece of land on the coast of the
Baltic Sea. After that all the actions were held in other countries.
16.2 The crushing defeat of Nazi Germany

Military operations undertaken in autumn 1944 to winter 1945 led
to the overthrow of German troops in Poland. The Red Army entered
the territory of Germany.
The relations of the USSR with the allies improved considerably
after the opening of the Second Front. But the attitude of Stalin, Churchill
and Roosevelt about the construction of the post-war world differed
greatly. These differences became the basis of a number of opposing
viewpoints, which were sought to be solved by the Yalta conference.
The Yalta conference was held in February, 1945, it was the second
summit of a ‘Great Threesome’ after the conference held in Teheran
in 1943. The conference in Yalta helped the Great Powers come to
an agreement about the post-war construction of the world in order
to eliminate fascism. The decisions about the return to the Soviet Union
of the Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril islands and about the reparations
from Germany in favor of the Soviet Union were taken. The USSR
confirmed its obligation to join the war against Japan in two or three
months after the end of the war in Europe.
Meanwhile, in March, 1945 the Red Army finished with the enemy
forces in Eastern Prussia. In April Hungary and the Eastern part of
Austria were liberated; the Soviet troops entered Vienna.
th
On the 16 of April, 1945 the decisive offensive of the Red Army
against Berlin began. Despite being evidently doomed to defeat, the
Wehrmacht continued to put up resistance. Germans fortified all the
approaches to the city, especially in the region of the Zeelov (Seelow)
Heights. The Battle of the Seelow Heights is the common English name
st
for ‘the Zeelov-Berlin offensive operation’ carried out by the 1 Baltic
Front of the Red Army, and was one of the last assaults on large
entrenched defensive positions of World War II. It was a fight over
four days, from April 16 to April 19, 1945. Close to one million Soviet
st
soldiers of the 1 Belorussian Front (including 78,556 soldiers of the
st
1 Polish Army), commanded by Marshal Georgy Zhukov, attacked
the position known as the ‘Gates of Berlin’. They were opposed by
th
about 100,000 German soldiers of the 9 Army. This battle is often
７８＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
incorporated into the Battle of Oder-Neisse, which was itself only the
opening phase of the Battle of Berlin. On the 21st of April the troops
of the Soviet Fronts commanded by Marshals Zhukov, Konstantin
Rokossovsky and Ivan Konev entered the suburbs of Berlin. On the
th
30 of April the last center of resistance, the Reichstag, was taken.
On the 2nd of May capitulation of the Berlin garrison began, Hitler
committed suicide.
th th
On the night of the 8 and early morning of the 9 of May, 1945
in Karlkhorst, a suburb of Berlin the Act of unconditional capitulation
th
of Germany was signed. After that on the 9 of May the Red Army
came to the aid of the Prague uprising and liberated the city.
The Great Patriotic War came to an end.
16.3 The end of World War II

In July and August of 1945 in the town of Potsdam (a suburb of
Berlin) the last conference of the leaders of the Anti-fascist coalition
took place. They came to a decision not to limit the period of occupation
of Germany and to rule it with the help of a special allied control
council. The military forces of Germany were to be liquidated; the Nazi
Party was to be forbidden. It was decided to create an International
military tribunal for the trail of the main war criminals. The passing
of Eastern Prussia to the Soviet Union was corroborated.
The Potsdam conference influenced greatly the development of
post-war history. American President Harry Truman informed Stalin
about the successful lightening test of the American nuclear bomb.
After the rout of Fascist Germany, the Second World War did not
end. The allies’ struggle with military Japan continued. Though the
th
country was doomed to defeat, on the 6 of August Americans dropped
th
an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and on the 9 of August of 1945, on
Nagasaki. These actions were estimated in the Soviet Union as nuclear
blackmail.
th
Nevertheless, on the 8 of August, 1945, according to the obligations,
which were adopted at the Yalta conference, the USSR declared War
against Japan. The war was carried out by the Soviet Army with great
nd
skill, so it was short and ended on the 2 of September, 1945. The
Japanese Quantune Army was defeated; Manchuria and Northern Korea
were occupied by the Red Army. The last fact was of great importance
for the subsequent victory of communists in China and Northern Korea.
Victorious ending of the Great Patriotic War ＆＆７８＝
On the 2nd of September, 1945 on board the American aircraft carrier

‘Missouri’ the Act of unconditional capitulation of Japan was signed.
So World War II, which lasted for 6 years (from September of 1939),
ended.
16.4 The significance and price of the Victory

The victory in the Great Patriotic War was of world–wide significance.
The most aggressive force, which threatened the independence and
even existence of a number of nations, was smashed. Most of the people
of the Soviet Union and first of all the representatives of the Slavic
nations (Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians) were saved from physical
annihilation. We should keep in mind, that Hitler planned not only victory
over the Soviet Union, but enslavement and annihilation of the greatest
part of the population of the country.
It was thought for a long time, that the Soviet Union lost, during
this terrible war, 20 million people. But the newest investigations of
historians and demographers showed that the national losses of people
exceeded 26 or 27 million people. This data includes the military losses
of the Red Army, which were, according to different estimates, from
8 to 14 million soldiers. Material losses of the country were also gigantic.
More the one third of all the national property was ruined.
As for the consequences of the war of a long duration, they were
contradictory. On the one hand, the Soviet people showed unprecedented
courage and patriotism. In the years of the war, in general, and in foreign
marches, in particular, the private dignity and initiative of the Soviet
people grew greatly, their world outlook widened. These facts became
the social and psychological basis of the future progressive changes
in the country. On the other hand, having gained this great victory
in a war, the Stalinist regime entered its apogee, the highest point of
its power.
Topic 17
Ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｖｕｙｚ３｝ｇｘ＆｡ｋｇｘｙ

17.1 The international position of the country
17.2 Restoration and development of industry
17.3 The situation in the countryside. Social policy
17.4 Political life after the Great Patriotic War
17.1 The international position of the country

After the War the country was in a very difficult position. The Soviet
Union lost more than 26 million lives during the Great Patriotic War.
1,710 cities and more than 70,000 villages were ruined, 25 million people
became homeless.
Difficulties relating to post-war reconstruction were aggravated by
the increasing confrontation between the USSR and the Western powers.
Soon after the War, the Cold War began with the collapse of the Grand
anti-Nazi Alliance. Two of the first well known episodes of the Cold
War were the famous speech of Winston Churchill, delivered in Fulton,
Missouri, USA, in which he called for an ‘Iron Curtain’ against commu-
nism, and the famous ‘Long Telegram’ of George F. Kennan sent by
him from Moscow, in which he advocated a policy of “containment
of Russian expansive tendencies” (See: Suny (2), pp. 20-21).
According to the view of Western scholars of the 1940s and 1950s,
“it was Soviet expansionism that forced a reluctant United States to
turn from isolation to a global containment policy, and thus the Cold
War was almost entirely the fault of Stalin’s territorial and political
ambitions” (Suny (2), p. 44). According to Soviet scholars and Western
radical revisionists of the 1960s, the principle culprit of the Cold War
was the United States, because of its dedication to ‘making the world
safe for free market capitalism’(See: Suny (2), p. 44). As for Western
moderate revisionists and modern Russian historians, they apportion
blame for the division of the world to both super powers. They concede
the aggressive tendencies of Stalin’s foreign policy, but they emphasize
that, on the pretext of ‘defense of freedom and democracy’, the USA
− ７８＞＆ −
The USSR in the post-war years ＆＆７８？
strove for control over the whole world. This point of view at the
beginning of the Cold War is represented in the contemporary university
textbook edited by A. Sakharov (Vol. 2, pp. 660-662).
As a result of the Second World War the Soviet Union achieved
an unprecedented influence in international affairs. Communist regimes
were implemented in the countries of Eastern Europe with the help
of the Soviet Army. All these regimes, named the ‘socialist camp’ or
the countries of the ‘people’s democracy’, were dependent on the USSR.
In 1949 the first international association of the socialist countries
appeared. It was the Economic Mutual Assistance Council (SEV). The
only country to have its own policy, of all the other countries of Eastern
Europe, was Yugoslavia. Its leader, Joseph Tito, was independent of
Stalin in his policies, which resulted in political conflict between Tito
and Stalin and the breaking of relations between the two countries.
With the object of containment of the Soviet Union, the North-Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) was created by the Western countries in
1949. As for the Soviet Union, it made an attempt to put America
to the test in the Far East. In 1950, with Stalin’s approval, North Korea
made an attack on South Korea, a country which was supported by
the USA. Soviet pilots and the so called ‘Chinese volunteers’ took part
in the Korean War, siding with the Soviet Union.
There is an another point of view, represented by an American
sociologist George Katsiaficas, Wentworth Institute of Technology, who
states that the Korean war was major responsibility of the United States,
with tensions flaring in 1948, and even before that. When protests in
Jejudo island about keeping Korea one country threatened the American
plan, an additional 1,700 policeman from around Korea were sent in
via US Navy ships. Between late March and mid-May, 10,000 people
were detained. The methods used, and the involvement of the United
States in the containment of protests in Jejudo and the Yeosun in-
surrection became the prologue of the Korean war. (See: George
Katsiaficas. Asia’s Unknown Uprisings: South Korea Social Movements
th
in the 20 Century. Oakland, California, 2012. Vol. 1. pp. 86-126).
The Korean War of 1950-1953 was the greatest local conflict of
that time, when the USSR and the USA were eager to exhaust each
other, without engaging in open military confrontation in either home
country. At the end of Stalin’s rule, the international situation became
very tense. The image of the enemy was escalated by both superpowers,
exemplifying the worst excesses of anti-Soviet and anti-imperialistic
７９６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
hysteria. Some émigré authors confirmed the worst expectations of

Western readers. For example, the émigré historians Mikhail Geller and
Alexander Nekrich argued that Stalin was preparing for a decisive attack
on Western Europe and, perhaps, the USA, from Chukotka. That is
a region in the far North of the USSR. This was very problematic,
indeed an impossible fictional horror story, because of the un-
precedentedly hard economic situation in the post-war Soviet Union
and because Stalin had economic goals to accomplish.
17.2 Restoration and development of industry

The 4th Five-Year Plan for the restoration and further development
of the Soviet economy was adopted in 1946. The tasks put forward
in the plan were implemented with enormous difficulties. Restoration
of the economy was built on semi-starvation and under-consumption
by the population. The Soviet people endured physical suffering with
great stoicism, hoping for a better future.
The main funds, as before the war, were concentrated in the heavy
industry sector. The Dnepr hydro-electric dam, the Kharkov tractor
plant and some other great industrial infrastructures that were destroyed
during the war were restored. At the end of 1947 industry attained
the pre-war level and then surpassed it.
After the restoration of industry, several new great projects were
begun. Construction of the Volga-Don canal, the Kuibyshev hydro-elec-
tric station, and the road from Salekhard to Igarka in the polar region,
were among them. Many of these ‘great constructions of Communism’
as they were called in the propaganda, were carried out by convict
labor.
The greatest event of that time was the creation of nuclear weapons,
which were considered to be the main means of opposition to the USA.
The Soviet nuclear program was put under the control of the ruthless
executive of the Soviet Secret Police Lavrenty Beria. The scientific
director of the nuclear program was the outstanding Soviet nuclear
physicist academician Igor Kurchatov. A large number of scientists and
industrial managers took part in this great project (Abram Ioffe, Vitaly
Kholin, Georgy Gamov, Georgy Flyorov). Under Igor Kurchatov’s direc-
tion, the Soviet Union successfully tested its first plutonium-based nu-
clear device, First Lightning, in 1949. For this reason Kurchatov is
remembered as ‘The Father of the Soviet Atomic Bomb’. The rapid
creation of nuclear weapons was a function of the high level of Soviet
The USSR in the post-war years ＆＆７９７
science and the deployment of all the resources of the country for the
needs of military research.
We should also keep in mind the effective activities of the Soviet
Special Forces (intelligence office), which organized the theft of American
atomic secrets. This fact was fully justified by a chief editor of the
Russian journal ‘National Defense’ (‘Natzional’naya Oborona’), and a
member of the Public Council of the Russian Federation Ministry of
Defense Igor Korotchenko, who writes: “Lavrenty Beria (of course,
relying on Igor Kurchatov and his team) managed to intelligently assess
priorities and give direction to a project that ultimately achieved the
desired result. The key to success - and this should get a special mention!
- was the access Soviet intelligence had to American nuclear secrets.
Kurchatov had practically complete access to Manhattan Project docu-
ments, and his unofficial consultants (NKVD intelligence, within which
the ‘nuclear’ intelligence network of the GRU was incorporated) were
scientists from Robert Oppenheimer’s team who disinterestedly collabo-
rated with organs of the Soviet secret police (Klaus Fuchs, Morris and
his wife Lona Cohen, Harry Gold and some others). … Had the Soviet
Union failed to learn the secret of nuclear weapons, an alternative could
have been the American nuclear bombing of the USSR according to
the plan ‘Pincher’. The plan was envisaged as a series of nuclear strikes
against the 20 most industrially developed Soviet cities: Moscow,
Leningrad, Gorky, Kuybyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov,
Kazan, Baku, Tashkent, Chelyabinsk, Nizhny Tagil, Magnitogorsk, Perm,
Tbilisi, Novokuznetsk, Grozny, Irkutsk, Yaroslavl” (Vedomosty, Russia.
2009, August, 29).
The development of missile weaponry was also accelerated. Stalin
decided to make rocket & missile development a national priority, and
a new institute was created for the purpose, the NII-88 in the suburbs
of Moscow. German engineers, who were involved in the war-time
mass-production of their V-2, and who had worked with Werner von
Braun, were sent to Russia. The scientific development of ballistic mis-
siles was put under the control of the great Soviet scientist Sergei
Korolyov. Later, the ‘Chief Designer’ launched the first cosmic rocket
with a man on board, the first ‘Sputnik’, the first intercontinental rocket.
17.3 The situation in the countryside. Social policy

Restoration of agriculture and the countryside had been proceeding
with great difficulty because the countryside itself remained the main
７９８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
resource for financing the restoration and development of industry. In

1946-1947 the countryside was gripped by crop failure and famine.
More than one million people died. Some writers, for example Boris
Pushkaryov, argued (textbook by Pushkaryov, Moscow, 2008. p. 346),
that Stalin used famine as a means for the suppression of the people’s
dissatisfaction, or did not use the necessary measures to combat famine.
The state reserves were not utilized to feed those who starved. But
this version should be clarified.
In order to hold the peasants in check different repressive measures
were used by the Stalinist state. In particular, peasants, who could not
or did not work the obligatory minimum work-days, were expelled from
collective farms and deported to special penal farms or settlements.
Hundreds of thousands of people were exiled to the Gulag for so-called
‘theft of state property’, though usually the theft in question was about
a handful of grain to stave off starvation.
Pre-war levels of agriculture were restored only toward the beginning
of the 1950s. But the agricultural branch of the economy did not develop
further; it stagnated, because of the heavy state burden pressing down
on the countryside. The triumvirate of extraordinary taxes, heavy assess-
ments and exceptionally low prices for agricultural products contributed
to mass poverty. The matter reached a point where even every fruit
tree in Central Russia was taxed, so peasants had to cut down all the
fruit trees in their gardens in order not to pay tax on them. The collective
farm workers tried to escape their difficult circumstances by fleeing
to the towns. All these factors contributed to a process of depopulation
of the Russian countryside.
Restoration of the economy permitted an improvement in the life
of the people for a little while. In 1947 the ration system was abolished,
and the usual retail trade was restored. At the end of the Stalin period
annual price reductions began. But all these measures were connected
to the life of the urban population. The level of life as a whole was
low, because of the low level of financing in agriculture and light industry.
By the time Stalin died in March, 1953, the USSR had become an
industrial, military and nuclear giant. It was one of only two global
‘superpowers’. The Soviet Union’s power was rivaled and checked only
by the power of the United States. The growth of the Soviet Union
was built on under-consumption and the outstanding exertions of its
people.
The USSR in the post-war years ＆＆７９９
17.4 Political life after the Great Patriotic War

With the end of the war, the people hoped for a better life and,
possibly, a softening of the political regime. Millions of soldiers and
officers, who were in Europe and had seen another world and a different
way of life, returned home. Stalin was afraid of a spontaneous rise
of people’s free-thinking or this or that form of inner opposition or
something like independent thinking and outlook. So it was decided
to organize several great ideological campaigns. In 1946 the well-known
writer Mikhail Zoshchenko and the great poet Anna Akhmatova became
the targets of abusive and humiliating criticism. In 1948, at the initiative
of the pseudo-scientist and dishonorable person Trophym Lysenko, the
science of genetics was finally destroyed in the Stalinist Soviet Union.
Cybernetics was defamed as a science. This led to a lag in the develop-
ment of Soviet electronics.
At the end of the 1940s the drive against the so called ‘stateless
(without kith or kin) cosmopolitans’ began. Soon the drive acquired
an anti-Semitic character. As a result the members of the well-known
social organization ‘the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee’ were arrested
and executed. Stalin’s mass penetration of agents of the international
Zionist organization ‘Joint’ was escalated.
Repressions gripped a part of the cadre of high party officials. The
most repressive measure of that time was the Leningrad Affair at the
end of the 1940s. During the Leningrad Affair such prominent statesmen
as the Vice-Chief of the Council of Ministers (Sovmin) and the Chief
of Gosplan (the State Planning Commission) Nikolay Voznesensky and
the secretary of the party’s Central Committee Aleksey Kuznetsov were
arrested and executed. More than 3,000 party officials were purged
during the post-war repressions.
Stalin’s political tactics were determined by his fear of an opportunity
presenting itself for an independent line or opposition within his circle.
In October, 1952, after a long break which lasted for many years, the
th
19 Communist Party Congress was held. The party was renamed from
‘The All-Russian Communist Party (VKPb)’ to the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Soon after the Congress, at the plenary
session of the Central Committee of the Party, Vyachaslav Molotov
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Anastas Mikoian the Minister of
Trade were the subjects of a vicious assault by Stalin. The new organ
of the Presidium of the Central Committee was constituted instead of
the Politburo immediately after that. There is a version of this history
７９：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
that Stalin wanted to dissolve the ‘old cadres’ among the new, younger
functionaries promoted to those administrative posts. Some historians,
for example, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov (1979), put forward the concept
that there was a real anti-Stalinist opposition and possible plotting in
the ruling circles of the USSR. They supposed Beria to be the organizer
and executioner of Stalin in March, 1953.
Thus, in the period 1945-1953 all the features of the Stalinist socio-po-
litical system reached their highest point of development. Since that
was the case, the necessity for fundamental reforms became urgent and
inevitable.
Part 4.
ＬＸＵＳ＆ＺＮＫ＆ＸＫＪ＆ＨＧＴＴＫＸ＆ＺＵ＆

ＺＮＫ＆Ｚ］Ｕ＆ＮＫＧＪＫＪ＆ＫＧＭＲＫ
Topic 18
Ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｖｋｘｏｕｊ＆ｕｌ＆Ｚｎｇ｝＆．７？；９３７？＜：／

18.1 The beginning of changes
18.2 The Twentieth Congress and the process of ‘de-Stalinization’
18.3 Contradictions of economic policy
18.4 Contrasts of the ‘Thaw’ and its finale
The period of 1953-1964 is imaginarily called the ‘Thaw’ according

to the title of a well-known novel during this period, by the Soviet
writer Iliya Ehrenburg. Ehrenburg reflected in his novel the first symp-
toms of changes after the death of Stalin and appreciated them as a
thaw. These three main periods of ‘Thaw’ in the post-Stalinist history
are often highlighted:
• March, 1953 to February, 1956 – the first, slow changes;

• After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU – the most decisive measures
of ‘de-Stalinization’;
• The first half of the 1960s – the ‘Thaw’ was burning out, conservative
tendencies were increased.
18.1 The beginning of changes

The new configuration of forces was adopted after Stalin’s death
in the high circles of the USSR. The process of re-distribution of power
started. The Chief of the Council of Ministers or the head of the Soviet
Government became Georgy Malenkov; Lavrenty Beria headed the
united USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The First Secretary
of the Communist Party was not immediately elected, but the influence
of Nikita Khrushchev in that sphere was the most considerable. So
finally Khrushchev became the party boss.
Soon the first measures for liquidation of the most intolerable con-
sequences of Stalin’s ruling were implemented. Decisions connected
to some repressive affairs, such as the ‘Doctor’s Affair’ *, were reviewed.
5)
* ‘Doctor’s Affair’ (‘Affair of the doctor-poisoners’ as a part of the of the Affair
− ７９＜＆ −
The USSR in the period of ‘Thaw’ (1953-1964) ＆＆７９＝
By Beria’s initiative two million prisoners (criminals) were released.

Malenkov created some measures, making the situation in the countryside
easier. He uttered some critical phrases about the so-called ‘cult of
personality’, but he did not say whose personality he meant.
The sharp infighting for power, which started immediately after
Stalin’s death in March, 1953, ended in June, 1953, when, by the
initiative of Khrushchev, Beria was arrested and then executed. There
are different readings of this episode of Soviet history in modern
historiography. For example, there is a view that considers Beria and
Malenkov to be more decisive reformers than Khrushchev. The first
who offered this point of view was an émigré historian Mikhail Gephter,
then it was reflected in a manual edited by Sakharov (Vol. 2, pp.
693-697).
In September, 1953, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the
CPSU Khrushchev was elected the First Secretary. That showed an
essential growth of his influence. Later, in 1955 Khrushchev insisted
on dismissal of Malenkov from the high post of the Chief of the Council
of Ministers. Nikolay Bulganin was appointed to this position and held
it until 1958.
At the Plenum of 1953 many important decisions were adopted.
They were connected to agriculture, which was the most complicated
branch of the Soviet economy. Taxes were reduced and the running
of private peasants’ plots was supported. In 1954 the decision of mass
cultivation of the virgin soils was adopted in order to rapidly increase
the development of Soviet agriculture. The campaign of cultivating virgin
soils was held from 1954 to 1960. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet
youth volunteers went to the far regions of Siberia, Kazakhstan, and
the Far East to cultivate these remote lands and to build new state
farms. So more than 50 million hectacres of virgin land was cultivated
and 425 state farms were organized there.
The problem of cheap grain had been solved for some time, but
soon new sharper problems appeared. Because of the incorrect plowing
methods of virgin land, lack of roads and granaries in this region and
some other factors, the productivity of the farms fell quickly. By 1962
about the Zionist plot) – criminal affair against the group of the prominent Soviet
doctors (Vovsy M.S., Kogan B.B., Feldman A.I., Grinshtein A.M.), that were
accused in plotting and killing of a number of well-known Soviet leaders (A.
Zhdanov and others). All of them were arrested in January, 1953, but were released
in March, 1953 after the death of Stalin.
７９＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
to 1964 only 65 per cent of the grain was harvested compared to the
first years of the virgin land drive. Moreover, all the state financial
subsidies earmarked for agriculture were put into the virgin land
territories.
As for the traditional regions of agriculture in Central Russia, which
were ruined during the war, they received nothing. So degradation of
the Russian countryside, of the historically traditional regions of agri-
culture (previously cultivated areas) continued. While the economies
of the new virgin-soil areas were improved only slightly due to lack
of granaries and the inexperience of plowing virgin land, the majority
of Russia’s long-standing farmers were hurt in the process.
Some steps were made in order to ease the political regime and to
maintain elementary law and order. Different extraordinary unlawful
organs, such as illegal courts, commissions and others, were liquidated.
Releasing of those who were illegally repressed in the Stalin period
began, though this process was going very slowly. Only about 5000
people were rehabilitated and released up to 1956. But these measures
inspired the Gulag prisoners to struggle for their rights. There were
a number of great revolts of prisoners in the special camps. The strongest
among them was the Kengir revolt in Kazakhstan. These events possibly
influenced further policy in the ruling circles.
18.2 The Twentieth Congress and the process of ‘de-Stalinization’

Acceleration of political changes began after the Twentieth Party
Congress, which was held in February, 1956. There Khrushchev made
a report about the “cult of personality of Stalin”.
th
“On the 25 of February, the day the congress was slated to end,
Soviet delegates attended an unscheduled secret session at which their
leader Khrushchev talked for nearly four hours with one intermission.
His speech was a devastating attack on Josef Stalin. Stalin was guilty
of ‘a grave abuse of power’. During his reign ‘mass arrests and deporta-
tions of thousands of people, and execution without trail or normal
investigation, created insecurity, fear, and even desperation’. Stalinist
charges of counter-revolutionary crimes had been ‘absurd, wild and con-
trary to common sense’. Innocent people had confessed to such crimes
‘because of physical methods of pressure, torture, reducing them to
unconsciousness, depriving them of judgment, taking away their human
dignity’. Stalin himself had been personally responsible for all this:
he ‘personally called the interrogator, gave him instructions, and told
The USSR in the period of ‘Thaw’ (1953-1964) ＆＆７９？
him which methods to use, methods that were simple – to beat, beat
and once again beat’. ‘Honest and innocent Communists’ had been tor-
tured and killed. Khrushchev assailed Stalin for incompetent wartime
leadership, for ‘monstrous’ deportations of whole Caucasian peoples,
for a ‘mania of greatness’ and ‘nauseating false’ adulation and self-
adulation. …Khrushchev’s speech was supposed to be kept secret.
However, the ruling Presidium approved distributing it to local party
committees; local authorities read the text to millions of party members
and others around the country; and Polish Communist leaders allowed
thousands of copies to circulate, one of which reached the US Central
Intelligence Agency. The US State Department eventually released the
th
text to the New York Times, which published it on the 4 of June,
1956.
…Not long after his ‘secret’ speech’, Khrushchev sensed the blow
had been too powerful, and increasingly he sought to limit the bounda-
ries of critical analysis, lest it end up polarizing society. His retreat
th
climaxed in a Central Committee resolution of the 30 of June which
blamed Stalin at most for ‘serious errors’. However, the retreat came
too late to prevent turmoil in Poland and a revolution in Hungary, which
Soviet troops, crushed at a cost of some 20,000 Hungarian and 1,500
Soviet casualties” (Taubman, pp. 268-270).
The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU ‘About the
cult of personality and its consequence’ was published in Pravda on
th
the 30 of June, 1956. The resolution differed greatly from the speech
made by Khrushchev at the congress. It was much more restrained in
criticism. All prerequisites of the personality cult and abysmal actions
of Stalin were reduced to the personal traits of his character. It was
underlined in the resolution, that the “cult of personality had not changed
the nature of the social system of the Soviet Union”.
Meanwhile, as Stalin was debunked, the life in the country changed
greatly. The process of rehabilitation of those who were repressed
accelerated. In the shortest possible time hundreds of thousands of
prisoners of the Gulag were released.
After the Twentieth Congress the social activity of people, especially
of students and intelligentsia, increased. Circles and groups of the
student youths began to appear in Moscow and Leningrad. But some
of these open-minded young people were arrested and condemned by
association in the ‘Affair of the history faculty of Moscow State
University’.
７：６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
At the end of 1956 the Soviet troops were directed to suppress the
greatest democratic movement in the countries of the Communist Block
notably in Hungary. These events had great influence on the political
situation in the USSR. They led to the strengthening of a conservative
mood in the governing circles of the CPSU.
At the same time the struggle for power among different groups at
the top of the Soviet leadership deepened. In June of 1957 Khrushchev
beat the so called ‘Anti-party group’, consisting of Molotov, Malenkov,
Kaganovich and Voroshilov. Usually this episode is interpreted as a
defeat of ‘Stalinists’. But there is another aspect of this event: the only
legal critics of Khrushchev’s policy were thereby eliminated. So
Khrushchev gained great power. Starting in 1958 he became the Chief
(Chairman) of the Council of Ministers, so the negative features of
his policy and character, which were inconsequent actions, and suscepti-
bility to ill-considered decisions, increased greatly.
18.3 Contradictions of economic policy

The results of Khrushchev’s economic policy were equivocal and
ambiguous. The greatest reorganization in the industrial sphere took
place in 1957, when the branch system of management (through minis-
ters) was replaced by the territorial system (through the so called sovnar-
khozy or the regional economic councils). If there was any positive
result, it was of short duration. In 1958 the Soviet GNP grew at a
rate of 7.1 per cent, after that it dipped down to 5.4 per cent by 1964.
“Sovnarkhoz, Soviet Narodnogo Hozyaistva, ‘Council of National
Economy’, usually translated as Regional Economic Council, was an
organization of the Soviet Union to manage separate economic regions.
They were subordinated to the Supreme Soviet of the National
Economy. Sovnarkhozes were introduced by Nikita Khrushchev in July,
1957 in an attempt to combat the centralization and departmentalism
of ministers. The USSR was divided into 105 economic regions, with
sovnarkhosez being operational and planning the management of local
economies. Simultaneously, a large number of ministers and their offices
were shut down.
In practice, the ministerial bureaucracy was replaced by a territoriality
(‘mestnichestvo’ in Russian economic slang), discordant organization
and duplication of efforts occurred despite the failure to fulfill obligations
to other sovnarkhozes, a criminal offense. Despite several attempts to
The USSR in the period of ‘Thaw’ (1953-1964) ＆＆７：７
patch the new organizational structure together, it failed in its purpose

to increase the productivity of the planned economy in the Soviet Union”
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovnarkhoz).
“Although the Moscow-based ministries, which Khrushchev abolished
in February, 1957 had favored the narrow needs of their own industries
at the expense of the areas, in which their plants were located, the
sovnarkhozy which replaced them fostered localism while losing sight
of all-Union interests,” a well-known American political scientist W.
Taubman writes. “That soon led to a process of recentralization in which
the number of regional economic councils was reduced, a new agency
called Supreme Economic Council was created to co-ordinate them and
a series of state committees was formed to duplicate the role of the
departed ministries. Nor did Khrushchev’s division of the party produce
positive industrial results” (Taubman, p. 280).
The main problem discussed at the top of the Soviet leadership was
the slow rate of scientific and technical development. Prominent success
was marked only in the military- engineering sphere, which was provided
with enormous economic, financial, intellectual and human resources.
The Soviet space program (opening up outer space) was the brightest
result of this direction of development. In 1957 the first-in-the world
intercontinental rocket was launched and then the satellite, ‘Sputnik’,
th
was placed in orbit. On the 12 of April, 1961 the first manned flight
by Yuri Alekseevich Gagarin into space took place. Gagarin was the
first human to orbit the Earth.
As for the other spheres of the economy, the introduction of scientific
achievements went very slowly. The process of innovation was hampered
by red tape (bureaucracy), conservatism and lack of incentives. In order
to solve this problem some measures were implemented. In 1955 the
problem of accelerating the scientific and technical progress was discussed
at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1957 the
Siberian Department of the Soviet Academy of Science was organized.
In the early 1960s the Branch Government Committees, which were
obliged to introduce the scientific developments into industrial pro-
duction, were organized. But changes in the sphere of energizing in-
dustrial management were not fundamental because of systematic
obstacles. The main among them was the Soviet planning system.
The situation in agriculture was much more complex. In the second
half of the 1950s a number of measures were undertaken in order to
provide a sharp rise in agricultural production. In 1958 the MTS were
７：８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
abolished and all machines, tractors and harvester combines were sold
to collective and state farms. Great hopes were connected with such
panaceas as universal cultivation of corn and the use of an intensive
arable farming system for cultivating crops requiring tilling between
rows. The resulting cornfields on flat and hilly country in cold and
warm regions earned Khrushchev the nickname of kukuruznick (‘the
corn enthusiast’). At the same time financial investments in agriculture
were reduced and the development of the private peasant’s plots was
restricted. As a result the situation in agriculture worsened.
During the period of the Seven-Year plan (1959-1965) the production
of agriculture in the USSR increased only 14 per cent instead of the
70 per cent goal of the plan. Due to provision shortages the USSR
had to buy food-stuffs from the United States. The social policy of
Khrushchev was also full of contradictions. Wages and pensions were
increased, working time per week was decreased, mass housing building
began. At the time, as a result of difficulties in agriculture, supplying
food to the population became worse. In 1962 prices for meat increased,
that led to discontent among the population. Mass dissatisfaction of
Khrushchev’s social policy revealed itself in the people’s civil dis-
obedience in the city of Novocherkassk, which was suppressed by
tanks.
18.4 Contrasts of the ‘Thaw’ and its finale

In the first half of 1960s the policy of Khrushchev became more
and more contradictory. In 1961 the XXII Congress of the CPSU was
held. It adopted the new Party program. It resumed the policy of criticism
of Stalin, it bravely proclaimed the dying away of the ‘dictatorship
of the proletariat’ and the construction of an ‘all-people’s state’. But
at the same time the absurd idea of building Communism in 20 years
was put forward.
The contradictions of social life in the period of ‘Thaw’ were revealed
brightly in Khrushchev’s policy toward the art intelligentsia. On the
one hand, the opportunities for creative work, free from ideological
restrictions became wider. It was displayed in the publication of
Solzhenitsyn’s novel ‘One Day in the life of Ivan Denisovych’, telling
about the life of a prisoner in a labor camp (1962). On the other hand,
persecution of dissidents continued.
One of the most well-known facts was the tormenting of Boris
Pasternak. In the course of meetings with art intelligentsia and in-
The USSR in the period of ‘Thaw’ (1953-1964) ＆＆７：９
tellectuals Khrushchev discredited himself by bullying writers and artists

and by his incredibly boorish behavior. In 1964 the young poet Joseph
Brodsky, future Nobel prize-winner, was condemned as a parasite and
sponger.
Not only intelligentsia, but all the Orthodox priesthood became the
object of hard persecutions. “Although religion had always been anathe-
ma to the Bolsheviks, Stalin had eased religious persecution, if only
to unite the populace for the war effort, and to impress his wartime
Western allies. It was Khrushchev who mounted an all-out assault that
reached its peak in 1961: anti-religious agitation was intensified, taxes
on religious activity increased, churches and monasteries closed, with
the result that the number of Orthodox parishes dropped from more
than 15,000 in 1951 to less than 8,000 in 1963. Khrushchev’s anti-reli-
gion campaign was a form of de-Stalinization, in that it reversed Stalin’s
compromise with religion and returned to Lenin’s more militant approach”
(Taubman, p. 282).
It was not surprising, that Khrushchev was losing the support of the
people more and more. Intelligentsia and the Soviet ruling class also
had had enough of his flip-flopping policy. In order to strengthen his
position Khrushchev developed several reorganizations. In 1962 he div-
ided party organizations into industrial and agricultural. In 1964 he ini-
tiated elaboration of the new Constitution in order to limit the terms
of office of the top of the Soviet leadership. But the plot against
Khrushchev had ripened already. So in October, 1964 Khrushchev was
dismissed from all his positions.
Topic 19
Ｏｔｚｋｘｔｇｚｏｕｔｇｒ＆ｖｕｒｏｉ｡＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ＆

ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆｡ｋｇｘｙ＆ｕｌ＆Ｚｎｇ｝
19.1 Softening of international tension
19.2 Relations with the Communist and Developing Countries
19.3 Contradictions of Khrushchev’s foreign policy
19.1 Softening of international tension

After the death of Stalin the Soviet leadership undertook several steps
to improve its international affairs. In June, 1953 a cease-fire in Korea
was achieved. North Korea has broken the cease-fire 49 times since
its inception in 1953, including the sinking of the Choenon Naval
Corvette on March 26, 2010 and a bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island
on November 23, 2010.
In July, 1954 the USSR took part in the Geneva Conference, devoted
to cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. This conflict was connected
with a military attempt of France to suppress the anti-colonial struggle
of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
In July, 1955 a four-power summit held in Geneva was the first
since the Potsdam Conference. The main issues discussed by Nikita
Khrushchev (the USSR), Dwight D. Eisenhower (President of the USA),
Anthony Eden Prime Minister of the UK) and Edgar Faure (Prime
Minister of France) were the German question, European security and
disarmament.
One of the sharpest problems of international relations was the
German question. The main obstacle for normalization of the Soviet
– West German relations was the question of the fate of the German
prisoners of war convicted of crimes of war in the USSR. The question
was solved during the visit of the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer
to the USSR in 1955. As a result diplomatic relations were established
among the two countries. An important achievement of the Soviet foreign
policy was the settlement of the question of the status of Austria, which
− ７：：＆ −
International policy of the USSR in the years of ‘Thaw’ ７：；
was occupied at that time by the forces of the four countries–victors

in the war (the USSR, the USA, the UK and France). In May, 1955
the USSR jointly with the other Great powers signed the Austrian State
Treaty, which restored an independent and democratic Austria in return
for an Austrian declaration of neutrality.
19.2 Relations with the Communist and Developing Countries

In the post-Stalin period certain changes began to appear in relations
of the Soviet Union with the countries of the Communist block.
Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1955 promoted the process of
normalization of relations among the two countries. In the same year,
on May 14, 1955, the USSR established the Warsaw Treaty (1955-1991).
The Warsaw Treaty was the informal name for the Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, commonly known as the Warsaw
Pact, creating the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The treaty was a mutual
defense treaty subscribed to by eight communist states (Albania,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, and The Soviet Union) in Eastern Europe. The
Warsaw Treaty was established by the USSR in response to the in-
tegration of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO in October,
1954 – only nine years after the defeat of Nazi Germany (1933-1945)
in World War II.
The Warsaw Treaty’s organization was twofold: the Political Con-
sultative Committee handled political matters, and the Combined
Command of Pact Armed Forces controlled the assigned multi-national
forces, with headquarters in Warsaw, Poland. The Supreme Commander
of the Warsaw Treaty was a First Deputy Minister of Defense of the
USSR, and the head of the Warsaw Treaty Combined Staff also was
a First Deputy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
So the USSR dominated the Warsaw Treaty armed forces. In the
Communist Block, the treaty was known as the military analogue of
the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CoMEcon), the Communist
East European economic community.
At the same time the policy of dictate over the countries of Eastern
Europe on behalf of the Soviet Union continued. It was revealed in
the intervention in Hungary in 1956, where a Hungarian revolution was
crushed by the Soviet troops at a cost of some 20,000 Hungarian and
1,500 Soviet casualties.
７：＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
An attempt by Khrushchev’s leadership to ignore the political opinion

of China led to the worsening of the Soviet-Chinese relations at the
end of the 1950s and to sharp confrontations among the two countries
in the 1960s.
From the middle of the 1950s one of the most important items of
the Soviet foreign policy became the relationships with the developing
countries or with the countries of the Third World that had become
free of colonialism. These countries were regarded as important allies
in the struggle against ‘imperialism’. In order to win them over to the
side of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership gave these countries
great financial and technological support, when the Russians themselves
were suffering shortages. The most shining example of the policy was
the building of Asuan hydroelectric station in Egypt on the Nile River.
The President of Egypt, Hamal Abdel Naser was awarded to the title
of Hero of the Soviet Union.
19.3 The Contradictions of Khrushchev’s foreign policy

The end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1960s was marked
by new international initiatives of the Soviet Union aimed at improving
relations with the Western countries. The greatest event in this sphere
was the visit of Khrushchev to the United States in 1959; it was the
first visit of a Soviet leader to America ever. The results of the visit
were mostly in a psychological sphere, it helped to make a great step
away from mutual incomprehension and bias. During the visit Khrushchev
made a speech in the United Nations. He called for a ‘general and
complete disarmament’.
The second visit of a Soviet leader to the United States was in 1960.
Khrushchev had no invitation, but had appointed himself as head of
the USSR’s UN delegation. “The notorious shoe-banging incident oc-
curred during a debate on October, 12 over a Soviet resolution decrying
colonialism. Infuriated by a statement of the Filipino delegate Lorenzo
Samulong who charged the Soviets with employing a double standard
by decrying colonialism while dominating Eastern Europe, Khrushchev
demanded the right to reply immediately, and accused Sumulong of
being ‘a fawning lackey of the American imperialism’. Sumulong re-
sumed his speech, and accused the Soviets of hypocrisy. Khrushchev
yanked off his shoe and began banging it on his desk, joined (less
loudly) by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. This behavior by
Khrushchev scandalized his delegation” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wi-
International policy of the USSR in the years of ‘Thaw’ ７：＝
ki/Nikita_Khrushchev).
In 1961, in Vienna, the bilateral summit of Khrushchev and the next
American president John F. Kennedy was held. During negotiations
the parity of the two powers in armed forces was recognized and because
of that the necessity of peaceful coexistence was recognized. Kennedy
described negotiations with Khrushchev to his brother Robert as “like
dealing with Dad. All give and no take”. As for Khrushchev, he told
his adviser Troyanovsky about Kennedy: “What can I tell you? This
man is very inexperienced, even immature. Compared to him, Eisenhower
was a man of intelligence and vision” (See: Taubman, p. 287).
At the same time the foreign policy of the USSR was determined
in many aspects by the traditions of the past, by the course of con-
frontation with the so called “imperialism” and struggle for the victory
of communism in the world. This ideological position arose in the
Caribbean crises, also known as the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), when
making use of the victorious Cuban Revolution under the leadership
of Fidel Castro, the Soviet Union secretly installed medium range missiles
in Cuba. Installation of missiles 90 miles from the territory of the USA
represented a threat to the national interests of that country and was
fraught with dangerous military risks. So Kennedy demanded the mis-
nd
siles be removed. On October, 22 Kennedy addressed his nation by
television, revealing the missiles’ presence and announcing a blockade
of Cuba. Informed in advance of the speech but not (until one hour
before) of the content, Khrushchev and his advisors feared an invasion
of Cuba. Even before Kennedy’s speech, they ordered Soviet command-
ers in Cuba that they could use all weapons against an attack – except
atomic weapons (See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikita_Khrushchev).
As the crisis unfolded, tensions were high in the US, less so in the
Soviet Union. By October, 25, with the Soviets unclear about Kennedy’s
full intention, Khrushchev decided that the missiles would have to be
withdrawn from Cuba. Two days later, he offered Kennedy terms for
withdrawal. Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in exchange
for a US promise not to invade Cuba and that the US would withdraw
missiles from Turkey, near the Soviet Heartland. The resolution was
seen as a great defeat for the Soviets, and contributed to Khrushchev’s
fall less than two years later. So it was a hard situation when the world
was on the verge of nuclear war.
The culmination of the policy of “Thaw” in the foreign affairs was
the signing of the test ban treaty. The Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon
７：＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water, often

abbreviated as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Limited Test Ban
Treaty (LTBT), or Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) is a treaty prohibiting
all test detonations of nuclear weapons except underground. It was
developed to slow the arms race and to stop the excessive release of
nuclear fallout into the planet’s atmosphere. It was signed by the govern-
ment of the Soviet Union (represented by Andrei Gromyko), the United
Kingdom (represented by Sir Alec Douglas-Home) and the United
States (represented by Dean Rusk) in Moscow on August 5, 1963, and
opened for signature by other countries. Thus the foreign policy of
the USSR during the “Thaw” period was characterized by different
contradictions. It revealed in a bizarre interweaving combination of new
approaches, brave initiatives and traditional ideological guidelines, and
sometimes elements of adventurism.
The period of ‘Thaw’ is interpreted ambiguously up to now not only
in historical science, but also in social opinion. Some people consider
Khrushchev to be an outstanding reformer; others estimate him as an
irresponsible figure, who could have destroyed the country.
Undoubtedly, the reforms, undertaken after the death of Stalin, were
significant and progressive. But they were limited in their goals and,
as a result, inconsistent. They tried to abolish the most negative aspects
of the existing system, doing everything in order to keep safe its essential
basis. We mean the absolute power of the Communist Party, or to be
more exact, the absolute power of nomenclature that was party’s elite.
Apart from this, the so called ‘Thaw’ furthered a number of lengthy
processes, that ultimately led to the downfall of the socialist system,
and then – of the country. On the one hand, the powerful nomenclature,
which was safe from the purges of Stalin’s period, began to turn into
an isolated, sheltered, speculative ‘caste’, which merged with their offi-
cial posts. So they decided to turn their political power into ownership.
Thus the precondition of the so called ‘capitalist restoration’ ripened.
On the other hand, the debunking of Stalin resulted in the decline
of ideology, erosion of communist ideals and growth of an ideological
and psychological ‘vacuum’ in mass consciousness. It is no wonder
the question of changes in the social system that was raised in 1991,
did not meet objections among the propertied, high society, nor the
populace. Since this was so, we can judge the whole historical period
from Khrushchev until our days as the ‘way from the Red banner to
the two-headed eagle’.
Topic 20
Ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｓｏｊｊｒｋ＆７？＜６ｙ＆ – ｌｏｘｙｚ＆ｎｇｒｌ＆

ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆７？＞６ｙ
20.1 The main characteristic peculiarities and the phases of the period
20.2 Socio-economic development
20.3 Political and spiritual life of the Soviet society
20.1 The main characteristic peculiarities and the phases of the

period
The twenty years of the Soviet history from Khrushchev to Gorbachev
is usually figuratively named as an ‘era of stagnation’. Yet we should
remember about the continuing and sometimes very successful develop-
ment of the country during this period, as the Western modernization
approach defined the post-1964 period “as marking the triumph of
rationality and development over the ‘Utopia’ of Lenin, Stalin and
Khrushchev” (Stephen E. Hanson, p. 293).
We can determine three main phases in the Brezhnev era:
• The second half of 1960s, noted by reform attempts;

• The first half of 1970s, when the reforms were stopped, but the stable
state of the Soviet economy remained;
• The second half of the 1970s, when the tendencies of stagnation became
evident; to some extent they were connected with the aging of Brezhnev
and his losing the ability to work.
The first phase of Brezhnev’s twenty-year period was the most special.
The initial years after the dismissal of Khrushchev were determined
by ambiguous tendencies. On one hand, it was the policy of political
and psychological pressure, revealed in eulogizing Stalin and persecut-
ing of dissidents. For example, authors Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuly
Daniel, whose samizdat writings (writings that were ‘published’ with
the help of a typewriter) had been smuggled out of the USSR and
published in the West, were arrested, and in February, 1966 both were
sentenced to years of forced labor. On the other hand, the unsatisfactory
− ７：？＆ −
７；６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
state of the economy demanded implementation of reforms and reorga-

nizations. So the first years of Brezhnev’s ruling were marked with
a paradoxical combination of the ‘conservative-protective’ and ‘liberal-
reformative’ measures. The decisive turning point in Brezhnev’s policy
took place after the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, when his con-
servative tendencies manifested.
th
Later, in the 24 Congress of the CPSU (1971), a new stage in the
development of the Soviet history was declared. The USSR was de-
scribed as being at the stage of ‘developed socialism’. The concept
of ‘developed socialism’ became the official ideology of the ‘era of
stagnation’, because it meant that all the problems were solved.
20.2 Socio-economic development

In September, 1965 a decision to reform the economics of industry
was reached. “In particular, Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin began to
articulate a strategy for economic change with striking similarities to
that promoted by Prime Minister Georgii Malenkov in the early post-
Stalin period. Like Malenkov, Kosygin declared that so called ‘Group
B’ industries – those producing consumer goods – should receive
greater priority relative to ‘Group A’ heavy industries. Under Kosygin’s
sponsorship, Soviet economists began to argue for a more decentralized
style of management, in which enterprise directors would orient them-
selves toward attaining profits rather than simply trying to meet and
exceed gross output targets set by ‘Gosplan’ ” (Stephen E. Hanson, p.
299). The reform was aimed on the widening of enterprises’ in-
dependence, and on transition from the gross production index to the
index of sold production as the main indicator of effectiveness and
successfulness of enterprise. So the question was about the permitting
of elements of a market economy to be produced. The first results were
outstanding: economic development accelerated, the Eighth Five-Year
Plan period (1966-1970) became the most successful in the history of
the Soviet Union.
The 1960s-1970s became a time of large-scale projects and deeds.
One of the most grandiose events of that time became the opening
up and working of oil and gas deposits in Western Siberia. Other ambi-
tious deeds were the building of the giant truck plant in Naberezhnye
Chelny (‘KAMaz’), car plant in Tolyatti (‘Zhiguli’) and the great Baikal
and Amur main train line (‘BAM’).
The USSR in the middle 1960s – first half of the 1980s ７；７
But as conservative tendencies in the political rulers increased, eco-

nomic reforms in industry were reduced. Super-centralization of the
economy, petty regulation, and administrative dictate became the main
principle of industrial and economic management again. As a result
economic rates slacked, and stagnation increased. So the Tenth Five-
Year plan (1976-1980) in the industrial sphere was fulfilled only to
50 per cent of its goal, though the attaining of a better economy always
was a priority. The USSR began to lag behind the developed countries
in science and technical development, especially in electronics. The
development of the military industry began to degrade, though it received
the lion’s share of state investment. For example, there were over 800,000
computers in the United States in the middle of 1980s, and only over
50 thousand in the Soviet Union.
Stagnation tendencies in agriculture proved to be the especially acute
and crucial. The beginning of Brezhnev’s rule was marked by the
March, 1965 Plenum, devoted to the development of agriculture. Thus
economic reform in agriculture was declared. The broadening of the
independence of collective and state farms and the principle of a firm
purchase plan of agricultural production were declared. It meant that
over and above the plan purchases that were to be implemented in
accordance with collective and state farm agreements, more purchases
were supposed to be made for higher prices. Moreover, state investments
in the agrarian sphere increased greatly at that time. The investments
in agriculture under Brezhnev were greater than the net aggregate of
the previous Soviet history.
What was the efficiency of all these measures? Calculation depends
on how one interprets a row of negative factors.
Declarations proclaiming the independence of agrarian enterprises
were not realized in reality, but stayed in official papers only. Giant
financial resources were invested in an irrational manner. For example,
the building of huge cattle-breeding complexes at small collective farms,
and reclamation and land improvement without taking into account differ-
ences of lands and landscape. As a result the rates of development
of agriculture slacked until the beginning of the 1980s when the food
supply of the Soviet people became awfully scarce: food queues appeared
everywhere, and ration cards were introduced. At the same time food
purchases from the West, acquired by the money received from the
export of oil, increased greatly. The situation looked like a collapse
of Soviet agriculture.
７；８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
Contradictory changes were also seen in the social sphere of life.

Because of an increase of the state workers and office workers salaries,
introduced from the middle of the 1960s, and a guaranteed monetary
payment and state pension for the members of the collective farms,
the incomes of Soviet citizens increased substantially. A lot of people
obtained flats, bought refrigerators, TV-sets, washing machines, and
some other consumer goods providing an increase in the average stand-
ard of living. Meanwhile the incomes of the population grew more
rapidly than the consumer goods production. The growth of the national
deficit was a reflection of an inflationary process, though the official
prices were stable. The main problem of a great number of people
became the problem of how to find this or that inflationary product.
A significant black market for goods arose at this time.
Reduction of the average lifespan of a Soviet citizen became the
generalized index of degradation of the economic and social system.
th
In the middle of 1980s the country was thrown down to 50 place
in the world on the index of life duration, sitting below many developing
countries of the Third World. One main factor which led to this situation
was the unprecedented abuse of alcohol by the population.
20.3 Political and spiritual life of the Soviet society

Political development of the Soviet society in Brezhnev’s era was
characterized by the growing gap between official ideology and the
real processes. Many words were said about the development of the
so called ‘socialist democracy’, about the strengthening of law and
order, and widening of social activity of the people. In 1977 a noisy
widespread propaganda campaign, connected with adoption of the new
Constitution of the USSR, was developed. The new Basic state law
in comparison with the Constitution of the 1936 formally looked like
a great step by the way of democratization of the Soviet society, by
widening civil rights.
In reality the political life was characterized by the increase of con-
servative tendencies, strengthening of bureaucratic absolute power, ad-
ministrative dictate, and the persecuting of dissidents. The stable state
of the ruling class, which appeared as a result of stopping mass re-
pressions, rotations and shifts, resulted in lifelong irrevocable tenure
of the ruling officials. The situation triggered the process of the aging
of the Soviet ruling class, when the so called ‘Kremlin elders’, unable
to work effectively, occupied high posts in the government and in the
The USSR in the middle 1960s – first half of the 1980s ７；９
Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The full political

degradation was revealed in the eulogy of Brezhnev, who became a
ludicrous figure in middle of the 1970s. As a leader, he lost his ability
to work, the country became almost ungovernable.
There was no real opposition to the regime in the USSR in the 1970s,
but even the rare dissidents were suppressed. As it was mentioned,
the authors Daniel and Sinyavsky were sentenced for publication of
their works abroad. In 1974 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was deprived of
his Soviet citizenship and forcibly thrown out of the USSR. The
well-known Soviet film director A. Tarkovsky, theater producer Yuri
Lyubimov, writer V. Nekrasov, poet J. Brodsky, and cellist M.
Rastropovich had to go abroad. In 1980 academician A. Sakharov a
well known designer of a thermonuclear weapon was exiled in the city
of Gorky for his protest against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.
The peculiar place in the social life of the Soviet Union could be
explained in the singular experience of Alexander Zinoviev with com-
plete justice. The great Soviet philosopher, novelist, logician and poet,
Zinoviev fairly criticized the dark sides of the Soviet reality, but was
accused of anti-Communism, and in 1978 was deprived of all his awards
and citizenship and sent into exile to Germany with his wife and
daughter. But what was Zinoviev’s satire about? As a well-known British
scholar of political economy Philip Hanson, Birmingham University,
thinks, his satire could hardly be labeled even anti-Soviet. “Zinoviev’s
earlier writings, were, indeed, full of contempt for the ways in which
people operated in the Soviet Union. They were not, however, full
of praise for any other social arrangements. True, Zinoviev quite often
compared the communist society with ‘civilization’. But this was a rather
abstract and possibly hypothetical ‘civilization’. It was not necessarily
located in New York or even Paris” (Philip Hanson //Zinoviev. info).
As for the few participants in democratic movements in the USSR,
dissidents, they were engaged in human rights activities. “Dissident
groups organized after the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Accordance,
the so called ‘Helsinki watch groups’ to monitor Soviet compliance
with the Helsinki human rights accords, further exposed the repressive
nature of Brezhnev’s politics and the hypocrisy of Soviet foreign policy”
(Stephen E. Hanson, p. 307). So the main undertaking of the Soviet
dissidents was publication of the ‘Chronicle of the current events’, where
they reflected all the violations of human rights in the USSR they could
find. The most prominent figures among the Soviet human rights activists
７；：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
were Vladimir Bukovsky, Anatoly Marchenko, Larisa Bogoraz, and Yuly

Galanskov. All of them were repressed in different forms. Suppression
of dissidents promoted the negative tendencies of stagnation in the
country.
In sum, the long period after the death of Stalin gave the Soviet
ruling class an opportunity to implement reformative changes in the
life of the country. But this chance was not used. The conservative
tendencies ascended, and the socio-economic problems became sharper.
Reorganizations of all the spheres of life became more and more neces-
sary from year to year, but it was much more difficult to realize them
in the 1970s or 1980s, than in the middle of the 1960s.
Topic 21
Ｌｕｘｋｏｍｔ＆ｖｕｒｏｉ｡＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ＆ｊ｛ｘｏｔｍ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｖｋｘｏｕｊ＆ｕｌ

Ｊｋ｜ｋｒｕｖｋｊ＆Ｙｕｉｏｇｒｏｙｓ
21.1 Soviet foreign policy in the second half of the 1960s
21.2 Détente of international tension
21.3 Worsening of international affairs
Contradictory tendencies of the inner development of the USSR

during the period of ‘Developed Socialism’ were also characteristic
of the foreign policy of the country. There was a complex combination
of new realistic approaches with the old ones, concerning the so-called
struggle with ‘world imperialism’.
Three main phases in the development of the Soviet foreign policy
are distinguishable in that period.
• The second half of the 1960s – connected with the sharpening of the
international situation firstly because of the war in Vietnam;
• The first half of the 1970s – known as détente in international affairs;
• The second half of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s, characterized
by new strained relations with the West.
21.1 Soviet foreign policy in the second half of the 1960s

The main negative factor of the international situation during the
second half of the 1960s was the war in Vietnam. According to the
decisions of the Geneva Conference of 1954 that country was divided
into two parts. In the north the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
was established, it was allied with the Soviet Union, the south was
under the control of America. The DRV supported the communist partisan
movement in the south of the country. In order to suppress the partisan
movement in Vietnam the USA began to enlarge their army presence
in South Vietnam starting in 1964. That led to escalation of the war
and mass bombardments (carpet bombing) of North Vietnam. The Army
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam lost about 266,000 from 1959
− ７；；＆ −
７；＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
through 1975. Military support of the DRV from the side of the Soviet
Union helped the DRV to oppose the USA pressure. Other than Viet
Cong ground troops, Soviet missiles were the main means of fighting
against American bombing. As for the USSR itself, a mass solidarity
movement with Vietnam was spread there.
Meanwhile, contradictions in the communist block became much
deeper. It was connected with the main peculiarity of the Soviet foreign
policy, which revealed the aspirations of the communist regime to sup-
press democratic reorganizations in the countries of Eastern Europe.
This became apparent to the world in the events of 1968. Because
the Soviet Union was afraid that the “Prague Spring” - the name of
peaceful democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia - could be the impetus
for the same changes in the other countries of the “Socialist camp,”
the leadership of the Communist party of the Soviet Union made a
st
decision to force an intervention into this country. So, on the 21 of
August, 1968, six months after it began, the democratic revolution was
put down by the military forces of the five member-countries of the
Warsaw Pact, but it was obvious that the main role in the intervention
was played by the Soviet Forces.
One of the most severe problems of the Soviet foreign policy was
a separate conflict with China. Breaking of relations among the two
communist countries on all levels of interaction became complicated
by abrupt and even rude mutual attacks in the mass media. It came
to armed hostilities on the Soviet - Chinese state border. The most
great among them was the conflict on the isle of Damanskii in 1969.
The Soviet Union had to invest a huge sum of money (200 billion
rubles) to build military fortifications and built up a concentration of
troops and armaments on the Soviet-Chinese border.
21.2 Détente of international tension

The end of 1960s up to the first half of 1970s were marked by
immense positive shifts in Soviet foreign affairs: détente, or relaxation
of international tension rose, and relations with the West improved.
An important precondition of that positive international situation was
the achievement of military and strategic “parity” of the Soviet Union
with the United States. In 1971 president Richard Nixon recognized
this fact in his radio appeal to the American people. The beginning
of détente is also connected with normalization of relations with Western
‘Developed Socialism’: foreign policy ７；＝
Germany. An important treaty was signed by the Soviet Union and

FGR in 1970. Both of the countries refused the use of force in solving
mutual affairs and recognized the state border by the rivers Oder and
Neisse. That treaty finalized the international and legal results of the
Second World War.
A number of significant agreements devoted to restriction of the
arms race were reached. The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons was concluded among the Soviet Union, the USA and Britain
in 1968. In 1971 the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement
of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil thereof was concluded.
In 1972 the first visit of a President of the USA (Nixon) to the
USSR took place. In the course of his visit a Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty (SALT 1) was signed by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev.
They signed both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim
Agreement between the United States and the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Weapons. SALT 1 froze the number of strategic
ballistic missiles launchers at existing levels and improved relations
between the US and the USSR.
Moreover, the Soviet Union and the USSR signed a number of docu-
ments, devoted to peaceful uses of atomic energy, collaboration in agri-
culture, transportation, science, technology, culture, education, health
care, building and other areas. All these agreements resulted in a growing
number of exchanges, contacts and cooperation in the different aspects
of economy and culture, creating a better understanding between the
people of the United States and the Soviet Union.
The new state of relations between the two countries gave great hope
for elimination of all items of confrontation among the West and the
East. The joint space flight of the Apollo and Soyuz spaceships for
a rendezvous and docking mission, including mutual visits of American
and Soviet astronauts in each other’s spacecraft in July, 1975, was the
symbol of rapprochement of the USSR and the USA.
The highest point of détente was the signing in 1975 of the Helsinki
Accords legally ratifying the new borders of the Eastern European states
as a result of World War II. Moreover, the ‘human basket’ of the Helsinki
Accords, which obliged the Soviet Union to uphold United Nations
human rights standards in the socialist block, furthered the struggle
for human rights in the Soviet Union as well.
７；＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
21.3 Worsening of international affairs

At the end of the 1970s the détente gave way to a new period of
confrontation. This situation was determined by two main areas of
contention. The first area was the Soviet policy of ‘export the revolution’,
a propagation of pro-Soviet regimes in the counties of the Third World
in order to undermine ‘world imperialism’. The most noticeable example
of that course was the Soviet-Cuban military interference in Angola,
which provoked a negative reaction from the West. The second area
was connected with the policy of the USA and their allies, who escalated
the arms race in order to exhaust the Soviet Union and then to inflict
a decisive blow on the communist system. At the end of 1970s these
endeavors took the shape of a purposeful plan of the American
leadership. While US corporations profited from the escalation of war
machines, bombs and missiles, the USSR was bankrupted the same
way.
The international prestige of the USSR worsened greatly after the
military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan on the pretext
of supporting the ‘revolutionary’ regime there. The decision about the
intervention was taken in December, 1979. The special forces of the
KGB, that is the name of the State Security Committee, captured the
Palace of the President of Afghanistan Hafisulla Amin, who was quite
loyal to the USSR, but suspected to be an undercover agent of Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). He also was suspected to have secret ties
with China. Amin was killed and the president of Afghanistan became
the Soviet protégé Babrak Karmal.
During this undeclared war in Afghanistan more than 15,000 Soviet
soldiers were killed, and more than 35,000 were wounded, more than
300 soldiers were missing or were taken prisoners. Estimates of the
Afghan deaths vary from 670,000 to 2 million. Five - 10 million Afghans
fled to Pakistan or Iran, one third of the prewar population of the country,
and another two million were displaced within the country. In the 1980s,
half of all refugees in the world were Afghan. The war in Afghanistan
beyond anything else, revealed the degradation of the regime, and the
necessity of a decisive revision of priorities of the Soviet international
doctrine.
Sharpening of the confrontation led to disruption of all the previous
agreements. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, signed after many
years of negotiations ending in 1979 (SALT II), did not come into
force. The straining of relations between the Soviet Union and the
‘Developed Socialism’: foreign policy ７；？
West reached its highest point during the rule of Yuri Andropov.
The President of the USA, Ronald Reagan declared the beginning of
the arms race in outer space and the creation of cosmic weapons –
‘strategic defense initiative’, or ‘Star Wars’ in the vernacular. On the
first of September, 1983 a symbolic event took place. A South-Korean
commercial aircraft was shot down in the sky over Soviet territory.
This event caused an unprecedented media campaign against the Soviet
Union, which was declared by the United States President Reagan as
an ‘evil empire’.
In sum, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union of the ‘stagnation’
period was characterized by contradictory tendencies. The period of
détente was short-lived. In their own turn, the mistaken actions in the
sphere of international affairs promoted the deepening of the crisis in
the Soviet social system itself.
Topic 22
Ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆｡ｋｇｘｙ＆ｕｌ＆Ｖｋｘｋｙｚｘｕｏｑｇ＆

．ｘｋｉｕｔｙｚｘ｛ｉｚｏｕｔ／＆．７？＞；３７？？７／＆
22.1 Launching reforms
22.2 Political polarization
22.3 Contradictions of Perestroika
22.4 Aggravation of political crises
22.5 August 1991 events and the end of the USSR
After the death of Brezhnev in November, 1982, the General

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU became Yuri Andropov,
the former Chief of the KGB (the Central Intelligence Office of the
USSR). “Andropov had spent the previous fifteen years as the chairman
of the KGB and that organization had left its mark on him. Immediately
prior to running the security police, he had been an anti-Stalinist secretary
of the Central Committee. Appointed by Nikita Khrushchev, Andropov
gathered around him in the first half of the 1960s a team of highly
capable consultants, who were to acquire a justified reputation as
‘progressives’ in the Brezhnev years and some of whom (especially
Georgii Shakhnazarov) were to be among the most influential contributors
to the “New Political Thinking” of the Gorbachev era.
Andropov, once he had become General Secretary, continued the policy
of cracking down on any sign of overt dissidence which he had pursued
as KGB chief, but he also somewhat widened the bounds of permissible
discussion by speaking more about economic and social problems than
the complacent Brezhnev had done. At the same time he demanded
greater discipline in the workplace and made examples of some of the
more notoriously corrupt officials who had prospered under his
predecessor. …Andropov was an admirer of the abilities and energy
of Mikhail Gorbachev and he accorded him greater responsibility within
the Secretariat of the Central Committee” (Brown, pp. 316-317).
He made some steps in the direction of strengthening discipline and
order in the country, but he died soon, in February, 1984, after only
− ７＜６＆ −
‘Perestroika’ (reconstruction) ７＜７
fifteen months at the helm.

The 13 months of the leadership of Konstantin Chernenko (13
February 1984–11 March, 1985) appeared to be a return to ‘zastoi’
that is stagnation, that confirmed the necessity of reforms.
From the middle of the 1980s the period of deep reforms in the
Soviet Union began. At the beginning reorganizations attempted to reform
the existing Soviet system on the basis of the socialist ideals. But in
reality the reforms took the form of a transition of a super-state with
centrally commanded socialist system into a society oriented toward
a market economy and democracy. The main prerequisite of the reforms
was the recognition of all the emerging problems in the country by
the party leaders. As British political scientist and historian, Archie
Brown, Oxford University, has aptly put in: “there was no pressure
from below for change in 1985. The dissident movement had been
crushed…. Yet all the mechanisms of political control were firmly in
place. So the Soviet state could have survived into the twenty-first century
without any radical reform, or -‘revolution from above’, - to shake its
foundations….Although Gorbachev, with some justification, spoke of
the presence of “pre-crisis phenomena” in the Soviet Union he inherited,
it was not so much a case of crisis forcing radical reform as radical
reform generating a crisis” (Brown, pp. 319-320). A lot of political
scientists “explained the Gorbachev ‘revolution’ as largely emanating
from the very top of the Soviet political structure and emphasized the
agency of the General Secretary Gorbachev and some other actors over
structural factors” (Suny, p. 61).
22.1 Launching reforms

In March of 1985, after Chernenko’s death, Gorbachev was elected
to General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Soon,
at the April Plenum of the Central Committee, the course on ‘uskorenie’
(acceleration) was declared in order to get the country moving again.
At that time the question was about the prioritization of economic tasks.
There was a lot of talk about the necessity of stopping a decline in
the rate of economic growth and providing of technological and scientific
growth in the Soviet economy. But soon it was found out that all these
problems were to be solved on the basis of political changes, or as
it was announced, on the basis of democratization of society, as
“Gorbachev himself was, from the very outset interested in what he
called ‘democratization’ ”(Brown, p. 320).
７＜８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
The first step in that direction was the policy of ‘glasnost’, which
was proclaimed at the January, 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee
of the CPSU. What did the phenomena of ‘glasnost’ mean? ‘Glasnost’
was “one of the key concepts in the Gorbachev era, meaning openness
or transparency; ...sometimes this term was indistinguishable from free-
dom of speech”. “ ‘Glasnost’ brought to the surface injustices and dis-
content that had been dangerous to air earlier....”. “Weak, and then
very sharp criticism of the Soviet past and present began to appear
in the mass media. From early on in the Gorbachev era criticism of
Stalin and Stalinism – which had been banned in the Brezhnev years
– resumed. The critiques became much more fundamental than
Khrushchev’s attack which had condemned only some of Stalin’s purges
but did not question the system that allowed him to get away with
mass murder”. (Brown, p. 323, 344, 324).
But still from October, 1987 the symptoms of political delimitation
(‘razmezhevanie’) first among progressive and conservative wings in
the CPSU Central Committee and then in the Soviet society as a whole
appeared. So in November, 1987 Boris Yeltsin was removed from his
post as Moscow party chief after he had criticized the party leadership
and, in particular Yegor Ligachev, the second secretary of the party,
for indecisiveness, sluggish reformist activity, and lack of radicalism.
As a result Yeltsin began to be treated in the society as a victim
of perestroika. The event evoked a wide public resonance, and resulted
in mass demands of deepening the process of democratization.
In their own turn the conservative forces made an attempt toward
consolidation. “In early 1988 the apparatus backlash against radical reform
became more apparent. A letter under the name of Nina Andreeva,
th
a hitherto unknown Leningrad lecturer, appeared on the 13 of March,
1988. The letter ‘I cannot forsake my principles’ expressed the attitude
towards the reforms from a pro-Soviet standpoint. It received immediate
support from within the Central Committee apparatus, and in particular
from Ligachev....On Gorbachev’s insistence, the Politburo discussed the
Andreeva letter at a session that lasted for two days. It turned out that
at least half the membership was basically sympathetic to the anti-
th
reformist line it had expressed. It was not until the 5 of April that
an article appeared in Pravda, the official CPSU newspaper, where
‘Andreeva’ was rebutted point by point. The article was given additional
party authority by being unsigned, though it was drafted by Gorbachev
and Yakovlev, his adviser. The publication of the article represented
a clear victory for the reformist wing of the leadership”(Brown, p. 326).
‘Perestroika’ (reconstruction) ７＜９
22.2 Political polarization

th
In June, 1988 the 19 Communist Party Conference was held. The
conference itself produced more open debate than had occurred in the
party since the 1920s. Politburo members Mikhail Solomentsev, Andrei
Gromyko and Yegor Ligachev were criticized for their conservatism.
Gorbachev was criticized for deviation from Communist orthodoxy. The
conference approved the idea of the reform of the political system of
the USSR. “The most important decision was the move to contested
elections for a new legislature, the Congress of People’s Deputies which
would, in turn, elect an inner body, the Supreme Soviet. The latter
was to be in session for some eight months of the year – unlike the
existing rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet which met for only a few days
each year”.
“The first contested national elections galvanized the Soviet Society...
and entirely brought new actors on to the political stage... A third
of the seats were reserved for the candidates from ‘public organizations’
(which ranged from the Communist Party itself to the Academy of Science
[Andrei Sakharov], the Writers’ Union [Sergey Mikhalkov], and
Film-Makers’ Union [Mikhail Ulyanov]).... These first contested national
elections marked a breakthrough to real political pluralism in the Soviet
Union and they kindled great enthusiasm” (Brown, pp. 327-328).
In May, 1989 the First Congress of the People’s Deputies was opened.
It showed the significant polarization of political forces, which appeared
in the course of the elections. The partisans of the political transformation
of the country formed the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies. This group
numbered academician Andrei Sakharov, Boris Yeltsin, historian Yuri
Afanasyev among its leaders. The political activities began to develop
– for the first time in Soviet history – outside the framework of the
Communist party. Different non-formal organizations began to appear.
One of first organizations of this kind was the public society “Memorial”.
The process of establishment of the multi-party system was pushed
forward. The Democratic Union in Russia and the People’s fronts in
national republics became prototypes of the first non-Communist parties.
The main tendency of political life in that period was the weakening
of the role and authority of the CPSU. The Third Congress of People’s
Deputies simultaneously with the introduction of the Presidency in the
th
Soviet Union removed the 6 clause devoted to the leading role of
the party from the Soviet Constitution. Thus the Communist Party’s
monopoly of power was removed de jure from the Constitution at a
７＜：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
session of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR in March,

1990; de facto, perhaps, this process began earlier. During 1990 the
party was left by more than four million people, and many of its grass-
roots organizations ceased to exist.
22.3 Contradictions of perestroika
• Positive sides and successes of perestroika
The most important changes at that time were done in political and
ideological spheres. Access to information increased greatly. New con-
cepts were introduced into the Soviet political discourse. A number
of political freedoms were introduced as well.
“A case in point was the idea of freedom. Instead of freedom meaning
the recognition of (Marxist-Leninist) necessity, it acquired in the Soviet
political lexicon its everyday meaning as freedom from constraints, the
same as ‘ordinary freedom, as established and practiced in the liberal
democratic countries of the world’. The term ‘pluralism’ had hitherto
been used in the Soviet publications and speeches in the context of
attacks on East European ‘revisionism’ and on ‘bourgeois democracy’.
It was Gorbachev who broke that taboo by speaking positively about
the ‘socialist pluralism’ and ‘pluralism of opinion’ in 1987. This gave
a green light to social scientists and journalists to advocate pluralism”
(Brown, p. 322).
A number of important western political concepts were officially ac-
knowledged at that time. The liberal concepts of ‘checks and balances’,
‘separation of power’, ‘a state based upon the rule of law and a market
economy’ were advocated at that time. Some of the new freedoms,
which were soon to be taken for granted, represented a huge step forward
for Soviet citizens. They were the following: freedom of meeting, freedom
of travelling, freedom of speech, freedom for information, freedom of
worship. “Among the most important was the ending of the persecution
of religion. Many places of worship were opened and reopened. The
year of the turning point for this was 1988. In June the celebration
of the millennium of Russian and Ukrainian Christianity took place
with state support. New legislation gave the Church the right to publish
literature and to engage in religious education. Other traditional religious
practices also benefited from the change of policy” (Brown, p. 324).
The publication of hitherto inaccessible works of the so called pro-
hibited authors was of great importance. The earlier forbidden literature
‘Perestroika’ (reconstruction) ７＜；
returned in Russia. “The solid monthly literary journals were able to

fill their pages with high-quality creative writings that had previously
failed to pass censors. Many of the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
appeared in official Soviet publications for the first time. The ‘Gulag
Archipelago’, the devastating indictment of the Soviet system, was serial-
ized in a large and very popular literary monthly ‘Novyi mir’ (‘New
World ’) in 1989. Other works, deemed in the past to be especially
dangerous were published in large editions. The most famous among
them were the following: George Orwell’s ‘Animal Farm’, and ‘Nineteen
Eighty-Four’, Arthur Koestler’s ‘Darkness at Noon’, Vasilii Grossman’s
‘Life and Fate’, ‘Doctor Zhivago’ (Boris Pasternak’s Nobel Prize-winning
novel) and Anna Akhmatova’s poem ‘Requiem’, about the victims of
Stalin, were published in large editions”.
“Films which had failed to pass censors in the unreformed Soviet
system were now screened. The great impact in the development of
the “New political thinking made in the anti-Stalinist Georgian film
produced by Tengiz Abuladze ‘Pokayanie’ (‘Repentance’), which had
its general release in November, 1986” (Brown, p. 324).
Important changes took place in the sphere of international policy.
Western historians, in particular Archie Brown, connect then with the
personality of Gorbachev: “The coming to power of Gorbachev and
the beginning of perestroika led to the toppling of ideological orthodoxy
in Soviet thinking about international affairs. New political doctrines
were introduced at that time. The concept of ‘reasonable sufficiency’
in military expenditure led to the ending of the Cold War. The idea
of supremacy of ‘all-human values’ over class values led to an emphasis
on interdependence of all the countries in the world. These doctrines
helped to make a qualitative step forward from the old Soviet doctrine
of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with countries that had different social systems”.
“The first fruits of the ‘New political thinking’ were to be seen in
arms reduction agreements. There were summit meetings between
Gorbachev and Reagan at Geneva (1985), Reykjavik (1986), Washington
(1987) and Moscow (1988). The Reykjavik meeting came close to out-
lawing a wide range of nuclear weapons. The Washington summit ended
by eliminating whole categories of nuclear weapons, both Soviet SS-20s
and the American cruise and Pershing missiles”(Brown, p. 339).
In the second half of 1988 the Soviet troops began leaving Afghanistan
in substantial numbers and the process was completed by the agreed-with
American date of February 15, 1989.
７＜＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
At the end of 1989 the Communist regimes fell in Central and Eastern
Europe. One after another the countries of the region rejected their
ruling parties and the Moscow connection and became independent and
non-Communist. The symbol of the end of the Cold War was the destruc-
tion of the Berlin Wall in autumn of 1989 (See: Brown, pp. 322-342).
Anyway, this policy of Gorbachev in the international affairs still
remains a subject of debate. For example, it is described in the book
of George W. Breslauer ‘Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders’ (New York
and Cambridge, 2002) as a ‘concessionary foreign policy’.
• Negative consequences of perestroika

The negative consequences of perestroika occurred in the economic
and social realms. As Archie Brown says, “the results of economic
reform and development during perestroika period were, to say the least,
disappointing” (Brown, p. 336).
After the beginning of Gorbachev’s reforms the national economy
was almost ruined *. Why did it happen? “There was also no agreement
6)
on what should be done to remedy matters”(Brown, p. 331). During

the initial period (1985-1987) that Gorbachev came to power, he talked
about modifying central planning, but did not make any truly fundamental
changes. But a number of erroneous and mistaken measures were
undertaken. The most famous in Russia was an economic error that
developed via the adoption of an anti-alcohol program. “The production
of alcohol in state distilleries was drastically reduced, vineyards were
cut down, and illicit alcohol production filled the gap... The state’s
monopoly of this industry... made a massive contribution to the revenue
side of the budget. ... The anti-alcohol campaign led to widespread
‘moonshine’ production, thus depriving the state of a large element
of turnover tax on each bottle of liquor”.
“Bad luck as well as bad decisions complicated economic policy
during perestroika”(Brown, p. 332). The second half of the 1980s was
marked by a fall in oil prices that led to budget scarcity. Giant unforeseen
expenditures and resources were required to liquidate the disaster at
the Chernobyl nuclear power station in Ukraine on 26 April, 1986.
Then Gorbachev and his advisers decided to weaken the economic
* We should keep in mind one significant thing: there was growth in the Soviet
economy in the pre-perestroika period, though it was low. According to the CIA,
the industrial growth in the USSR in 1981-1987 consisted of 2.2% per year,
down from 4% from 1971-80 and 6.3% from 1961-1970 (See: Rosefield, p. 26).
‘Perestroika’ (reconstruction) ７＜＝
restrictions and to go in the direction of a market economy, including

private ownership. They began by revamping economic legislation. “The
Law on Individual Activity, adopted in November, 1986, legalized in-
dividual and family-based work, such as car repairs, taxi service, and
private tuition. ... The Law on the State Enterprise, adopted in June,
1987,... devolved more authority then hitherto to the enterprise level,
in particular, to factory managers”(Brown, p. 332). It led to an inadequate
situation. Plant managers were not responsible for the results of the
work of their enterprises, receiving their salary as state officers, but
they could take the full advantage of the enterprises cash flow, as if
they were owners. As a result tax revenues from the enterprises declined
from 1985 until 1989 a total of 20 per cent.
In the post-Soviet period, when a process of privatization occurred,
the Enterprise Law was used by factory managers to the fullest. “Taking
advantage of the enhancement of their legal rights provided by the 1987
law, factory managers, often aided and abetted by local party officials
converted their control of industrial enterprises into ownership”(Brown,
p. 333). An unintended consequence of this economic policy was criminal-
ization of private ownership, business, and entrepreneurship in Russia.
The Government actually gave up the mechanisms of ruling its economy.
Any attempts to change the situation with the help of this or that
economic project were not effective. For example, a group of ambitious
economists put forward a document known as the ‘500-Days Plan’,
a utopian attempt to make the transition of the Soviet economy to a
market economy within that time period. The document was “less a
plan or program and more a set of aspirations which were subsequently
agreed to have been over-optimistic” (Brown, p. 335).
All these attempts of improving the Soviet economy on the basis
of trial and error led to economic collapse. The plants stopped, the
department stores were empty, and shortages were found in every kind
of product. The economic difficulties ended in a great discontent and
dissatisfaction from below. In the summer of 1989 the strike movement
began. The first to strike were miners from Kuzbass. They stopped
all train travel by the Trans-Siberian railroad. It was a hard blow for
the Gorbachev regime.
７＜＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
22.4 Aggravation of political crisis

The sharpest problem, which aggravated intensely an internal crisis
at the end of the Gorbachev era, was the relationship among the national
republics, as the Soviet Union was a multi-national country. The impact
of perestroika on multinational relations revealed itself in a growth of
national separatism, in a number of difficult, sometimes bloody inter-eth-
nic conflicts and, finally in the break-up of the Soviet Union. Why
was it so? What were the causes of such a radical development?
We should keep in mind a number of causes, concerned with the
legacy of the Soviet past and perestroika itself. What was this legacy?
Archie Brown points out the following five main legacy items.
The first legacy was a historical one. Many forms of national dissent
and resentment had been accumulated for a long time, during the whole
Soviet history, and even earlier. But these national aspirations were
always suppressed by the Soviet power, because of the main concept
of its national policy – the USSR – as a friendly family of nations
without any national problems or discontent. So national aspirations
and nationalism of different kinds were boiling under the political surface
and at a time of glasnost they were brought to the surface.
Ex.: “In July, 1987 Moscow’s Red Square was the scene of a sit-down
demonstration by Crimean Tatars demanding to be allowed to return
to their homeland, from which they had been exiled by Stalin” (Brown,
p. 345).
The second legacy was an institutional one. It is a fact that during
the Soviet history all the national republics received their own “national”
branches of the Communist Party and national ruling institutions – na-
tional Councils of Ministers, national Supreme Soviets and national
Academies of Science. This “institutional determinism” was an important
side of the Soviet national policy. But it led to the growth of national
elites and power mechanisms and institutions, which could have pre-
tensions to an independent national statehood. Still “though the power
structure of the unreformed Soviet Union could fairly be characterized
as pseudo-federal, the federal forms which up until 1985 played an
extremely circumscribed role in the political life of the country were
of great latent importance” (Brown, pp. 342-343).
Ex.: “The appointment of a Russian, Gennadii Kolbin, as a first
secretary of the CPSU in Kazakhstan in December, 1986 provoked
riots in Alma-Ata (Almatu)” (Brown, pp. 344-345)..
‘Perestroika’ (reconstruction) ７＜？
The third legacy was a cultural one. One of the apparent successes
of the Soviet power was “the achievement of near-universal literacy
in the USSR and the existence of a substantial stratum of the population
in all the republics who had received a higher education. It is, as a
rule, intellectuals rather than peasants who are the bearers of national
ideology. In Central Asian republics, in particular, a native intelligentsia
and national consciousness were the creations of the Soviet period. New
ways of looking at the world were a result of higher education and
broadening intellectual horizons” (Brown, p. 343).
Ex.: In 1988 the dispute between the scholars from Armenian and
Azerbaijani Academies of Science over the land of Nagorno-Karabakh
led to bloody inter-ethnic violence (the slaughter of Armenians in Sumgait
and pogrom of Armenians in Baku) – killed over 200 people from
the both sides.
The forth legacy was connected with perestroika itself. “Perestroika
produced its own impetus for centrifugal pressure. Glasnost’ brought
to the surface injustices and discontent, including national, that would
have been dangerous to air earlier” (Brown, p. 344). Perestroika weakened
the role of the communist ideology and, thus, left the space open for
other ideologies. As Ronald G. Suny has pointed out: “While alternative
discourses, like class and gender, were silenced, the national discourse
began to dominate” (Suny (1), p. 160).
Ex.: Peaceful demonstrations of young people in Tbilisi in April,
1989 were suppressed by Soviet troops.
The fifth legacy was an international one. It was connected with
changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which became
independent from Moscow’s tutelage and non-Communist. Their example
became a case in point for the Soviet republics, especially for the Baltic
ones (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). “They were no longer ready to argue
simply for greater sovereignty within a renewed Soviet Union, but for
an independent statehood that would be no less than that enjoyed by
Czechs, Hungarians and Poles” (Brown, p. 346).
So what was the result? The competitive elections of 1990 in the
Baltic republics brought to the political stage candidates who proclaimed
state independence of their republics and the concept of leaving the
USSR. These new political actors represented national fronts of Latvia
and Estonia and the ‘Saudis’ movement from Lithuania. It was the begin-
ning of the so called ‘sovereignty parade’, that sharpened the opportunity
for the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was decided to turn a
７＝６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
‘ready-to-break’ pseudo-federation into a genuine federation on the basis

of a new Union Treaty. “In April, 1991 Gorbachev initiated a new
attempt to negotiate a new Union Treaty, which would preserve a renamed
Union on a voluntary basis. Only nine out of the fifteen republics
participated in the talks…. But events conspired against the preservation
of even a smaller union” (Brown, p. 347).
th
On the 12 of June, 1991 Yeltsin was elected as the Russian President.
He became the first popularly elected direct-vote leader in Russian
history. So infighting between the two Presidents began. And the positions
of Gorbachev were weaker, because he was elected as Soviet President
not popularly and directly, but by the Congress of People’s Deputies
of the USSR. Yeltsin had a real legitimacy to speak for Russia, and
Gorbachev became a relatively weak figure of a state ready to break
up. It was a situation very much similar to “dual power” in 1917. So
Archie Brown wrote: “Yeltsin had been pressing for Russian sovereignty
within the Union. In May, 1990 he insisted that Russian law had suprem-
acy over Union law. This was a massive blow against a federalist
solution to the problems of the Union” (Brown, p. 347).
From the spring of 1991 hundreds of thousands of miners began
a general “without time-limit” strike. They demanded Gorbachev’s resig-
nation and dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. These events
struck the crucial blow against the existing regime.
22.5 August 1991 events and the end of the USSR

The draft of the new Union Treaty was due to be signed on the
20th of August, 1991. Gorbachev was in the middle of a vacation in
August at his holiday home in Foros on the Crimean coast. He was
th
going to return to Moscow on the 19 of August. But the situation
suddenly changed. A group of top political functionaries in an inadequate
attempt to preserve the Soviet Union struck a final blow.
Gorbachev, his wife, his family and two of his close colleagues were
th
put under house arrest on the 18 of August and a state of emergency
was declared in Moscow early in the morning of the 19th of August.
A self-appointed State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP)
was set up. The most public role in it was played by the Soviet vice-
president Gennady Yanaev. The figures of a plot were V. S. Pavlov,
the Prime Minister; B. K. Pugo, the minister of Internal Affairs; V.
A. Krychkov, the chief of the KGB; D. T. Yazov, the minister of
Defense; O. D. Baklanov, the member of the Defense Council; V. A.
‘Perestroika’ (reconstruction) ７＝７
Starodubtsev, the leader of the Peasant’s union, and A. I. Tyziakov,

one of the chiefs of the military-industrial complex.
“The emphasis of the plotters was on patriotism and preserving the
Soviet state (as the majority of the Soviet people [76.4 per cent] supported
the idea of the preserving of the USSR in the All-Union referendum
th
held on the 17 of March, 1991 - authors). There was no reference
to restoring the monopoly of power of the Communist Party or to
Marxism-Leninism” (Brown, p. 348). The plotters decided to arrest
Yeltsin but failed to do it. Then they moved troops into Moscow, but
did not use fire.
“Yeltsin in the Russian White House (the home at that time of the
Russian government), became the symbol of resistance to the coup.
He received strong support from Western leaders” (Brown, p. 348).
The White House was surrounded by thousands of Muscovites. Yet,
faced with political resistance, the forces of coercion themselves became
divided. They lacked the resolution to carry the coup to its logical con-
st
clusion and gave up the attempt on just the 21 of August.
“The putsch became a moral blow both for the Union and for the
leadership of Gorbachev.... The Baltic States instantly declared their
th
independence. This was recognized by the Soviet Union on the 6 of
September. Four days later Armenia followed suit, while Georgia and
Moldova already considered themselves to be independent. Thus a large
number of republics refused to negotiate the new Union Treaty” (Brown,
th
p. 348). On the 8 of December, 1991 in Belovezhskaya Pushcha
(Belorussia) Yeltsin (Russia), Leonid Kravchuk (Ukraine) and Stanislav
Shushkevich (Belorussia) signed a treaty, in which they announced that
the Soviet Union was ceasing to exist and that they were going to
create a Commonwealth of Independent States (SNG). Gorbachev be-
st
came a decorative figure. On the 21 of December, 1991, at the summit
in Alma-Ata, the leaders of the nine republics adopted the declaration
about the Soviet Union ceasing to exist and about associating with the
th
Commonwealth of Independent States. On the 26 of December the
Upper Chamber of the Supreme Council of the USSR adopted the
th
resolution about the USSR ceasing to exist. On the 27 of December,
1991 Gorbachev announced that he was ceasing to be the president
of the USSR (See: Brown, p. 348).
Thus, perestroika, which began as an attempt to reform the existing
system ended with its crucial collapse. It meant the disintegration and
complete dismemberment of a country, the unity of which had been
７＝８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
provided by Communist Party rule. In that sense Russian history “went

backwards”: the country came to the historical borders of the middle
th
of the 17 century. Several scholars think that the break-up of the Soviet
Union was inevitable. It was something as a contribution, paid back
by the country, for its democratization. Others stigmatize Gorbachev
and Yeltsin as traitors of the national interests. Meanwhile, the necessity
of deep and fundamental reforms was accepted without any doubt by
all sides.
But there were no influential forces in the country who could implement
deep and fruitful reform, first of all in the economy, which skidded
lower. Why was it so? Perhaps, it was a result of the pernicious influence
of an authoritarian regime existing in Russia for such a long time. In
the absence of real democracy the top of the ruling class did not consider
public opinion, and as for the people, they were politically passive.
Topic 23
Ｖｕｙｚ３Ｙｕ｜ｏｋｚ＆Ｘ｛ｙｙｏｇ＆＆
23.1 The social and economic situation after 1991
23.2 Political development of the country
23.1 The social and economic situation after 1991

After the triumphal August days the country and its political leadership
were faced with the problem of construction of the new order. “As
in all revolutions, destruction of the ‘ancien regime’ came easier and
more quickly than the construction of the new order. Bigger tasks of
creating a new state, economy and polity soon erased the euphoria of
August, 1991 for Russia’s political leadership. Russian President Yeltsin,
the hero of those events, seemed overwhelmed. He spent three weeks
in September outside Moscow on vacation” (McFaul, p. 352).
After transformation of the social system of the country, the Russian
leadership implemented radical economic reform as its first priority.
“Yeltsin turned his attention to dismantling the command economy and
creating a market economy. He and his new government inherited a
bankrupt economy – no hard currency reserves, a giant budget deficit,
foreign debt of 80 billion dollars, declining industrial production, a mone-
tary overhang and scarcity of goods. ... A team of young reformers,
led by the new deputy prime minister for economy, Yegor Gaidar initiated
such reforms, which acquired the unfortunate label of ‘shock therapy’.
Gaidar’s program for economic reform called for immediate liberaliza-
tion of prices and trade at the same time achieving macroeconomic
stabilization through control of the money and government spending.
Once stabilization had been accomplished, massive privatization was
to follow. Gaidar’s plan was consistent with neo-liberal approach to
markets and market development; the less the state intervened in the
market, the better…. In January 1992 Yeltsin and Gaidar introduced
dramatic price liberalization. Prices on most items (exceptions were
milk and bread) as well as all consumer durables were freed overnight.
− ７＝９＆ −
７＝：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
…The January, 1992 price liberalization produced a sharp rise in

inflation. But monthly inflation rates steadily declined from 38 per
cent in February, 1992 to 9 per cent in August, 1992” (McFaul, pp.
358-359). Still, at 108 per cent annual inflation, the ruble was losing
half its value every year.
Liberalization was followed by privatization, which has been singled
out as the ‘driving force behind economic reform in Russia and the
heart of the transformation process’. The policy of privatization of the
state enterprises was proclaimed as the basis for development of a huge
stratum of private owners. The main measure in order to convert the
Soviet citizens into private owners was to be the issuing of vouchers.
“The results of privatization were mixed. To be sure, the private
sector expanded; by 1996 around two-fifths of the labor force was em-
ployed in the private sector, compared to one-tenth a decade earlier.
But there were significant costs. The so-called ‘voucher privatization’
scheme from 1992 to 1994 transferred ownership of thousands of enter-
prises, mostly to existing management and trade-union functionaries.
It guaranteed neither good management of those enterprises nor the
prospect of attracting outside investment. The loans-for-shares scheme
of 1995-1997 enabled powerful oligarchs to acquire cheaply from the
state through rigged auctions, some of Russia’s most valuable oil compa-
nies including Yukos, Sibneft and Sidanco. In addition, predatory and
criminal cliques flourished, hindering the potential viability of the enter-
prises, and limiting the possibility for engaging with new markets and
embracing technological change” (Gatrell, pp. 406-407).
“Demographically the transition was extremely painful. The project
of liberalization promoted environmental degradation, declining health
conditions and increasing infant mortality. Adult male life expectancy
plummeted. Many citizens reverted to a subsistence economy. Ordinary
citizens often required two or more jobs in order to compensate for
meager and uncertain wages. Again, mutual support networks played
an important part in maintaining a basic standard of living. A more
extreme response was emigration. According to official figures between
1992 and 1998 some 700,000 people left Russia to settle in counties
outside the former Soviet Union. Germany was by far the most popular
destination” (Gatrell, p. 408).
“On paper, Russian privatization looked successful. Newspapers in-
formed that by January 1994, 90,000 state enterprises had been privatized.
The record on the actual creation of real private property rights was
Post- Soviet Russia ７＝；
less rosy. Privatization of small shops and services created actual owners
with clearly delineated property rights. Privatization of large state enter-
prises did not. Instead, by the summer of 1993, insiders had acquired
majority shares in two-thirds of Russia’s privatized and privatizing
firms, state subsidies accounted for 22 per cent of Russia’s GNP, while
indicators of actual restructuring (bankruptcies, downsizing, unemploy-
ment, unbundling) were not positive” (McFaul, pp. 360-361).
We should point out, that in reality privatization appeared to be the
seizure of state property by representatives of the top managerial stratum,
shadow capital and ex-party bosses. So privatization failed, as if it was
the criminal redistribution of national property, which resulted in the
emergence of a massive stratum of impoverished people and a very
narrow group of over-rich ‘new Russian’ oligarchs.
There is an important clarifying position, arguing that the privatiza-
tion project was doomed to failure from the very beginning. Why? The
private owner couldn’t emerge as a result of the redistribution of property.
A solid private owner is brought up via the process of creating his
or her own business and capital by him or herself.
The process of privatization was accompanied by a great decrease
in production. Economists say that at the end of the twentieth century
Russia suffered the process of deindustrialization, the country lost the
greatest part of its industrial potential that was achieved through such
hard losses in the previous periods. The country survived only through
oil sales. Many of the enterprises were closed; salaries were not paid
for months and even years, such as the case of the coal miners, teachers,
doctors and others. Cadres of highly qualified, skilled workers had to
change their professional activity to do the work of small traders, going
to other regions or abroad to buy things to resell at home.
As for the stratum of ‘new Russians’ they continued embezzling the
state property, spending enormous sums of money to live in luxury,
and buying immovable property abroad. It was not a surprise that the
country was going through total and unprecedented criminalization.
Organized crime merged with the economy; previously respectable
politicians took millions in bribes, and laundered budget money in false
firms. Many social diseases appeared: drug addiction, homelessness,
prostitution. The social codes of morals became deformed: theft and
corruption were no longer ignominious and shameful. The principle
‘Pecunia non olet’ – (money doesn’t smell) was adopted. Talent, educa-
tion, and honest labor began to lose their significance. An aphorism
７＝＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
of one of the well known politicians was “If you are so clever, why
are you so poor?” It became the symbol of the Yeltsin era.
Some positive steps in economic development began to appear only
in the middle of the 1990s. The most important step for the better
was the decline of inflation starting in 1996.
23.2 Political development of the country

The political development of the country fell into sharp conflicts.
They were revealed in four main schisms:
• conflict between the “two branches” of power – President Yeltsin and

the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation;
• increase of authoritarian tendencies in the ruling policy of Yeltsin, with
the establishment of the presidential republic;
• use of military force in Chechnya;
• decline of Yeltsin’s popularity and growth of political polarization, via the
influence of communists and nationalists.
The conflict between the President and the Russian Congress of people
had been increasing gradually. An American academic and diplomat,
Michael McFaul, Stanford University, underlines, that the Congress sup-
ported Yeltsin through all his difficult times: in August, 1991, Yeltsin
and Khasbulatov, and many of their supporters huddled inside the
Congress building – the so-called White House – as their chief defensive
strategy for throwing the coup. In November, 1991, the Congress gave
Yeltsin extraordinary powers to deal with economic reform. In December,
1991, The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Congress ratified Yeltsin’s
agreement to dissolve the Soviet Union. So the Russian Congress was
a real ally of the President (See: McFaul, pp. 361-362).
But in the course of economic reforms, which led to marginalizing
and criminalization of the country, the situation began to change. The
Congress tried to prevent Yeltsin’s support of the criminal form of
privatization. The Congress tried to reassert its superiority over the
President. Thus, the disagreement over economic reform in turn spawned
a constitutional crisis between the Parliament and the President.
During the summer of 1991, in preparing for the Tenth Congress
of People’s Deputies, the deputies drafted a series of constitutional
amendments that would liquidate Russia’s Presidential office altogether.
Yeltsin pre-empted their plans by dissolving the Congress in September,
1993. The Congress, in turn, declared Yeltsin’s decree illegal and recog-
Post- Soviet Russia ７＝＝
nized Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi as the new interim President.

So two heads of state and two governments each claiming sovereign
authority over the other appeared.
“The October, 1993 events were a national tragedy for Russia. Debates
about institutional design moved beyond the realm of peaceful politics
into the arena of military confrontation. Yeltsin used tanks against the
Russian Congress, and fired at its building. The whole world could
see this in real time on television. In 1993, several hundred people
died by troop assault at the Congress’s White House (in comparison
to 1991, when three men died). In addition to the loss of life, the October
events abruptly ended Russia’s romantic embrace of democracy. If the
end of the military stand-off in 1991 triggered rapturous support for
the new regime and the democratic ideals that it claimed to represent,
the end of the fighting in 1993 marked a nadir of the support for the
Russian government and the end of optimism about Russia’s democratic
prospects” (McFaul, pp. 361-362).
So what was the result? The following events were vividly depicted
by Michael McFaul, who showed that the tragic moment created a
special opportunity for Yeltsin to widen his ruling powers. After dissolv-
ing the parliament in October, 1993 through the use of force, the Russian
President was free to draft a new constitution as he and his aides saw
fit. The new constitution adopted in December, 1993 spelled out a set
of basic guarantees for all Russian citizens and codified a new system
of government. The new political system in Russia included the office
of President; a Prime Minister and his cabinet; a bicameral parliament,
consisting of a lower house, the State Duma, and upper house, the
Federal Council. The new constitution gave the President extraordinary
powers, compelling some to label the regime a form of authoritarianism.
The President appointed the Prime Minister in this scheme. Also the
lower house of parliament, State Duma, had to approve the President’s
choice for Prime Minister. But if they rejected the President’s candidate
three times, then the Duma was dissolved and new elections were to
be held. Not surprisingly, votes against the Prime Minister have been
few and far between. The President also has the right to issue decrees,
which have the power of law until overridden by a law passed by both
the upper and the lower houses of the Parliament and signed by the
President. The President also controlled the nomination process of judges
in the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court (See: McFaul, p. 363).
“Yeltsin’s opponents ridiculed this new basic law, claiming, not without
７＝＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
merit, that the new constitution gave the President extraordinary powers
and process of drafting a constitution that was undemocratic. Actually,
there was no compromise between different parties or regional leaders
in the making of this constitution. Rather, Yeltsin imposed his will
and then offered voters the opportunity to accept his constitution….
In a constitutional referendum held in December, 1993, the official count
claimed that 58.4 per cent supported Yeltsin’s constitution, while 41.2
per cent opposed it” (McFaul, pp. 364, 366).
“The same constitutional ambiguity that fuelled conflict between
Yeltsin and the Congress also allowed federal conflicts to fester.
Eventually, one of them - Chechnya- exploded into a full-scale war”
(McFaul, p. 364). It was Yeltsin who said, looking for support from
the national republics in the days of Gorbachev rule, “Swallow as much
sovereignty as you can!”, but then he withdrew his slogan and promise.
“Immediately after the August, 1991 coup attempt, General Johar
Dudaev and his government declared Chechnya’s independence. In
March of the following year, Tatarstan held a successful referendum
for full independence”. The situation demanded a conclusion of a new
federal treaty. But Yeltsin opted not to devote time or resources toward
constructing a Russian Federal order. As for “the new December, 1993
constitution, it specified that all constituent elements were to enjoy
equal rights vis-à-vis the Center. Absent from the document was any
mention of a mechanism for secession. The formal rules of a new
constitution did not resolve the conflict between the Center and the
regions. Negotiations over the distribution of power between the central
and sub-national governments continued. All sub-national governments
except one – Chechnya – agreed to maintenance of a federal order”.
“...After solidifying his power with the defeat of the Russian Congress
and the adoption of the new constitution, Yeltsin committed to a military
solution following a series of challenges from Dudaev.... On the first
of December, 1994 Yeltsin organized a ground assault and on the 11th
of December, 1994 a full-scale air attack on Chechnya. For the second
time Yeltsin had ordered the deployment of Russian military forces
against his own people” (McFaul, pp. 364, 365).
It was declared officially that wide-scale war operations were launched
to restore the constitutional order and against the “anti-constitutional
regime of Dudaev”. The first war in Chechnya lasted for one and a
half years. By that time “Yeltsin finally sued for peace in June, 1996,
an estimated 45,000-50,000 Russian citizens had lost their lives” (McFaul,
Post- Soviet Russia ７＝？
p. 365).
But in reality, relations with Chechnya were not normalized. The
so-called Chechen “liberation movement” appeared. It organized a num-
ber of bloody terrorist attacks in the Caucasus and even in Moscow.
st
“On the 1 of September, 1999, the war came to Moscow, when an
explosion in its downtown wounded 41 people. Further terrorist attacks
in Moscow and elsewhere killed more than 300 Russian civilians in
one month. Russians understood the terrorist attacks to be acts of war
committed by Chechnya and its foreign supporters. Society demanded
a response, and the Russian government responded. In October Russian
troops crossed into Chechen territory for the second time in a decade.
Chechnya was to be liberated from the bandits and terrorists by any
means necessary. Over 100, 000 troops were sent to the theatre to accom-
plish this objective”. (McFaul, p. 376).
And what about the fourth tendency?
During the middle of the 1990s, the Russian economy as well as
the Russian state had continued to contract, generating deep political
polarization. Sharp political struggle marked the 1995 elections in the
Government Duma and the 1996 election of the President of the Russian
Federation.
A number of years of falling production, double digit inflation and
general economic uncertainty led to the growth of opposition and protest
votes. The total percentage of votes for anti-government parties well
exceeded 50 per cent. The most organized opposition party in Russia
at that time appeared to be Communists under the leadership of Gennady
Ziuganov. But there was one extraordinary outcome in the electoral
process of the 1990s. It was the popularity of the nationalist Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) with its leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
As for the Presidential elections, which were held in the summer
of 1996, the official count claimed that in the second round of elections
53.55 per cent supported Yeltsin and 40.55 per cent supported Ziuganov.
But this time it was not easy for Yeltsin to gain a victory. To defeat
Ziuganov and stay in power for the second term, Yeltsin turned the
1996 presidential election into a referendum on revolution. Yeltsin asked
voters not to judge him by the achievements of his administration over
the previous four years. They were too unpopular: economic collapse,
armed conflict with the parliament and the war in Chechnya. He convinced
voters that Russia had to proceed with what he and his allies had started
７＞６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
in 1991: the transformation of Russia into a market economy and demo-

cratic polity. Yeltsin’s campaign also emphasized that the current
President was the lesser of the two evils. And last, but not least, the
image of Yeltsin was changed. He stopped drinking, and more im-
portantly, he stopped the war in Chechnya. (See: McFaul. pp. 366-371).
Yeltsin’s new term of office didn’t make life in the country easier.
The activities of the President were manifested in recasting ministers
and other cadre re-arrangements. The last blow for the country and
the people was the August, 1998 financial crisis, which impoverished
millions of citizens.
“The transformational depression in the Soviet Union”, asserts an
American academic, a leading expert on Russian and Soviet studies
Steven Rosefielde, “was far deeper than the drop in consumption during
World War II” (Rosefielde, p. 1).
Part 5.
ＺＮＫ＆ＩＵ［ＸＹＫ＆ＵＬ＆ＸＫ＼Ｏ＼ＧＲ＆ＵＬ＆

ＺＮＫ＆ＩＵ［ＴＺＸ＿
Topic 24
Ｉｕｔｙｕｒｏｊｇｚｏｕｔ＆ｇｔｊ＆ｓｕｊｋｘｔｏ｢ｇｚｏｕｔ＆

ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｙｕｉｏｋｚ｡＠＆＼４＼４＆Ｖ｛ｚｏｔ＆ｇｔｊ＆ｎｏｙ＆ｚｋｇｓ
24.1 The heritage
24.2 Stability
24.3 National Welfare
24.4 Sovereign democracy
In August, 1999 the new Prime Minister of Russia was appointed:

V. V. Putin. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was born on 7 October,
1952 in Leningrad in the family of a worker. Putin graduated from
the International Law branch of the Law Department of the Leningrad
State University in 1975, writing his final thesis on international law.
Putin joined the KGB in 1975 upon graduation, and underwent a year’s
st
training at the 401 KGB school in Okhta, Leningrad. He then worked
briefly in the Second Chief Directorate (counter-intelligence) before he
was transferred to the First Chief Directorate, where, among his duties,
was the monitoring of foreigners and consular officials in Leningrad.
In 1985 he graduated from the Red Bannered Institute of KGB of the
USSR named in honor of Y. V. Andropov. In 1985-1990 he worked
abroad (the German Democratic Republic), from 1990 – at different
offices in Leningrad State University, then – in the Saint Petersburg
Administration. Putin was then called to Moscow and in June, 1996
became a Deputy Chief of the Presidential Property Management
th
Department. He occupied this position until March, 1997. On the 26
of March, 1997 Putin was appointed the deputy chief of Presidential
Staff, which he remained until May, 1998, and the chief of the Main
Control Directorate of the Presidential Property Management Department
th
(until June, 1998). On the 25 of July, 1998 Vladimir Putin was appointed
the head of the FSB (Federal Security Service of Russia, the main
domestic security agency of the Russian Federation and the main succes-
sor agency of the Soviet Committee of State Security [KGB]), the position
Putin occupied until August, 1999.
− ７＞８＆ −
V. V. Putin: the course of revival ７＞９
On the 31st of December, 1999 in his New Year address to the nation
Yeltsin declared his resignation, so according to the Constitution the
responsibilities of the President passed to the Prime Minister V. V.
th
Putin. On the 26 of March, 2000, ahead of schedule, elections were
held. Putin won in the first round with 52.8 per cent of the votes.
th
In the second Presidential elections on the 14 of March, 2004 Putin
received a larger majority of votes (71 per cent) (http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Vladimir_Putin).
nd
On the 2 of March, 2008 the next Presidential elections were held.
The candidacy of Putin was not put forward according to the Constitution.
The Presidency of the country was won by D.A. Medvedev, who was
earlier the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia. Dmitry Anatolyevich
th
Medvedev was born on the 14 of September, 1965 in Leningrad in
the family of a professor of Leningrad State University. He graduated
from the Law Department of Leningrad State University in 1987; in
1990 Medvedev defended his dissertation, titled “Problems of realization
of civil juridicial personality of state enterprise” and received his
Candidate of Science degree in private law. In 1990-1997 he worked
as a Professor of Saint Petersburg University and in the Administration
of Saint Petersburg. In 1999 he began to work in Moscow as a Deputy
Head of the staff of the Government of the Russian Federation, then
a Deputy Head of a Presidential staff. In 2000-2008 he was appointed
a Chairman of Gazprom’s board of directors. From October, 2003 up
to November, 2005 he was the Head of the President’s Administration.
From November, 2005 he was appointed First Deputy of the Prime
Minister of the Russian Federation.
After the election of D. A. Medvedev as the new President V. V.
Putin continued his state activities as the head of the Government
th
of Russia (from the 8 of May of 2008), a period of so-called
‘tandemocracy’ followed. In September, 2011, Putin and Medvedev
agreed that Putin should seek a third non-consecutive term in the 2012
presidential election, which he won with a vote of 63.8 per cent in
the first round on 4 March, 2012. D.A. Medvedev was appointed by
Putin to the position of Prime Minister of Russia
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Dmitry_Medvedev).
24.1 The heritage

The first Presidential term of Putin was connected with significant
difficulties. He inherited a very hard heritage. One third of the population
７＞：＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
of Russia lived below the standard poverty line, and pensions and
wages were not paid on time, or were not paid at all. In 1992 33.5
per cent of people in Russia were living in poverty (The Moscow News,
2012, Feb.28-Mar. 1).
The situation was aggravated by the lack of law and order in the
country. The Constitution and Federal Laws ceased working in a num-
ber of regions of the country. The deduction of taxes in the Federal
budget stopped also. Terrorism became the main danger in the North
Caucasus. The Russian Federation was disintegrating. According to
Andranik Migranyan, the well-known Russian political scholar, Putin
came into office when the worst regime had been established: “the
economy was totally decentralized, and the state had lost central authority,
while the oligarchs robbed the country and controlled its power
institutions. In two years Putin had restored the hierarchy of power,
ending the omnipotence of regional elites as well as destroying political
influence of oligarchs and oligopolies in the federal center. The Boris
Yeltsin Family-era with its non-institutionalized center of power, was
ruined”; this undercut the positions of the actors, such as Boris Berezovsky
and Vladimir Gusinsky, who had sought to privatize the Russian state
“with all of its resources and institutions” (Migranyan, p. 5).
The situation contributed greatly to elaboration of the main values
of the ideology and practice of Vladimir Putin’s leadership. They have
been the following: stability, sovereign democracy, sovereignty, and
national welfare.
24.2 Stability
Starting with the goal of achieving stability V. V. Putin began to
tackle myriad problems by strengthening the state system and con-
solidation of the ‘verticality of power’. One of the first measures in
this direction was an enlargement of the administrative territorial division
of the country, as this was very difficult to run, since it had 89 territorial
th
federal subjects away from the Centre. On the 13 of May, 2000, he
issued a decree dividing the 89 federal subjects of Russia into seven
federal districts (the Central, North-Western, Sothern, Volga-region,
Ural-region, Siberian- and Far-Eastern-region districts of Russia). They
were overseen by representatives (plenipotentiaries) of the President named
th
by Putin in order to facilitate federal administration. On January 19
th
2010 the new 8 North Caucasian Federal District was split from the
Southern Federal District.
V. V. Putin: the course of revival ７＞；
The path to stability was completed by administrative reforms. It

was carried out on the highest level of the political structure – on the
level of the Government and the President’s Administration and on the
level of regionally-run institutions, and local administrations.
In July, 2000, according to a law proposed by Putin and approved
by the Federal Assembly of Russia, he gained the right to dismiss heads
of the federal districts. In 2004, the direct election of governors by
popular vote was ended.
This was seen by Putin as a necessary move to stop separatist
tendencies and get rid of those governors who were connected with
organized crime. The measure proved to be temporary: in 2012, as
proposed by Putin's successor Dmitry Medvedev, the direct election
of governors was re-introduced. Along with the return of elected gover-
nors, Medvedev’s reforms also simplified the registration of political
parties and reduced the number of signatures required by non-parlia-
mentary parties and independent candidates to participate in elections,
thus further loosening the restrictions imposed by previous Putin-en-
dorsed legislation.
Putin presided over an intensified fight with organized crime and
terrorism that resulted in murder rates that were cut in half by 2011,
as well as significant reduction in the number of terrorist acts by the
2010s. Putin succeeded in codifying land law and tax law and promul-
gated new codes about labor, administrative, criminal, commercial and
civil procedural law. Under Medvedev’s Presidency, Putin’s government
implemented some key reforms in the area of state security, Russian
police reform and Russian military reform.
One of the effective ways of preserving stability was the organ-
ization of a centre-right political party in Russia - The United Russia.
The party was founded in December, 2001, through a merger of the
Unity and Fatherland-All-Russia parties. Ideologically, it self-identifies
as a “Russian conservative” party, and it supports the policies of the
Presidential administration of V. V. Putin and D. A. Medvedev
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin).
Nowadays (2012) Putin believes that the policy of stability, his key
slogan at the beginning of the 2000s, should be added by the course
of modernization and intensive development. He understands that by
supporting stability only, the state could be involved in extending
stagnation, which is a breeding ground for different forms of parasitism
and corruption. According to a government report Russia maintains its
７＞＜＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
place in the lower echelons of Amnesty International’s Corruption

Perceptions Index, and kickbacks account for some two percent of GDP
(The Moscow News, 2012, 27-29 March). The anti-corruption drive is
one of the important priority points of the domestic policy as a directive
of the Presidential administrations of Putin and Medvedev. “For the
first time in Russia’s thousand-year history we have a normative base”
to fight bribery, Medvedev said. He outlined five priority areas where
the process could be intensified during the next Presidential term,
including reducing the government’s presence in the economy, ensuring
public oversight and reducing corruption in the state purchases sector”
(The Moscow News, 2012, 27-29 March).
24.3 National Welfare

The economic policies of Putin have their own characteristic features.
They differ from a model of ‘economizm’, supported by a number of
Russian economists (E. Gaidar, G. Yavlinskii, B. Kudrin). Development
of the economy is not an end in itself for Putin. Putin tries to improve
the economy in order to improve the living standards of the people.
According to this philosophy Putin ceased the practice of economic
reforms according to Western patterns. This policy was run during the
period from 1985 up to the 1990s, but Putin removed it via the policy
of national projects, which showed a number of positive results.
Under the Putin administration the economy made real gains of an
average 7% per year (2000: 10%, 2001: 5.1%, 2002: 4.7%, 2003: 7.3%,
th
2004: 7.2%, 2005: 6.4%, 2006: 8.2%, 2007: 8.5%), making it the 7
largest economy in the world in purchasing power. Russia’s nominal
nd th
Gross Domestic Product increased six-fold, climbing from 22 to 10
largest in the world. In 2007, Russia’s GDP exceeded that of the Russian
SFSR in 1990, meaning it had overcome the devastating consequences
of the 1998 financial crisis and preceding recession in the 1990s.
During Putin’s eight years in office, industry grew by 76%, investments
increased by 125%, and agricultural production and construction in-
creased as well (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin).
Real incomes more than doubled and the average monthly salary
increased eight-fold from $80 to $640. From 2000 to 2006 the volume
of consumer credit increased 45 times and the middle class grew from
eight million to 55 million. The number of people living below the
poverty line decreased from 30% in 2000 to 14% in 2008. There was
a threefold decline in the poverty rate between 1992 and 2011. In 1992,
V. V. Putin: the course of revival ７＞＝
33.5 percent of people in Russia were living in poverty. In 2011 only

12.8 percent of the population still did, according to the statistic serv-
ice’s estimates. The Economic Development Ministry said it expects
a gradual decline in poverty in 2012 to 12.7 percent, with a further
drop to 12.5 per cent by 2014. In 1995, 49 per cent of household
incomes were spent on food, but in 2010 those expenditures amounted
to only 29.6 per cent. The figures underpin the strong improvement
in the people’s standard of living, as generally, the larger a percentage
of one family’s income that was spent on food, the poorer the family,
(The Moscow News, 2012, 1 Mar.-28 Feb.).
Going on his third period of presidency Putin introduced ambitious
plans to grow national welfare by spending more on it.
Education spending: to spend billions of dollars to raise the salaries
of university and college professors by September, 2012 and double
their wages by 2018; students’ monthly stipends are to be increased
by 5,000 rubles ($170).
Living conditions spending: improvement in living conditions for 60
percent of Russian households by 2020, including lowering the price
of housing by 20 to 30 per cent and reducing the cost of mortgages.
Child care spending: Putin promised to increase monthly state subsidies
to 7,000 rubles ($230) for the third and every additional child in a
family to encourage families to have more children.
The representatives of the opposition name these plans ‘populist
promises’. But in reality these concrete figures aim the economy of
Russia toward ongoing growth. Moreover, these concrete figures turn
out to be a visible indication of the development of the country, easy
to check by every citizen of Russia.
24.4 Sovereign democracy

The term ‘Sovereign democracy’ was first proposed by Vladislav
Surkov, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. He determined
‘Sovereign democracy’ as “a society’s political life where the political
powers, their authorities and decisions are put forth and controlled by
a diverse Russian nation for the purpose of reaching material welfare,
freedom and fairness by all citizens, social groups and nationalities,
by the people that formed it” (Vladislav Surkov. Nationalization of the
th
Future // Expert magazine. 2006, 20 of November).
Putin has made good use of this term in his speeches to the deputy
７＞＞＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
corps of Russia by filling it with political pragmatism. When using

this term, he underlined that not every sovereignty guarantees the
development of the state, and not every democracy means the state
is running based on the national interests. ‘Sovereign democracy’ is
a principle based on reforms at the federal level, supported by cleaning
out the criminal element from local administrations. It is based on a
type of sovereignty that is directed toward the independent solving of
all the national problems on the basis of democratic procedures (See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin).
These ideas determine the core of Putin’s foreign policy which can
be characterized as the policy of gentle appeasement of regional prob-
lems and international conflicts, preserving geo-political interests of
Russia.
The success of Putin’s Russia has been determined by a correct-minded
approach to solving problems of the development of Russia. Putin’s
domestic, socio-economic and international policy ensured great support
for him from the majority of Russian citizens. He was supported by
the nation not only as a politician, but first of all as a national statesman,
responsible for the country and its development.
ＩＵＴＩＲ［ＹＯＵＴ
At the beginning of the twentieth century Russia and her people stood
over the historical choice, which has worked itself out over the sub-
sequent one hundred years. It was the choice among a number of directions
of economic, socio-political and cultural developments. Those directions
of development were milled by Russian history during the twentieth
century in open or hidden forms. Such urgent problems of national
choice became the problem of preserving national identity for Russians
and the people of other nationalities living in Russia. There are the
problems of power and society, masses and elite, the choice between
socialism and socialization, the problem of war and peace, faith and
religion, the peasant question, the choice of an ideological niche for
a national idea, and the gathering of statehood.
The twentieth century as the epoch of solving these questions and
choosing the way of development ended with positive results for Russian
history. It means, as an outstanding Russian political scholar, Andranik
Migranyan, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, says,
that “Russia has achieved a colossal divorce from the past, and the
social revolution is over. Russia now must endure its evolutionary devel-
opment toward consolidated democracy which will nurture a civil society
capable of exercising control over the state…. We have never been
so close to the creation of a real consolidated democratic system which
would crown Russia’s modernization and permit the country to join
the family of civilized nations, thus putting an end to disputes over
whether or not Russia is part of Europe. Russia possesses all of the
requirements to settle this question: private ownership and a pluralistic
political system, although its civil society and party system are not
yet fully developed. We have a consolidated power system. We have
an enlightened leadership which understands all the problems, hardships
− ７＞？＆ −
７？６＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
and deadlocks that a course toward totalitarianism or authoritarianism

can entail. We have the consolidated West, which is strong enough
to steadily encourage the process. And we have a society that is educated
and developed enough to accomplish the transformation of Russia. There
is simply no other way to retain the integrity of the Russian state”
(Migranyan, p. 8).
st
Russia entered the 21 century as a part of geopolitical space, figured
out how to apply her historical choices and became ready to answer
the main challenges of the forthcoming development. The lessons of
Russian history of the twentieth century were dramatic, but optimistic.
They showed both a giant national strength of mind and peace-making
talent.
ＨＯＨＲＯＵＭＸＧＶＮ＿
Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman. The Mystery of Stalin’s Death: Beria’s

Plot. - Frankfurt/Main, 1979.
Ball, Alan. Building a new state and society: NEP, 1921-1928// The
Cambridge History of Russia, Volume III - The Twentieth Century.
- Cambridge, 2006.
Boffa, Juseppe. The History of the Soviet Union. - Moscow, 1994.
Vol.2.
Breslauer, George W. Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders. - New York
and Cambridge, 2002.
Brown, Archie. The Gorbachev Era // The Cambridge History of Russia,
Volume III - The Twentieth Century. - Cambridge, 2006.
Brzezinski, Zbigneiw K. The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet
Totalitarianism. - Cambridge, 1956.
Cohen, Stephen. Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and
History Since 1917. - New York and Oxford, 1985.
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties. -
London, 1968.
Danilov Victor P., Viola, Lynne; Ivnitskii Nikolay A.; Kozlov, Denis.
The War Against the Peasantry, 1927-1930: The Tragedy of the
Soviet Countryside. -Yale, 2005.
Dmitrenko, V. P. Soviet economic policy in the first years of the prole-
tariat dictatorship: the problems of regulating trade relations. -
Moscow, 1986.
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931. -
Bloomington and London, 1978.
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union,
1921-1934. - Cambridge, 1979.
Gatrell, Peter. Economic and demographic change: Russia’s age of eco-
− ７？７＆ −
７？８＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆＆ Modern Russian History: a textbook
nomic extremes // The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume

III - The Twentieth Century. - Cambridge, 2006.
Geller, Mikhail; Nekrich, Alesandr. Utopia in Power: The History of the
Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present. - London, 1982.
Gorodetskyi, Ephim. Soviet Historiography of the Great October. -
Moscow, 1981.
Gushchin, Nikolay Y. Peasantry of Siberia in the period of building
socialism (1917–1937 гг.). - Novosibirsk, 1983.
Hanson, Philip. Alexander Zinoviev and the Russian Tragedy. The Reality
of Post-Communism // Ziniviev.info
Hanson, Stephen E. The Brezhnev era // The Cambridge History of
Russia, Volume III – The Twentieth Century. - Cambridge, 2006.
Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. The February Revolution of Petrograd, 1917. -
Washington, 1981.
Hosking, Geoffrey A. A History of the Soviet Union. 1917-1991. -
Moscow, 1991.
Katsiaficas, George. Asia’s Unknown Uprisings: South Korea Social
th
Movements in the 20 Century. - Oakland, California, 2012.
McFaul, Michael. The Russian Federation // The Cambridge History
of Russia, Volume III – The Twentieth Century. - Cambridge,
2006.
Melgunov, Sergey. Underhanded plotting before the revolution of 1917.
- Paris, 1931.
Migranyan, Andranik. What is ‘Putinism’? // Russia in Global affairs, 13
April, 2004.
Pavliuchenkov, S. A. War communism: the power and masses. -
Moscow, 1997.
Polyakov, Yuri A. Transition to the New Economic Policy and Soviet
peasantry. - Moscow, 1967.
Polyakov, Yuri A. Civil war: overview through the years. - Ufa, 1997.
th
Pushkaryov, Boris S. Two Russias in the 20 century: An Overview
of History 1917-1993. - Moscow, 2008.
Protasov, Leo. The All-Russian Constituent assembly: the history of
its birth and death. - Moscow, 1997.
Raleigh, Donald J. The Russian civil war // The Cambridge History
Bibliography ７？９
of Russia, Volume III – The Twentieth Century. - Cambridge,

2006.
st
Rosefielde, Steven. Russia in the 21 century. The prodigal superpower.
- Cambridge, 2005.
Shearer, David R. (1). Stalinism, 1928-1940 // The Cambridge History
of Russia, Volume III - The Twentieth Century. - Cambridge,
2006.
Shearer, David R. (2) Policing Stalin’s Socialism Repression and Social
order in the Soviet Union, 1924-1953. - Yale, 2009.
Shumilov, M.I.; Shumilov, M. M. A History of Russia: the end of the 19th
– and the beginning of the 21th century. - Saint Petersburg, 2008.
Smith, Stephen A. The Revolution of 1917 - 1918 // The Cambridge
History of Russia, Volume III - The Twentieth Century. -
Cambridge, 2006.
Suny, Ronald G. (1) The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution
and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. - Stanford, Calif., 1993.
Suny, Ronald G. (2) Reading Russia and the Soviet Union in the
twentieth century // The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume
III – The Twentieth Century. - Cambridge, 2006.
Taubman, William. The Khrushchev period, 1953-1964 // The Cambridge
History of Russia, Volume III - The Twentieth Century. -
Cambridge, 2006.
The History of Russia from Ancient times up to the beginning of the
XXI century/Sakharov, Aleksey N. (eds.). - Moscow, 2006.
Vol. 2.
Tucker, Robert C. Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia:
from Lenin to Gorbachev. - New York, 1987.
Vert, Nikolas. A History of the Soviet State, 1900-1991. - Moscow,
1995.
Volkogonov, Dmitry. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy: Political Portrait
of J. V. Stalin. - Moscow, 1998. Vol.1.
White, Stephen. The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialization
// Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds.). Political Culture and
nd
Political Change in Communist States, 2 ed. - New York, 1979.
Zimina, Valentina D. The White Affair of the rioting Russia: Political
regimes of the civil war period. 1917-1920. - Moscow, 2006.

Modern Russian History A Textbook

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Modern Russian History A Textbook

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Modern Russian History A Textbook

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ＳＵＪＫＸＴ＆ Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ ＮＯＹＺＵＸ＿＠＆ Ｇ＆ ＺＫ＾ＺＨＵＵＱ＆

With respect and gratitude

To Professor Shin Gyonggu,

ＳＵＪＫＸＴ＆ Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ ＮＯＹＺＵＸ＿＠＆ Ｇ＆ ＺＫ＾ＺＨＵＵＱ

ＩＮＵＴＴＧＳ＆ ＴＧＺＯＵＴＧＲ＆ ［ＴＯ＼ＫＸＹＯＺ＿＆ ＶＸＫＹＹ

ＯＹＨＴ＆ ＆ ？＝＞３＞？３？＝＜８６３；８３：＆ ．６９？８６／＆

Ｌｏｘｙｚ＆ Ｖｘｏｔｚｏｔｍ ＠＆ Ｙｋｖｚｋｓｈｋｘ＆ ８６７８

Elena V. Katyshevtseva (Nikulina)

James Douglas Stuber

Translated from Russian by

Part 1. The Wave of Russian Revolutions and Lenin’s Period of Soviet

Topic 2. Russia in 1917: from February to October ―――― ７？

Topic 3. The establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship ―――― ８＜

Topic 4. Сivil war ―――― ９：＆

Topic 5. The ‘War Communism’ Policy ―――― ：８＆

Topic 7. Formation of the USSR ―――― ；？＆

Part 2. The ‘Revolution from Above’ and the Establishment of Stalinism

Topic 9. Industrialization of the USSR ―――― ＝：

Topic 10. Collectivization of agriculture ―――― ＞８＆

Topic 12. Russian culture in the 1920s – 1930s ―――― ？＞＆

Topic 17. The USSR in the post-war years ―――― ７８＞

Part 4. From the Red Banner to the Two Headed Eagle

Topic 22. The USSR in the years of ‘Perestroika’ (reconstruction) (1985-

Topic 23. Post-Soviet Russia ―――― ７＝９

Part 5. The Course of Revival of the Country

Conclusion ―――― ７＞？＆ ＆

Bibliography ―――― ７？７＆

Is it urgent to learn modern Russian history?

originality and distinctiveness. The special time in modern Russian history

ＺＮＫ＆ ］Ｇ＼Ｋ＆ ＵＬ＆ Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ ＸＫ＼ＵＲ［ＺＯＵＴＹ＆

Ｚｎｋ＆ Ｌｋｈｘ｛ｇｘ｡＆ Ｘｋ｜ｕｒ｛ｚｏｕｔ４＆ Ｚｎｋ＆ ｙｕｉｏｇｒ＆ ｇｔｊ＆ ｖｕｒｏｚｏｉｇｒ＆

1.1 Preconditions and the beginning of the revolution

losses on the Western and South-Western fronts. The summer of 1915

the government, not having the possible consequences in mind.

On that day in different parts of the Tavrida Palace simultaneously

1.2 The downfall of monarchy

1.3 The political situation after the downfall of monarchy

organized by liberals). The first chief of the Government became Prince

the main point.

pally about solving their pressing socio-economic problems and only

The sinister singing is almost heard, -

(26 May 1917)

(from ‘Swans Haven’ Trans. L. Katyshevtseva, 2012)

Ｘ｛ｙｙｏｇ＆ ｏｔ＆ ７？７＝＠＆ ｌｘｕｓ＆ Ｌｋｈｘ｛ｇｘ｡＆ ｚｕ＆ Ｕｉｚｕｈｋｘ

The main tendencies in the political development from February to

2.1 Three crises

decision, since in the eyes of masses it identified the moderate socialists

2.2 The increase of the All-National crisis

the peasants and landlords gained the character of a peasant revolution.

2.3 Strengthening of the Bolsheviks’ positions

ordering his troops to advance on Petrograd. Kerensky had no option

2.4 The Bolshevik seizure of power

Assume Power’ Lenin wrote: “History will not forgive us if we do

personality approach in American historiography determined the October

Ｚｎｋ＆ ｋｙｚｇｈｒｏｙｎｓｋｔｚ＆ ｕｌ＆ ｚｎｋ＆ Ｈｕｒｙｎｋ｜ｏｑ＆ ｊｏｉｚｇｚｕｘｙｎｏｖ

3.1 Bolsheviks in power

Immediately after the Second Congress of Soviets ratified the

3.2 The Constituent Assembly and the Brest-Litovsk Peace

ＳＵＪＫＸＴ＆Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ＮＯＹＺＵＸ＿＠＆Ｇ＆ＺＫ＾ＺＨＵＵＱ＆

ＳＵＪＫＸＴ＆Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ＮＯＹＺＵＸ＿＠＆Ｇ＆ＺＫ＾ＺＨＵＵＱ

ＩＮＵＴＴＧＳ＆ＴＧＺＯＵＴＧＲ＆［ＴＯ＼ＫＸＹＯＺ＿＆ＶＸＫＹＹ

ＯＹＨＴ＆＆？＝＞３＞？３？＝＜８６３；８３：＆．６９？８６／＆

Ｌｏｘｙｚ＆Ｖｘｏｔｚｏｔｍ＠＆Ｙｋｖｚｋｓｈｋｘ＆８６７８

Conclusion ―――― ７＞？＆＆

ＺＮＫ＆］Ｇ＼Ｋ＆ＵＬ＆Ｘ［ＹＹＯＧＴ＆ＸＫ＼ＵＲ［ＺＯＵＴＹ＆

Ｚｎｋ＆Ｌｋｈｘ｛ｇｘ｡＆Ｘｋ｜ｕｒ｛ｚｏｕｔ４＆Ｚｎｋ＆ｙｕｉｏｇｒ＆ｇｔｊ＆ｖｕｒｏｚｏｉｇｒ＆

Ｘ｛ｙｙｏｇ＆ｏｔ＆７？７＝＠＆ｌｘｕｓ＆Ｌｋｈｘ｛ｇｘ｡＆ｚｕ＆Ｕｉｚｕｈｋｘ

Ｚｎｋ＆ｋｙｚｇｈｒｏｙｎｓｋｔｚ＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆Ｈｕｒｙｎｋ｜ｏｑ＆ｊｏｉｚｇｚｕｘｙｎｏｖ

Ｚｎｋ＆］ｇｘ＆Ｉｕｓｓ｛ｔｏｙｓ＆Ｖｕｒｏｉ｡

Ｘ｛ｙｙｏｇ＆ｊ｛ｘｏｔｍ＆ｚｎｋ＆ｖｋｘｏｕｊ＆

Ｌｕｘｓｇｚｏｕｔ＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ

Ｌｕｘｋｏｍｔ＆ｖｕｒｏｉ｡＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆Ｙｕ｜ｏｋｚ＆Ｙｚｇｚｋ＆ｏｔ＆ｚｎｋ＆｡ｋｇｘｙ

ＺＮＫ＆ＸＫ＼ＵＲ［ＺＯＵＴ＆ＬＸＵＳ＆ＧＨＵ＼Ｋ＆ＧＴＪ＆

Ｏｔｊ｛ｙｚｘｏｇｒｏ｢ｇｚｏｕｔ＆ｕｌ＆ｚｎｋ＆［ＹＹＸ