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(Ebook PDF) (Ebook PDF) Human Resource Management Theory and Practice 5th Edition All Chapter
(Ebook PDF) (Ebook PDF) Human Resource Management Theory and Practice 5th Edition All Chapter
(Ebook PDF) (Ebook PDF) Human Resource Management Theory and Practice 5th Edition All Chapter
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Human Resource
Management
Theory & Practice
vii
contents
viii
contents ix
1.1 The employment and psychological contract between employees and employers 12
1.2 HRM functions, contingencies and skills 16
1.3 The Harvard model of HRM 19
1.4 Ulrich’s human resources business partner model 26
4.1 The core dimensions of job design for individual employees 114
4.2 Alternative job designs for an employee 115
4.3 An example of job rotation 120
4.4 An example of job enlargement 121
4.5 An example of job enrichment 121
4.6 The job characteristic model 122
4.7 The work design–human factor paradox 137
xviii
list of figures xix
xx
about the authors
xxi
about the contributors
xxii
about the contributors xxiii
H. vii. 196.
From two incidents mentioned in Herodotus it is
evident that the Persians adopted both these lines of
H. vii. 196.
advance. He says that the numbers of the Persian
army were so large, that of the rivers of Achaia even
the largest, the Apidanos, barely sufficed for its purposes. This
indicates the use of the Krannon-Thaumaki route.
The visit of Xerxes to Halos indicates that he, with part of his
army, took the coast route.
It was after entering the Malian plain that the real difficulties of the
campaign began. Xerxes and his army were face to face with Mount
Œta. It may be well to realize in so far as possible the prospect
which would meet his eye when, after completing the passage round
Othrys, he arrived at Phalara From that point of view nearly the
whole length of Œta would be extended before him as he faced
southwards. Away to the south-west, at a distance of from twelve to
fifteen miles, stands the highest and most imposing mass of the
range, a great hummock crowned by four or five peaks. The
hummock itself rises some five thousand feet almost sheer from the
plain, and the peaks on it rise some fifteen hundred feet more. In full
view from Phalara, too, would be that tremendous ravine, a dark,
wedge-shaped cut in the side of the mountain, which a
comparatively small stream has hollowed out to a depth of four
thousand feet. As the eye travels eastward along the range there is a
decrease in the actual height of it, the general level of the ridge
being perhaps not more than four thousand feet. But the face
towards the plain is marked by the broad black band of those famous
rocks the Trachinian cliffs. They end suddenly towards the east,
where a thin, perpendicular, black streak in the mountain side marks
the exit of the great ravine of the Asopos.
It is a magnificent picture; but the background is as magnificent as
the picture itself. High as the range is, there rises above it in the
distance, behind the four-thousand-foot ridge, the great peak of
Giona. Though it is one of the most impressive peaks in Greece, its
ancient name is unknown. It is far away among the confused mass
of the great ranges of Northern Ætolia; and yet it seems so near
when it is lit up by the last rays of the setting sun, while all the
foreground of the broad Malian plain, and even of Œta, is involved in
the deep blue shadow of the eastern twilight. It rises from the east
towards heaven in a long, gradually ascending ridge, becoming
steeper in the final effort of its climb. Then, the highest summit once
attained, it falls sheer down into a valley of misty gloom.
Paus. x. 21.
It was plainly important that the enemy’s fleet
should be excluded from the Malian Gulf. The road
eastwards from Thermopylæ runs by the side of the Gulf for a long
distance after it has issued from the east gate of the pass; and it
would have been fatal to the defenders had troops been landed
there, since they would have been within short striking distance of
the Greek position, and so have rendered any escape by way of the
mountain path which leads by the modern Boudenitza to the Phocian
plain at Elatea difficult, if not impossible. But there was a further
possibility of which the Greek commanders must have been aware,
and against which they would have to provide. If it was possible 200
years after this time for the Athenian galleys to sail close in shore
and attack the flank of the army of Brennus when it was assailing the
narrow part of the pass, there must have been a very much greater
possibility of this being done in the year 480. On this rapidly
advancing shore that which was done in 279 b.c. with difficulty, and
not without danger, must conceivably have been a comparatively
easy matter in 480.
There was a further danger to be feared, supposing the northern
bend of the strait had been left open. Landing on the north coast of
Eubœa, a Persian force might have made its way to Chalets, and so
have turned Thermopylæ. In the wars of later Greece this was a
measure recognized as possible and actually put in practice by
combatants commanding this part of the strait. The Greeks were
undoubtedly right in the choice of Artemisium. As a naval station it
possessed two further advantages: the strait was comparatively
narrow at that point, and, above all, it was within sight of
Thermopylæ.
From the hillside above the road through the pass, only 150 feet
above the level of the plain, the view extends right down this
northern bend of the Euripus. From a point still higher up, some 1600
feet above the road, the whole channel is extended like a map.
Signalling from one position to the other by means of the smoke and
fire signals then used must have been quite easy, and it would be
even possible from this higher position at Thermopylæ to observe
the movements of large bodies of ships in the neighbourhood of
Artemisium, though, owing to the distance, a single ship would
hardly be discernible to the naked eye. It is quite clear that
Herodotus was aware of the intimacy of the relation between the two
113
positions.
The strategic capacity of those who were responsible for the
Greek plans in the war of 480 was never more advantageously
displayed than in this design of the dual defence of the pass and the
strait. Had it been carried out with equal wisdom, or even with more
harmonious vigour, Greece might perhaps have been spared the
losses and anxiety of the year that followed.
On the general question of Greek strategy let it be remarked at
this, the outset of the story of the great events of the war, that it is
unquestionably wrong to judge of it on the mere evidence of the
direct statements made by Herodotus. What may be derived from
him is rarely more than the mere narrative of events as related to
him at the time, long subsequent to the events themselves, when he
made the collection of material for his history. It is only too easy to
imagine that the strategical motives underlying those events, which
cannot, even at the time at which they were operative, have been
known to many, must have vanished from the popular story, even if
they ever had any place in it. It may also be doubted whether
Herodotus would have been qualified to appreciate fully such
motives had the record of them survived until his own day. What he
has given to the world is the popular story of the Persian war,
distorted, it may be, at times by imaginative additions, but, in so far
as can be seen, drawn in the main from veracious sources. The
historian himself wanted to get at the truth about the war. He brought
to bear upon his material a certain amount of critical acumen which
the extreme simplicity of his language has a tendency to conceal. In
military history he seems to have been under
HERODOTUS AND
STRATEGIC
the disadvantage of lack of practical
QUESTIONS. experience; and consequently where he
makes statements of cause they are often
unconvincing, sometimes demonstrably wrong. But he made an
honest endeavour to correct such errors as might arise from his own
inexperience by visiting the scenes of the great events which he
describes. His descriptions of the regions of Thermopylæ and
Platæa are undoubtedly those of an eye-witness; Salamis he must,
Mykale he may well have seen. He supplies consequently a vast
accumulation of reliable facts which make it possible in many cases
to reconstruct the design which lay behind them; and by that means
it may be seen that the Greek Council of War, in spite of its divisions,
in spite of half-hearted compromise of plans, was composed of men,
some of whom, at any rate, were quite able to grasp the large
strategical considerations involved in a war far greater than any of
which they had had experience.