Logan - Laverick v. The Rep

Ghana Law Reports Year: 2007 Vol: Page: 27-May-22
JOHN DAVID LOGANand FRANK DAVID LAVERICK v THE REPUBLIC
SUPREME COURT, ACCRA

07-Feb-07
S.A.B. AKUFFO J.S.C., BROBBEY, J.S.C., ANSAH, J.S.C., ANINAKWA, J.S.C., ADINYIRA, J.S.C.

Page 1 of 12
Categories:
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; Indictment; Particulars of offence
Accused charged with conspiracy and possession of narcotic drugs - Prosecution giving facts not part of
particulars of offences - Reliance on such facts constituting miscarriage of justice - Narcotic Drugs (Control,
Enforcement and Sanctions) Law, 1990 (PNDCL 236), ss 2 and 56( c).
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; Conspiracy and possession of narcotic drugs; Proof of
No direct evidence from prosecuction witness on charges of conspiracy and possession - No evidence that accused
had knowledge of drug on premise - Accused presence at premise insufficent cannot justify conviction.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; Circumstantial evidence; Nature of

Reliance on - Need for circumstantial evidence to lead to irresistible conclusion on crime committeed - Conviction
based on circumstantial evidence wrongful - Such incriminating evidence to be ignored - Criminal Procedure
Code, 1960 (Act 30), ss 173 and 174.
JUDGMENT
ANINAKWAH, J.S.C.
The Appellants are both British subjects. On the 28th day of January, 2004, they were charged jointly with four (4)
others on two Counts:-
1. Engaging in Criminal conspiracy to commit an offence relating to Narcotic Drug contrary to Section 56(c.) of
the Narcotic Drugs (Control, Enforcement and Sanctions) Law, P.N.D.C.L 236.
Particulars of the offence given as follows:-
“Kevin Dinsdale Gorman, Mohammed Kamil, John David Logan, Frank David Laverick, Allan William Hodgson
and Sven Leonhard Herb between September 2003 and 7th January 2004 in Spain, United Kingdom and Tema
Ghana engaged in Criminal conspiracy to commit an offence relating to narcotic drug”.
2. Possession of Narcotic Drugs without Lawful Authority contrary to Section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs (Control,
Enforcement and Sanctions) Law, 1990, P.N.D.C.L. 236.
Copyright 2003 © Council For Law Reporting Generated From: DIGITAL ATTORNEY
Page 2 of 12
The particulars of this offence are given thus:
“ Kevin Dinsdale Gorman, Mohammed Ibrahim Kamil, John David Logan, Frank David Laverick, Allan William
Hodgson and Sven Leonhard Herb between 30th December, 2003 and 7th January, 2004 at Tema in the Greater
Accra Region and within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal had in their possession 588.33 Kilograms of Cocaine, a
Narcotic Drug”.
All the accused persons pleaded “NOT guilty” and were remanded in custody.
After a full trial all the accused persons were convicted and Sentenced to 20 (Twenty) years I.H.L each, sentences
to run concurrently.
Dissatisfied with their convictions and sentences, John David Logan, Frank David Laverick and Allan William
Hodgson appealed to the Court of Appeal on many and various grounds.
On 4th November 2005, the Court of Appeal by a Majority of 2 to 1 decision dismissed the appellants’ appeal.
Still not satisfied, the appellants, this time – John David Logan, and Frank David Laverick are now before this
Court on appeal and praying that their convictions be quashed and sentences set aside. Their appeal is grounded
on as many as Seven (7) Original grounds and four additional grounds with most of them repeating themselves.
For purposes of this Appeal I find ground (a) of the original grounds and ground 4 of the additional grounds both
of them saying the same thing as the most pertinent grounds, and are hereby stated as one hereunder.
“ That the Verdicts of both the trial Court and the Court of Appeal are unreasonable and not supported by the
evidence on record”.
Other grounds would be referred to in the course of this judgment as and when the need arises.
The nature of the charges against accused persons is such that it requires the full knowledge of the facts in order to
properly appreciate the kind of evidence adduced to prove the same. The facts as presented by the prosecution are
therefore quoted “in extenso” hereunder.
“Following intelligence reports received from International Sister Agencies by the Narcotic Board in Ghana
concerning Narcotic drugs the Ghana Narcotic Control mounted surveillance on the 1st Accused for about a year
Page 3 of 12
ago.
The first Accused is a Director, Shareholder and Operation Manager of Shipping Company called TUNA T-GO
based in Tema.
On 7/1/2004 acting on further Intelligence information a combined team of the Narcotic Control Board and the
Drugs Law Enforcement Unit of the Police Service raided the residence of the 1st Accused, where it discovered
bails and parcel of whitish substances suspected to be cocaine concealed in a special compartment or hole in a
wall within the corridor upstairs behind a large dressing mirror. My Lord, the 1st Accused together with 3rd, 4th
and 5th Accused person who were in the house at the time were confronted with the substances. In reaction, the 1st
Accused said the items were brought there by one Yakuba for safe keeping (by the 1st Accused) for a fee of
(US$50,000.00 Dollars) Fifty thousand US dollars. While this was going on the 6th Accused who had arrived at
the residence of the 1st Accused together with all other accused persons except the 2nd Accused person were
arrested and sent to Narcotic Control Board Offices together with the items. The items were forwarded to Ghana
Standards Board for examination. My Lord, further investigation by the Police and Narcotic Control Board
revealed that all the accused persons were engaged in criminal conspiracy to commit crime relating to Narcotic
Drugs. At the trial evidence will be led to show that A4 came from Spain to Ghana on 15/9/03 and on 17/9/2003
he together with the 1st Accused (A1) traveled to Brazil and continued to Venezuela ostensibly to procure cement
for prospective customers in Calabar in Nigeria and Mallagu in Equatorial Guinea. They returned to Ghana on
29/9/03. We shall lead evidence at the trial to show that they did not go there for cement.
Further evidence disclosed that the 1st Accused used 3 operational passports, two British passports and one
America. And the 4th Accused also uses two operational British passports.
My Lord A4 returned to Spain and was later joined by A1. From Spain A1 travelled shortly to America (U.S) and
returned on 27/12/03 and met A3, and A5 in London. In London A1 gave A3 £8,000.00 and U$5,500.00 Dollars
to be brought to Ghana for him. Our investigation reveals that this was brought down to Ghana to A1.
My Lord further investigations revealed that on 30/12/2003 the A1 returned to Ghana from London with a lot of
foreign currency. In the evening of the same day the A2 who was later arrested came to collect the money in a
polythene bag in the house of A1 at night and left that same night of 30/12/2003 at about 11 p.m. After A2 had
collected the money from A1 they both met at Prampram Beach Lodge to await the arrival of a canoe to take
delivery according to them, cartons of fish and food. This canoe did arrive powered by 2 outboard motors carrying
big parcels or bail of certain items which were off loaded and later re-loaded into a van which had been brought
there by A2 for conveyance. My Lord, the canoe which brought the items was A6 and one Craig whose
whereabouts is up to now not known. Evidence will reveal that A1 supervised the loading and off loading of the
items from the canoe into the van. They also engaged the services of workers of the Lodge to off-load the items
after which they were given ¢200,000.00 each. On the following day 31/12/2003 the A2 brought the items in two
consignments to the A1’s house. The items with the assistance of a witness (who will testify were sent upstairs in
the room of A1 which items were later concealed in a compartment as earlier mentioned. My Lord, the items as
earlier indicated were forwarded to the Ghana Standards Board for examination and the same found to be
positively narcotic Drugs i.e. Cocaine. My Lord, we intend calling six witnesses to prove our case against the
accused persons herein.”
These are the facts as given by the prosecution, and in support of which evidence was led to prove the
prosecution’s case against the accused persons. And whatever evidence that was led in support should directly
Page 4 of 12
concern and be in line with the particulars of the offence as given by the prosecution. This admonishing becomes
necessary when particulars of A1 and A4’s travels from Spain to Ghana and to Brazil and continued to Venezuela,
then to Calabar in Nigeria and Mallegu in Equitorial Guinea are given.
These places mentioned in the facts of the case do not form part of the particulars of the offences given by the
prosecution and therefore should not have any place in the scheme of reckoning in this case.
Any attempt to connect any of the accused persons to these places mentioned would amount to importation of
evidence not forming part of the case, and which if relied upon would amount to miscarriage of justice.
In supports of its case, the prosecution called 12 witnesses, 5 of whom gave eye witnesses account of how the
cocaine arrived at A1’s house.
None of the 5 eye witnesses gave any evidence or at all implicating any of the two appellants John David Logan
and Frank David Laverick and none of the remaining 7 witnesses gave any direct evidence or at all to incriminate
any of them in either the conspiracy charge or that of possession. The only evidence of note against the two
Appellants is that the police met them in 1st Accused’s house during the raid into the house and arrested them.
And the question is whether their mere presence in the 1st Accused’s house at the material time, without any
evidence implicating them justified conviction.
The Appellants John David Logan and Frank David Laverick were charged together with 4 others with the
offences of CONSPIRACY and POSSESSION.
All parties to this case, Lawyers and the Lower Courts have done justice to the offence of Conspiracy. They have
adequately and accurately spelt out in no uncertain terms as to what constitute the offence of Conspiracy under our
Criminal Law. I will therefore refer to only a few statute and case law definitions, which I find relevant to this case.
Sections 23(1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) defines Conspiracy thus:-
“If two or more persons agree or act together with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime,
whether with or without any previous concert or deliberation to commit or abet that crime, as the case may be.”
And in the oft - quoted case of The State Vrs. Otchere & Ors. [1963] 2 GLR, 463, the Supreme Court observed at
page 471 thus:-
“That the law of conspiracy as stated in our Criminal Code embodies the principles of the English law of
Conspiracy as enunciated in judicial decisions of the English Courts.”
Page 5 of 12
The Supreme Court made references to the following English cases-
In the case of R. v Meyrick [1929] 21 Cr. App p.94 at 99, Lord Hewart C.J delivering the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeal in England referred to two passages from the judgments in the cases of R vs. Mulcahy [1868] LR
3HL 306 HL and R vs. Brisac [1803] 4 East 164; 102 ER. 792 respectively and to the charge to the jury in R. vs
Parnell as together embodying the English Law on the subject.
In R v Mulcahy, Willess J stated thus;- “A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in
the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.
So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very
plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful,
punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means”.
In R vs. Brisac, Grose J stated, “conspiracy is a matter of inference deduced from certain criminal acts of the
parties accused done in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them”.
In R vs. Parnell, Fitzgerald J in his reference to the jury said:
“It may be that the alleged conspirators have never seen each other, and have never corresponded, one may have
never heard the name of the other, and yet by the law they may be parties to the same common criminal
agreement”.
“Thus in some of the Fenian cases tried in this country, it frequently happened that one of the conspirators was in
America the other in this country, that they never seen each other but that there were acts on both sides which led
the jury to the inference, and they drew it, that they were engaged in accomplishing the same common object, and
when they had arrived at this conclusion the acts of one became evidence against the other”.
At the close of prosecution’s case, there was no evidence from which it could be inferred that the appellants John
David Logan and Frank David Laverick had involved themselves with any of the other 4 accused persons to
perform any criminal acts in pursuance of any criminal purpose in common among them.
On the possession charge it is in evidence that when the Police arrived at A1’s house they conducted a thorough
search on the bodies and rooms of the accused persons. There is no evidence that the appellants herein had any
knowledge or at all of the existence of the cocaine in A1’s house, let alone having possession of the drugs.
Page 6 of 12
This, notwithstanding, and as the accused persons were tried summarily, the trial court exercised its jurisdiction
under sections 173 and 174 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ghana (1960) (Act 30) and formed the opinion that
a case had been made out against the accused sufficiently to require them to make their defence.
Sections 173 and 174 dealing with summary trials state thus:-
173 “If at the close of the evidence in support of the charge, it appears to the court that a case is not made against
the accused sufficiently to require him to make a defence, that Court shall, as to that charge acquit him”.
174 “At the close of the evidence in support of the charge, if it appears to the Court that a case is made out against
the accused sufficiently to require him to make a defence, the Court shall call upon him to enter into his defence
and shall remind him of the charge and inform him that, if he so desires, he may give evidence himself on Oath or
make a Statement …..”.
It is not clear what evidence informed the trial Court to exercise its discretion under Section 174 and called upon
the Appellants John David Logan and Frank David Laverick to make their defence. As at the close of the evidence
for the prosecution, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence implicating the 2 Appellants.
In conspiracy charges such as the one in our instant case where there is no direct evidence, the conspiracy
therefore, as Grose J put it :- “Is a matter of inference, to be deduced from the physical Criminal acts of the parties
accused, done in pursuance of an apparent Criminal purpose in common between them”.
The Supreme Court in the case of The State vs. Ali Kassena [1962]1 GLR p144 at 149 pronounced on Section 173
of the Criminal Procedure Code,1960 (Act 30) thus:
“Section 173 is concerned with Summary trials where the judge decides both questions of law and fact. It is for the
judge in a summary trial to weigh the evidence and then decide whether from the facts proved the guilt of the
accused can be inferred. Evidence is said to be sufficient when it is of such probative force as to convince and
which if un-contradicted will justify a conviction. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the opinion of Lord
Wright in Casewell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. [1940] AC 152 p 169 thus: -
“There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to
establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical certainty as if they had actually been
observed. In other cases the inference does not go beyond reasonable probability. But if there are no positive
proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere
speculation and suspicion.”
The Supreme Court continued – “where therefore, the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution fails to take
the case out of the realm of conjecture, the evidence is best described as ‘insufficient’-. It is the type of evidence
which because it cannot convince, cannot be believed, and therefore is incapable of sustaining conviction. In these
Page 7 of 12
circumstances it would be wrong in a summary trial to over-rule a submission of no case to answer.”
In the instant Appeal, it is clear that there is no evidence on record to support conviction. Section 173 is
mandatory, the operative word is shall, thereby giving no option to the trial court where a case is not made out
against the accused sufficiently to require him to make a defence.
There being no such evidence the trial court erred in calling upon the appellants to make a defence.
We agree with the minority opinion that by the Court so erring, grave miscarriage of justice has been occasioned
and that on the authority of the Supreme Court cases of Donkor vs. The State [1964] GLR 598 and Nyarko vs. The
State [1963] 2GLR p.59, the appellants were wrongly called upon to make their defence.
In Donkor v. The State (supra) the Supreme Court held that where the defence is wrongly called upon, the fact that
the accused gives incriminating evidence filling the omissions for the prosecution will not change the legal
position especially where no offence has been alleged or proved by the prosecution. This statement by the
Supreme Court re-echoed the same sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court in Donkor v. The State (supra).
We will therefore, like the judge in the Minority decision quash the convictions and set aside their sentences.
When the appellants Logan and Laverick opened their defence they produced such concrete evidence, that turned
out to be more consistent with innocence than with guilt. The gravamen of their evidence was that they had
planned to travel on to Nigeria for the release of an Oil Tanker owned by Frank David Laverick and managed by
John David Logan, which at that time was being held in the Nigerian Navy.
These two men according to their evidence stopped in Ghana on their way to Nigeria to consult first accused –
David Dinsdale Gorman, who held Power of Attorney over the vessel. The two appellants tendered genuine
documents to support their defence to the satisfaction of the trial Judge. It was on one of the mornings they spent
at Gorman’s house, i.e. on the 7th January 2004, when the Police raided the house, met them there and arrested
them.
When the Police discovered the drugs from the hidden compartment the first accused, Gorman, the owner of the
house readily admitted that he put the drugs in the secret compartment for a friend called YAKUBA at an agreed
fee of $50,000.00 US Dollars.
Logan and Laverick had their rooms and bodies searched, but nothing was found on them. They could, therefore,
be said to be “at that wrong place at the wrong time”.
Page 8 of 12
Despite being satisfied with their defence the trial judge went ahead to convict and sentence them. The said
conviction and sentence were by a majority of 2-1 affirmed by the Court of Appeal, which found no merit in the
appellants appeal.
In support of his judgment the trial judge made some dangerous and damning findings against 3rd and 4th
accused. As there was no direct evidence against them, the trial judge based his said findings on alleged
circumstantial evidence. According to him, “linking the 1st accused to his imaginary spokes of a wheel, the
prosecution had it that 1st accused went to overseas to meet the 3rd and 4th Accused persons and travelled with
4th accused to Venezuela and met the 3rd accused in Spain before Christmas in 2003. And soon after the return of
the 1st accused to Ghana, the 3rd, 5th and 4th accused travelled to Ghana at a shorter (sic) intervals, namely
2/1/2004; 3/1/2004 and 6/1/2004 respectively. Then the 1st accused instructed the 6th accused to pick the 3rd and
4th accused persons at Kotoka International Airport when they arrived in Ghana on 3/1/2004 and 6/1/2004
respectively which he did.
To me the 3rd and 4th accused did not travel to Europe and South America with 1st Accused respectively for
nothing. They travelled on a purpose to procure the goods in question i.e. Narcotics Drugs, Cocaine. The purposes
of the travel was for procuring, exporting and may be distributing or selling the stuff, cocaine.
The defence on the other hand had submitted to the contrary. The main reasons given by the 3rd and 4th accused
was that they have come together to resolve their differences in respect of oil tanker business in Nigeria to resolve
the differences between them in respect of their oil tanker on which the 1st accused held a Power of Attorney for
the 4th accused.
The 3rd and 4th accused person have provided credible evidence that they deal with that oil tanker business. I
therefore find that they are in Oil tanker business. Nonetheless, I also find that they (1st, 3rd and 4th accused
persons) are also in narcotic business since the three of them can do more than one business.
Secondly, I find that the reason being given by the 3rd and 4th accused persons for their presence in Ghana was a
ruse in that:-
(1) The 3rd and 4th accused persons came upon the heels of one another i.e. the 3rd accused came to Ghana on
2/1/2004 while the 4th accused also arrived in Ghana on 6/1/2004, and they were picked up by the 6th accused at
Airport in Accra on the instructions of the 1st accused.
It is my considered opinion that the fact that 1st accused instructed the 6th accused to pick the 3rd and 4th accused
persons from the Airport on their arrival in Ghana on 2/1/2004 and 6/1/2004 respectively presupposes that there
was an arrangement between the 1st accused and them.
Page 9 of 12
I therefore find that the arrivals by the 3rd and 4th accused persons in Ghana and their convergence in the 1st
accused house have been pre-designed to further their diabolical plans in pursuit of their dealings in cocaine. And
that it was fortuitous that they converged in the house of the 1st accused with others – i.e. 1st, 5th and 6th accused
persons to see whether the goods-cocaine had arrived at the place in which they were meant to be stored.
(2) They said that they were on their way to Nigeria but I consider that that was false. They had not procured a
visa to visit that country at the time of their arrest on 7/1/2004, even though they claimed they were visiting that
country on 9/1/2004.
(3) Even though the 3rd accused has a rented place of abode at house No. H11/N11 Community 2, Tema,
where the 1st accused’s house is, he never went to stay there. That was not surprising because he well knew that
the offending matter had landed or about to land in Ghana and that he ought to stay together with the co-
conspirators to clinch the deal. The reason that he (3rd accused) give the court amply belied his purpose of staying
in the 1st accused’s house. He said that he was in arrears of rent with his landlord even though he admitted that; he
was not under any harassment or threat of ejection from him.
I therefore find that the presence of the 3rd and 4th accused persons in the 1st accused’s house could not have
been coincidental or accidental, but for the purpose of engaging in criminal conspiracy.
I further find that the 1st, 3rd, and 4th accused persons were also in conspiracy in relating to the subject matter of
the charge(s) before this court. Accordingly, I convict them (1st 3rd and 4th accused persons) together with the
2nd, 5th and 6th accused persons on the charge of conspiracy”.
These are inferences allegedly drawn from circumstantial evidence on the record. And the question then is,
speaking as an appellate Court, whether, in fact, such inferences were drawn from facts that really existed in the
evidence, and whether these findings, based on such inferences are supported by evidence on record.
Our answers to these questions can only be in the negative. These findings of the trial judge are a mixture bag of
imported evidence, falsehoods and little truths. The only truths from it being pieces of evidence concerning the
arrivals of the 3rd and 4th accused from overseas and their being picked by the 6th accused and their staying at 1st
accused’s house.
All other pieces of the evidence are mere fantasies, not borne out of the evidence on record.
For circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, it must be inconsistent with innocence of the accused. It must
lead to irresistible conclusion not only that the Crime charged had been committed, but it was in fact committed by
the persons charged in order to arrive at a definite conclusion.
Page 10 of 12
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence that has no facts supporting it, as is seen in the instant case, is
therefore, wrong.
As has already been stated the defence put up by the Appellants was more consistent with innocence than with
guilt and on the authority of R vs. ANSERE 3WALR 385 at 387, the trial Court should have given the benefit of
the doubt created by the appellants’ defence to the appellants and acquitted and discharged them. The findings in
support of the conviction are mere speculations and suspicions.
When the case came before the Court of Appeal, the Honourable Lords by a majority of 2-1 dismissed the appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that there was substantial circumstantial evidence to sustain the charges beyond
reasonable doubt against the appellants Logan and Laverick in the absence of any direct evidence against them.
This holding cannot be supported having regard to certain findings by Akamba JA in his lead judgment. In his
submissions the Learned Court of Appeal judge stated among others thus:
“The appellants in their written submission have raised a number of issues, which according to them, informed
albeit wrongly, the conclusions of the trial judge.
They contend that the conduct of the trial judge in his attempt to “bridge the gap” in the evidence and misstating
the facts has led to a miscarriage of justice.
For instance the trial judge alluded to 3rd and 4th appellants as having travelled to Europe and South America
with the 1st accused respectively for the purpose of procuring, exporting and may be distributing or selling the
stuff, cocaine”. Reacting to the said contention of the appellants, Akamba JA, stated thus:-
“There is however nothing on record to support his finding. There is equally no evidence to suggest that the
narcotic substance retrieved from the A1’s house was procured from Europe and South America and by 3rd and
4th Appellants”.
Akamba JA stated further thus:-
“Counsel for the 3rd and 4th appellants also referred to other conclusions made by the trial judge, which were not
backed by evidence”.
“This includes the finding that even though the 3rd and 4th appellants dealt in the Oil business they were also in
the narcotic business, which latter finding is based upon suspicion and speculation. There is no doubt that even
though the trial judge lapsed into certain conclusions bordering on speculations and suspicions as recounted
Page 11 of 12
above, there was nevertheless substantial circumstantial evidence to sustain the charge beyond reasonable doubt
against the 3rd and 4th appellants and I so hold”.
Akamba JA went on further to make the following finding thus:-
“The first count for which the 5th appellant was charged together with the 3rd and 4th appellants and others took
place between September 2003 and 7th January 2004 which period fell within the period the 5th appellant was in
Ghana. It is my finding that although the judge based his conclusions on some faulty reasons there was
nevertheless sufficient evidence to support his conclusion that the prosecution had proved the charges against the
3rd 4th and 5th appellants beyond reasonable doubt and I so hold.”
Whatever substantial circumstantial and sufficient evidence there was that His Lordship referred to was not stated.
However, throughout the entire proceedings, what the prosecution relied on as its strongest evidence against the
appellants have been their alleged sequential arrival in Ghana and their presence at first accused’s house at the
material time. These pieces of evidence being relied on by the prosecution have been so satisfactorily explained in
their defence to the satisfaction of the trial judge. And it was the quality of their said defence that informed the
prosecution to throw in the towel at the Court of Appeal. Again Akamba JA erred when he tried to place the
burden of proof on the 3rd appellant at certain stage in the case.
In considering the fate of the appellants in this case, our hearts tell us one thing whilst our heads tell us another.
However, the Constitutional imperative created under Article 19 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana demands that
any person put before the Court be given a fair trial. We will listen to our heads and allow the appeal. The
Minority judgment of the Court of Appeal is hereby affirmed. The Majority judgment is quashed and sentences
set aside.
S.A.B. AKUFFO(MISS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
S. A. BROBBEY
J. ANSAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COUR
MRS. S. O. ADINYIRA
R. T. ANINAKWAH
COUNSEL:
MR. ADDO ATTUAH FOR APPELLANTS.
Page 12 of 12
MR. AGYEMANG-DUODU, PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY

WITH MRS. SHELA BADU, SENIOR STATE ATTONEY AND
MS. BARBARA SAKYI, STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE REPUBLIC.

Logan - Laverick v. The Rep

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Logan - Laverick v. The Rep

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ghana Law Reports Year: 2007 Vol: Page: 27-May-22

JOHN DAVID LOGANand FRANK DAVID LAVERICK v THE REPUBLIC

SUPREME COURT, ACCRA

JOHN DAVID LOGANand FRANK DAVID LAVERICK v THE REPUBLIC

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; Circumstantial evidence; Nature of

Particulars of the offence given as follows:-

The particulars of this offence are given thus:

The Supreme Court made references to the following English cases-

In R vs. Parnell, Fitzgerald J in his reference to the jury said:

circumstances it would be wrong in a summary trial to over-rule a submission of no case to answer.”

Akamba JA stated further thus:-

Akamba JA went on further to make the following finding thus:-

MR. AGYEMANG-DUODU, PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY

You might also like