LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN v.

HEIRS OF NATIVIDAD

WON LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF A DRUNK PASSENGER WHO DIED WHEN IT FELL IN THE RAILINGS AND WAS HIT BY THE
MOVING TRAIN CAUSING ITS INSTANTENOUS DEATH?
YES. Only LRTA is liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common
carrier.

A contract of carriage was created from the moment a person paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of
the latter, entitling him to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all circumstances.

Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so
long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage

In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or
avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is
NOT RELIEVED of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

In case of death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden
shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred the presumption would be that it has
been at fault pursuant to ART. 1756 of the CC.

The foundation of LRTA‘S LIABILITY IS THE CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the
breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier.

On the other hand, there‘s no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he
must also be absolved from liability.

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., v. CA

WON CARRIER IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF A PASSENGER WHO FELL FROM ITS PLATFORM WHILE TRYING TO ALIGHT THE BUS
WHILE THE SAME WAS STILL IN SLOW MOTION AND SUDDENLY ACCELERATED?
 YES. THE CARRIER IS LIABLE.
 Art. 1756 specifically provides that any injury that might be suffered by a passenger is right away attributable to its
fault or negligence. It is incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence.
 By stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is thus entitled all the
rights and protection pertaining to their contractual relation.
 The duty which the carrier owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting
therefrom.
 When the bus is not in motion, there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to
board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it is the duty of
the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the
peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same.

WON THE PASSENGER IS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN ITS ACT OF ALIGHTING WHEN THE bus had "just started"
and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was on its platform
 NO. The act of the victim in boarding the same cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances.
 When the bus is not in motion, there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to
board.
 A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.
 Hence, it is the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the
effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same
 Furthermore, it is not negligence per se for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly.
 The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the
driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION v. SUYOM

WON petitioner is liable for death & injuries suffered by private respondents in an action based on quasi-delict for the
negligent acts of a driver who is not the employee of the petitioner but was driving the vehicle that’s been subjected to
unregistered sale and registry continued to be under his name
 YES. petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the
tractor at the time of the accident
 The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful
operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible
for the consequences of its operation.
 In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and
employer being considered as merely its agent.
 The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service.
 The registered owner of a motor vehicle is solidarily liable for the injuries and damages caused by the negligence of
the driver, in spite of the fact that the vehicle may have already been the subject of an unregistered Deed of Sale
in favor of another person
 Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the deaths
and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS & JEEPNEY OWNERS UNDER BOUNDARY SYTEM
MARTINEZ v. NLRC
WON Petitioner is correct in alleging that there is absence of employer-employee relationship between her deceased son
and private respondents because there is no evidence that her son paid a single centavo by way of wages to private
respondents; rather, they were governed by the boundary system
 NO. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION ID DEVOID OF MERIT.
 NLRC v. DINGLASAN: The relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the
other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee.
 In the lease of chattels the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be
reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor.
 In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the
latter. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary"
they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer
and employee
 . The doctrine is applicable by analogy to the present case.
 Thus, private respondents were employees of Raul Martinez because they had been engaged to perform activities
which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer

WON private respondents, being then employees of Raul Martinez, necessarily continue to be employees of the petitioner as
the new operator of the business? If in the affirmative, were they illegally dismissed?
 NO. Private respondents simply assumed the continuance of an employer-employee relationship between them
and petitioner, when she took over the operation of the business after the death of her son Raul Martinez, without
any supporting evidence.
 The rule is settled that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts are not enforceable against the transferee of an
enterprise.
 The reason for the rule is that labor contracts are in personam, and that claims for backwages earned from the
former employer cannot be filed against the new owners of an enterprise.
 Nor is the new operator of a business liable for claims for retirement pay of employees.
 Thus the claim of private respondents should have been filed instead in the intestate proceedings involving the
estate of Raul Martinez.

KABIT SYSTEM
LIM v. CA
WON to recognize an operator under the kabit system as the real party in interest and to countenance his claim for
damages is utterly subversive of public policy
NO.

The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows
other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the
earnings.
Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly penalized by law, the kabit system is invariably recognized as
being contrary to public policy.
The reason is because one of the primary factors considered in the granting of a certificate of public convenience for the
business of public transportation is the financial capacity of the holder of the license, so that liabilities arising from accidents
may be duly compensated.
The kabit system renders illusory such purpose and, worse, may still be availed of by the grantee to escape civil liability
caused by a negligent use of a vehicle owned by another and operated under his license.
If a registered owner is allowed to escape liability by proving who the supposed owner of the vehicle is, it would be easy for
him to transfer the subject vehicle to another who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage
done.
Thus, for the safety of passengers and the public who may have been wronged and deceived through the baneful kabit
system, the registered owner of the vehicle is not allowed to prove that another person has become the owner so that he
may be thereby relieved of responsibility.

he thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon
whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy
therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved.

In the present case it is at once apparent that the evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system does not exist:
1. neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages;
2. the case arose from the negligence of another vehicle;
3. The riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced

Hence, private respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his passenger jeepney as
well as on his business.

HIGHKACKING
FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC v. CA
WON Fortune Express breached its contract of carriage by failing to exercise the required degree of diligence in ensuring
the safety of its passengers.
 YES. Because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was
made possible.
 A common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting their
baggages.
 Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
 Here, Petitioner's employees failed to prevent the attack on one of petitioner's buses because they did not exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, petitioner should be held liable for the death of atty. Caorong

WON seizure of bus was a fortuitous event

NO.

Art. 1755, CC: "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."

To be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that:

(1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will;
(2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(3) the occurence must be render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of any of
the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being excused from liability

In the present case, this factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered force
majeure) is lacking.
As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of
petitioner's buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary
precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.

G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC vs. HEIRS OF ROMEO L. BATTUNG Sr.

Where the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of [the common carrier’s] employees, and therefore involving no issue of
negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable [care] as well as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from
causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable.

To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which is not the
intention of the lawmakers.

Since Battung‘s death was caused by a copassenger, the applicable provision is, not Article 1756 in relation to Articles 1733
and 1755 of the Civil Code, but Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states that:
"a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."

Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a family, in
assessing the existence of any culpability on the common carrier’s part.

Common carriers are not insurers of the absolute safety of their passengers and that their liability for personal injuries rests
upon their negligence. The duty of a common carrier to ensure the safety of its passengers should be balanced with the
passengers' right to privacy.

Common carriers should be given leeway in assuming that passengers will not bring anything dangerous on board unless
there is evidence to the contrary

Here, Unlike, Fortune’s case, There was also no showing that during the course of the trip, Battung’s killer made suspicious
actions which would have forewarned petitioner’s employees of the need to conduct thorough checks on him or any of the
passengers.

SULPICIO LINES, INC. vs. NAPOLEON SESANTE,

the Captain’s erroneous maneuvers of the vessel was the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking. Even assuming the
seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of the Orient, the petitioner could not escape liability considering that, as borne out by
the aforequoted findings of the BMI, the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel had been the gross
negligence of its captain in maneuvering the vessel. The Court also notes that Metro Manila was experiencing Storm Signal
No. 1 during the time of the sinking

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. CA

WON PETITIONER IS CORRECT IN AVERRING THAT Viana ceased to be a passenger when he disembarked the vessel and that
1 hour had already lapsed since Viana disembarked the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to
unload his cargoes prior to the operation of the crane, consequently his presence there was no longer reasonable.

NO. Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident.

The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left
the vessel owner‘s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has,
after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier‘s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier‘s premises.

All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers,
and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and
includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure.

Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim
his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time.

Hence, Petitioner is liable for the death of Viana, a passenger of the vessel. The SC ruled that there was justifiable cause for
the presence of Anacleto on or near the petitioner’s vessel an hour after the petitioner disembarked from the vessel

WON the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught
with serious peril.
 NO. , the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed
by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was
disputable and not indubitably established.
 Even assuming the existence of the supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around the unloading area and the
guard's admonitions against entry therein, these were at most insufficient precautions which pale into insignificance
if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the danger to which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that
petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly and
actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area

TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. CA

WON Trans-Asia failed to exercise extraordinary diligence required for a common carrier when it departed with only one (1)
engine running. and in its course of voyage, its engines conked out in the open sea, and for more than an hour it was stalled
and at the mercy of the waves, thus causing fear in the passenger
 YES. , the vessel was unseaworthy even before the voyage began.
 For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be:
1. adequately equipped for the voyage and
2. manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew.
 The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a
clear breach of is duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.
 Here, in allowing the vessel to leave the port of origin on only one functioning engine, instead of two, THUS
unseaworthy, and undertake the contracted voyage, with full awareness that it was exposed to perils of the sea, it
deliberately disregarded its solemn duty to exercise extraordinary diligence and obviously acted with bad faith
and in a wanton and reckless manner.
 Hence, Petitioner, as a common carrier, failed to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of its
passengers, AND acted in bad faith and with malice by allowing the unseaworthy vessel to undertake the voyage.

NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC, vs. CA

WON Petitioner is liable for breach of cc for damages & injury cause by the sinking of its vessel due to failure of its
employees to take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the
ship.
YES. A shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature
of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner.

BROKERAGE AS COMMON CARRIER

TORRES-MADRID BROKERAGE, INC. V. FEB MITSUI MARINE INSURANCE CO., INC

WON TMBI, A BROKER, which facilitates shipment documents and deliver cargoes to its client, IS A COMMON CARRIER
o YES. A brokerage may be considered a common carrier if it also undertakes to deliver the goods for its customers

o Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.

o A customs broker — whose principal business is the preparation of the correct customs declaration and the proper
shipping documents — is still considered a common carrier if it also undertakes to deliver the goods for its
customers. The law does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and
one who undertakes this task only as an ancillary activity.

o In this case, TMBI’s delivery of the goods is an integral, albeit ancillary, part of its brokerage services. TMBI admitted
that it was contracted to facilitate, process, and clear the shipments from the customs authorities, withdraw them
from the pier, then transport and deliver them to Sony‘s warehouse in Laguna.

o The fact that TMBI does not own trucks and has to subcontract the delivery of its clients‘ goods, is immaterial. As long
as an entity holds itself to the public for the transport of goods as a business, it is considered a common carrier
regardless of whether it owns the vehicle used or has to actually hire one.

o Lastly, TMBI‘s customs brokerage services — including the transport/delivery of the cargo — are available to anyone
willing to pay its fees. Given these circumstances, we find it undeniable that TMBI is a common carrier.

WON hijacking of the truck was a fortuitous event.

o NO, the theft or the robbery of the goods is not considered a fortuitous event or a force majeure.
o Generally, in case of theft or robbery – a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it can prove that it observed extraordinary diligence.

o An exception to this rule, is cited in the case of De Guzman v. CA: A robbery attended by “grave or irresistible
threat, violence or force” is a fortuitous event that absolves the common carrier from liability.

o In this case however, neither TMBI nor BMT succeeded in substantiating this theory that the hijacking was attended
by force or intimidation through evidence

WON TMBI & SONY ARE SOLIDARY LIABLE to MITSUI

o NO. ONLY TMBI SI LIABLE TO MITSUI.
o Article 1736, a common carrier‘s extraordinary responsibility over the shipper‘s goods lasts from the time these
 goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation, until they are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee.
o Although the cargo disappeared during transit while under the custody of BMT — TMBI‘s subcontractor — it did not
diminish nor terminate TMBI‘s responsibility over the cargo. Article 1735 of the Civil Code presumes that it was at
fault.
o MBI’s liability to Mitsui does not stem from a quasi-delict but from its breach of contract. The tie that binds TMBI with
Mitsui is contractual,

Notably, BMT, however, is liable to TMBI for breach of their contract of carriage.

By subcontracting the cargo delivery to BMT, TMBI entered into its own contract of carriage with a fellow common carrier.

BRITISH AIRWAYS, INC. v. CA

WON BA is not liable for alleged breach of contract of carriage for repeated failure to transport respondent’s employees
despite confirmed booking of said workers ,as there was no contract of carriage as no ticket was ever issued
NO.

TRAVEL AGENCY IS NOT A COMMON CARRIER, THUS NOT OBLIGED TO OBSERVE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE

CRISOSTOMO V. CA
WON Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc., a travel agency, engaged in facilitating tour booking and
accommodation is a common carrier, thus, required to exercise extraordinary due diligence towards informing its client’s
booking information
NO. Petitioner’s submission is premised on a wrong assumption

Pursuant to definition of common carriers under ART. 1732, CC, A contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a
certain person or association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another
for a fixed price. Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers and are classified as private or special
carriers and common or public carriers.

. It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either
passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier.

Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another since its covenant with its customers is
simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Respondent‘s services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and
facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours.

In contrast, the object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers or goods. It is in this sense that the
contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for services and not one of carriage.

Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care required of respondent is that of
a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an
ordinarily prudent person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation

Article 1733
 CC is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the its passengers..

Article 1755

CC bound to carry its passenger safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.