Financial Inclusion and Poverty A Tale of Forty-Five Thousand Households

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Applied Economics

ISSN: 0003-6846 (Print) 1466-4283 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raec20

Financial inclusion and poverty: a tale of forty-five


thousand households

Sefa Awaworyi Churchill & Vijaya Bhaskar Marisetty

To cite this article: Sefa Awaworyi Churchill & Vijaya Bhaskar Marisetty (2019): Financial
inclusion and poverty: a tale of forty-five thousand households, Applied Economics, DOI:
10.1080/00036846.2019.1678732

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2019.1678732

Published online: 18 Oct 2019.

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APPLIED ECONOMICS
https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2019.1678732

Financial inclusion and poverty: a tale of forty-five thousand households


a
Sefa Awaworyi Churchill and Vijaya Bhaskar Marisettyb
a
School of Economics, Finance & Marketing, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia; bSchool of Management Studies, University of Hyderabad,
Hyderabad, India

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Using a new nationally representative survey data covering approximately 45,000 Indian house- Financial inclusion; banking;
holds, we examine the effects of financial inclusion on poverty. We construct a multidimensional credit; insurance; poverty
indicator of financial inclusion and examine the effects of financial inclusion on multiple measures JEL CLASSIFICATION
of poverty including the household Poverty Probability Index (PPI), household deprivation scores, G21; G22; I30
and poverty line. We find that financial inclusion has a strong poverty-reducing effect. This finding
is consistent across the different measures of poverty used, and alternative ways of measures
financial inclusion. These results underpin the importance of financial inclusion and the need for its
promotion across countries.

I. Introduction across India, we examine the impact of financial


inclusion on poverty. India makes for a unique sam-
The literature on the impact of finance on poverty
ple to explore this relationship in detail particularly
remains inconclusive. Studies have shown that
because it hosts the world’s largest intervention and
finance promotes growth, however, as noted by
programmes aimed at increasing financial inclusion
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007), an estab-
(Günther 2017). Since the 1970s, the Indian govern-
lished positive effect of finance on growth does not
ment have put in various efforts to promote financial
necessarily mean finance helps alleviate poverty.
inclusion as a way of addressing poverty. One note-
Economic growth may be characterized by uneven
worthy effort was the introduction of a licencing rule
distribution of income which causes poverty,
by the Reserve Bank of India in 1977, known as the
although it can also be associated with falling
1:4 rule which required existing banks to open four
inequality and poverty. Specifically, if finance via
branches in unbanked (or excluded) locations in
economic growth increases the income of the rich
order to get a licence for operation in already banked
and further worsens the distribution of income,
locations (Burgess and Pande 2005; Chakravarty and
then finance will not help the poor. Conversely,
Pal 2013). The introduction of the 1:4 licence rule
finance may help the poor if it promotes inclusive-
ensured that issues of financial exclusion were ade-
ness and helps the poor overcome challenges asso-
quately addressed in rural and semi-urban areas, and
ciated with investments. Against this background,
although this rule was abolished in the early 1990s,
a growing body of literature has sought to empiri-
several other banking and financial sector reforms
cally examine the impact of finance on income
including the introduction of lending targets, forma-
distribution on the one hand (see, e.g. Ang 2010;
tion of self-help groups, interest rate deregulation,
Clarke, Xu, and Zou 2006; de Haan and Sturm
nationalization of private banks and deregulation of
2017; Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, and Mahalik 2017),
foreign banks, among others, were introduced to
and on the other hand, on poverty (see, e.g. Akhter
ensure operational flexibility of banks as well as
and Daly 2009; Beck et al. 2008; Chibba 2009;
promote financial inclusion (Burgess and Pande
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick 2005).
2005; Cole 2009; Mohan and Ray 2017).
Our study seeks to contribute to the literature on
These efforts to promote financial inclusion have
finance and poverty. Specifically, using a unique
been deemed successful. According to statistics
household data on approximately 45,000 households
from the Global Financial Inclusion database, as

CONTACT Sefa Awaworyi Churchill sefa.churchill@rmit.edu.au School of Economics, Finance & Marketing, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 S. A. CHURCHILL AND V. B. MARISETTY

of 2014, 53% of Indians had an account which 2007; Beck et al. 2008; Levine 1998). However,
represents an increase of 18% from 35% in 2011 while useful inferences are drawn from these stu-
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015). Further, Prime dies, the use of macro-level data cannot provide
Minister Modi’s launch of the ‘Pradhan Mantri nuanced and detailed insight into how individuals
Jan Dhan Yojana’ in 2014 which had the target of and households are influenced by their inclusion or
granting 75 million bank accounts was exceeded, exclusion from the financial system. The use of this
and as of November 2016, over 260 million micro data is important as it helps shed light on
accounts were opened (Günther 2017). Despite how households and individuals benefit from
the success in promoting financial inclusion in financial inclusion.
India, a fundamentally important question remains A number of studies use Indian micro data but
unanswered: does financial inclusion enhance well- focus on different aspects of financial inclusion. For
being and alleviate poverty in India? Very few instance, Ghosh and Vinod (2017) examine the rela-
studies have empirically examined this research tionship between financial inclusion and gender to
question. ascertain whether genders matters for financial
Burgess and Pande (2005) used state-level panel inclusion. Accordingly, they examine financial inclu-
data on rural bank expansion as well as credit and sion as an outcome variable. Swamy (2014), on the
savings share to examine the impact of financial other hand, uses household survey data to examine
inclusion on poverty. They found that bank branch gender variations with regards to how financial
expansion across rural unbanked areas in India inclusion programs impact on various development
helped reduce poverty. More recently, Inoue and outcomes including income, expenditure and food
Hamori (2012) examine the impact of financial security, among others. A related strand of literature
deepening on poverty using an unbalanced panel focusses on the role of remittances in alleviating
of 28 Indian states. They measure financial deepen- poverty. International remittances are an impor-
ing as the credit and deposit amounts associated tance source of finance for Indian, with over
with a region’s commercial banks as share of regio- $79 billion dollars in 2018 alone (World Bank
nal output. They found evidence that financial dee- 2019). Studies examining the impact of remittances
pening decreased poverty as measured by state- present mixed evidence on its effectiveness in alle-
level poverty headcount ratio. Several other studies viating poverty (see, Banga and Sahu 2013; Castaldo,
on the subject have used macro-level data either at Deshingkar, and McKay 2012; Dey 2015; Imai et al.
the country-level, state-level or district-level (see, 2014). We contribute to these related bodies of lit-
e.g. Bell and Rousseau 2001; Binswanger and erature by providing new evidence on the relation-
Khandker 1995; Sehrawat and Giri 2016). ship between financial inclusion and poverty. Thus,
Some studies have also examined the implica- we examine the impact of financial inclusion on
tions of financial inclusion with a focus on African poverty in India using data from the Financial
countries particularly Nigeria (see, Aideyan 2009; Inclusion Insights (FII) 2016/2017 survey.
Dimova and Adebowale 2018; Seck, Naiya, and We measure financial inclusion multidimen-
Muhammad 2017). These studies have often sionally by taking into account access to banking
focussed on the impact of access to finance or services (including savings, checking and fixed
microfinance on expenditure and consumption. deposit accounts), access to credit and access to
A closely related study is Dimova and Adebowale insurance. Based on the multidimensional financial
(2018), which use data from the General inclusion measure, we examine the direct effects of
Household Survey for Nigeria and find evidence financial inclusion on three measures of poverty
to suggest that access to finance increases income including 1) household deprivation scores based
inequality but improves household welfare. on the multi-dimensional poverty index (MPI)
Going beyond studies that have focussed on approach (Alkire and Santos 2010, 2) household
India and Nigeria as case studies, most studies Poverty Probability Index (PPI), and 3) a binary
that examine the relationship between finance and variable capturing households below (and above)
poverty, in general, tend to focus on cross-country the poverty line. Our results suggest that financial
data (see, e.g. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine inclusion contributes to poverty reduction.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 3

The remainder of the study is structured as fol- We adopt three measures of poverty given the
lows. The next section provides a brief overview of information available in our dataset. First, we use the
the empirical model and data used while Section 3 Poverty Probability Index (PPI) which is computed by
discusses the estimation strategies. In Section 4, we the FII team and readily available in the dataset. The
present our empirical results. Section 5 concludes. PPI is a measure of poverty, commissioned by the
Grameen Foundation, which provides scores for
households based on household characteristics to
II. Data and empirical model determine the likelihood of a household living below
the national poverty line.3 In the case of India, the
This study uses cross-sectional data from
poverty line in the FII is set at $2.50 per day and takes
InterMedia’s Financial Inclusion Insights (FII) pro-
into account current country conditions. The scores
gram. The FII surveys produce data across 12 coun-
on the PPI range between 0 and 100 with 0 represent-
tries including India that highlight trends in the uses
ing the most likely poor household and 100 the least
of financial services and technology. Our sample is
likely poor household. Our second measure of poverty
based on the 2016 survey for India which started in
is a dummy variable which captures households that
September 2016 and ended in January 2017.
live below or above the poverty line of $2.50 per day.
Accordingly, our dataset captures the most recent
trends allowing us to provide a more contemporary Our third measure of poverty is based on the
view on the relationship between financial inclusion multidimensional poverty index (MPI) developed
and poverty. The dataset includes information on by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development
household demographics, assets, poverty indicators Initiative (OPHI) (Alkire and Santos 2010).
and financial behaviour among others. The survey Consistent with the MPI, we consider three dimen-
was carried out on 45,540 individuals located in sions of household characteristics including health,
1050 communities (towns and villages).1 However, education and living standards, and apply equal
accounting for missing observations, regressions weights of 1/3 to each dimension. We also weight
with the highest number of observations includes the indicators within each dimension equally.
44,705 households. Thus, with two indicators each under the health
To examine the relationship between financial and education dimensions, each indicator is
inclusion and poverty, we specify the following assigned a weight of 1/6 while each of the 6 indi-
model: cators under the living standard dimension
receives a weight of 1/18. Indicators available in
Pi ¼ βFi þ γX i þ αi þ εi (1) our dataset which we use under each dimension are
reported in Appendix Table A1. The measure of
where Pi is the measure of our outcome variable, poverty used in our study is a deprivation score
which is poverty for household i. Fi is the measure which is assigned to each household based on the
of financial inclusion, while Xi is a vector of control indicators. The deprivation score per household is
variables consistent with the literature on the deter- calculated by taking the weighted sum of number
minants of household poverty including age, gender, of deprivations and thus the score for each house-
marital status, household size, education, asset own- hold lies between 0 and 1, where the score increases
ership, employment status, religion, household loca- as the number of household deprivations increases
tion (rural vs. urban) and number of children in until the maximum of 1 is reached when
household.2 The variable αi is a state-level dummy a household is deprived in all indicators. The math-
variable that controls for unobserved State-level fixed ematical representation of the deprivation score is
effect while εi is a normally distributed error term. given as;

1
These individuals include 16,874 respondents who agreed they were household heads. Note that some respondent did not answer the question about
whether or not they were household heads. However, every respondent included is surveyed about their household characteristics.
2
The common trend in the literature is to control for household head characteristics in household-level regressions, however, given that all respondents in our
survey are not households heads (or at least did not agree that they were household heads), we proceed to control for characteristics of respondents with the
assumption that these respondents to an extent, represent their various households. To ensure robustness of our results, we also examine our relationship of
interest in the household head sample only in Table A4 (i.e. the sample where respondents agree that they are household heads).
3
See https://www.povertyindex.org/about-ppi for details on the construction of the PPI.
4 S. A. CHURCHILL AND V. B. MARISETTY

di ¼ w1 I1 þ w2 I2 þ . . . þ wn In (2) climatic risks and several individual-specific shocks


(Dercon 2005). Thus, as access to finance is argued
where di is the household deprivation score, Ii ¼ 1 if to ease household constraints associated with credit
a household is deprived in indicator i and Ii ¼ 0 if while access to insurance eases constraints asso-
otherwise. wi is the weight attached to indicator i ciated with risks. Accordingly, consistent with the
P
with di¼1 wi ¼ 1. literature (see, e.g. Zhang and Posso 2017), we
Our measure of financial inclusion is consistent apply equal weights to the three dimensions of
with the existing literature and based on the World financial inclusion. However, for robustness, we
Bank’s definition of financial inclusion which sug- also use the individual indicators that are included
gests that a household or individual is considered in the financial deprivation index in our regres-
financially included when they have access to sions. Appendix Table A2 presents details of the
affordable financial products that meet the needs indicators used while Table A3 presents a descrip-
associated with transactions and payment, credit, tion and summary of variables used in the study.
savings and insurance (World Bank 2018). This
definition is also consistent with the macroeco-
nomic literature which has often considered mea- III. Estimation techniques
sures such as banked population, access to credit To estimate Equation (1), we first apply ordinary
and access to insurance as the core pillars of finan- least squares (OLS) techniques for regressions
cial inclusion (Mialou, Amidzic, and Massara 2017; involving PPI and deprivation scores, and logit
Park and Mercado 2015). estimation techniques for poverty line regressions.
We develop a multi-dimensional financial inclu- These constitute our baseline results on the effects
sion index using an approach similar to equation of financial inclusion on poverty. However, it is
(2). We consider three dimension of financial possible that Equation (1) may suffer from endo-
inclusion, namely, access to bank, access to loan/ geneity given the potential for reverse causality
credit and access to insurance.4 We assign each between poverty and financial inclusion. Thus, to
dimension an equal weight of 1/3 and develop address this problem and ensure the robustness of
a household financial deprivation score based on our results, we conduct two sets of additional ana-
equation (2). Based on a 0.5 cut off threshold, our lysis that apply: 1) the two-stage least squares
measure of financial inclusion takes the value 1 if (2SLS), and 2) propensity score matching (PSM).
the household financial deprivation score is less For 2SLS regressions, we use the average time (in
than 0.5, and 0 if otherwise. Such measures of minutes) taken by a household member to get to
financial inclusion have been used in the literature the nearest financial institution. We argue that the
to capture a holistic perspective of financial inclu- time taken to reach the nearest financial institution
sion (see, e.g. Zhang and Posso 2017). We apply which provides access to financial services will
equal weight to each of the three dimensions of influence financial inclusion given that people
financial inclusion given evidence from the existing take into account the time factor before making
literature which suggests the importance of each decisions to (or not to) avail financial services.
dimension and how they complement each other. Thus, we expect a correlation between time to
The importance of access to credit and banking as financial institution and financial inclusion. The
an indicator of financial inclusion is well-known in exclusion restriction is that the time variable affects
the financial inclusion literature (Beck and household welfare (i.e. poverty) only through its
Demirguc-Kunt 2006, 2008). A related literature effects on financial inclusion (i.e. access to credit,
on risk and poverty has also demonstrated the savings, insurance, etc.). We run standard 2SLS
critical role of insurance. Particularly, evidence instrumental variable (IV) regressions using this
suggests that high-income risk is inevitable in instrument, and to further ensure robustness and
developing countries. Many households tend to increase the predictive power of the instrument, we
be vulnerable because of economic fluctuations, adopt the Lewbel (2012) 2SLS approach which
4
In our dataset, access to bank captures households that have either a checking, savings or fixed deposit accounts.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 5

combines both internal and external instruments. deviations in the number of households living
The Lewbel (2012) approach relies on heteroske- above the poverty line.
dasticity to construct internal instruments, and has As discussed previously, increasing trends in PPI
been used in the literature for robustness check on scores suggest better performance in terms of pov-
finding using conventional IVs or when external erty while decreasing trends in household depriva-
IVs are either unavailable or weak (see, e.g. tion scores suggests that same. Thus, our results
Awaworyi Churchill and Mishra 2017; Mishra suggest that across all columns, financial inclusion
and Smyth 2015).5 contributes to poverty alleviation.6 These results
As an additional approach to address endogene- are consistent with findings from macro-level stu-
ity, we also use PSM. PSM can be used to determine dies (see, e.g. Bruhn and Love 2014; Burgess,
the average effect of the treatment (in our case Pande, and Wong 2005). Further, comparing the
households that are financially included) on our effects of financial inclusion with other control
outcome variable (poverty). PSM has been effec- variables, we observe that the effects of financial
tively used in the literature to address endogeneity inclusion are relatively stronger compared to most
in non-experimental data (see, Awaworyi Churchill control variables including gender, education,
and Smyth 2017; Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Zhang ownership of land, employment status and religion.
and Posso 2017), and thus in our case, it can help Thus, the effects of financial inclusion on poverty
draw causal inferences about the effect of financial are not only statistically significant but are also
inclusion on poverty. We apply Rosenbaum and economically meaningful and have practical
Rubin (1983)’s PSM technique and consistent with relevance.
discussions in the literature which encourage the However, OLS results are biased in the presence
use of different matching algorithms in PSM (see, of endogeneity. Thus, for robustness, we report
e.g. Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008), we employ the 2SLS results using distance to nearest financial
nearest neighbour, radius, kernel and local linear institution as instrument in Table 2. Here,
regression matching methods. Columns 1 to 3 report results using our external
instrument only while Columns 4 to 6 report
Lewbel 2SLS results which combine both external
IV. Empirical results and internal instruments.7 Comparing 2SLS and
OLS results, we find that endogeneity causes
Table 1 presents baseline results for the effects of
a downward bias in OLS estimates given that the
financial inclusion on poverty. Columns 1, 2 and 3
effects of financial inclusion in 2SLS results are
present results for effects on PPI scores, household
considerably higher. Specifically, 2SLS results sug-
deprivation scores and our binary variable capturing
gest that a standard deviation increase in financial
households above the poverty line, respectively. In
inclusion is associated with increases of 0.740 (vs.
what follows, we interpret our results focusing on
0.026 in OLS) and 0.656 (vs. 0.160 in OLS) stan-
standardized coefficients only given that they are
dard deviations in PPI scores and the number of
comparable across estimations types and variables.
people above the poverty line, respectively.
From Column 1, we observe that a standard
Similarly, a standard deviation increase in financial
deviation increase in financial inclusion is asso-
inclusion is associated with a decline of 0.832 (vs.
ciated with a 0.026 standard deviation increase in
0.017 in OLS) standard deviations in the level of
reported PPI scores. From Column 2, a standard
household deprivation. Effects of financial inclu-
deviation increase in financial inclusion is asso-
sion from Lewbel 2SLS results with internal and
ciated with a decline of 0.017 standard deviations
external instruments are considerably lower than
in the level of household deprivation. Lastly,
results from the standard IV with distance to near-
a standard deviation increase in financial inclusion
est financial institution as instrument, however,
is associated with an increase of 0.160 standard
compared with OLS results, they are relatively
5
See Lewbel (2012) for details.
6
These results are consistent with those reported for the sub-sample where respondents are household heads (Appendix Table A4).
7
F-statistics from first stage regressions suggest that our instruments used in both specifications are not weak.
6 S. A. CHURCHILL AND V. B. MARISETTY

Table 1. Financial inclusion and poverty (Baseline results). inclusion remains valid. We perform PSM using
(1) (2) (3) multiple algorithms (i.e. nearest neighbour, radius,
PPI Score Deprivation Poverty Line
Financial Inclusion 0.015*** −0.011*** 0.210*** kernel and local linear regression matching meth-
(0.003) (0.002) (0.030) ods) to ensure that our results are robust. Our
[0.026] [−0.017] [0.160]
Male −0.004** −0.000 −0.015 results, which are summarized in Table 3 suggest
(0.002) (0.002) (0.025) that for effects of financial inclusion on PPI scores,
[−0.010] [−0.000] [−0.015]
Age 0.000*** −0.000 −0.000 the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) across all PSM algorithms is between 0.013 and
[0.021] [−0.002] [−0.001]
Rural −0.006*** 0.020*** −0.085*** 0.015. For effects on household deprivation scores,
(0.002)
[−0.014]
(0.002)
[0.038]
(0.026)
[−0.083]
the ATT is between −0.009 and 0.016, while for
Married 0.000 −0.008*** 0.046* effects on poverty line, the ATT is between 0.029
(0.002) (0.002) (0.025)
[0.001] [−0.015] [0.045] and 0.035. These results are consistent with our
Children −0.003*** 0.010*** −0.032** baseline results and more importantly confirm that
(0.001) (0.001) (0.014)
[−0.022] [0.059] [−0.099] financial inclusion helps in poverty reduction.
Household size −0.044*** −0.006*** −0.448*** Lastly, we examine the robustness of our results
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010)
[−0.440] [−0.048] [−0.801] to alternative measures of financial inclusion.
Primary 0.006** −0.013*** −0.086** Specifically, we focus on the individual compo-
(0.003) (0.002) (0.035)
[0.010] [−0.019] [−0.065] nents of financial inclusion which constitute the
−0.360***
Secondary 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002)
0.010
(0.029)
multi-dimensional financial inclusion indicator.
[0.028] [−0.735] [0.011] We examine the effects of access to bank, access
Tertiary 0.038*** −0.382*** 0.346***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.046) to loan, and access to insurance individually on our
[0.049] [−0.436] [0.203] outcome variables. Results from this exercise are
Farm Land −0.009*** 0.004** −0.058**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.025) reported in Table 4. Panel 1 of Table 4 reports
[−0.021] [0.008] [−0.059] results for the effects of financial inclusion proxied
Employed −0.002 0.009*** −0.068***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.026) by access to bank only, while Panel 2 reports effects
[−0.004] [0.018] [−0.067] for access to loan or credit. Panel 3 reports effects of
Self-employed 0.016*** −0.005* 0.051
(0.004) (0.003) (0.043) access to insurance. Results here suggest that the
Christian
[0.020]
0.006
[−0.006]
0.039***
[0.028]
−0.074
individual dimensions of financial inclusion help in
(0.012) (0.011) (0.150) reducing poverty. This finding is consistent across
[0.004] [0.023] [−0.022]
Muslim −0.014 0.062*** −0.281** all columns of each panel except Column 2 of Panel
(0.011) (0.010) (0.136) 2 where the effect of access to credit is statistically
[−0.021] [0.080] [−0.185]
Sikh 0.076*** −0.011 0.651*** insignificant. Comparing standardized coefficients
(0.014) (0.012) (0.170) across each panel, we find that the effects of access
[0.051] [−0.007] [0.199]
Hindu −0.025** 0.063*** −0.335** to insurance is the strongest, followed by access to
(0.011) (0.010) (0.132) bank (which includes services such as owning
[−0.044] [0.098] [−0.265]
Buddhist 0.026** 0.056*** 0.040 a savings account, checking account or fixed
(0.013) (0.012) (0.159)
[0.013] [0.025] [0.009]
deposit account), and lastly, access to credit.
Constant 0.792*** 0.431*** 2.224*** Given that households that have access to credit
(0.013) (0.011) (0.167)
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes might automatically have access to banking ser-
Observations 44,705 44,705 44,705 vices as well, it might be the case that there is
R-squared 0.253 0.595 0.121
a high correlation between these two dimensions
Columns 1 and 2 report OLS results while Column 3 reports logit results.
Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. of financial inclusion. Thus, in an additional test,
Standardized coefficients in brackets. we drop access to bank and only include access to
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
credit and insurance in our composite index to
examine if our results are robust. These results
higher as well, except in Column 6. This confirms are reported in Panel 4 of Table and are consistent
the downward bias in OLS results. with our main findings.
Turning to PSM results, we find that the emerging We now turn towards understanding the house-
conclusion regarding the effects of financial hold beneficiaries of financial inclusion, especially
APPLIED ECONOMICS 7

Table 2. Financial inclusion and poverty (2SLS Regressions).


2SLS with external instrument Lewbel 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES PPI Score Deprivation Poverty Line PPI Score Deprivation Poverty Line
Financial Inclusion 0.641*** −1.533*** 0.821* 0.020*** −0.022*** 0.036**
(0.249) (0.485) (0.444) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014)
[0.740] [−0.832] [0.656] [0.036] [−0.034] [0.029]
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39,065 39,065 39,065 39,065 39,065 39,065
First stage
Time to bank −0.010*** −0.008***
(0.003) (0.003)
Partial R-squared 0.238 0.390
F-statistic 10.57 63.38
Columns 1 to 3 present 2SLS results using time to nearest bank as instrument.
Columns 4 and 6 represent Lewbel 2SLS results that combine internal and external instruments.
Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity in parentheses.
Standardized coefficients in brackets.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table 3. PSM results with different matching methods. they have the least insurance access as well as access
ATT (average treatment effect on to banking and loan. Insurance access is only 11%
the treated)
Poverty
while access to banking and loans is 8% and 13%,
Matching method PPI Score Deprivation level respectively, for self-employed households. However,
1 – Nearest Neighbour (one-to-one) 0.013*** −0.009*** 0.029*** households in rural areas and those below the poverty
(0.001) (0.003) (0.010)
4 – Nearest Neighbour 0.015*** −0.013*** 0.034*** line, appear to have benefitted from financial inclu-
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) sion across all dimensions with at least 50% of house-
Radius 0.014*** −0.012*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) holds in these categories recorded as beneficiaries of
Kernel 0.015*** −0.016*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
insurance, banks and loans. Similarly, households
Local linear regression 0.014*** −0.014*** 0.032*** with farmland (which are often households in rural
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Baseline results for comparison 0.015*** −0.011*** 0.210*** areas) tend to benefit as well from financial inclusion.
(0.003) (0.002) (0.030) This suggests that plans to target poor households and
Notes: ***represent significant at the 1 per cent level. those in rural areas appear to be effective, thus
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
explaining the poverty-reduction effect of financial
inclusion.
through the strongest channel – insurance. Access
to insurance benefits households by improving
their resilience, providing better access to critical V. Conclusion
services and improving entrepreneurial activities. Using new nationally representative survey data, we
Dercon and Christiaensen (2007) argue that low- examine the impact of financial inclusion on poverty
income households are more exposed to risks and in India. We measure financial inclusion multidi-
less able to deal with them. They often resort to mensionally and examine effects on three measures
strategies that are expensive and inefficient to man- of poverty including household deprivation scores,
age risks. Likewise, Carter and Barrett (2006) household Poverty Probability Index (PPI), and
report that insurance improves insured parties’ a binary variable capturing households below (and
resilience to shocks by providing them with an above) the poverty line. Our results suggest that
efficient means to manage risk and avoid welfare- financial inclusion contributes to poverty allevia-
reducing risk-coping strategies such as disposing of tion. This finding is consistent with existing studies
productive assets or depleting savings. that found that financial development and financial
Table 5 presents distributions with regards to inclusion is effective for poverty reduction and
access to insurance, banking and loans. It is clear higher income among poor households (see, e.g.
from the table that self-employed or entrepreneurs Chibba 2009; Jalilian and Kirkpatrick 2005; Zhang
did not benefit much from financial inclusion, as and Posso 2017).
8 S. A. CHURCHILL AND V. B. MARISETTY

Table 4. Financial inclusion and poverty (Analysis by financial inclusion dimensions).


(1) (2) (3)
PPI Score Deprivation Poverty Line
Panel 1: Effects of access to bank
Financial inclusion 0.009*** −0.008*** 0.070***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.024)
[0.020] [−0.015] [0.070]
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,705 44,705 44,705
R-squared 0.253 0.595 0.120
Panel 2: Effects of access to loan/credit
Financial inclusion 0.005* 0.001 0.073**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.036)
[0.007] [0.001] [0.045]
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,705 44,705 44,705
R-squared 0.253 0.594 0.121
Panel 3: Effects of access to insurance
Financial inclusion 0.021*** −0.018*** 0.260***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.035)
[0.031] [−0.024] [0.171]
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,705 44,705 44,705
R-squared 0.253 0.595 0.121
Panel 4: Access to credit and insurance (composite)
Financial inclusion 0.020*** −0.020*** 0.257***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.049)
[0.038] [−0.034] [0.219]
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,705 44,705 44,705
R-squared 0.265 0.594 0.125
Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity in parentheses.
Standardized coefficients in brackets.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table 5. Distribution of household access to financial inclusion variables.


Percentage with insurance Percentage without insurance
PANEL A: HOUSEHOLD LEVEL ACCESS TO INSURANCE DISTRIBUTION
Self-employed respondents 11.54 88.46
Respondents with farmland 41.85 58.15
Respondents below poverty line 59.86 40.14
Respondents in rural area 56.86 43.14
Percentage with access to bank Percentage without access
PANEL B: HOUSEHOLD LEVEL ACCESS TO BANKING DISTRIBUTION
Self-employed respondents 8.32 91.68
Respondents with farmland 42.19 57.81
Respondents below poverty line 66.82 33.18
Respondents in rural area 68.54 31.46
Percentage with access to loan Percentage without access
PANEL C: HOUSEHOLD LEVEL ACCESS TO LOANS DISTRIBUTION
Self-employed respondents 13.55 86.45
Respondents with farmland 50.20 49.80
Respondents below poverty line 63.23 36.77
Respondents in rural area 68.92 31.08
Self-employed respondents 13.55 86.45

We argue that financial inclusion is likely to work compared to access to bank accounts and credit. This
through a number of mechanisms to contribute finding could be explained by the fact that poor and
towards poverty reduction. Our findings suggest that vulnerable households are often excluded and left
access to insurance has the strongest effect on poverty with less coping strategies to income shocks (Zhang
APPLIED ECONOMICS 9

and Posso 2017), and this exacerbates issues of pov- Ashraf, N., D. Karlan, and W. Yin. 2010. “Female
erty. However, with financial inclusion, particularly Empowerment: Impact of a Commitment Savings Product
access to insurance, their resilience against such in the Philippines.” World Development 38 (3): 333–344.
Awaworyi Churchill, S., and V. Mishra. 2017. “Trust, Social
income shocks increases and provides them with Networks and Subjective Wellbeing in China.” Social
opportunities to move out of poverty. Indicators Research 132 (1): 313–339.
Beyond insurance, the effects of access to bank Awaworyi Churchill, S., and R. Smyth. 2017. “Ethnic Diversity
accounts suggest that improving access to various and Poverty.” World Development 95: 285–302.
accounts including savings accounts empowers Banerjee, A., E. Duflo, R. Glennerster, and C. Kinnan. 2015.
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(Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2010). Similarly, the Banga, R., and P. K. Sahu. 2013. “Impact of Remittances on
effects of access to credit could be explained by Poverty in India: Empirical Evidence.” In Human Capital
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Beck, T., and A. Demirguc-Kunt. 2006. “Small and Medium-size
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Overall, our results present some implications for Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (11): 2931–2943.
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“Finance, Firm Size, and Growth.” Journal of Money, Credit
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APPLIED ECONOMICS 11

Appendix

Table A1. Dimensions, indicators and weights for multidimensional poverty.


Dimension (weight) Deprived if . . . (weight)
Education (1/3) Household head has less than 5 years of education (1/6)
Any school age child is not going to school (1/6)
Health (1/3) Household member needed a doctor but delayed or did not go because of funds in the last 6 months (1/6)
Household has gone without enough food to eat because of funds in the last 6 months (1/6)
Standard of Living (1/3) The household does not have a refrigerator (1/18)
The household does not have a stove/gas burner (1/18)
The household does not have a television (1/18)
The household does not have an electric fan (1/18)
The household does not have a chair, stool, bench, or table (1/18)
The household does not have a motorcycle, scooter, motor car, or jeep (1/18)

Table A2. Dimensions, indicators and weights for multidimensional financial inclusion.
Dimension (weight) Financially deprived if . . .
Bank (1/3) Household does not have a bank account (bank account includes savings, current, fixed deposit or microfinance account)
Loan/Credit (1/3) Household does not have access to loan/credit from bank, microfinance institution or other formal institution
Insurance (1/3) Household does not have access to medical, life, property, unemployment/income or family insurance

Table A3. Description and summary statistics of variables.


Household
Full sample head sample
Variable Description Mean SD Mean SD
PPI Score Poverty Probability Index on a 0 to 1 scale 0.480 0.215 0.502 0.217
Deprivation Deprivation score based on multi-dimensional poverty indicators 0.386 0.243 0.401 0.247
Poverty Line Dummy variable equals 1 if income lived on is more than $2.50 per day 0.346 0.476 0.376 0.484
Financial Dummy variable equals 1 if household financial deprivation score is less than 0.5 0.156 0.363 0.199 0.399
Inclusion
Bank access Dummy variable equals 1 if household has access to a bank 0.631 0.482 0.706 0.456
Loan access Dummy variable equals 1 if household has access to loan/credit 0.098 0.297 0.117 0.322
Insurance access Dummy variable equals 1 if household has access to insurance 0.110 0.313 0.142 0.349
Household size Number of people in household 4.142 2.124 3.677 1.958
Male Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent (or household head in household head sample) is male 0.466 0.498 0.818 0.386
Age Age of respondent (or household head in household head sample) 37.971 14.856 45.142 13.495
Rural Dummy variable equals 1 if household lives in rural area 0.690 0.462 0.697 0.459
Married Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent (or household head in household head sample) is married 0.693 0.461 0.773 0.419
Children Number of children in household 1.235 1.464 1.070 1.383
Primary Dummy variable equals 1 if highest level of education of respondent (or household head in household 0.148 0.356 0.175 0.380
head sample) is primary education
Secondary Dummy variable equals 1 if highest level of education of respondent (or household head in household 0.459 0.498 0.439 0.496
head sample) is secondary education
Tertiary Dummy variable equals 1 if highest level of education of respondent (or household head in household 0.084 0.278 0.074 0.261
head sample) is tertiary education
Farm Land Dummy variable equals 1 if household owns a farm land 0.394 0.489 0.405 0.491
Employed Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent (or household head in household head sample) is employed 0.328 0.469 0.524 0.499
Self-employed Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent (or household head in household head sample) is self- 0.075 0.263 0.123 0.328
employed
Christian Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent (or household head in household head sample) is Christian 0.021 0.144 0.023 0.151
Muslim Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent (or household head in household head sample) is Muslim 0.109 0.312 0.102 0.303
Sikh Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent (or household head in household head sample) is Sikh 0.021 0.145 0.018 0.132
Hindu Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent (or household head in household head sample) is Hindu 0.827 0.378 0.838 0.368
Buddhist Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent (or household head in household head sample) is Buddhist 0.012 0.108 0.012 0.109
Time to bank Log of average time taken from residence to nearest financial institution 3.303 0.606 3.309 0.610
12 S. A. CHURCHILL AND V. B. MARISETTY

Table A4. Financial inclusion and poverty (Household head sample).


(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES PPI Score Deprivation Poverty Line
Financial Inclusion 0.020*** −0.019*** 0.258***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.045)
[0.036] [−0.031] [0.212]
Male −0.007 −0.003 −0.023
(0.005) (0.004) (0.054)
[−0.012] [−0.004] [−0.018]
Age 0.000*** −0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
[0.027] [−0.006] [0.025]
Rural −0.011*** 0.019*** −0.129***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.043)
[−0.024] [0.035] [−0.122]
Married −0.009** −0.008** 0.028
(0.004) (0.003) (0.048)
[−0.017] [−0.014] [0.025]
Children −0.002 0.010*** −0.022
(0.002) (0.002) (0.025)
[−0.011] [0.058] [−0.064]
Household size −0.049*** −0.007*** −0.430***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.018)
[−0.449] [−0.057] [−1.740]
Primary 0.003 −0.009** −0.115**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.053)
[0.005] [−0.014] [−0.091]
Secondary 0.014*** −0.359*** 0.015
(0.004) (0.003) (0.046)
[0.032] [−0.715] [0.016]
Tertiary 0.049*** −0.385*** 0.396***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.076)
[0.060] [−0.406] [0.215]
Farm Land −0.003 0.003 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.041)
[−0.007] [0.005] [−0.002]
Employed −0.003 0.001 −0.099**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.041)
[−0.007] [0.003] [−0.102]
Self-employed 0.007 −0.007* −0.048
(0.005) (0.004) (0.060)
[0.011] [−0.009] [−0.033]
Christian 0.027 0.008 0.263
(0.021) (0.019) (0.265)
[0.019] [0.005] [0.082]
Muslim 0.010 0.033* 0.047
(0.019) (0.019) (0.249)
[0.014] [0.040] [0.030]
Sikh 0.105*** −0.034 0.935***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.306)
[0.065] [−0.018] [0.256]
Hindu −0.005 0.038** −0.011
(0.019) (0.018) (0.242)
[−0.008] [0.056] [−0.009]
Buddhist 0.049** 0.019 0.445
(0.022) (0.021) (0.279)
[0.025] [0.008] [0.100]
Constant 0.786*** 0.486*** 1.666***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.291)
Observations 16,641 16,641 16,641
R-squared 0.267 0.597 0.113
Columns 1 and 2 report OLS results while Column 3 reports logit results.
Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity in parentheses.
Standardized coefficients in brackets.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

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