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elements that seem to be common to all. Our hope is that this book can be used as a
kind of universal supplement, therefore, and that the discussions it contains will have
roughly equal relevance for all law students taking the basic tax course, no matter what
the identity of their primary course materials. So as not to seem to claim too much,
however, we should state again that not every casebook subject is taken up in detail; and
some are omitted entirely.
This Fourteenth Edition reflects the more significant (in terms of the purposes of
this book) statutory, regulatory, and judicial developments since the publication of the
Thirteenth Edition. Of those various developments, the most significant by far is the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.
LAWRENCE ZELENAK
Duke University
March 15, 2018
8
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN
PREFACE
Introduction. Terminology, Timing and Rates
(a) Tax Terminology
(b) Tax Rates
Part A. Income
1. Non-Cash Benefits: Meals-and-Lodgings; Imputed Rents
1.01 General Comment
1.02 Forced Saving and Forced Consumption—“Convenience of the Employer”
1.03 Imputed Income
2. Recovery of Capital Investment
2.01 General Comment; Corporate Stock
2.02 Annuities
2.03 Life Insurance
2.04 Damage Awards
(a) Personal Injury
(b) Commercial Damages
3. Increase in Net Worth—Cancellation of Indebtedness
3.01 General Comment
(a) Effect of Inflation
(b) Discharge by Third Parties
(c) When Is a Loan Not a Loan?
(d) Mortgages
3.02 Cancellation of Indebtedness
(a) Cancellation of Business Debt
(b) Cancellation of Personal (Nonbusiness)
Debt
4. Gifts and Bequests
4.01 Gains and Losses—Realization by Whom?
(a) Lifetime Gifts
(b) Bequests
4.02 Divided Interests—Gifts in Trust
4.03 Commercial Gifts
5. The Realization Requirement—Macomber, Bruun, and
the Divorce Cases
5.01 General Comment
5.02 Stock Dividends
5.03 Leasehold Termination—Helvering v. Bruun
5.04 Marital Property Settlements—Davis and
Farid-Es-Sultaneh
5.05 Cottage Savings and the Realization
Threshold
9
5.06 Deferral and Exemption: Individual Retirement Accounts
Part B. Deductions
6. Business Expenses
6.01 Everyday Expenses of Employment
(a) Childcare and Housekeeping
(b) Nice Clothes
(c) Commuting to Work
(d) Litigation Expense
6.02 Business or Pleasure—Travel and
Entertainment
6.03 Capital Expenditures
(a) Repairs or Alterations
(b) Business Intangibles and Advertising
(c) Lease or Purchase
(d) Education
6.04 “Ordinary and Necessary”
6.05 Reasonable Compensation
6.06 Interest
(a) “Tax Arbitrage” and Special
Disallowances
(b) Sham Transactions
6.07 Losses
6.08 Bad Debts
6.09 Depreciation—General Background
(a) Eligible Property
(b) Limitation to Cost
(c) Useful Lives
(d) Permissible Methods
6.10 ACRS and Leveraged Leases
(a) ACRS
(b) Leveraged Leases and the Transfer of Tax Benefits
6.11 Purchased Intangibles; Code § 197
7. Personal Expense Deductions
7.01 General Comment
7.02 Medical Expenses, Health Insurance, and
Casualty Losses
(a) Medical Expense
(b) Casualty Losses
7.03 Charitable Contributions
7.04 Home Mortgage Interest
7.05 Miscellaneous Deductions
7.06 Standard Deduction and Adjusted Gross
Income
7.07 The Child Tax Credit and Dependent Care
Credit
10
(a) Child Tax Credit
(b) Dependent Care Credit
7.08 EITC
7.09 Education Incentives
7.10 The Alternative Minimum Tax
Part C. Attribution of Income
8. The Early Cases
8.01 Gifts of Personal Service Income; Lucas v. Earl;
Poe v. Seaborn
(a) Redirected Salary
(b) Services in Kind
8.02 Assignment of Deferred Income: Helvering v. Eubank
8.03 Gifts of Income from Property—Horst, Blair
and Schaffner
(a) The Horst Case
(b) Blair and Schaffner
8.04 Gifts in Trust—Corliss, Wells and Clifford
8.05 Summary of Attribution Principles
9. Statutory Treatment of Income Attribution
9.01 Grantor Trusts
(a) Reversionary Interests
(b) Income for Grantor’s Benefit
(c) Revocability and Powers to Control
Enjoyment
(d) Persons Other than Grantor Treated as
Owner
9.02 Unearned Income of Minors (and Some Young Adults)—The Kiddie Tax
9.03 Family Business Associations
(a) Partnerships
(b) Corporations
9.04 Joint Returns: Taxation of Married and Single Persons
9.05 Alimony and Separate Maintenance
Part D. Tax Accounting
10. Annual Accounting
10.01 Loss Carryovers—Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks
10.02 Claim of Right
10.03 The Tax Benefit Rule
11. The Cash Method
11.01 Constructive Receipt and Cash Equivalency
(a) Constructive Receipt
(b) Deferred Compensation
(c) “Calling Off” Constructive Receipt
11.02 Prepaid Expenses
12. The Accrual Method
12.01 Recognition of Income and Expenses; Disputed Items
11
(a) Timing of Revenues and Expenditures
(b) Disputed Items
12.02 Advance Receipts and Reserves for Estimated Expenses
12.03 Use of Inventories
(a) The “First-in, First-out” (FIFO) Method
(b) The “Last-in, First-out” (LIFO) Method
(c) Comparison of Principal Methods
Part E. Recognition of Gains and Losses—Selected
Issues
13. Transactions in Mortgaged Property
13.01 Nonrecourse Debt and the Depreciation
Allowance; The Crane Rule
13.02 Real Estate Tax Shelters: The “At-Risk” and “Passive Activity Loss”
Limitations
(a) At-Risk
(b) Passive Activity Losses
13.03 Mortgage of Appreciated Property—The
Woodsam Case
13.04 Dispositions of Encumbered Assets—Tufts and Diedrich
(a) Excessively Mortgaged Property
(b) Conditional Gifts
13.05 Estate of Levine: An Exercise
13.06 Short Sales and Related Devices
14. Deferred Payment Transactions
14.01 In General
14.02 The Installment Method
14.03 The “Fair Market Value” Rule
15. Non-Recognition Transactions
15.01 Like-Kind Exchanges
15.02 Sale of a Personal Residence
Part F. Capital Gains and Losses
16. Introduction
16.01 Some History; Repeal and Reinstatement
16.02 Legislative Purpose
16.03 Mechanics of Computation
17. Judicial Development of the Capital Asset Definition
17.01 General Comment
17.02 Everyday Business Activities
17.03 Substitute for Future Income
(a) Carved-out Interests; Hort and Lake
(b) Sale of a Life Estate
(c) Other Contract Rights
17.04 Fragmentation and Imputed Interest
(a) Sale of an Entire Business
(b) Bond Discount and Imputed Interest
12
17.05 Recurring Receipts
(a) Contingent Payments
(b) Open Transactions
18. Sales of Business Property
18.01 Property Held for Sale to Customers
18.02 Fixed Assets: Real and Depreciable Property
(a) Section 1231
(b) The Recapture Principle
19. Personal Services
19.01 Employee Stock Options
19.02 Patents, Copyrights, and Self-Created
Property
Afterword
Note. What Is the True Value of a Tax Preference?
Note. Income Tax, Consumption Tax, Flat Tax
Note. Tax Shelters and Economic Substance
13
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
A Law Student’s Guide to the Leading Cases and
Concepts
FOURTEENTH EDITION
14
1
Introduction
contributes $5,000 to charity, the value of the deduction from her standpoint is
obviously $1,600. The effect is just the same whether the amount of the charitable gift is
excluded from her gross income in the first instance, or included but then allowed as a
15
deduction.
A major complicating factor in the federal income tax is the special treatment
accorded to long-term capital gains. In computing gain (or loss) from the sale of
property, the taxpayer subtracts her cost, or basis, for the property sold from the amount
realized on the transaction. The gain, if any, is recognized and included in her gross
income under § 61. If the property sold is a capital asset—for example, securities or
real estate acquired for investment—and if the property has been held for more than 1
year, the gain will be taxed at a lower tax rate—now, generally, 15% or 20%—than the
rate that applies to wages, salaries, business profits and other kinds of ordinary income.
As capital gains are thus more to be desired than income that does not qualify for the
lower rate, the scope of the capital asset definition becomes a matter of considerable
importance.
Once gross income has been reduced by allowable deductions, including personal
and dependency exemptions, the figure that remains is the taxpayer’s taxable income.1
Taxable income is the residual or net amount on which the taxpayer’s tax liability is
based. Having selected the appropriate rate schedule from § 1 (depending on whether
she is married, single, or a “head of household”), the taxpayer then determines her tax
by fitting her taxable income into the schedule in the manner indicated below. The tax
liability that results may be reduced by statutory credits—e.g., the child tax credit
(7.07). Tax credits are subtracted directly from the tax due. While the dollar-value of a
deduction depends on the particular taxpayer’s applicable tax rate (so that the value is
greater for higher than for lower-bracket taxpayers), a credit has the same dollar-value
for all taxpayers entitled to use it. This is so because a credit is a dollar-for-dollar
reduction of the tax itself rather than being a subtraction from gross income.
Income tax returns are filed and taxes are paid on an annual basis, which for almost
all individual taxpayers simply means the calendar year. Accounting rules are employed
to allocate income and deduction items to one taxable year or another, with most
individuals using the cash method of accounting and most businesses using the accrual
method. The timing of income and deductions is important, because taxpayers strongly
prefer to pay their taxes later rather than sooner. Money in the bank or invested in
government bonds earns
interest—until recently quite a bit—so that if given a choice between paying $1,000
of taxes today and paying $1,000 of taxes a year from now, the taxpayer will always
choose the later date. Assuming interest at a rate of 8%, the present value—the value
today—of $1,000 due in one year is only $926. Put differently, the sum of $926
invested at 8% today will grow to $1,000 at the end of one year. If (because of
accounting or other legal rules) the $1,000 tax is not due until a year from now, the
taxpayer can meet that obligation by currently setting aside the sum of $926. But if the
tax is due today, the full $1,000 will have to be surrendered. It follows that a year’s
delay is worth $74 ($1,000 – $926) to the taxpayer in cold hard cash. The government,
of course, sees the matter in opposite terms: a year’s delay “costs” the Treasury exactly
the same amount. As suggested in Part A and elsewhere, the question of “pay now or
16
pay later” is at the heart of many of the legal controversies that arise in the tax field,
though this fact is not always apparent to the naked eye.2
(b) Tax Rates
As far as individual taxpayers are concerned, the schedule of tax rates is
progressive, or graduated, which simply means that as income increases an individual’s
tax liability also increases but at a greater rate. For the year 2018, the rate structure
begins, in effect, with a zero-bracket—referred to as the standard deduction—of
$24,000 for married couples, $18,000 for heads of households, and $12,000 for other
single persons. All taxpayers are permitted to receive income up to these levels at a tax
rate of zero.
Once the amount of the standard deduction is exceeded the positive rates take hold.
For the year 2018, the tax schedule for married couples contains seven rate-brackets, to
wit:
10% on taxable income up to $19,050;
12% on taxable income over $19,050 but not over $77,400;
22% on taxable income over $77,400 but not over $165,000;
Although the couple’s top marginal tax rate is 24%, their effective (average) rate on
their taxable income is about 17.7% ($31,779 divided by $180,000). (If we take into
account the fact that their standard deduction of $24,000 is the functional equivalent of
the imposition of a zero tax rate on an additional $24,000 of income, their effective tax
17
rate with respect to their total income is about 15.6% ($31,779 divided by $204,000)).
Above the first bracket level, the effective rate is bound to be lower than the marginal
rate on the taxpayer’s last dollar of income, because the effective rate is simply a
weighted average of the applicable marginal rates, which begin at 10% and rise to 24%
only on the last $15,000 of the taxpayers’ taxable income.
To illustrate the marginal-effective rate distinction still further, one occasionally
hears someone say (usually of someone else): “X doesn’t want to earn any more money
this year because it will put her in a higher bracket.” This statement may mean, simply,
that the speaker thinks that X will not care to earn an additional $10,000 if that income
will be taxed at a high marginal rate—say 35%. Since X would net only $6,500 after
tax, she may prefer to substitute more leisure for that amount of additional spendable
income. This could be a valid surmise, depending on X’s personal preferences and how
hard she would have to work to earn the $10,000. But if the quoted comment is
supposed to signify that X will sustain an after-tax loss
and actually be poorer in consequence of the additional earnings, then the speaker
has obviously got his marginal and effective rates mixed up. Taken in this sense the
comment could only be true if, by adding the $10,000 to her existing taxable income,
the marginal tax rate applicable to the last $10,000 somehow became applicable to X’s
income overall. But it does not: the lower segments of X’s income continue to be taxed
at the same marginal rates as previously, i.e., the first $19,050 at 10%, the next $58,350
at 12%, and so on. Hence, additional earnings will always involve some increase in a
taxpayer’s after-tax income as long as the highest marginal rate of tax is less than 100%.
There have been sharp debates in Congress and elsewhere about just how
progressive the rate structure should be, but the fundamental idea of progressive
marginal rates has not been seriously challenged in Congress in recent years. However,
the merits of progressivity have been debated as a philosophical matter with more or
less intensity for decades, generations, even centuries.3 The federal income tax’s closest
brush with “proportionate taxation” (that is, taxation of all income at a single “flat” rate)
occurred in the late 1980’s; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 featured only two marginal tax
rates, of 15% and 28% (or three marginal tax rates, if one counts the quasi-zero bracket
created by the standard deduction).
Which is correct as a matter of social policy, a progressive rate-structure or a
proportional rate-structure? President Reagan made his own view very clear on one
occasion when, citing Biblical precedent, he asserted that “There can be no moral
justification [for] the progressive tax.”4 President Clinton, on the other hand, though a
Bible reader himself, insisted that a flat or proportional rate-structure unduly favors
upper-income taxpayers and for that reason fails to meet a standard of tax equity or
“fairness.” Congress came close to supporting President Reagan’s position in 1986, but
then in 1993 moved in President Clinton’s direction by imposing higher marginal rates
—as high as 39.6%—on high-income taxpayers. Although there is ongoing political
controversy over appropriate marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution, the
principle
18
6
19
the 20% top rate on long-term capital gains, keep in mind that where § 1411 applies the
combined top tax rate on ordinary investment income (e.g., interest) is 40.8% and the
combined top rate on capital gains is 23.8%.
The 3.8% tax on net investment income is new. By contrast, federal payroll taxes
on wages have been around for many decades. An employee is subject to a payroll tax
equal to 6.2% of her wages, up to a ceiling on taxable wages (in 2018) of $128,400. The
employer is also taxed on those same wages, also at the rate of 6.2%. Revenue from
both the employee and employer tax is dedicated to funding social security retirement
payments. There are also payroll taxes to fund Medicare. These taxes are imposed on all
wages; there is no wage ceiling for purposes of the Medicare taxes. Again, there are two
identical rate (1.45%) taxes, one imposed on employees and one on employers. Finally,
the Affordable Care Act recently added § 3101(b)(2), which imposes an additional 0.9%
tax, applicable to wages in excess of $200,000 for a single taxpayer, or in excess of
$250,000 in the case of a joint return. This tax is imposed only on the employee; there is
no corresponding tax on the employer. Taking into account the 37% top income tax
rate, the 1.45% basic Medicare tax, and the 0.9% additional Medicare tax, the top
combined federal tax rate imposed on employees on their employment income is
39.35%. The combined top rate rises to 40.8% if we also consider the 1.45% tax
imposed on the employer.
More than a loose end. Section 199A, added to the Code by the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017, generally provides a deduction equal to 20% of the “qualified business
income” of a noncorporate taxpayer. For a taxpayer in the top (37%) rate bracket under
§ 1, § 199A produces an effective tax rate of 29.6% (that is, taxing 80% of income at
37% is the equivalent of taxing 100% of income at 29.6%). As with many other features
of the 2017 legislation, § 199A is scheduled to terminate after 2025.
20
original (unadjusted) basis of depreciable property used by the taxpayer in the business.
Suppose, for example, a qualifying business has $1,000,000 of taxable income, pays
$300,000 of wages, and uses depreciable assets with total original basis of $400,000.
Absent the cap rules, the § 199A deduction would be $200,000. The first cap rule
produces a ceiling of $150,000, and the second produces a ceiling of $175,000 ($75,000
plus $100,000). The allowable deduction is $175,000. Like the personal services rules,
the cap rules do not apply to a taxpayer with taxable income below $157,500
($315,000). The exemption is phased out as income rises above $157,500 ($315,000);
the phase out is complete at $207,500 ($415,000).
The legislative history does not offer any rationale for § 199A, and it is certainly
not self-evident that the owner of a qualifying business deserves to be taxed more
lightly than the owner of an equal-income disqualified personal services business, or
than an equal-income employee. The deduction limits based on percentages of wages
paid suggest the deduction is intended as a reward for “jobs creators,” but (as the
American Bar Association pointed out to Congress, to no avail) law firms and other
personal services businesses also create jobs. The best explanation for the provision is
probably simply that, when Congress in 2017 reduced the corporate tax rate from 35%
to 21%, owners of unincorporated businesses successfully demanded a parallel tax cut.
Owners of personal services
21
necessary in computing the various personal expense allowances and for certain other purposes. See discussion at
7.06.
2 The same point—that postponing her tax payments favors the taxpayer—can be made in another way. In the
example above, if the $1,000 tax is not due for one year, the taxpayer (rather than the government) will earn the
stipulated 8% return during that period. The taxpayer will then have 80 “extra” dollars of her own when the year is
over. But if the $1,000 has to be paid to the Treasury immediately, the return on that money will belong to the
government. Viewed as of the end of the year, therefore, there is $80 at stake. While the text suggests that the
amount at stake is only $74, that is because the text is looking at the problem from the beginning of the year.
Really, the $74 mentioned in the text and the $80 mentioned in this note are the same quantities. Thus, $74 is the
present value (again, at 8%) of $80 due a year from now; $80 is just $74 one year later.
For convenience, an explanation of the concept of “present value,” together with related Tables and a very
brief “Exercise,” is provided in the Appendix.
3 Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (1953); Blum, The Uneasy
Case for Progressive Taxation in 1976, in Campbell, ed., Income Redistribution (1977), p. 147. And see Bankman
& Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal.L.Rev. 1905
(1987).
4 “Proportionate taxation we would gladly accept on the theory that those better able to pay should remove
some of the burden from those least able to pay. The Bible explains this in its instruction on tithing. We are told
that we should give the Lord one tenth and if the Lord prospers us ten times as much, we should give ten times as
much. But, under our progressive income tax, computing Caesar’s share is a little different . . .” Reagan,
Encroaching Control: Keep Government Poor and Remain Free, 27 Vital Speeches of the Day 677 (1961).
5 Even if inflation did not result in an increase in the top marginal tax rate applicable to a taxpayer’s income, it
could produce an increase in the taxpayer’s effective (average) tax rate by causing a greater proportion of the
taxpayer’s income to be taxed at the taxpayer’s top marginal rate.
6 For one of the best discussions, see Avi-Yonah, et al., The Games They Will Play: An Update on the
Conference Committee Tax Bill (revised December 22, 2017), available at ssrn.com.
22
11
Part A
INCOME
Code § 61, which contains the definition of “gross income,” is the starting point for
a study of the federal income tax. The section begins with a catch-all clause—“gross
income means all income from whatever source derived”—and then proceeds to
enumerate fifteen specific classes of receipts which are regarded as within the income
definition. The enumeration is extensive; it picks up most or all of the common classes
of income—salaries, wages, business profits, dividends, interest, rents and royalties—
and includes as well a good many special kinds of benefits, such as annuities, income
from discharge of indebtedness, and income in respect of a decedent. The intent is plain:
to the extent that there might be doubt about one or another of the items enumerated, the
desire of Congress to bring that item within the definition of income is made clear and
unmistakable. But the enumeration is not designed to be exhaustive. The forms that
commercial dealings can take in the modern world, and the labels that can be assigned
to income from different sources, are simply too various for any listing to fully
comprehend. Accordingly, the catch-all clause is expected to supplement the
enumeration by including any non-enumerated items which can properly be defined as
“income.” In that way it plays an important, if subordinate, role in determining the
scope of the provision.
Unavoidably, perhaps, the language employed by § 61 is somewhat tautological
—“. . . gross income means all income . . .”—and in the old days, at least, there was
considerable preoccupation with the question of how much ground the catch-all clause
was actually intended to cover. Was the quoted phrase—“all income . . .”—as sweeping,
as embracing as it sounded, or were there certain inbuilt criteria which might actually
operate to exclude some forms of enrichment from the tax base? In Eisner v.
Macomber,1 decided in 1920, the Supreme Court stated that “income may be defined as
the gain derived from labor, from capital, or from both combined,” a construction which
could be taken to mean that unless the factor of labor or capital were present in a given
case, the income definition would not encompass the item in question, and the income
tax would not apply to it. One was therefore invited to speculate about the status under
the law of such things as “give-away” prizes ($25,000 for catching the fish with the
advertiser’s identification tag on its tail2); awards for civic achievement (the Peace Prize
—Nobel or Lenin);
12
23
outside the concept of “income” which the Supreme Court had approved in Macomber?
Or could it be asserted that “labor” or “capital” somehow inheres in every human
activity? The Macomber definition apparently possessed metaphysical properties which
made it difficult to apply in an absolute fashion, and hence most commentators
contented themselves with the observation that close cases would have to be resolved on
an individual basis.3
Happily, the Supreme Court in 1955 put an end to much, perhaps all, of the
uncertainty which the Macomber decision had generated by discarding the labor-capital
formulation in favor of a broader and simpler concept of “income.” In Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co.,4 the taxpayers had received treble damage awards under the
antitrust laws. Pointing out that two-thirds of the awards represented fines or penalties
imposed on the wrongdoers for violating federal laws, the taxpayers argued that only the
basic one-third portion which compensated for loss of profits could be treated as derived
from labor or capital or both combined. Making no real attempt to bring the punitive
damages within the Macomber definition, the Court nevertheless held that the awards
were taxable in their entirety. “Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion. The
mere fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punishment for
unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income to the
recipients.” Congress, the Court stated significantly, had applied “no limitations as to
the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature.” Macomber, it
said, could not be regarded as the “touchstone” to all questions of gross income.
The Court thus resolved—more or less at a stroke—much of what had seemed
troublesome and tantalizing about the term “income.” With “source” declared irrelevant,
the “touchstone” to all income questions becomes simple enrichment; all gains are
taxable (at least if “clearly realized”), whether traceable to labor, to capital, or to mere
good fortune. If punitive damages are within the scope of the income definition just
because the recipient is made wealthier thereby, then so are prizes and awards (lucky or
deserved); so are damages and subsidies of all sorts; and so are packets of cash found
13
in the backs of taxicabs. Each represents an “accession to wealth,” and that factor
by itself, under Glenshaw, justifies inclusion in the tax base. The catch-all provision of
§ 61 is indeed as sweeping as it seems to be; the income tax is source-blind, and any
measurable gain is within its reach.
The Glenshaw decision has survived the ensuing decades without material
qualification, and it is altogether unlikely that the Court will ever return to a narrower
view of the meaning of “income.” It is therefore fair to ask at this point whether there is
anything still left to debate under the heading “What is income?” The answer, of course,
is: just about everything. Apart from the taxability of windfalls, punitive damages and
similar trivia, the Glenshaw case resolves none of the real difficulties in the field,
though it does, perhaps, help to sharpen the issues. The problems that survive the
Glenshaw decision are, and in the nature of things always were, the critical ones from
the standpoint of the structure of the tax law, and their solutions are not greatly
24
advanced by the assertion that all realized gains are “income.” This is not to say that a
contrary decision in Glenshaw would not have been troublesome: if punitive damages
had been held non-taxable even though they plainly enriched the recipient, Congress
would presumably have had to extend the enumeration in § 61 to include such receipts
and then might have had to resort to further enumeration if and when other unusual
items obtained exemption in the courts. Although Congress is still obliged to explicitly
exempt receipts it doesn’t wish to cover, e.g., college tuition scholarships (see Code
§ 117), this is done as a matter of conscious legislative design rather than chance
judicial action. Our point, however, is that Glenshaw does not, and could not, reach the
technical questions with which the law is chiefly concerned in taxing “income”; hence
the decision, though important philosophically, has little direct effect on the learning job
that lies ahead.
The structural or technical issues to be examined in this Part can very roughly be
divided into three categories (implied by the Glenshaw opinion itself, as a matter of
fact). Since income includes all “gains” that are “clearly realized” regardless of
“source,” the relevant questions would seem to be:
(a) What constitutes a “gain”? Has the taxpayer enjoyed the requisite “accession to
wealth” by reason of some particular event, and if he has, in what amount? This
question seems to have an economic ring to it rather than an abstract legal quality; it
calls for a measurement of the taxpayer’s personal wealth, or at least the change therein
from one point in time to another—presumably the beginning and end of the calendar
year. While that inquiry appears somewhat less problematic than the question of how to
define “income,” even so one anticipates disputes. And since income may be
14
25
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absorbement pénible… De Paris, je me suis rendu sans tarder à
Brémenville, un village du Nord… C’est de là que je viens.
— Et maintenant, vous retournez à Paris ?
— Non, je vais plus loin… je vais à Moret.
— En tout cas, je suis charmé que les Audrettes se soient
trouvées sur votre chemin, citoyen colonel… Quand avez-vous quitté
Brémenville ? Hier ?
— Hier matin.
— C’est que je connais bien ce village-là… Un joli pays, pas
vrai ?… Des cousins à moi l’habitent et, quoiqu’on ne voisine guère
à de si grandes distances, j’ai moi-même passé quelque temps à
Brémenville l’année dernière, pour des affaires de famille…
— Ah ! vraiment, fit le colonel Fargeot.
Et il était visible que les affaires de famille du citoyen Pouponnel
ne l’intéressaient pas plus que ne l’exigeait strictement la politesse.
L’aubergiste s’étonna sans doute de cette indifférence
persistante, car il regarda plus attentivement son jeune client.
— Si la chose n’était pas bien invraisemblable au lendemain
d’une victoire qui doit vous avoir mis le cœur en fête, reprit-il, je
dirais que vous paraissez triste, citoyen…
Pierre releva la tête.
— Je suis triste, en effet, répondit-il, je suis même plus que
triste… je suis malheureux… car, tandis que j’accourais à
Brémenville tout fier, tout joyeux de mon grade nouveau, mon père,
malade depuis plusieurs jours sans que j’eusse pu en être averti,
était à l’agonie… quelques heures à peine après mon arrivée, il est
mort dans mes bras…
— Oh ! c’est affreux… et je vous plains bien sincèrement…
Il y eut un silence. Puis, incapable de contenir longtemps la
naturelle agilité de sa langue, l’aubergiste demanda :
— Votre père était de Brémenville ?
— Non, mais il y remplissait depuis deux ans les fonctions de
maître d’école…
Pouponnel tressaillit, le visage illuminé.
— … De maître d’école… attendez donc ! s’écria-t-il. Fargeot… le
citoyen Antonin Fargeot… c’est cela !… Mais je l’ai connu votre
brave homme de père… Je l’ai vu à Brémenville, chez mes cousins
précisément… Suis-je étourdi de ne pas m’en être souvenu tout de
suite ?… Ce n’est pas d’ailleurs que vous lui ressembliez au citoyen
Antonin Fargeot, ajouta-t-il enveloppant le jeune homme d’un regard
amusé. Il était aussi frêle et mince que vous voilà grand et solide…
Et je ne pouvais guère m’imaginer qu’il eût pour fils un aussi bel
officier… Ah ! oui certes, un officier fièrement beau !… Je ne
voudrais pas vous flatter, citoyen colonel, mais s’il y en a beaucoup
de bâtis comme vous dans les armées de Bonaparte, je me figure
que les ennemis de la nation n’ont qu’à bien se tenir !
Et, satisfait de sa péroraison, l’aubergiste brandissait d’un geste
martial le couteau et la fourchette dont il venait de se servir pour
détacher l’aile d’un poulet.
Il est vrai de dire que son jugement admiratif n’avait rien
d’excessif et que c’était en effet un très bel officier que Pierre
Fargeot — beau non pas seulement par l’ensemble de son être
physique, sa haute taille, la sveltesse robuste de ses vingt-quatre
ans, beau encore de toute la loyauté, de toute la fierté, de toute la
noblesse de l’âme jeune et ardente dont le pur rayonnement éclairait
ses traits mâles et transparaissait, en dépit d’un chagrin
profondément ressenti, sous la douceur veloutée de ses yeux bruns.
L’aubergiste se tut encore un instant, mais, comme Fargeot ne lui
répondait que par un très pâle sourire, l’idée lui vint que l’orphelin
attendait un retour courtois au souvenir du maître d’école.
— Pendant ces dernières heures que vous avez passées à son
chevet, votre pauvre père possédait-il encore toute sa tête ?
questionna-t-il.
A ces mots, l’officier parut sortir d’un rêve, et une singulière
réplique lui échappa.
— Je ne sais pas… murmura-t-il comme malgré lui.
— Vous ne savez pas ? répéta Pouponnel étonné.
— Je veux dire que les phrases les plus sensées furent souvent
interrompues par le délire, pendant cette triste nuit d’agonie et que
le…
Ici, le jeune homme s’arrêta, saisi par une émotion dont il voulait
réprimer les manifestations visibles.
— Alors… vous avez connu mon père, citoyen ? demanda-t-il
pourtant au bout d’un instant, lorsqu’il sentit que sa voix s’était
raffermie.
L’aubergiste était toujours disposé à répondre et à répondre
copieusement.
— Je l’ai connu comme on peut se connaître quand on s’est vu
deux ou trois fois, citoyen… mais je sais qu’il était fort estimé à
Brémenville, pour son savoir d’abord, puis pour sa bonté, sa charité,
puis enfin pour ses opinions républicaines qu’on savait de bonne
marque… Tenez, je me rappelle maintenant… il m’a conté qu’il avait
un fils dans l’armée… et à ce propos, comme je le plaignais d’être
séparé de son gars, il m’a dit de belles paroles : « — Vous avez
raison, citoyen, depuis huit ans que l’enfant s’est engagé, je suis
bien seul et souvent bien triste ; mais quand je pense que c’est moi,
le pauvre diable de maître d’école qui ai donné à la République un
soldat comme celui-là, je prends en patience le chagrin, l’isolement
et j’en arrive à oublier beaucoup d’autres choses encore… » Ah ! oui,
c’en était un bon, un pur le citoyen Fargeot !… Et par le temps
d’aujourd’hui, an VIII de la République, il ne faudrait pas croire qu’ils
courent les rues, les vrais républicains… Il y a même des gens qui
disent comme cela que le citoyen Premier Consul…
— Eh bien ? questionna Pierre.
— … qui disent que le citoyen Premier Consul ne l’est pas
républicain autant qu’on voudrait, voilà !
— Ah ! vraiment, fit l’officier, ces gens-là disent que le citoyen
Premier Consul n’est pas républicain ! Que disent-il donc qu’il est ?
— Ils disent qu’il est… bonapartiste, citoyen colonel, avoua
l’aubergiste.
Fargeot souriait plus franchement, amusé de ce verbiage.
— Peut-être l’est-il, en effet, concéda-t-il. Pourquoi la qualité de
bonapartiste et celle de républicain seraient-elles incompatibles,
puisque nous sommes en république et que Bonaparte est à la tête
du gouvernement ?… Mais combien vous dois-je, citoyen, pour votre
excellent repas, ajouta le jeune homme, en reculant un peu la table.
— Allons, citoyen colonel, un bon mouvement, décidez-vous à
passer la nuit ici, s’écria maître Pouponnel sans plus répondre à la
demande qui lui était faite. Je vous donnerai la plus belle chambre
de l’auberge et, sans me flatter, vous y serez aussi bien logé que le
général Bonaparte aux Tuileries.
Pierre Fargeot secoua négativement la tête.
— Je vous remercie, dit-il, mes moments sont comptés et mon
voyage réglé heure par heure, étape par étape jusqu’à Moret. Sous
peine d’être infidèle à cet itinéraire rigoureusement tracé, je dois, ce
soir même, atteindre le village de Mons-en-Bray. C’est donc là que je
passerai la nuit.
— Mons-en-Bray, ce soir ! Mons-en-Bray ! répéta l’aubergiste en
levant les bras au ciel. Mais vous n’y pensez pas, citoyen colonel ! Si
longs et clairs que soient les jours de thermidor, jamais vous
n’atteindrez Mons-en-Bray avant la nuit ! Il faut compter, des
Audrettes à Mons, quatre bonnes heures… en marchant bien !
— Mettons-en donc trois en marchant très bien, citoyen. Nous en
avons vu de plus dures !… Et cette course à pied sera la dernière
que j’aurai à fournir puisqu’à Mons-en-Bray, je retrouverai mon
ordonnance et mes chevaux.
— Vous ne pouvez pas arriver en trois heures à Mons… il
faudrait pour cela posséder les bottes du Petit Poucet, citoyen. Et,
entre les Audrettes et Mons, vous ne rencontreriez pas seulement
une grange où dormir, si vous vouliez vous arrêter en route.
— Je ne m’arrêterai pas en route, je marcherai jusqu’à ce que
j’arrive et j’arriverai toujours une fois, déclara l’officier avec une belle
assurance juvénile. L’essentiel est que je ne me trompe pas de
direction et connaisse le chemin le plus court. Pouvez-vous me
l’indiquer ?
— Citoyen colonel, insinua maître Pouponnel de son ton le plus
enjôleur, je saurais mieux vous l’indiquer à la lumière du matin.
Mais le visage de l’officier se fit plus grave.
— N’insistez pas, citoyen… je suis attendu à Moret par la seule
parente qui me reste au monde, une tante de mon père, très âgée
déjà et qui m’a élevé… Le malheur dont je viens d’être frappé et qui
l’atteint presque aussi douloureusement que moi est encore ignoré
d’elle… Tout retard de ma part serait coupable, vous le
comprendrez.
— J’aurais eu grande joie à loger aux « Armes de la Nation » un
de nos vainqueurs de l’armée d’Italie ; mais je vois que vous êtes
incorruptible, citoyen colonel, fit l’aubergiste avec un geste résigné. Il
ne me reste donc plus qu’à vous enseigner le chemin de Mons-en-
Bray.
II
LE CHEMIN DE MONS-EN-BRAY