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Edited by
Vicki L. Birchfield and Alasdair R. Young
TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY AMONG THE

UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION,
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE
Triangular Diplomacy among the United States,
the European Union, and the Russian Federation
Vicki L. Birchfield
Alasdair R. Young
Editors
Triangular Diplomacy
among the United
States, the European
Union, and the
Russian Federation
Responses to the Crisis in Ukraine
Editors
Vicki L. Birchfield Alasdair R. Young
Sam Nunn School of International Sam Nunn School of International
Affairs Affairs
Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA, USA Atlanta, GA, USA
ISBN 978-3-319-63434-0 ISBN 978-3-319-63435-7 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63435-7
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017952173
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
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tional affiliations.
Cover illustration: Denys Rudyi / Alamy Stock Photo
Printed on acid-free paper
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgments
This volume grew out of a Jean Monnet workshop organized by the

Center for European and Transatlantic Studies at the Georgia Institute of
Technology on May 1–2, 2015. The workshop was supported under the
European Union’s Erasmus+ Program (Jean Monnet Center of Excellence
2014–1842). The contributions to this volume reflect the views only of
the authors, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible
for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
Some of the participants in that workshop did not end up contributing
to the volume—Dina Khapaeva, Nikolay Kopsov, Jeff Mankoff, and
Richard Whitman—but their insights and comments contributed greatly
to the volume. We are grateful to Aarij Abbas, Simeon Bruce, Joshua
Jacobs, Zoe Larrier, Allison Stanford, and Daniel Yoon for their research
and editorial assistance. We would also like to thank Marilu Suarez for
providing excellent logistical support for the workshop and the Sam Nunn
School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech for funding some of our
research assistants. We are grateful to Scott Brown, Richard Whitman, the
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics series editors, and an anony-
mous reviewer for their comments on the manuscript. We also owe a debt
of gratitude to Palgrave’s Politics editorial team—Ambra Finotello and
Imogen Gordon Clark—for their support and encouragement. All short-
comings remain our own.
Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Vicki L. Birchfield

Georgia Institute of Technology, GA, USA Alasdair R. Young
v
Contents
1 Introducing Triangular Diplomacy 1

Alasdair R. Young and Vicki L. Birchfield
2 Empirical Scene Setting: The Contours

of the Crisis and Response 21
3 Outsourced Diplomacy: The Obama

Administration and the Ukraine Crisis 55
Deborah Welch Larson
4 ‘Crowdfunded Diplomacy’? The EU’s

Role in the Triangular Diplomacy Over
the Ukraine Crisis 77
Hiski Haukkala
5 Democracy and Progressive Modernity

in Constructions of Community: Europe,
the United States, and the Russian ‘Other’ 95
Grainne Hutton, Sara Morrell, and Jarrod Hayes
vii
viii CONTENTS
6 Russia Plays the (Triangular) Sanctions Game119

Christopher Patane and Cooper Drury
7 Ukraine and Triangular Diplomacy: Kyiv’s

Legitimacy Dilemmas in the Midst of the Crisis143
Valentina Feklyunina and Valentyna Romanova
8 Whose International Law? Legal Clashes

in the Ukrainian Crisis169
Mikulas Fabry
9 Triangular Diplomacy and Europe’s Changing

Gas Network: From “Trying-Angles” to Stable
Marriage189
Adam N. Stulberg
10 Conclusions: Comparison and Triangulation217

Vicki L. Birchfield and Alasdair R. Young
Index227
Abbreviations
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CE Council of Europe
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
ECU Eurasian Customs Union
EEAS European External Action Service
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
EPP Eastern Partnership Program
EU European Union
EUAM European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security
Sector Reform Ukraine
G7 Group of Seven
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
KIIS Kyiv International Institute of Sociology
MH17 Malaysian Airlines Flight 17
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFIUs NATO Force Integration Units
NRF NATO Response Force
ix
x ABBREVIATIONS
OHCHR Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human

Rights
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UK United Kingdom
UN SC United Nations Security Council
UN United Nations
UNGA UN General Assembly
US United States
VEB Volkseigener Betrieb
VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
WTO World Trade Organization
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Triangular diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis 8

Fig. 2.1 Spectrum of EU member states’ attitudes toward Russia 30
Fig. 6.1 Changes in Monthly Public Approval since the Onset
of Sanctions 133
xi
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Economic interdependence, 2013 4

Table 1.2 Comparing the transatlantic partners 6
Table 2.1 Minsk agreements summary and comparison 40
Table 2.2 EU and US restrictive measures as of the end of 2016 44
Table 2.3 Restrictions on doing business in Crimea 45
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Introducing Triangular Diplomacy
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent conflict

in eastern Ukraine represent both the greatest security challenge to west-
ern Europe since the end of the Cold War and a profound challenge to
international norms. Focusing on the short-term response to the annexa-
tion of Crimea and subsequent conflict, this volume explores the interac-
tions between the US, the EU and Russia. These three powers represent
This chapter is part of a wider project, which has been funded with support from
the European Commission (Jean Monnet Center of Excellence 2014-1842). It
reflects the views of only the authors, and the Commission cannot be held
responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
We are grateful to Aarij Abbas, Simeon Bruce, Joshua Jacobs, Zoe Larrier,
Allison Stanford and Daniel Yoon for their research and editorial assistance.
Earlier versions were presented to the ‘Triangular Diplomacy and the Crisis in
Ukraine: The European Union, The United States and the Russian Federation’
Jean Monnet Workshop at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 1–2 May 2015,
and to the ISA’s 57th Annual Convention, March 16–19, 2016, Atlanta,
Georgia. We are grateful to Scott Brown, Richard Whitman and the other
participants for their comments.
A.R. Young (*) • V.L. Birchfield

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology,
Atlanta, Georgia, USA
© The Author(s) 2018 1

V.L. Birchfield, A.R. Young (eds.), Triangular Diplomacy among
the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63435-7_1
2 A.R. YOUNG AND V.L. BIRCHFIELD
the vertices of the triangle in ‘triangular diplomacy,’ with Ukraine as the

‘object’ in the middle.
This volume is distinctive in two particular ways. First, it is explicitly
comparative, considering how the US and the EU responded to the same
crisis, although the stakes were different for each and the nature of the
problem was not necessarily understood in the same ways (see Chap. 5). It
thus contrasts a conventional, if exceptional, great power—the US—with
a very non-traditional foreign policy actor—the EU, which is typically
depicted as distinctive in terms of capabilities, organization and motiva-
tions. This volume, therefore, sheds light on what kind of international
actor the EU is and helps to inform foreign policy analysis more broadly.
The Ukraine crisis is a particularly appropriate case as it presents an espe-
cially critical test for the EU’s foreign policy as it concerns aggression by
its neighboring great power—Russia.
The second distinctive feature of this volume is its ‘360-degree’ per-
spective.1 Rather than focusing on the perspective of a single party in a
bilateral relationship or even the contending perspectives of a bilateral
pair, this volume engages with both how the US and the EU each regard
the other in its dealings with Russia, and also how Russia and Ukraine
perceive the motivations and effectiveness of the western powers. This
360-degree perspective is enhanced by considering the interactions of the
parties in cross-cutting, thematic issues of particular relevance to the crisis
and response.
Investigating the crisis in Ukraine through the lens of ‘triangular diplo-
macy’ helps to elucidate the complexity of crisis response when the three
core actors have very different relationships with the affected party, as well
as varying perceptions of the nature of the crisis. As a heuristic device the
concept of triangular diplomacy probes the parameters and consequences
of foreign policy behavior and reactions in ways that would be missed by
analyses of only bilateral and multilateral engagements. To be clear, this
volume does not seek to provide a definitive account of an unfolding,
high-stakes story. Rather, it takes a snapshot—roughly the two-and-a-half
years after the annexation of Crimea—to shed light on foreign policy
choices of great powers at a time of crisis.
This introduction aims to set the stage analytically for the other contri-
butions. It begins by making the case for studying the EU’s foreign policy
from a comparative perspective. It then sets out the triangular diplomacy
framework. The chapter concludes by introducing the other contributions
to the volume.
INTRODUCING TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 3
Comparing the EU as a Foreign Policy Actor

One of our analytical ambitions for this volume is to shed light on the EU
as a foreign policy actor by comparing its policy choices and policy effec-
tiveness in response to the Ukraine crisis with those of the US. The exist-
ing literature on the EU as a foreign policy actor, in the words of Niemann
and Bretherton (2013: 263), has tended to be ‘EU-introverted (or even
Eurocentric).’ The literature tends to emphasize that the EU is a sui
generis foreign policy actor. This depiction entails an implicit comparison
of the EU with traditional foreign policy actors, most commonly the
US. This literature focuses on what kind of foreign policy actor the EU
is—a civilian power (Duchêne 1973), normative power (Manners 2002)
or market power (Damro 2012), among others (for a review see Peterson
2012). These depictions emphasize the distinctiveness of the EU’s power
resources and/or its identity.
There is another, even more voluminous, strand of the literature that
describes specific EU foreign policies. This literature tends to be particu-
larly ‘EU-introverted’ (Niemann and Bretherton 2013: 263), lacking even
implicit comparison to the policies of other actors. There are, however, a
few exceptions that explicitly compare EU policies to those of other actors,
but these primarily concern external policies in which the EU is most
‘state-like’, such as climate change (see, e.g., Kelemen and Vogel 2010),
regulatory cooperation (Drezner 2007) and promoting norms through
preferential trade agreements (Postnikov 2014). There are two notable
exceptions with respect to traditional foreign policy.2 Möcklie and Mauer
(2011) compare American and European foreign policies toward the
Middle East. Although empirically rich, this work is largely descriptive,
and the EU qua the EU is only a peripheral actor. The other exception is
Brown (2014), who contrasts the different perceptions of China’s rise in
the EU and the US in order to explain differences in their policies toward
China. To an extent, our argument is a nice complement to Brown’s; simi-
lar perceptions of threat lead to similar responses. Comparison, thus, helps
to illuminate the EU’s foreign policy choices and begins to contextualize
how distinctive a foreign policy actor the EU is.
Comparison is particularly useful in assessing foreign policy effective-
ness (Niemann and Bretherton 2013: 268). The literature on EU foreign
policy effectiveness, whether reflexively or not, echoes Laatikainen and
Smith’s (2006: 16–19) distinction between internal and external effective-
ness. One strand of the literature, reflecting the limited centralization of
foreign policy authority in the EU, focuses on the EU’s ability to agree
and sustain common positions, what Laatikainen and Smith called internal
effectiveness and which is frequently referred to as ‘coherence’ (Niemann
and Bretherton 2013: 267). As Hiski Haukkala argues in Chap. 4, the
EU’s coherence in response to Russia’s aggression was unexpectedly high.
Given EU coherence/internal effectiveness, the next question is
whether the EU is also externally effective. Much of the EU foreign policy
literature concerned with external effectiveness uses goal attainment as the
metric of effectiveness (Jørgensen et al. 2011: 603; see Dee 2013: 28–31).
Goal attainment, however, may be an unrealistic objective. Foreign poli-
cies frequently fail, at least for some considerable time, to achieve their
objectives because the goal is ambitious, the problem is intractable or
other actors are uncooperative (Jørgensen et al. 2011: 604). Influencing
the behavior of another great power when the policy in question is seen as
affecting a core interest of the state, as is the case with Russia and the crisis
in Ukraine (see Chap. 6), is a particularly tall order. Reference to goal
attainment in such cases, therefore, may yield an unfairly harsh assessment
of effectiveness. Comparison with another foreign policy actor, therefore,
helps to contextualize how demanding the policy objective is, thus permit-
ting a more nuanced assessment of effectiveness (see also Niemann and
Bretherton 2013 (eds)).
The Challenges of Comparison

Although the case for comparing the responses of the EU and the US to
the crisis in Ukraine is strong, there are some analytical challenges to the
comparison. Two sets of differences particularly stand out (see Table 1.1).
First, the EU and US vary considerably in their power resources relative to
Russia. As Mearsheimer (2014) and Walt (2014) contend, Russia is not a
Table 1.1 Economic interdependence, 2013 (US$ billion)

Trade partner Exports to Russia Imports from Russia Inward stock of FDI in Russia
EU 224.1 135.0 242.7

US 11.2 16.7 13.2
World 527.3 315.0 565.7
Sources: Trade data from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics; world FDI stock from UNCTADSTAT; US
FDI stock based on own calculation from USTR (2016); EU FDI stock based on own calculation from
Commission 2016-DG Trade (convert from euros to dollars using IRS’s yearly average exchange rate)
peer competitor to the US. It is a regional power. In particular, this reflects

the relative military capabilities of the two countries. Although the US has
military superiority, its forces are relatively remote after the draw-down of
its forces in Europe after the end of the Cold War, although the Pentagon
redeployed heavily armed troops to eastern Europe beginning in January
2017. European forces, by contrast, are relatively close to Russia. Taken
together, the EU’s member states have considerable armed forces, but the
EU does not have a centralized army and there is much duplication, and
there is considerable doubt about their combat readiness (Cooper 2003;
Soesanto 2015). European forces are nearer to Russia than American
ones, but weaker.
In economic terms, by contrast the EU is much more important to
Russia than is the US. The EU is by far Russia’s most important trade
partner (see Table 1.1). In 2012, Russia’s trade with the EU was 14 times
greater than that with the US. In 2013, crude oil, natural gas and petro-
leum products accounted for 68 percent of Russia’s total exports.3 Seventy-
one percent of its gas exports went to the EU (Commission 2014: 2).
Much is made of EU’s dependence on Russian natural gas. That depen-
dence, however, varies sharply among the member states, with some—
such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia—getting
all of their natural gas from Russia, while others—such as Denmark,
France, the Netherlands, Romania and the UK—get less than 20 percent
of their natural gas from Russia (Commission 2014: Annex 1). Moreover,
the EU is a vital export market for Russia. This interdependence is a source
of both influence and vulnerability for both the EU and Russia, while the
US is largely on the sidelines (see Chap. 9).
The second major set of differences between the EU and the US as
foreign policy actors concerns how foreign policy is made. Foreign policy-
making in the US, at least in the macro-sense, is relatively straightforward.
Responsibility for foreign policy is centralized at the federal level.
Moreover, under both the Constitution and secondary legislation, the
president enjoys considerable authority to respond to crises such as that in
Ukraine (see Chaps. 2 and 3). The situation is very different in the EU,
where foreign policy decision-making remains primarily in the hands of
the member states, although they can and do take collective decisions
(White 2001; Chap. 4). Because of the pooled nature of decision-making
in the EU, all of the member state governments must agree, meaning that
any one member state can block common action. Thus, there are many
more veto players in the EU’s foreign policy process than there are in the
Table 1.2 Comparing the transatlantic partners

EU US
Geostrategic Near peer Not near peer

Capabilities Military capacity Limited, but proximate Substantial, but remote
compared Economic capacity Significant, but highly Low with low
to Russia interdependent interdependence
Foreign Locus of authority Decentralized with Highly centralized
policy- pooled decision-making
making Veto players Many veto players Few veto players
capacity (at central level)
US’s. All else being equal, therefore it is much easier for the US to decide
to act. In addition, the EU’s member states retain considerable foreign
policy autonomy, as was exercised by the French and German govern-
ments in engaging Russia and Ukraine in efforts to resolve the conflict
through the Normandy Process (see Chaps. 2 and 4). Thus, the US and
the EU are very different in terms of the material and decision-making
capabilities (Table 1.2). Nonetheless, their policy choices look remarkably
similar.
Introducing the Triangular Diplomacy Frame

This volume’s second analytical ambition is to make the case that some-
times apparently bilateral relationships are actually more complicated,
involving interaction with other actors, and that recognizing this dynamic
can help to explain foreign policy choices. We contend, therefore, that it is
useful to analyze the interaction among bilateral relationships. There are
extensive literatures on the US–Russia (e.g., Roberts 2014; Stent 2012),
the EU–Russia (e.g., Haukkala 2010; for a review, see Schmidt-Felzmann
2015) and the US–EU relations (e.g., McGuire and Smith 2008; Peterson
and Pollack 2003; for a review, see M. H. Smith 2015), but these are
treated as largely discrete bilateral relationships. The existing literature on
the Ukraine crisis reflects this tendency. It either focuses on distinct bilat-
eral relationships—mostly the EU–Russia and the US–Russia, but also
Ukraine–Russia (Menon and Rumer 2015; Sakwa 2015)—or tends to
conflate the EU and the US as the ‘West’ (Wilson 2014). Cross and
Karolewski (2017) share our aspiration to use the Ukraine crisis to inform
our understanding of the EU as an international actor. Their s pecific aim

is somewhat different, however—they ask ‘whether and to what extent the
Russia–Ukraine crisis serves as a critical juncture and catalyst for shaping
the EU’s power’—and they focus on only the EU’s response. In this vol-
ume, we explicitly consider how the three bilateral relationships interact.
In doing so, this volume is an initial response to Michael H. Smith’s
(2015: 580) call for greater scholarly attention to transatlantic diplomatic
coordination.
Analysis of the interaction among bilateral relationships seems to be
remarkably rare in the international relations literature. Berridge (2005),
in his textbook on diplomacy, has two chapters devoted to bilateral diplo-
macy, which is explicitly defined as ‘limited to two parties’ (108), and one
on multilateral diplomacy, which is effectively about formal organizations
(156–69). This focus is echoed by the contributions to Niemann and
Bretherton (2013 (eds)), which consider EU effectiveness in either bilat-
eral relationships or international institutions (270). It is also echoed in
The Sage Handbook of European Foreign Policy (Jörgensen et al., eds,
2015), which has ten chapters on EU foreign policies toward specific
countries of regions and three on relations with different multilateral insti-
tutions. Hill (2016: 183) identifies ‘other states’ foreign policies’ as one of
five main global-level factors that might influence an actor’s foreign policy,
but he reduces this constraint to the ‘hierarchy of states’ and the discus-
sion warrants just over a page (191–2). Thus the interaction among more
than two parties other than in multilateral settings is rare in the literature.
We contend that the crisis in Ukraine illustrates that a focus on only either
bilateral relationships or multilateral institutions misses an important part
of the story.
There are three edited volumes that come close to our ambitions. One
is Möckli and Mauer’s (2011), which focuses on European–American rela-
tions and the Middle East, but its primary focus is on the European–
American relationship and what American and European policies toward
the Middle East reveal about that relationship. The volume only touches
upon transatlantic cooperation in the context of the Quartet, the 1990–91
Gulf War and Iran’s nuclear program, and even then the ‘target’ is largely
inanimate. Another is Wouters et al. (2015), which explores the ‘triangu-
lar relationship’ between the EU, China and the developing world. It,
however, stresses the absence of an EU–China leg to the triangle (p. 14).
The third volume is Hallenberg and Karlsson (2006: 2), which examines
relations among the EU, the US and Russia and explicitly asks whether a
‘strategic triangle’ exists among the three. Their primary concern, however,
is whether the EU is sufficiently developed as an international actor to be
considered a pole in such a strategic triangle. Our volume is related to, but
goes beyond, these earlier efforts.
We deploy the framework of triangular diplomacy as a heuristic device
to capture the interaction between the EU, the US and Russia in the
Ukrainian crisis. These three powers represent the vertices of the triangle
in ‘triangular diplomacy,’ with Ukraine as the ‘object’ in the middle
(see Fig. 1.1). The idea, therefore, is to capture transatlantic cooperation
in putting pressure on Russia. Our analytical approach, therefore, refer-
ences the US’s policy of ‘triangular diplomacy’ in the 1970s when it
sought to develop relations with China as a counter to the Soviet Union.4
The use of the ‘triangle’ metaphor to refer to great-power balancing
among the US, China and Russia has resurfaced lately (see Gordon and
Schneider 2014; Kotkin 2009).5 Smith (2015: 580) refers to ‘great power
triangles’ to describe the EU and the US, as established powers with
shared interests in containing or socializing the rising powers.
Our approach, however, seeks to capture a policy dynamic different
from that pursued by then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. For
Kissinger (and more recently) triangulation meant using closer relations
with one party to enhance leverage with the third party (Gordon and
Schneider 2014). This is also the sense of ‘triangular’ used by Hallenberg
Fig. 1.1 Triangular diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis

and Karlsson (2006: 1). We, by contrast, are describing cooperation

between two parties to affect a specific behavior of the third. Kissinger
(1979: 712) explicitly excluded such cooperation against one apex of the
triangle from his understanding of triangular diplomacy.6 In addition, our
approach does not imply balance of power motivations for the policy (a
point to which we return below).
We understand triangular diplomacy to be coordinated action by two
states (which, in keeping with the triangle metaphor, we refer to collec-
tively as the ‘base’) to change behavior of another state (the ‘target’).
What we are interested in explaining are the foreign policies of the indi-
vidual states. Our argument is that the interaction between the members
of the base causes their foreign policies toward the third state to be differ-
ent than would be the case without that interaction. In addition, the ‘tar-
get’ state is likely to adopt strategies aimed at disrupting that
cooperation.
This is a hard case to make empirically, particularly in the context of a
single case, absent the counterfactual of what would happen if there were
no cooperation. Our authors use detailed process tracing to try to isolate
the impact of interaction on the behavior of the protagonists. Given the
inherent analytical challenges, we do not claim here to demonstrate the
impact of triangulation. Rather, we aim to show that our 360-degree
approach reveals new insights about the Ukrainian crisis and make the case
that the interaction among bilateral relationships warrants more
attention.
In order to help to clarify what we mean by triangular diplomacy, we
situate it in broader literatures. There are three literatures that are particu-
larly relevant: those on strategic partnerships, strategic balancing and
international cooperation. With respect to ‘strategic partnerships,’ the
idea is that there are important countries with which having good rela-
tions might be helpful in addressing common problems (e.g., Carter
2006). This literature, however, is relatively underdeveloped, not going
beyond the potential benefits of a partnership to explore why cooperation
between strategic partners occurs in a particular instance, which is our
focus. It is worth noting that the EU in its relations with its designated
‘strategic partners’ has tended to focus on its bilateral relationships with
them rather than engage in ‘triangulation’ with those partners to address
common problems (Renard 2012). The transition from a focus on the
bilateral relationship to cooperation with respect to a third party is pre-
cisely our concern.
The second pertinent literature concerns strategic balancing, specifi-

cally Kissinger’s meaning of the concept. Like triangular diplomacy, bal-
ancing implies coordination among some parties with respect to another,
but the literature on balancing (including on ‘soft balancing’ (Pape 2005;
Paul 2005)) focuses on the relative power of the participants rather than
trying to affect the specific behavior of one, which is our focus. In strategic
balancing, power is structural, while in our case, it is relational.
The third relevant literature is the extensive literature on international
cooperation. While triangular diplomacy is a form of international coop-
eration, it is different from the focus of the literature. The literature has
tended to analyze the attainment of common goals among all of the par-
ties (Oye 1985: 1), while triangular diplomacy is about cooperation with
another actor in order to change the behavior of a third. The literature on
international cooperation is particularly helpful for capturing cooperation
within the base, but it does not capture the interaction with the target.
Thus, while there are a number of proximate and useful literatures, our
framework of triangular diplomacy is distinctive.
Informed by these proximate literatures, particularly that on interna-
tional cooperation, there are several reasons why states might engage in
triangular diplomacy. Such cooperation can reduce the costs of trying to
change another state’s behavior through burden sharing and/or spreading
the blame. Cooperation helps to amplify the effects of coercive measures,
such as sanctions. Cooperation may also be a way to off-set vulnerabilities
with respect to the target.
Although there are benefits to pursuing triangulation, there are also
costs. Two costs in particular standout: the transaction costs of coordinat-
ing actions and the need to compromise. Given these costs, actors are
more likely to pursue triangulation when the policy preferences of the
members of the base are proximate, reducing the costs of compromise.
Actors are also more likely to pursue triangulation if the effectiveness of
unilateral actions is limited either because of the power of the target or
because the actor’s purchase is limited. Actors are also more likely to pur-
sue triangulation if there are costs to unilateral action, including retalia-
tion or circumvention.
As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, the conditions con-
ducive to the EU and the US cooperating in order to try to influence
Russia’s policy are all present in the Ukraine crisis. Following Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and particularly after the downing of Malaysian
Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), the EU’s (particularly Germany’s) position
regarding how to deal with Russia changed, becoming much more similar
to that of the US (Chaps. 4 and 5). In addition, Russia is a powerful coun-
try and therefore difficult to influence, so unilateral action was unlikely to
be successful, particularly as the EU’s most potent lever—energy imports—
was too costly to use (Chap. 9). In the circumstances, cooperation on
sanctions, especially financial sanctions, was particularly important so as to
prevent Russia simply being able to circumvent the sanctions imposed by
one party. Thus, the Ukraine crisis represents a most likely case for the EU
and the US to pursue triangulation.
Given that the Ukraine crisis is a most likely case, we do not make any
claims about when triangulation is likely to be pursued. Rather, we draw
attention to an important, but understudied feature of international rela-
tions. In the conclusion, we reflect on the heuristic of triangular diplo-
macy and consider how the research agenda might be advanced.
Introduction to the Rest of the Volume

While the three bilateral relationships in the Ukraine crisis—the EU–
Russia; the US–Russia and EU–US—provide the sides of our metaphori-
cal triangle, our focal points are the three vertices: the EU, the US and
Russia. Thus, rather than focusing on the bilateral relationship per se, we
focus on how each of the protagonists views the situation and, critically,
the behavior of the other major players. Thus we are in each case inter-
ested not just in why each party is doing what it is doing, but how it per-
ceives the behaviors of the other parties and how the other parties perceive
it. Thus we adopt a 360-degree perspective.
This volume has three complementary types of substantive
contributions:
1. analyses of the foreign policies of the US (Chap. 3), the EU

(Chap. 4) and the Russian Federation (Chap. 6), as well as Ukraine
(Chap. 7);
2. analysis of the internal debates and understandings of the crisis in
the transatlantic partners—the ‘base’ (Chap. 5);
3. analyses of the interactions in cross-cutting issues: international law
(Chap. 8) and energy (Chap. 9).
The overarching aim of the conclusion is to draw together the findings

of the substantive chapters and draw out the implications for foreign policy
analysis and, in particular, how we can understand the EU as an interna-

tional actor. The remainder of this chapter provides a more detailed over-
view of the organization and content of each contributing chapter.
The second chapter in the introductory section sets the stage empiri-
cally for the other contributions. It begins by characterizing the signifi-
cance of Russia’s aggression for the transatlantic community. It then
describes (briefly) the chain of events that led to Russia’s intervention in
Ukraine. It also describes the state of the relationships between the EU
and Russia and the US and Russia, including the absence of transatlantic
cooperation with respect to Russia prior to the crisis in Ukraine. The focus
of the chapter is on outlining how the US and the EU have responded to
Russia’s aggression. It addresses three components of that response:
efforts aimed at halting the conflict in Ukraine (including diplomatic ini-
tiatives and the imposition of restrictive measures and economic sanctions
on Ukrainian separatists and Russian officials and firms); measures intended
to support Ukraine (including statements of political support; bilateral
and multilateral economic assistance; non-lethal (thus far) military assis-
tance; trade liberalization); and steps to reassure North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) members bordering Ukraine. It is the first of these
components that are the focus of this volume, so this chapter serves as
scene setting for the subsequent contributions, which go into more detail,
but it also situates that discussion in a broader context. It concludes by
identifying three analytically pertinent questions that motivate the rest of
the volume: why are the EU’s policies so similar to those of the US despite
them being such different foreign policy actors? How has their coopera-
tion affected the policies that they have each pursued? How has that coop-
eration affected the response to the crisis?
The Second Section offers analyses of the principal players and their
respective policies with regard to the immediate outbreak of the crisis.
Deborah Larson’s ‘Outsourced Diplomacy: The US, EU and the Ukraine
Conflict’ starts from the observation that the US has not been directly
involved in promoting a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis; rather it
has pushed for sanctions and sought to isolate Russia. The chapter argues
that the Obama administration effectively ‘outsourced’ the resolution of
the crisis, delegating responsibility to the EU and particularly to Germany.
Larson claims that it did so because it viewed the crisis as mainly affecting
European rather than global US interests. Initially, however, this delegation
was problematic due to the legacies of different European and American
approaches toward Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The
downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, however, provoked a shift in

European preferences toward those of the US, facilitating transatlantic
cooperation. The most visible manifestation of this cooperation has been a
united front in maintaining sanctions. This chapter thus illustrates how
(passive) triangulation created an opportunity for US policy (outsourcing)
and how the alignment of preferences facilitates the pursuit of (active) tri-
angular diplomacy.
Chapter 4—“‘Crowdfunded diplomacy’? The EU’s Role in the
Triangular Diplomacy over the Ukraine Crisis” by Hiski Haukkala—
assesses the EU’s performance and situates it in the triangular diplomacy
frame. Haukkala argues that the crisis in Ukraine has been a particularly
challenging issue for the EU, because it has called into question the EU’s
objectives and very modus operandi in its ‘neighborhood,’ spurred inter-
nal soul-searching about the role of its policies in precipitating the con-
flict, and challenged the EU’s actorness and status in global politics. He
contends that the EU has risen to a very difficult occasion: swiftly con-
demning Russia’s actions, imposing a series of gradually tightening sanc-
tions against Russia and channeling political and economic support to
Ukraine. In addition, the EU or, more precisely, some key EU member
states have played the leading role in the political management of the cri-
sis. Haukkala contends that the EU’s response to the crisis, while coordi-
nated with the US, was internally motivated. Moreover, even though the
EU’s policy has not resolved the conflict, the Ukraine crisis has helped the
EU to come of age as an international actor.
Chapter 5 in this section—“Democracy and Progressive Modernity in
Constructions of Community: Europe, the United States, and the Russian
‘Other’”—is explicitly comparative. Grainne Hutton, Sara Morell and
Jarrod Hayes analyze how the foreign policy elites in the ‘base’ of the tri-
angular diplomacy framework—the US, the EU, France and Germany—
frame their relationship with the Russian ‘target’/‘Other.’ They argue that
the elites identify the ‘Self’ differently and use distinct discourses to frame
their condemnation of Russia. President Obama tended to define the Self
in transatlantic terms, while EU and German leaders focused on a
European Self. French leaders, by contrast, tended to present the Self in
national terms. The leaders of all of these polities made prominent use of
the discourse of progressive modernity, which emphasizes Russia’s disrup-
tion of peaceful collaboration, including the violation of international law,
but only the US emphasized the democracy/freedom discourse, which
hinges on the very nature of the Russian Other. The authors argue that
these different emphases are significant because the progressive modernity

discourse suggests that relations with Russia can return to normal once it
changes its behavior, while the emphasis on democracy/freedom suggests
that conflict will endure until Russia itself changes. Thus, they contend
that these differences suggest a fault line within the base that Russia might
be able to exploit.
In Chap. 6—“Russia Plays the (Triangular) Sanctions Game”—
Christopher Patane and Cooper Drury apply the triangular diplomacy
frame from the perspective of the ‘target.’ They examine how the Russian
government has sought to both deflect blame and divide the Europeans
and the EU from the US. They argue that the sanctions have enabled the
Putin regime to blame the West for Russia economic woes, which helps to
explain the regime’s continued strong popularity despite deteriorating
economic conditions. Moreover, they contend that Russia characterizes
the EU’s and US’s sanctions differently. Russia characterizes the EU’s
sanctions as more harmful to the EU than to Russia and being pursued by
a foolish elite that has been duped by the US, as part of a strategy to
undermine European support for sanctions. The US’s sanctions, by con-
trast, are portrayed as an aggressive attempt by the US to weaken Russia.
In their analysis, therefore, the ‘target’ is an active player seeking both to
deflect the political costs of the sanctions and to undermine the coopera-
tion that underpins them.
The final chapter of the second section gives space to the focus of the
conflict. In ‘Ukraine and Triangular Diplomacy: Kyiv’s Legitimacy
Dilemmas in the midst of the Crisis,’ Valentina Feklyunina and Valentyna
Romanova analyze Ukraine’s attempts to influence the triangular diplomacy
pursued by the EU and the US. The framework of triangular diplomacy
supports a particularly nuanced understanding of how Ukraine sought to
navigate the perils of an asymmetrical conflict. Unable to influence Russia’s
behavior directly, Ukraine sought to influence it by appealing to Brussels
and Washington for symbolic, diplomatic and material support. At the same
time, the chapter shows that the Ukrainian authorities and political elites
recognized a substantial difference in the willingness and ability of the EU
and the US to exert pressure on Russia. Wary of the EU’s lack of internal
cohesion and aware of the importance of its economic links with Russia,
Kyiv sought, mostly unsuccessfully, to advocate a more active diplomatic
role for Washington. Importantly, Ukraine consistently called for a greater
solidarity between Brussels’ and Washington’s policies toward Russia.
While Kyiv largely succeeded in communicating its narrative of the crisis,
it struggled to convert the discursive success into a diplomatic one. The

perceived inadequacy of the resulting US and EU support for Ukraine and
pressure on Russia undermined pro-EU support within Ukraine.
After considering the primary actors and the various interests and iden-
tities at play in this conflict, Section Three examines how they interact
with respect to two key, cross-cutting issues: the role and limits of interna-
tional law and the importance of energy. The first chapter in this section
poses a central question in its title, ‘Whose International Law? Legal
Clashes in the Ukrainian Crisis.’ Here, Mikulas Fabry examines the role of
international law in the Ukrainian crisis. He demonstrates that the US and
the EU have held uniform views on major international legal issues raised
by Russia’s military intervention, the Crimean referendum, and the
absorption of Crimea into the Russian Federation. This uniformity is nota-
ble because the post-Cold War years saw multiple disagreements both
among the member states of the EU and between EU member states and
the US over the interpretation of legal norms in high-profile cases involv-
ing the actual or potential use of military force. Russia consciously drew
upon some of those contested cases, especially the Kosovo intervention
and recognition, to construct a plausible-sounding legal case for its actions
in Ukraine. Neither the past rifts over cases nor Russia’s attempts to justify
its actions have prevented the emergence of a unified transatlantic legal
view of the crisis in Ukraine. Crucially, this unified view developed in close
coordination rather than fortuitously. There can be little doubt that
American and European leaders sought a strong common position in
order to cast Russia’s legal argument in as unconvincing a light as possible
before the global diplomatic audience. Thus, triangular diplomacy is evi-
dent in the legal contestation of the Ukraine crisis.
Arguably the most complex cross-cutting issue involves the implica-
tions of energy politics and is the subject of the chapter by Adam Stulberg
(Chap. 9), titled “Triangular Diplomacy and Europe’s Changing Gas
Network: From ‘Trying-Angles’ to Stable Marriage.” This chapter expli-
cates the puzzle of strategic restraint in gas relations in the wake of Russia’s
annexation of Crimea through the lens of triangulation. Unlike other
chapters in this volume, however, the three poles of central concern in the
gas trade are Russia, Ukraine and the EU, with the US playing a more
indirect role. The chapter begins by spelling out the distinguishing fea-
tures and logic of strategic energy interaction, and traces the impact of
alternative asymmetric triangular structures on the intensity and duration
of gas conflicts prior to the contemporary crisis. It then examines how the
structure of cross-border gas relations transformed from three interacting

but asymmetric ‘point-to-point’ relationships to a triangle system embed-
ded within a broader regional gas network in the lead up to the conflict.
This transformation effectively created more symmetry and stability within
the strategic gas triangle, as it bolstered energy security for Brussels and
Kyiv while circumscribing Russia’s coercive options. The chapter then
probes the strategic consequences of the transformation of the Europe-
Eurasian gas network through facilitating more resilient and diversified gas
relationships into and across Europe, including liquid natural gas exports
from the US, despite Russia’s enduring prominence as a commercial sup-
plier. The chapter concludes by exploring the implications for coercive
diplomacy, as well as prospects for mitigating tensions and strengthening
US–Euro–Russian energy governance in the transition to a global gas
network.
Wrapping up the volume in Section Four, the editors in ‘Conclusion:
Comparison and Triangulation’ draw out the implications of the contribu-
tions to the volume for our understanding of the EU as an international
actor and highlight the insights gleaned through the use of the triangular
diplomacy frame. Drawing on the contributions to this volume, the chapter
underlines how considering how bilateral relationships interact—employ-
ing the triangular diplomacy frame—can reveal insights about real world
problems. It addition, it highlights how the 360-degree perspective reveals
several intriguing features of the Ukraine crisis that have been overshad-
owed in more conventional accounts of the crisis—including the relative
roles of the EU and US, the challenges to their cooperation, and Russian
efforts to undermine it. The chapter also problematizes restricting the met-
aphor to the interactions among three parties (the triangle) and considers
its applicability to other cases. It concludes by considering what the Ukraine
crisis reveals about the EU as a foreign policy (and international) actor.
Notes
1. Triangles have 180 degrees, but 180 degrees implies only a bilateral focus.
We, therefore, have plumped for a 360-degree perspective, which is familiar
from business and arguably also captures Ukraine as a reference point.
2. Wouters et al. (2015) (eds) compare the ‘intensity’ of the EU’s and China’s
‘relations’ with different regions of the developing world (see pp. 6–8).
Their comparison focuses on historical ties, geographic proximity and insti-
tutional arrangements.
3. Energy Information Administration. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/

todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17231. Accessed June 28, 2015.
4. U.S. Department of State Archives: Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1969–1976.
Vol. 1 (http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i/21100.htm).
5. Lo (2010) directly critiques the contemporary use of the triangulation on
the grounds that Russia is not really powerful enough to make it an effective
strategy.
6. ‘Triangular diplomacy, to be effective, must rely on the natural incentives
and propensities of the players. It must avoid the impression that one is
‘using’ either of the contenders against the other…’
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CHAPTER 2
Empirical Scene Setting: The Contours

of the Crisis and Response
Although the focus of this project is on the efforts of the US and the EU
to halt and roll back Russian aggression in Ukraine, it is necessary to
rehearse, at least briefly, the origins of the crisis. As will become clear
below and in the contributions that follow, although the sequence of
events is broadly accepted, which of those events constituted a provoca-
tion to whom is vigorously contested, both within and between the
parties.1
This chapter is part of a wider project, which was funded with support from the
European Commission (Jean Monnet Center of Excellence 2014-1842). It
reflects the views of only the authors, and the Commission cannot be held
responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
We are grateful to Aarij Abbas, Simeon Bruce, Joshua Jacobs, Zoe Larrier,
Allison Stanford and Daniel Yoon for their research and editorial assistance. An
earlier version was presented to the ISA’s 57th Annual Convention, March
16–19, 2016, Atlanta, Georgia. We are grateful to Scott Brown, Richard
Whitman and the other participants for their comments.
A.R. Young (*) • V.L. Birchfield

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology,
Atlanta, Georgia, USA
© The Author(s) 2018 21

V.L. Birchfield, A.R. Young (eds.), Triangular Diplomacy among
the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63435-7_2
This chapter begins by characterizing the significance of Russia’s

aggression for the transatlantic community. It then describes (briefly) the
chain of events that led to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, the US and
EU’s responses to which are the focus of this volume. The chapter then
surveys those responses, including those taken in the context of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which are not the focus of this
volume, but are included for completeness. This chapter, therefore, pro-
vides the background for the chapters that follow.
Real World Significance

There is broad agreement that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine presents
a stern test for the transatlantic alliance, particularly the EU. Former
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General Philip Breedlove
(2016: 102) wrote, ‘Russia poses an enduring existential threat to the
United States, its allies, and the international order.’ The then NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2014: 1) stated, ‘How
Western democracies respond to [Russia’s aggression in Ukraine] and
reshape Euro-Atlantic security will be, I believe, the defining challenge
of the next decade.’ Former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright
(2014) wrote that ‘Russia’s behavior is a game-changer in the post-
World War II world.’ The 2015 US National Security Strategy con-
cluded that ‘Russia’s aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European
security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggres-
sion cannot be taken for granted’ (White House 2015). The European
Commission’s 2016 European Union Global Strategy concurred, stat-
ing that ‘peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given. Russia’s
violation of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine, on top
of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged
the European security order at its core’ (Commission 2016b: 33).
There is thus a clear sense that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine repre-
sents the most profound security challenge to the West since the end of
the Cold War (Menon and Rumer 2015).
Russia’s aggression is a particular challenge to and for the EU. In the
most straightforward sense, because of proximity and relative capabilities,
Russia, as Walt’s (2014) assessment of Russia as regional power implies, is
a threat to Europe, not the US. Russia’s aggression, however, also poses a
EMPIRICAL SCENE SETTING: THE CONTOURS OF THE CRISIS AND RESPONSE 23
challenge to the EU’s aspirations to be a global actor (see also Chap. 4).
The 2003 European Security Strategy proclaimed, ‘Europe should be
ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a
better world’ (European Council 2003: 1). There has since been a bur-
geoning literature on the EU as a ‘global actor’ (for an overview, see
Peterson 2012).
Russia’s aggression poses the sternest test to date to that aspiration for
two, reinforcing reasons. First, Russia is the EU’s neighboring great
power. As great powers tend to be assessed in terms of how they engage
with each other, the EU’s response to aggression on its border is a particu-
larly apt test of its great-power credentials. This is particularly the case as
Ukraine falls within the great powers’ overlapping spheres of influence—
the EU’s neighborhood and Russia’s ‘near abroad.’ Second, the EU’s
international influence is widely understood to dissipate sharply with dis-
tance (Lavenex 2011; Rees 2011; and Smith 2008). As the Ukrainian
crisis is on its borders, it should be one with which the EU is relatively well
equipped to cope. If the EU cannot respond effectively to a crisis on its
borders, what does that imply about crises further afield? Reflecting this
assessment, former EU High Representative Baroness Catherine Ashton
said that the EU should be judged as an international actor ‘by how it
deals with its neighborhood.’2 The EU’s Global Strategy describes ‘man-
aging’ the EU’s relationship with Russia as ‘a key strategic challenge’
(Commission 2016b: 33).
From Trade Talks to Conflict via Annexation

This profoundly challenging crisis has its origins, ostensibly, in a trade
agreement, or rather the rejection of a trade agreement. The EU and the
Ukraine were due to sign an Association Agreement, which, to be fair, is
considerably more than just a trade agreement, at the Eastern Partnership
Summit in Vilnius at the end of November 2013. Just before the sum-
mit, Ukraine’s then President Viktor Yanukovych announced that he
would not sign the agreement, as he had been expected to do. This pre-
cipitated what became known as the Euromaidan demonstrations in
Kiev, which ultimately led to Yanukovych’s ouster in February 2014.
That change of government created the opportunity for Russian aggres-
sion (see Box 2.1).
Box 2.1 Timeline: Origins of the Crisis
3/07 Association agreement talks begin

2/18/08 Negotiations of deep and comprehensive free trade area
(DCFTA) start
7/1/09 Ukraine joins eastern partnership
2/25/10 Yanukovych becomes president
12/19/11 EU postpones signing of association agreement due to
imprisonment of former prime minister Tymoshenko
3/30/12 Association agreement initialed
7/19/12 DCFTA initialed
6/13/13 Ukraine becomes observer to the Eurasian customs union
8/14/13 Russia blocks exports to Ukraine
11/21/13 Ukraine suspends preparations to sign association agreement
Euromaidan protests begin
12/17/13 Russia agrees to lend $15 billion to Ukraine and provide 33%
discount on gas
2/21/14 Yanukovych loses vote of no confidence and flees Ukraine
Association Agreements, which go beyond liberalizing trade to include

political cooperation and reforms (see Box 2.2), are the EU’s principal
tool for institutionalizing relations with relatively small, but politically sig-
nificant countries, including those in its ‘neighborhood.’ The EU and
Ukraine had begun negotiating the Association Agreement in 2007 to
replace the ten-year Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that they
had concluded to structure their relations following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Negotiations of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area (DCFTA), the trade portion of the agreement, began in February
2008. One of the Association Agreement’s explicit objectives was ‘to
establish conditions for enhanced economic and trade relations leading
toward Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU Internal Market’ (Art
1.2(d)). The negotiation of the Association Agreement was concluded in
2011, and it was initialed in March 2012.
Russia did not raise any objections to the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement until the summer of 2013 when the text was published and it
seemed that Ukraine would actually sign (House of Lords 2015: 53–4).
Former EU High Representative Baroness Catherine Ashton contends
that Russian President Vladimir Putin did not raise the EU’s Association
Agreement with Ukraine in any of the twice yearly summit meetings prior
to August 2013.3 A highly critical House of Lords (2015: 6) report
Box 2.2 Summary of Key Elements of the EU-Ukraine Association

Agreement
Title I: General principles
Title II: Political dialogue and reform, political association, coopera-

tion and convergence in the field of foreign and security policy
• To deepen political association and increase political and security
policy convergence and effectiveness;
• To promote international stability and security based on effective
multilateralism;
• To strengthen cooperation and dialogue on international security
and crisis management, notably in order to address global and
regional challenges and key threats;
• To foster result-oriented and practical cooperation for achieving
peace, security and stability on the European continent;
• To strengthen respect for democratic principles, the rule of law
and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,
non-discrimination of persons belonging to minorities and respect
for diversity, and to contribute to consolidating domestic political
reforms;
• Promoting peace and international justice by ratifying and imple-
menting the Rome statute of the international criminal court and
its related instruments.
Title III: Justice, freedom and security

• Increase dialogue and cooperation on migration, asylum and bor-
der management;
• Introduce a visa-free travel regime for the citizens of Ukraine in
due course, provided that the conditions for well-managed and
secure mobility are in place;
• Commitment to combating organised crime and money launder-
ing, to reducing the supply of and demand for illicit drugs and to
stepping up cooperation in the fight against terrorism;
• Wish to enhance people-to-people contacts.
Title IV trade and trade related matters

• Deep and comprehensive free trade agreement:
• Elimination of almost all tariffs and barriers in the area of trade
in goods, the provision of services, and the flow of investments;
• Once Ukraine has taken over the relevant EU acquis, the EU

will grant market access for example in areas such as public pro-
curement or industrial goods.
Title V economic and sector cooperation

• Energy cooperation; macro-economic cooperation; management of
public finances; taxation; statistics; environment; transport; space;
cooperation in science and technology; industrial and enterprise
policy; mining and metals; financial services; company law, corpo-
rate governance, accounting and auditing; information society;
audio-visual policy; tourism; agriculture and rural development;
fisheries and maritime policy; Danube river; consumer protection;
cooperation on employment, social policy and equal opportunities;
public health; education, training and youth; culture, sport and
physical activity; civil society, cross-border and regional cooperation;
participation in European agencies and Programmes.
Title VI Financial cooperation with anti-fraud provisions

• Ukraine will benefit from EU financial assistance through existing
funding mechanisms and instruments in order to achieve the
objectives of the association agreement;
• The EU and Ukraine will take effective measures to prevent and
fight fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities.
Title VII institutional, general and final provisions

• EU-Ukraine summit will be established;
• Association council will provide for dialogue at ministerial level;
• Association committee will assist the association council;
• A parliamentary association committee will be established;
• A civil society platform will be established;
• Gradual approximation of Ukraine’s legislation to EU norms and
standards (between 2 and 10 years from entry into force);
• Dynamic approximation (as EU law and legislation develop);
• Monitoring of application and implementation of the agreement;
• Dispute settlement mechanism.
Source: Adapted from Commission, ‘EU–Ukraine Association

Agreement: Quick Guide to the Association Agreement,’ 7 December
2015. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/pdf/071215_
eu-ukraine_association_agreement.pdf. Accessed 10 Aug 2016
accused the EU of ‘sleep walking’ into the crisis. While taking issue with
that characterization, Baroness Ashton admitted that the EU ‘didn’t see it
coming.’ John Mearsheimer (2014) contends that the West did not antici-
pate Russia’s response because it was suffering from the ‘liberal delusion’
that great-power politics were no longer relevant in post-Cold War
Europe. As the contributions to this volume make clear, very different
perceptions of events and actions by the key actors contributed to the
crisis, but these misunderstandings were mutual: Russia misjudged the
West as much as the West misjudged Russia.4
In immediate response to Yanukovitch’s decision not to sign the
Association Agreement, a small demonstration in favor of Ukraine sign-
ing swelled into a major demonstration, with tens of thousands of pro-
testors occupying Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in
central Kiev, starting what became known as the Euromaidan protests
(Diuk 2014). As demonstrators remained on the streets, Yanukovych
struck a deal with Russian President Putin on 17 December, under which
Russia agreed to prop up the Ukrainian government by buying $15 bil-
lion in Ukrainian government bonds and cutting the price it charged
Ukraine for natural gas by a third. Although there had been periodic
attempts to clear the square earlier, the violence escalated sharply during
18–20 February 2014, with the police using live ammunition to disperse
the protesters. As political support for the regime ebbed in response to
the violence a political solution was sought. A deal between Yanukovych
and some of the leaders of the demonstrations, which was brokered by
France, Germany and Poland, was rejected by the protesters on the
streets. On 21 February, Yanukovych lost a vote of no confidence in the
Parliament and fled the country (House of Lords 2015: 57; Traynor
2014). On 23 February, Ukraine’s Parliament formally impeached him,
and its speaker, Oleksander Turchynov, was appointed interim president
until elections on 25 May.
The international crisis subsequently unfolded rapidly. On 27 February,
Russian troops, in unmarked uniforms, occupied strategic buildings in
Crimea (Booth 2014). On 6 March, the Crimean parliament voted to
secede from Ukraine and join Russia, a decision that was endorsed by a
dubious referendum on 16 March. Two days later, Russia formally annexed
Crimea. Fighting in eastern Ukraine—primarily in the Donetsk and
Luhansk oblasts—broke out in April 2014 as pro-Russian separatists, with
military support from Russia, sought to emulate Crimea. As a result of the
ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights documented 9,900 people killed and

23,246 injured from mid-April 2014 to 15 February 2017.5 It is this crisis
that is the focus, from different perspectives, of the contributions to this
volume.
Recent Transatlantic Relations with Russia

While our focus is on relations among the EU, US and Russia (and Ukraine)
in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, it is worth considering what their
relations were like prior to the crisis. Two features stand out. First, relations
between the EU and Russia and the US and Russia were both fraying prior
to the Ukraine crisis and were characterized, at least on the part of the
West, by disinterest, if not neglect. Second, there were two entirely separate
bilateral relationships—US-Russia and EU-Russia; there was next to no
transatlantic dimension to their relations with Russia to speak of.
European Union: Interdependent, but Inattentive

The EU’s relations with Russia are institutionalized in the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which entered into force in 1997. It is
primarily a trade agreement, but is broader, institutionalizing political dia-
logue and committing both sides to respect democracy and human rights,
including the rights of minorities (Timmerman 1996). As with Ukraine’s
PCA, the agreement was originally for ten years, but it renews automati-
cally annually unless either side decides to terminate it. The EU and
Russia, consequently, began negotiations on a more far-reaching, ‘New
Agreement’ in 2008. These negotiations began at the same time as the
EU’s DCFTA talks with Ukraine. These negotiations, however, stalled in
2011, because the trade portion of the negotiations was complicated by
Russia working to create what would become the Eurasian Economic
Union and being reluctant to engage in liberalization beyond what it had
undertaken in order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
it did in August 2012 (House of Lords 2015: 23; Young and Peterson
2014: 205). The EU subsequently became dissatisfied with Russia’s imple-
mentation of its WTO obligations. Trade talks thus stalled the
relationship.
Particularly during Vladimir Putin’s second spell as president, which
began in May 2012, Russia has turned away from Europe (Chap. 6; House
of Lords 2015: 18–20).6 It has become more authoritarian and more secu-
ritized, and the government has become more actively involved in the
economy. In addition, Russia came increasingly to see the EU as a ‘deca-
dent’ rival. European policy did not adapt to these changes, and the EU
effectively did not have a Russia policy prior to the crisis in Ukraine (House
of Lords 2015: 23). On both sides, arguably, the bilateral EU-Russia rela-
tionship suffered from political neglect (House of Lords 2015: 26–7) and
atrophied.
Although the political relationship was weak, the economic relation-
ship between the EU and Russia was strong. As discussed in Chap. 1,
the EU was by far Russia’s most important trade partner and most
important source of foreign investment. The bulk of Russia’s crude oil
and natural gas exports went to the EU in 2013, and 39 percent of the
EU’s natural gas imports come from Russia (Commission 2014: 15;
2016a: 5). This energy interdependence has moderated how the EU
and Russia have responded to each other in the context of the Ukraine
crisis (see Chap. 9).
Interdependence also colored how the EU had sought to influence
Russia in the past. It had only episodically and briefly sought to use trade
policy to shape Russian behavior. The EU delayed the adoption of an
interim agreement on the trade elements of the PCA for three months in
response to Russia’s initial military campaign in the Russian territory of
Chechnya in December 1994, but the interim agreement was adopted
despite only limited improvements on the ground. The resumption of hos-
tilities in Chechnya in the 2000s did not result in any suspension of prefer-
ential access to the EU’s market (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011: 206–14). The
EU did not adopt a trade policy response to the erosion of democracy in
Russia, highlighted most vividly by the mass protests that followed the
(widely viewed as flawed) election of Vladimir Putin for the second time as
president. The EU did suspend negotiation of the New Agreement in
response to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, but that suspension lasted
only a few months. Consequently, James Hughes (2006: 19) has argued
that the EU’s relationship with Russia ‘is heavily loaded with pragmatic
calculations about the costs and benefits of an interdependency of trade,
that trump concerns over other more value-based issues, such as democra-
tisation or human rights.’ Moreover, he contends that the EU’s policy has
become more pragmatic and less principled over time. The EU’s recent
history with Russia fostered two assessments that are essentially opposite
sides of the same coin. On one side, the EU has had little impact on Russian
behavior when it has sought to use trade policy as a stick. On the other side,
the EU has lacked the resolve to stand by its principles.
An important reason for the EU’s lack of resolve was that the EU’s
member states had very different views of appropriate policies toward
Russia, with five favoring engagement and seven being quite confronta-
tional (see Fig. 2.1) and the rest not taking consistent or strong positions.
In particular, the member states differed on the extent to which they
viewed Russia as a political or military threat or as an economic opportu-
nity. This was a roughly, but only roughly, east-west divide. It is worth
noting that a number of the member states that have favored a more con-
frontational approach toward Russia—notably the Baltic states and
Slovakia—are also among the most heavily dependent on Russian natural
gas, so gas dependence did not determine EU member states’ attitudes
toward Russia even before the crisis in Ukraine.
Russian aggression in Ukraine, particularly the downing of Malaysian
Airlines Flight ML17 in July 2014, upset the rough balance among the
EU member states and prompted a number of them to reassess their
approaches to Russia (House of Lords 2015: 61; Chap. 4). Germany, in
particular, has shifted its position and now sees Russia’s actions in Ukraine
as a threat to European security. It is this shift in attitudes toward Russia
that opened the door to the imposition of sanctions against Russia. This
shift also brought the EU’s view of Russia closer to that of the US, open-
ing the door to transatlantic cooperation.
Fig. 2.1 Spectrum of Engagement Confrontation

EU member states’ atti-
Cyprus Estonia
tudes toward Russia (late
2000s) (Source: Reflects France Czech Republic
the consensus view in the Germany Latvia
literature (based on
Schmidt-Felzmann 2011: Greece Lithuania
52)) Italy Poland
Slovakia
United Kingdom
United States: Tensions Without Respect

In contrast to the EU, the US does not tend to institutionalize its bilateral
relationships. Rather it seeks to conclude issue specific agreements. A par-
tial exception to this tendency was the creation of the US-Russia Bilateral
Presidential Commission, which framed cooperation across a wide range
of issues. The Commission, however, is much less formal than the arrange-
ments that the EU concluded and pursued with Russia.
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has regarded Russia as a sec-
ondary, regional power, much to the irritation of the Russian leader-
ship, particularly Putin (Chap. 3; Roberts 2014: 3). The US-Russian
relations particularly soured during President George W. Bush’s sec-
ond term, not least because of Russia’s incursion into Georgia (for a
review, see Roberts 2014: 2–5). The US’s support for Georgia during
that conflict was interpreted by Russia as an indication that the US did
not respect its regional interests and traditional sphere of influence
(Roberts 2014: 4).
Relations had grown sufficiently poor that in 2009, President Barack
Obama felt the need to ‘reset’ the relationship. The US-Russia Bilateral
Presidential Commission was part of this reset.7 The reset led to a more
pragmatic approach focused on mutual benefits (Roberts 2014: 2). For
the US, this meant cooperation on security measures, combating terror-
ism, and upholding the arms control regime. These were of interest to
Russia too, although it also wanted to rebuild the economic relationship,
particularly by encouraging American foreign direct investment (see also
Stent 2012).
But after initial successes, such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty and securing Russian support for sanctions on Iran over its sus-
pected nuclear weapons program, the US-Russian relationship was allowed
to languish (see Chap. 3). An indication of the US not prioritizing Russia
was that in October 2013, the US Department of State eliminated its
funding program for advanced language and cultural training on Russia
and the former Soviet Union (Title VIII) (King 2015: 88). Russia, unlike
the Soviet Union, was not a central preoccupation for the US, rather it was
an important player that could be helpful on some issues and an obstacle
on others (Stent 2012: 125).
The US-Russia economic relationship has also remained underdevel-
oped. In 2013, the US received only 2 percent of Russia’s exports and
provided just over 5 percent of its imports (see Table 1.1). US firms
accounted for just over 2 percent of the stock of foreign direct investment
in Russia. Thus, in sharp contrast to the EU, the US and Russia were
barely connected economically. Therefore, Russia did not figure promi-
nently in Washington’s world view either politically or economically prior
to the crisis in Ukraine.
Takeaway
Prior to the events of late 2013, Russia was not a priority for either the US
or EU, although it was considerably more important, particularly eco-
nomically, for the EU than for the US. Particularly for the US, Russia
mattered across a range of issues and it needed to be engaged, but it was
more as a means to an end than an end in itself. In addition, relations
between Russia and both the US and EU were already strained prior to
the crisis. Russian concerns about western disrespect, encroachment on its
sphere of influence and interference in its internal affairs and western con-
cerns about Russia’s illiberal democracy and increasingly statist capitalism
soured both relationships. Thus, both the EU-Russia and US-Russia rela-
tionships were weak and fraying.
Tellingly, although there were strong parallels and overlaps between the
EU-Russia and US-Russia relationships, they were, by and large, separate
relationships. There was virtually no transatlantic cooperation with respect
to Russia (Hallenberg and Karlsson 2006: 211). There was no triangular
diplomacy. It was only in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine that the
EU and the US began to coordinate actively their policies toward Russia.
The Transatlantic Response and the Emergence

of Triangular Diplomacy
There are three related, but distinct aspects of the transatlantic response to
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent aggression in eastern Ukraine:
• efforts aimed at halting the conflict in Ukraine—including diplomatic

initiatives and the imposition of restrictive measures and economic
sanctions on Ukrainian separatists and Russian officials and firms;
• measures intended to support Ukraine—statements of political sup-
port, bilateral and multilateral economic assistance, non-lethal (thus
far) military assistance, trade liberalization; and
• steps to reassure NATO members bordering Ukraine.
The focus of volume is on the efforts to address the conflict in Ukraine,

but efforts to support Ukraine and to reassure other European states are
also important. We briefly review the EU and US actions to realize those
objectives here before returning to the central issue of efforts to halt the
conflict in Ukraine.
Efforts to Support Ukraine

The EU and its member states and the US have sought to bolster the
Ukrainian state. This has come through repeated rhetorical commitments
to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and rejection of Russia’s annexation of
Crimea (see Chaps. 5 and 8). For instance, the Council of the European
Union in March 2014 stated:
The European Union strongly condemns the clear violation of Ukrainian

sovereignty and territorial integrity by acts of aggression by the Russian
armed forces as well as the authorisation given by the Federation Council of
Russia on 1 March for the use of the armed forces on the territory of
Ukraine. These actions are in clear breach of the UN Charter and the OSCE
Helsinki Final Act, as well as of Russia’s specific commitments to respect
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity under the Budapest
Memorandum of 1994 and the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation
and Partnership of 1997 (Council 2014: 1).
President Obama, speaking in Tallinn, Estonia, on 4 September 2014,

stated:
[Russia’s aggression against Ukraine] is a brazen assault on the territorial integ-

rity of Ukraine – a sovereign and independent European nation. It challenges
that most basic of principles of our international system – that borders cannot
be redrawn at the barrel of a gun; that nations have the right to determine their
own future. It undermines an international order where the rights of peo-
ples and nations are upheld and can’t simply be taken away by brute force.8
Following the change in government in Ukraine, the EU-Ukraine

Association Agreement was signed on 27 June 2014. The agreement was
ratified simultaneously by the Verkhovna Rada and the European
Parliament on 16 September 2014. Parts of the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement—including cooperation on the rule of law, the fight against
crime and corruption, as well as intensified sectoral cooperation—were
provisionally applied as of 1 November 2014. Beginning in April 2014,
even before the Association Agreement was signed, the EU unilaterally

granted Ukraine preferential access to its market. Both the EU and Ukraine
have provisionally applied the DCFTA since 1 January 2016.9 The agree-
ment’s full entry into force, which requires ratification by each of the EU’s
28 member states, however, was temporarily blocked by Dutch voters
rejecting the agreement in a non-binding citizens-initiative referendum in
April 2016.
In order to address the concerns of the Dutch voters, the heads of state
and government of the EU’s member states adopted in December 2016 a
legally binding interpretation of the Association Agreement (European
Council 2016). This interpretation confirmed that the Association
Agreement did not:
• confer on Ukraine the status of a candidate country for accession to

the Union, nor constitute a commitment to confer such status to
Ukraine in the future;
• contain an obligation for the EU or its member states to provide col-
lective security guarantees or other military aid or assistance to
Ukraine;
• affect the right of member states to determine volumes of admission
of Ukrainian nationals to their territory in order to seek work,
whether employed or self-employed;
• require additional financial support by the member states to Ukraine,
nor change each member state’s exclusive right to determine the
nature and volume of its bilateral financial support.
These clarifications were sufficient the Dutch lower house to approve

the Association Agreement in February 2017. The senate followed suit in
May, clearing the way for the Dutch government to ratify the agreement,
enabling it to come into force.
The EU and the US have also, both individually and through the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), provided substantial financial assis-
tance to Ukraine (see Box 2.3). This financial assistance is conditional on
policy reforms, including tackling corruption, overhauling the energy
sector, repairing the financial system, strengthening the business environ-
ment and adhering to the rule of law, and putting Ukraine’s finances on
a sustainable path.10 In October 2015, for instance, the IMF suspended
the third tranche of its loan due to concerns about budget and political
reforms and the lack of effort to tackle corruption (Wall Street Journal,
18 May 2016).11
Box 2.3 Highlights of Assistance to Ukraine
4/14/14 EU approves €1 billion in macro-financial assistance (MFA) to Ukraine

4/16/14 US sends medical supplies and other non-lethal aid to Ukraine
4/21/14 US announces $50 million assistance package to Ukraine
4/29/14 European commission adopts €365 million special measure to support
state building in Ukraine
4/30/14 IMF executive board approves stand-by arrangement for Ukraine
5/20/14 EU disburses first loan tranche of €100 million of MFA I to Ukraine
6/4/14 US pledges an additional $23 million in security assistance to Ukraine
6/7/14 US announces $48 million more in economic assistance to Ukraine
6/17/14 EU disburses first €500 million of MFA II to Ukraine
6/27/14 EU signs association agreement with Ukraine
8/23/14 Germany pledges $690 million in aid to Ukraine
9/16/14 Ukraine ratifies association agreement. European Parliament gives its
assent.
9/18/14 US announces $53 million in non-lethal military aid to Ukraine
11/12/14 EU disburses €260 million of MFA I to Ukraine
11/20/14 US increases provision of non-lethal military aid to Ukraine
12/03/14 EU disburses final €500 million of MFA II to Ukraine
12/19/14 Obama signs bill authorizing the provision of lethal military assistance
to Ukraine
1/28/15 US agrees to provide additional $1 billion in loan guarantees to
Ukraine
3/11/15 IMF executive board approves $17.5 billion extended fund facility
3/11/15 US sends additional $75 million in non-lethal assistance to Ukraine
3/19/15 British troops training Ukrainian soldiers
4/15/15 EU approves up to €1.8 billion in macro-financial assistance to
Ukraine
4/21/15 US troops begin training Ukrainian national guard
EU disburses final €250 million of MFA I to Ukraine
10/15 IMF suspends third tranche of loan
5/18/16 IMF provisionally approves releasing third tranche (to be finalized in
July).
6/3/16 US signed agreement to enable third loan guarantee of up to $1
billion
Note: Updated as of 8/11/16. The IMF had not yet approved releasing third tranche, as had been
expected
Sources: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs: Ukraine. Available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/neighbourhood_policy/ukraine_en.htm.
Accessed 29 June 2015
U.S. Treasury, “Statement of U.S. Treasury Department on Additional Economic Assistance to
Ukraine,” 13 January 2015. Available at: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/jl9737.aspx. Accessed 29 June 2015
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„So ein junger Leutnant hat sich zu bescheiden. Das habe ich
ihm geschrieben. Ein für alle Mal. Wir leben einfach. Ich könnte es
aus eigenem bestreiten, wenn nicht Fritz ... und die Wohnung ...“
Es würgte ihm am Halse und er fuhr hastig fort: „Die Wohnung
möchte ich behalten ... Ich habe jetzt eine Schauspielschule und
brauche Platz.“
Er dachte: „Und schließlich findest du heim ...“
Aber er sagte es nicht. Die Bewegung schnürte ihm den Hals
vollends zu. Sie aber starrte auf den Tisch herab und krampfte die
Hände ineinander.
Es waren Minuten, die sich zu Ewigkeiten dehnten.
„Selbstverständlich führe ich Buch über alles, was du schickst.
Was übrigbleibt am Ende des Monats, geht zum Teil an die
Sparkasse auf Isoldens Namen, zum Teil an eine Versicherung.
Wenn sie zwanzig Jahre alt ist, wird ihr eine nette Summe
ausgezahlt. Sie kann dann etwas anfangen oder heiraten ... kurz, sie
kann sich ihr Leben schaffen ...“
Karla sah ihn mit großen, feuchten Augen an.
„Das ist schön von dir, Ernst ...“
Er schüttelte den Kopf.
„Nein. Das ist selbstverständlich. Dazu sind die Eltern da ... Das
ist Notwehr gegen das Leben. Das lernt man an Beispielen.“
Sein Ton wurde wieder lehrhaft, ohne daß er es wollte. Und
dieser Ton gab sie der Wirklichkeit zurück.
„Nächsten Sommer singe ich in Bayreuth — weißt du das
schon?“
Sie sagte es sehr feierlich. Was gab es denn auch Größeres für
sie als ihr Kind, ihre Liebe und Bayreuth?!
Es waren die Gipfelpunkte ihres Lebens, um die all ihre
Sehnsucht, alle ihre Gedanken kreisten. Bayreuth — das hatte sie
noch erleben wollen — bevor sie dem Warten Erfüllung gab.
Bayreuth sollte ein Abschied und ein Wiedersehen sein — ein
glanzvolles Ende und ein seliges Beginnen!
Aber sie brachte nichts von alledem über ihre Lippen.
Er sah ihre Bewegung. Deutete er sie richtig oder falsch —? Er
ergriff ihre beiden Hände, drückte sie an die Lippen und ging.
Sie rührte sich nicht, lehnte totenbleich an der Wand. Hatte er
verstanden? Oder hatte er Hoffnung geschöpft — eine Hoffnung, die
sie nicht erfüllen konnte ...?
Die ganze folgende Nacht war er aufgeblieben. Hatte sich zu
Ronacher gesetzt und hatte den König-Schampus getrunken, war zu
den Schrammeln gefahren und dann von Café zu Café bis zum
frühen Morgen. Hatte sich in seinem Hotelzimmer aufs Bett
geworfen und war dann abends in die Oper gegangen ... ganz oben,
„aufs Paradies“ hinauf, wo die Enthusiasten sich
aneinanderdrängten.
Und die verwöhnte Wiener Jugend raste, wie einst die Kieler
Jugend, wie die Neger und die Brasilianer gerast hatten.
Aber damals war er es gewesen, der ihre Schritte leitete, sie
schützte; jetzt bedurfte sie seines Schutzes nicht mehr, war ihm
entwachsen, entflohen ...
Der Vorhang fiel ein zweites Mal herab. Brausende, tosende Rufe
erfüllten die heiße Luft.
Karla erschien wieder und immer wieder. Durch sein großes
Opernglas konnte er jeden Zug in ihrem Gesicht erkennen. Er sah
auch, wie sie plötzlich stutzte, wie durch die Schminke hindurch ein
heißes Rot ihr in die Schläfen stieg und ihre Augen sich starr auf
eine Loge richteten. Er beugte sich vor, hob sein Glas bis zur Höhe
des ersten Ranges. Da schoß auch ihm das Blut zu Kopf, und seine
geraden, dichten Brauen zogen sich heftig zusammen.
In einem nilgrünen, tief ausgeschnittenen Samtkleid, Brillanten
und Perlen um den blendend weißen, schlanken Hals, zwei
flimmernde Brillantsterne im tiefgewellten, leuchtend roten Haar saß
Mariette de Santos. Neben ihr John Russel, in Frack und weißer
Binde, den kühnen Abenteurerkopf vorgebeugt über die Brüstung,
die Hände mit den krallenartigen Nägeln zu lautem Klatschen
vorgestreckt. Hinter dem Stuhl seiner Frau stand Don Pedro de
Santos. Sein Bart lag jetzt lang und breit wie ein Fächer auf dem
bläulichweißen Frackhemd. Er stand da, regungslos, feierlich, wie es
seine Art war, mit dicken, müden Lidern und sattem Besitzerlächeln.
Elegant und temperamentvoll schlug Madame de Santos ihren
Spitzenfächer gegen den Rücken ihrer Hand, auf die Gefahr hin, ihn
zu zerbrechen, ergriff dann einen Teerosenstrauß, der vor ihr auf
dem roten Samt der Logenbrüstung lag, und warf ihn mit graziösem
Schwung auf die Bühne.
Er flog Karla zu Füßen. Sie bückte sich nicht nach ihm und
übersah es, daß ein Kollege ihr ihn reichte. Mit einer letzten
Verneigung ging sie ab und kam trotz allen Rufens und Tobens nicht
wieder.
Die Luft wurde Altmann eng und schwül. Er glaubte ersticken zu
müssen. Mit den Ellbogen bahnte er sich einen Weg aus dem
Menschenknäuel heraus und stürzte die endlosen steinernen
Treppen hinunter.
Auf der stillen, frostig kalten Ringstraße aber blieb er stehen und
schöpfte tief Atem.
Hatte er das nicht schon einmal empfunden? Hatte er das alles
nicht schon einmal erlebt ...? Wo nur? ... Wann? ...
Und plötzlich wußte er es.
An jenem Abend war es, da die Nordeni von ihrem Elternhause
sprach, von ihrem Vater, der gekommen war, sie zu hören, und dann
davongegangen war auf Nimmerwiederkehr ... an jenem Abend, da
auf einer mondbeglänzten Terrasse Brasiliens ein rotes Schöpfchen
vor ihm hergegaukelt war, ihn um all seine Besonnenheit gebracht
hatte ...
Kaum je war ihm der Abend noch eingefallen. Nie hatte er mehr
dieses kurzen Abenteuers gedacht, und nie anders, als mit
heimlichem Ärger über sich, mit kalter Verachtung gegen das kokette
Pariser Grisettchen.
Er hatte Karla albern und geschmacklos gescholten, als sie einst
darauf zurückgekommen war, hatte es nicht mal der Mühe wert
gefunden, sich ihre Verzeihung zu erbitten — und nun hatte er
gesehen, wie auch jetzt noch alles harte Abwehr in ihr war gegen die
Frau, um die er ihrer nur auf kurze Stunden vergessen? War er denn
selbst an allem schuld, an der Entfremdung, der Ferne zwischen
ihnen? ... Hatte diese Entfremdung nicht schon damals begonnen in
Brasilien, und hätte er den Weg noch finden können zu ihr, als sie
aus bangem Schauer heraus ihm an den Hals geflogen war am
Totenbett der Nordeni?
Altmanns Schritte hallten in den menschenleeren engen Gassen
der fremden Stadt, die ihn dünkte wie ein unentwirrbares Labyrinth.
Nun stand er zum fünften oder sechsten Male vor der Stefanskirche.
Aber er mochte nicht fragen, ließ sich die Richtung nicht gerne
weisen. Und so war er immer denselben Weg gegangen, und es war
immer der falsche gewesen!
In Wien! Im Leben! In seiner Ehe!
Hatte sich im Kreise herumgedreht und war zum
Ausgangspunkte zurückgekehrt — in der Sackgasse stecken
geblieben — bei „seinen Leuten“.
Da fiel ihm das Kind ein.
Und wie ein Sonnenstrahl durchbrach es das dunkle Gewölk um
ihn herum.
Mochte sein Leben verpfuscht, vernichtet sein — das Kind hielt
ihn aufrecht. Die Liebe seines Kindes sollte die Nacht erhellen, die
sich um ihn zusammenballte. — — —
Und jetzt, nach so langen Wochen, saß Schmerzchen auf seinen
Knien und fragte, wie Kinder fragen, die lächelnd auf Wunden treten:
„Warum fahren wir nicht nach Wien?“
„Du dummes, dummes Schmerzchen du ...“
So gab auch er ihr, aus verbissenem Weh heraus, den Namen,
den die Mutter ihr gegeben, aus schmerzerfüllter Seligkeit.
iese letzten Wiener Herbsttage — Karla vergaß sie nicht so
bald. Auch ihre Empfindungen nicht, an jenem Opernabend,
da sie Mariette de Santos in der Loge erblickt hatte.
Der Theaterdiener brachte ihr die Teerosen in ihre Garderobe, wo
bereits ein großer Korb mit Riesenorchideen von John Russel stand.
Sie warf die Rosen der Ankleidefrau zu.
Die zornige Erregung über die Dreistigkeit der in all ihrer
Millionenpracht immer noch grisettenhaften kleinen Pariserin
überwog fast die Freude über die Anwesenheit John Russels.
Doch er kam zu ihr am nächsten Tage. Halb Freund, halb
Geschäftsmann, in alter brutaler Offenheit.
„Well, Karla König ... ich hätte nicht geglaubt, daß Sie noch
immer in Gefühl machen, wie man in Berlin sagt. Ich habe die de
Santos’ in Paris getroffen, und wir sind zusammen hergereist. Von
Paris aus hatten wir telegraphisch die Loge bestellt. Dear me, die
kleine Frau hat vor Wut über Sie einen Weinkrampf bekommen im
Zwischenakt — sonst wäre ich schon gestern in Ihre Garderobe
gekommen. Ich wußte, daß Ihr ... daß Mister Altmann in Berlin
geblieben ist. So nahm ich an ... well, wir wollen nicht davon
sprechen. Man häutet sich alle sieben Jahre — schöne Frauen
sollen sich sogar öfter häuten.“
Karla lächelte und legte ihre Hand in seine Pranke.
„Sie haben es immer nur gut mit mir gemeint. ... Aber das muß
ich Ihnen sagen, mit dem Häuten ist es nichts bei mir.“
„Hat auch was Gutes, Karla König ... das macht dickfellig mit den
Jahren ... unverwundbar ... Und dann geht’s einem erst recht gut!“
Sie schüttelte leise den Kopf.
Aber John Russel war nicht gekommen, um zu philosophieren. Er
kam mit sehr bestimmten Vorschlägen. Wie lange lief der Vertrag mit
der Wiener Oper? Bis zum übernächsten Jahr vorläufig? Schön.
Dann sollte sie nicht verlängern, nicht anschließend jedenfalls. Ein
Jahr sollte sie sich frei halten für die Metropolitan in New York. Im
Juni acht Vorstellungen in London. Wenn sie vernünftig wäre, konnte
er für das darauffolgende Jahr mit St. Petersburg abschließen. Er
bot ihr ein Vermögen.
Aber sie schüttelte wieder den Kopf. Sie war nicht „vernünftig“ in
seinem Sinne.
Er lehnte sich zurück in den Sessel und legte die Beine
übereinander. Es schwante ihm — das gab eine lange Sitzung.
„Ich muß Ihnen was sagen, Karla König, es ist ja diesmal gut
ausgegangen — aber dem Kapelle hab’ ich eins ’reingewürgt. War ja
Unsinn mit Berlin. Berlin ist Ende, nicht Anfang. Das eine Mal hat
man Sie gehen lassen, ein zweites Mal nicht. Hofoper ist eine
Lebensversicherung! Der Tod für den Künstler. Dazu sind Sie zu
jung. Ein Name muß rollen. Rauf und runter. Muß Spektakel
machen, anwachsen, groß werden von allem, was er angesammelt
hat, was an ihm hängen geblieben ist! Sie sagen Bayreuth. Kapelle
besauft sich vor Entzücken. Aber ich sage: Bayreuth ist wie ein
Orden. Ich biete Ihnen mehr! Ich biete Ihnen Gold. Millionen.
Weltruf.“
Karla saß vor ihm in einem einfachen hellgrauen Kleid und hatte
die Hände über dem Knie verschlungen. Sie hielt ihre sprechenden
braunen Augen unter den kaum angedeuteten, hochgezogenen
Brauen beharrlich gesenkt. Nur ihre Wangen brannten und verrieten
ihre innere Bewegung.
Sie dachte an Schmerzchen. Dachte daran, daß es ihre Pflicht
war, für sie zu sorgen. „Ihr Kind soll das meine sein“, hatte Gaudlitz
gesagt .... Wenn aber Altmann die Sorge des fremden Mannes um
das Kind, das ja auch das seine war, zurückwies? Welchen Leiden
ging sie entgegen, wenn ihr Schmerzchen, ihr erstes, angebetetes
Kind, in kümmerlichen Verhältnissen groß wurde, während ihre
künftigen Kinder in Reichtum aufwuchsen, auf den Höhen des
Lebens wandelten ...?
John Russel kniff seine scharfblickenden Habichtaugen
zusammen. Holla ... war da wieder ein Mann im Spiel? Wieder einer,
den er mitzerren, durchfuttern mußte? Wieder ein Sekretär,
Begleiter, Geliebter oder künftiger Gatte?
„Well, Karla König, überlegen Sie nicht lange. Freie Reise für Sie
und Zofe und — für noch eine Person, wenn Sie wollen ...“
Da mußte sie lachen.
Und das Lachen gab ihr den Selbsterhaltungstrieb zurück, das
stärkste Gefühl für ihr ureigenstes Recht als Frau. Wie kleinmütig sie
nur gewesen war. Sie schlug die Hände zusammen und lachte
wieder, hell, froh und im tiefsten Innern beglückt über ihr befreiendes
Lachen.
„Also abgemacht?“ John Russel hielt ihr die Hand hin.
Sie aber sagte, noch immer vergeblich mit dem Lachen
kämpfend: „Abgemacht ist, daß Sie jetzt bei mir speisen werden.
Sonst nichts. Nicht New York, nicht St. Petersburg — nicht einmal
Wien. Ich verlängere den Vertrag nicht und schließe keinen
anderen.“
Sie legte ihren Arm in den des zum erstenmal vor Verblüffung
sprachlosen John Russel und zog ihn mit sich fort in das kleine
Eßzimmer.
An diesem Nachmittag aber schickte auch sie ihr erstes
Lebenszeichen an Gaudlitz:
„Warten bis nach Bayreuth.“ — — —
— — — Lang und still dehnten sich die Tage in Adelens neuer,
kleiner Wohnung. Wenn sie mit Hilfe der Bedienungsfrau ihre drei
Stuben instand gesetzt, ihren Marktbesuch erledigt und das
Mittagessen gekocht hatte, setzte sie sich auf den hohen Tritt vor
dem Fenster und spähte nach ihrem Manne aus. Eines Tages ließ
sie sich sogar den unter altem Gerümpel gefundenen „Spion“ am
Fenster anbringen. Der brachte ihr die größte Zerstreuung, indem er
ihr das Bild der Straße in ihre stille Stube warf. Und auch während
ihr Mann seinen Nachmittagsschlaf hielt oder seine Privatstunden
gab, saß sie vor dem stummen Berichterstatter des Straßentreibens
und flickte und stickte. Es war ihr kaum bewußt, daß sie dasselbe
tat, was ihr einst in jungen Mädchenjahren als der Gipfel des
Stumpfsinns an ihrer Mutter erschienen war.
Es waren seltene Festblicke, wenn Vickis „Nurse“ an ihrer Tür
läutete und den eigenwilligen, stets opponierenden Robbi
hereinzerrte. Robbis Gunst war nur von Gassenjungen zu erringen.
Großmamas Kuchen und Schokolade machten ihm nicht den
mindesten Eindruck. Von dem Zeug bekam er zu Hause so viel er
wollte. Er greinte und war so lange unausstehlich, bis er wieder
draußen war.
Der Enkel war ein Ruppsack, Vicki in ihrer Fahrigkeit kaum noch
für ein ernstes Gespräch zu brauchen. Sie hatte nie Zeit. Nicht in,
nicht außer dem Hause. Kein gemütliches Fleckchen gab es bei ihr,
wo sich Adele zum Geplauder hätte niederlassen wollen, und wenn
es klingelte, zuckte Vicki zusammen — ob es am Telephon oder an
der Wohnungstür war. Es gab immer Plötzlichkeiten: Besuche, die
kamen oder gemacht werden mußten, ein Auftrag ihres Bodo, der
keinen Aufschub erduldete, ein Brief, der jetzt in dieser Stunde
aufzugeben war. Vicki war immer auf dem Sprung, immer unruhig,
zerstreut, auf Meilen entfernt mit allen Gedanken ...
Und wenn gar der Schwiegersohn nach Hause kam: „... die
Mama ist da? ... So ... ja ... ’Tag, aber ... auf mich bitte zu verzichten
... ich hab’ zu arbeiten ... ich habe Geschäftsbesuch ... ich muß
verreisen ...“ Dann klappten Türen — zwei — drei, als wollte er sich
verstecken! Vicki lief wie ein Irrwisch umher, von ihm zu ihr — von
ihr zu ihm, rote Flecke auf den Wangen ....
Adele kannte diese heißen roten Flecken! Wußte, was an Hast
und Erregung hinter ihnen steckte ... Nein — Vickis Haus war nichts
für sie. Das war ähnlich, wie wenn man zwischen zwei elektrischen
Straßenbahnen und einem Automobil eingeklemmt war und nicht
’raus wußte! Diese Aufregung genoß sie zehn Mal am Tage an
anderen — wenn sie in ihren „Spion“ blickte ... Dafür dankte sie.
Blieb Fritz.
Adele’s Augen leuchteten und feuchteten sich zugleich, wenn sie
an ihn dachte.
Alle Frauen sahen sich nach ihm um auf der Straße, so ein
hübscher, flotter Leutnant war er. Flott ... ja ... zu sehr.
Unbekümmert, liebenswürdig dreist.
„Kram’ in deinem Strumpf, alte Dame ... da findest du noch ein
paar Goldfüchse, wie?“
„Heute nehme ich meine alte Dame mit ins Schauspielhaus ...
he? Kabale und Liebe! Was zum Weinen ... entzückend!“
Er brachte ihr ein Veilchensträußchen für einen Groschen, eine
Schachtel Pralinés für fünf Mark, bestand auf einem Wagen, dem er
die „Tour“ bei ihrem Einsteigen bezahlte, und holte sich am nächsten
Morgen „was aus ihrem Strumpf“.
Sie schüttelte den Kopf, sie weinte sogar. Er aber lachte.
Lachte sorglos beruhigend.
„Meine alte Dame“ — „Mein alter Herr“ — es klang feudal. Es
brachte einen Hauch von Vornehmheit in die bürgerliche
Dreizimmerwohnung. Adele bestand darauf, daß ihr Mann den
Zylinder aufsetzte, wenn er mit seinem Sohne ausging. Und sie sah,
wie auch seine Augen aufleuchteten, wenn er den frischen blonden
Jungen mit den strammen, schlanken Gliedern vor sich stehen sah.
Selbst Vicki fand Zeit, mit dem Bruder auszugehen, wenn er aus
Küstrin über Sonntag Berliner Luft schnappen kam. Völkels waren
überhaupt „patente Menschen“, erklärte Fritz zur großen Beruhigung
der Mutter, die sich über die neue geschwisterliche
Zusammengehörigkeit freute.
Manchmal frühstückte er mit dem Schwager, beim Austermeyer.
Es waren Bodo Völkels beste Stunden, und er war dann einem
kleinen Pump sehr zugänglich. Selbst einem Pump, der nie
zurückgezahlt wurde.
Schwieriger wurde Fritz sein Verhalten zu Altmann und Luise. Er
wußte mit diesen zwei starren, ernsten Menschen, deren Leben so
streng geregelt war, nichts anzufangen.
Wenn auch Luise ihm noch manchmal mit der hageren Hand
über das blonde gescheitelte Haar strich, Altmanns Hand legte sich
nur schwer auf seine Schulter, um der Frage Nachdruck zu geben:
„Keine Dummheiten gemacht, wie? Alles in Ordnung? Ich möcht’
es mir auch ausbitten!“
Das war kein Ton, der ihm eine Beichte erleichtert hätte.
Bei Tisch saß er strammer, als wenn er der Kommandeuse seine
Aufwartung machte.
Er wußte nicht, wohin mit seinen Beinen und seinen Worten —
so ernst blickten der Onkel, die Tante und selbst das kleine Bäschen
mit den braunen Zöpfen.
Selbst nach der „Tante Karla“ wagte er kaum zu fragen, seit die
Antworten so merkwürdig einsilbig gelautet hatten und Vicki ihm
unter dem Siegel des Vertrauens einmal zugeraunt hatte:
„Weißt du ... da ist was mulmig ... Daran würde ich in der
Landgrafenstraße lieber gar nicht tippen. Bodo sagt, sie wäre jetzt
eine ganz große Nummer in Wien — da kann man sich ja denken,
nicht wahr? Mir tut nur das Kind leid. Herrgott, hat sie sich mit ihrem
‚Schmerzchen‘ gehabt! Es war wirklich nicht mehr schön — na, und
was steckt hinter allen ihren Worten? ... Gar nichts. Das ist eben so
am Theater. Mama hat schon ganz recht, wenn sie sagt, daß Onkel
Ernst im kleinen Finger wertvoller ist als sie. Ja ... er hat eben der
Bühne entsagt und sich ganz der Erziehung seines Kindes
gewidmet. Das ist doch gewiß hochachtbar ... da bin ich ganz
Mamas Meinung.“
Einmal, zwischen zwei Zigaretten, im Zimmer des Vaters, brachte
Fritz das Gespräch auf Karla — schnodderig, ein bischen überlegen.
„Amüsiert sich wohl in Wien, die gute Tante, wie? ...“
Aber er brach ab, als er sah, wie der Vater erblaßte.
„Untersteh’ Dich nicht ... hörst Du ... untersteh’ Dich nicht, in
diesem Ton von ihr zu sprechen! Noch ein Mal — und Du kriegst es
mit mir zu tun!“
Das junge Blut huschte Fritz über die Stirn. Er stand auf, zupfte
an seinem Kragen.
„Bitte gehorsamst um Verzeihung ... es lag mir fern ... es lag mir
wirklich ganz fern.“
Innerlich dachte er: Sieh Einer meinen alten Herrn an! Hätt’ ich
ihm gar nicht zugetraut! ...
Es war anerkennend; aber ihm war nicht mehr ganz behaglich in
der einfachen Studierstube, mit dem alten bequemen Sessel, den
gestrichenen Bücherregalen und der großen Nietzschebüste auf
dem Sockel hinter dem Schreibtisch.
An den Weihnachtsabend erinnerte er sich genau, da der Vater
sie zum Geschenk erhalten, und erinnerte sich auch noch, wie die
Mutter mit spitzen Fingern die Bücher hochgehoben, die der Vater
geschenkt hatte.
Donnerwetter ja ... sein alter Herr mochte wohl was übrig haben
für die hübsche, lustige Schwägerin mit der schönen Stimme ... Er
selber war ja auch verknallt in sie gewesen. Eigentlich nett von
seinem alten Herrn ... Da fiel plötzlich all der dicke, klebrige
Schulstaub ab, und es kam der Mann zum Vorschein, der Kamerad,
der Geschlechtsgenosse zum mindesten, der sich ritterlich vor der
Frau aufpflanzte, der seine Verehrung galt ...
„Ehrenwort, Papa ... war ganz harmlos, die Frage ... ganz
harmlos ...“
Alwin Maurer löschte in der Erregung seine halbgerauchte
Zigarre.
„Na ja, mein Junge ... das will ich auch annehmen. Denn Du ...
gerade Du ...“
Er dachte an das Schweigen, zu dem er sich Altmann gegenüber
verpflichtet hatte, als er Karlas Hilfe angenommen hatte, und winkte
mit der Hand ab.
„Na ja ... also ... Kein Wort weiter.“
Fritz ruhte nicht eher, als bis der Vater mit ihm ausging,
Versöhnung feiern und ein Glas leeren auf das Wohl der Tante.
„Wir zwei allein, alter Herr ... in einem gemütlichen Eckchen — is’
recht?“
Dr. Maurer sah ihn an, und ein blasses Lächeln überflog sein
graues Gesicht. Was aus dem Rüpel doch geworden war! Aus dem
„verdammten Bengel“, den er bis zu seinem vierzehnten Jahr in der
Furcht des Stockes gehalten hatte. Bis zu dem Tage, da Karla
gekommen war und von dem Apothekerssohn erzählt hatte — mit
ihrer jungen, warmen Stimme.
Diese Stimme hatte ihm den Stock aus der Hand gewunden ...
hatte vielleicht in letzter Stunde den neuen Weg gezeigt, den er als
Vater zu gehen hatte. Hatte ihn Milde, Nachsicht, Verständnis
gelehrt, hatte ihm einen Kameraden geschenkt in seinem Sohn!
„Gehen wir, Junge.“
Und heimlich, auf Zehenspitzen, damit Adele sich nicht an sie
hinge mit Fragen und Einwänden, schlichen sie ins Vorzimmer,
holten ihre Mäntel vom Riegel und zogen die Tür leise hinter sich ins
Schloß.
Eine Stunde später ging eine Karte ab nach Wien, Kärntner
Straße: „Meine liebe Karla! Sitze hier mit meinem Jungen und trinke
mit ihm auf Dein Wohl, Deinen Erfolg und Dein Glück. Alwin.“ Und
darunter in eleganter, flüchtiger Schrift: „Handkuß von Deinem
gehorsamen Neffen und Bewunderer Fritz.“
Als sie heimkehrten, Fritz bereichert um einen blauen Lappen,
Dr. Maurer in gehobener Stimmung, sagte er:
„Wollen wir doch wiederholen, die kleine Kneiperei — was, mein
Junge?“
„Selbstredend, alter Herr! Wird mir ein Hochgenuß sein ...!“
Und er trug Grüße für Mama auf und verabschiedete sich mit
herzlichem Händedruck vor dem Haustor — weil er „nach Küstrin
zurückmußte“! ...
In Wirklichkeit hatte er eine Verabredung mit Kameraden bei
Hiller. — — —
— — Zum Frühjahr ließ Alwin Maurers Gesundheitszustand
wieder viel zu wünschen übrig. Es stellten sich ernstere
Beschwerden und schließlich Anfälle von Gallenkolik ein. Der Arzt
warnte vor Aufregungen und Überarbeitung.
Adele lief jetzt wieder alle Tage zu Luise, klagte ihr Leid.
Luise erbot sich, mit dem Bruder zu sprechen. Alwin mußte
diesmal nach Karlsbad — unweigerlich! Adele nickte und trocknete
die Augen.
Gewiß. Das Geld dafür war ja auch zusammen. Aber die Ferien
mußten abgewartet werden. Und bis dahin ...
Wieder fing sie an zu weinen.
Luise legte ihre hageren Arme um die vollen Schultern der
Schwester.
„Na, was ist denn noch?“
Adele wickelte ihr feuchtes Taschentuch um die Hand. Leicht
gesagt, keine Aufregungen! Fritz dachte nicht daran, sie ihnen zu
ersparen! Er „aaste“ mit dem Gelde! Alle paar Wochen kam er mit
einem Schuldenzettel an. Sie hatte zusammengerechnet:
sechshundert Mark waren in den letzten acht Wochen
zusammengekommen.
Luise schlug entsetzt die Hände zusammen:
„Was habt ihr denn gemacht?“
„Gezahlt natürlich. Erst hat Alwin gelacht. Ich sollte dem Jungen
sein bißchen Leben nicht vergällen mit meinen Predigten! Dann ging
er wieder mal ein Glas Wein trinken mit ihm, um ihm den Kopf
zurechtzusetzen — aber zum Schluß war er nur wieder einen
Hunderter los oder sechzig, siebzig Mark ... Und das reißt nicht ab ...
Wenn er sich anmeldet, dann schlägt mir immer das Herz bis hier
oben herauf ...“
Adele schluchzte auf, empfand plötzlich die Tragik ihres Lebens.
Alles war falsch gewesen. Alles, was sie je getan, geraten, gefordert,
erbettelt! Nun stand sie da, verängstigt von der Erfolglosigkeit ihres
Tuns, verprügelt vom Leben, wollte schützen, wollte retten. Konnte
nicht das eine — nicht das andere.
Blieb wieder nur der Bruder.
Doch er war härter geworden in diesen letzten Jahren,
verschlossener als früher.
Luise hatte einmal gesagt:
„Weißt du, Adele, manchmal kommt es mir vor, als gäbe er uns
schuld an Karlas unverantwortlichem Benehmen!“
Und Adele hatte verständnislos ihre Augen aufgerissen:
„Uns?! Ja ... was können denn wir dafür? Wir, die wir uns immer
nur für sie aufgeopfert haben?“
Mit Mühe hatte Luise sie davon abgehalten, eine
Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem Bruder und ihnen beiden
herbeizuführen.
„Tu das nicht ... glaube mir ... Er ist wie eine allzu straff
gespannte Saite. Empfindlich war er immer — jetzt aber verträgt er
kaum eine leise Berührung! Man muß ihn schonen.“
Und auch jetzt sagte Luise:
„Man muß ihn schonen. Wenn er erfährt, daß Fritz ...“
Sie hatte lauter gesprochen, als sie beabsichtigt, und sie beide
hatten es nicht gemerkt, daß er ins Eßzimmer gekommen war.
„Ist schon wieder was mit dem Jungen los?“
Die Schwestern schraken zusammen. Adele wollte alles
vertuschen, abstreiten. Altmann aber runzelte die Stirn.
„Ich verbitte mir die Geheimniskrämerei. Ich muß wissen. Wenn
wir nicht im Einverständnis handeln, dann ist alles zwecklos. Ihr habt
keine Ahnung, wie man mit solchem Burschen umgeht! Alwins Art ist
ein Verderb für den Jungen! Nicht einen Pfennig darf er über seinen
Zuschuß hinaus kriegen, nicht einen halben Pfennig! Er muß es
lernen, auszukommen, muß es lernen, sich etwas zu versagen!“
Er schlug gegen seine Gewohnheit heftig auf den Tisch.
Fühlte denn Adele nicht, daß es noch immer Karlas Geld war,
das der Junge bekam? Fühlte sie nicht, daß es vielleicht eine Zeit
geben würde, da er keinen Pfennig mehr von Karla würde
annehmen dürfen, für sich oder einen der Seinen —?
„Kann ich Isoldchen noch sehen?“, fragte Adele im Aufstehen.
Altmann machte die Korridortür auf. Er rief:
„Schmerzchen! ... Tante Adele ist da!“
Die Schwestern tauschten einen Blick. Luise nickte dabei: Ja ...
ja ... so nannte er das Kind jetzt oft ...
Adele seufzte auf.
Schmerzchen kam herein; nicht sehr eilig. Ein weißes
Schürzchen mit gestickter Krause deckte fast vollständig das
dunkelblaue, an den Ellbogen geflickte Kleidchen. Ihr Haar war in
zwei ordentliche Zöpfe geflochten, die eine schwarze Schleife
zusammenhielt. Ihr Gesichtchen war länglich und zart, die Brauen
gerade und dunkel. Kurze, dichte Wimpern umschatteten die großen
braunen Augen, die rund waren, wie die ihrer Mutter. Sie knixte,
sagte guten Abend. Ihr Lächeln hatte einen wehmütigen Zug. Ihre
Augen blickten meist vorbei an dem, der mit ihr sprach — blickten
geradeaus durchs Fenster oder zur Tür, als müßte in der Luft
draußen etwas Ersehntes vorüberschweben oder zur Tür irgendwas
Erwartetes eintreten.
Das war ihr nicht abzugewöhnen. Es lag darin eine große, fast
unheimliche Gleichgültigkeit für ihre Umgebung. Nur ihrem Papa und
Pauline, die sie ganz selten einmal besuchte oder zum Großpapa
abholte, sah sie lange und mit heiterer oder ernster Aufmerksamkeit
ins Gesicht. Und auf dem Grunde ihres Ernstes, ihrer Heiterkeit lag
es immer wie eine stumme Frage.
Denn die Erwachsenen hatten ihr verboten, zu fragen — so oft zu
fragen, wann die Mama käme. „Im Sommer“, sagte Papa
ausweichend.
Schmerzchen bekam wunderschöne Ansichtskarten von der
Mama, mit so vielen, vielen Küssen darauf, daß sie sie gar nicht
zählen konnte. Schmerzchen las Mamas Schrift wie Gedrucktes und
war sehr stolz darauf. Mama schrieb so zärtlich, hatte so viele, gute,
schöne Wörtchen für sie. Die Mamas der anderen Kinder hatte sie
nie so zärtliche Worte sagen hören!
Ja ... aber die anderen Mamas blieben bei ihren Kindern, gingen
nie fort von ihnen ... nie. Sie hatte es manchmal aufgeschnappt,
wenn Damen unter sich sprachen: „Ich könnte mich von meinem
Kinde nicht trennen —“, „Ohne mein Kind — nein, dazu habe ich es
viel zu lieb“. Das gab Schmerzchen jedesmal einen bösen, heftigen
Stich.
Seit nun aber der Papa gesagt hatte: „Im Sommer“, hatten
Schmerzchens Zukunftsvorstellungen einen gewissen Umriß
erhalten. Sie würde weiße Kleider tragen und mit Mama spazieren
gehen wie andere Kinder. Mama würde sie von der Schule abholen,
und sie würde sagen: „Ich habe keine Zeit, mich mit euch
herumzubalgen, meine Mama wartet unten.“ Ganz laut würde sie
sagen „meine Mama“, daß die ganze Klasse es hörte! Und auf der
Straße würde sie sich von ihrer Mama küssen lassen ... da konnten
die anderen sehen, wie die Mama sie lieb hatte.
Die Aprilsonne brannte bereits durch die Fensterscheiben. Aber
wen sie auch fragte — noch war es nicht Sommer. — — —
Das Fenster stand weit auf, und die warme Abendluft kroch über
die Weinranken und Geranientöpfe der kleinen Loggia in Adelens
Eß- und Wohnstube. Auf dem Tisch lag die Wäsche ihres Mannes.
Auf den Stuhllehnen hingen die Röcke, auf dem Boden standen
Stiefel, braune Schuhe, Pantoffeln. Adele zählte alles durch, trug es
auf zwei weiße Blätter ein, unter die Überschrift: „Verzeichnis“. Sie
holte noch eine Flasche Kölner Wasser, drei Seifenstücke und eine
Schachtel Zahnpulver aus dem Schlafzimmer. Dann stand sie noch
einmal auf und holte den Schwamm, den Waschhandschuh. Zu
dumm, wie ihr Gedächtnis nachgelassen hatte. Bald hatte sie dies,
bald das vergessen und jenes übersehen. Seit Wochen hatte sie
nichts getan, als geplättet, geflickt, geputzt, gekauft. Sie war wie
zerschlagen! Der Mann verreiste auf kaum einen Monat, und es
machte ihr fast ebensoviel zu schaffen, wie Vickis Hochzeit. Wie
hatten doch ihre Kräfte nachgelassen in den paar Jahren! Im Grunde
war sie es zufrieden, daß sie allein blieb. Ganz allein. Daß sie nur
sich selbst leben konnte, nicht kochen, nicht räumen brauchte.
Ausruhen durfte. Endlich mal ausruhen! Auch die Bedienungsfrau
durfte ihr nicht ins Haus.
Alwin Maurer kam herein, blinzelte mit den Augen im grellen
Weißlicht der Gaskrone. Er fuhr streichelnd mit der Hand über
Adelens Rücken.
„So viele Mühe machst du dir ...“
„Ach was ... komme du nur gesund zurück. Ja und dann bitte ich
dich Alwin ... gib Acht auf deine Sachen. Sieh mal her ...“
Dr. Maurer nickte zerstreut.
„Ja ... ja, gewiß ... danke schön .. Sag’ mal, hat Fritz nichts
geschrieben? Noch immer nicht?“
Sie neigte den Kopf tiefer, drückte das Kinn an die Brust. Daß ihr
Mann gerade jetzt ...
Alwin Maurer baute die Seifenstücke aufeinander. Tiefe Schatten
lagen um seine Augen. Die heftigen Schmerzen, die er in der letzten
Zeit ertragen mußte, hatten eine scharfe Leidenslinie um seinen
Mund eingegraben, die der kurze, rötliche, grauuntermischte Bart
kaum verdeckte.
„Der Junge gefällt mir nicht ... schon eine ganze Weile nicht. Paß
auf.“
„Ich soll aufpassen ... ich! Ich kann mich nicht zwischen ihn und
meinen Bruder stellen. Das weißt du. Du kennst Ernst genau so gut
wie ich. Früher war er anders, aber jetzt ... Er hat Worte, die wie
scharfe Messer sind. Wenn er so mit Fritz gesprochen hat ... Fritz ist
kein kleiner Junge mehr ... Fritz ist Offizier. Er selbst hat es ihn ja
werden lassen. Er konnte sich denken, daß ein Leutnant anders
auftreten muß als ein kleiner Schauspieler, ein Lehrer.“
Zum ersten Male in ihrem ganzen Leben gab Adele den
heißgeliebten Bruder der Kritik ihres Mannes preis. Zum ersten Male
klagte sie ihn an, verurteilte ihn.
Jetzt wußte sie erst, wie er war, wie er sein konnte. Jetzt
klammerte sie sich an ihren Mann, erwartete von ihm Trost,
Beruhigung, Abhilfe.
„Du mußt noch vor deiner Reise mit Ernst sprechen. Mußt ihm
sagen ...“
Aber Alwin Maurer schüttelte den Kopf, und sein Gesicht wurde
noch grauer.
„Wir haben freiwillig auf unser Elternrecht verzichtet, Adele, an
dem Tage, da wir das Anerbieten deines Bruders annahmen. Unsere
S o r g e um unsere Kinder gibt uns ein Recht auf sie — nicht der
Umstand, daß wir sie in die Welt gesetzt haben.“
Adele führte die grobe, dunkle Schürze an die Augen.
„Darum ist er aber doch immer unser Kind ...“
„Ja ... wie Vicki unser Kind ist, seitdem ihr Mann für sie sorgt.
Genau so. — Zum Packen ist auch noch morgen Zeit. Komm, Adele,
laß uns einen Abschiedsschoppen irgendwo trinken.“
„Ach ja, Alwin ... das wollen wir.“
Sie kleidete sich um, tupfte ein Stückchen Watte in Reismehl und
suchte so die Spuren ihrer Tränen und die heißen Flecken auf den
Wangen zu verwischen.
„So, Alwin ... nun wollen wir vergnügt sein.“
Denn es blieb ja doch das Beste in ihrer langen Ehe, diese
Ausgänge zu zweien, an Sommerabenden, wenn der Flieder blühte
oder die Linden ihren starken Duft ausströmten und sie in der
verschwiegenen Stille eines entlegenen Gartenlokals, beim
flackernden Schein einer einsamen Laterne einander zutranken, und
wenn sie sich zurückversetzte in jene längst vergangene Zeit, da
solche Abende, durchduftet von Sommer und Hoffen, zu den
schönsten Augenblicken ihrer einst so schwer erkämpften Brautzeit
gehörten. — — —
Die Familie brachte Alwin Maurer zur Bahn, wie einst Karla.
Sogar Vicki erschien mit einem Körbchen, das sie sich mit hastig
zusammengekaufter Backware hatte füllen lassen.
Schmerzchen blickte mit gespanntem Ausdruck auf Onkel Alwin.
„Fährst du nach Wien, Onkel?“ fragte sie.
Alwin Maurer beugte sich über ihr zartes, ernstes Gesicht. Er
wurde ganz rot dabei. „Vielleicht“, flüsterte er ihr ins Ohr. „Aber das
wissen nur du und ich!“
„Ja“, nickte Schmerzchen.
Und nun wurde auch sie rot. Denn es war ein wichtiges
Geheimnis, das der Onkel ihr anvertraut hatte, und ihr kleines Herz
schlug ganz schrecklich schnell vor Freude darüber.
Alwin Maurer drückte noch ein letztes Mal die ausgestreckten
Hände.
„Fritz ist richtig nicht gekommen!“ sagte er.
Altmann überhörte es. Alwin war unverzeihlich in seiner
Schwäche. Es war nur gut, daß er dem Jungen letzthin mal eine
ordentliche Standpauke über seinen „katastrophalen“ Leichtsinn
gehalten hatte. Wenn er noch ein einziges Mal Dummheiten machte,
dann würde die Zulage auf die Hälfte herabgesetzt! Dann sollte er
sehen, wie er fertig wurde. Natürlich — jetzt maulte er. Spielte den
Beleidigten!
„Mach’ dir keine Sorgen, Alwin ... denk’ an dich und nur an dich.
Hast dir’s verdient!“
Altmann schüttelte ihm kräftig die Hand. Ging noch eine Strecke
mit dem langsam abfahrenden Zuge.
„Du ... s i e wird wohl jetzt in Bayreuth sein ... Vielleicht ..“
Das „Vielleicht“ war das letzte, was Alwin Maurer noch hörte. Und
er sah die Frauen mit ihren wehenden Tüchern nicht mehr.

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Triangular Diplomacy among the United

States, the European Union, and the

The Constitutional Theory of the Federation and the

Troikanomics: Austerity, Autonomy and Existential

The European Ombudsman and Good Administration in the

Politics of Uncertainty: The United States, the Baltic

The Contestation of Expertise in the European Union 1st

Culture and Diversity in the United States: So Many

The European Union And The Technology Shift 1st Edition

Feed-in tariffs in the European Union 1st ed. Edition

TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY AMONG THE

ISBN 978-3-319-63434-0 ISBN 978-3-319-63435-7 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017952173

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover illustration: Denys Rudyi / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

This volume grew out of a Jean Monnet workshop organized by the

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Vicki L. Birchfield

1 Introducing Triangular Diplomacy 1

2 Empirical Scene Setting: The Contours

3 Outsourced Diplomacy: The Obama

4 ‘Crowdfunded Diplomacy’? The EU’s

5 Democracy and Progressive Modernity

6 Russia Plays the (Triangular) Sanctions Game119

7 Ukraine and Triangular Diplomacy: Kyiv’s

8 Whose International Law? Legal Clashes

9 Triangular Diplomacy and Europe’s Changing

10 Conclusions: Comparison and Triangulation217

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

OHCHR Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human

Fig. 1.1 Triangular diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis 8

Table 1.1 Economic interdependence, 2013 4

Introducing Triangular Diplomacy

Alasdair R. Young and Vicki L. Birchfield

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent conflict

A.R. Young (*) • V.L. Birchfield

© The Author(s) 2018 1

the vertices of the triangle in ‘triangular diplomacy,’ with Ukraine as the

Comparing the EU as a Foreign Policy Actor

The Challenges of Comparison

Table 1.1 Economic interdependence, 2013 (US$ billion)

EU 224.1 135.0 242.7

peer competitor to the US. It is a regional power. In particular, this reflects

Table 1.2 Comparing the transatlantic partners

Geostrategic Near peer Not near peer

Introducing the Triangular Diplomacy Frame

our understanding of the EU as an international actor. Their s­ pecific aim

Fig. 1.1 Triangular diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis

and Karlsson (2006: 1). We, by contrast, are describing cooperation

The second pertinent literature concerns strategic balancing, specifi-

Introduction to the Rest of the Volume

1. analyses of the foreign policies of the US (Chap. 3), the EU

The overarching aim of the conclusion is to draw together the findings

analysis and, in particular, how we can understand the EU as an interna-

downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, however, provoked a shift in

these different emphases are significant because the progressive modernity

it struggled to convert the discursive success into a diplomatic one. The

structure of cross-border gas relations transformed from three interacting

3. Energy Information Administration. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/

Postnikov, E. (2014). The Design of Social Standards in EU and US Preferential

Empirical Scene Setting: The Contours

Alasdair R. Young and Vicki L. Birchfield

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Vicki L. Birchfield

1 Introducing Triangular Diplomacy 1

2 Empirical Scene Setting: The Contours

3 Outsourced Diplomacy: The Obama

4 ‘Crowdfunded Diplomacy’? The EU’s

5 Democracy and Progressive Modernity

6 Russia Plays the (Triangular) Sanctions Game119

7 Ukraine and Triangular Diplomacy: Kyiv’s

8 Whose International Law? Legal Clashes

9 Triangular Diplomacy and Europe’s Changing

10 Conclusions: Comparison and Triangulation217

Fig. 1.1 Triangular diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis 8

Table 1.1 Economic interdependence, 2013 4

our understanding of the EU as an international actor. Their s pecific aim