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 Brief contents

Preface ..............................................................................................................................................................................xv
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................................................xvi
New to this edition .......................................................................................................................................................xvi
How to use the learning features ...........................................................................................................................xviii
How to use the online resources ............................................................................................................................... xx
List of case studies .......................................................................................................................................................xxii
About the contributors .............................................................................................................................................xxiv
World map ..................................................................................................................................................................xxviii

Part One International relations in a global era

Introduction: From international politics to world politics ................................................................... 5

patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
1 Globalization and global politics ..................................................................................................................19
anthony mcgrew

Part Two The historical context

2 The rise of modern international order .....................................................................................................39

george lawson
3 International history of the twentieth century ........................................................................................54
len scott
4 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order? ....................................................................70
michael cox
5 Rising powers and the emerging global order .........................................................................................84
andrew hurrell

Part Three Theories of world politics

6 Liberal internationalism ............................................................................................................................... 103

tim dunne
7 Marxist theories of international relations ............................................................................................ 115
stephen hobden · richard wyn jones
8 Realism .............................................................................................................................................................. 130
tim dunne · brian c. schmidt
9 Feminism ........................................................................................................................................................... 145
helen m. kinsella
10 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches ................................................................................................ 160
meera sabaratnam
11 Poststructuralism ............................................................................................................................................ 177
lene hansen
12 Social constructivism .................................................................................................................................... 192
michael barnett
13 International ethics ........................................................................................................................................ 207
richard shapcott
viii Brief contents

Part Four Structures and processes

14 War and world politics .................................................................................................................................. 225

tarak barkawi
15 International and global security .............................................................................................................. 240
john baylis
16 Global political economy ............................................................................................................................. 256
nicola phillips
17 Gender ............................................................................................................................................................... 271
paul kirby
18 Race in world politics .................................................................................................................................... 287
robbie shilliam
19 International law ............................................................................................................................................ 303
christian reus-smit
20 International organizations in world politics ........................................................................................ 319
susan park
21 The United Nations ........................................................................................................................................ 334
devon e. a. curtis · paul taylor
22 NGOs in world politics .................................................................................................................................. 349
jutta joachim
23 Regionalism in international affairs ......................................................................................................... 365
edward best · thomas christiansen

Part Five International issues

24 Environmental issues .................................................................................................................................... 387

john vogler
25 Refugees and forced migration .................................................................................................................. 404
ariadna estévez
26 Poverty, hunger, and development .......................................................................................................... 419
tony evans · caroline thomas
27 Global trade and global finance ................................................................................................................ 435
matthew watson
28 Terrorism and globalization ........................................................................................................................ 449
james d. kiras
29 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ...................................................................................... 466
sheena chestnut greitens
30 Nationalism, national self-determination, and international relations ....................................... 481
john breuilly
31 Human rights ................................................................................................................................................... 498
ratna kapur
32 Humanitarian intervention in world politics ........................................................................................ 514
alex j. bellamy · nicholas j. wheeler

Glossary .........................................................................................................................................................................531
References .....................................................................................................................................................................553
Index ...............................................................................................................................................................................591
 Detailed contents

Preface ..............................................................................................................................................................................xv
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................................................xvi
New to this edition .......................................................................................................................................................xvi
How to use the learning features ...........................................................................................................................xviii
How to use the online resources ............................................................................................................................... xx
List of case studies .......................................................................................................................................................xxii
About the contributors .............................................................................................................................................xxiv
World map ..................................................................................................................................................................xxviii

Part One International relations in a global era

Introduction: From international politics to world politics ................................................................... 5

From international politics to world politics 6
The study of International Relations 6
Theories of world politics 8
Theories and globalization 14
Globalization: myth or reality? 15

1 Globalization and global politics ..................................................................................................................19

Introduction 20
Making sense of globalization 20
The crisis of globalization and the liberal world order 27
Globalization and the transformation of world politics 30
Conclusion 33

Part Two The historical context

2 The rise of modern international order .....................................................................................................39

Introduction 40
Historical international orders 40
How did modern international order emerge? 43
The consequences of the global transformation 47
Conclusion 51

3 International history of the twentieth century ........................................................................................54

Introduction 55
Modern total war 55
End of empire 58
Cold war 60
Conclusion 67

4 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order? ....................................................................70
Introduction 71
The United States: managing the unipolar ‘moment’ 71
After the USSR: Yeltsin to Putin 72
x Detailed contents

Europe: rise and decline? 74

A new Asian century? 75
A new Global South 78
From 9/11 to the Arab Spring 79
From Obama to Trump 80
Conclusion 82

5 Rising powers and the emerging global order .........................................................................................84

Introduction 85
The post-cold war order 85
The US order under challenge 87
Three questions about the power of rising powers 90
Debating the impact of rising powers on international relations 93
Beyond the BRICS 95
Conclusion: rising states and the globalization of world politics 96

Part Three Theories of world politics

6 Liberal internationalism ............................................................................................................................... 103

Introduction and context 104
Founding ideas of nineteenth-century liberal internationalism 105
Internationalism and institutionalism: peace through law 107
The challenges confronting liberal internationalism 109
Conclusion: incomplete, but indispensable, internationalism 113

7 Marxist theories of international relations ............................................................................................ 115

Introduction 116
The essential elements of Marxist theories of world politics 118
Marx internationalized: from imperialism to world-systems theory 119
Gramscianism 121
Critical theory 124
New Marxism 125
Conclusion 127

8 Realism .............................................................................................................................................................. 130

Introduction 131
Realism in context 131
One realism, or many? 135
The essential realism 138
Conclusion 142

9 Feminism ........................................................................................................................................................... 145

Introduction 146
What is feminism? 147
What is feminist international relations theory? 150
Gender and power 152
Four feminist international relations theories 152
Conclusion 157
 Detailed contents xi
10 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches ................................................................................................ 160
Introduction 161
What are postcolonial and decolonial approaches? 161
Where did postcolonial and decolonial ideas come from? 164
What are the main ideas underpinning postcolonial and decolonial thought? 167
Postcolonial and decolonial approaches to studying world politics 170
Decolonization: the struggle continues? 173
Conclusion 174

11 Poststructuralism ............................................................................................................................................ 177

Introduction 178
Studying the social world 178
Poststructuralism as a political philosophy 179
Deconstructing state sovereignty 184
Identity and foreign policy 187
Conclusion 190

12 Social constructivism .................................................................................................................................... 192

Introduction 193
The rise of constructivism 193
Constructivism 195
Constructivism and global change 201
Conclusion 205

13 International ethics ........................................................................................................................................ 207

Introduction 208
The study of ethics: methods 209
Global justice, poverty, and starvation 214
Just war tradition 217
Conclusion 220

Part Four Structures and processes

14 War and world politics .................................................................................................................................. 225

Introduction 226
Defining war 227
War: international and global 228
Clausewitz’s philosophy of war 230
War, state, and society in the West 233
War, state, and society in the Global South 236
Conclusion 238

15 International and global security .............................................................................................................. 240

Introduction 241
What is security? 241
The traditional approach to national security 243
Alternative approaches 245
Globalization and the return of geopolitics 248
Conclusion 252
xii Detailed contents

16 Global political economy ............................................................................................................................. 256

Introduction 257
Approaches to IPE 258
What drives globalization? 260
Who wins and who loses from globalization? 265
The future of globalization 268
Conclusion 269

17 Gender ............................................................................................................................................................... 271

Introduction 272
Sex and gender in international perspective 272
Global gender relations 274
Gendering global politics 276
Gendering global security 279
Gendering the global economy 282
Conclusion 284

18 Race in world politics .................................................................................................................................... 287

Introduction 288
Histories of race in world politics 288
Thinking through race 294
Contemporary manifestations of race in world politics 296
Conclusion 300

19 International law ............................................................................................................................................ 303

Introduction 304
Order and institutions 304
The modern institution of international law 305
From international to supranational law? 310
The laws of war 311
Theoretical approaches to international law 314
Conclusion 315

20 International organizations in world politics ........................................................................................ 319

Introduction 320
What are international organizations? 320
Why are international organizations important? 324
Why do states create IOs? 325
How can we analyse IO behaviour? 331
Conclusion 332

21 The United Nations ........................................................................................................................................ 334

Introduction 335
A brief history of the United Nations and its principal organs 335
The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security 339
The United Nations and economic and social questions 344
Conclusion 347

22 NGOs in world politics .................................................................................................................................. 349

Introduction 350
What are NGOs? 351
 Detailed contents xiii
The growing importance of TNGOs 356
Conclusion 363

23 Regionalism in international affairs ......................................................................................................... 365

Introduction 366
Regional cooperation and regional integration 366
Regional cooperation in a global context 370
The process of European integration 377
Conclusion 380

Part Five International issues

24 Environmental issues .................................................................................................................................... 387

Introduction 388
Environmental issues on the international agenda: a brief history 389
The functions of international environmental cooperation 391
Climate change 395
The environment and international relations theory 400
Conclusion 401

25 Refugees and forced migration .................................................................................................................. 404

Introduction 405
Concept production and the politics of international protection 406
Types of forced migration 408
The international refugee regime and institutionalized racism 415
Conclusion 417

26 Poverty, hunger, and development .......................................................................................................... 419

Introduction 420
Poverty 420
Hunger 422
Development 425
Conclusion 433

27 Global trade and global finance ................................................................................................................ 435

Introduction 436
The globalization of trade and finance 436
The regulation of global trade 440
The regulation of global finance 444
Conclusion 447

28 Terrorism and globalization ........................................................................................................................ 449

Introduction 450
Definitions 450
Terrorism: from transnational to global phenomenon (1968–2001) 451
Terrorism: the impact of globalization 453
Globalization, technology, and terrorism 456
Combating terrorism 460
Conclusion 464
xiv Detailed contents

29 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ...................................................................................... 466

Introduction 467
WMD technology and its spread 467
Theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation 473
Evolution of non-proliferation efforts 476
Conclusion 479

30 Nationalism, national self-determination, and international relations ....................................... 481

Introduction 482
Nationalism, nation-states, and global politics 482
The changing meanings of NSD since 1918 489
Conclusion 494

31 Human rights ................................................................................................................................................... 498

Introduction 499
The global human rights structure 499
The core assumptions on which human rights are based 503
Doing human rights advocacy 508
Conclusion 511

32 Humanitarian intervention in world politics ........................................................................................ 514

Introduction 515
The case for humanitarian intervention 515
The case against humanitarian intervention 517
The 1990s: a golden era of humanitarian activism? 519
The responsibility to protect (RtoP) 521
Conclusion 527

Glossary .........................................................................................................................................................................531
References .....................................................................................................................................................................553
Index ...............................................................................................................................................................................591
 Preface

In this new edition of The Globalization of World Politics we have followed a similar format and
structure to previous editions, but we have added several new and exciting chapters that we believe
make this already popular and successful book even better. These alterations are based on the edi-
tors’ sense of changes that are happening in the field of International Relations, but they are also in
response to feedback from students from around the world, comments from teachers and scholars of
International Relations, and the extremely detailed reviews of the seventh edition commissioned by
Oxford University Press. Together, all these comments have helped us identify a number of additional
areas that should be covered. We have included a thoroughly rewritten chapter on globalization and
global politics that explores the implications of the current crisis of globalization for world politics
and world order. We have made the excellent section on the diversity of theoretical perspectives even
better by strengthening the historical contextualization of the theories that have shaped the field and
by including a new chapter on postcolonial and decolonial approaches. We have improved the section
on international issues by commissioning new chapters on human rights and on refugees and forced
migration. We have also updated the learning features, including nearly two dozen brand new case
studies and many new suggestions for further reading.

Praise for The Globalization of World Politics

‘The chapter on Postcolonial and Decolonial Approaches offers many new insights and excellent examples
and debates. The Opposing Opinions feature will ignite heated and reflexive debate amongst students.’
Birsen Erdogan, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of
International and European Law, Maastricht University

‘The new chapter on Refugees and Forced Migration covers a topic of great relevance and interest to
students, including good discussion of the theoretical and legal debate of various categories of refugees
and effective examples and case studies to illustrate the complexities of such a challenging policy issue.’
Craig Mark, Professor in the Faculty of International Studies,
Kyoritsu Women’s University

‘The updated chapter on Human Rights pushes the reader to challenge and re-think common assump-
tions – the critical and reflective focus is a very welcome addition to the current IR textbook market.’
Samuel Jarvis, Teaching Fellow in International Relations,
University of Southampton

‘It still does what it has always set out to do, introducing students to the main theoretical and conceptual
underpinnings of global politics while offering a set of highly relevant and contemporary case studies
to show these ideas in action. I am really delighted that the editors are engaging with authors from the
Global South - this is long overdue and demonstrates the quality of scholarship from these regions. In
particular, Chapter 10 provides excellent coverage of the origins, historical context and main intellectual
contribution of postcolonial and decolonial approaches.’
Neville Wylie, Deputy Principal and Professor of International History,
University of Stirling
 Acknowledgements

Producing an edited book is always a collective enterprise. But it is not only the editors and authors
who make it happen. We make substantial revisions to every new edition of this book based on the
numerous reviews we receive on the previous one. We are extremely grateful to all those who sent to us
or Oxford University Press their comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the seventh edition and
our plans for this eighth edition of the book. Very many of the changes are the result of reviewers’ rec-
ommendations. Once again, we would also like to thank our excellent contributors for being so willing
to respond to our detailed requests for revisions, and sometimes major rewrites, to their chapters. Many
of these authors have been involved with this book since the very first edition, and we are extremely
grateful for their continued commitment and dedication to International Relations pedagogy.
Here we would also like to make a special acknowledgement and extend our greatest thanks to
the editorial assistant on this edition, Dr. Danielle Cohen. With efficiency, deep conscientiousness,
patience, and humour, she has done an excellent job working with the contributors and the editors to
ensure deadlines were met and all tasks completed on time. The book is much better because of her
hard work.
The editors would also like to thank the editorial and production team at Oxford University Press,
especially Sarah Iles and Emily Spicer. They are always a pleasure to work with.
John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens

The authors of Chapter 32 are grateful to Zeenat Sabur for her research support in preparing this
updated version of the chapter.
The publishers would be pleased to clear permission with any copyright holders that we have in-
advertently failed, or been unable, to contact.

New to this edition

The eighth edition has been rigorously updated following extensive reviewer feedback. Key changes
include:
• New Chapter 25 on refugees and forced migration by Professor Ariadna Estévez, University of
Mexico
• Incorporation of postcolonial and decolonial approaches in Chapter 10 by Dr Meera Sabaratnam,
SOAS University of London
• Newly authored Chapter 31 on human rights encourages you to think critically about key issues in
the field and consider whether human rights are universal
• Expanded coverage of non-Western approaches, particularly perspectives from the Global South,
is woven throughout the chapters to ensure you appreciate the importance of viewing interna-
tional relations from representative and varied perspectives
• Updated International Relations theory chapters reflect a more contextualized and historical per-
spective, allowing you to gain a thorough, nuanced understanding of the historical and political
context in which these approaches emerged
 Nationalism, national
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societies and(
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annually.
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playing
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companying questions will help you evaluate the- money
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arefarmers move to the cities for George who1987 :leading
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of universities provide, cashmeaning that they can organization knowledge.
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26.1
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the
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globalization
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(about
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26.1 illustrates
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Haiti’s
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to knowledge.world. They enmesh t
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Points:
available false.
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markets. Woodrow Wilson’s globalization. existence, the77 G77 aims
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of diplomacy on society, World fi rstWar, articulated
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Case Studies activists involved in decolonization struggles other they
conduct
provide
struggles
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Case wider
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for guarantees
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diplomacy
have foundand
perspectives
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of
Hunger onsocial
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universities
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Hunger
createin
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Two engaging and relevant Case Studies in every are spaces
stand different issues.
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their ideas,
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networks,
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in with

rice was in the Haitian market at

chapter illustrate how ideas, concepts, and issues static institution, but rather becomes whatever its students and
Education
provide has historically functioned as a tool of liberation.
staff make of it.guarantees of independence andbelow
than radically changing
dominated
territorial
them.
that of localimported
world
growers. GATT:
Forced rice outwas
economy. of theav
see Gen
For most
market,
Many activists involved in decolonization struggles and other world they
farmers abandoned encounter
below
their that
farms and ofis local
moveda more grcities in
to the
are manifested in the real world. Each Case Study struggles for rights have found that universities across the world of work, to change
adding furtherit.toThis
farmers means
the legions
abandoned that ittheir
of unemployedis mor
peo
1. Do you agree that today we have more democratic forms of knowledge-making and knowledge-sharing than in the past?
are spaces to develop their ideas, create social networks, andThe 2008 sityglobal economic crisis brought
willincreases in tr
is followed by questions to encourage you to apply 2. Is the predominance
produce of theown.
writing of their EnglishThe
language a barrieristotherefore
university decolonization? price
not a
of rice
education
(and of work
many
they
other
seek
staple
established fields of knowledge or wa
foods),
be about
leaving man
short of the daily calorieThe 2008
intake global by the W
recommended
theory to current and evolving global events. static
3. Areinstitution,
more peoplebut ratherin becomes
interested whatever
trying to survive its students
in the world and
than in trying than
to change
Programme. it?Inradically
2010, Haitichanging them.
was struck by
price of rice (and many
an earthquak
staff make of it. further misery, killing an untold number of people, and
For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers www.oup.com/he/baylis8e short
1.5 million with limited of to
access the daily
food calorie
and shelter.
brought Category 4ProgrHurricane Matthew, which left
1. Do you agree that today we have more democr ple in need of emergency food supplies. Food
further misery,drought,
further aggravated by a three-year killingmade
an
2. Is the predominance of the English language a barrier to decolonization?
the El Niño effect of 1.5 million
2015–16, with alimited
bringing 50 per cent
in local food production. According to the World Bank
© US Navy Photo / Alamy Stock Photo brought Category 4
3. Are more people interested in trying to survive in the world58 than
per in trying
cent of thetopopulation
change it? suffer food insecurity
of women and children plearin need of emergency
There was a time, over 30 years ago, when Haiti produced suf- old children), 30 perfurther aggravated
cent of children are stunted,by a
19 per
For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers
ficient rice to feed the population. In the 1980s, faced with an
www.oup.com/he/baylis8e
underweight, 10 per cent are wasted, and 23 per cent
acute economic crisis and sharp rises in food prices, Haitians
the El Niño effect of
born babies are underweight.
© US Navy
took toPhoto / Alamy
the streets Stock Photo
in rebellion against the dynastic president The scale of these indisasters,
local food
and theproduction.
level of hunger
Jean Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier. Under pressure from US and currently suffer, leaves farmers in a ‘catch 22’ situation:
 Trump and the emergence of other ‘strongman lead- The structure of the
ers’ in recent years, individual and societal insecurity is challenges, particular
increasingly
254 john baylisas the forces How
evident to use the learning
of fragmentation and features nature, andxix the forces
integration associated
remains unclear how
Chapterwith 25
Chapter
great power
globalization
Refugees destabilize
Refugees
25relations
and forced migration
and forced
will develop There
all impose important
seems no sign that a407
migration
407
paradigmatic
traditional identities and thereby
in the years ahead as geopolitical and geostrategic complicate relation-
a more peaceful world is takingand
viduals, states, placeint
in i
(2007), Boxes
by the late 1980s there was a ‘fractioning’ ships
of within
the changes and unfold.among There are states.
also the security issues asso- politics, or indeeddoes the
perhaps continuing
that such a pe
(Each
2007),chapter
by the late 1980s there was aof‘fractioning’ of the Box what25.1
refugee label label
withinoffers a rich
forced supply
migration concise boxes
studies—that In many ciated with
ways, Box 25.1 Colonial
one commentator
contemporary Colonial has calledpowers
powers
international the ‘crisisand
and
politics forced
is possible.
forced The empirical historical eviden
towards international
refugee within forced migration
that enhance your understanding of key IR develop- studies—that of international institutions’ (Weiner 1995).
migration contemporary events, suggest caution. Peri
is, theis,multiplication of related labels used to toare
managecharacterized
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migration
of what
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anxiety,described
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ments, definitions andofdebates
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by the Many
challenging in the and West what some argue regard that as international
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peoplepeople
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the legal protection
the legal protection of refugee
of refugee status.
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necessarily of other ‘strongman
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political The structure
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maintained at national
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particular is is not to argue
kinds of political syst
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as ‘types of of
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The situation
increasingly evident as the forces of fragmentation and
has changed
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migration years,
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see ‘Types of forced
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). Zetter integration associated with globalization all impose important constraints on the
order hastraditional
beenconfl challenged
confl ict,
identities it would
and by claims
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complicate a it serves
ict, it would not be such a pressing issue. Mainstream lit- unimpor
pressing
relation- only
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viduals, states,politics
and lit- are
international instituti
(2007)(2007 ) regrets
regrets this shift
this shift fromfrom refugee
refugee studies
studies to
toWesternforced
forced interests
ships within and
and
erature undermines
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argues states.
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erature argues that forced migration is produced by problems is of non-
does
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of real
migration
migration studies
studies sincesince
it has it has negative
negative consequences In manyofways,
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governance andthe international
the legitimacy politics
of ‘fragiletowards
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(Stepputat and global security
Western are states and non-state
of governance andactors. Thereashas
legitimacy ofalso been
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for policy,
for policy, givengiven
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the the refugee
refugee regime regime allowed
allowed for characterized and Sorensenby what might
2014be). described
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approaches, therepolitical
is no (see Ch.
some for unease inand the Sorensen
US and 2014
some ). In other mainstream
Western approaches,
coun- there
tension is noand confl ict.
real protection
real protection fromfrom persecution.
persecution. He He claims
claims thatthat 164
ties glo-
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that security
some
164
rity paradox’.meera
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assessment
Many
assessment
meera
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dictatorial
the West
sabaratnam
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argue that international
of the productive nature of these ‘causes’. From
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possible
largely of about
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that
‘geopolitics’
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. may
mistrust, From
discussions
themselves be self-
and uncert
balization is reshaping the refugee regime, and there- maintained a atdecolonial
a global level and postcolonial perspective, Th however,
is is not toforced
balization is reshaping the refugee regime, andprevailing there- liberal a decolonial andbypostcolonial
a rules-based Western perspective, however, argue
forced that there is no room
order against
migration
international istheir
order. not anown
In recent innocent interests.
years, consequence
however, Attempts
that of structural
change, search
or that forces
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fore the concept of the refugee itself, since the original migration is notbyan innocent consequence of structural forces in helping us to
fore the concept of the refugee itself, since the original to mitigate, orKey
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2009: 7). a desirable migrant and who is not (Squire international Postcolonial
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understand
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from
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that
and a fascinating
practitioners
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Discussing voluntary/involuntary migration, or not achieved, From a geopolitical and non-Western perspective, forced
such
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deprivation, vio-makes the study of g
r
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forced migration, is a form of fractioning the refugee ing to seriousnew labels such
migration people
international
approaches.
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future. of a series insuchmainstream
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fascinating laws, important r
activity.
lence, and deadly forms of life in poor or middle-income
in human rights law and rhetoric,
label, and some scholars seek to ground these new labels for both analyti- andapproaches.
omissions intended to create extreme deprivation, vio-
countries subordinated to the hegemonic and colonial power
cal and policylawobjectives. Certainfor academics, some of lence, and deadly forms of life in poor or middle-income
in human rights and rhetoric, both analyti- of the West. For instance, Mexican scholar Guadalupe Correa-
them from the Global South, believe that forced migra- countries
Cabrera subordinated
(2017) has established to the hegemonicempiricallyand the colonial
link between power
cal and Questions
policy objectives. Certain academics, some timof Questions
tion should in fact becomenot a legal 144
category subsuming
dunneof · killings,
brian
the Questions
West. c .Forschmidt
instance, Mexican
forced disappearances, femicides, displacement, and scholar Guadalupe Correa-
End-of-chapter
them from the Globalquestions
South, believe only
thatprobe
forcedyour un-
migra- Cabrera (2017)extraction. has established empirically the link
hydrocarbon Correa-Cabrera argues that between
in the
both internal and international displacement,
derstanding of each chapter, but also encourage you while 1. 1.
Why Why
is is security a ‘contested concept’?
security a ‘contested concept’?
tion should
also
in fact
including
become a legal category subsuming 6. How
killings,
case of would
forced
north-eastern a realist
disappearances, explain
Mexico, the 9/11
femicides,
2. Why do traditional realist writers focus on national security? by
violence haswars?displacement,
been produced and
to reflect on theother types
material of forced
you’ve mobility, such as
just covered. 2. Why do traditional realist writers focus
argueson national security?
both deportation
internal and andinternational displacement,
qualified migration, which 144 while
are ofttim Postcolonial and decolonial ideas are inspired by theNATO)
7.
en dunne
Will
hydrocarbon
elites 3. Western
to Whyforce do governments
extraction.
corporations
wars occur? and
Correa-Cabrera
to hire their institutions
private security. that
She (such in asthe
claims his- ha
A
case ·the
that
3. of 4.ideas
north-eastern
there
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brian Whyc do associated
do
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awars
spatial fi nd with
it diffiWestern
Mexico,
coincidence
occur? violence
cult civilization
to cooperate?
between has beenglobalare produced
fluxes to survive
(theby in the twenty
also including other types of forced
ignored (Riaño-Alcalá 2008; De Génova 2002; Gzeshmobility, such as Postcolonial
tory global
and
5. mobility
Do you find and
practice decolonial
of
of ‘liberal
people, ideas
decolonization.
institutionalism’ are
convincing? inspired
Th ey share by the
many his- the
8.
elites
4. What to
Why is at
force domightstake in
corporations
states the
findthe itcapital,
debate
todiffi and
hirebetween
cult tocrime)
private and economic
defensive
security.
cooperate? She andclaims
offensive realism?
deportation and qualified
2012; Delgado-Wise migration,
2014 ). which are often tory common
9. and
6. How 6. would
inequality.
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structural historical
practice
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this
realism of
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ignored From
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a postcolonial perspective (see Box 25.1), common Gzesh between
10. at
global least
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mobility
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claims philosophical
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inequality.
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the reasons for forcedperspective
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www.oup.com/he/baylis8e of in
of hydrocarbons, postcolonial
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Estévez (2018c) claims it is necessary to incorporate to analyse it as an and African
internal dynamics descent, broaden decolonial
the gap further approaches
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crime. The impact withby trying
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community and private actors ranging from multi- andled African

to increased descent,
income decolonial inequality in the approaches
region, since
(Correa-Cabrera have
2017 ) been
law designed to tackle it, in order to analyse it as an
Further Reading look
Further
internal at Reading
the
dynamics common broaden historical
the gaproots between of theirrich and approaches
poor, and
national
on-going process corporations
initiated to organized
both by the crime groups. principally
international
Further Reading
before
while looking
reinforcing
cultivated
at the
social
by Latin American thinkers. We will
di erences
inequality. between them. tari
Annotated recommendations for further reading at
Estévez argues that forced migration is a process that look at the common historical
the end and
community private
of each chapter actors
help you ranging fromyourself
familiarise multi- ForForaAn ageneral
important
general survey
survey of theofrealist
the
foundation realist is a roots
traditiontradition shared ofunderstanding
(Correa-Cabrera their approaches 2017) of so
starts with structural and accumulation projects— before production looking of forced
at the migration
di erences is determined
between them. by LA:
three
nationalwithcorporations
the key academic to organized
literature and crime groups.
suggest how the history
Smith,
Smith, M. J. (1986),
M. J. (1986), of Western
Realist Thought
Realist Thought empires.
from Weber
fromtoManyWeberWestern
Kissinger (Baton Rouge,
to Kissinger countries
(Baton Rouge,sive
Louisiana State
LA
often facilitated by law enforcement or organized elements: An important 1) geographical foundation specifi
isthe city
aparts
shared alongseminalthe realistinter-
understanding rofV. Milner
University Press). An excellent discussion of many of the thinkers.
Estévez youargues that forced
can explore migration
your interest is a process
in a particular that
aspect controlled
University
Walt, S. M. (2002), and
Press).
‘The dominated
An
Enduringexcellent other
Relevance discussion
of Realistof of the
many
Tradition’ ,world,
ofI. the
in begin-
seminal
Katznelson and H. indi
crime activities—that displace or ultimately kill Walt, national lines of‘The race, gender, and(New class; 2)W.aNorton).process
IR. structural and accumulation projects— the
startspeople.
ofwith history
production S.with
(eds), M. Political
of
(2002),
of Western
forced
Science: TheEnduring
empires.
migration
State of the Discipline
isMany
Relevance andof
determined
York:
Western
the W.Realist
countries
byTradition’
of the, in I.ofWh
three
An exposition Kthe
The forcibly displaced are further exposed to ning starting with
realist tradition
the from
Spanish
structural
one of its leading
conquest
and accumulation
proponents.
(eds), Political Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: W. W
occupation projects
often gangs,
facilitated
organizedby law
crime, enforcement
and sexual violence while on controlled
or organized elements:
that
realistdisplace and
1)
tradition
Twentieth-century
dominated
geographical
people,
fromrealism
classical who
one
other
specifi
are
of its in turn
leading
parts
cityfurther of the the
along
proponents.exposed
world, inter- begin-
crimetheiractivities—that
way to a new home. displace or ultimately
The lives of those whokill national
sur- ning toCarr,
thewith
E. H.
lines
threats the of
(1939), The
race, gender,
Spanish
represented conquest
Twenty Years’ Crisisby
andand
gangs,
1919–1939:
class;
Anorganized
2) a crime,
occupation
Introduction to the
process of the
Study of International
people. Th e forcibly displaced are further
vive the fi rst two stages of the process are managed by exposed to starting
Twentieth-century
Relations with(London: structural
classical
and sexual violence; and 3) the management of peo-
Macmillan). and
realism
An important accumulation
critique of liberal idealism. projects
Morgenthau, H. J. (1948), Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
gangs,legal
organized crime, and sexual
and administrative violence
apparatuses suchwhile on
as migra- that
ple displace
Carr, byH.legal
E.
Alfred (1939),
A. Knopf). people,
and The Twenty
A foundational whotext
administrative are
Years’ indiscipline
Crisis
for the turn
apparatuses further
1919–1939:
of International An exposed
such
Intr as
Relations.
their tion
way andto a asylum
new home. The From
systems. lives of those
this who sur-the tomigration
perspective, the
Relationsthreats
Structural realism
and
(London: represented
asylum Macmillan). systems,by Angangs,
which
important organized
expel critique people ofcrime,to idealism.
liberal
vive the fi rst two stages of the process are managed by andKeohane,
sexual
Morgenthau,
R. O.violence;
H. J. (1948),
(ed.) (1986), Neorealismand 3)
Politics
andthe
among management
its Critics
Nations: The
(New York: Columbia ofUniversity
Struggle peo- for Po
Press). This
legal and administrative apparatuses such as migra- Alfred
collection A. Knopf).
of essays A foundational
ple by legal and administrative apparatuses such as of realism by
includes key chapters bytext for
Kenneth the
Waltz, discipline
an interesting of International
defence R
How to use the online resources

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 List of case studies

Case Study 1.1 Rubbishing globalization: the crisis in toxic trade ······························································ 25
Case Study 1.2 Globalization 4.0: the next phase ··························································································· 30

Case Study 2.1 The standard of civilization ······································································································ 50

Case Study 2.2 Imperialism with Chinese characteristics ············································································· 51

Case Study 3.1 China’s cold wars ························································································································· 62

Case Study 3.2 The Cuban missile crisis ············································································································· 63

Case Study 4.1 Russia and the West: a new cold war? ··················································································· 73
Case Study 4.2 Populism, globalization, and the end of the liberal order? ············································· 81

Case Study 5.1 The BRICS ······································································································································ 88

Case Study 5.2 Brazil ················································································································································ 89

Case Study 6.1 The 1990–1 Gulf War and a ‘new world order’ ·································································108
Case Study 6.2 Imperialism and internationalism in nineteenth-century Britain ································112

Case Study 7.1 The Naxalite Rebellion in India ·····························································································116

Case Study 7.2 Greece and the disciplining power of capitalism ·····························································117

Case Study 8.1 The Melian dialogue—realism and the preparation for war ··········································134
Case Study 8.2 Strategic partnerships with ‘friendly’ dictators ·································································141

Case Study 9.1 Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom ··················································149
Case Study 9.2 The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan ·····································155

Case Study 10.1 The Buen Vivir movement ······································································································162

Case Study 10.2 The debate over ‘failed states’ ·······························································································171

Case Study 11.1 Discourses on the Ebola outbreak in 2014 ········································································182

Case Study 11.2 Foreign policy and the construction of identity—Russian discourse on Crimea ·····188

Case Study 12.1 Social construction of refugees and the contemporary migration crisis ···················199
Case Study 12.2 The ‘human rights revolution’ ································································································203

Case Study 13.1 Ethics of migration ····················································································································213

Case Study 13.2 Targeting civilians and non-combatant immunity ···························································219

Case Study 14.1 War and Eurocentrism: the Second World War ································································229
Case Study 14.2 War and society: France, the United States, and Vietnam ·············································231

Case Study 15.1 Insecurity in the post-cold war world: the Democratic Republic of Congo ·············243
Case Study 15.2 Growing tensions in the South and East China Seas ·······················································249

Case Study 16.1 The BRICs and the rise of China ····························································································264
Case Study 16.2 Slavery and forced labour in global production ·······························································267
 List of case studies xxiii
Case Study 17.1 Female guerrillas in the El Salvadoran civil war ································································279
Case Study 17.2 Neo-slavery and care labour in Asia ····················································································283

Case Study 18.1 The Universal Negro Improvement Association and African
Communities League (UNIA-ACL) ························································································293
Case Study 18.2 Race, caste, and Dalits ··············································································································299

Case Study 19.1 Is international law an expression of Western dominance? ··········································307

Case Study 19.2 Individual criminal accountability and the non-Western world ··································313

Case Study 20.1 Challenging or upholding the international order? The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank ························································································································322
Case Study 20.2 The limits to IO action: UNCTAD and the Group of 77 (G77) ·······································330

Case Study 21.1 UN peacekeeping in the Congo ····························································································340

Case Study 21.2 The 2003 intervention in Iraq ································································································343

Case Study 22.1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 ‘Women, Peace
and Security’ and NGOs ··········································································································357
Case Study 22.2 Migrants and NGO search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean Sea ·············359

Case Study 23.1 Central America: a perpetual pursuit of union? ·······························································371

Case Study 23.2 Regionalism in Southeast Asia—beyond intergovernmentalism? ································375

Case Study 24.1 Common but differentiated responsibilities? ····································································397

Case Study 24.2 The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) ········································································398

Case Study 25.1 Illegalizing refugees: the case of the Rohingya ·································································411
Case Study 25.2 Geographies rich in resources, and forced migration in Central America ················413

Case Study 26.1 Hunger in Haiti: food security and rice imports ·······························································424
Case Study 26.2 Multidimensional poverty alleviation in Himachal Pradesh ·········································428

Case Study 27.1 The Chinese currency and the US trade deficit ································································437
Case Study 27.2 Tax havens and overseas aid budgets ··················································································445

Case Study 28.1 Three generations of violent Islamic extremists ·······························································457

Case Study 28.2 The 2016 Lahore terrorist attack ···························································································461

Case Study 29.1 Nuclear programmes: North Korea and Iran ·····································································470
Case Study 29.2 Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster ······················································································471

Case Study 30.1 Kurdish nationalism and Kurdistan ······················································································483

Case Study 30.2 Germany ······································································································································488
Case Study 30.3 India ··············································································································································492
Case Study 30.4 Yugoslavia ····································································································································493

Case Study 31.1 The Islamic veil ban ··················································································································506

Case Study 31.2 Same-sex relationships and LGBTQ rights in Uganda ·····················································507

Case Study 32.1 Darfur: barriers to intervention ·····························································································518

Case Study 32.2 The role of Middle Eastern governments in Operation Unified Protector
(Libya, 2011) ·······························································································································524
 About the contributors

Tarak Barkawi is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and
Political Science.

Michael Barnett is University Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at the George
Washington University.

John Baylis is Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations and a former Pro-Vice-
Chancellor at Swansea University.

Alex J. Bellamy is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for
the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland.

Edward Best is Head of Unit at the European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, and
Senior Fellow of Maastricht University.

John Breuilly is Emeritus Professor of Nationalism and Ethnicity, London School of Economics and
Political Science.

Thomas Christiansen is Professor of Political Science and European Integration at Luiss Università
Guido Carli in Rome, Italy.

Michael Cox is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the London School of Economics
and Political Science and Director of LSE Ideas.

Devon E. A. Curtis is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the
University of Cambridge.

Tim Dunne is Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, where he is also
Pro-Vice-Chancellor.

Ariadna Estévez is a Professor at the Centre for Research on North America, the National
Autonomous University of Mexico.

Tony Evans was Professor of Global Politics at the University of Southampton.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri.

Lene Hansen is Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen.

Stephen Hobden is Reader in International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences,

University of East London.

Andrew Hurrell is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University.

Jutta Joachim is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the
Netherlands.
Another random document with
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Haugwitz in Brünn. The hint was sufficient to induce Savary to
decline the company of Novosiltzov.
When Savary informed the emperor of the illusion of the Russian
generals, and of their belief that fears were entertained of the
Russians, and that on this account embassies were sent to seek for
peace—Napoleon very cunningly took care to strengthen the fools in
their folly. Savary was sent again to the enemy’s camp to propose an
interview between Napoleon and the emperor of Russia. The
interview was declined; but Prince Dolgoruki was sent to propose
conditions to Napoleon. The latter did not allow him to come into his
camp, but received him at the outposts.
If it be asked why the Russians, with whom there were only some
twenty thousand Austrians, did not wait for their third army, under
Bennigsen, or reduce Bonaparte to the greatest perplexity, by taking
up a strong position in Hungary or Upper Silesia, or remaining quietly
upon the heights of Pratzen, the reply is, that the whole system of
supplies was bad, and that want had reached so great a pitch, that it
would have been impossible for them to remain. Certain it is that
they suffered themselves to be drawn down from the heights, and
away from Austerlitz, near Brünn, where the talents of their generals
were unable to devise any plan of battle which Napoleon could not
immediately oversee; it would have been otherwise in the mountains.
The French allege, that Napoleon had long before fixed upon the
very place in which the Russians offered him battle at Austerlitz, on
the 2nd of December, as his battle-field, and laid all his plans
accordingly. The possession of the heights of Pratzen was regarded
by those skilled in strategy as the key of this battle-field. The
Russians were in full possession of these heights, with all their force,
on the 1st of December; on the 2nd they descended from them,
when Bonaparte drew back one of the wings of his army. He had
long calculated on gaining the victory by the possession of these
heights, and thus rendering the retreat of the Russians impossible.
He did not, therefore, fail, in the very opening of the battle, to seize
upon them.
A column of the third Russian army, under Bennigsen,
commanded by Michelson, just arrived at the decisive moment when
Napoleon had also called to his aid Bernadotte’s corps, and when
the Bavarians were on their march from Budweis to Moravia; but
none of their leaders could lay any claim to the reputation of a
commander of genius. Napoleon’s proclamation to his army shows
his full confidence in his own superiority, as well as in that of his
generals and soldiers; and this confidence was fully realised on the
bloody field of Austerlitz on the 2nd of December.

THE CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU AND FRIEDLAND (1806-1807 A.D.)

After the defeat at Austerlitz the emperor

[1806 a.d.] made an attempt, whether sincere or not is
uncertain, for a reconciliation with Napoleon. He
sent D’Oubril to Paris, who, after a negotiation of ten days,
concluded a treaty with the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke
(July 20th, 1806). But Alexander refused to ratify the treaty, upon the
very questionable allegation that his ambassador had exceeded his
powers.
Prussia now suffered the just consequences of her policy.
Disappointed in her hopes of acquiring Hanover, the reward for
which she crouched to Napoleon, she imprudently provoked him to
war without waiting for the arrival of the aid due to her by Russia.
The campaign was decided in one day by the two terrific defeats of
Jena and Auerstadt (October 14th, 1806). Prussia was hopelessly
ruined before the Russian armies, ninety thousand strong, under
Bennigsen and Buxhövden, could arrive to save her. The Russians
entered Prussia in November, and on the 26th of December the
battle of Pultusk was fought with great obstinacy and loss of blood
on both sides. The French spent the whole of a December night
without covering; rain and snow fell incessantly; they waded up to
their knees in marshes, spent twelve hours in making an advance of
eight miles, and were obliged to pay dearly for their passage over
the Narev. During the battle, Marshal Lannes and other generals
were several times obliged to put themselves at the head of single
regiments and battalions, and yet no decisive advantage was
gained. The French, indeed, boasted of the victory; because the
Russians, after having maintained their ground on a part of the field,
retreated the next day.
If the victory at Pultusk, of which Bennigsen boasted, and on
account of which he was afterwards rewarded by his emperor, and
appointed commander-in-chief, was very doubtful, on the other hand,
Prince Galitzin completely defeated the French at Golymin, on the
very day on which they were to attack Buxhövden, at Ostrolenka.
This victory, too, was the more glorious, inasmuch as the Russians
were less numerous than their opponents. The French, however, had
not been able to bring up their artillery; and the superiority of the
Russians in this particular decided the event. The weather and the
time of the year rendered active operations impossible for some
weeks. Bennigsen retired to Ostrolenka, and afterwards still farther;
whilst the French, under Ney and Bernadotte, were scattered in the
country on the farther side of the Vistula, in which Ney at length
pushed forward as far as Heilsberg.
In January, 1807, Bennigsen and Napoleon
[1807 a.d.] came, almost simultaneously, upon the idea of
changing the seat of war from the extreme east
to the west. In the east, the struggle was afterwards carried on by
two particular corps—a Russian, under Essen, and a French, first
under Lannes, and then under Savary. This bloody struggle,
however, had no influence on the issue of the war. Bennigsen no
sooner learned that Ney had scattered his troops widely over the
country on the farther side of the Vistula, than he broke up his
quarters, and resolved to attack him, before Bernadotte, who was
near, could come to his relief; but he was too late. Ney had already
retreated when Bennigsen arrived; whether it was as the French
allege, because Napoleon, who had seen the danger with which he
was threatened, sent him orders to retreat, which arrived on the very
day on which he was to be attacked by the Russians, or that General
Markov was at first too eager, and Bennigsen afterwards too
irresolute. Ney luckily marched from Heilsberg, nearer to the Vistula,
and Bennigsen followed him hesitatingly, so that Bernadotte was
able to keep him employed for some days till Napoleon came up. On
receiving news of Bennigsen’s march, the French emperor had sent
orders to all his corps to renew the campaign on the 27th, and he
had so taken his measures, that before the Russians had any
suspicion of an attack, the main army of the French would fall upon
their left flank, whilst they were on their march. For this purpose,
Bernadotte was to allure Bennigsen quite to the Vistula; and then to
advance again as soon as Napoleon had outflanked the left of the
Russians.
The despatch containing these orders for Bernadotte fell into the
hands of the Russians, through the inexperience of the officer
entrusted with it, who failed to destroy the document at the right time.
Thus warned of the impending danger, and finding themselves
pressed on all sides, they allowed their stores and heavy baggage,
at various places, to fall into the hands of the enemy, and thereby
escaped being surrounded. After considerable sacrifices, they
succeeded, on the 6th of February, in reaching the Prussian town of
Eylau, which is only nine hours’ distance from Königsberg. Soult
attacked their rear, on the low hills behind the town, on the 7th, and
drove them in; on the following day a general engagement took
place. The honour of the victory is probably due to the Russians, as
even Savary admits, who shared in the battle. It is not less certain,
however, that the whole advantage accrued to the French, who,
indeed, admit that the battle was one of the most dreadful recorded
in history. The French accuse Bernadotte of having, by his delay,
prevented the victory from being complete; whilst the Russians are
just enough to admit that Lestocq, with his Prussians, saved their
wing from utter defeat. The number of deaths in the battle, and on
the day preceding it, was immense. Great numbers fell, not by the
sword, but by cold, want, and excessive exertion. Whole battalions
and regiments of the French—as, for example, that of Colonel
Sémelé—were literally annihilated. Few prisoners were made,
because the whole battle was fought with the bayonet.
The royal family of Prussia was placed in a very melancholy
position by the issue of the battle, for they were obliged, in the
middle of winter, to flee to Menel, where they found themselves
among Russians, of whom their own emperor alleged, that,
notwithstanding his despotic power, he was not able to restrain their
barbarity, or to put a stop to their rapacity. Here, in the farthest corner
of Prussia, they received news every month of the fall of one fortress
after another, or of forced contributions levied upon their people.
The French army also retired after the battle of Eylau as well as
the Russians. Bennigsen marched towards Königsberg, and
although Berthier, on the morning of the 7th, wrote to the empress
that they would be in Königsberg with their army on the following
day, the French, nevertheless, drew off nearer to the Vistula. Nothing
important was undertaken by either party for some months, but
vigorous preparations were made for a new struggle; whilst new
means were tried to prevent Prussia from taking any energetic
measures—that is, from forming a close union with England and
Russia. The king hesitated between the bold advice of Hardenberg
and his friends, and the unconditional submission to the will of
Napoleon, which was recommended by von Zastrov. The Russians
were thoroughly dissatisfied with the English, and complained of
being very badly supported by them; they suffered want of all kinds,
were worse treated in many places in Prussia than the French, and
even borrowed 660,000 dollars in coin from the king of Prussia.
Hardenberg, who accompanied his master to Tilsit, succeeded in
having a new treaty entered into at Bartenstein between Russia and
Prussia. Its principle was the same as that of the agreement made
on the 12th of October, of the preceding year, at Grodno, by virtue of
which the emperor bound himself to support the cause of the king
with all his forces. In this treaty, it was not only promised, just as if
they were before Paris, that Prussia should receive back all that had
been lost, but it was formally determined what was to be done with
the conquests wrested from France, and how even the left bank of
the Rhine was to be partitioned among the allies.
About this time Bennigsen was appointed commander-in-chief of
the Russian armies; but he is generally accused of incapacity, and
fearful descriptions are given of the disorders, fraud, and
embezzlement which prevailed, and of the plunder and barbarity
which they practised against unfortunate Prussia. The emperor
Alexander, as soon as he arrived at the army, did everything in his
power to restore order; he was able, however, only to remedy single
abuses; even Nicholas, who manifests a degree of severity from
which Alexander shrank back, is not able to reach the source of the
evil. Towards the end of May, Bennigsen thought his troops already
sufficiently reinforced to make an attack upon the French, and drive
them across the Vistula; whilst the combined army of English,
Swedes, and Prussians, were to make an attack from Pomerania.
The French army, lying from Dantzic to the Narev, was brought,
before the beginning of June, when the campaign commenced, to
150,000 men, whose pay and sustenance were drawn from the
requisitions and contributions imposed on Prussia. In April, 1807, the
French senate passed a decree levying 80,000 conscripts, 60,000 of
whom were to be immediately sent to the army; and the Poles, too,
deceived by the hope of the restoration of their nationality, raised a
body of between 25,000 and 30,000 men, among whom were whole
regiments recruited by the Polish nobility, or formed exclusively of
nobles who volunteered their service, although Napoleon limited all
the expectations of the Poles to the country on this side of the
Vistula.
As soon as Bennigsen, in the beginning of June, made a serious
movement in advance towards the Vistula, a series of murderous
engagements began, similar to those which preceded the battle of
Eylau; on the 9th, the main body of both armies came in sight of
each other at Heilsberg, and on the 10th the French made an
attempt to drive the Russians from their position. The united corps of
Soult and Lannes, supported by the cavalry under Murat, made
repeated attempts to force the Russians to give way; they, however,
kept their ground.
Bennigsen afterwards heard, at Wehlau, that the French had
separated into two divisions, and he resolved on the 13th, instead of
continuing his route on the farther side of the Alle, to wheel about
before Wehlau, and attack the French. By this step, as all writers
admit, he gave himself into the hands of his great opponent, who
never suffered his enemy to commit a fault with impunity. The
position taken up by Bennigsen was such as to leave him no
alternative between victory and destruction, for he had the Alle in his
rear, and a marsh on one flank. Napoleon took advantage of this
mistake, as usual; and the orders which he issued before the battle
prove that he was sure of the victory. About five o’clock in the
evening of the 14th of June, a battery of twenty guns gave the signal
for the fight; it was bravely maintained on both sides, and both
armies suffered great loss. The French accounts exaggerate the
number of the Russians who were led into the battle of Friedland, as
well as the number of prisoners: certain it is, however, that
seventeen thousand Russians were either killed or wounded.
After the battle of Friedland, there was no longer any account to
be taken of the Prussians: and it was a piece of great good fortune
that such a sovereign as Alexander reigned in Russia, otherwise
Prussia would have been wholly lost. Lestocq, with his Prussians,
was obliged hastily to cross the Haff to Memel; and their magazines,
considerable stores of powder and ammunition, together with one
hundred thousand muskets, which the English had sent by sea to
Königsberg, fell, with the town, into the hands of the French.
Bennigsen was not very closely pursued on the other side of the
Alle; he passed the Niemen on the 19th, and burned down the bridge
behind him; immediately afterwards, Bonaparte arrived in Tilsit. Of all
the Prussian fortresses, Colberg alone might have been able to
maintain itself for some weeks, and Graudenz was saved merely by
the peace. The treaty with England, which the Prussian minister
signed in London on the 17th of June, and by which £1,000,000
sterling was promised in subsidies, came too late.
Schladen informs us that all those who were about the king of
Prussia had so completely lost courage, that Von Hardenberg, Von
Stein, Von Schladen himself, and many others who recommended
perseverance, found none upon whom they could reckon. With
respect to the Russians, he informs us that there was a party who
assumed a threatening aspect—that the army was dissatisfied with
the war—that the grand duke Constantine behaved often very rudely
towards the Prussians, and allowed himself to be used as an
instrument for working on the fears of his brother Alexander. On the
7th of June, the emperor manifested a disposition altogether contrary
to the agreements and partition-projects of the convention of
Bartenstein. He was dissatisfied with England, and perceived that
the Austrians had no other object than to fish in troubled water, and
he was, therefore, desirous, as much as possible, to withdraw from
the whole affair. He proposed a truce for himself, with a clause that
the Prussians also should obtain a cessation of hostilities; but the
Russians and Prussians were to negotiate each for themselves
respecting the conditions. Napoleon having entertained the proposal,
Russia agreed, that during the continuance of the truce, the French
should retain possession of the whole of Poland, except the circle of
Bielostok. The agreement was signed on the 21st, and a four weeks’
notice of the renewal of hostilities was reserved. By the terms of the
truce granted to Prussia, the French remained in possession of the
whole kingdom; and the few fortresses which were not yet reduced
were not to be supplied either with new works, ammunition, or
provisions. Blücher, who commanded the Prussian auxiliary forces in
Pomerania, was to leave the king of Sweden to his fate. The peace
was to be negotiated at Tilsit, and for that purpose one half of the
town was to be declared neutral.k

Meeting of Alexander and Napoleon at Tilsit (1807 A.D.)

Napoleon desired, as far as means and powers would allow, to

give all possible pomp and solemnity to the interview with his mighty
adversary. With this object, in the middle of the Niemen, opposite
Tilsit, a raft was constructed, on which were two pavilions, covered in
white cloth. The one which was destined for the two monarchs was
of vaster dimensions and was adorned with all possible luxury; the
other and smaller one was for their suites. On the frontals of the
pavilions were painted in green, on the Russian side, an enormous
A, and on the side turned towards Tilsit an N of equal size. To the
annoyance of the Prussians, the monogram of Frederick William III
was absent from the decorations of the Niemen raft. The French
guards were ranged in lines, fronting the river. “All this army,” writes
an eye-witness, “awaited the appearance of their invincible leader,
their thunder-bearing semi-divinity, in order to greet him at the
moment of his swift passage to the wharf.” Thousands of the
inhabitants of Tilsit and French soldiers covered the high left bank of
the Niemen.
 The emperors got into the boats simultaneously. When both boats
put off, the grandeur of the spectacle, the expectation of an event of
world-wide importance took the ascendency over all other feelings.
Universal attention was concentrated upon the boat that carried that
wonderful man, that leader of armies, the like of whom had never
been seen or heard of since the times of Alexander the Great and
Julius Cæsar. Napoleon stood on the boat in front of his suite,
solitary and silent, his arms folded on his breast as he is represented
in pictures. He wore the uniform of the Old Guard and the ribbon of
the Legion of Honour across his shoulder, and on his head that little
historical hat, the form of which has become famous throughout the
world. Reaching the raft somewhat sooner than Alexander, Napoleon
rapidly got onto it, and hastened to meet the emperor. The rivals
embraced and silently entered the pavilion, accompanied by the
joyful acclamations of the troops and the inhabitants, who were
witnesses of a world-wide event—the reconciliation of Russia and
France. At that moment a large boat put off from the left bank of the
Niemen, having on it about twenty armed soldiers—and remained
between the raft and the Russian shore. Evidently Napoleon did not
hesitate to take open measures of safeguarding against any possible
unforeseen occurrences.
That day the king of Prussia did not assist at the interview:
Napoleon did not wish to see him, and Frederick William remained
on the right bank of the Niemen. “In that fateful hour, whilst the
destiny of his monarchy was being decided, his gaze was constantly
fixed and his ear directed towards the raft, as though he desired to
listen to the conversation between the two emperors. Once he went
down to the edge of the river and only stopped when the water was
up to his horse’s middle.” The first interview between Alexander and
Napoleon lasted an hour and fifteen minutes. “I detest the English no
less than you do,” were the first words of the emperor Alexander,
“and I am ready to support you in everything that you undertake
against them.” “If such is the case,” answered Napoleon, “then
everything can be arranged and peace secured.”
Taking advantage of Alexander’s inimical disposition towards
Great Britain, Napoleon entered upon a terrible philippic against the
perfidy of Albion, representing it as a greedy, extortionate nation ever
ready to sacrifice everyone, even its most faithful allies, for its own
profit. In further conversation Napoleon strove to instil into Alexander
that he was victimised by his allies, that he was mistaken in
protecting the Germans, those ungrateful and envious neighbours,
and in supporting the interests of a set of greedy merchants who
showed themselves to be the representatives of England; all this
was occasioned, according to him, by a feeling of generosity carried
to excess, and by doubts which arose from the incapacity or
corruption of ministers. After this Napoleon began to praise the
valour and bravery of the Russian troops, with which he had been
much struck at Austerlitz, Eylau, and Friedland; he considered that
the soldiers on both sides had fought like veritable Titans and was of
the opinion that the united armies of Russia and France might
dominate the world, and give to it prosperity and tranquillity. Up till
now Russia had squandered her forces, without having any
recompense in view; by an alliance with France she would acquire
glory, and in any case reap substantial advantages. Of course
Russia was bound by certain obligations to Prussia, and in that
respect it was indispensable that the honour of the emperor
Alexander should be carefully guarded. In conclusion Napoleon
expressed his intention of restoring to Prussia sufficient territory
honourably to rid the emperor of his ally; after that, he affirmed, the
Russian cabinet would be in a position to pursue a fresh line of
policy similar in everything to that of the great Catherine. Only such a
policy, in Napoleon’s opinion, could be possible and advantageous
for Russia.
Having flattered Alexander as emperor, Napoleon in order to
complete the charm proceeded to flatter him as a man. “We shall
come to an agreement sooner,” said he, “if we enter upon
negotiations without intermediaries, setting aside ministers, who
frequently deceive or do not understand us; we two together shall
advance matters more in a single hour than our intermediaries in
several days. Nobody must come between you and me; I will be your
secretary and you shall be mine,” added Napoleon. Upon this basis
he proposed to the emperor Alexander for convenience’s sake to
transfer the negotiations to Tilsit, declaring the position of the town to
be a central one. The emperor gladly accepted Napoleon’s invitation,
and it was settled that negotiations should at once be entered upon
in order to come to a definitive agreement[55] on the matter.g

RUSSIA DECLARES WAR AGAINST ENGLAND (1807 A.D.)

The English government, alleging that in the secret articles of the

treaty of Tilsit, of which they had possessed themselves, they had
proof of Napoleon’s design to seize the Danish fleet, fitted out an
expedition against Denmark with extraordinary celerity. Copenhagen
was bombarded for three days, and a great part of the city
destroyed. The Danes then capitulated (September 7), and
surrendered their fleet to the English, with all their naval stores in
their arsenals and dockyards.
The expedition against Copenhagen was soon followed by a
declaration of war on the part of Russia against England. In the
manifesto published on this occasion (September 16th), Alexander
complained bitterly of the bad faith of England, as manifested
especially in the little aid she had afforded to the allies who had
taken up arms in a cause in which she was more directly interested
than any other power, and in the robber-like act of aggression she
had committed against Denmark. He annulled all former conventions
between Russia and England, especially that of 1801; proclaimed
anew the principle of the armed neutrality; and declared that there
should be no communication between the two powers until Denmark
had received just compensation, and peace was concluded between
France and England. In consequence of this declaration, an
embargo was laid on all the English vessels in Russian ports, and
Prussia was compelled to follow this example.

THE CONQUEST OF FINLAND (1807 A.D.)

It was not till the 6th of October that a formal demand was made
upon Sweden to close the ports of the Baltic against English ships
and trade. The king persevered in his alliance with England; and
finally, because the emperor of Russia had conferred upon Napoleon
the order of St. Andrew, he sent back his insignia; whereupon
Alexander not only returned his Swedish order, but quietly adopted
measures to take possession of Finland, whilst the Danes were
preparing, in concert with the French, to invade the western
provinces of Sweden. Although in the months of November and
December, Gustavus repeatedly declined the proposals of the
Russians for a union against England, everything went on in Sweden
as in times of the most profound peace; and even when the Russian
forces were collected on the very frontiers of Finland, the unfortunate
king adopted no measures of defence whatever. On the 21st of
January he was, for the last time, called upon to declare war against
England; he replied by concluding a new alliance with her on the 8th
of February. On the 21st, the Russians invaded Finland, without any
specific declaration of war, and on the 14th of March, 1808, Denmark
declared war against Sweden. The whole of Finland as far as Vasa,
the island of Åland, and even the islands of Gotland, Åbo, Sveaborg,
and all the fortresses, were taken possession of by the Russians
even before the Swedish army and fleet were prepared. It was not till
the end of April and beginning of May that a Swedish army under
Klingspor and Aldercreutz, supported by a Swedish fleet, appeared
in the field, and fought with various success.
We have lately seen Alexander take military possession of the
Danubian provinces as a “material guarantee,” whilst affecting not to
be at war with Turkey. This was in exact conformity with Russian
precedents. Finland, as we have said, was occupied without a
declaration of war; but manifestoes were issued by General
Buxhövden, one of which contained the following passage: “Good
neighbours, it is with the greatest regret that my most gracious
master, the emperor of all the Russias, sees himself forced to send
into your country the troops under my orders. But his majesty the
king of Sweden, whilst withdrawing more and more from the happy
alliance of the two greatest empires in the world, draws closer his
connections with the common enemy, whose oppressive system and
unparalleled conduct towards the most intimate allies of Russia and
of Sweden herself cannot be coolly endured by his imperial majesty.
These motives, as well as the regard which his imperial majesty
owes to the safety of his own states, oblige him to place your country
under his protection, and to take possession of it in order to procure
by these means a sufficient guarantee in case his Swedish majesty
should persevere in the resolution not to accept the equitable
conditions of peace that have been proposed to him, etc.”
When the Russians took possession of Finland, the king gave
them a pretence for incorporating it with their empire, which,
however, they would no doubt have done in any case. He caused
Alopeus, the Russian ambassador, to be arrested. This took place
on the 3rd of March, and on the 25th a declaration was published on
the part of the emperor of Russia, announcing to all the powers that
“from that moment he regards the part of Finland hitherto reputed
Swedish, and which his troops had only been able to occupy after
divers battles, as a province conquered by his arms, and that he
unites it forever to his empire.”
It was easy to anticipate that the superior force of the Russians
must in the end prevail; although the Russian garrison in Gotland,
and that in the island of Åland, were at first taken prisoners, the
island occupied, and the Russians beaten by land at Vasa on the
26th of July, and by sea at Roggerwick on the 26th of August. The
Swedes lost all the advantages they had thus gained by the bloody
battle fought at Ormais on the 14th of September, and by the defeat
at Lokalar on the 18th. The Russian generals, probably in order to
give courage to the malcontents, who were very numerous in
Sweden, issued orders not to receive any letters or any flags of truce
which were sent in the king’s name, and carried on negotiations with
the Swedish generals alone, for a suspension of arms, which was
concluded for an indefinite time, on the 20th of September, but only
continued till the 27th of October, when the Russians resumed
hostilities, and the Swedes were driven to the north, across the
Kemistrom. On the 20th of November a new truce was agreed upon
between the Swedish general Adlercreutz and the Russian general
Kamenskoi, with the reserve of fourteen days’ notice before renewal
of operations. By the conditions of this agreement the Swedes were
to evacuate the whole of Uleåborg, and to retire completely behind
the Kemistrom, with all their artillery, arms, and stores.
 On the 13th of March in the following year a revolution was
effected in Sweden, by which Gustavus was deposed; his uncle, the
duke of Södermanland, became regent, and was afterwards
proclaimed king (June 5, 1809) under the title of Charles XIII. At
Stockholm the people flattered themselves that the dethronement of
Gustavus would speedily bring peace to Sweden; but it was not so.
Alexander refused to treat with a government so insecure as a
regency, and hostilities continued. General Knorring who had passed
the Gulf of Bothnia on the ice with twenty-five thousand Russians,
took possession of the Åland islands, and granted the Swedes a
cessation of hostilities, to allow them time to make overtures of
peace. Apprised of this arrangement, Barclay de Tolly, who had
crossed the gulf with another body of Russians towards Vasa, and
taken possession of Umeå, evacuated west Bothnia, and returned to
Finland. A third Russian army, under Shuvalov penetrated into west
Bothnia by the Torneå route, and compelled the Swedish army of the
north under Gripenberg to lay down their arms (March 25th). This
sanguinary affair occurred entirely through ignorance; because in
that country, lying under the 66th degree of north latitude, they were
not aware of the armistice granted by Knorring. On the expiry of the
truce, hostilities began again in May, and the Russians took
possession of the part of west Bothnia lying north of Umeå.
The peace between Russia and Sweden was signed at
Frederikshamm on the 17th of September. The latter power adhered
to the continental system, reserving to herself the importation of salt
and such colonial produce as she could not do without. She
surrendered Finland, with the whole of east Bothnia, and a part of
west Bothnia lying eastward of the river Torneå. The cession of these
provinces, which formed the granary of Sweden and contained a
population of 900,000 souls, was an irreparable loss to that kingdom
which had only 2,344,000 inhabitants left. In the following year
Bernadotte, prince of Ponte Corvo, was elected crown prince of
Sweden, and eventual successor to the throne, under the name of
Charles John.
The loss of Finland had been but slightly retarded by some
advantages gained over the Russian fleet by the combined
squadrons of England and Sweden. The Russian vessels remained
blockaded on the coast of Esthonia, but in an unassailable position,
from which they were at last delivered by the weather and the
exigencies of navigation in those dangerous seas. Another Russian
fleet under Admiral Siniavin, which sailed to Portugal to co-operate
with the French against the English, was obliged to surrender to
Admiral Cotton after the convention of Cintra. It was afterwards
restored to Russia. The war declared by that power against England
in 1807, was little more than nominal, and was marked by no events
of importance.

WAR WITH PERSIA AND WITH TURKEY

The annexation of Georgia to Russia, effected as we have seen, in

the beginning of Alexander’s reign, drew him into a war with Persia,
which did not terminate until 1813. The principal events of that war
were the defeat of the Persians at Etchmiadzin by Prince Zitzianov
(June 20, 1804); the conquest of the province of Shirvan by the
same commander (January, 1806); the taking of Derbent by the
Russians (July 3rd); and the defeat of the Persians by Paulucci, at
Alkolwalaki (September 1st, 1810).
About 1805 the condition of the Ottoman Empire, badly organised
and worse governed, was such that everything presaged its
approaching dissolution. Everywhere the sultan’s authority was
disregarded. Paswan Oglu, pasha of Widdin, was in open revolt. Ali
Pasha of Janina was obedient only when it suited his convenience.
Djezzar, the pasha of Syria, without declaring himself an enemy to
the Porte, enjoyed an absolute independence. The sect of the
Wahhabees was in possession of Arabia. After the departure of the
English from Egypt, first the beys, and afterwards Muhammed Ali
reigned over that country, and only paid their yearly tribute to the
sultan when they pleased. In Servia, Czerni George was making
himself independent prince of the Slavonians of the Danube. Ipsilanti
and Morusi, both Greeks, by the permission, or rather by the
command of Russia, were appointed hospodars of Moldavia and
Wallachia, for seven years at least, and were therefore rather
subjects of the Russians than of the Turks. Selim III, who had
reigned since 1789, convinced that the Porte could never re-
establish its authority except by better organising the army, had
endeavoured to model it on the European system. This attempt
afterwards cost him his throne.
The English and Russian ambassadors ruled either alternately or
together in Constantinople. But for their interference the old
friendship between France and the Porte would most likely have
been restored in July, 1802. At the time of the foundation of the
empire in France, the sultan hesitated long whether he would lean
upon the English and Russian, or upon the French influence, for he
felt a great want of confidence in Napoleon, since he had been
informed by the English of the language which fell from the emperor
in conversation with Lord Whitworth. He was reported to have taken
the partition of Turkey for granted—as a thing unavoidable; and that
on such partition the province of Egypt ought necessarily to fall to the
share of France. This conversation was printed, in 1803, among the
documents connected with the renewal of the war between England
and France, and was communicated to the sultan. The French,
indeed, in their official journals, contradicted the allegation; but who
ever put any faith in their official journals?
On this ground we must explain the fact that the Turks favoured
the Russians in the war which they were carrying on with the
Persians; suffered them to sail up the Rion (ancient Phasis), and
even to build a fort at its mouth. They were even desirous of
renewing the friendly alliance formed with Russia in 1798, which
renewal, indeed, the emperor of Russia was afterwards unwilling to
confirm, because the English had taken care to have the inviolability
of the Turkish Empire incorporated in the treaty of 1798. Had,
therefore, the emperor of Russia ratified the alliance, he would have
guaranteed to the Turks the actual condition of their empire in
Europe, which he did not wish to do. This excited the suspicion of
the Turks, who inclined more and more towards the French, and did
not suffer themselves to be frightened by the threats of the English
and Russians. Immediately after the Peace of Presburg, the Turks,
who had previously acknowledged Napoleon’s empire, sent a new
ambassador to Paris. In return, Napoleon sent engineers, officers,
artillerymen, workmen, and materials, in order to enable the sultan to
improve his army, artillery, and the bulwarks of his empire; whilst, on
the other hand, the Russian ambassador, Italinski, and the English
ambassador, Arbuthnot, threatened war if the alliance with the
French was not relinquished; and Italinski’s threats fell with a double
weight because a corps of Russians were ready for action on the
Bug.
About the time at which Napoleon adopted the resolution of
attacking Prussia also, and therefore foresaw a war with Russia, a
Turkish army was assembled to take the field against the Russians
on the Turkish frontiers, and Napoleon clearly saw how
advantageous to him a war between the Russians and the Turks
would be. He therefore sent General Sébastiani as ambassador
extraordinary to Constantinople. Sébastiani arrived there in August,
1806; and soon gained so great an influence that for some time the
Divan was entirely under his direction. At his instance it refused to
renew the treaty of alliance with England, which was on the point of
expiring; and it dismissed Ipsilanti and Morusi, as creatures of
Russia, from their offices. In consequence of the threatening
language held by Arbuthnot, the English ambassador, they were
reinstated; but when this took place hostilities had already begun.
The emperor Alexander had ordered General Michelson to enter
Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte then declared war against Russia
(December 30th); but deviating for the first time from a barbarous
custom, it allowed Italinski, the Russian minister, to depart
unmolested.
A few days afterwards, Arbuthnot quitted Constantinople, after
having repeatedly demanded the renewal of the alliance and the
expulsion of Sébastiani. On the 19th of February, 1807, an English
fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Duckworth, forced the passage of
the Dardanelles, and appeared before Constantinople. Duckworth
demanded of the Divan that the forts of the Dardanelles and the
Turkish fleet should be surrendered to him; that the Porte should
cede Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, and break off alliance with
Napoleon. But instead of profiting by the sudden panic which his
appearance had excited, he allowed the Turks time to put
themselves in a posture of defence. Encouraged and instructed by
Sébastiani, they made their preparations with such energy and
success that in the course of eight days the English vice-admiral
found that he could not do better than weigh anchor and repass the
Dardanelles.
Shortly afterwards Admiral Siniavin appeared in the Archipelago,
and incited the Greek islanders to throw off the Turkish yoke; whilst
Duckworth sailed to Egypt upon a fruitless expedition in favour of the
mameluke beys against Muhammed Ali. Siniavin defeated the
Turkish fleet on the 4th of April, captured several ships, and took
possession of some islands. The bad condition of his ships,
however, compelled him to give up the blockade of the Dardanelles,
and to retire, in order to refit, after having another time defeated the
Turkish fleet. Meanwhile, Selim had been deposed. His successor,
Mustapha IV, declared that he would continue to prosecute the war
with England and Russia. But Siniavin, before he retired to refit, met
the Turkish fleet off Lemnos, on the 1st of July: the Turks were
beaten, lost several ships, and a great many men.
The campaign of the Russians on the Danube, in 1807, was not
productive of any decisive result, as General Michelson received
orders to detach the third army corps to oppose the French in
Poland, Czerni George, the leader of the revolted Servians, took
Belgrade, Shabatz, and Nish, penetrated into Bulgaria, where he
was reinforced by some Russian troops, and gained divers signal
advantages. The war was conducted with more success on the
frontiers of the two empires in Asia. The seraskier of Erzerum was
entirely defeated by General Gudovitch (June 18); and that victory
was the more important, as it prevented the Persians from making a
bold diversion in favour of the Turks.
The emperor Alexander had agreed by the public articles of the
Treaty of Tilsit (July, 1807) to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia; but
this was only a collusion between the two contracting parties. The
Russians not only aimed at the permanent possession of the two
provinces, but regarded all the Slavonians of the Danube as allies or
subjects of the czar. When the Turks, on the 14th of July, concluded
a peace with Czerni George, whereby Servia became in some
measure independent—and Czerni George afterwards called himself
prince of Servia—a Russian general guaranteed the treaty by his
signature, as one of the parties to the agreement. In the following
year Radovinikin, a Russian envoy, repaired to Belgrade to establish
the new principality; called an assembly of the nobles; drew up a
sketch of a constitution for Servia, and tried to organise the
administration.
The French general, Guilleminot, was sent to the Turkish camp to
negotiate a truce on the terms ostensibly laid down in the Treaty of
Tilsit: namely, that the Russians should evacuate Moldavia and
Wallachia, but that the Turks should not occupy the two provinces
until after the conclusion of a definitive peace. But Guilleminot’s
instructions contained a direct command to use the whole weight of
the French influence in favour of the Russians and against the Turks;
even one of Napoleon’s greatest admirers, although owning
occasional republican scruples, admits that their tone was very
equivocal. In fact, it very soon became obvious that the whole
mission of the general was a mere piece of diplomatic imposture and
treachery. A congress was held at Slobozia, in the neighbourhood of
Giurgevo, on the 24th of August, 1807, and a truce was signed,
which, it was said, was to continue till the 30th of April, 1808. The
Russians were to withdraw; the fortresses of Ismail, Braila, and
Giurgevo to be given up to the Turks, whose troops, however, were
to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia in thirty-five days. Everything,
however, which afterwards took place in consultation between the
French and Russians, in reference to Turkey, bore upon a scheme of
partition.
The Russians at length, on the 7th of August, had left Cattaro and
the other strong places in Dalmatia to the French; their emperor, on
the 9th, had ceded all his rights as protector of the republic of the
seven united islands to Napoleon, and the latter was busy making
preparations thence to extend his operations and his dominion
further to the east. Marmont, who administered the province of
Dalmatia, received orders to fortify Ragusa more strongly, and to
make a report on the best plan to be adopted in case it should be
desirable to send an army quickly from Corfu, through Albania,
Macedonia, and Thrace. The Russians continued to be quiet
observers of all this, and in the mean time made firm their footing in
the provinces on the Danube. They made a pretence of the conduct
of the Turks on the occupation of Galatz, and their ill-treatment of the
inhabitants of Moldavia, for not fulfilling the agreement entered into
at Slobozia. The Russian troops, who, according to the terms of the
treaty, were already retiring, received contrary orders; and the Turks,
again driven out of the two provinces, occupied Galatz anew.
The conduct of the negotiation respecting the division of the
Turkish booty, was committed to the chief of Napoleon’s secret
police, who had been actively engaged in the murder of the duke
d’Enghien. He now held a princely rank as the duke of Rovigo, and
was sent to St. Petersburg with this and similar commissions. In the
Russian capital the emperor Alexander and the duke acted as rivals
in the art of dissimulation; the emperor loaded him with civilities of all
kinds, as some compensation for the coolness and contempt with
which he was at first treated, to a surprising extent, by the empress-
mother and the Russian nobility. He was, indeed, soon consoled, for
the slaves of the czar were as zealous in showing respect in the
presence of their master, as they were gross in their insolence when
not under his observation. The accounts which Savary gives us of
the political principles of the pious emperor and his chancellor, and
their complete agreement with Napoleon’s morality and his own,
would be quite incredible to us, did he not literally quote their words.
Savary’s secret report to the emperor Napoleon, partly written in the
form of a dialogue, is to be found among the fragments of
Napoleon’s unprinted correspondence. A contempt for public
agreements, and the plunder of Sweden, even before the declaration
of war, astonish us less than Romanzov’s audacious contempt of the
opinion of all Europe; he thought it not worth a moment’s
consideration; and this was quite in accordance with the language
held by his master in speaking on the subject of Turkey. Thibaudeau
has given so correct an opinion of both the emperors—of the nature
of their consultations—of Savary and Romanzov that we cannot do
better than refer the reader to the words of that writer.