Ron Chernobrov

Roman History 295J

Legion Over Phalanx: Battle at the Dog’s Heads

The Second Macedonian War, taking place from 200-196, led to one of the most

critical battles that the Roman Republic had fought since their defeat at Cannae, and

would change the face of warfare forever. This battle, fought at Cynoscephalae in 197

brought the traditional Greek Phalanx system of warfare up against the recently

successful Roman legionary system. Cynoscephalae proved in just one single day the

superiority of the Roman way of war, and paved the way for the eventual collapse of the

Phalanx system. Through closely looking at the two systems, the battle itself, and its

aftermath, Cynoscephalae’s profound impact becomes very clear. However, prior to the

battle both sides had seen both major successes with their individual styles of war, and

not until their mutual clash in 197 does it become clear what the future would hold.

The Macedonian army of Philip V employed the Phalanx system

of warfare, which had been used by Greek armies for many centuries prior. The term

technically means “line of battle” (Heitland 25), and consisted of solid lines of infantry

all armed with extremely heavy equipment. Each solider carried a large round shield, and

a heavy pike that “in the time of Philip V… was over 20 feet in length (Heitland 26). The

soldiers would stand in a solid line formation, going up to 16 rows back (numbers vary

by phalanx), with each soldier holding his shield in such a way that it would cross over

with the shield of the man next to him. This formation would result in both a complete

wall of shields for protection, and a complete wall of spears for assault, creating one

enormous mass of heavy infantry. This was the primary strength of the Phalanx, where

“nothing can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge…” (Polybius 29). The

Macedonians had perfected this system, and had proved it to be highly effective. The

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Roman way of war, the legionary system however, was completely different, and would

soon bring the phalanx to its knees.

Although the Romans also fought in specific formations, their equipment and

method of fighting was very different. Roman soldiers were typically equipped with a

long, rectangular shield, and a short sword used “both for cutting and thrusting (Polybius

30). There was no tight, wall formation like that which the Phalanx used, as “each man

must move separately, as he has to cover his person with his long shield, turning to meet

each expected blow…” (Polybius 30). This forced at least 3 feet of space between each

soldier in the formation. However, there was even more flexibility built into the system as

well. Within their setup, the Roman army was split into separate formations of troops

called Maniples, which also allowed for whole units of soldiers to also have their own

freedom of movement. So, much like the troops had their own freedom of movement

within their formations, the units, especially those on the flanks, could also have their

own freedom of movement independent of the war machine as a whole. This was

something the Phalanx was not capable of.

The two systems of war, the Phalanx, and the Legion, would collide in 197 at

Cynoscephalae. The battle at Cynoscephalae was not merely an isolated clash of two

major powers. The Macedonian Wars all stemmed from the Second Punic War, where

Phillip of Macedon allied with Hannibal. (Boatwright 128). Philip did this after seeing

the Roman defeat at Cannae in 216, which encouraged him to work against the Romans.

This sparked the first of the Macedonian Wars in 215, running through 205. After many

years of mostly inconsequential fighting, both sides made peace, “the so-called Peace of

Phoenice, in which both sides essentially kept what they held” (Boatwright 128). This

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peace however, was not meant to last. After several Greek city-states sent for help to

Rome, Rome intervened against Macedon once again in 200. The intervention was an

excellent opportunity for the Romans to exert their influence over a new region, and thus

the Second Macedonian war begun. This second conflict was fought until 196; ending not

long after Philip’s army was crushed at Cynocephalae.

The battles and skirmishes with Philip had accomplished little during the early

stages of the war, and fighting did not become decisive until the arrival of the Consul

Titus Quinctius Flamininus in 198. Flaminius was elected Consul when “he was not yet

30 years of age, and had never been aedile or praetor” (Heitland 21). However, his skills

on the battlefield, and leadership ability led him to be very successful in waging the

Macedonian War. Through a heavy push forward that none of his predecessors were able

to accomplish, Flamininus was able to force a battle with Philip at the hills of

Cynoscephalae in 197. The two completely different styles of warfare clashed there with

stunning results.

The Roman and Macedonian armies met at the hills of Cynoscephalae on a misty

morning in 197. Each army came to the field with approximately 25,000 troops, and so

the match up was fairly equal numerically (Heitland 25). After several hours of light

skirmishing along the hills, both sides moved into the battle with the full weight of their

armies. The Macedonian phalanx crashed full force into the Roman left and center,

pushing the Romans back quickly (Heitland 25). The advantage of the Phalanx is evident

here, as the Romans in their loose formation, and short stabbing swords, could do nothing

to stop the wall of spears that rapidly advanced upon them. However, while the Roman

left flank was successfully routed, on the Macedonian left “there had not been time for

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the proper formation of the Phalanx” (Heitland 26). The Roman troops collided with the

scattered hoplites there, forcing them into close quarters combat. With their full gear

equipped, but the formation scattered, the hoplites were unable to fight effectively in

individual combat, and so quickly fled the field. This is where the tide of the battle

quickly turned.

After the Macedonian left flank was defeated, the Romans there found themselves

far past their retreating comrades. The rest of the Macedonian army had advanced so far

ahead of their own left flank in their push on the Roman center, that they had not noticed

the disaster that had occurred there. Seeing this opportunity a Roman military tribune

from the victorious Roman right swung his troops around to strike the rear of the

advancing Macedonian phalanx. This spelled the end for Philip’s troops, as “it is

impossible for the phalanx to turn right about face, or to fight man to man…” (Polybius

26). The Macedonian’s were completely destroyed as the Romans sliced into them from

behind, and were forced to flee the field. In that simple yet decisive move, the battle was

over. Philip lost approximately 13,000 men either to death, or capture (Heitland 27). With

that crushing defeat, the Macedonians sued for peace.

The peace that followed the Second Macedonian War marked a critical shift in

Rome’s power worldwide, and ended Greek power forever. Philip was forced to remove

his troops from all Greek cities, had to surrender his fleet, and pay Rome enormous sums

of money as a war indemnity (Boatwright 128). Flamininus took an extraordinary action

here as well, which depicted Rome’s dominance over the region. He held a massive

festival called the Isthmian Games, and “proclaimed the freedom of a number of Greek

cities…” (Boatwright 129). This established an interesting, although not terribly unique

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relationship between Rome and Greece. Greece was never to be free in the sense that they

could do whatever they wanted, they merely would not have to face occupation, taxes, or

military occupation. They would still have to “acknowledge the leadership of a larger and

more powerful state,” (Boatwright 129). The future would change even this, as Greece

later becomes a Roman province, and loses this proclaimed “freedom” as well. All these

events, along with the direct military impact, essentially resulted from one stunning

Roman victory at Cynoscephalae.

The weaknesses of the phalanx system were made exceptionally clear at

Cynoscephalae, and the Romans exploited these weaknesses to the best of their abilities.

Although very effective when fighting head-to-head against another formation of

soldiers, the phalanx could accomplish little else. The system did not have the same

flexibility and maneuverability that the Roman legion did. This was evident when the

Romans struck the hoplites before the phalanx formed up, and there was nothing the

Macedonians could do. Their equipment was far too bulky, and their training was entirely

based on the assumption that they had the support of the men next to them. Both these

problems proved to be fatal. Combine those flaws with the inability to maneuver to meet

a foe from a different direction (let alone from completely behind them), and the entire

tactic collapses. On the other hand, the Romans had the ability to not only maneuver their

individual troops, but also entire units. The ability for a single commander to detach from

the rest of the army and move independently proved to be critical for Roman successes.

Therefore, although the phalanx had been successful for many centuries prior, it

was not able to adapt to the changing ways of war. The battle at Cynoscephalae was the

beginning of the end for the entire phalanx system of warfare. In the coming centuries the

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Roman legion would expand, and advance in both its tactics, and size. Conversely, the

Greek system would start to disappear, especially as the Romans established themselves

as the dominant power in Greece at the end of the second war. The Macedonians were

never a major world power again, and Rome’s control over the entire Mediterranean

region was solidified even more after Philip’s defeat. Through all this, it becomes clear

that through just one day of fierce fighting at The Dog’s Heads, an entire system of

warfare fell apart, and with it, an ancient civilization was to be forever changed due to the

power of Rome.

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Roman History 295J

Works Cited

Boatwright, Mary, Daniel Gargola, and Richard Talbert. fffffThe Romans From
Village to Empire. 1st ed. New fffffYork: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Heitland, W.E. The Roman Republic. 2nd ed. London: fffffCambridge University
Press, 1923.

Polybius. The Histories. 5 ed. London: William dddddHeinemann LTD, 1930.