Indian Political Science Association

Indian Political Science Association
US INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA: A SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

Author(s): S. GABRIEL and V. M. SATISH
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec. 1990), pp. 565-579
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
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US INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA:
A SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
S. GABRIEL and V. M. SATISH
The unexpected defeat of the ruling Marxist Sandinista

National Liberation Front (FSLN) of Daniel Ontega in Nicaragua,
a Central American country, in the general election held on 25
February 1990 was given wide coverage in the international
media. The survival of the Sandinista Communist government
in Nicaragua, despite US opposition, was perceived by the media
as a test-case in the contemporary period for the continued
existence of a government in a small country in the face of oppo-
sition from a powerful country. Compared to big countries,
smaller countries have to rely more on foreign trade, a greater
concentration of their exports to a limited number of countries
and a lesser diversification in the range of commodities they
export. Further in many small countries a large portion of avai-
lable capital is controlled by foreignorganisations.1 The econo-
mics of these countries are such that they have to depend heavily
on foreignaid and loans for their development. These realities
make the ruling elite in the small states of the world vulnerable
to external influences. With limited internal markets, the
economy of a small state relies heavily on the export of their
goods and services and the exports are mainly concentrated on
one or a few products whereas imports are very diverse.2
After the US failure to contain communism in Vietnam

inspite of a long drawn out war, some US scholars have been
exploring new strategies to contain left movements in the Third
World. One strategy,the Low Intensity Wargare (LIW), was
intended to wean away the masses from supporting such move-
ments and to supply arms and ammunition to those people who
TheIndian ofPolitical
Journal Science, - December,
Vol.51, No. 4, October 1990.
566 THE INDIANJOURNALOF POLITICALSCIENCE
oppose the Marxist governmentsin these countries. Farther, the

US soldiers need not be sent to the area of operation and the
local population can fighton behalf of the US; when a favour-
able climate is created the US forces can intervene directly,if
that is necessary.3 The cost of LIW is meagre in comparison to
a full scale war.
LIW is one formof destabilization, as in the LIW all kinds
of effortsare made, short of open invasion, to weaken and elimi-
nate another for ideological, strategic, economic and political
reasons which are unacceptable to the powerful state.4 Further
the LIW aims to isolate and suffocatea successful regime and
to create circumstances which would make the people realize the
mistake of going in for a communist form of government. In
LIW an effortis also made to legitimise the counterrevolutionary
alternative to the revolution.5 The strategyof LIW will vary so
as to suit the differentconflict situations - the nature of the
economy inherited by a revolutionary government, the socio-
cultural melieu in a country and the extent to which a country's
economy is dependent on the international trade and commerce
etc. Starting with the overthrowof the Haile Selessie regime in
Ethiopia, the 1970s witnessed the emergence of a few radical
socialist regimes in various parts of the Third World. The internal
changes in some African countries including Mozambique and
Angola disappointed the US administration. The changes that
followed in Iran, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada and Rhodesia
were not to the liking of the USA. In 1975, the US felt that
Laos and Cambodia were 'losť to the West. According to David
N. Schwarty these internal changes in the various Third World
countries had been viewed by US administration as Soviet ex-
pansionist moves under the guise of detente,6
The economies of most of the countries of Central America
are controlled by the USA. Even after obtaining Independence
from Spain, the countries in Central America were dominated by
metropolitan centres of the world. Nicaraguan economy as part
of the Spanish colonial empire had undergone some drastic chan-
ges during the colonial era, which in turn made it extremely
dependent on the metropolitan centres of the world without an
industrial base of its own.
Since the arrival of the Spaniards in the 16th century and
after they left the country in 1828, its human and material
A SUCCESSOR FAILURE? 567
US INTERVENTIONIN NICARAGUA:
resources had been used consistentlyfor the benefit of a small

privileged export-orientedoligarchy who acquired wealth through
the export of agricultural and cattle products, ship building and
gold mining activities. The majority of the people scratched out
a living by growing corn, rice, and beans. While the concen-
tration of land ownership in the hands of a few haciendasand lati-
7
fundas enabled them to increase their economic strength, a large
section of the Nicaraguan people remained landless labourers or
marginal producers.
In Nicaragua from 1828 to 1902 there were endless conflicts

among the differentgroups that controlled political power; from
1903 to 1935 the strong disagreements among the political elites
made it easier for USA to interferein the affairsof Nicaragua*
During the rule of the Somoza family, which came to power in
1936 and lasted till the communist revolution in 1979, the depen-
dence of the Nicaraguan economy on the USA increased
considerably.
During the latter part of the Somaza regime (1950 and 1977)
a ninefold increase in agro-exports provided a base for capital
accumulation in Nicaragua. During this period, the production
of land devoted to food production fell from 75 percent to 50
percent and the domestic terms of trade moved sharply against
domestic food producers. Peasants accounted forhalf the popula-
tion and capitalist farmerscontrolled crucial agricultural exports.
In 1979, the economy was dependent on the export of four main
agricultural exports - coffee,cotton, sugar and beef. Capitalist
producers continued to be the principal producers of these main
export items which have been the only source of foreignexchange
earnings. At the same time the country imported food stufffrom
the United States and from Western Europe.8
Nicaraguan foreign trde sector was even more dependent on

the United States. Although the US was the dominant element
in the economy, exports did not go exclusively to that country.
In 1977, the US accounted for 28 per cent of all Nicaraguan
foreign trade.9 The dependence on the US market was particu-
larly important in the case of sugar, bananas, shellfish,meat and
tobacco as virtually all Nicaragua's export of these products were
destined for the US market. In the case of meat and shellfish,
the dependence on US market stemmed fromits geographical
proximity to the market and in the case of bananas to the

complete control of the sector by the US based Standard Food
Company. At the same time, Nicaraguan coffee went mainly to
the West European and Japanese market and the US accounted
for about 5 per cent of the coffee exports. Although the US was
insignificantas a market for cotton and coffee, the processing of
these commodities into an exportable form was dependent on
the US machinery, spare parts and maintenance.10 All export
sectors were also almost entirely dependent on imports from the
US for tractors, harvesting equipment, fertilisers,pesticides and
other productions inputs and for the maintenance of warehouses,
transport and port facilities.11 The Sandinistas inherited an
economy characterised by a dependence on agro-exports and the
virtual absence of an industrial base. The ownership of the
bananas, plantations, oil refineriesand petrochemicals was mainly
concentrated in the United States. Almost half of the corporate
sector in the country was controlled by the Somoza group.
The Somoza regime was overthrownon 17 July 1970 by the

FSLN in a revolution led by the leftistSandinistas, supported by
a section of the Catholic Church and a significantsection of the
middle class. The FSLN and its guerilla fighters played an
important role in defeating the National Guards, the contras,
who had been the main pillar of the Somoza regime. During the
1980 US presidential election campaign, the Republican platform
charged the Carter administration for the lossess sufferedby the
USA in various parts of the Third World. The succession of a
new conservative Republican president, Ronald Reagan, marked
a new turnin the US Third World Policy. The Reagan admini-
stration which came to power with a mission to revitalize the US
in world affairsviewed the various National Liberation Movements
as an instrument of the Soviets to impose Marxist-Leninist
regimes. One of the primaryobjectives of the administration has
been to overturn the so called Soviet gains in the Third World.
Based on the strategy of LIW, the Pentagon high officialstook
initiatives to create and assist pro-Western, anti-communist
insurgenciesagainst these regimes. It has been in Central America,
especially in Nicaragua that the full range of LIW and destabili-
zation has been employed as an alternative to direct invasion.
Following the Sandinista victory,the US administration came to
the conclusion that it should adopt LIW against Nicaragua. The
IN NICARAGUA!
US INTERVENTION
two main phases of the LIW strategy used in Nicaragua were

(i) direct economic sabotage by the contras and (ii) the adoption
of coersive economic policies against Nicaragua. The contras
who fled to the neighbouring countries following the revolution
raided Nicaragua from these countries. Most of these countries
were friendlyto U.S.A. The contras, who were the supporters
of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua destroyed many Government
buildings. The contras attacks had been mainly designed to
disrupt the smooth functioningof the economy and prevent social
transformationswhich were removing certain elements of feuda-
lism, from taking place in the society. As a result of contra
attacks, a number of Nicaragua's ports were destroyed and
Government vehicles, health clinics and child care centres,schools
and production centres were damaged. Technically trained
people such as health workers, volunteers, teachers and agricul-
tural extension workers,workersin the farming cooperatives etc
had been the prime targets of contra attacks.
Some of the major attacks launched by the contras in 1983

were pipelines of the Sandino airport causing severe damages
calculated at more than $ 380 million. The agro-industrial pro-
duction sector had also been one of the main targets of contra-
attacks.12 They frequently attacked the agricultural cooperatives
located in the northern and Atlantic zones as well as fish-farms,
gold and silver mines. The following table shows the amount of
money given directly by the US government upto 1989 90 to the
contras.
authorisedUS aid to theContras

Officially
Month & Year US $ in Remarks

millions
November 1981 19.95 Approved by the National Security

Council for operations against
Nicaragua
December 1982 30 00 Approved by the US Congress for
December 1983 24.00 direct or indirect support for mili-
tary operations within Nicaragua.
June 1985 32.00 The House of Representatives and
the Senate approved different
P- 16
Month & Year US $ in Remarks

millions
humanitarian aid package for the

contras.
June 1986 100.00 Endorsed by the House of Repre-
sentatives.
June 1987 36.00 Endorsed by the House of Repre-

sentatives as Humanitarian aid for
the contras.
September 1988 73.60 Approved by the Congress for

humanitarian and militaryaid.
March 1989 45,00 US Congress allocated fresh huma-
nitarian aid for the contras over
the period May 1989 to November
1990,
Total 360.55 million
Note: What the President had acquired through Congress is

only a part of the fund that had been given as a reward
for the contras for their activities.
A United Nations Commission calculated the war-related

damages to the tune of US $ 480 million. Large amounts of
external assistance were needed to reconstruct the war torn
economy and the Sandinista government sought a total of US $
2.5 billion as economic aid from various sources.13 The Carter
administration responded by granting various small scale loans
and grants as well as by a long range proposal for $ 75 million
for Nicaragua as part of the overall foreignaid bill for the 1981
fiscal year.14 However, 60 percent of this amount was meant for
the private sector of the country in order to strengthenthe
moderates against the Sandinistas.15 When the Somozas left the
country, they left behind a total foreign debt of $ 1.6 billion,
about 75 per cent of which was owed to the US private multi-
national banks.16 Immediately after the Sandinista victory,the
US multinational bankers wanted the Sandinistas to repay the
foreigndebt at commercial rate of interest over the next twelve
US INTERVENTION
IN NICARAGUA:
years. Even though the Sandinistas requested them to reschedule

the debt and arrange for repayment at concessional rates of
interests, the bankers did not agree. It appears that theywanted
to squeeze the very limited foreign exchange reserve of $ 3.5
million left in the country. The paltry amount of reserves that
could be accumulated through international aid had to be used
to repay the foreign debt incurred by the Somozas. At a time
when short term loans from multinational banks as well as from
the Soviet bloc were not forthcoming, these bankers advised the
Sandinistas to impose austerity measures upon its citizens.
According to Susanna Jonas such an advice was given by the US
private banks because they wanted to arouse middle class discon-
tent in the country and turn them against the Sandinistas.17 As
a measure of its austerity, the government decided to limit the
payment of bonus to workers. This made a section of the middle
class to protest against the government.
Within two days of coming to power, President Reagan

carried out a revision of the sixty million dollar credit granted to
Nicaragua by the Garter administration. He suspended payment
of a sum of $ 15 million which was approved by the Congress
and all loans to Nicaragua. In April 1981, Washington cut offall
US aid and food shipments to the Sandinistas and even denied a
credit of $ 9.6 million that had been earmarked for the purchase
of grain in the USA. Along with this the Reagan administration
exerted pressure on the international lending institutionslike the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, International
Development Association and similar multilateral bodies includ-
ing private US banks, not to extend any loans to the Sandinis-
tas.18 Because of US veto these institutions stopped lending to
Nicaragua far developmental projects like water supply schemes,
road building, or educational development programmes. On
many occasions the State Department officialsdirectly interfered
to discourage bank lending to Nicaragua.
One of the main objectives of the US was to disrupt the

agro-export sector of the Nicaraguan economy. In October 1982,
a US based multinational, the Standard Fruit terminated a five
year agreement it signed a year before with the Sandinistas. In
the same year, the Reagan administration slashed the Nicaraguan
sugar quota by 90 per cent forcingthe Sandinistas to find alter-
native sugar markets overnight. Similarly, Exxon, a US based
oil company refused to ship Mexican oil to Nicaragua. Many

other US firmsrefused to permit the selling of replacement and
spare parts to Nicaragua, rendering inoperative a large per cent
of Nicaraguan machinery destroyed by contra attacks.19
During his second term in office,the Reagan administration

continued this economic war and went a furtherstep by imposing
a full economic embargo on 1 May 1985. Keeping in mind the
forthcominggeneral elections in Nicaragua, he renewed the trade
embargo even in the midst of the Iran-contra scandal. The
pattern of contra attacks show that the main objectives of the
guerilla war waged in the rural area were to undermine Nicara-
gua's agrarian economy and to drive a wedge between the revolu-
tionary Sandinista government and the peasantry - the single
largest force in the country. The US administration viewed the
Sandinista government as an aggressive totalitarian regime which
mightstrengthenthe forces of communism in other parts of Latin
America. It feltthat the success of a revolution based on guerilla
fightingand the continued existence of the revolutionary govern-
ment followinga policy of socialist pattern of devlopment should
not be allowed to continue at any cost. The US, with the help
of Nicaragua's neighbours, used radio broadcasts as a means to
discredit the government in the eyes of the people. Though the
Sandinista government improved the health facilities,strenthened
the elementary and adult education centres and made significant
progress in the economic activity in the early period of their
tenure, in the latter part of their rule, it encountered consider-
able difficulties because of the increased interferenceof the
contras. Nicaragua had to build up a strong military force to
defend the country from the contra attacks and a possible US
military intervention. By 1985, nearly 50% of its national budget
was devoted to the militaryforces. The strategyof LIW involves
the use of proxy guerilla forces while simultaneously sending
signals to Nicaraguan militaryintelligence that a direct military
interventionwas just around the corner. The constant build up
of US forces and installtions in Honduras and other Central
American countries plus the joint military exercises along the
Nicaraguan border areas has been designed to force the Sandin-
istas to develop, finance and maintain two different
military
establishments: (i) A standing army to defend the countryagainst
a possible US invasion on its Pacific Coast and urban areas and
US INTERVENTION A SUCCESSOR FAILURE? 573
IN NICARAGUA!
(ii) A counterinsurgencyguerilla style army to control the contra

units.20
Because of external compulsions, Nicaragua had been forced

to build up a strong militaryforce to defend the country fromthe
contra attacks and a possible direct US military intervention.
The vast majority of Nicaragua's militaryforces were geared to
defend the country froma possible US attack. Without such a
fear, Nicaragua would have needed an army, that is only half the
size of those Guatemala and El Salvador to control the contras,
whereas it actually maintained one that was twice the size of that
maintained by its neighbours. Guarding the cities and the coasts
represented a heavier military burden on the economy because
the vast majority of the scarce resources went into building up a
powerful army that made the Pentagon hesitant to launch a direct
intervention.
Local militia drawn from the peasantry as well as urban

workersand party cadres workingforthreeto six monthshad been
guarding the country against contra attacks. With the growth of
contra forces,Sandinistas were forced to draftand professionalise
numbers of young men and women into the militia which how-
ever managed to break the back of the contra threat. Because
of contra attacks each year from 1982 to 1989, Nicaragua had
been uncertain whether it should be allowed to collect its vital
coffee harvest. In this alert situation, thousands of people had
been mobilized not only to pick coffee, but to protect the pickers
fromcontra attacks. Even though the Sandinistas had been able
to defend their country against these attacks, it had an unbea-
rable economic burden on the national populace. By 1985, when
the Sandinistas had developed a powerful defence machinery,
50 per cent of its national budget was devoted to wage the un-
declared war. Compulsory conscription to strengthen the mili-
tary and local militia units of the youth, especially from peasant
families who employ labour on their own farms, made a section
of the population hostile to the revolution. Most of the people
wanted to see an end to the war and the restoration of
normalcy.
The very location of the contra war affected Nicaragua's
principal productive activities in terms of labour, GDP and
foreign exchange earnings. Production of coffee, beans, and
cattle rearing, which are the backbone of the country's economy,

were all located principally in the war zones. On the eve of the
1990 elections, coffee production was down by about a third and
the country's national herd was about half of what it was in 1977.
There had been shortages of beans since production was shifted
to the less fertilePacific coastal area. The direct and indirect
cost of the war had been skyrocketing.The Nicaraguan National
Insititute of Statistics and Census has calculated the direct cost
of the war from 1980 to 1987 at about $ 1,282.7 million. Indirect
and direct effectsof the war on the GDP have been calculated at
more than $ 3.6 billion.21
As a result of the contra war, Nicaraguan export sector had

been totally disrupted, further tightening the foreign exchange
noose. Despite the enormous costs of the embargo, it did not
destroy the Nicaraguan economy. Within a remarkably short
period of time, Nicaragua found new markets for the products
previously sold in the USA. However, the country had suffered
a loss as a result of having to ship its products over greater dis-
tances. These transportcosts were particularly important in the
case of perishable goods such as shellfish, meat, and bananas
which before the embargo went exclusively to the US. Further-
more, while the value of Nicaraguan sales to European and
Japanese marketsdiminished due to increased transportcosts, the
need to rely on these more distant locations for imports had
inflated import values. Meanwhile the move away from dollar
purchase to Yen, Deuts Mark and other currencies, had meant
that Nicaragua had been particularly vulnerable to the apprecia-
tion of major European and Far Eastern currencies against the
US dollar, as virtually all Nicaragua's exports are valued in
dollars.22
In the long run, the impact of the embargo on imports and

its consequent indirect impact on exports had been much more
serious. The fact that spare parts and replacements were no
longer available had seriously undermined virtually everycapital
input which predated 1979. For example, tractors,harvesters,
and crop processors were idle or inefficientfor want of spare
parts; electricity supply was threatened by the breakdown of
aging US generators; doctors and dentists could not get replace-
ment parts for their equipment; US made cars, trucks and buses
were falling apart. Thus all sectors were affected by shortages
IN NICARAGUA:
US INTERVENTION
of US equipment and, with wear and tear, the list had been ex-
tending day by day from 1982 to 1989. Contra war had been
the single most important factor accounting for the collapse of
the Nicaraguan economy. Of the agro-exports, coffee had been
most directly affected by the war as the highlands bordering
Honduras are the location of prime coffee plantations. Agro-
exports which were not located in the war zones had experienced
numerous war related problems At times agricultural produc-
tion and quality had sufferedfromthe lack of transport forinputs
and for exports.
The US economic embargo had affected the arrival of raw

materials and consumer goods which at certain times had provok-
ed crisesin the supply of such necessities as oil, soap, toilet paper,
powder milk and tooth paste. Small scale industry had also been
affected by the scarcities with negative consequences for thé
sustenance of thousands of humble families. Nicaraguan produc-
tive sector which had been seriously damaged by the contras,
affectedthe production of corn, beans, the delivery of meat and
milk - all of which negatively affected the recovery of produc-
tion investment efforts and raising the standard of living of
oridinary Nicaraguans.23 The financial cost of defending the
country had necessitated the raising of taxes, restrictions on
extending good health care and education and inflationary pres-
sure which affected the workersmost of all.
Some 300,000 Nicaraguans - nearly 10 per cent of the

country's population - had been displaced by the contra war.
Many of them were evacuated fromtheirrural homes and resettled
in safer rural areas on an organised basis by the government.
Beginning in 1985, people were evacuated from areas where the
contras enjoyed significantsupport. The Sandinista army decided
that the only way to deal with the contras was to empty these
areas of civilians and turn them into free-firezones. Many of
the people thus forciblyevacuated were active or passive contra
supporters. Many of them had relatives who joined the contra
army voluntarily or were kidnapped into it. Political problems
have been serious, especially in the communities where people
were resettled involuntarily. These problems were compounded
by the war which limited the resources available to solve these
problems.
The situation was further aggravated by the austerity

measures taken by the government including significantreduc-
tions in state personnel in 1988 and 1989. In such a precarious
situation many people thought that if the war ended they would
be free to return to their homes in the mountains and the country
could overcome the distortions brought about by the war. Since
the triumph of the revolution in 1979 the rightist forces also
remained withinNicaragua as legal opposition parties. Seven out
of the nine registered political parties participated in the 1974
elections. Over 75% of all registered voters cast their ballots for
one of the seven parties contested. The FSLN got 67% of the
vetes and other opposition parties together got 33% of the total
votes polled.24
Various peace agreements signed by the Central American

countries - the Contadora, Arias Peace Plan, etc., - did not
bring peace and normalcy to Nicaragua. At a summit meeting
of Central American heads of state on February 13, 1989, Presi-
dent Ontega agreed to bring forward the general elections in
Nicaragua from November 1990 to 25 February 1990 and
appealed to the Central American countries not to support con-
tras in their territories. A total of 14 opposition parties together
with the contra political leadership came together on a common
platform against the the FSLN. The UNO (United Nicaraguan
Opposition), led by Mrs. Chamorro promised to end the ten year
old civil war and make efforts to recover the economy. The
UNO manifesto also promised to abolish compulsory military
service in the militia units.
The conflictsituation in and around Nicaragua became criti-

cal in the firsthalf of 1988 when the US Congress allotted fresh
humanitarian aid package to the contras and renewed the trade
embargo against Nicaragua. The Guardian (United Kingdom)
reported that the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
was authorised by the US Congress in fiscal year 1989 and 1990
to distribute $ 12.5 million to opposition groups in Nicaragua
which had played a very active role in developing the UNO.
According to the Newsweek magazine, the CIA clandestinely
channeled $ 5 million to the opposition in Nicaragua in 1986.
Hemispheric initiative, a Boston based group monitoring the
Nicaraguan elections estimated that the US had provided a total
of more than $ 26 million to the opposition since 1984. This
US INTERVENTION
IN NICARAGUA:
support has enabled them to bring the vascillating middle class

under their sway. The opposition in Nicaragua created the im-
pression that if the UNO won the election, the US would end the
embargo and economic warfare. At the time of the election,
the country was in much greater need than ever before necessary
edible commodities like rise, meat, legumes, cotton, coffee, etc.
which were imported fromoutside. The resumption of the un-
declared war in 1988 had made it difficultfor FSLN to lessen the
gravity of the need of the people as it had promised before the
revolution The 14 party coalition National Opposition Union
(UNO) headed by Mrs. Chamorro, secured 54.8% polled by the
FSLN. While in the 1984 election, more than 75% of the people
exercised their franchise in 1990, there was a massive 96% turn
out of the 1.75 million voters.25
Despite its defeat, the FSLN continues to be the single

largest party in the country. The UNO consisting of 14 political
parties in a fructiouscoalition without a clear cut stand on many
issues. Given the experience of other pro-American governments
in Latin America which followed a liberal economic policy, the
extent to which the new regime can solve the economic problems
of Nicaragua by pumping dollars from abroad is amute point. In
Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and some other Latin
American countries, the authoritarian regimes which have the
backing of Washington have been findingit difficultto solve the
problems of the people. Latin America will continue to be one
of the trouble spots of the world. However, in February 1990,
in Nicaragua the USA has succeed in bringing about a situation
which made the people of Nicaragua to vote out in impartial
election a Marxist party that came to power through a violent
revolution.
NOTES
1.Clark, Collin and Payne, Tony, Politics, Securityand

, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, pp. 51-52.
Development
2. Knox, A. D., "Some Economic Problems of Smaller

Countries*' in Benedict B.,(ed.) Problemsof SmallerTerritories
, Allen
and Unwin, London, 1987, pp. 357-58.
P.-17
3. Robinson, William I. "Nicaragua: Strategyof Counter-

revolution" MonthlyReview , (New York) Vol. 37, No. 7, December
1985, pp. 11-12.
Also see Zhuttz, Richard H. Jr. "Low Intensity Conflict:
Future challenges and Lessons from the Regan Years" Survival
London, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1988, pp. 21-22.
4. Cited in Thompson, Carol B. "War by Another Name:
Destabilization in Nicaragua and Mozambique", Race and Class,
(London) Vol. 29, No. 4, 1988, pp. 21-22.
5. William I. Robinson, No. 3, pp. 16-17.
6. Schwartz. David N. "Detente: A United States View"
in Crockett, Richard, Smith, Steve (eds) The Cold War: Past and
, London, Allen and Unwin, 1987, p. 79-90.
Present
7. The commonly used terms for small-scale land lords
and big land lords respectively.
8. Gibson, "A Structural Overview of the Nicaraguan
Economy," in Splading R., (ed.) The Political Economyof Révolu-
tionaryNicaragua, Allen and Unwin, Boston, 1987, pp. 20-21.
9. Golding, Ian and Pizare, Roberto "Perspectives on
Nicaragua's Foreign Trade." IDS Bulletin(Sussex), Vol. 19, No. 3,
pp. 26-27.
10. Fitsgerald, E. V. K. "Economics of the Revolution,"
in Walker, Thomas W., (ed.) Nicaragua in Revolution , Praeger,
New York, 1983 pp, 203-21: See also Golding Ian and Pizzare
Roberto, "Perspectives on Nicaragua's Foreign Trade," IDS
Bulletin, (Sussex), Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 24-31.
11. Gibson, n. 8, pp. 22-24.
12. Thompson, Carol B. n. 4, pp. 23-24.
13. Conroy, Michael E. "US Economic Aggression in
Nicaragua", Latin AmericanPerspectives
, (London), Vol. 12, No. 2,
pp. 40-44.
14. Ibid.,
15.Jonas Sussana, "The New Cold War and the
Nicaraguan Revolution: The Case of US aid to Nicaragua" in
Central American Action Network, (ed.) CentralAmericain Revolu-
tion,West view, Boulder, 1983, pp. 91-92.
IN NICARAGUA:
US INTERVENTION
16. Ibid.,
17. Susanna Jonas, n. 15.
18. Gonroy, Michael E. n. 13, pp. 42-43.
19. Marchetti Peter, Jerez Cesar, "Democracy and Milita-
rism: War and Development.", IDS Bulletin , (Sussex) Vol. 19,
No. 3, pp. 3-4.
20. Marchetti, Peter and Jerez Cesaar, n. 19, pp. 3-4.
21. Ibid.,
22. Golding Ian and Pizzare Robert, "Perspectives on
Nicaragua's Foreign Trade", n. pp. 27-28.
23. Utting Peter, "The Peasant Question and the Develop-
ment Policy", IDS Bulletin, (Sussex) Vol. 12, No. 3, pp 40 42.
24. Central American Historical Institute, "Analysis of the
Election" Envio, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 1-29.
25. Ibid.,

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US INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA: A SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

S. GABRIEL and V. M. SATISH

The unexpected defeat of the ruling Marxist Sandinista

After the US failure to contain communism in Vietnam

oppose the Marxist governmentsin these countries. Farther, the

resources had been used consistentlyfor the benefit of a small

In Nicaragua from 1828 to 1902 there were endless conflicts

Nicaraguan foreign trde sector was even more dependent on

proximity to the market and in the case of bananas to the

The Somoza regime was overthrownon 17 July 1970 by the

two main phases of the LIW strategy used in Nicaragua were

Some of the major attacks launched by the contras in 1983

authorisedUS aid to theContras

Month & Year US $ in Remarks

November 1981 19.95 Approved by the National Security

Month & Year US $ in Remarks

humanitarian aid package for the

June 1987 36.00 Endorsed by the House of Repre-

September 1988 73.60 Approved by the Congress for

Total 360.55 million

Note: What the President had acquired through Congress is

A United Nations Commission calculated the war-related

years. Even though the Sandinistas requested them to reschedule

Within two days of coming to power, President Reagan

One of the main objectives of the US was to disrupt the

oil company refused to ship Mexican oil to Nicaragua. Many

During his second term in office,the Reagan administration

(ii) A counterinsurgencyguerilla style army to control the contra

Because of external compulsions, Nicaragua had been forced

Local militia drawn from the peasantry as well as urban

cattle rearing, which are the backbone of the country's economy,

As a result of the contra war, Nicaraguan export sector had

In the long run, the impact of the embargo on imports and

The US economic embargo had affected the arrival of raw

Some 300,000 Nicaraguans - nearly 10 per cent of the

The situation was further aggravated by the austerity

Various peace agreements signed by the Central American

The conflictsituation in and around Nicaragua became criti-

support has enabled them to bring the vascillating middle class

Despite its defeat, the FSLN continues to be the single

1.Clark, Collin and Payne, Tony, Politics, Securityand

2. Knox, A. D., "Some Economic Problems of Smaller

3. Robinson, William I. "Nicaragua: Strategyof Counter-

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