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 R e c o m m e n d a t io n s o f D e e l y ’s w o r k fr o m A fr ic a , A u s t r ia , A u s t r a lia ,
B r a z il, B u lg a r ia , C a n a d a , C h in a , D e n m a r k , E n g la n d , E s t o n ia ,
F in la n d , F r a n c e , G e r m a n y , G r e e c e , H u n g a r y , I ta ly , M e x ic o , N e w
Z e a la n d , P o la n d , R o m a n ia , R u s s ia , S in g a p o r e , S p a in , T a iw a n ,
U k r a in e , U n it e d S t a te s :

“No current thinker has carried out a more penetrating advance into a genuine
‘post-modernism’ by the use of history and semiotics than has John Deely, and
this collection gives us the heart of his work.”
B e n e d i c t M . A s h l e y , O.P., Professor Emeritus, A q u in a s Institute o f Theology <*t St.
Louis University, M issouri

“John Deely, alongside Peirce, has proven to have the widest conceptual grasp,
both historical and systematic, of semiotics.”
E v g e n Ba e r , D ean o f Hobart College and Professor o f Philosophy, H obart & W illiam
S m ith Colleges, Geneva, N e w York

“John Deely is one of the most original and insightful philosophical thinkers of
our generation. This volume pulls together a number of Deely’s most important
contributions over the years, and admirably demonstrates the impressive scope
and depth of Deely’s thought.”
M i c h a e l Ba u r , Professor o f Philosophy, Fordham University, N e w York

“This collection of essays provides an excellent resource for anyone interested

in the future of philosophy. John Deely is an outstanding thinker and these
essays provide a much needed introduction to his work. They will interest not
only philosophers and semioticians, but anyone interested in cognition and
language.”
D r . P a u l Ba i n s , author o f T he Primacy o f Semiosis (University o f Toronto Press,
2 0 0 6 ), fir st philosophical study o f John D eely’s work; Kerikeri, N e w Z ealand

“John Deely is the soul of the most comprehensive historiography of semiotics,

which makes him the most competent witness for the semiotics of the 21st
century.”
J e f f B e r n a r d & G l o r i a W i t h a l m , I A S S & Institute fo r Socio-Semiotic Studies,
Vienna, A ustria

“John D eely’s book shows him as one o f the best Semioticians o f the world.
At the same time it shows a scholar very acquainted with the history o f the
actual development o f semiotic consciousness, where he shows the centrality
o f Latin thought to that development — most notably in neglected Latin
centuries afterWilliam of Ockham, where suchjesuits as the Conimbriceneses
(familiar to Peirce) dug into the foundations for an understanding o f sign,
and also the Latin Thomistic commentators as culminating in John Poinsot’s
Tractatus de Signis. O ur whole view o f our present transition to a ‘postm odern’
era and its relation to the prem odern epochs o f philosophy is changed by
this work.”
M a u r i c i o B e u c h o t , O.P., P h .D . Researcher and Professor at the Sem inar o f
Hermeneutics o f the Institute de Investigaciones Filologicas o f the Universidad N ational
A utonom a dc M exico

“John Deely s legacy is a pivotal element in the future of both Semiotics and
Thomistic thought.”
M a x B o n i l l a , S S L , S T D , Vice President fo r Academ ic Affairs, Franciscan University
o f Steubenville, O hio

“The indispensable Realism fo r the 2 V C entury shows that only if we integrate

the richness of our millennial philosophical heritage can we hope to understand
the role and the limits of science and logic, and map their relation to ethics and
signs in the new era that is opening up before us.”
T h o m a s F. B r o d e n , Professor o f French, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana

“Dr. Deely is a pioneer in demonstrating the implications of Thomistic thought

for problems today. He maintains the thought of St. Thomas as a living force in the
intellectual culture, rather than as simply a kind of museum piece among the exhibits
of history, making that thought come to the attention of thinkers who would not, in
the normal course of events, have any particular interest inThomism at all.”
P a d r e R o b e r t o B u s a , S.J., Pontificia Universita Gregoriana di R o m a alia facolta
di Filosofia dell’ A loisianum di Gallarate, all’ Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di
M ilano, Italy; creator o f the In d ex Thomisticus database

“From his early work on Brentano, Heidegger and evolution through his
ground-breaking contributions to semiotics, John Deely has been one o f our
most important, brilliant and prolific philosophers. And he is certainly the most
original. Hopefully, this anthology will introduce many new people, especially
younger philosophers and graduate students, to Deely’s work. Philosophy will
be much better off if it does.”
J o h n C. C a h a l a n , Editor, Resources fo r M odern Aristotelians, M ethuen, Massachusetts

“Prof. Cobley’s assemblage of a Jo h n D eely Reader provides us with a very rare

example ofdeep multidisciplinary insight into the intersection ofdifferent domains
— from Science to Humanities. The book’s theoretical framework incorporates
a variety o f philosophical, anthropological and semiotic backgrounds. Far more:
it gives the reader illustrations from biology and theory of evolution and even
physics to ethics and postmodern understanding of the liberal arts. It is a book
of the new era.”
P r o f . T a t i a n a C h e r n i g o v s k a y a , P hD , Dsc, President o f R ussian Association fo r
Cognitive Studies, H onorary member o f the Semiotic Society o f Finland, Foreign member
o f the Norwegian Academ y o f Sciences and Letters M em ber o f the steering committee fo r
cognitive science in Europe; S t. Petersburg, R ussia
“John Deely is one the giants of contemporary semiotics, whose pivotal works
cover the whole span of the field, from the theoretical to the philosophical.
This collection of some of his major writings constitutes a veritable map that
charts where the field has been and where it will be heading. These are essential
readings for anyone who wishes to enter into that field seriously and gainfully.”
M a r c e l D a n e s i , D epartm ent o f Anthropology, University o f Toronto, Canada; Editor-
in -C h ie f Semiotica

“John Deely has not only paid attention to the Second Scholasticism but also
to the first one, and (while dealing with questions that are at the center stage of
contemporary culture, and working across all the disciplines, both the humanities
and the sciences) he has contributed to expand the knowledge of the Thomistic
tradition beyond the confines of the Catholic world.”
U m b e r t o E c o , Universita degli S tu d i di Bologna, Italy

“As the 20th century projects of analytic philosophy, critical theory and naive
scientific epistemology rapidly begin to fade from view, the stage is set at last
for the ascendance of philosopher John Deely s four-and-a-half decades-long
counter-project, ushering in the fourth great age of human understanding: the
age o f semiotic realism — what Deely calls ‘The Way of Signs’. Providing the
newcomer with a concise one-stop overview of Deely s forty-year-long project,
while at the same time assembling the readings in such a fashion as to yield new
insights even for those scholars already well acquainted with Deely’s work, Paul
Cobley’s brilliantly assembled and edited R ealism fo r the 2 l s t Century. A Jo h n
D eely R eader is a long-overdue compilation of the works of a philosopher who
is perhaps the most far-seeing thinker of our time.”
D o n a l d Fa v a r e a u , U niversity Scholars Programme, N ational University o f Singapore

“Deely s study o f the implications of evolution as it relates to the nature o f the

human person requires a rethinking of ethics and the context of natural law.”
D e s m o n d J. F i t z G e r a l d , Professor Emeritus, University o f San Francisco, California

“Deely s integration of zoosemiotics arid evolutionary theory into a philosophy of

human understanding offers a more comprehensive account of our cognitive capacities
than is found in linguistically-based or logically-biased speculative philosophies.”
R o b e r t S. H a t t e n , Jacobs School o f M usic, Indiana University, Bloomington

“This book enables us to gauge the compass o f John Deely’s heuristic project.
It unveils the stages in a synthesis which the author has been elaborating since
1966 to trace the emergence of H om o semioticus. John Deely achieves the feat
o f combining the rigor of classical philosophy with the powerful imagery of
the epic o f knowledge, conjugating the realism o f ethics and the abstraction of
formal semiotics. In this way, he opens horizons of thought absolutely essential
for the 21st Century.”
A n n e H e n a u l t , Universite de Paris I V Sorbonne
 “That truth and illusions are not the same is an insight human beings share with
each other and with no other animals in the world. They know this because they
are semiotic animals; they know about the action of signs, semiosis. But to reinstall
a semiotic realism in post-Kantian Western thinking based on this insight is no
small task.Yet, this has been the ambition ofjohn Deely’s groundbreaking writings
throughout three decades. The reader of this volume will be richly rewarded.”
J e s p e r H o f f me y e r , D epartm ent o f Molecular Biology, University o f Copenhagen,
D enm ark

“John Deely is a brilliant philosopher and scholar who knows how to combine
the old and the new with a sharp historical knowledge o f the most important
issues. That’s why his work should be read by students as well as by professional
philosophers and all those who want to achieve a deeper understanding in the
humanities.”
P r o f , d r h a b . P i o t r J a r o s z y n s k i , C hair o f the Philosophy o f Culture, J o h n Paul II
Catholic University o f Lublin, Poland

“It is amazing that John Deely actually succeeds to add a new dimension to the
study of semiotics — but then, who else would be able to do so?”
J o r g e n D i n e s J o h a n s e n , Professor o f General and Comparative Literature, University
o f Southern D enm ark

“Professor John Deely has made an extensive contribution to the development

o f philosophical thought. His research in the area of semiotics and the history
o f philosophy lays down a new context for understanding reality in terms of
human evolution. Realism fo r the 2 1 st Century. A J o h n D eely R eader is a great book
that can become the roadmap for mutual understanding in future years.”
A n a t o u j K a r a s , PhD , Professor and C hair o f Philosophy, L v iv Franko N ational
University, Ukraine

“As a Chinese scholar engaged in studies o f semiotics, phenomenology, and

hermeneutics, I am greatly impressed by John Deely s wide intellectual horizon
displayed in this excellent Reader. I think it will also arouse a deep interest
among Chinese readers.”
Y o u z h e n g L i , G uest Senior Fellow at Chinese A cadem y o f Social Sciences, Beijing, and
Vice-President o f I A S S

“Deely is today among the leading semioticians who has elaborated on both
Peirce s and Sebeok’s theories, but he is also an original author with his own
semiotic voice and insights, attempting to expand the understanding o f semiosis
beyond its traditional limits.”
A l e x a n d r o s L a g o p o u l o s , A ristotle University, Thessaloniki, Greece

“This impressive collection is a welcome addition to philosophers concerned

about philosophical realism in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and moral
theory, together with that mostly uncharted historical territory between late
medieval and early modern philosophy.”
A n t h o n y J. L i s s k a , M aria Theresa B arney Professor o f Philosophy, D enison University,
Granville, O hio

“John Deely, the most remarkable follower o f Charles Sanders Peirce today,
represents the philosophical direction of semiotics. His insight into the most
complicated problems o f semiotics is impressive; even his most provocative
claims are always inspiring.”
M i h h a i l L o t m a n , Estonian Institute o f H um anities, Tallinn; Professor o f Semiotics and
Literary Tl'ieory and Senior Researcher, Tartu University, Estonia

“Semiosis and semiotics across history, in nature and in culture, from science to
philosophy, from the inert to the living universe, from human body to mental events,
from logic to ethics, under the glasses of an expert in the field, who tells us the evolution
of his thinking in the last fifty years and his anticipation for the 21st century.”
S o l o m o n M a r c u s , M em ber o f the R om anian Academy, E m eritus Professor, University
o f Bucharest, R om ania

“This book can be considered as a kind o f‘vade-mecum’ o f the human being in

the era o f globalization.”
J e a n -C l a u d e M b a r g a , Full Professor, University ofYaounde I, Cameroon, Africa

“The fruits of a Promethean effort with zeal and passion embracing the entirety
o f human knowledge in a single Weltanschauung.”
I v a n M l a d e n o v , author o f Conceptualizing Metaphors. O n Charles Peirce’s M arginalia
(Routledge, 2 0 0 6 ); Bulgarian A cadem y o f Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria

“A comprehensive collection of Deely s brilliant papers on topical issues of

semiotic philosophy had been a desideratum on the reading list o f all semioticians
for a long time. This ‘Deely Reader’ fills the gap in the semiotic library and is
one more reason to guarantee its author a place among the leading figures if not
classics o f contemporary philosophy and semiotics.”
W in f r j e d N o t h , Director, Research Center fo r Cultural Studies, Universitdt Kassel,
Universitat Kassel, G erm any

“In John Deely s thought there is always a fruitful mixture of a penetrating analysis
concerning some o f the most difficult issues in the history o f philosophy with a
masterful overview of the role of philosophical thought in the 21st century. The
reader with a desire to learn will profit greatly from this superb book.”
J a i m e N u b i o l a , University o f Navarra, Spain

“This volume is an essential guide for the scholar of philosophy or of semiotics.”

Fr a n k N u e s s e l , Professor o f Classical and M odern Languages, U niversity o f Louisville,
K entucky
“Realism is not merely a philosophic or literary trend, but one of the principal
aims o f the human being from its relations to nature, to others, and in the relation
o f its own body to politics. It is inevitably connected with sign interpretation
and the question o f truth. The author o f the summa Four A ges o f Understanding
is aware o f this, and, in his ever intriguing and fascinating way, considers in
this volume the question o f realism in its various facets: philosophical, semiotic,
gnoseological, logical, ethical, etc. The editor has offered to the reader a wide,
shrewd, and keen-witted selection o f Deely s very topical texts.”
A u g u s t o P o n z i o , Dipartimento di Pratiche Linguistiche eA nalisi diTesti, Facolta di Lingue
e Letterature Straniere, Sezione Filosofa e Scienze dei segniUniversita degli S tudi di Bari

“By providing a great primer on the work o f one o f the contemporary world’s
few philosophers deserving of the name, Cobley s edition o f Deely s essays fills
a major need on the present intellectual scene. Deely is one o f the few scholars
today with the historical background in philosophy capable o f helping us
properly understand the misbegotten natures of modernism and postmodernism
‘falsely so-called’. For this reason alone, serious thinkers should purchase a copy
o f Cobley’s book and recommend it to others.”
P e t e r A . R e d p a t h , F ull Professor o f Philosophy, S t . f o h n ’s University, Staten Island,
N e w York

“Realism fo r the 2 1 st C entury is a must for anyone seriously interested in a broad

and philosophically rather than linguistically conceived semiotics. Paul Cobley
has done a first-rate job in his selection of John Deely’s most pertinent insights
published over the last half century. Readers will be grateful for this original and
carefully argued case for realism as an escapable inference from general semiosis.”
H o r s t R u t h r o f ,M A , P hD , F I C I F A A S , E m eritus Professor o f Philosophy, M urdoch
University, Perth, Western Australia

“The twelve chapters o f this carefully edited Reader open new semiotic vistas in
the broad philosophical panorama of the author of the Four A ges o f U nderstanding
and ensure John Deely a place of prominence among the vanguard o f postmodern
intellectual culture.”
P r o f e s s o r L u c i a Sa n t a e l l a , Director o f the G raduate Program in Technologies o f
Intelligence and D igital D esign, Catholic University o f Sao Paulo

“Deely s semiotic approach, with its realism o f the word, shines a distinctive light
on the relation between language and reality in the thought o f St Thomas. This
light at the same time reveals a path both distinctive from and yet harmonious
with the traditional approaches to metaphysics as ‘first philosophy’.The sections
on Brentano and Husserl, Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant are particularly intriguing
and important for the matter o f a transition to a postmodern era o f philosophy
in a global intellectual culture.”
K e n n e t h L. S c h m i t z , Professor Em eritus, U niversity o f Toronto, Canada; P ontifcal
Jo h n Paul I I Institute fo r Studies on M arriage and Family, W ashington, D C
“This volume illuminates the delicate path of Semiotics with a powerful light,
leading the reader through fruitful fields of thoughts to the very roots of
philosophy. With incredible precision o f composition, consistency of content, and
clarity o f expression, the author depicts the development of Realism, revealing
the dependence o f postmodern thought on concepts introduced by the Latin
Age. This work is a true masterpiece in contemporary philosophical literature.”
P a v l o S o d o m o r a , P hD , Professor o f Latin and Greek, D epartm ent o f Latin Language,
L v iv D a n ylo H a ly tsk y N ational M edical University, Ukraine

“No one has so elegantly, precisely, and sharply clarified the problematic of
representation in philosophy and semiotics as John Deely, providing thereby the
single most important of the foundation stones for a postmodern era.”
E e r o T a r a s t i , Professor o f Musicology, U niversity o f H elsinki; Director o f the
International Semiotics Institute at Imatra, Finland; President o f the I A S S / A I S
(International Association fo r Semiotic Studies)

“This book provides illuminating readings and discussions of some of the major
issues on the relationship between the physical and the mental universe viewed
from a holistic and ethical scope of semiotics. Besides the semiotic disciplines and
theoretical debates, John Deely brings in significant exposition of philosophical
perspectives and historical insights into the analyses of the formation of logic and
law behind objective reality, to the semiotic and phenomenological controversy
over mental events, and especially to the search for and establishment o f a new
phase o f realism in postmodernity.”
H s i u - c h i h T s a i , E ditor-in-C hief, C hung- W ai Literary Quarterly, N a tio n a l Taiwan
U niversity Press; Professor, D epartm ent o f Foreign Languages and Literatures, N ational
Taiwan U niversity

“Professor Deely is a philosopher; his writings demand reading and re-reading.

It is an excellent idea to have a ‘Deely Reader’, where the twelve chapters
appear as if in twelve different colors, and the whole reader unites them into
a multidimensional picture. People will read and repeatedly read the Deely
Reader.”
Vi l m o s Vo i g t , Folklore D epartm ent Chair, Lorand Eotvos University, Budapest,
H u ngary

“This volume gathers some of the most important articles by John Deely. Deely
has roots in the Thomism of the Latin Age both early and late, as well as in the
Neothomism of the 20th century. Through the path of Sign, first sketched in
Latin by John Poinsot, Deely has resolved many of the problems and paradoxes
o f modernity facing postmodernity. While he succeeded in giving semiotics its
philosophical foundation historically, he also demonstrated that semiotics is the
new foundation for philosophy itself as postmodern.”
M a r t i n W a l t e r , Germany, Editor o f the critical edition reprint o f P oinsot’s C ursus
Philosophicus (Hildesheim : Georg O lm s Verlag, 2 0 0 8 )
“John Deely stands foremost among the philosophers working within the
expansive domain of semiotics, the study of signification. He is renowned for
his incisive penetration into whatever subject he takes up, for the clarity of his
writing, and for having singlehandedly revived Joao Poinsot, the first thinker
to argue that the triadic nature of the relation constitutive of signification is
irreducible. The University o f Scranton Press has done us all a great favor in
bringing some of Deely s most perceptive writings together in a volume that
will be a much-valued reference and standard text.”
W C. W a t t , Professor o f C ognitive Sciences Em eritus, U niversity o f California, Irvine

“All those interested in understanding what a truly postmodern philosophy will

look like owe Paul Cobley a very great debt for bringing together, so usefully and
in one accessible volume, this distillation o f John Deely s deeply well-informed
contribution to philosophy over a period o f more than 40 years.”
W e n d y W h e e l e r , London M etropolitan University, E ngland (U nited K ingdom )
 R e a l is m f o r
t h e 2 1st C e n t u r y

A J o h n D e e ly R e a d e r
ii
 Re al is m f o r
t h e 2 1st Ce n t ury

A J o h n D e e ly R e a d e r

Edited by Paul Cobley

Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA,

and L ondon, England, U K :
Scranton U niversity Press
 C opyright © 2009 by Paul Cobley and John Deely, w ith rights o f survivor
All rights reserved.

Deely, Jo h n N.
Realism for the 21st century : a John Deely reader / edited by Paul Cobley.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-58966-148-6 (hardcover)
1. Philosophy, A m erican—20th century. 2. Philosophy, A m erican—21st century. 3. R e ­
alism. 4. Semiotics. I. Cobley, Paul, 1 9 6 3 -II.Title.
B 945.D 3851C 63 2009
191—dc22
2009014979
 E d ito r ia l A c k n o w le d g m e n ts
This book has been in gestation for a while, from the first time I encoun­
tered a collection o f photocopied readings that students at the University o f St.
Thomas, Houston (and elsewhere) were using in the early years of this century
W hile in St. Kyrik, Bulgaria, I discussed with Deely the possibility of publish­
ing a book o f his essays on realism in relation to semiotics. Eventually, it lead
to the volume you are holding in your hands.
I would like to thank a number o f people for their patience while this
book was coming to fruition. First, Jeff Gainey, who had the wherewithal to
contract the Reader in the first place. Secondly, Sara Cannizzaro, who did
some crucial scanning and editorial work in the early stages of putting the ms.
together and Stephen Sparks for exceptional proof-reading in the late stages.
Thirdly, my colleagues in semiotics who have discussed Deely s work with me
over the years: Merja Bauters, Soren Brier, Marcel Danesi, Jesper Hoffmey-
er, Guido Ipsen, Jorgen Dines Johansen, Erkki Kilpinen, Kaie Kotov, Kalevi
Kull, Dario Martinelli,Winfried Noth, Anti Randviir, Frederik Stjernfelt, Eero
Tarasti, and Jean Umiker-Sebeok. Special mention in this respect should be
given to Augusto Ponzio and Susan Petrilli, who have not only given me
pointers regarding Deely s work but have given immense support to me over
the years, as did Tom Sebeok, the image o f whose gesture bringing me together
with Deely will remain with me forever.
The most patient o f the lot are those who have been closest to me during
this enterprise, Alison, Stan and, just as I was about to deliver the first version
o f the manuscript, Elsie.
Lastly, but not least, I need to thank Brooke Williams for her hospitality and
intellectual stimulation, and John Deely, without whose openness and co-op­
eration this project could never have gotten off the ground. Deely s endeavour
is remarkable in any context; yet, in his forging o f a philosophical foundation
for the future of semiotics, he is truly to be lauded and critically appraised. For
his more local helpfulness in putting together this Reader, designed to offer a
guide to the way his work has provided this foundation, I can only say that it is
equivalent in generosity to his philosophical achievement.

I would also like to thank the following publishers, organizations and in­
dividuals for permission to reprint the Deely essays in this volume, as follows:
Readings 1, 2, 6, 8, and 10 — The Philosophy Documentation Center and the
two ACPA publications, the Proceedings o f the A m erican Catholic Philosophical A s ­
sociation and Am erican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly — Readings 1, 2, 6, and 8;
Tire Thom ist — Readings 4 and 9; — M outon de Gruyter — Reading 5; Mari­
lyn Nissim-Sabat and Listening — Reading 1 l;Tartu University Press — R ead­
ing 7; Ashgate Press — Reading 3. Fourthly, I want to thank Umberto Eco for
his permission to reproduce (on pp. 2 & 392) two o f his cartoons from the 1983
summer that he and John Deely taught together the May 30-24June “Historio­
graphical Foundatios of Semiotics” course at Indiana University, Bloomington.

v
vi
Just as nominalism leads inevitably to idealism,
so also inevitably realism leads to semiotics.

D eely 2 0 0 8 : 83

v ii
 T a b le o f C o n t e n t s :

I n tr o d u c tio n to th e D e e ly R e a d e r :
“ From R ealism to Sem iotics” ...................... .3
by Paul Cobley, Editor
S e c t i o n I: C h a n g e a n d P r o c e s s i n t h e P h y s i c a l U n i v e r s e

First R eading, fro m A p r il 1 9 6 6 ............................... 21

“T h e Em ergence o f M an:
an inquiry into the operation o f natural selection
in the m aking o f m an ”
S e c t i o n II: E t h ic s

Second Reading, fro m 1 9 6 9 .................................. 54

“E volution and Ethics”
Third Reading, fro m 2 0 0 6 ..................................... 74
“E volution, Semiosis, and Ethics:
R eth in k in g the C o n tex t o f N atural Law ” ,
with an Appendix on Immortality
S e c t io n III: H u m a n a n d A n im a l: Z o o s e m io t ic s

Fourth R eading,from 1 9 7 1 .....................................91

“A nim al Intelligence and C o n cep t-F o rm atio n ”
S e c t io n IV : L o g ic

F ifth Reading, fro m 1 9 8 1 ..................................... 140

“T h e R elatio n o f Logic to Sem iotics”
S e c tio n V : O b je c tiv ity

S ix th R eading,from 1 9 7 1 .................................... 211

“T h e M y th as Integral O bjectivity”
Seuenth Reading, fro m 2 0 0 1 ................................ 225
“ Semiosis and Jakob von UexkiilTs C o n cep t o f U m w elt”
with an Editor s Appendix
overview o f Deely’s four-stage treatment of umwelt
 C o n te n ts c o n tin u e d :

S e c tio n V I: M e n ta l E v e n ts

E ighth R eading,from 1 9 7 8 ............................. 252

“ Sem iotic and the Controversy over M ental Events.
T h e Idealist R o o t o f H usserl’s Phenom enology in B ren tan o ”
S e c t io n V II: H is t o r ic a l P e r s p e c tiv e
S c h o la s tic R e a lis m in th e T r a n s itio n t o P o s t m o d e r n it y

N in th Reading, fro m 1 9 9 4 ............................. 266

“W h at H appened to Philosophy betw een Aquinas and Descartes?”
Tenth Reading, fro m 1 9 9 2 ............................... 293
“Philosophy and E xperience”
with two Appendices:
1. K an t’s handling o f the scandal o f m in d -in d ep en d en t being,
2. P oinsot’s statem ent o f the singularity o f relation
Eleventh Reading, fro m 1 9 9 5 ................................ 319
“A Prospect o f Postm odernity”
A fter w o rd

Twelfth Reading, ivritten fo r the volume, 2 0 0 9 .................. 327

“ O n Purely O bjective R eality ”

C o m p ila tio n o f Sources C ited ,

a lp h a b etica lly arranged and h isto rica lly la yered ........... 345

C hron ological B ib lio g ra p h y o f D e e ly P u b lic a tio n s .........391

In d ex ........................................... 423
1. o f C ontents in D e ta il ..................................... 424
2. o f Nam es, Terms, and Concepts ............................... 429

IX
 As nominalism is idealism in embryonic form,
so realism in philosophy proves to be semiotics in embryonic form.

D eely 2 0 0 8 : 9 8

x
 R e a l is m f o r
t h e 2 1 st C e n t u r y

A John D e e ly R e a d e r
 Cartoon reprinted from Sem iotica 6 9 -1 /2 (1988), p. 113 note 9, as used by the
University o f California Press for its first flyer concerning its 1985 Poinsot edition:

A n n o u n c in g

T R A C T A T U S D E S IG N IS
The S e m io tic o f J o h n P o in s o t
E d ite d b y J o h n D e e l y

J u n e 1983
B lo o m in g to n , In d ian a

E d ito r’s N o te : In 1983 Eco and Deely were team -teaching the May 30-24 June
“Historiographical Foundations o f Semiotics” course o f the ’83 International Sum m er
Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies (ISISSS) held that year on the Bloom ington
campus o f Indiana University. A group including Eco and Deely regularly w ent to dinner
at N ick’s English H u t Restaurant in tow n, and Eco drew a series o f cartoons reflecting
the course o f the various conversations.This cartoon, as also the one on p. 20 below, come
from this series (most o f this series was stolen from the kitchen table in Deely s apartm ent
near the end o f the sum m er school). T he cartoon above was used tw o years later by the
University o f California Press on its first flyer announcing the bilingual critical edition
o f Poinsot’s Tractatus de S ig n is on w hich Deely had been w orking since Spring o f 1970. A
review o f the Eco-D eely IU course b y jo rg e n Dines Johansen, “ Four and a H alf Billions
Years o f Semiosis. ISISSS ‘83 in R eview ” , appeared in Sem iotica 53—1/3 (1985), 273—287.

2
I n t r o d u c t i o n : f r o m R e a l is m t o Se m io t ic s 1

P au l C o b le y

W hile Charles Sanders Peirce is acknow ledged as the greatest A m er­

ican philosopher, Jo h n Deely, in his wake, is arguably the m ost im p o rtan t
liv in g A m erican philosopher. Despite the fact that he m ounts a serious
critique o f the philosophical m ainstream and its blinkered faddish ways,
D eely m aintains his status across philosophy in general as well as in tw o
fu rth er broad dom ains. These latter are Catholic philosophy and sem iot­
ics, b rought together by D eely in a persuasive fusion that enriches both.
M any see the pinnacle o f D eely s w ork in his 2001 b o ok, the F o u r
A g e s o f U n d e rsta n d in g , a volum e that is clearly th e m ajor ‘p o stm o d e rn ’
co n trib u tio n to the establishment o f a crossroads for philosophy, sem iot­
ics and C atholic thought. However, unlike m any scholars w h o produce
a single landm ark w ork, D eely has repeatedly published groundbreaking
books and articles w hich are cited over and over. T h e form er include
In tro d u c in g S e m io tic (1982), H u m a n U se o f S ig n s (1994), N e w B e g in n in g s

1 This introductory essay outlines as follows:

D efining the Semiotic A nim al...................................................................................... 6
T he H um an U n u v e lt .......................................................................................................7
Sign, O b ject,T h in g ......................................................................................................... 8
M ind-dependent Being and M ind-Independent B e in g ............................................ 9
R e la tio n ....................................................................................................................... 11
T he D octrine o f S ig n s ................................................................................................ 13

3
4 Paul Cobley, E ditor '« R e alism f o r the 2 1 s t C e n tu ry: A D e e ly R e a d e r

(1994a), In te n tio n a lity a n d S em io tics (2007) and, o f course, the bestselling,

B asics o f S em io tics (1990). His defining articles include m any o f the read­
ings that are reproduced in the current volum e, am ong w hich it is invidi­
ous to single o u t one, although ‘T h e relation o f logic to sem iotics’ (1981)
will always be notable because o f its size and influence.
D eely has been instrum ental in excavating the scholastic grounds o f
sign study and, partly because o f this, his reach in semiotics cannot be
underestim ated. His w ritings have been seen as the philosophical to u c h ­
stone for the epoch-m aking w ork o f biosem iotics (see, especially, Fa-
vareau 2008); he has placed Jo h n Poinsot firm ly am ong the p an th eo n
o f con trib u to rs to the doctrine o f signs (Deely 1988; D eely and Powell
1985); he has w idened awareness o f the sem iotic endeavours o f Jacques
M aritain (Deely 1986); and has also elevated the status o f the p rotosem i­
otics o f b o th A ugustine (Deely 2009c) and Aquinas (Deely 2001; C hap. 7,
and D eely 2004m ) as m ajor foundations ofW estern philosophy. Indeed,
D eely s influence penetrates fields beyond sign study as it is in stitu tio n ­
ally conceived (see, for example, C obley 2006).
A n au th o rity on the w ork o f Peirce and a m ajor figure in b o th co n ­
tem porary semiotics and Scholastic R ealism , D eely’s thinking on realism
has dem onstrated ho w awareness o f signs has heralded a new, genuinely
‘p o stm o d ern ’ epoch in the history o f hum an thought. ‘P o stm o d ern ’ ap­
pears here, o f course, in inverted comm as to distinguish it from the fash­
ionable intellectual and publishing m ovem ent em anating m ainly from
Paris and associated w ith the academ ic trend o f poststructuralism from
the 1960s onwards. Thom as A Sebeok, one o f the three key figures in the
history o f the do ctrin e o f signs (the o th er tw o are Peirce and Saussure),
characterised this m ovem ent, n o t unjustifiably, as an “ab o rtio n ” (Shintani
2000), chiefly for its nihilism and ill-founded glottocentric u n d erp in ­
nings. D eely (2003b), in a w ittily repetitious m ode, refers to the likes o f
D errida, Foucault, Lacan and their various slavish amanuenses as “ the
post-m oderns falsely so called” . T h e p o in t is n o t that contem porary se­
m iotics as em bodied in D eely’s w ritings defines itself negatively against
the no w w eary Zeitgeist o f ‘postm odernism (falsely so called)’ n o r that
D eely s philosophy is simply antagonistic. R ather, D eely ’s w ritin g calls
for a m ore thoroughgoing superseding o f the ‘m o d e rn ’ than has been
offered by the com paratively glib posturing and lip service o f so-called
 Introduction «’ From R ealism to Sem iotics «’ Paul Cobley 5

p o stm o d ern thinking. Indeed, D eely s am bitions and his achievem ents
throw in to relief the m any difficult questions that face philosophy and
the way that Parisian postm odernism has n o t only ducked those ques­
tions b u t has actually shored up the edifice o f ‘m o d ern ’ ways o f thinking.
T h e m atter can be sum m ed up by means o f a simple exam ple w hich is
close to hom e and will be offered as a prelim inary here. Its m ore detailed
co-ordinates, its ram ifications and its philosophical foundations can be
traced thro u g h the readings collected in this volume.
A lthough the postm odernists (falsely so called) p u rp o rted to present
a devastating challenge to the entirety o f W estern thought, u nderm ining
its very basis and im plying the dem and for wholesale renewal, they really
did n o th in g o f the sort. Taking the writings o f Jacques D errida as an apt
example, since they are from the field o f philosophy, there is repeated it­
eration that D errida either abolishes the entire W estern philosophical tra­
dition w ith his w ork or, at the very least, goes com pletely against its grain
(see, for example, Collins 1996).Yet, at the same tim e as touting its ow n
‘revolutionary’ bearing, D errid a’s ‘deconstruction’ o f philosophical texts
has proven an attractive career move to those schooled in the W estern
tradition, unw illing to give it up and content to eke out their days w ith ar­
cane re-readings o f classics and m odern philosophy (the collection edited
by Silverman 1989, is fairly transparent in this respect). D eely s proposals
for philosophy, constituting a central narrative in his w ork, are in com plete
contrast to this kind o f self-perpetuation. As will be seen, D eely marshals
a widespread and penetrating critique o f m odern thought, calling, in the
process, for a renewal o f philosophy through a greater understanding o f its
history w hich, ultimately, will lead to the birth o f the truly post-m odern
world. In such a situation, w hat dawns is a new epoch in w hich the shack­
les o f the m o d ern — nom inalism , Cartesianism, res cogitans — are throw n
off, giving way to a period in w hich know ledge o f sign functioning re­
juvenates thought. T h e history o f philosophy is n o t left intact in such a
way that academics can carry on doing w hat they were already doing and
simply im plem ent a new spin. R ather, the revolution envisaged by Deely
— unlike the public relations o f the ‘postm odernists’ “falsely so-called”
— entails real work. It requires revisiting w hat “ . . . happened to phi­
losophy betw een Aquinas and Descartes”, an issue that m ost philosophers
gratefully ignore, content to simply live w ith a massive lacuna; it requires
6 Paul Cobley, E ditor • ’ R ealism f o r the 2 1 s t C e n tu ry: A D e e ly R ea d er

a re-visitation o f Scholasticism; and it requires the developm ent o f a full-

blooded sem iotic consciousness o r ‘doctrine o f signs’.

D e f in in g th e S e m io t ic A n im a l

W hile this sums up one narrative strand o f D eely s w ork, the rich ­
ness o f his w ritings needs greater scrutiny. T h e full extent o f this rich ­
ness cannot be grasped unless one consum es his oeuvre — books and
articles — in its entirety (or at least in greater proportion). How ever, the
cu rren t volum e is designed to reveal that richness by introducing readers
to som e o f D eely s key articles, focussing especially o n those narrative
strands w h ich allow the close thinking w h ich enables D eely to arrive at
his over-arching perspective.
T h e crucial feature o f D eely s philosophizing is his insistence on
realism, as opposed to nom inalism , as the means to apprehend the world.
T h e close kin o f bo th these m odes o f th o u g h t and their com m onalities
o f th eo ry and m ethod, especially as noted by Peirce, lead D eely to offer
clarification by rooting o u t nom inalism in those areas w here it seems
m ost plausible. Effectively, D eely could be said to track the developm ent
o f a ‘pragm aticist’ realism, following Peirce — a form o f th in k in g that is
incom patible w ith medieval nom inalism . So, D eely’s w ork w ould seem
to pertain to questions o f know ledge — how hum ans com e to know
(realism) and how they rem em ber (or repeatedly forget) w h at they m ight
k n o w (the history o f p re-m o d ern , m o d ern and postm odern th ought; cf.
W illiam s 1985, 1988). Such an agenda is n o t far rem oved from that o f
any phenom enologically orientated thinker o f the last h u n d red years.
E xcept D eely is very suspicious o f the term epistem ology and its deploy­
m en t in philosophy and in thinking in general (see D eely 2009d).
It is hoped that this collection o f D eely’s w ritings dem onstrates the
way in w hich his w ork, from the beginning, was concerned n o t so m uch
w ith w hat he m ight view, relatively, as the trifles o f epistem ology — fig­
ures o f speech, m etaphor, language games and the hype, alm ost co n tem p o ­
raneous w ith D eely s early essays, surrounding the ‘linguistic tu rn ’ (R orty
1967) — b ut w ith ontology, being. Early, substantial, essays in this volume,
then — ‘T h e em ergence o f m an’, ‘Evolution and ethics’ and ‘Anim al in ­
telligence and co n cep t-fo rm atio n ’— are philosophical but take D arw in­
ian theory, biology and science as their focus. O n e o f their tasks is to
 Introduction From R ea lism to Sem iotics Paul Cobley 7

explore the philosophical issues at stake in defining w hat makes a hum an

distinct from o th er animals. Thus, D eely cites one o f the m ost intelligent
com m entators on the m atter o f the last fifty years, the linguist Charles
H ockett.Y et, the m ost dom inant presence, perhaps, although n o t always
discussed directly, is M o rtim er Adler. D espite D eely s disagreem ents w ith
A dler regarding specific points, it seems that his early w ork is in conversa­
tion w ith A dlers T h e D ifference o f M a n a n d th e D ifference it M a k e s (1967),
a defence o f hum ans as different in kind (rather than in degree) from
animals. T h e gap betw een A dler’s position and that o f D eely is evident
w h en one consults the discussion o f the w ork o f Sebeok from later in
D eely s career (for example, 2003b and 2005e) as well as D eely ’s w ritings
o n ‘the sem iotic anim al’ (2005g; Deely, Petrilli and Ponzio 2005). Yet it
is telling that, w ith Sebeok, and unlike those epistem ologically inclined
postm odernists w h o prefer to pronounce such questions old-fashioned
and undecidable, D eely is engaged in the very task o f asking w h at co n ­
stitutes the hum an.

T h e H u m a n U m w e lt

Let it be clear, though, that D eely s — and Sebeok’s and b io sem io t­

ics’ — focus on the question o f the hum an em bedded in nature does n o t
am o u n t to a naive scientistic attem pt to posit a o n e -to -o n e relation o f
h u m an perception and the w orld, as Parisian postm odernists w ould be
likely to im m ediately charge from their self-righteously nom inalist posi­
tion. Generally, for the postm odernists falsely so called, “ the m in d know s
only w h at the m ind m akes” (Deely 2003b: 30), w h ich is simply carrying
to the extrem e a m o d e rn proposition to an u ltra m o d ern position. As will
be seen from the essays in this collection, D eely explores the vicissitudes
o f life in the h u m an u m w e lt, a m ixing o f ens reale and ens rationis in h u ­
m an relations to objects. A lthough the im plications o f this will unfold on
reading the follow ing essays, a little unpacking is required here.
Firstly, the concept o f u m w e lt, from Jakob von U exkiill (see Kull 2001),
underpins nearly all the w ritings in this collection, although it makes its
first explicit appearance in the relatively early essay on animal intelli­
gence (R eading 4), before becom ing the central issue o f investigation
in R ead in g 7. T h e crux o f the concept for D eely is that animals’ species-
specific sensoria are the basis o f their u m w e lt (2001h: 126):
8 Paul Cobley, Editor R ea lism f o r the 2 1 s t C e n tu ry : A D e c ly R e a d er

W hat Uexkiill uniquely realized was that the physical environment,

in whatever sense it may be said to be the ‘same’ for all organisms
(we are speaking, o f course, o f the environm ent on earth, though
much o f w hat we say could be applied, m u ta tis m u tandis, to bio­
spheres on other planets should such eventually be found), is not
the world in w hich any given species as such actually lives out its
life. N o. Each biological life-form, by reason o f its distinctive bodily
constitution (its ‘biological heritage’, as we may say), is suited only
to certain parts and aspects o f the vast physical universe. And w hen
this ‘suitedness to ’ takes the bodily form o f cognitive organs, such
as are our own senses, or the often quite different sensory m o­
dalities discovered in other lifeforms, then those aspects and only
those aspects o f the physical environm ent which are proportioned
to those modalities becom e ‘objectified’, that is to say, made present
no t merely physically but cognitively as well.

P u t simply, an anim al’s u m w e lt is its ‘objective’ world: it is the w orld that it

lives in, h o w it apprehends everything around itself (and even w ith in it­
self); yet, at the same tim e, that apprehension takes place on the very basis
o f the sensory apparatus that it possesses. A dog’s hearing, for exam ple, a
key part o f its sensory apparatus, is m uch m ore h o n ed to high frequen­
cies than a h u m an ’s; for this reason, a dog inhabits a different u m w e lt to
a hum an.

S ig n , O b je c t, T h in g

Im p o rtan t to understanding these m atters is the term inology D eely

employs. A n anim al’s u m w e lt is its ‘objective’ w orld and it is w here an
anim al relates to ‘objects’. Custom arily, ‘objective’ implies p h en o m en a
com pletely separate and closed o ff from the vagaries o f subjects’ appre­
hensions. C om m only, in speech, we refer to an ‘objective v iew ’ o r that
w hich is untram m elled by o pinion and partisan perspectives. Deely, on
the o th er hand, perform s a logical re-figuration o f objectivity. Q u ite
rightly, he dem onstrates that the w orld that seems to be w holly in depen­
d ent o f hum ans — ‘objective’— can never be such. R ather, it is a specific
kind o f m ixture o f that w hich is in d ependent of, and d ependent on,
hum ans.T he m atter arises directly in R eadings 2 ,5 ,7 and, especially, 6 and
the ‘A fterw ord’, below. D eely offers a th o rough re-o rien tatio n o f w h at is
 Introduction '« From R ea lism to Sem iotics Paul Cobley 9

com m o n ly understood as the dependency o f the w orld on its subjects, a

re-o rien tatio n derived, principally, from the distinction betw een ‘signs’,
‘objects’ and ‘things’. As D eely m aintains elsewhere (1994: 11),

There are signs and there are other things besides: things w hich are
unknow n to us at the m om ent and perhaps for all our individual
life; things which existed before us and other things w hich will ex­
ist after us; things which exist only as a result o f our social interac­
tions, like governments and flags; and things which exist w ithin our
round o f interactions — like daytime and night — but w ithout be­
ing produced exactly by those interactions, or at least not inasmuch
as they are ‘ours’, i.e. springing from us in some prim ary sense.

O bjects, on the o th er hand, are “w hat the things becom e once ex p e­

rie n c ed ” (1994: 11), bearing in m ind also that experience takes place
th ro u g h a physical, sensory modality. In this sense, even such entities
as u n ico rn s o r the m inotaur can be considered objects e m b o d ie d in the
physical m arks o f a text. B ut D eely argues that a “ thing o f ex p erien ce”
— an object — requires m ore than ju st em bodim ent: the C olosseum and
the Arc de T rio m p h e preceded us and are expected to exist after us; b u t
the p o in t is that their existence as such is the product o f a n th ro p o se m io -
sis. T h ere are plenty o f things — such as some metals in the earth and
som e things in the universe, as D eely suggests (1994: 16) — that an th ro -
posem iosis has n o t yet touched. O bjects are thus som etim es identical
w ith things and can even “present themselves ‘as if ’ they were simply
things” (1994: 18). Likewise, signs seem to be ju st objects o f experience
— the light from a candle, the scent o f a rose, the shining m etal o f a gun;
b u t a sign also signifies b e y o n d itself. In order for it to do so, a sign m ust be:
n o t ju st a physical thing; n o t ju st an experienced object; b u t experienced
as “ doubly related” (Deely 1994:22), standing for som ething else in some
respect o r capacity (or, for short: in a context).

M in d -D e p e n d e n t B e in g a n d M in d -I n d e p e n d e n t B e in g

T h e ‘objective’ w orld, then, is a w orld o f experienced things som e­

times presenting itself as a w orld o f ‘ju st things’.This corresponds to — but
does n o t resolve — a specific distinction betw een objects o f knowledge
that was already current in medieval scholasticism. T h at is, the division
10 Paul Cobley, Editor W R e alism f o r the 2 1 s t C e n tu ry: A D c e ly R ea d er

o f ens (being), from its p r im u m c o g n itu m (first object) into ens reale (m ind-
independent being) and ens rationis (m ind-dependent being).T he division
and its consequences are discussed explicitly in R eadings 5, 9 and the
‘A fterw ord’, below (see, also, especially, D eely 2005g). In these readings,
D eely also resolves the division in respect o f animals and their u m w e lte n
by way o f the w ritings o f the 17th century scholar o f the late Latin tradi­
tion, Jo h n Poinsot. For Deely, Poinsot’s writings, especially his ‘ Tractatus
de S ig n is ’ (1632) w hich D eely rescued from consignm ent by historio­
graphical partiality to m ere footnote status, offer in a num ber o f ways the
possibility o f developing a proper semiotic consciousness even before the
w ork o f Peirce. Ostensibly, Poinsot (also know n as Jo h n o f St Thom as) was
engaged in extended exegeses o f A quinas’ realism.Yet, D eely dem onstrates
that Poinsot’s w ork has implications beyond the confines o f Thom ism .
T h e ch ief co n trib u tio n o f Poinsot is his specific realist foregrounding o f
the sign as the object o f study to illum inate m in d -d ep en d en t and m in d -
in d ep en d en t being. As D eely w rites (in R eading 5, below),

the analysis o f sign — semiotic — provides a point o f view that is

superior to, that literally transcends, the traditional division o f being
into w hat is independent o f the m ind (ens reale) and what is depen­
dent upon it (ens rationis ), because in the sign, as in experience, both
orders o f being are found.

H um ans live in the realm o f signs. So, too, do o th er animals — b u t h u ­

mans are “ the only animals capable o f recognizing that there are signs
(distinct from their practical recognition and use) and capable o f devel­
oping a sem iotic consciousness” (Deely 2005g: 7 5 ).T h e overw helm ing
im pedim ent to a sem iotic consciousness in m o d ern th o u g h t has been the
prom inence in such th o u g h t o f the Kantian idealist n o tio n o f the “ ding
an sich” , the entity that is unknow able. C o m in g im m ediately before D es­
cartes and the m oderns (and well before the u ltra m o d ern s o r p o stm o d ern ­
ists falsely so called), Poinsot’s T hom ism offered the m eans to the realism
that w ould fully inform a sem iotic consciousness (Deely 2005g: 76):

Semiotics recovers the ens reale insisted upon as knowable by scho­

lastic realism; yet, at the same time, semiotics demonstrates the
objectivity o f ens rationis in the social construction o f species-specif­
ic realities among biological organisms. W ith this twofold accom-
 Introduction From R ealism to Sem iotics Paul Cobley 11

plishment, semiotics manifests the distinctiveness o f cultural reality

in the hum an species as the locus where the differences betw een ens
reale and eus rationis become knowable and distinguishable as such
consequent upon the hum an grasp o f ens p rim u m cognitum .

Essential to the developm ent o f such a sem iotic consciousness is an u n ­

derstanding o f the difference betw een things, objects and signs and the
way that they im pinge on each other.
To dem onstrate the s ig n /o b jec t/th in g relation and the shift in de­
pendency, D eely employs the image o f an iceberg’s tip: to be sure, th e tip
protrudes into experience as an object (a m in d -d ep en d en t entity, in the
o rd er o f en s rationis ); m oreover, it is, as such, a thing (m in d -in d ep en d en t,
in th e o rd er o f ens reale); but, above all, as is k now n from the popular
phrase, the tip is a sign that there is m uch m ore below (1994: 144). A n
im p o rtan t corollary o f this, though, is that w hatever is b eneath the tip
o f the iceberg cannot be approached as a thing. It is possible that ex p eri­
ence could m ake it an object but, even then, through the sensations it
provokes, the feelings about them and its consequence, it is only available
as a sign. It is sim ultaneously o f the order o f ens reale and ens rationis and it
w o u ld be foolish to bracket off one or the o th er in an attem pt to render
it as eith er solely object or thing. H ence Peirces statem ent that “ to try to
peel o ff signs & get dow n to the real thing is like trying to peel an o n io n
and get dow n to the onion itself” (see B rent 1993: 300 n. 84).

R e la tio n

O n ce things, objects and signs are distinguished, the task o f a d o c­

trin e o f signs is to define exactly w hat a sign is. This is no small m atter,
in spite o f the num erous soundbites on the topics proffered by sem iot­
ics textbooks p u rp o rtin g to quote Peirce or Saussure. Yet, w h at D eely ’s
w ork does is to trace an im portant factor in the lineage o f sign study
from ancient times through the m iddle ages and, finally, in the logic o f
Peirce.This is the issue o f relation, discussed at som e length in R eadings 2,
3 and 6 and, especially, in R ead in g 5 and the ‘A fterw ord’, below.
For Deely, the controversy over relations began w ith the transla­
tion o f A ristotle by B oethius (c.480—524 a d ) and was b ro u g h t to a head
w ith Poinsot’s 1632 treatise on signs. A ccording to the tradition o f Latin
th o u g h t (from R ead in g 6 below),
12 Paul Cobley, Editor R ea lism for the 2 1 s t C e n tu ry: A D e e ly R eade r

relation involves three basic elements: what they called the founda­
tion, or g ro u n d , in our terms — some characteristic o f an individual;
the relation itself, which is over and above the individual — supra-
and inter-subjective, we would say; and that to which the thing is re­
lated through its foundation, which they called the term or term inus
o f the relation.

For many, including some w h o believe that they are fellow travellers o f se­
m iotics — explaining, for example, how individual o r mass hum an com ­
m unication works — w hat a sign is involved in is ‘representation’. For
them , the w hole o f the sign is the act o f representation: som e entity stand­
ing in for som e o th er entity from w hich it is different. This difference is
im portant, b u t it is n o t the w hole o f the sign. For Poinsot and, later, for
Peirce, the sign needs to be understood as the entire relation (ibid.):

In terms o f signs, what Poinsot is saying is that the sign — significa­

tion — consists in the relation, the second o f the three elements.
Representation at best is the fo u n d a tio n for the relations o f significa­
tion. So apparently for the first time, Poinsot establishes a systematic
distinction between signification and representation, where the role o f
representation is isolated and identified within signification. All signs,
thus, involve representation, but not all representations are signs.

W h at is frequently considered the sign — the ‘relation’ betw een some

gro u n d and som e term inus — was discovered to be false. T h e real rela­
tion that constitutes the sign consists o f ground, term inus and ‘relation’ as
a triad. Furtherm ore, Poinsot delineates the functions o f signs in relation
to objects. As such, the relation o f representation m ust differ from that
o f signification simply because an object can represent an o th er and also
represent itself, whereas it w ould be a contradiction for a sign to be a
sign o f itself. A sign is only a sign o f som ething if that som ething is other
than the sign (see R ead in g 5, below, and D eely 2001 i). Lastly, Poinsot
em phasized that the relation in a sign is n o t so m uch suprasubjective as
contextual: in one set o f circum stances the relation in a sign could be
o f the order o f ens reale, in an o th er set it could be o f ens rationis (Deely
2 0 0 li: 729).Thus, here (Deely 2001: 371) is

the whole doctrine o f Poinsot at the end o f the late Latin devel­
opm ent that the being proper to sign consists neither in m ind-
 Introduction W From R ea lism to Sem iotics Paul Cobley 13

independent nor in m ind-dependent relation determinately but in

ontological relations as able to be either or both depending on
surrounding circumstances, the context o f the actual exercise hie et
n u n c in any give case.

T h e establishm ent o f this doctrine, consolidated w ith Peirce, is o f im ­

m ense significance for the history o f sign study and also for the true
sem iotic consciousness that D eely theorizes after the m odern.
In the Afterw ord, below, p. 344 to this volum e, D eely shows how A r­
istotle had im plied that relations are in the substances or subjects w here
they are enacted, largely because relations are to be found in ens reale.Yet,
relations m ight exist betw een subjects on a m in d -d ep en d en t basis, ac­
cording to the m oderns. D eely writes, “W hat distinguishes relation as an
accident o f substance is n o t that it is in the substance bu t that by virtue o f
relation o ne substance is toward another, w h eth er in th o u g h t o r in reality
o r b o th ” (Afterword, below, p p .). H e adds,

A relation between two gargoyles is still a relation, even though

there be [sic] no gargoyle substances. But in order for gargoyles to
be substances, there must be gargoyles possible to exist indepen­
dently o f finite mind.

As can be seen, the issue o f relation is also the issue o f sign, as D eely
makes clear w ith reference to Poinsot. T h e ontology o f the sign can be
m in d -d ep en d en t o r m ind-independent, ju st as the status o f relation can
be as legitim ate on its ow n term s w h eth er it is found in ens rationis o r in
ens reale. T h e difference o f hum ans consists in this very contextualization
that D eely ’s philosophy makes so evident: the ability to identify signs
as sign relations and the ability to enact relations on a m in d -d ep en d en t
basis. In the tw enty-first century, realism is the way in w h ich these rela­
tions are recognized and semiotics is the disciplinary field in w hich its
investigations take place (see Sebeok 1986).

T h e D o c t r in e o f S ig n s

This reader in John D eely s w ork is designed to give those w ho

are interested in Scholastic Realism (especially Thom ism ) an authentic
understanding o f w hat it means in contem porary philosophy, and a sense
o f the depth that realism retains in the wake o f the scientific revolutions
14 Paul Cobley, E ditor W R ealism f o r the 2 1 s t C e n tu ry: A D e e ly R e a d er

that have transpired since the 17th century (when m odernity may be said
to have begun).T he reader has been assembled to dem onstrate, as well, the
fu tu re relevance that distinctively Scholastic realism has now that m oder­
nity itself is com ing (by force o f events in our general intellectual culture)
to belong to an epoch requiring a rear-view m irror to be seen in a proper
perspective. Secondly, o f course, it is aim ed to introduce, in general, the
w ork o f Jo h n Deely, particularly in its vindication o f Peirce’s claim that
scholastic realism is essential to, even if not sufficient for pragmaticism and
semiotics, and therefore essential to the establishment o f a postm odern
epoch o f intellectual culture in contrast to the epoch o f m odernity.
As should be clear from the foregoing, these readings, advance the
understanding o f the realism problem in the context o f 20th century
know ledge o f hum anity and nature. To further em phasize ho w these
readings attem pt to push that understanding to the h o rizo n o f a (truly)
p o stm o d ern view o f the im plications o f realist philosophy, each reading
is placed in an indicative section.These are com plem ented by a com plete
bibliography o f D eely’s w ritings at the end o f the volum e, w hile the
sections are further com plem ented here by some suggestions for fu rth er
reading w h ich m ight assist in following through the im plications o f the
section topics.
Section I is entitled ‘C hange and Process in the Physical U niverse’
and features D eely s early essay on the philosophical im p o rt o f natural se­
le c tio n ,‘T h e em ergence o f m an’.This is n o t the only essay o f D eely ’s on
D arw inian them es from this p eriod and m ight profitably be read along­
side D eely (1965/66, 1966, 1969; D eely and N ogar 1973; A dler 1974).
Section II is on Ethics, a recurrent them e in D eely s later w ork (see
D eely 2003a, 2005g; Deely, Petrilli and Ponzio 2005), b u t here consid­
ered in relation to the question o f evolution in a 1969 co n trib u tio n to
the A m e r ic a n C a th o lic P hilosophical A sso c ia tio n Proceedings, and giving clues
to the later developm ent o f ethics in respect o f the sem iotic animal. Evo­
lution (in D eely’s view) is a crucial concept w h en considering ethics: this
is n o t because it suggests that ethics has developed simply as an attribute
o f hum ans as the acm e o f evolutionary progress.The m atter is m ore com ­
plicated than that, in that the sign is interposed in this developm ent. T he
o th er reading in this sectio n ,‘Evolution, semiosis and ethics’, makes clear
that the h u m an ’s im m ersion in signs and its relation to them governs both
 Introduction «’ From R e alism to Sem iotics Paul Cobley 15

ethics and the place o f hum ans in the universe. T h e key feature o f h u ­
m ans as ‘the sem iotic anim al’ is that, unlike other animals w ho use signs,
the h u m an know s that s/h e is using them and has variously developed
ideas ab o u t w h at constitutes a sign. O n e part o f the faculty — bu t cru ­
cial — is the hum an ability to project or anticipate ‘possible w orlds’. An
ethical bearing obviously entails such anticipation o f a w orld in w hich
given ethical imperatives are standard, and w here new ethical imperatives
— fu rth er possible worlds — can always be anticipated or introduced.
As D eely dem onstrates in this reading, such a m ovem ent is, in fact, an
instance o f the very basis o f semiosis. Semiosis is n o t a unitary p h e n o m ­
e n o n o f the present: in semiosis, the future, by influencing the present,
rearranges the relevance o f the past. Semiosis does n o t rem ain ju st chance
and b ru te force (Secondness) bu t is always to be dosed w ith Thirdness. It
is this dynam ic (w hich D eely 2009 has term ed a vis a prospecto ) that is at
w o rk in the evolution o f the cosmos — a pull toward the self-awareness
th at constitutes the sem iotic animal. And, if a clinching reason is needed
to justify the study o f signs used by all animals, this is surely it.
A great cham pion o f ‘zoosem iotics’, the post-1963 Sebeokian devel­
o p m en t o f anim al com m unication studies and the topic o f Section IV,
D eely has regularly supported the w ork o f zoosem ioticians (as well as
biosem ioticians) and explicated their endeavours in relation to philoso­
phy, realism and semiotics in general. Despite idiosyncratically insisting
o n a dieresis on the second ‘o ’ — zoosem iotics — D eely s discussions o f
zoosem iotics have evinced a cutting edge in defining anthroposem iosis
(see, especially, D eely 1990: 50—82, 1994: 66—76 and 2003b). T h e essay
o n ‘A nim al intelligence and co n cep t-fo rm atio n ’ inaugurates this strand
o f D eely ’s w ork.
As spiritual and intellectual successor to his illustrious forebear,
Charles Peirce, D eely could n o t be separated from the pursuit o f logic
and its relation to semiotics, the topic o f the 1981 M o u to n d ’O r w in n in g
essay in Section IV. From the 1970s D eely co n tin u ed to directly address
the topic o f logic in semiotics (see D eely 1975b, 1985a, 1990a, 1993)
as well as addressing specific issues in the relation o f the tw o (1992b,
2002b); however, the post-Peircean gro u n d w o rk had been co m p reh en ­
sively carried o u t in the essay here and the extension o f its arg u m en t in
In tro d u cin g S e m io tic (1982).
16 Paul Cobley, Editor «’ R ealism for the 2 1 s t C e n tu ry: A D c c ly R ea d er

O bjectivity, as has been seen, is a central concept for Deely, both

logically and historiographically. A lthough nobody has really taken on
H eid eg g er’s 1947 call for a total revision o f understandings o f the sub-
je c t/o b je c t couplet, there are still few w h o w ould dare to attem pt the
re-fig u rin g o f objectivity and subjectivity, the F o u r A g e s o f U n d e rsta n d ­
in g (2001) can be seen as an excursus on the m atter, although the m ost
sustained discussions can be found in the essay on m yth that features in
Section V. For supplem ents to the analysis offered here, see D eely (1975,
1991b, 1994, 2 0 0 lh , 2007; see also H aldane 1996). As has been indicated,
the m ost im p o rtan t concept to have subtended the m atter o f objectivity
in D eely s th in k in g since the m id-1970s has been that o f U m w e lt. R e a d ­
ing 7 in Section V details som e o f D eely s early acquaintance w ith the
th eo ry o f U m w e lt (partly through Sebeok) and, in the part o f the read­
ing labeled 2b, especially, dem onstrates the intersection o f a n u m b er o f
concerns, th ro u g h the question o f objectivity, o f this reader as a w hole:
realism, en s reale and ens rationis, the difference o f m o d ern th inking and
th o u g h t a fter the m o d ern , differences betw een species’ rooted in their
com m unicational and cognitive sensoria and, ultimately, a fu rther co n ­
cern w ith the origins o f semiosis (on physiosemiosis and pansemiosis see,
especially, D eely 2006f).
O n e way in w hich the question o f physical and m ental worlds has
b een approached is through the definition o f w hat constitutes ‘m ental
events’. This is a typically m o d ern preoccupation and a key issue for
m o d ern psychology, particularly discursive psychology (see, for exam ple,
Edw ards and P otter 2005). Here, in ‘Sem iotic and the controversy over
m ental events’, D eely shows that the m atter had already been m ulled
over at length before Locke, Descartes and K ant in the p erio d o f transi­
tio n from Latin to national languages in E urope. H e presents the problem
initially as that o f the ‘co g ito ’ bu t cunningly shows later that the sem iotic
alternative is older than m o d ern ity (see also R asm ussen 1980). R elated
w ork on intentionality, an o th er key concept pertaining to D eely ’s dis­
cussion o f m ental events as elucidated by the late Latin tradition, bu t
ignored by m o d ern philosophy after B rentano, can be found in D eely
(1972, 2007). As w ith a n u m b er o f his w ritings from this period, but
culm inating recently in In te n tio n a lity a n d S em io tic s (2007), D eely shows
that, w hile it is com m only presented as based on the “ obvious” o r “ com -
 Introduction «’ From R e alism to Sem iotics * Paul Cobley 17

m o n sense” n o tio n o f the m ental vs. the physical, in fact in Brentano,

the source o f H usserl’s n otion o f intentionality, the so-called “physical”
is intram ental, n o t at all extram ental (a term derived from M aritain; cf.
D eely 2009d).
Section VII is co ncerned w ith the history o f philosophy, a topic
that is integral to the developm ent o f a truly ‘p o stm o d ern ’ intellectual
culture and w h ich D eely has seen fudged at all turns, particularly by
‘professional’ philosophers. T h e great repression by philosophy’s histori­
ographers has involved any w ork after O ckham and anything before the
m o d ern , especially Scholastic Realism . In the first essay in this section,
D eely outlines the C artesian prejudices that repressed the Latin tradition
in favour o f the predom inantly idealist and nom inalist intellectual culture
that characterized m odernity. T h e second reading offers a ‘Prospect o f
p o stm o d ern ity ’, dem onstrating how the re-discovery o f repressed Latin
th o u g h t, and Scholastic R ealism in particular, facilitates a view o f neces­
sary future developm ents w hich will allow an accurate understanding o f
the fun ctio n in g o f the sign in the hum an u m w e lt (see also D eely 1974,
1977a, 1986, 1992a, 1994g, 1995a, B euchot and D eely 1995, Santaella
1994).T h e third essay, from 1992, on ‘Philosophy and ex p erien ce’, sums
up the history o f ideas even m ore m inutely in respect o f key concepts in
this volum e — sig n /o b ject/th in g , experience, sensation and relation —
w hilst still providing a useful grand sweep o f that history. In sum , it posits
G reek and Latin philosophy (based on being in a quite precise sense:
the existence exercised by things independently o f h um an apprehension
and attitude); m o d ern philosophy (based on the instrum ents o f h um an
know ing, but in a way that unnecessarily com prom ises being); philoso­
phy after the m o d ern (synthesizing the ancients and the m oderns) w hich
follows n eith er the ancient way o f things n o r the m o d ern way o f ideas,
bu t the way o f signs.
T h e final essay in the volum e is an ‘A fterw ord’ new ly w ritten by
D eely for this volum e. H ere, he returns to, and advances, the p h en o m ­
enon o f objectivity, arguing forcefully that w hat is th o u g h t to be ‘objec­
tive’ is dem onstrably different from w h at objectivity entails w h en it is
revealed by realist analysis. Nevertheless, as he shows, hum an existence is
frequently governed by examples o f a ‘purely objective reality’ — a fic­
tion w hich nevertheless perfuses, is perfused by and guides experience.
18 Paul Cobley, E ditor ^ R e a lism f o r the 2 1 s t C e n tu r y : A D e e ly R ea d er

Purely objective reality is n o t only necessary in m any hum an circum ­

stances but is frequently a locus o f considerable power, even in the face
o f “hardcore reality” (things, en s reale). This analysis takes D eely directly
to the heart o f the ‘social construction o f reality’ and exemplifies the
penetrating insight into social action that realism promises to offer in the
wake o f the m odern (see also D eely 2009c).
 T h e T w el ve
D eel y R e a d in g s

19
 T he author in 2nd year philosophy at the Pontifical Faculty o f Philosophy
at the Aquinas Institute in R iver Forest, Illinois, at the tim e o f w riting R eading 1

20
R e a d in g 1

T he Emer g en c e o f M a n :
A n In q u ir y in t o t h e O p e r a t io n o f N a t u r a l

S e l e c t i o n i n t h e M a k i n g o f M a n *1

Source: T h e N e w Scholasticism XL.2 (April, 1966), 141-176

J o h n D e e ly

Man came silently into the w orld.... it becomes [evident], by an un­

ceasing convergence of all signs and proofs, that the human ‘species’,
however unique the position among entities that reflection gave it,
did not, at the moment of its advent, make any sweeping change in
nature. ...The more deeply science plumbs the past of our humanity,
the more clearly does it see that humanity, as a species, conforms to
the rhythm and the rules that marked each new offshoot on the tree
of life before the advent o f mankind.

Teilhard de Chardin 1 9 6 0 : 183—1 8 5

By way o f preface, I wish only to recall to m ind that every line o f

th o u g h t has its starting point. T he th o u g h t in this essay begins w ith tw o
premisses.

1 T he essay has the following Section outline:

I. Them atic R e m a rk s .............................................................................................. 23
II. Limning the Fact o f H um an E m e rg e n ce...........................................................25
III. T he Limits o f Historical Inquiry into the Fact o f H um an Em ergence . . . . 33
IV. T he Causative Factors in the Emergence o f M a n .............................................34
V. H um an Emergence in Genetic P erspective...................................................... 41
VI. M an’s Capacity for Culture “Radicaliter Sum pta” .......................................... 44
VII. T he Spirit o f Man: Transcendent E p ig en esis....................................................47

21
22 Paul Cobley, Editor W R ea lism f o r the 2 i s t C e n tu ry: A D e c ly R eade r

T h e first premiss is agreem ent w ith T heodosius D obzhansky’s con­

ten tio n that “ no one w h o takes the trouble to becom e familiar w ith the
p ertin en t evidence has at present a valid reason to disbelieve that the
living w orld, including m an, is a product o f evolutionary developm ent,”
that, in short, “m an is a biological species w hich has evolved from ances­
tors w h o w ere n o t m e n ” .2
T h e second premiss is acceptance o f the claim o f Sir Julian H uxley
that “ the discovery o f the principle o f natural selection m ade evolution
com prehensible; together w ith the discoveries o f m o d ern genetics, it has
rendered all o th er explanations o f evolution untenable” .3
In a w ord, because the so-called synthetic theory o f evolution so ad­
equately em braces all the know n facts in the history o f life and is ju d g ed
virtually irrefutable by a consensus o f the experts, in w ritin g this paper
I take the p o in t o f view that any attem pts at form ulating philosophical
affirm ations about hum an origins — w hich either leave this th eo ry o u t
o f account, o r oppose its legitim ate claims, m ust rem ain highly tentative
and indeed suspect.4
It is necessary that philosophy exam ine w hat this th eo ry says about
the operation o f evolution, and direct its inquiry into hu m an origins
in a m an n er that harm onizes w ith the patterns o f d evelopm ent w hich
the facts them selves disclose. Since, however, in research “real progress
com es n o t so m uch from collecting results and storing th em away in
m anuals as from in q u irin g into the ways in w hich each particular area is

2 Dobzhansky 1 956:6,9.This means in negative terms that from the vantage afforded
by the n eo- and paleo-sciences, there is simply no coherent basis for regarding m an as
unrelated genetically o m n i e x p a rte to the biological community. W atson’s and C rick ’s
breakthrough w ith the D N A m odel in 1953, together w ith the critical hom inid fossil
finds o f C. Leakey in 1959 and 1964 heavily underscore this remark o f Dobzhansky’s.
D uring this same decade, we may note that, scriptural studies have taken equally signifi­
cant strides. In fact, the last ten years have seen unparallelled advances in the science o f
man at almost every level. The extent to which this broad range o f developments alters
the theological terrain mapped by H u m a n i G eneris in 1950 is a question that has yet to be
investigated integrally. However, despite the seriousness o f this question, it stands below
the horizon o f the problematic which engages these pages.
3 H uxley 1953:35.
4 T he broad basis for this point o f view is set forth in Deely 1965: 27 -5 0 and 1960:
33-66.
 R eading 1 '« T h e Em ergence o f M a n ^ John Deely 23

basically constituted” ,5 th ro u g h o u t o u r study o f hum an em ergence “we

m ust equally resist the tem ptation to regard m an either as som ething
com pletely unlike any anim al o r as som ething devoid o f all novelty” .6
Such are the po in t o f view and m ethod w hich define w hat follows.

I. T h e m a tic R e m a r k s

We know that the organisms on earth today have issued from one
o r a few simplest form s, and that the entire developm ent has required
som ething m ore than two billion years. All around us, we see a w orld
w h ich has built itself up, so to speak, from scratch; and the biological
co m m unity traces its descent from very different beings w hich lived in
the past. In this respect, the history o f the w orld and the history o f life
correspond, p o in t by point.
This knowledge, however, is an acquisition o f quite recent times. Be­
fore the discovery and verification o f biological evolution, for example, the
various kinds o f living things had always seemed to have a fundam ental
perm anence w hich rem ained unaffected by the passage o f time. Structural­
ly, the universe seemed to be som ething “given” once and for all. Gilson —
to give one illustration — describes “the eternal and uncreated cosmos o f
Aristotle, peopled w ith species immutably fixed under their present appear­
ances” , as “ com pletely alien to history both in its origin and its duration” .7
C onsidered in such a cross-sectional perspective, the interval separat­
ing m an from the o th er animals was obvious. H e could be defined w ith
Porphyrian precision as “Anim al rationale” , and the definition w o u ld be
readily appreciated in term s o f the ontological gap it denotes.
B ut the re-setting o f the w orld in general and m ankind in particular
w ith in a perspective o f tem poral developm ent and a dim ension o f em er­
gent p h en o m en a has altered this cross-sectional view point considerably.
A. Irving H allow ed, professor o f anthropology at the U niversity o f P en n ­
sylvania and in the Psychiatry Division o f the School o f M edicine, sum ­
m arizes the n ew p o in t o f view as it bears on m an succinctly:8

3 H eidegger 1962: 2 9 ,2 8 -3 0 ,3 5 0 , 371,413—14, and 490 note x.

6 Dobzhansky 1962: 203.
7 Gilson 1962:129.
8 Hallowell 1960: 129.
24 Paul Cobley, Editor W R e a lism f o r the 2 1 s t C e n tu r y : A D c e ly R e a d er

The advent o f Darwinism helped to define and shape the problems

o f m odern psychology as it did those o f anthropology. An evolu­
tion o f the ‘m ind’ within the natural world o f living organisms was
envisaged. N ow a bridge could be built to span the deep and mys­
terious chasm that separated man from other animals and which,
according to Descartian tradition, must remain forever unbridged.
Darwin him self explicitly set processes o f reasoning, long considered
an exclusively hum an possession, in an evolutionary perspective. ...
H e argued that mental differences in the animal series present gra­
dations that are quantitative rather than qualitative in nature.

It is a fact that m uch o f contem porary research centers on questions

co n cern in g the em ergence o f psychic structures in an effort to span the
deep and m ysterious abyss that has com e to separate m an psychologically
from the animal. As Sir Julian H uxley explains, the evolutionary scientist
“wants to understand som ething o f the way in w hich the dual-aspect
system o f m ind and behavior evolves; o f ho w m ental organization is spe­
cialized and im proved during evolution” .9
O n ce it was established that m an represents a term inal p ro d u ct in a
developm ent spanning millions o f years and in no wise h u m an in origins,
the questions concerning him m ust be raised in new term s and directed
in th e first place toward his origins. Above all, we can no longer think
prim arily in term s o f an ontological g a p b etw een the h u m an anim al and
the so-called b ru te animal. T h at there is such a gap today is undeniable.
B u t in an evolving world, the first question is, ho w did it get there?
S t.T h o m as,in analyzing the ontological difference b etw een m an and
anim al cross-sectionally, claim ed to show that there is in m an a strictly
spiritual principle w hich in som e way transcends the conditions o f m a­
terial existence. A nd w hile it is true that every developm ent is m ore ac­
curately u nderstood at its term than in its inception, yet co n tem p o rary
thinkers assuredly cannot confine themselves to the h o riz o n o f an o u t­
m o d ed problem atic. It is necessary to com e to grips w ith the very data
o f evolution, and see w h eth er or n o t they provide an intelligible g ro u n d
for d eterm in in g an ontogenic o r epigenic break at the threshold o f h um an
em ergence, the onset o f hom inization.

9 Huxley 1953:81.
 R eading 1 ^ T h e Emergence o f M a n ^ John Deely 25

II. L im n in g th e F a c t o f H u m a n E m e r g e n c e

O n c e evolutionary science entered its phase o f synthesis in the first

h a lf o f o u r ow n century, the attention o f students o f hum an developm ent
“becam e focused m ore upon the m ysterious evolutionary changes w hich
are believed to have taken place betw een the behavioral systems o f the
highest prim ates and those o f the earliest m en ” , 10 all o f w hich changes
are subsum ed u n d er the expression “m an ’s capacity for culture.” In this
co n n ectio n , a crucial p o in t on w hich all students o f evolutionary science
agree, regardless o f their philosophical stance, is the fact that w ith the
appearance o f m an in the biological com m unity “ the basic novelty was,
how ever, the developm ent o f unprecedented intellectual abilities, w hich
m ade possible the control o f environm ent by culture” .11 It is this m ore
restricted sense o f a root capacity that will prim arily guide o u r inquiry.
Let us begin by placing this “basic novelty” in its historical perspec­
tive. W e k n o w that the history o f m o d ern m an, H o m o sapiens, spans little
m ore than a quarter o f a m illion years. H e is preceded by an o th er group,
H o m o erectus, anatom ically quite different but, by the classical definition
“A nim al rationale,” unquestionably hum an.T his stage o f hu m an anatom ­
ical developm ent is itself preceded by the controversial A u stra lo p ith e c in e
fossils. These fossils include the first know n tool-m akers and place th em
at the astonishing depth in tim e o f m ore than one and th ree-q u arter
m illion years.12 I f we m aintain, as perhaps we m ust, that H o m o F aber is an
operational definition coextensive w ith the m etaphysical A n i m a l rationale,
then the age o f true m an approaches tw o m illion years.
T h at only one truly hom inid species existed at this tim e level is a view
seriously challenged on the basis o f Louis S. B. Leakey s very recent and
m ost im portant finds in w hat may prove to be the cradle o f civilization,

10 Critchley 1960: 294-295.

11 Dobzhansky 1956: 108.
12 “Dr. Leakey believes, and many other palaeontologists and archaeologists seem to
agree w ith him , that he has found stone and bone that was either simply utilized or
deliberately shaped at the bottom o f Bed I in Olduvai Gorge, w hich has been dated at
between 1.9 and 1.75 million years ago. H e has also found a circle o f stones, perhaps a hut
circle, at that level.” — Personal letter from Professor Sol Tax o f the University o f C hi­
cago D epartm ent o f Anthropology, dated 18 May 1965. Cf. Dobzhansky 1956: 174-176;
Fleischer et al. 1965: 72-74; Flanagan ed. 1965: 51—52.
26 Paul Cobley, Editor R e a lism f o r the 2 1 s t C e n tu ry: A D e c ly R ea d er

the O lduvai Gorge in Tanzania, East Africa. T h e April 2 -4 , 1965 inter­

national “ O rigins o f M an ” symposium, sponsored by the W enner-G renn
Foundation for A nthropological Research and called by Professor Sol Tax
o f the U niversity o f Chicago, focused the controversy over the interpreta­
tion to be placed on Leakey s finds, b u t failed to disclose a consensus o f
expert opinion.
We m ay say in any case that so far as m ankind today is concerned,
only one species o f A u stra lo p ith e c u s could have been o u r ancestor. Spe­
cies contem poraneous w ith that ancestor becam e extinct w ith o u t issue.
“ This is so because there is only one h o m in id species no w living, and it
cannot be derived from tw o o r m ore reproductively isolated species.” 13
A considered and consistently expressed opinion o f Dobzhansky, one o f
the c o u n try ’s leading geneticists and an outstanding au th o rity on evolu­
tion, is this:14

T he evidence now available is compatible with the assumption that,

at least above the australopithecine level, there always existed only
a single prehum an and, later, a hum an species (which evolved w ith
tim e from H o m o erectus to H o m o sapiens). M ankind was and is a
single inclusive Mendelian population, endowed w ith a single cor­
porate genotype, a single gene pool.

C o m m en tin g on this very statem ent in the light o f the O rigins o f

M an sym posium , Professor Sol Tax w rites:15

I think it would be difficult to improve upon Dr. Dobzhansky’s

cautious m anner o f stating this matter, for the main disputes do oc­
cur at the Australopithecine level and below. Many palaeontologists
now take serious consideration o f the possibility that the hom inid
bush contains some branches that died out some time ago, as urged
by Dr. Leakey and by analogy to the history o f other mammals.

13 Dobzhansky: “But we cannot lightly dismiss the possibility that the now -living hu­
m an species carries in its gene pool genetic elements derived from m ost or from all the
fossil races o f H o m o erectus and H o m o sapiens, though in very unequal proportions. O n the
other hand, we may be descended from only one ancient race, all others having petered
out.” (1962: 188). (Cf. also 1962: 183,192).
14 Dobzhansky 1962: 220-21. Cf. 188,220,221, 239,269; see also Dobzhansky 1951:
305-6.
15 Personal letter o f May 18, 1965.
 R eading 1 T lic Em ergence o f M a n W John Deely 27

However, Dr. R obinson contends that there was only one such
extinct branch, and Dr. Simpson seems not yet to be convinced that
this branching occurred at all.

Leaving the dialectic o f controversy to the specialists concerned and

keeping to the question w hich guides o u r ow n inquiry, we may in line
w ith cu rren t thin k in g in population genetics envisage at the onset o f
h um an em ergence a speciation process operating through a group o f re-
productively and proxim ally related individuals spread out over a lim ited
b u t sufficiently broad “surface o f evolution.” By assuming at this stage in
o u r problem atic such a w ide and com plex cross-section at the base o f
the h u m an stem , w e make allowance for m arginal and divergent form s
as well as for the truly ancestral form s, thus taking account o f the bush­
like (or at least “bushy”) structure evidenced in the various fossil stages
o f h u m an developm ent.16 (Against this backdrop, H o m o h abilis m ight be
perhaps best in terp reted as a transitional form m arking the general line
o f advance tow ard P ith eca n th ro p u s.)
W e may say that the structural evolution o f m an has progressed
th ro u g h three m ain stages or groups: the A u stra lo p ith e c in e group, the
H o m o erectus group, and o u r ow n group, H o m o sapiens. Together w ith the
developm ent o f up rig h t posture, the unmistakable, constant, and m ain
trend th ro u g h o u t has been the developm ent o f a larger and m ore n eu ro -
logically com plex brain.
“Drs. Leakey and R o b in so n agree that the absolute brain size o f A u s ­
tralopithecus has probably been overestim ated in the past. Dr. R o b in so n
has ju st com pleted a rather thorough restudy o f this question and cam e
up w ith a m ean capacity o f 430 cc. for A u stra lo p ith e c u s .” 17 (The brain size
o f H o m o h abilis may have been som ew hat larger than that o f the Aus-
tralopithecines o f South Africa.) R ich ard C arrin g to n , th o u g h assigning
apparently too large a brain to the A ustralopithecines as a group, makes
this valuable observation:18

16 Teilhard de Chardin 1962: 35-6. See infra, ad fn. 66.

17 Tax, Letter o f 18 May 18 1965.
18 C arrington 1964: 7 8 -7 9 .Tax assures me (letter o f 18 May 1965) that “m ost people
would still agree w ith C arrington’s statement about relative brain size, called enceph-
alization by Dr.J. N. Spuhler. I m ight add that, while everyone seemed to agree that the
concepts o f encephalization and excess neurones are more meaningful than absolute
Another random document with
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 BOOK XXII.

A.D. 1686-1688.

Conduct of the soldiers—A riot—Recantation of Sibbald—Alexander Peden—

Proceedings of the society-men—Synod of Edinburgh—Parliament—Disputes
among the persecuted—Indulgence—Thanksgiving for the Queen’s pregnancy
—Seizure and death of Mr Renwick—Dr Hardy’s trial and acquittal—Rescue of
David Houston—Murder of George Wood—Arrival of the Prince of Orange.

[A.D. 1686.] The entrance of the new year was signalized by an

exploit worthy of the heroes of the day. A party of their marauders
came to the parish of Stonehouse, in Lanarkshire, and carried off
eight men and two women who had infants at the breast, for alleged
hearing an ejected minister; while another no less heroic band,
under Skene of Hallyards, plundered the house of a widow, in the
neighbouring parish of Glassford, and destroyed what they could not
carry off, because they chose to allege her son had been at
Bothwell.
Intent upon forcing his favourite object, the king had ordered his
chapel of Holyrood-house to be repaired[164] for the use of the royal
servants who had embraced the royal religion; and the paraphernalia
necessary for conducting its Romish rites with becoming splendour,
being openly brought to Leith, this, with the ostentatious celebration
of mass in the popish meetings, roused such indignation in the
Edinburgh populace, that “a great rabble of prentices” rose, who
threatened to pull down the mass-house. They insulted the
Chancellor’s lady and her company coming from chapel, assailing
them with opprobrious language, and throwing dirt at them, but doing
no further damage. For this riot several were apprehended, and one
“baxter lad” sentenced to be whipped; but when the hangman was
about to perform his duty, the mob rose, rescued their associate out
of his hands, and gave himself a sound drubbing. The confusion,
however, continuing, the troops in the Castle and Canongate were
called out to assist the town-guard, when a woman and an
apprentice of one Robert Mein, were killed. Next day, a women and
two youths were scourged, guarded by soldiers; and one Moubray,
an embroiderer, was indicted for his life. At the place of execution, he
told Mr Malcolm, a minister who attended him, that he was offered a
pardon if he would accuse the Duke of Queensberry of having
excited the tumult; but he would not save his life by so foul a
calumny.
164. He also erected a seminary in the Abbey—the Royal College; and in order to
allure youth and induce Protestant parents to send their children, the
scholars were to be taught gratis; and no particular system of religion was to
be inculcated by the Jesuits!—crede.

This was not the only ominous circumstance which preceded the
meeting of parliament. Another took place at the same time, which
bore more immediately upon the grand question that was to come
under their consideration, and for which they had especially been
called together—the recantation of Sir Robert Sibbald, M.D. This
celebrated antiquarian, who lived in a course of philosophical virtue,
but in great doubts of revealed religion, had been prevailed upon by
the Earl of Perth to turn papist, in order to find that certainty which he
could not find upon his own principles. But he was ashamed of his
conduct almost as soon as he had made his compliance, went to
London, and for some months retired from all company. There, after
close application to study, he came to be so convinced of the errors
of popery, that he returned to Scotland some weeks before the
parliament met, and could not be easy in his own mind till he made a
public recantation. The Bishop of Edinburgh was so much a courtier,
that, apprehending many might go to hear it, and that it might be
offensive to the court, he sent him to do it in a church in the country;
but the recantation of so learned a man, after so much studious
inquiry, had a powerful effect.
Fining, that lucrative branch of persecution, though still a favourite,
began now to descend to the humbler classes of consistent
Presbyterians; for the chief gentlemen and heritors among them
were either dead, forfeited, or in exile; yet the gleanings were by no
means despicable, and far from being so regarded by some of the
under-hirelings of government. In the parish of Calder, John
Donaldson, portioner, was fined £200 for a prayer-meeting held at
his house on a Lord’s day; John Baxter, £40; Walter Donaldson, for
his wife being present, £36; with several others in smaller sums,
making in all £816. 16s. Scots. William Stirling, bailie-depute of the
regality of Glasgow, who imposed these fines, received a gift of them
for his zeal and exertions.[165]
165. While the rulers were plundering the best in the land, solely because they
were the best, they were no less anxious to protect those who were at least
not the most worthy; but they were their own minions. The universal
profligacy of manners which had been introduced at the Restoration, appears
to have been followed by its natural consequence, an almost universal
bankruptcy; for, when those who had wasted their substance in riotous living
could no longer supply their waste by the plunder of the persecuted
Presbyterians, they supported themselves for a while by the scarcely less
dishonourable shift of living upon their creditors; then failing, and throwing
themselves upon the crown. Fountainhall notices some such circumstances
as mere matters of course:—“Provost George Drummond,” says he, “turnes
bankrupt, as alsoe George Drummond, town-treasurer, [and] Drummond of
Carlourie; and the Chancellor gets protections to them all, and to Skene of
Hallyards in Louthian, and John Johnstoun of Poltoun;” and he adds, in the
same business-like style, “William Seaton, in the life-guards, gets a gift of
5000 merks he had discovered resting to Argyle.”

On the 4th of January, at the criminal court, Sir Duncan Campbell

of Auchinbreck and thirty-two more Argyleshire heritors, were
forfeited for joining with the Earl, and their estates were gifted chiefly
to those of the same family who had joined the royal party during the
invasion, although, as usual, the prelates and their relatives came in
for a share of the spoil, Campbell of Otter’s estate being gifted to
Commissary M’Lean, son to the Bishop of Argyle. Fountainhall adds,
“there were sundry apparent heirs amongst the forfeited, whose
second brothers were on the king’s side with Atholl. It were but
charity to encourage them, to make them donators to their brothers’
forfeitures.” On the same day, the Earl of Lothian, brother-in-law to
Argyle, was admitted a privy councillor, with a pension of £300 per
annum, given, it was said, in reward of the great courage he
displayed in the Dutch war, when fighting under the king, then Duke
of York; but rather, as the same author hints, to engage his interest
in the ensuing parliament. Protestant heritors who had not taken the
test were also ordered by his majesty to be pursued and fined; but
within a few days a letter came, postponing the time for taking the
test, and shortly after another dispensing with it altogether in their
favour during the king’s pleasure.
About this time, Mr Alexander Peden died (January 26th), full of
assurance of faith, and was privately interred in the churchyard of
Auchinleck. He was certainly an extraordinary man, whose memory
was long cherished in the south and west of Scotland with fond
affection, and where he had laboured long and faithfully and with
much success. A little before the Restoration, he was settled as
minister at New Luce, in Galloway, where he remained about three
years, till he was thrust out by the tyranny of the times. When about
to depart, he lectured upon Acts xx. from the 7th verse to the end,
and preached in the forenoon from these words—“Therefore, watch
and remember, that for the space of three years I ceased not to warn
every man,” &c., asserting that he had declared unto them the whole
counsel of God, and professing he was free from the blood of all
men. In the afternoon, he preached from the 32d verse; “And, now,
brethren, I commend you to the word of his grace,” &c.—a sermon
which occasioned a great weeping in the church. Many times he
requested them to be silent; but they sorrowed most of all when he
told them they should never see his face in that pulpit again. He
continued till night; and when he closed the pulpit door, he knocked
three times on it with his Bible, saying each time—“I arrest thee in
my master’s name, that none ever enter thee but such as come in by
the door, as I have done.” And it is somewhat remarkable that
neither curate nor indulged entered that pulpit, which remained shut
till it was opened by a Presbyterian preacher at the Revolution. Yet it
may be doubted whether he would have thought that any one
entering by that settlement, did so exactly in the manner that he did.
Some time before his death, through the misrepresentations which
were brought him, he had been much alienated from James
Renwick, and had spoken bitterly against him; but when on his
deathbed he sent for Mr Renwick, and asked if he was that Mr
Renwick there was so much noise about. “Father,” he replied, “my
name is James Renwick; but I have given the world no ground to
make any noise about me, for I have espoused no new doctrine.” He
then gave him such an account of his conversion and call to the
ministry—of his principles and the grounds of his contending against
tyranny and defection—that Mr Peden was satisfied, and expressed
his sorrow for having given credit to the reports that were spread
against him.[166]
166. Ker of Kersland, in his memoirs, speaking of Mr Peden, says—“Abundance
of this good man’s predictions are well known to be already come to pass.
When he was sick unto death in the year 1686, he told his friends that he
should die in a few days; ‘but having,’ said be, ‘foretold many things which
will require some time before they be verified, I will give you a sign which will
confirm your expectation, that they will as surely come to pass as those you
have already seen accomplished before your eyes. I shall be decently buried
by you; but if my body be suffered to rest in the grave where you shall lay it,
then I have been a deceiver, and the Lord hath not spoken by me: whereas,
if the enemy come a little afterwards to take it up and carry it away to bury it
in an ignominious place, then I hope you will believe that God Almighty hath
spoken by me, and consequently there shall not one word fall to the ground.’
Accordingly, about 40 days after his interment, a troop of dragoons came,
lifted his corpse, carried them two miles to Cumnock, and buried them under
the gallows.”—Crookshanks, vol. ii. p. 320.—James Nisbet, in his memoirs,
states the same fact, p. 134.

The unflinching confessors of the truth in this day, like those in

primitive times, were often in perils among false brethren, and often
persecuted with the scourge of the tongue, even by some who were
suffering in the same cause. They were accused “of overturning the
Presbyterian government in the church, and substituting a loose kind
of independency, by committing the trial and censure of offences to
persons who were not office-bearers—of usurping the magistrates’
place in the state, by constituting themselves a convention of
estates, and managing the civil affairs of their community by their
edicts—and of disowning, as silent and unfaithful, all ministers who
cannot preach upon their terms, there being not now, according to
them, one minister in Scotland, England, or Ireland, save one Mr
James Renwick, who, by his own confession in a letter to a friend in
Ireland, is not one either.”
To this Mr Renwick, at the desire of the societies, replied—“That
they never committed the trial of ‘scandals’ to the people in a judicial
way, but only allowed them, when there were no church judicatories,
to withdraw privately from associating with those who erred, that they
might not partake of other men’s sins, but by this be a means of
reclaiming offending brethren; which certainly was not overturning
Presbyterian government, any more than their declining the authority
of tyrants was thrusting themselves into the magistrates’ room.” He
added, personally—“As to that, that by my own confession I am not a
minister of the church, I altogether deny. I said I am a minister
wherever I have a call from the people and do embrace it.—O! that
all those who shall agree together in heaven, were agreeing upon
earth, I think if my blood could be a mean to procure that, I could
willingly offer it.”
A change having taken place in the cabinet about the end of the
year, the administration was now intrusted only to papists, chiefly to
Perth the chancellor, and his brother Melford, who had gained the
king’s entire confidence by embracing his religion, and the Earl of
Murray, another proselyte, who was appointed Commissioner to
open the parliament, from which was expected a repeal of those
penal statutes his ancestor, “the good regent,” had procured to be
enacted against papists.
Preparatory to the sitting of parliament, the synod of Edinburgh
met, when its usual tranquil submissiveness was interrupted by a
contrariety of sentiment respecting the test; some contending for it,
and others urging toleration to all who differed in judgment,
insinuating a charitable accommodation with the papists. Paterson,
bishop of Edinburgh, who had lately returned from London, gratified
by a pension of £200 sterling, told them that the king would defend
their religion, and only craved the exercise of his own for those of his
persuasion in private, which he said could not be denied him,
because he might take it by his prerogative of church supremacy,
asserted by parliament 1669. He further told them that the
Archbishop of St Andrews (Ross) and himself had got ample power
to suspend and deprive any that preached sedition, i. e. impugned
the king’s religion, even though they should be bishops. Mr George
Shiels, minister at Prestonhaugh, was sharply reproved “for that he
declaimed rudely against popery in the Abbey church on the
preceding Sunday, having said the Pope was as little infallible as the
Bishop of the Isles”—who was one of the silliest in the world—“and
that he would believe the moon to be made of green cheese, and
swallow it, as soon as he would believe in transubstantiation.”
Parliament met, April 29th. In his letter, the king was perfectly
explicit. After hanging out the lure of a free trade with England, and
an indemnity for his greatest enemies themselves, i. e. the
consistent Presbyterians, he came to the point:—“Whilst we show
these acts of mercy to the enemies of our person, crown, and royal
dignity, We cannot be unmindful of others, our innocent subjects,
those of the Roman Catholic religion, who have, with the hazard of
their lives and fortunes, been always assistant to the crown in the
worst of rebellions and usurpations, though they lay under
discouragements hardly to be named: Them we do heartily
recommend to your care, that they may have the protection of our
laws, and that security under our government, which others of our
subjects have, not suffering them to lie under obligations which their
religion cannot admit of.”
The Commissioner enforced this communication by what he must
have thought an irresistible argument. He informed the house that he
was instructed to give the royal assent to any acts prohibiting the
importation of Irish cattle, horses, and victual, or any measures
which might prevent smuggling these articles into Scotland to the
prejudice of the landholders of the country! and likewise promised to
authorise such regulations as should secure exact payment to the
tenantry from all his officers and soldiers in their quarters, both local
and transient, for the future. In return, he expected that they would
show themselves the best and most affectionate subjects, to the
best, the most incomparable, and most heroic prince in the world!
The dutiful parliament humbly thanked the king for his care of the
trade of his ancient kingdom, and expressed their astonishment at
his clemency, testified in the offer of an indemnity to these desperate
rebels, who could have expected pardon from no monarch on earth
but his sacred majesty! and sincerely and heartily offered their lives
and fortunes for suppressing all such as should, upon any account or
pretext whatsoever, attempt either by private contrivance or open
rebellion, to disquiet his glorious reign. As to that part of the royal
letter relating to his subjects of the Roman Catholic religion, they
promised, in obedience to his majesty’s commands, to go as great
lengths as their consciences would allow, not doubting that his
majesty would be careful to secure the Protestant religion
established by law. “This,” says honest Wodrow, “is the first time
since the Restoration I remember that the parliament speak of their
conscience.”
Their answer, however, was so little satisfactory at court, that
although the custom always had been to print these official
documents, it was not allowed to be printed; and within a few days
the royal displeasure was expressed against such as had opposed
the Commissioner in this affair. Sir George Mackenzie, lord advocate
—who with rat-like sagacity, when he perceived the vessel was
sinking, had already shown a disposition to leave her—was laid
aside from an office he might curse the day he ever was appointed
to fill. Lord Pitmedden was removed from the bench, and the Earl of
Glencairn and Sir William Bruce from the privy council. Glencairn
was besides deprived of his pension, as was also the Bishop of
Dunkeld.—“Thir warning shots,” observes Sir John Lauder, “were to
terrify and divert other members of parliament from their opposition.”
Could any inconsistency or tergiversation in unprincipled
politicians astonish us, we might well be amazed at the
shamelessness of the parties on this occasion. When a bill for
repealing the penal statutes was brought in, the papists—or Roman
Catholics, as they were styled by their foster-brethren the Scottish
bishops, in compliment to the king—were now strong advocates for
liberty of conscience, contending that nothing can bind the
conscience as a divine law, which neither directly nor by clear
consequence is founded on the doctrine or practice of Christ or his
apostles, or of the primitive church; that no oath whatsoever can bind
or oblige to that which is sinful or unlawful to be done; and that for a
Christian magistrate to take away the life or estate of a subject who
is not guilty of sedition or rebellion, nor of injuring his neighbour, but
is quiet, and peaceable, and contents himself in the private exercise
of his own religion, merely for difference of opinion, is neither
founded on the doctrine or practice of our Saviour or his apostles,
nor of the church in the following ages, who never urged their kings
or emperors, when the empire became Christian, to take away the
lives and fortunes of open infidels and heathens who did worship
stocks and stones, although these idolatrous heathen, when they
had power, did execute all manner of cruelty against the Christians.
The Episcopalians, taking up the arguments of some of the first
reformers, asserted “that by the doctrine of the New as well as of the
Old Testament, the magistrate beareth not the sword in vain, for he
is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that
doth evil. Idolaters are ranked among the very chief of evil-doers;
and John foretells it as that which God requires of, and approves in,
the king’s of the earth, in times of reformation, that they shall hate
the Babylonish whore, and make her desolate and naked, and shall
burn her with fire—a just punishment upon her who made and cruelly
executed laws for burning to death the innocent saints of God! But
the penal laws were enacted merely for the safety of the religion of
the country against papists, who are not the meek lambs they
pretend to be—as witness the Irish massacre and the murderous
conduct at present in France, towards persons who were guilty of no
rebellion, and who only sought to worship God according to their
conscience!”—It is impossible not to pause here and ask, whether
those who urged these reasons for keeping papists out of power,
had no sense of shame, or no memory—whether they did not
recollect, that, for more than twenty-five years, they had been
pursuing exactly the same course towards their own Protestant
brethren in Scotland?
 During the first month of the session, the Commissioner was
incessant in his attention to the nobles and leading men, and liberal
both of his promises and threatenings, but all he could prevail upon
them to consent to, was a bill for allowing Roman Catholics “the
exercise of their religion in private houses—all public worship being
excluded—without the danger of incurring sanguinary or other
punishments contained in any laws or acts of parliament against the
same.” But as such a restricted liberty would not satisfy the king, it
was dropped; and an act in favour of the heir of Argyle, who had
been prevailed upon to profess the royal religion, closed the session.
Several of the bishops had strenuously opposed the repeal, clearly
perceiving that their craft was in danger, because, had the papists
obtained power, they would not long have retained their livings
without apostatizing from their religion; others were prepared to go
every length to please the king and keep their places. Nor is it
perhaps judging too harshly, to say, that if the alternative of allowing
liberty to Presbyterians, or themselves turning papists, had been
offered them, they would have chosen the latter, such appeared to
be their hatred at what they called the fanatical rigidity of the former.
[167]

167. The methods of solicitation to obtain consent to this act were very strange
and extraordinary. The laying aside of men from their places, who could have
no interest but serving their consciences—commanding Mar, Ross, Kilsyth,
Sir John Dalziel, &c. to their charges, but they offered to give up their
commissions—the imprisoning my two servants, I being a member of
parliament—the importunities used by Sir William Paterson and others in
concussing members of parliament—their dealing with members not clear to
stay away or go home, and then prolonging the meeting to weary out the
poorer sort, who had exhausted both their money and credit—and lastly, the
letters were one post all broken up and searched, to see if any
correspondence or intelligence could be discovered between Scotland and
England.—Fountainhall’s Decis. vol. i. p. 419.—The burrows, because they
were obstinate against the court party, could justly expect no favour. They
never were so unanimous in any parliament as in this, but formerly
depending on noblemen: and therefore some called this an independent
parliament.—Ib. p. 418.
 Defeated in parliament, contrary to all expectation, James
determined to carry through his favourite project by the power of his
prerogative. First, he re-modelled his privy council, turning out the
most stubborn opponents, as the Earls of Mar, Lothian, and
Dumfries, with other decided Protestants, and introducing the Duke
of Gordon, the Earls of Traquair and Seaforth, and other papists in
their room, dispensing, by his own absolute authority, with their
taking the test. To them he most undisguisedly communicated his
royal intentions in the plainest language of tyrannical assumption:
—“It was not any doubt We had of our power in putting a stop to the
unreasonable severities of the acts of parliament against those of the
Roman Catholic religion, that made us bring in Our designs to our
parliament, but to give our loyal subjects a new opportunity of
showing their duty to Us, in which we promised ourselves their
hearty and dutiful concurrence, as what was founded on that solid
justice we are resolved to distribute to all, and consequently to our
Catholic subjects. And to the end the Catholic worship may, with the
more decency and security, be exercised in Edinburgh, we have
thought fit to establish our chapel within our palace of Holyrood-
house, and to appoint a number of chaplains and others whom we
require you to have in your special protection and care. You are
likewise to take care that there be no preachers nor others suffered
to insinuate to the people any fears or jealousies, as if we intended
to make any violent alteration; and if any shall be so bold, you are to
punish them accordingly; for it is far from our thoughts to use any
violence in matters of conscience, consistent with our authority and
the peace of our ancient kingdom.”
Still Mr Renwick was the Mordecai in the gate. He kept the fields,
and continued to pursue his course steadfastly, notwithstanding the
calumnies to which he was exposed, and the opposition he met with
from several of the other persecuted ministers, and the dissensions
among some who attended his ministry. About the end of the year,
as he was preaching through Galloway, a protestation was
presented to him by William M’Hutchison, in the name of all the
professors between the rivers Dee and Cree, lamenting the woful
effects of their divisions, and the adherence of so many to him
without the consent and approbation of the remnant of godly and
faithful ministers, and referring and submitting themselves in all
these to an assembly of faithful ministers and elders. He retorted,
“The divisions had arisen from those Presbyterian ministers who
changed their commission and exercised their ministry under this
abjured antichristian prelacy: from others, who took a new holding of
their ministry from an arrogated headship over the church, by
accepting indulgences, warrants, and restrictions from the usurper of
their Master’s crown: from others, who have been unfaithful in not
applying their doctrine against the prevailing sins of our day: from
others, who have satisfied themselves to lie by from the exercise of
their ministry, and desisted from the work of the Lord, and that when
his vineyard stood most in need: and, he adds, from others, who
have carried on or countenanced hotch-potch confederacies with
malignants, and sectaries, and temporizing compilers.”[168] But he
was strengthened and comforted by the accession of two efficient
coadjutors in his work—Mr David Houston from Ireland, and
Alexander Shiels, who had escaped from the Bass, where he had
been a considerable time confined. On the 9th of December, a
proclamation was issued, offering a reward of £100 sterling to any
who should bring him in dead or alive. In the end of the month, David
Steil, in the parish of Lesmahago, was surprised in the fields by
Lieutenant Crichton; and after he had surrendered upon promise of
safety, was barbarously shot.
168. This last accusation seems rather strained, as at this time there were no
sectaries visible in Scotland, except Quakers or Gibbites, with neither of
whom did the indulged confederate. In England and upon the borders, it is
true, the good persecuted ministers united together, without much regard to
church government, which the state of the times did not permit being very
strictly observed among the sufferers, who appear to have practically
adopted the general principle of the people judging of the character and
qualifications of the ministers they heard, and of the consistent conduct of
those with whom they held communion.—vide Memoirs of Veitch and
Brysson.

[1687.] James’s precipitation in forcing popery upon his people

appeared so impolitic, that even a jesuit missionary thought he made
too great haste; but he told him he would either convert England or
die a martyr; and, when one of his popish lords gently remonstrated
with him, replied—“I am growing old, and must take large steps,
else, if I should happen to die, I might perhaps leave you in a worse
condition than I found you.” Yet with a strange inconsistency, he
allowed both his daughters to be educated in the Protestant faith;
and when he was asked why he was so little concerned about their
conversion, replied—“God will take care of that!” But he had
introduced shoals of seminary priests and jesuits for the instruction
of his other subjects; and, while he interdicted the Presbyterian
ministers from preaching or publishing any thing against his religion,
under pain of treason, he employed these emissaries of Rome in
every quarter; and having appointed Watson, a papist, his printer,
assiduously caused publications in favour of popery to be widely
disseminated. His most powerful argument, however, was,
bestowing the chief places upon papists, especially converts, which
induced many of the nobility and gentry to apostatize; and, like all
apostates, they became the bitterest persecutors of the faith they
had forsaken.
Mr Renwick and his hearers continued to be the objects of
unmitigated hatred, in proportion as they continued to hold fast their
integrity and preach the gospel. Two persons returning from hearing
him, James Cunningham, merchant, and John Buchanan, cooper in
Glasgow, were seized, sent prisoners to Edinburgh, and banished to
Barbadoes;[169] and, on the 17th of February, the council received a
letter from the king, in which he expressed his highest indignation
against these enemies of Christianity, as well as government and
human society, the field-conventiclers, whom he recommended to
the council to root out with all the severity of the laws, and the most
vigorous prosecution of the forces, it being equally his and his
people’s concern to be rid of them. At the same time, he sent a royal
proclamation, allowing, “by Our sovereign authority, prerogative,
royal and absolute power,” moderate Presbyterians and quakers to
meet in their private houses, but to hear such ministers only as have
accepted or are willing to accept the toleration without explanation;
and in like manner, by the same absolute power, he suspended all
laws and acts of parliament, and other proceedings, against Roman
Catholics, so that they should in all time coming, not only be as free
as Protestants to exercise their religion, but to enjoy all offices,
benefices, &c., which he should think proper to bestow, upon their
taking an oath acknowledging him as rightful king and supreme
governor of Scotland, England, France, and Ireland, and over all
persons therein, and that they would never resist his power or
authority; at the same time, he declared he would never suffer
violence to be offered to any man’s conscience, nor use force or
invincible necessity against any man on account of his persuasion.
This, which was termed the first indulgence, did not pass the council
unanimously. The Duke of Hamilton, and the Earls of Panmure and
Dundonald, refused to sanction it; for which the Duke was
reprimanded and the two Earls dismissed the board; and as a
practical exposition of its real meaning, sixteen men and five women
were shortly after, in the month of April, banished to America,
because they would not own the present authority to be according to
the word of God, nor engage never to hear Mr Renwick preach.
169. Perhaps it does not belong exactly to religious persecution, but as it is a
curious trait of the times, I quote the following:—“Reid the mountebank
pursues Scot of Harden and his lady for stealing away from him a little girl,
called the tumblin-lassie, that danced upon his stage; and he claimed
damages and produced a contract, whereby he bought her from her mother
for £30 Scots. But we have no slaves in Scotland, and mothers cannot sell
their bairns; and physicians attested the employment of tumblin would kill
her; and her joints were now grown stiff, and she declined to return; though
she was at least a prentice, and so could not run away from her master: yet
some cited Moses’ law, that if a servant shelter himself with thee against his
master’s cruelty, thou shalt surely not deliver him up. The lords renitente
cancellario, in opposition to the Chancellor, assoilzied Harden.”—
Fountainhall’s Decis. vol. i. p. 440. A few days after, his lordship adds, “Reid
the mountebank is received into the popish church, and one of his
blackamores was persuaded to accept of baptism from the popish priests,
and to turn christian papist, which was a great trophy. He was called James,
after the king, the chancellor, and the Apostle James.”—Ibid. p. 441.

None of these indulgences satisfied fully the Presbyterian

ministers, while they were decidedly testified against by the
denounced wanderers. Another was therefore issued, July 5th, to
palliate the former, giving them leave to meet and serve God after
their own way, be it in private houses, chapels, or places purposely
built or set apart for that use; while it again denounced the full vigour
of the law and of the army against such as should be guilty of field-
conventicles; “for which, after this our royal grace and favour—which
surpasses the hopes and equals the very wishes of the most
zealously concerned—there is not the least shadow of excuse left!”
On the 20th, the Presbyterian ministers from various parts of the
country met at Edinburgh, and agreed to accept the benefit of the
new toleration; but an address of thanks to the king, “for granting
them the liberty of the public and peaceable exercise of their
ministerial functions without any hazard,” was not carried without
considerable opposition. Upon this, many of the exiles returned from
Holland, and among them Mr Patrick Warner, to whom the Prince of
Orange, at parting, gave the following significant advice:—“I
understand you are called home upon the liberty granted there; but I
can assure you that liberty is not granted from any favour or
kindness to you or your party, but from favour to papists and to
divide you among yourselves; yet I think you may be so wise as to
take the good of it and prevent the evil designed, and, instead of
dividing, come to a better harmony among yourselves, when you
have liberty to see one another and meet freely together.”
The wanderers, as they were excepted, so they disregarded the
toleration. Persecution had made them cling closer to their
principles. They refused to accept as a favour what they believed
themselves entitled to claim as a right—the liberty of worshipping
God according to their conscience—and they published their
reasons:—They could not have any transactions with a person
whose principles bound him to keep no faith with heretics, and
whose dissimulation they had already detected. They considered
accepting toleration from him as bargaining with an apostate,
excommunicated, bigoted papist, and as such under the Mediator’s
malediction, “yea, heir to his own grandfather’s [James VI.]
imprecations, who wished the curse of God to fall upon such of his
posterity as should at any time turn papists. They renounced him as
a magistrate, because he had not taken the oath constitutionally
required; and to accept this toleration flowing from his absolute
power, would be acknowledging a power inconsistent with the law of
God and the liberties of mankind; for, though nothing can be more
desirable than when true liberty is established by the government,
nothing can be more vile than when true religion is tolerated under
the notion of a crime, and its exercise only allowed under certain
restrictions.” As to the address of thanks by the ministers, they
considered it “a train of fulsome flatteries, dishonourable to God, the
reproach of his cause, the betraying of the church, the detriment of
the nation, and the exposing of themselves to contempt.”
The conduct of the government, amid all their professions of
toleration, fully warranted the worst suspicions of the persecuted. On
the 25th July, John Anderson, younger of Wastertown, was indicted
before the court of justiciary, for having in a tavern, over a glass of
wine, argued in favour of using defensive arms against tyrants, and,
by an execrable majority of that degraded tribunal, condemned to
die. He was not executed, but the stain of the sentence remains
upon the memories of the servile senators who pronounced it. And
this was followed on the 5th October by a proclamation, not only
forbidding all field-conventicles, under the usual penalty, but even
indulged ministers, from preaching in houses, unless they observed
the prescribed directions; that is, unless they abstained from
exposing or in any way reflecting upon the king’s religion, i. e. the
errors of popery; and on the 18th, by another, all officers, civil and
military, were ordered to apprehend James Renwick, and assured of
the sum of £100 sterling for taking him dead or alive—a high price!
but so cautious had he been, that he had eluded fifteen desperate
searches made after him within five months since the first toleration,
which exasperated the rulers beyond measure.
The year One Thousand Six Hundred and Eighty-Eight—a
year greatly to be remembered as the last in the annals of the
persecution in Scotland—was ushered in by a circumstance which
threatened to rivet their chains upon the Presbyterians, but which in
the good providence of God was the means of accelerating their
deliverance. On the 2d of January, the Queen’s pregnancy was
announced; and the 29th was ordered to be observed as a day of
thanksgiving in the diocese of Edinburgh, where the clergy were
commanded to pray, after this form, for “Our gracious Queen Mary:
—Good Lord, strengthen her, we beseech thee, and perfect what
thou hast begun. Command thy holy angels to watch over her
continually, and defend her from all dangers and evil accidents, that
what she has conceived may be happily brought forth to the joy of
our sovereign lord the king, the further establishment of his crown,
the happiness and welfare of the whole kingdom, and the glory of thy
great name!” The papists, who pronounced the conception
miraculous in answer to a vow the Queen had made to the lady of
Loretto, prophecied that the promised birth would be a son. The
Protestants sighed in secret, and began to whisper their suspicions
of a fraud.
On the 17th, Mr Renwick published a testimony against the
toleration and in vindication of field-meetings, the convening of which
he contended was a testimony for the headship, honour, and princely
prerogative of Jesus—“Since in these meetings there is a particular
declaration of our holding our ministry and the exercise thereof from
Christ alone, without any dependence on, subordination to, or
license from, his usurping enemies;” and this testimony he was
shortly after called upon to seal with his blood. From Edinburgh he
went to Fife and preached several Sabbaths, then re-crossed the
Firth, and upon the 29th of January, preached his last sermon at
Borrowstounness; thence he returned to the capital, where he
arrived on the 31st, under cloud of night. Having gone to a friend’s
house on the Castle-hill, who dealt in English wares, a custom-house
officer, Thomas Justice, was informed by one of his spies that a
stranger had arrived; and early next morning he came with some
others on pretence of searching for prohibited goods. Mr Renwick
hearing the noise, came out of his room, when the officer standing at
the door exclaimed—“My life for it, this is Mr Renwick!” on which Mr
Renwick went to another door, and finding it also beset, fired a pistol
to terrify his pursuers, and was attempting his escape, when he
received a severe blow on the breast, that stunned him; and he fell
several times as he was running, and was taken. He was carried
directly to the guard-house, and from thence to a committee of the
privy council, who ordered him immediately to be laid in irons.
Previously to his being indicted, he was examined in Viscount
Tarbet’s chamber, when he undauntedly maintained his principles,
disclaiming the idea that lineal descent alone gave a right to the
crown, and disowning especially the authority of James as a papist,
who had never taken the Scottish coronation oath, and therefore
could not legally reign; justifying the non-payment of cess, as it was
an impost levied for suppressing the gospel; and asserting the right
of carrying arms at field-meetings as necessary self-defence. On
every point about which he was questioned, he answered with an
openness which greatly softened his inquisitors, and saved him the
torture. He received his indictment on the 3d of February, charging
him with having cast off the fear of God and all regard to his
majesty’s laws; of having entered into the society of rebels of most
damnable and pernicious principles, and become so desperate a
villain, as openly to preach in the fields these his treasonable
doctrines. On the 8th he was brought to the bar of the justiciary.[170]
When asked whether he pled guilty or not guilty to his libel, he
answered that he acknowledged all “except where it is said, I have
cast off all fear of God; that I deny: for it is because I fear to offend
God, and violate his law, that I am here standing ready to be
condemned.” Being asked if he had any objections to the jury, he
made none, but protested “that none might sit on his assize that
professed Protestant or Presbyterian principles, or an adherence to
the covenanted work of reformation.” He was found guilty on his own
confession, and sentenced to be executed on the 10th. Lord
Linlithgow, justice-general, asked if he desired longer time. He
answered, it was all one to him; if it was protracted, it was welcome;
if it was shortened, it was welcome: his master’s time was the best.
170. The following note is appended to his life in the last edition of the Scots
Worthies, Glas. 1827. p. 541:—“It is to be remarked, that many of the jury
were professors and eminent in the tolerated meetings; while others, even of
the malignants, chose rather to run the hazard of the penalty;—as the Laird
of Torrance, who compeared not, and Sommerville, chamberlain of Douglas,
who, though he appeared, yet when he saw Mr Renwick turn about and
direct his speech to them, ran away, saying—‘He trembled to think to take
away the life of such a pious-like man, though they should take his whole
estate.’”

Many efforts were made to induce the youthful suffer to comply.

He was reprieved to the 17th. Paterson, bishop of Edinburgh,
appears to have interested himself much on his behalf. He often
visited him, and applied for another reprieve, which would have been
readily granted, provided Mr Renwick would only have petitioned.
“Will you kill yourself with your own hands?” asked the bishop, “when
you may have your life upon so easy terms.” He replied, he acted not
rashly but deliberately, and was fully convinced that the truths for
which he suffered were sufficient points to suffer for. The bishop took
his leave, expressing his sorrow for his being so tenacious, and
afterwards offered to serve him to the utmost of his power. Mr
Renwick thanked him for his civility, but knew nothing he could do, or
that he could desire. Mr Macnaught, a curate, visited him, robed in
his canonicals—an insult which Mr Renwick appeared to feel, but
took it calmly. When asked his opinion respecting the toleration and
those that accepted it, he declared he was against it; but as for those
that embraced it, he judged them godly men. He was also visited by
some popish priests who essayed his conversion, but he
peremptorily ordered them to be gone.
On the morning of his execution, the goodman of the tolbooth, i. e.
head jailer, begged that on the scaffold he would not mention the
cause of his death, and forbear all reflections. Mr Renwick told him
that what God gave him to speak, that he would speak, and nothing
else, and nothing less. The jailer said he might still have his life, if he
would but sign that petition which he offered him. Mr Renwick
replied, that he had never read in Scripture or history of martyrs
petitioning for their lives when called to suffer for the truth; and in
present circumstances, he judged it would be found a receding from
the truth and declining a testimony for Christ. His mother and sisters,
who had been kept away, at length obtained liberty to see him. He
exhorted them much to prepare for death, expressing his own joyful
assurance of endless glory. Observing his mother weep, he exhorted
her to remember that they who loved any thing better than Christ
were not worthy of him. If ye love me, rejoice that I am going to my
Father, to obtain the enjoyment of what eye hath not seen, ear hath
not heard, nor hath it entered into the mind of man to conceive.
When the signal drum beat, he joyfully exclaimed—“Yonder the
welcome warning to my marriage; the Bridegroom is coming—I am
ready—I am ready.”