Defence Studies

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Exploring military victory in battle: a qualitative

study on contemporary tactics

Lars Henåker

To cite this article: Lars Henåker (2020): Exploring military victory in battle: a qualitative study on
contemporary tactics, Defence Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2020.1750300

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DEFENCE STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020.1750300

Exploring military victory in battle: a qualitative study on

contemporary tactics
Lars Henåker

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This study examines simulated battle settings, to analyze how Received 13 December 2018
tactics are performed and victory is achieved by observing tacti- Accepted 30 March 2020
cians dueling in wargames. In contemporary warfare, victory in KEYWORDS
battle relates to a wide variety of elements. According to military Defence studies; victory;
theory, these elements commonly involve deployment, reconnais- wargaming; tactics; land
sance, manoeuvre, breakthrough, tempo, surprise, exploitation, and warfare; military problem
shock, resulting in enemy organizational breakdown. Ideally, if one solving
side in combat exploits all elements successfully, the likelihood of
victory increases. Although the use of the tactical elements is not
always obvious to the participants, the study indicates a correlation
between using the elements and victory in a wargame setting.
Although wargames inherent bias by not being the real world,
they are used in training, education and analysis worldwide. The
study also illustrates that the participants view tactical victory
differently in battle.

Introduction
This study explores the relationships between how tacticians act and the mechanisms
used, resulting in either success or defeat in relation to theories about combat in land
warfare. Current research emphasizes in particular the following elements: deployment,
reconnaissance, manoeuvre, breakthrough, tempo, surprise, exploitation, and enemy
organizational breakdown, as important aspects of how tactical victory can be achieved
(see Biddle 2004; Collins 2010; Leonhard 1994; Lind 1985; Storr 2009). This study’s
findings indicate that when these elements are employed as part of wargaming, the
chance of tactical victory increases, especially if the opponent uses them to a lesser
degree. One important reason for this study is that while the majority of current research
focuses on war and its impact on society, few studies focus on battle itself (e.g., Lind 1985,
50; Storr 2009, 8–21; Hulterström and Widén 2013, 51). Many studies also have
a strategic and not a tactical focus, further reducing the literature (Friedman 2017, 5).
This study aims to contribute to the current debates on tactical victory by analysing the
role of contemporary military theory and the relationship between how tacticians act and
the outcome of wargaming battles. If we look to the classical study of tactics, we note Carl
von Clausewitz’s definition of tactics as “the theory of the use of military forces in
combat” (Clausewitz 1997, 75), which provides a broad basis for the field of tactics.

CONTACT Lars Henåker lars.henaker@fhs.se Swedish Defence University, Drottning Kristinas väg, Stockholm,
Sweden, 37115 93
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
2 L. HENÅKER

Tactics include, by definition, both theoretical and practical knowledge (Liddell Hart,
212–213) of how to use military forces in combat in an effective way (e.g. Fuller, 107–110,
Lind, 12). More specifically, Basil Liddell Hart (1929, 215) points to the importance of
exploiting one’s own effects before an opponent has the chance to react. J.F.C. Fuller
(Fuller 2012, 108, 272) suggests that one may reduce the enemy’s chance to win by
destroying his plans. In addition, William Lind’s (Lind 1985, 12) view on successful
tactics emerge from manoeuvre warfare. This approach emphasizes the need to combine
techniques and education, and to seek unique solutions. That said, military tactics
include a wide range of battlefield performances. This study focuses on exploring how
tacticians use tactics in order to defeat an enemy during wargames. In this study, I have
adopted a deductive approach and observed in recorded wargames the conduct of 48
academics and military officers skilled in military tactics, to understand how victory
emerges in battle. In particular, this study focuses on the execution of tactics and how it is
applied rather than planning processes, although they may be intimately connected. One
common way to assess tactics is by focusing on planning processes (e.g. Friedman 2017,
145–146; Storr, 38, 142–143; Leonhard, 8). Military problems are dynamic, complex and
opaque, and military decision-making is central to solving such problems. A dynamic
problem requires a series of decisions, making timing and tempo important factors. In
addition, the environment changes because of the tacticians’ own actions (Brehmer 2000,
233–234). According to Gary Klein, the level of experience matter in situations involving
decision-making under time pressure as experience improves the ability to withstand
pressure (Klein 1998, 161–168). Observations concerning the tacticians’ skills within the
narrative were visualized by recording all of their decisions in the form of clicks. During
a period of almost two hours, the individual tacticians made 150 to 250 different clicks. In
the study, I use this material to identify decisive clicks with regards to the tactical
performance under scrutiny. The article begins by presenting an overview of the decisive
tactical elements, method, and wargame epistemology. The subsequent part focuses on
the analysis and conclusions regarding the tacticians’ performance and the extent to
which the successful tactician’s action complies with or challenges contemporary the-
ories. In conclusion, I argue that, if one side in combat exploits a successful use of
elements as advocated by current research, the likelihood of victory in battle increases.

Decisive tactical elements

This part describes in brief which of eight elements identified above in military theories as
important in achieving victory. I highlight what significance each element has and what
items I focus on. Deployment is the starting point that determines the order of battle and
disposition in the upcoming battle. Deployment includes combined arms and the approach
to battle. It is only relevant prior to the battle and as such, it influences the first contact with
enemy units (Leonhard 1991, 253). In my analysis, I focus on how well combined arms
integrate, if manoeuvre units are within range of their own artillery support, how small-unit
independently approach the battle and the battle groups dispersion (Biddle 2004, 35) of
own “soft targets” such as logistic and artillery units. The element of reconnaissance
amounts to the practice of exploring the battlefield and exploiting weak spots and oppor-
tunities as they are discovered (Storr 2009, 49). According to Storr, the exploitation of
reconnaissance may result in the seizure of opportunities, neutralization of enemy
 DEFENCE STUDIES 3

reconnaissance, the location of surfaces and gaps, disruption to defence including HQs and
logistic units, the demoralization and creation of uncertainty and the disguise of the nature
and direction of the attacker´s thrusts (Storr 2009, 50). In my analysis, I focus on whether
reconnaissance companies find and exploit gaps while avoiding being annihilated (>85per-
centage losses) if contact with the enemy is made. Third, we find the element of manoeuvre.
Manoeuvre amounts to movement on the field of battle including adopting fire positions
and establishing protection and it tends ultimately to culminate in fighting. Hence,
manoeuvre requires time, where its greatest success is seen in terms of achieving
a breakthrough into the enemy´s rear or interior lines, and disrupting enemy units’ move-
ments. Through manoeuvre, a smaller force can defeat a much larger one, and major
victories can be won with relatively few casualties on the winning side (Collins 2010, 4). In
my analysis, I focus on manoeuvre leading to infiltration and outflanking of enemy units.
Fourth, breakthrough is the beginning of overturning the opponent’s defence (Biddle 2004,
40–41). A breakthrough opens up a defence line and forces the opponent to react.
A reaction is, for example, when using reserves in a counter-attack, a withdrawal to new
defence positions or redeploying supporting units such as artillery and logistics. As
a prelude, breakthrough enables exploitation to occur. In my analysis, I focus on man-
oeuvre units reaching and pursuing enemy soft targets. In this study, soft targets are equal
to artillery and logistic unit. Fifth, we find tempo. Lind suggests that the purpose of
manoeuvre warfare should be to outpace the enemy and implement action faster than
the enemy (Lind 1985, pp. 4–8; for a more detailed discussion, see Boyd 1996, 2007). The
side with greater speed tends to deny the enemy from being able to use its forces effectively.
In my analysis, I focus on control of Uppsala city1 as a hub and if any side is linear, passive,
or fighting in a static mode, using attrition. Sixth, surprise can be achieved in a number of
ways such as unexpected timing, direction, means, and methods of an attack. In addition,
deception, intelligence, security, speed, and originality are major factors in achieving
surprise (Storr 2009, 84). Lind underlines the importance of avoiding fixed schemes and
instead inventing new tactical patterns and creating new tactical options that lead to
confusion and disorder (Lind 1985, 6–7). In my analysis, I focus on disruption of artillery
by direct fire occurring as a result of unexpected timing and direction. Seventh, exploitation
is a crucial ingredient in achieving victory. In essence, exploitation consists of conducting
a successful attack followed by the subsequent exploitation of the enemy’s weaknesses or
a collapsed enemy defence and turning a small tactical victory into a large-scale operational
success (Leonhard 1994, 155). Exploitation is important for victory in that it reduces the
attacking side’s casualties and deprives the defending side of any organized coherent
defence. The combination of shock and surprise further reduces their defensive capability.
Shock occurs in battle mainly due to rapid bombardment, sudden approach, the use of
armour and certain types of weapons (Storr 2009, 87). In my analysis of exploitation, I focus
on units in depth assaulting rear enemy units. The final element is to accomplish enemy
organizational breakdown, achieved through breaking the defender´s will and cohesion by
reducing their participation in further combat (Clausewitz 1997, 204; Storr 2009, 90–92;
Leonhard 1991, 112). Hypothetically, if all the elements are achieved, the likelihood of
winning the battle increases, and if the opponent does not follow the elements, the chances
of winning increase even further. In my analysis, I focus on the losses of manoeuvre units.
When one side has less than 45 percentage losses at the same time the opponent received
more than 85 percentage in losses, an organizational breakdown is taken to occur.
4 L. HENÅKER

Method
This study uses a qualitative approach to operationalize, analyse, and interpret the
content of collected material into meaningful conclusions (Patton 2015, 5–15; Margolis
and Zunjarwad 2018, 616–621). The collection of data contains recordings of 48 tacti-
cians’ actions in a computerized wargame duel, one blue side and one red side, of
approximately two hours and exploring military action and decision processes. All
duels are recorded to be replayed and then deductively analyzed. The replay of each
battle enables analysis of how the elements have been used to achieve victory. Some
elements, such as manoeuvre and tempo, are present throughout the battle process, while
others may arise following a chain of decisions and actions, such as breakthrough and
exploitation. To conduct an analysis of the material, the text operationalizes seven
predefined levels of victory (Bartholomees 2008, 26–28) and eight tactical decisive
elements. The results of each battle are then translated and placed in any of the defined
victory levels, e.g. decisive victory or draw. The fighting results are compared with how
well the elements have been used. This means that established results reveal something
about the quality of the fight and any differences between the participants’ actions.
Although tactical proficiency is ultimately a result not only of how well one tactician
being assessed performs, a full consideration must be taken in account of how well the
tactician’s opponent acts. In the assessment, both tactician’s overall performances are
compared to each other’s conduct of successful tactics. In detail, through the elements,
I screen and compare each side’s performance in every duel to find mechanisms explain-
ing how one side is more or less successful than the other side. This means also that both
tacticians at the same time possibly make similar decisions, in the form of clicks, equally
good or bad. Moreover, tacticians doing some of the elements while achieving others.
Tacticians do deploy their battlegroup, conduct reconnaissance, manoeuvre,, and exploi-
tation. Eventually, the tacticians achieve breakthrough, high tempo, surprise, and enemy
organizational breakdown. Tacticians may intend to achieve elements but are denied it
because of their opponent or lack of tactical skills. The analysis of “doing and achieving”
is necessary in order to find a meaningful interpretation of elements impact.

Epistemology of the wargame

Artefacts are visible structures and processes, easy to observe but difficult to decipher,
which in their style embody the emotional display in observable culture, rituals, routines,
and organizational charts (Schein 2004, 25–26). Wargames and tactics are artefacts,
created by humans for a variety of reasons. Wargames are delimited by simulation and
modelling, and playable simulation of military action (Perla 2011, 23; Sabin 2016, 47; Elg
2018, 266–286). A wargame can never replace a real-world situation in its dynamism and
complexity (e.g. Rubel 2006, 123; Caffrey, 263) in its simplification of it. Wargames have
been part of military curriculums for about 200 years and are perceived as something of
an art form (Elg 2017, 6). In the studied wargame´s simplicity, details of aerial tactics,
operational art of war and strategic assets are diminisheded to a minimum not to distract
tacticians by even more complex systems than a battle group already represents.
However, simplification carries the inherent risk of misrepresenting the “real world” to
the extent that valid assessment of ground force tactics is threatened. Moreover, we need
 DEFENCE STUDIES 5

to recognize that absence of strategic and operative assets such as aerial assets will
systematically alter the incentives and behaviours of tacticians in ways that are not
faithful to real life. Accordingly, any inferences made about the value and effect of said
behaviours in battle must be viewed with circumspection. One limitation of the findings
of this article study is the participant’s similar background. A Western European
approach bias to solve tactical problems may differ from how other tacticians and
academics solve the same situation. However, victory would be possible to measure
regardless of whom playing when using the same context. In general, the expected results
risk not measuring victory objectively. If playing with participants from other back-
grounds, different tactical patterns would possibly result. Still, victory would be possible
to measure regardless of against whom one was playing when using the same context. We
need to remember that the results derive from wargame duels and lacking some features
that exist in a real combat setting and influence which negatively hinder us drawing
generic conclusions. According to Rubel (2006), wargames are not experiments; however,
they can include experimentation, which focuses on aspects of command, and control
(Rubel 2006, 114–115). The validity of a model (or knowledge) is formed from the degree
of utility in the process of problem-solving (Rubel 2006, 109). Despite the fact that the
wargame as a tool presents an imperfect model of reality, it is the best means to facilitate
the visualization of the decision-making process (Perla 2011, 24–25). Insights that result
from conducting wargames are conditional however, and their validity must reflect the
comparable effects of the decision-making process in real-world situations (Rubel 2006,
116). A certain significance can be ascribed to a wargame’s outcomes when it is con-
ducted according to given rules. These rules form the foundation for a valid simplifica-
tion in the simulation of reality (Rubel 2006, 118). A wargame is built around the
elements of physical parts, rules, and decisions made by individual tacticians and the
effects of reality, skills, and chance influence the result throughout the whole wargame
(Sabin 2016, 117). The amount of information and the time given to make a plan based
on the scenario must be accepted as realistic. When comparing wargame research,
findings suggest that wargames appear to be explanatory, repeatable, and double directed
and that playing wargames provides new insights (Sabin 2016, 47) and patterns in tactics.
Through a controlled visualization of the cause-and-effect linkages in a wargame, the
specific conditions give insights generated by the wargame itself. The wargame functions
as a tool in helping to understand the tactician's' mind for decision-making in a complex
and dynamic environment (Rubel 2006, 111–112).
In this study, a computerized wargame referred to as SSM,2 developed at the Swedish
Defence University (SEDU), was used to record and collect samples for analysis. The
recording also collected tacit knowledge as this is of great significance for our ability to
cope with complex and dynamic situations (Klein 2011, 34). The wargame used is
categorized as a so-called “low fidelity” wargame. While low fidelity wargames have
purposely been designed to include only a minimum level of detail as opposed to more
advanced, so-called “high fidelity” wargames, they have proven to be as effective
(Waldenström 2012, 1–2). Moreover, to measure how successful tactics and victory
emerge we reduce and frame a narrative into a combat scenario by the peeling back of
some real-world features, retaining only the core of abilities required to conduct tactics.
There is, however, some need to be cautious of the fact that wargames can create inputs
that are invalid in the form of what are termed “game artefacts”. This generates the
6 L. HENÅKER

further risk that such defects become attributed to the “fog of war”. A crucial assumption
of wargaming is that the tacticians will try to make the best decisions they can. In
addition, we need to believe that tacticians are expected to be loyal to trying to win or
fulfilling their tasks (Rubel 2006, 115–116).
The 48 participants in the wargame were officers, academics, and students ranging
from civilian academics to OF-2–OF-5 (lieutenant to Colonel). The range of age was
31 years to 62 years and the participants were from Finland, Norway, England, Germany,
and Sweden. Although the participants had different backgrounds, their culture simila-
rities are to be considered as bias and a limitation when drawing conclusions of the
generating the results. The majority of all participants were Swedish citizens and with
that arguable have a common tactical bias. The samples average time in academic studies
was a little more than three years (150 ECTS), their military average time as platoon
commanders was over two years in average an as company commanders over one-and
-a-half years. In average, the sample group had a little more than six months as battalion
commanders. The explorative study was conducted over a period of three weeks in
February 2018 at SEDU. All participants were provided with 10 minutes to read their
task and if possible, create their own plan on a map before starting the wargame, after
which a 15-minute tutorial enabled them to locate all the features of the wargame. After
building confidence in using all the features through the tutorial, participants began the
duel. The duel lasted between 1 hour and 30 minutes and 1 hour and 45 minutes. The
game-time equalizess real time including speed and distance making the realism accu-
rate. Most of the samples had not been in contact with SSM and none had seen the
scenario before the wargame started. In this study, a modern and technological army
force, reflecting an already existing north European and east European army, is used in
a narrative to outline the requirements of realism and acceptance. The choice of per-
spective affects the design, and this in turn influences the continued steps in the research
process. After conducting a battle, each participant was asked to estimate their own level
of victory outcome in a seven-step scale assessing their performance from own decisive
victory down to enemy decisive victory.
This study observes and explores relationships between how tacticians act and what
mechanisms lead to either success or defeat in relation to theories about victory in
combat. In detail, the impact on how successful each battle was performed is measured
through the elements of deployment, reconnaissance, manoeuvre, breakthrough, tempo,
surprise, exploitation, and enemy organizational breakdown. This gives different obser-
vable results for analysing quality assessments. Qualitative research uses a naturalistic
approach (Patton 2002, 39) such a “real world setting” to understand phenomena in
a specific context. At the same time, qualitative research is considered weak when
generalizing validity. Therefore, researcher bias, such as selective recording or one’s
personal view and perspective, is one threat to validity that the researcher must be careful
and mindful of. Crucial to this point is that the researcher constantly engages in self-
reflection and become more self-aware on her potential bias and predispositions
(Johnson 1997, 283–284). While we cannot draw a generic or universal conclusion on
tactics from this study, we may observe other important things. The most prominent of
these involve a better understanding of how tacticians act to achieve victory as part of
a wargame setting. In natural social settings, a researcher lacks full control over the
scheduling of experimental stimuli necessary in the true experiment, although such
 DEFENCE STUDIES 7

situations are recalled as quasi-experimental design (Campbell and Stanley 1966, 34). In
this study, the wargame does not qualify to the level of the experiment. Therefore, it is
viewed as quasi-experimental because of the lack of randomized samples including no
control of how tacticians conduct their tactics. Internal validity refers to the extent
a researcher is warranted in observing a causal relationship (Shadish et al. 2002, 53). In
this study, internal validity refers to inferences about whether observed covariation
between the tactical situation and tacticians’ decision-making reflects a causal relation-
ship to achieve victory in the form of measuring their actionable results. If external
validity does not interfere with internal validity, it is of high importance for any applied
discipline. High external validity in qualitative studies stems from repeatability and
a maximum of similarity in experimental situations (Campbell and Stanley 1966, 18).
Moreover, wargames are widely used to train officers and staffs and the game’s built-in
“flaws” do not prevent conclusions from being drawn and being used in real conflicts and
war. Although a wargame is an applicable construction and base for decision-making
accepted in training, education, analysis of complex and dynamic military problems and
dilemmas, it is commonly used. Finally, it is most unlikely that real opponents will sit
down before a battle and play the scenario representing the real tactical settings in
advance thus risking the revelation of their goals, assets, and causes of action. That is
often why similarly educated tacticians from the same side conduct duels, and knowing
each other as peers, create a wargame bias that risks generating predictable and not valid
results.

Levels of victory in battle

According to Ardant du Picq’s classical definition, tacticians do not enter the battle to
fight, but to win (Du Picq 1987, 69). Du Picq’s definition is reinforced by Storr’s
argument that military thoughts must focus on the difficulties in winning battles
(Storr, p. 8). In du Picq’s definition, it becomes important to visualize victory. William
Martel (2011) points to the fundamental question of what victory means by confronting
scholars and policy-makers. A complete understanding of victory is not to be found in
the literature nor is it possible to answer Martel’s question without common agreement
on the meaning and essence of victory (Martel 2011, 533). This study suggests that
different levels of victory can be identified. Rotte & Schmidt argue that the outcome of
a battle is interpreted in elements of victory, defeat, or draw. They also argue that negative
or positive outcomes could vary in degree by implying, for example, a modest or an
overwhelming defeat (Rotte and Schmidt 2003, 176). Levels of victory contain certain
criteria, in order to be as thorough as possible to facilitate analysis, battle damage
assessment or to establish the general outcome.
Collins suggests that a “ . . . victory or defeat is a social construction of the participants
themselves”. He also points out that “in decisive battles, there is general agreement on
both sides as to the outcome . . . ”. Furthermore, he argues, “some battles are indecisive,
a stalemate with no victory announced”. “Victory and defeat are above all emotional
conditions; although physical destruction contributes to a degree . . . ” (Collins 2010, 10).
Measuring victory levels means taking into consideration both physical and non-physical
parameters. By utilizing a computerized wargame in order to explore the tactician’s
courses of action in a combat situation, the recording plays a vital part in analyzing
8 L. HENÅKER

every outcome of all battles. A pre-defined implication of victory was used to refine and
emphasize differences in tactical military combat victory in order to manifest different
levels similar to Bartholomees’s (2008) scale of success. In his conceptual scale of success,
seven steps are used to grade different levels of success and victory. The seven steps are
defeat, loss, no win, tie, no loss, win, and victory. Barholomees’ scales are very similar to
those employed in this study, which by comparison were defined and conditioned in
advance of the content. Being able to make an accurate assessment of the battle status at
any given moment is a challenge. Casualties are one very important indicator and reveal
the results of both sides’ losses. Levels of victory in battle is an attempt to grade levels of
tactical victory in battle before performing an analysis of the explorative study. In
addition, it is difficult to find a scientific grade system defining the levels and meaning
of tactical victory. The definition of different levels of victory is as exciting in military
history as it is in commercial wargames (e.g., Butterfield 1983; Herman 1990; Essig and
Powell 1991; Astell and Gayler 1991); however, this study needs to formulate a detailed
definition of what each level means for the participating tacticians to use. I have analyzed
how the tacticians performed and from the recording of every battle evaluated how
successfully the tacticians had completed their tasks, comparing a casualty ratio to their
own estimation of victory level.
During the wargame, the highest level of victory is defined as decisive victory. In this
study, decisive victory is defined as being when all enemy units have been eliminated or
have surrendered; there are few or no own losses and there is no opportunity for the
enemy to take back the initiative. The next level is major victory, defined as being when
the majority of enemy units have been eliminated or have surrendered; there are some
own minor losses and there is a marginal opportunity for the enemy to regain the
initiative. The third level is defined as own minor victory, achieved when certain parts
of the enemy’s units have been eliminated or have surrendered; own losses are fewer than
the enemy’s but there is a possibility for the enemy to regain the initiative. The fourth
level constitutes a draw, defined as being when smaller elements from both sides have
units that are dissolved, eliminated, or have surrendered; own losses are equal to or less
than the opponent’s and both sides have culminated. The participants could also choose
to reverse their outcome and assess their own decisive loss, own major loss and own minor
loss using the same definitions as if they had been successful.
The results from a total of 24 battles indicated that seven battles had ended in decisive
or major victories, eight battles had ended as minor victories and, finally, that nine battles
had ended without any indication of a clear victory for either side. Defining or fully
recognizing enemy side losses proved to be a difficult task. During the wargame, only
eliminated enemy units were shown on the screen as dead or dying. Fourteen out of 24
battles had none or only one deviation between the different levels of victory in both
sides’ assessment. For example, one side assesses the result of the battle as an own major
victory while the opponent assesses the same battle as an own minor loss. Five of 24 battles
had two levels of difference in the assessment of the same battle and finally five battles had
three levels in deviation. This seems to indicate the level of difficulty for the tacticians
themselves in determining the outcome of a battle. This error is most likely attributable
to a combination of under- and over-estimations in own performance, different points of
view as to whether tasks have been completed, or emotional mechanisms denying or
 DEFENCE STUDIES 9

amplifying the result. Generalizing victory and defeat in battle is still poorly defined today
(Storr 2018, 255) although this study suggests an actionable definition.

The order of battle

This scenario attempts to generalize land force-tactics in a known context for the
participants and is in line with the literature. The fictitious countries of Blueland and
Redland stood in opposition to each other and both sides were given a limited amount of
intelligence on their opponent. The participants did not know whether their respective
responsibilities were identical to each other. Tacticians performed tactics individually
when playing the wargame. The Blueland order of battle consisted of one mechanized
battalion, one brigade reconnaissance company, and one artillery battalion. Their task
objective was to delay the opponent within their own area of responsibility for at least six
hours (from the game’s start) in order to inflict major enemy losses and limit the
opponent’s ability to control the large central town early. Blueland should also be
prepared, six hours after receiving a new order, to defend a bridging area. In contrast
to this, the Redland order of battle consisted of one Tank Battalion, one Mechanized
Battalion, one Reconnaissance Company, and two Artillery Battalions. The task objective
was to defeat enemy units within the assigned area by no later than six hours after the
order (from the game’s start) to ensure their own mobility for a continued attack
westwards. Redland was to be prepared, six hours after receiving their orders, to seize
and defend the bridging area.
Figure 1 is from the server computer showing both sides at the same time. Each side only
knew that an enemy battlegroup was advancing into its own predesignated area of
responsibility but not the exact enemy order of battle. The strength ratio in Redland’s
favor was 1.5:1 for tanks, 1:1 for combat fighting vehicles, 3:1 for artillery, and 1.3:1 for
troops, although Blueland had an advantage with regard to different types of artillery
ammunition. The next section examines the sample’s overall performance in action in
relation to theory in order to answer the question of whether the use of knowledge of
contemporary theories corresponds to whether tacticians achieve military tactical victory.

Tactical performance – an analysis

This analysis encompasses the battle events from deployment to eventual enemy orga-
nizational breakdown in an attempt to avoid only focusing on the beginning and allowing
the participants to adjust and adopt their tactics. In the analysis, the researcher is the
instrument scrutinizing the wargame recordings by comparing them to all elements.

Deployment
I start to analyse blue side’s deployment then the red side. Nine of 24 blue tacticians
manage to create a combined arms deployment in keeping a main effort until the first
contact with the enemy. Four of these nine end in a major or a total victory, one of nine
render a minor victory and four of nine ended in draw. Twenty-two of 24 blue battle-
groups had full cover from own artillery although two of 24 tacticians moved their
artillery units too close before enemy contact. Five of 24 blue battlegroups succeeded
in using an independent small unit deployment of which two of five later on ended as
10 L. HENÅKER

Figure 1. Illustrates deployment set up of Blueland in the west and Redland in the east, including areas
of responsibility.

major victories, two minor victories, and one draw. Five of 24 tacticians conducted
a dispersion deployment and ended in two own minor victories, two draw, and one
minor loss. Deployment on red side and the use of combined arms was five of 24 red
battlegroups advanced in a main effort on column ending in one minor red victory, two
blue major victories, and two draw. All red battlegroups manage to be in the range of own
artillery until the first enemy contact. Two of 24 tacticians used a small unit independent
advance ending in two draws. Finally, two red battlegroups used dispersion as an
approach rendering in two minor losses. Overall, a very short distance between the
reconnaissance units and the manoeuvre units was maintained and in the first contact
with enemy units’ own side manoeuvre companies were almost immediately involved in
the same skirmish as their reconnaissance units.

Reconnaissance
Three of 24 blue sides’ reconnaissance companies found and exploited gaps resulted in
one major victory and two draw. In total, blue side had five of 24 reconnaissance
companies’ annihilated (more than 85 percentage losses) and the battles ended in one
major victory, one minor victory, two draw, and one minor loss. Four of 24 red
reconnaissance companies exploited gaps resulted in two minor victories, one draw,
and own major loss. No annihilation of red reconnaissance companies occurred. Without
any exceptions, the tacticians used their reconnaissance platoons as a vanguard until their
 DEFENCE STUDIES 11

Figure 2. This screenshot reflects a common advance from both sides’ reconnaissance platoons just
minutes before the first direct observed contact. (20–25 minutes into the wargame from the start
point).

first contact with enemy units. The three reconnaissance platoons, just minutes in front
of their battle groups, often became feelers providing the tacticians with only a short
timeframe to take new decisions as the first contact occurred as shown in Figure 2.
Because of the short distance between advancing reconnaissance platoons and the bulk of
manoeuvre units, the enemy was hit with massive force, which indirectly gained the
function of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance units often successfully infiltrated into the
enemy’s rear area and sometimes located “soft targets” (in this study defined as artillery
and logistic units) to attack.

Manoeuvre and breakthrough

Blue side manoeuvre rendered in two infiltrations out of 24 battlegroups and resulted in
one minor victory and one draw. Three of 24 tacticians outflanked the opponent resulted
in one major victory, one minor victory, and one draw. Red side manoeuvre consisted of
two infiltrations that resulted in one major victory visualized in Figure 3 and one draw
battle. Only one of 24 red battlegroups manages to out-flank its opponent, which resulted
in a minor victory. Twelve of 24 blue battlegroups reached breakthrough resulting in one
total victory and one major and three minor victories. Five of these breakthroughs ended
as draw. Ten of 24 red battlegroups gained breakthroughs leading to one major victory,
three minor victories and four draws. Later on, red side suffered two major and two
minor losses. On eight occasions, some of the tacticians tried to reach the enemy rear area
12 L. HENÅKER

Figure 3. A screenshot from SSM reflects a rare moment of victorious combat where Redland divided
Blueland forces and pursued artillery and logistics units in the Blueland rear area.

in a deep manoeuvre by using more units than just reconnaissance platoons. The area
consists of rich infrastructure, forests, open fields, swamps, and creeks. The dominant
terrain in their area of responsibility was Uppsala3 (see map), referred to hereafter as the
town, placed centrally and constituting a hub around which almost all fighting was
conducted. The observation concerning manoeuvre noted that all participants used
mechanized units in or near the town in order to gain ground and to repel enemy
assaults. Often the high speed of advance was halted or slowed down directly after the
first enemy contact. On some occasions, manoeuvre companies managed to break-
through and engage enemy artillery and logistic units destroying as much as possible.
These contacts often resulted not only in the pursuit of enemy “soft targets” but also in
drawing enemy manoeuvre units in to defend their own artillery and logistics. Once
a breakthrough was established, a new phase of the battle started. Heavy exchanges of fire
often occurred during the first contact.
The contact lured other units into a skirmish and away from the participant tactician’s
objective and plan. After the initial contacts, reconnaissance units were sometimes used
as mechanized combat platoons. The implication of this was that further intelligence
gathering in depth was negatively and directly affected. This premature fight resulted in
weak or indifferent reactions and surprised almost all of the participants. Several battles
ended with a winner after reaching a breakthrough. Although not all breakthroughs
ultimately led to a decisive or major victory, five of 24 did. Tacticians that did not find any
enemy “soft targets” after gaining a breakthrough redirected their units towards the
 DEFENCE STUDIES 13

nearest fight or in some cases, started to advance towards a secondary task instead of
pursuing “soft targets”. Engagements were directed towards reconnaissance units who
had manoeuvre-companies very close behind them, and who consequently were unable
to change direction. Instead, these units had to face full engagement with the nearest
enemy unit. Some of the breakthroughs occurred through the infiltration of reconnais-
sance platoons or a single company. In some cases, a breakthrough was reached at an
early stage but was ignored or not fully exploited. Tacticians use the road network to
develop the highest possible speed, because their opponent was already in their own area
of responsibility. High speed initially gained them some ground but this was halted
abruptly almost immediately after the first manoeuvre companies came into contact. At
the moment of the first contact, the baptism of fire, some tacticians were successfully able
to engage targets with the right combined arms, indirect fire and even withdraw from
disadvantaged situations. Some tacticians did not manoeuvre their units but accepted the
firefight because of their previous manoeuvre. In those cases, results depended on
massive firepower and how quickly they could bring indirect fire down onto the oppo-
nent. By using roads as speed avenues, it became obvious where the main effort was. After
the first “clash of armour” in or near the town, small differences were spotted such as new
fire positions and reinforcements in how micro manoeuvring was conducted, often in
adaption to the current fight. Even successful micro manoeuvring led to breakthroughs
after some fighting. Speed often leads to full engagements in disadvantageous areas such
as a large town or when the distance between friendly units is too close within the
battlegroup. A smaller force can defeat a much larger one, and major victories can be won
with relatively few casualties on the winning side (Collins 2010, 4). Blueland forces were
smaller but won six out of seven decisive or major victories. Levels of minor victories or
draws were divided more equally between the sides in their outcome. In the comparison
of whether the theories correspond to successful tactical victory through manoeuvre and
breakthrough or not, observations reveal an unambiguous relationship.

High tempo and surprise

Analyzing tempo in four of 24 blue battlegroups controlling the town of Uppsala
achieving one total victory, one major victory, and two draw. Six of 24 blue battlegroups
acted linearly, passive, and static and used an attrition approach that resulted in one
major loss, two minor losses, two draws, and one minor victory. Red side had nine of 24
battlegroups controlling the town of Uppsala, which resulted in one major victory, one
minor victory, five draws, one minor loss, and one major loss. Analyzing surprise
achieved through direct fire and unexpected timing and direction against enemy artillery
units occurred in six of 24 blue cases. The result later become one total victory, one major
victory, two minor victories, and two draws. Red side managed to reach surprise by
disrupting 12 of 24 battles resulting in one major and three minor victories, five draws,
but also one major loss, and two minor losses. To keep up a high tempo, decisions
concerning ongoing engagements are at least as important as those decisions concerning
infiltration and encirclement using surfaces and gaps. Although the tactician’s priority
was to maintain a high tempo, less fortunate tacticians found that their artillery units on
the roads became overt targets, which were easy to attack and pursue. In addition, it is
important to avoid surprise and have the ability to hold on to control of a “movable box”
when delaying the enemy by constantly shifting weapon systems and having mortar fire
14 L. HENÅKER

successfully supporting the delaying action. Surprise effects can be expected if an attack is
unexpected in time and/or direction and if different means and methods are used. The
high tempo created a fragmented battlefield, having units from both sides bypass each
other without coming into contact. The high tempo was also combined with the shortest
distance to their objectives. Instead of using a manoeuvre that could surprise the enemy,
a head-on approach was often adopted. Due to the high tempo, tacticians gained
important ground but this was often quickly reduced during the first contact to take
up fire positions. High tempo transformed quickly into static fire positions seconds after
the first skirmishes and the momentum and pace gained was heavily reduced in combi-
nation with a lack of reserves to exploit or break off the fight.
High tempo was observed initially as a fast acceleration up to high speed, heavy
bombardment, and successful infiltrations at the same time. After the first contact, the
high tempo was usually reduced quickly and severely decelerated in order to defend and
make new decisions. The choice to continue to fight after the first contact occurred
almost in every battle. At the same time, new fights arose out of new contacts in
combination with minor successful infiltrations. All the participants had multiple fights
running concurrently. Tempo increased with the number of minor multiple firefights
and infiltrations. Surprise was observed as a reaction to the first contact, with reconnais-
sance units over-compensating with the use of artillery fire. As a result, a majority of the
participants were running out of artillery ammunition before the wargame ended.
Reserves were uncommonly divided in order to reduce or amplify surprises. After
being surprised, the participants compensated for the lack of reserves by withdrawing
units from engagements. The use of high tempo and surprise must be considered success
factors when all seven of the 24 battles with a decisive or major victory utilized these
tactics against an opponent acting passively or trying to win by attrition.

Exploitation
Eight of 24 blue battlegroups exploited the breakthrough in enemy rear area and these
ended with one total victory, one major, and two minor victories and four draws. On the
red side, 10 of 24 battlegroups exploited the enemy rear area and resulted in one major
victory, three minor victories, four draws, and two major losses. Exploitation occurred
after minor breakthroughs, often with surviving reconnaissance units or manoeuvre
units infiltrating through the enemy advance. Through the number of observations, the
pattern of exploitation indicates some different lines of approach. The first line was
observed through the involuntary bypassing of enemy units and the discovery of enemy
artillery positions more by chance than on purpose. The second line of exploitation was
achieved by infiltrating enemy lines after only a short engagement with enemy units.
When this kind of breakthrough occurred, most commonly involving only a few man-
oeuvre units, the exploitation of fanning out was limited. The third line of exploitation is
through a massive first blow on the enemy resulting in the elimination of the enemy or
forcing enemy units to withdraw from the unfavourable situation, providing the attacker
with a gap. Common for all the different exploitation situations was that the tacticians did
not know what to do with the advantage once it had been gained. In the most successful
narratives, the side that achieved exploitation also pursued enemy rear units for a longer
period, forcing the enemy to not only withdraw engaged units but also support or protect
those being pursued by reinforcing them. The breakthrough and exploitation made it
 DEFENCE STUDIES 15

possible to seize the secondary area before gaining control over the primary target area
and some of the tacticians used that opportunity. In the essence of exploitation,
a successful attack is followed by utilizing enemy weaknesses or collapsed enemy
defences. This can turn a small tactical victory into a large-scale operational success
(Leonhard 1994, 155). These unsuccessful exploitations occurred when no “soft targets”
were found or when contact was lost while pursuing the enemy. Sometimes the main
body of a battlegroup advanced through an enemy front line and was able to attack large
concentrations of enemy units with full effect. Shock effects mainly reduce the attacking
side’s casualties and deprive the defenders of any organized coherent defence. However,
the comparison and investigation of whether theory corresponds to how tacticians
successfully conduct military tactical victory through exploitation and the creation of
chaos and shock indicates a less clear relationship.

Accomplish enemy organizational breakdown

Exploring the last element, six of 24 blue battlegroups ended in an enemy organizational
breakdown divided into one total victory and five major victories. One red battlegroup
reached a final stage of an enemy organizational breakdown in achieving a major victory.
Seven of the 24 battles achieved the level of major or decisive victory. In these battles, the
destruction of an enemy force was not only dependent on fast and deep manoeuvre but
also the combination of different weapon systems and temporary contact resulting in
manoeuvre companies being tied down. If the rear units were at an early stage of
disruption or being pursued, negative effects affected the possibility to combine artillery
with manoeuvre units. Overall, an interesting phenomenon was observed in that heavy
losses did not affect the participants’ performance in achieving their objectives. On the
contrary, almost all tacticians struggled and did not reveal their inner thoughts, while
playing during silence, until the wargame was over, even though they could regroup,
withdraw, and change modus or even surrender. The findings concerning enemy orga-
nizational breakdown correspond well to the theories as small, scattered, pockets of
resistance without any possibility of regaining the initiative, no artillery capability or
manoeuvre companies without casualties were observed. The organizational breakdown
was observed through attrition, in combination with a clear breakthrough dividing the
opponent into small pockets of resistance.
In sum, no side having a decisive or major victory did so without the use or achieve-
ment of a minimum of three elements. Although no tactician manages to achieve all
elements in the same battle, six of seven decisive or major victories had more elements
present than the losing side. Moreover, in four of the battles, the losing side did not use
any of the elements. One battle had an opposite result when only three elements were
used and achieved by the winner while five elements were used by the losing side. We
observe a similar trend in all the eight minor victories and losses. In six of these eight
battles, either side used or achieved at least one element. Tacticians winning a minor
battle all had more representations of elements than the losing side. When scrutinizing all
the items of focus in this study and comparing them to the result of seven decisive and
major victories, we find some elements more used or achieved than others. The element
of deployment was present in five of seven victories. The element of reconnaissance was
present in two of seven victories. The element of manoeuvre was observed in one of the
victories, while the elements of tempo and breakthrough were found in four of seven
16 L. HENÅKER

victories. Both surprise and exploitation were found in three of seven victories and
finally, in six of seven victories we found enemy organizational breakdown.

Measuring victory
Levels of victory provided an interesting and vital result that included the tacticians’ own
estimation and all battles being replayed in an analysis to measure the outcome of
a battle. I consider loss ratio to be important, when measuring the contemporary
theories, in determining the most successful tactician during battle. Reaching the ratio
1.70:1 or more in losses indicates an unambiguous decisive or major victory in this study.
The ratio between 1.70:1 and 1.35:1 was a mix of decisive, major, and minor victories
shown in Figure 4. This finding provides a measurable loss ratio and facilitates the
assessment of a battle. On one occasion, the level of major victory was reached although
the loss ratio was a draw due to skilful manoeuvring and not through the elimination of
enemy units. Six of seven decisive and major victories ended in huge losses on the losing
side. The seventh battle had an equal loss ratio, considered to be a major victory achieved
by excellent manoeuvring, including the division of enemy side units into small pockets
scattered all over the battlefield.
The comparison and analysis correspond with how tacticians successfully achieved
military tactical victory when accomplishing enemy organizational breakdown. It was
confirmed in those six battles that the casualty ratio was 2.5 higher on the losing side.
Although the findings in this study clearly indicate the necessity of operating in line with
the theories in order to achieve a successful outcome of a battle, we need to remember
that only 30% of all battles were assessed as decisive or major victories while 70% of all
battle outcomes were viewed as minor victories or draws. In those 70%, the tacticians
were neutralized by equal opponents whose behaviour could be as aggressive and skilful
as in the more successful battles but without achieving any success. In 30% of more
successful battles, there were also tacticians who lost due to static and passive behaviour.
We understand and perform tactics differently, some more, some less, skillfully as
observed in each wargame battle. This is no small endeavour for the participants who
won a decisive or major victory mainly by their understanding of the feedback from the
screen to sharpen new decisions and use the elements more skillfully. Successful battle
was measured through the elements of deployment, reconnaissance, manoeuvre and

Figure 4. Different levels of victory identified by loss ratios.

 DEFENCE STUDIES 17

breakthrough, high tempo and surprise rendering in shock, and finally enemy organiza-
tional breakdown. Some of the elements formed a logical sequence while others shifted in
frequency.

Conclusions
Why does someone win in a wargame battle? This study contributes to the discussion on
victory and defeat by observing the role of modern contemporary theories and the
relationship in how tacticians act and their outcome in wargame battles. In particular,
I analyze eight tactical elements with regards to the wargames. These are deployment,
reconnaissance, manoeuvre, breakthrough, tempo, surprise, exploitation, and enemy
organizational breakdown. Fourteen of 15 victories, from decisive to minor, indicate
a comparatively higher presence of the eight elements. Although no victory had all
elements present, 6 of 15 lost battles had no presence at all. Wargames do not represent
reality. However, the results of these 48 battles still mirror decisions from tactical
wargaming situations. These decisions have been analyzed herein as computer clicks.
Moreover, 1/3 of all wargame battles ended in a major or decisive victory. The observed
results indicate differences in how tacticians used their skills and resources but also how
different individuals define victory. During the 48 wargame battles, the elements clearly
affected decision-making processes. Even though the Simple Surface warfare Model
(SSM) wargame used in this study does not exhaust real-life situations, the players still
reveal recorded patterns aimed at achieving victory. Each battle begins with deployment,
including creation of a balanced combined arms force using manoeuver, and attrition to
gain the initiative by using surprise. After successful breakthrough, collapse occurs as an
organizational breakdown. Some of those elements exist more or less during the battle
and some do not. The elements suggest a reasonable line of interdependent events in
order to achieve victory in combat. In addition, the study suggests that reconnaissance,
combined arms, high tempo, and manoeuvre are present as fluctuations and when
breakthrough occur (or not). If not recognized in a timely fashion, these advantages
disappear unexploited. However, this issue demands further research as breakthrough
was difficult to identify, even though when it was, a moment of triumph opened to be
used or lost.
Victory in this study is divided into different levels of success helping tacticians reach
a common understanding of the battle’s total sum. Victory levels in the wargame rank
tacticians’ performances and value their results. Victory would be relatively easy to define
if only considering losses, but both Collins and Storr argue that victory includes emotions
and subjective opinions, make thus precision somehow wicked, reflected in almost half of
all estimated outcomes. How well do tacticians master tactics? In a survey that accom-
panied each game, the tacticians themselves assessed their own performance. Around
60% of the participants were correct in their assessments while 40% were more or less
wrong.
In conclusion, this study shows that particular aspects of tactical victory are possible to
measure through war games. Moreover, modern theories regarding victory in battle are
useful tools to better understand battle mechanisms. Herein I have focused on recorded
clicks and the patterns they form in wargame situations, to interpret and decode such
mechanisms. My results illustrate that it is difficult but not impossible to measure details
18 L. HENÅKER

of victory as part of war game situations. This should not be taken to indicate that the
elements under scrutiny are always valid in real-life situations. However, my results do
illustrate that tacticians tend to relate to and employ the theoretical elements in order to
win tactical duels.

Notes
1. See The Order of Battle.
2. Simple Surface warfare Model was first designed as a naval wargame but later developed also
as an air and land wargame.
3. Approx. 150 000 inhabitants.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Lars Henåker is Lieutenant Colonel and PhD candidate at Swedish Defence University. He
conducting War Studies at the Swedish Defence University. His research interest is in army tactics,
wargames and to measure tactical quality.

ORCID
Lars Henåker http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5206-9745

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