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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

CHAPTER 9
GAME THEORY AND STRATEGIC THINKING
Chapter Overview

This chapter introduced the concept of strategic games. Many real-life situations can be
analyzed as if they were strategic games, with associated rules, strategies, and potential
payoffs.

Game theory can explain the logic behind outcomes that might not seem intuitive at first.
Sometimes, for example, both players in a simultaneous game may choose to behave in a way
that makes both worse off. When games are played in turns rather than simultaneously, the
first mover’s decision can dictate the outcome of the entire game. With repeated play,
however, the first mover’s advantage weakens. Players who can communicate with each other
and agree on a strategy can often secure a better outcome than if they acted alone. Such
agreements may break down if one side tries to get ahead by defecting.

Backward induction is another useful analytical tool; it allows you to break down your decisions
and predict how they will affect others’ decisions and shape the final payoff.

When trying to solve a real-life problem, whether societal, personal, or business, it helps to
think through these strategic issues. Doing so can help you see how to “play” the game given
the rules and constraints. It also can help you see how to change the rules and constraints, if
possible, to help get to a better outcome.

Much of the analysis in this chapter involved one player guessing what the other will do and
acting accordingly. In the next chapter, we’ll see that knowing what one player is planning to do
isn’t always easy, and that a lack of information can have real economic consequences.

Learning Objectives

LO 9.1: Understand strategic behavior and describe the components of a strategic game.
LO 9.2: Explain why noncooperation is always the outcome in the prisoners’ dilemma.
LO 9.3: Identify whether or not a player has a dominant strategy in a one-time game.
LO 9.4: Identify whether or not a Nash equilibrium will be reached in a one-time game.
LO 9.5: Explain how a commitment strategy can be used to achieve cooperation in a one-time
game.
LO 9.6: Explain how repeated play can enable cooperation.
LO 9.7: Explain how backward induction can be used to make decisions.
LO 9.8: Use a decision tree to solve a sequential game.
LO 9.9: Define first-mover advantage and identify it in practice.
LO 9.10: Explain why patient players have more bargaining power in repeated games.

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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

LO 9.11: Explain how a commitment strategy can allow players to achieve their goals by
limiting their options.

Chapter Outline

OPENING STORY: LITTERBUGS BEWARE

Games and Strategic Behavior (LO 9.1)
Rules, Strategies, and Payoffs
One-Time Games and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner's Dilemma (LO 9.2)
Finding the Dominant Strategy (LO 9.3)
Reaching Equilibrium (LO 9.4)
Avoiding Competition through Commitment (LO 9.5)
Promoting Competition in the Public Interest
Repeated Play in the Prisoners’ Dilemma (LO 9.6)
The Tit-for-Tat Strategy
BOX FEATURE: REAL LIFE – WHAT DO PRICE-MATCHING GUARANTEES GUARANTEE?
BOX FEATURE: FROM ANOTHER ANGLE – TIT-FOR-TAT AND HUMAN EMOTIONS
Sequential Games
Think Forward, Work Backward (LO 9.7)
Deterring Market Entry: A Sequential Game (LO 9.8)
BOX FEATURE: WHAT DO YOU THINK? – SURVIVING WITH STRATEGIC THINKING
First-Mover Advantage in Sequential Games (LO 9.9)
Repeated Sequential Games (LO 9.10)
Commitment in Sequential Games (LO 9.11)
BOX FEATURE: REAL LIFE – DR. STRANGELOVE, OR HOW WE LEARNED TO
LOVE THE COMMITMENT DEVICE

Beyond the Lecture

Class Discussion: Games and Strategic Behavior (LO 9.1)

Consider showing students this brief interview with Vanessa Rousso, a professional poker
player briefly discussing the use of game theory in poker.
1. What strategic behavior occurs in poker (or similar games)?
2. How can game theory be applied in poker?
3. Can game theory give someone an advantage in poker?

Class Activity: Games, Strategic Behavior, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (LO 9.1, LO 9.2)
Consider placing students in groups and having them work through a game theory problem. A
simple prisoner’s dilemma works well with the class. You can set up a number of scenarios for
students to discuss. Additionally, consider having students attempt one of the free game theory
applets available here.

Class Discussion: One-Time Games and the Prisoner’s Dilemma [LO 9.2]
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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

Consider showing this clip from the British game show Golden Balls. The players must simply
decide to split or steal. If they both choose split, they split a sum of money. If one person splits
and one steals, the person who steals gets all of the money. If they both steal, they get nothing.
You can use well-timed pauses while showing the video to ask students if they understand and
what they think is going to happen. It’s a great example of the prisoner’s dilemma, attempts at
cooperative game theory, and [Spoiler Alert] a player defecting from the cooperation strategy.
Students really respond well to the “surprise” ending in this clip.

Class Discussion: One-Time Games and the Prisoner’s Dilemma [LO 9.2]
For a short comic relief, you can show this clip from the cartoon Dilbert. Keep in mind that
games only work if we assume everyone understands the game, strategies, payoffs, and rules.
If we begin to include outside influence, the strategies and payoffs can change.

Clicker Questions

There are three main purposes to clicker questions. First, they are a great way to do a quick
and instant “on demand” test of student understanding of the material. You can cover
material, and instantly get feedback on student comprehension. You can see whether you need
to explain certain topics again, or move on to the next subject. Second, they are a great
method to break up the class and take a moment away from lecture. It gets the students
actively involved. Finally, certain clicker questions can be framed in a “discussion” manner, in
which you can invite students to talk about the possible right answer with their peers. You can
instruct students to convince their classmate of a right or wrong answer.

1. What does it mean for a strategy to be dominant? [LO 9.1, LO 9.2]

A. The strategy provides the highest payoffs most of the time
B. The strategy will always make the other players lose
C. The strategy will create a positive sum outcome
D. The strategy is the best choice for you no matter what the other players choose

Feedback: Dominant strategies are best for you no matter the choice of the other players.

2. Players will be more likely to cooperate in simultaneous games when [LO 9.3]
A. The game will be repeated
B. Large positive payoffs exist for one player
C. The game is zero-sum
D. The rules and payoffs of the game aren’t understood by one of the players

3. In sequential games, backwards induction means that? [LO 9.4]

A. The game is played in reverse and the last player chooses first
B. Optimal strategies are determined starting with the last player, and going to the first, in
order to determine the outcome of optimal play

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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

C. The last player assumes the first player doesn’t know the payoffs, so no useful predictions
can be made
D. The players in the middle of the game lose because the first and last players have an
advantage

4. The prisoners’ dilemma is a famous game, and has many real-life applications. What is true
about this type of game? [LO 9.2]
A. The Nash equilibrium is not a result of dominant strategies
B. Players cooperate as a dominant strategy
C. The Nash equilibrium is not the highest possible payoff for the players
D. Real life examples of this type of game often involve illegal behaviors

Feedback: The Nash equilibrium leads to worse payoffs for both players compared to a
cooperative outcome. However, it is the dominant strategy of both players to NOT cooperate!

5. Which of the following could most likely turn into a prisoner’s dilemma game? [LO 9.2]
A. A husband and wife each deciding how much spending money to bring on vacation
B. A student and professor trying to solve a grade dispute
C. Two teenage boys trying to embarrass each other to win the affections of a girl
D. Two countries deciding the size of their nuclear arsenal

Feedback: Perhaps a student discussion question. [C] and [D] could both be correct. For the
boys, the strategies are “embarrass” or “not embarrass” their friend, with a dominant strategy
for each being “embarrass”, even though it makes them both look bad. For the two countries,
the dominant strategy could be “get more nukes”.

Solutions to End-of-Chapter Questions and Problems

Review Questions

1. Taking an exam can be considered a game. Describe a rule, a strategy, and payoff for this
game. [LO 9.1]

Answer: Rule: The exam might have a time limit, such as one hour. Another rule could be
that you have to show your work when solving a problem in order to get full credit.
Strategy: Instead of taking the exam in order, you might decide to start with the questions
that are worth the most points, to make sure you allocate your time for the greatest payoff.
Payoff: The score/grade you receive on the exam is your payoff.

2. Why is strategic behavior required to win a presidential election? Describe some of the
rules, strategies, and payoffs that define this game in the real world. [LO 9.1]

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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

Answer: Strategic behavior is about thinking about what your opponent is likely to do and
letting this inform your own choices. Elections involve a lot of strategic behavior; candidates
pay attention to the messages and actions of their opponents and decide the best way to
respond. Some rules of this game include guidelines for how votes are counted and limits on
sources of fundraising. Some of the strategies involve choosing where to campaign and
when, choosing what message to emphasize to certain voters, and whether to run negative
ads about your opponent. Payoffs include campaign contributions, endorsements, and
votes.

3. Felix and Sam are roommates. They both want the dishes to be washed, but each would
prefer that the other person do it. Use the decision matrix in Figure 9Q-1 to explain why Felix
and Sam are likely to end up with a sink full of dirty dishes. Their preferences are ranked from 1
(lowest) to 4 (highest). [LO 9.2]

Answer: If Sam does dishes, Felix prefers not do the dishes (4) rather than to help Sam (2). If
Sam does not do dishes, Felix prefers not to do dishes either (3) rather than do all the dishes
himself (1). No matter what Sam does, Felix prefers not to do dishes. Sam has the same
preferences as Felix. If Felix does dishes, Sam prefers not do the dishes (4) rather than to
help Felix (2). If Felix does not do dishes, Sam prefers not to do dishes either (3) rather than
do all the dishes himself (1). No matter what Felix does, Sam prefers not to do dishes. Alas,
Felix and Sam will wind up with dirty dishes.

4. Two neighbors share a pond they have stocked with catfish. They have agreed upon the
amount of fishing each can do in order for the stock of catfish to replenish itself. If one neighbor
increases the amount he fishes a little bit, the catfish stock could still replenish itself. If both
neighbors increase their fishing, the stock will not be sustainable. Both neighbors would like to
cheat and increase the amount they fish, but want the other neighbor to stick to the
agreement. [LO 9.2]
a. What is the noncooperative outcome, and why does it occur?
b. What is the cooperative outcome, and how could the neighbors achieve this outcome?

Answer:
a. The noncooperative outcome is for both neighbors to increase fishing, which will make
them both worse off. This outcome occurs because they both have an incentive to cheat
if the other neighbor sticks to the agreement. They both know they can be better off by
cheating if the other neighbor doesn’t, so both wind up cheating.
b. The cooperative outcome is to stick to the original agreement about the amount of
fishing that is sustainable without having to restock the pond. The neighbors could
achieve this outcome if they can agree to a commitment strategy, such as sole financial
responsibility to restock the pond if one of the neighbors cheats.

5. You have been texting with your friends trying to make plans for this evening. Your best
friend Jocelyn is not sure if she will finish her homework in time to come out, but if she does,
she wants to go to a new restaurant on the north end of town that you've both been wanting to
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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

try. Another group of friends is going to a restaurant on the south end of town, but you've
already been to this restaurant and it was only okay. No one is returning your calls, but you
need to get on the subway and head into town if you want to do anything this evening. You
have to decide whether to head north or south. Do you have a dominant strategy? Explain why
or why not.

Answer: Something can only be a dominant strategy if you want to choose it no matter
what the other players are doing. It's true that you would prefer to head north if you knew
Jocelyn is coming out, but if you knew Jocelyn was staying home, you would prefer to head
south. Thus, you do not have a dominant strategy in this case.

6. You have just played rock, paper, scissors with your friend. You chose scissors and he chose
paper, so you won. Is this a Nash equilibrium? Explain why or why not.

Answer: Even though you don't regret your choice, your friend regrets his choice. A Nash
equilibrium is reached when all players choose the best strategy they can, given the choices
of all other players. In other words, this is a point in a game when no player has an incentive
to change his or her strategy, given what the other players are doing. Because your friend
regrets his choice, this is not a Nash equilibrium.

7. Two firms each have the option of polluting during production or cleaning up their
production process such that they don't pollute. Of course, polluting is cheaper than not
polluting. The payoffs for each of the choice combinations are shown in the decision matrix in
Figure 9Q-2. The government would like to stop pollution by making it illegal and charging a
fine if a firm is found polluting. How large does the fine need to be to keep a firm from
polluting?

Answer: If the government charges a fine for pollution, this changes the payoffs. A fine of,
say, $10,000 is too small. There is still an incentive to pollute. But a fine of $65,000 is just
enough to incentivize the firms to choose not to pollute.

8. Explain how you could use a tit-for-tat strategy to motivate your roommate to do his share
of the cleaning. [LO 9.6]

Answer: Tit-for-tat involves taking the same action (or inaction) as the other player. If your
roommate does not pull his weight on cleaning, tit-for-tat would mean you stop doing your
portion of the cleaning as well. Of course, this may be difficult for you if your roommate has
a higher tolerance for a mess than you do. If that is the case, you could find some other
chore of importance to your roommate, such as taking turns buying snacks, and refuse to
cooperate.

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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

9. Toni and Kala are new coworkers. They make a plan to go out together every Thursday
night. On their first Thursday night out, Toni buys a pitcher of beer and shares it with Kala. Kala
is excited to discover that her Thursday night outings will include free beer as well as a way to
have fun with her new coworker. Explain why Kala is likely to be disappointed. [LO 9.6]

Answer: It is unlikely that Toni was signaling that she will always buy the drinks when they
go out on Thursdays. Customarily, people take turns buying rounds. If Kala does not
respond with tit-for-tat buy buying the next pitcher, Toni will likely respond with tit-for-tat
by not buying more pitchers either.

10. Suppose your goal is to be promoted at your job. Use backward induction to determine
what you should do to work toward that goal right now, and describe each step in your logic.
[LO 9.7]

Answer: If your goal is to be promoted, you would start by finding out the requirements and
preferred qualifications of the job you want. Next, you would assess your own skills,
experience, and education to determine how they match up with the job requirements and
preferences. As of today, you would work on obtaining or enhancing skills, experience, and
knowledge in alignment with the necessary qualifications for the job you want. Perhaps you
sign up for an advanced economics course!

11. You are playing a game with a friend. It’s your move but you don’t have a dominant
strategy. Your payoff depends on what your friend does after your move. You consider flipping
a coin to decide what to do. You are about to reach for a coin, but then you realize that your
friend has a dominant strategy. Explain how using backward induction (rather than a coin toss)
will now determine your next move. [LO 9.7]

Answer: If you don’t have a dominant strategy because your payoff depends on what your
friend does after your move, it’s unclear how you should decide. However, if you reason
that your friend has a dominant strategy, you can use your expectation of what they will do
to work backward. Knowing that your friend has a dominant strategy takes the guesswork
out of what they will do next. You can now choose your own move based on confidence
that your friend will follow his dominant strategy.

12. Melissa let Jill cheat off of her during a history exam last week. Now Melissa is threatening
to tell on Jill unless Jill pays her $50. Use the decision tree in Figure 9Q-3 to explain whether Jill
will pay Melissa to keep her quiet. [LO 9.8]

Answer: Jill will not pay Melissa. Jill knows that Melissa will also be expelled if she reveals
that she let Jill cheat. Jill knows Melissa will not want to get expelled for $50 and will call
Jill’s bluff.

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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

13. Nicolas has asked for a raise. His boss must decide whether to approve his request. If
Nicolas doesn’t get the raise, he will have to decide whether to stay at his job or quit. Construct
a decision tree for these sequential decisions and choose a payoff structure where Nicolas has a
dominant strategy to stay at his job even without getting the raise. [LO 9.8]

Answer: Numbers are arbitrary, but students should choose a payoff structure such that
Nicolas has a dominant strategy to stay even if he is not offered the raise. If Nicolas’s boss
knows his payoff structure, he will not offer the raise. A sample decision tree is below.

14. Job offers could be considered a one-round bargaining game with a first-mover advantage:
The company offers you a job at a certain salary, and you can take it or leave it. Explain why the
company might not capture all the surplus in this game, even if you can’t make a counteroffer.
[LO 9.9]

Answer: Even if you cannot make a counteroffer, you do still have options. Presumably,
you have applied to more than one place. At least the company who plans to hire you
should assume that you are looking into other options and may even have other offers
on the table. Therefore, they would want to make you an offer attractive enough that
you accept it over some other offer you may have.

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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

15. Muriel likes her job, but her boss gives lousy bonuses. Muriel was recently offered a new
job with better rewards, and her friend wants to know if she intends to take it. “It depends on
whether the bonus this year is generous. Let’s wait and see. We’ll find out next week.” Explain
why Muriel is likely to be accepting the new job. How could she improve her strategy if she
wants to stay at her cur-rent job and be better rewarded? [LO 9.9]

Answer: Waiting to see what her bonus is this year is not a good strategy. There is no
reason she should expect her boss to behave differently than usual. Her boss would have no
reason in increase the size of bonus unless Muriel moves first and tells him that she has
another offer she is prepared to take if her bonus structure does not increase by a certain
amount.

16. Suppose you are moving out of the country and need to sell your car fast. Explain why you
are likely to get lower offers from used-car dealers if they find out that you are moving away
soon. [LO 9.10]

Answer: If dealers know you are moving soon, they know that you do not have time to be
patient and wait for a good offer. Due to the limits on your time, dealers will have the upper
hand in negotiating a price. They have other cars to sell and can be more patient.

17. Hal is negotiating his salary for a job offer. Hal’s potential employer moves first by making
an offer. Hal knows he will accept the offer but asks for a couple of weeks to think it over. If the
offer was acceptable to Hal, why did he do this? [LO 9.10]

Answer: If Hal is not desperate to get paid right away, asking for more time may increase
his offer. Hal is hoping that by asking for time the employer will see this as a sign that he is
considering other options. Hal is also hoping that the employer is less patient for the work
to begin and will increase the offer in order to get a quicker decision.

18. Many warrior cultures have codes of conduct that make retreat from battle and other
cowardly behaviors extremely dishonorable. Warriors are expected to die bravely in battle
rather than surrender; if they do retreat, they face an enormous social stigma. Paradoxically,
these codes could help warriors to win their battles. Explain. [LO 9.11]

Answer: The cultural pressure and stigma essentially remove the option for retreat. If a
warrior knows that retreat is never going to be an acceptable option, his only choice is to
fight. Knowing that he must win his battles or die trying, he will fight harder.

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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

19. A town’s two gas stations are each considering lowering prices to attract more sales. How
this affects the profits for each gas station depends on whether the other station also lowers
prices. The decision matrix in Figure 9Q-4 shows the payoffs, depending on what each player
decides to do. Suppose both gas stations lower their prices, and they find themselves in the
worst-case scenario in which both have also lowered their profits. Now suppose gas station A
announces in an advertisement that it is committed to keeping the new low prices. Why would
gas station A do this? What outcome would you expect? [LO 9.11]

Answer: Gas station A is using a commitment strategy to signal to gas station B that it won’t
be returning to higher prices. Gas station A is best off if it has low prices while gas station B
has high prices. However, gas station B might keep prices low in hopes that gas station A is
the one to retreat (switch back to higher prices). With the public announcement, gas station
A has “burned its bridges,” and gas station B knows that it will have higher profits ($65,000
rather than $35,000) if it returns to higher prices. This will leave gas station A with the
higher profits at $125,000.

Problems and Applications

1. Say whether each of the following is a rule, a strategy, or a payoff. [LO 9.1]
a. In chess, when you capture your opponent’s king, you win the game.
b. In Monopoly, players frequently mortgage their existing properties to raise cash to buy new
ones.
c. In chess, the rook piece can move any number of spaces directly forward, back-ward, or to
either side, but it cannot move diagonally.
d. In rock-paper-scissors, you might always play rock.

Answer: Rules define the actions that are allowed in a game. Strategies are the plans of
action that players follow to achieve their goals. Payoffs are the rewards that come from
particular actions.
a. Payoff: In chess, when you capture your opponent’s king, you win the game.
b. Strategy: In Monopoly, players frequently mortgage their existing properties to raise cash
to buy new ones.
c. Rule: In chess, the rook piece can move any number of spaces directly forward, backward,
or to either side, but it cannot move diagonally.
d. Strategy: In rock-paper-scissors, you might always play rock.

2. Sharon is going to an auction. Say whether each of the following is a rule, a strategy, or a
payoff. [LO 9.1]
a. Bids must increase in increments of $20.
b. The highest bid wins the item being auctioned.
c. Sharon waits until the bidding is just about to close before she enters a bid.
d. The money raised from the auction goes to charity.

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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

Answer: Rules define the actions that are allowed in a game. Strategies are the plans of
action that players follow to achieve their goals. Payoffs are the rewards that come from
particular actions.
a. Rule. Bids must increase in increments of $20.
b. Payoff. The highest bid wins the item being auctioned.
c. Strategy. Sharon waits until the bidding is just about to close before she enters a bid.
d. Rule. The money raised from the auction goes to charity.

3. Two families are trying to decide whether to donate to a fund to build a public park. The
payoffs are shown in Figure 9P-1. [LO 9.2]
a. What is the mutually beneficial outcome?
b. Acting in their best interests, what strategy will each family choose?
c. Explain why this game is or is not an example of a prisoners' dilemma.

Answer: In the prisoners' dilemma, noncooperation is the outcome. If Family B donates,

Family A is best off not donating. If Family B does not donate, Family A is best off not
donating. The same is true for Family B: If Family A donates, Family B is best off not
donating. If Family A does not donate, Family B is best off not donating. Thus, both families
choose not to donate. But it is clear that they could be better off by cooperating at
donating. However, acting in their best interests yields a less-than-optimal outcome. Thus,
this is an example of the prisoners' dilemma.

4. In Figure 9P-2, what is the dominant strategy for Player A? What is the dominant strategy
for Player B? [LO 9.3]

Answer: A dominant strategy is a strategy that is the best one for a player to follow no
matter what strategy other players choose. Player A should choose Strategy 1: If Player B
chooses Strategy 1, Player A should choose Strategy 1 (–2 versus –3). If Player B chooses
Strategy 2, Player A should choose Strategy 1 (1 versus 0). Thus, Player A has a dominant
strategy to choose Strategy 1.
Player B should choose Strategy 1: If Player A chooses Strategy 1, Player B should choose
Strategy 1 (–2 versus –3). If Player A chooses Strategy 2, Player B should choose Strategy 1
(1 versus 0). Thus, Player B has a dominant strategy to choose Strategy 1.

5. A town’s two gas stations are each considering lowering prices to attract more sales. How
this affects the profits for each gas station depends on whether the other also lowers prices.
The decision matrix in Figure 9P-3 shows the payoffs, depending on what each player decides to
do. Identify any Nash equilibria. [LO 9.4]

Answer: A Nash equilibrium is an outcome in a game that is reached when all players
choose the best strategy they can, given the choices of all other players. There are two Nash
equilibria: (1) Gas station B lowers price and gas station A keeps higher price, and (2) Gas
station A lowers price and gas station B keeps higher price. In these two quadrants, neither

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Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

player can unilaterally improve its position by changing its strategy unless the other player
also changes its strategy.

6. Consider again the two families trying to decide whether to donate to a fund to build a public
park. The payoffs are shown in Figure 9P-1. [LO 9.4, 9.5]
a. What is the Nash equilibrium?
b. Suppose Family A agrees to match the donation of Family B. Under these new circumstances,
what strategy will each family choose?

Answer: Each family has a dominant strategy to not donate. Thus, the Nash equilibrium is
where neither family donates. When both players have a dominant strategy, playing the
dominant strategy will always result in a Nash equilibrium. Remember that a Nash
equilibrium is reached when all players choose the best strategy they can, given the choices
of all other players. In other words, this is a point in a game when no player has an incentive
to change his or her strategy, given what the other players are doing.
When Family A agrees to match Family B's donation, Family B knows that they don't have to
worry about Family A not donating. They will choose to donate, and Family A will also
donate.

7. In which of the following situations, a or b, is a tit-for-tat strategy more likely to be

successful at maintaining cooperation? [LO 9.6]
a. An agreement of mutual support between players on a reality television show, in which the
relatively worst-off player is eliminated every episode.
b. A peace treaty between neighboring countries.

Answer: A tit-for-tat strategy is one in which a player in a repeated game takes the same
action that his or her opponent did in the preceding round. Thus, a peace treaty between
neighboring countries would likely be more successful at maintaining a cooperative
equilibrium.

8. Which of the following are examples of tit-for-tat strategies? [LO 9.6]

a. A friend forgets to send you a birthday card this year, so you decide not to send one to her
on her next birthday.
b. Your friend let you borrow her class notes last week, so you decide to skip class again this
week.
c. You and your roommate take turns buying toilet paper, milk, and other shared items.
d. Your book club chooses a book you don’t want to read, so you decide not to go this month.

Answer: a and c. A tit-for-tat strategy is one in which a player in a repeated game takes the
same action that his or her opponent did in the preceding round.

9-12
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill
Education.
Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

9. Using backward induction in Figure 9P-4, decide which class a hypothetical college student
should take her freshman and sophomore years, assuming that she wants to be an economics
major. [LO 9.7]

Answer: Backward induction is the process of analyzing a problem in reverse, starting with
the last choice, then the second-to-last choice, and so on, to determine the optimal
strategy. To be an economics major in her junior year, she needs to take Intro Statistics in
her sophomore year. To take Intro Statistics in her sophomore year, she needs to take
Algebra in her freshman year.

10. You need to travel from Minneapolis to Copenhagen; it’s now Tuesday morning. You know
you need to arrive in Copenhagen no later than 4 pm on Wednesday. Using backward induction
in Table 9P-1, choose your travel itinerary. Enter the flight numbers for each leg of your trip.
[LO 9.7]

Answer: First leg: Flight 1252. Second leg: Flight 2004. Third leg: Flight 803

11. In the sequential game shown in Figure 9P-5, what choice should Player A make now to
achieve the highest payoff at the end of the game? [LO 9.8]

Answer: Player A should choose Strategy 2. Even though the highest payoff for Player A is if
Player A chooses Strategy 1 and Player B chooses Strategy 4, Player B will not choose
Strategy 4 if Player A chooses Strategy 1. If Player A chooses Strategy 1, Player B is better off
choosing Strategy 3, which leaves Player A with a payoff of only 5. However, if Player A
chooses Strategy 2, Player B is better off to choose Strategy 4, which leaves Player A with a
payoff of 8. Because 8 is better than 5, A chooses Strategy 2. B will then choose Strategy 4.

12. Company A is considering whether to invest in infrastructure that will allow it to expand
into a new market. Company B is considering whether to enter the market. Assume the
companies know each other’s payoffs. Using Figure 9P-6, choose the outcome that will occur
from the list below. [LO 9.8]
a. A invest, B enter.
b. A invest, B don’t enter.
c. A don’t invest, B enter.
d. A don’t invest, B don’t enter.

Answer: a. Company B has a dominant strategy to enter. Given this, Company A is better off
to invest.

9-13
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill
Education.
Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

13. In the sequential game shown in Figure 9P-7, does Player A have a first-mover advantage?
[LO 9.9]

Answer: Yes. If Player A chooses Strategy 1, Player B is better off to choose Strategy 1. This
will leave player A with a payoff of 4 while Player B has a payoff of 9. However, if Player A
chooses Strategy 2, Player B is better off to choose Strategy 2. This will leave Player A with a
payoff of 9 and Player B with a payoff of 8. Player A has the first-mover advantage and will
choose Strategy 2.

14. Which of the following are examples of first-mover advantage? [LO 9.9]
a. You make an offer on a house. The seller can only accept or reject the offer.
b. You and your roommate are dividing chores. The chores are written on slips of paper and
drawn from a hat. You get to draw first.
c. You are first in line to buy a raffle ticket.
d. You can take vacation whenever you like, as long as no other employees are also scheduled
to take vacation. You submit your vacation requests first this year.

Answer: a and d.

15. Which player is likely to have higher bargaining power: a city government responding to
angry citizens’ demands that the trash be collected regularly or the sanitation workers’ union?
Explain your answer. [LO 9.10]

Answer: The sanitation workers’ union has higher bargaining power because the union can
be more patient than a government under pressure from angry citizens.

16. Which player is likely to have higher bargaining power: a large, established company
shopping around for a new parts supplier, or a start-up company trying to sell its parts? Explain
your answer. [LO 9.10]

Answer: The established company shopping around for a new parts supplier is in a better
position to be patient for a good deal than a start-up company that needs to build business.
Therefore, the established company has more bargaining power.

9-14
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill
Education.
Chapter 09 - Game Theory and Strategic Thinking

17. Figure 9P-8 shows a sequential game in which one player decides whether to injure another
player. The injured player can then choose whether to sue, which involves costly legal fees. [LO
9.11]
a. What is the predicted outcome in this “game”?
b. The injured party threatens to always sue when injured. Is this a credible threat? What is the
predicted outcome if the injured party has threatened to always sue when injured?
c. What is the predicted outcome if the injured party has made a binding commitment to
always sue when injured?

Answer:
a. The injurer gets the highest payout if he does harm and does not get sued, which is what
will happen because the injured party is worse off if he sues than if he doesn’t when the
injurer does harm.
b. Even if the injured party threatens to sue, the injurer knows that the injured will be worse
off if he sues than if he doesn’t when the injurer does harm. Thus, the injurer does not
believe the threat. It is not a credible threat. Because the injurer does not believe the
threat, the outcome of the game is unchanged.

c. Now that the injured party has made a binding commitment to always sue, the injurer is
worse off if he gets sued than if he does no harm. He will choose not to do harm.

18. Two companies are considering whether to enter a new market. The decision matrix in
Figure 9P-9 shows each company’s payoff, depending on whether one, both, or neither enters
the market. Company A is in Costa Rica. Company B is in Nicaragua. [LO 9.8]
a. If Company A enters, what should Company B do?
b. If Company B enters, what should Company A do?
c. Suppose the Nicaraguan government releases a press statement that it will cover any profit
losses for Company B. How much will this policy cost the Nicaraguan government? (Hint: Think
carefully about what Company A’s best choice would be.)

Answer:
a. Company B should not enter, to avoid losing $1M.
b. Company A should not enter, to avoid losing $3M.
c. If the Nicaraguan government releases a press statement that it will cover any profit
losses for Company B, Company B will enter. Knowing this, Company A will
not enter because if it enters when Company B does, it will lose $3 million. So, Company B
will earn $3 million, and the Nicaraguan government will not have to pay any money.

9-15
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Education.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
would pull up but one patch, but
here you have pulled up all the
patches.” Kapunohu replied:
“This will give us plenty of food;
we will not be required to get it in
small quantities.” Kapunohu
[222]then picked up his spear,
Kanikawi, broke off the point and
started the fire. When the fire lit,
he took some of the taro and cut
it up and threw the pieces into
the fire and in this way used the
taro for firewood. Because of this
action of Kapunohu, the saying,
“the hard taro of Waiahole,” is
known from Hawaii to Niihau.
When Olopana saw what
Kapunohu had done, he began
to scheme, that with the use of
Kapunohu he would be able to
conquer the whole of Oahu, as
he and Kakuhihewa, the king of
the Kona side of Oahu, were on
bad terms. Through the advice of
his priest, Olopana was made
doubly sure that Kapunohu was
a very strong and brave man and
was fearless and willing to meet
all comers. Therefore Olopana
made Kapunohu the
commander-in-chief of his forces
and urged upon him to go and
nana mai la ke kaikuahine a
olelo mai la: “Ka haha!
Kupanaha oe! Kai no o ka
huhuki ae nei kau hookahi loi,
eia ka o ka huhuki no kau a pau
loa.” I aku o Kapunohu: “Nui hoi
paha ka ai, aole e kii liilii.” Lalau
aku la o Kapunohu i kana ihe ia
Kanikawi, a hahaki ae la i ka
maka, [223]a hoa iho la i ke ahi, a
a ke ahi, lalau aku la i ke kalo a
kolikoli, kiola aku la i loko o ke
ahi, a mai la ke ahi, pela no kana
hana mau ana, a lilo iho la ke
kalo i wahie no ke ahi. Nolaila,
ma keia hana ana a Kapunohu,
ua kapaia “kalo paa o Waiahole,”
he olelo kaulana loa ia mai
Hawaii a Niihau. A ike o Olopana
i keia mau hana a Kapunohu,
noonoo iho la ia, oia, ke kanaka
e puni ai o Oahu nei ia ia, no ka
mea, e noho kue ana laua o
Kakuhihewa ke ’lii o Kona nei.
Maopopo iho la ia Olopana ma
kona lohe i ka olelo a kana
kahuna, he kanaka koa ikaika
loa o Kapunohu, he kanaka
makau ole, he kanaka aa i mua
o ka lehulehu. Nolaila, hoolilo
aku la o Olopana ia Kapunohu i
alihikaua nona, e hele e kaua
me Kakuhihewa, ma keia kaua
fight Kakuhihewa. In this battle
Kakuhihewa was slain by
Kapunohu and the whole of
Oahu came under the rule of
Olopana.
After the death of Olopana,
Kapunohu left Oahu and
journeyed to Kauai. Boarding his
canoe he set sail and first landed
at Poki, in Waimea; from this
place he continued on to
Wahiawa and then on to Lawai in
Koloa where he settled down.
There lived at this place a great
warrior, by the name of
Kemamo, who was noted for his
great strength and skill in the use
of the sling; he was without
equal in its practice; his left hand
was considered better than his
right, and he could throw a stone
for a distance of six miles and in
the seventh mile its force
ceased. No person in Kauai was
found who could face him, not
from amongst the chiefs or
soldiers. Because of this man
people were afraid to travel
between Koloa and Nawiliwili;
those on the Koolau side could
not pass over to Nawiliwili and
those from the Kona side were
ana, ua make o Kakuhihewa ia
Kapunohu, a lilo o Oahu nei a
puni ia Olopana.
A make o Olopana, haalele iho
la o Kapunohu ia Oahu nei, holo
aku la ia ma ka waa a pae ma
Poki i Waimea, Kauai, hele aku
la ia malaila aku, a hiki i
Wahiawa, malaila aku a Lawai i
Koloa noho. I laila o Kemamo
kahi i noho ai, he koa ia, he
kanaka ikaika i ka maa ala, aohe
ona lua ma ia hana o ka lima
hema kona oi loa, e hiki ia ia ke
maa i ka ala hookahi, i na mile
eono, a i ka hiku o ka mile, pio
ka ikaika o ka ala. Aole he
kanaka aa o Kauai, e hakaka me
Kemamo aole alii, aole koa.
Nolaila, ua makau loa ia ka hele
ana mai Koloa aku a Nawiliwili,
aole hiki i ko Koolau ke hele mai
maanei o Nawiliwili a pela ko
Kona nei, aole hiki ke hele aku
ma o o Koloa. No ka mea, e
noho ana o Kemamo ma waena
o Koloa a me Nawiliwili, me kana
wahine o Waialeale.
afraid to travel toward the Koloa
side, for the reason that
Kemamo and his wife
Waialeale 21 lived between Koloa
and Nawiliwili.
When Kapunohu arrived at
Lawai he was entertained that
night by some of the people of
the place, and on the next day
he prepared to continue on his
journey. When he was ready to
start, the people said: “You must
not go by this way or you will get
killed by our great warrior.”
Kapunohu then asked: “Who is
this warrior?” “Kemamo.” “In
what is his strength?” “He is very
skilful in the use of the sling. He
never misses a shot, and the
strength of his flying stone will go
over five miles. Therefore you
must not go for you will get
killed.” Kapunohu said: “Then he
is not strong. The sling is only a
plaything for the boys of our
place and it is not considered of
any consequence.” These
remarks made by Kapunohu
were carried around until they
reached Kemamo; so Kemamo
made the remark: “Yes, this is
the first time that my strength in
A hiki o Kapunohu i laila, moe
iho la ia a ao ae, i kau hale
kamaaina, hoeu ae la o
Kapunohu e hele, olelo mai
kamaaina: “Mai hele oe, o make
auanei oe i ke koa o makou nei.”
Ninau aku o Kapunohu: “Owai ia
koa?” “O Kemamo.” “Pehea
kona ikaika?” “He maa ala kona
ikaika, aole e hala ka ala ke lele
mai, aole hoi e nawaliwali i na
mile elima, nolaila mai hele oe, o
make auanei.” I aku o
Kapunohu: “Aole hoi ha he
ikaika, he mea paani ka maa ala,
na ko makou kamalii mai
lewalewa, a he mea ikaika ole
no.” No keia olelo a Kapunohu,
kaulana aku la ia a lohe o
Kemamo, i iho o Kemamo: “Ae,
akahi mea nana i hoole kuu
maa, oia, ina he manao kona e
hele mai e hoike i na ikaika o
maua, e hele mai no.” A lohe o
Kapunohu, hele aku la ia a hiki, i
mai la o Kemamo: “Ea! O oe ke
kanaka nana i hoole kuu ala?” I
the use of the sling has been
denied. Well and good; if he
desires to come and test as
which of us is the stronger, let
him come on.” When Kapunohu
heard this, he went out to meet
Kemamo. Upon seeing
Kapunohu, Kemamo asked: “Are
you the man that has said that I
have no strength in the use of
the sling?” Kapunohu replied:
“Yes, I am the man. It is because
these people said that you are
very skilful in the use of the sling,
so I said, that it is the plaything
with the small boys at our place.”
When Kemamo heard this he
became very angry toward
Kapunohu and said: “What will
the stranger bet on the
proposition?” Kapunohu replied:
“My life will be [224]my stake.”
“Yes,” said Kemamo, “and what
else?” Kapunohu replied: “That
is all a traveler takes with him. If
you beat me my life shall be
forfeited, and if I should beat you
your life shall be forfeited.”
Kemamo agreed to this and the
bet was declared made.
Kemamo then said: “The course
over which we shall compete in
aku o Kapunohu: “Ae, owau no,
no ka olelo mai a lakou nei, he
ikaika oe i ka maa i ka ala.
Nolaila, olelo aku au, he mea
paani ia na ko makou kamalii
mai lewalewa.”
A lohe o Kemamo, huhu iho la ia
ia Kapunohu, a olelo mai la: “E!
Heaha kau pili, e ka malihini?” I
aku o Kapunohu: “O na iwi ka’u
pili.” Ae mai o Kemamo: “Ae,
[225]a heaha hou ae?” I aku keia:
“O ka waiwai iho la no ia a
kamahele o na iwi, ina wau e eo,
alaila make au, a ina hoi oe e
eo, make oe ia’u.” Ae mai la o
Kemamo: “Ae ua mau ia pili
ana.” Olelo aku o Kemamo: “O
ka pahu a kaua, e ku ai a maa,
mai Koloa a Moloaa i Koolau ka
pahu ia ma waena o laila ka
kaua hana, a i puka ma o o
throwing the stone with the sling,
shall be from Koloa to Moloaa in
Koolau. We must make our
throws over these points and
toward Moloaa; whoever throws
the greatest distance beyond
Moloaa wins.” Kapunohu replied:
“Yes, I will agree to that, but I am
going to use my spear while you
use your sling.” Kemamo agreed
to this. Kemamo then asked:
“Who shall take the first chance?
Shall it be the stranger, or shall it
be the native son?” Kapunohu
answered: “Let the native son
take the first chance and the
stranger the last.”
Kemamo then took up his sling
and threw his stone, which went
six miles and over, and it only fell
and rolled after it had entered
into the seventh mile, stopping at
Anahola, where it was picked up
by the best runner of Kauai, a
man by the name of
Kawaikuauhoe. Kapunohu then
threw his spear, darting along
from Koloa and over Niumalu,
and as it shielded the sun from
the coconut trees at this place
the land was given the name of
Niumalu, 22 as known to this day;
Moloaa eo kekahi o kaua.” Ae
aku la o Kapunohu. I aku nae o
Kapunohu: “O ka’u hana i ike o
ka pahee, malaila no wau, o kau
hana hoi i ike o ka maa, malaila
no oe.” Ae mai la o Kemamo. I
aku o Kemamo: “Ia wai mua, i
kamaaina paha, i ka malihini
paha?” I aku o Kemamo: “I
kamaaina ka mua, he hope ka
ka malihini.”
Ia wa, maa o Kemamo a pau
eono maila, a i ka hiku
nawaliwali, pela ka nawe hele
ana a hiki i Anahola waiho, ilaila
loaa i ke kukini mama o Kauai, o
Kawaikuauhoe kona inoa. Pahee
o Kapunohu i kana ihe, holo aku
la kana ihe mai Koloa aku a
Niumalu, o ka malu o ka la i ka
ihe a Kapunohu, kapaia ia aina o
Niumalu a hiki i keia la. Mailaila
aku ka holo ana, a hiki i
Kawelowai mauka o Wailua,
nolaila kela inoa, e pili la, o
Kawelowai, a me Waiehu, no ke
then it went on and into the
water in upper Wailua, giving the
place the name of Kawelowai as
well as the land next to it which
is called Waiehu; from this place
it again took an upward flight
flying along till it pierced through
a ridge at Anahola, which is
called Kalaea, leaving a hole
through it, which can be seen to
this day; from this place it went
on past Moloaa, then past
Waiakalua, then into Kalihikai,
where it grew weaker and finally
stopped at Hanalei.
komo ana o ka ihe i loko o ka
wai, a lele hou, mailaila aku a
Kalalea i Anahola, o ia kela puka
e hamama ala a hiki i keia la,
malaila aku a hiki i Moloaa,
malaila aku a Waiakalua a
Kalihikai maalili ka ihe, a Hanalei
pau ka holo o ka ihe. A eo ae la
o Kemamo hooko ia ka laua pili,
a lilo ae la o Kapunohu i alii no
Kauai.

Kemamo was therefore beaten

and the conditions of their bet
were carried out. Kapunohu
became thereby king of Kauai.
[215]

1 Readers will have noticed in many

cases, as in this story, the name of a
person and a place to be the same.
Kukuipahu figures in story as a king of
Kohala and proves so in this case. ↑
2 Kanikaa, Kapunohu’s god in human
form. ↑
3 Game of pahee, glancing a javelin
kind of spear over a level course or
track. ↑
4 The human passions predominate
over his claimed god-like powers. ↑
5 Making the best of a bad defeat.
This seems to be the usual course
with not a few legendary contestants. ↑
6 Weaving nature’s phenomena into
local tradition. ↑
7 A natural act, especially considering
the prevailing custom of all dipping
their fingers in the same poi bowl. ↑
8 Proverbial Hawaiian hospitality
seems to have its limitations and
observance of etiquette. ↑
9 Wiliwili (Erythrina monosperma), a
tree of very light, soft wood. ↑
10 Kukui (Aleurites moluccana), the
candle-nut tree, hence its name. ↑
11 Nothing small about the feats of
Hawaiian heroes. ↑
12 This method of defining a land
section, ili aina, has its counterpart
in the story of Umi. ↑
13 Residents of Kohala speak of the
divisions of their district as inside,
the eastern, and outside, the western
portion. ↑
14 Ilima district, probably so called from
its drier section favoring the growth
of this popular plant of the Sida genus,
with its orange-yellow blossoms. ↑
15 This is one way of illustrating the
force of air current from a spear’s
flight. ↑
16 Rather a large number of scalps for
one warrior’s belt. ↑
17 A severe penalty for the breakfast
table insult; see application of note
8. ↑
18Ahupuaa, a division or tract of land
within a district which might embrace
several ili. ↑
19 It is difficult to understand the
writer’s viewpoint to reconcile the
statement of his hero’s ability to handle
a club which required 4000 men to
carry it. ↑
20 Name of the highest mountain peak
of the Koolau range. ↑
21 Kauai’s loftiest mountain. ↑
22 Niumalu, shaded coconuts would be
one definition. ↑
 [Contents]

FORNANDER COLLECTION
OF
HAWAIIAN ANTIQUITIES
AND FOLK-LORE
THE HAWAIIANS’ ACCOUNT OF THE
FORMATION OF THEIR ISLANDS AND
ORIGIN OF THEIR RACE, WITH THE
TRADITIONS OF THEIR MIGRATIONS,
Etc., AS GATHERED FROM ORIGINAL
SOURCES

BY
ABRAHAM FORNANDER
Author of “An Account of the
Polynesian Race”
WITH TRANSLATIONS EDITED AND
ILLUSTRATED WITH NOTES BY
THOMAS G. THRUM

Memoirs of the Bernice Pauahi Bishop

Museum
 Volume V—Part II

Honolulu, H. I.
Bishop Museum Press
1919

[iii]

[Contents]
 CONTENTS

Legend of Halemano.
CHAPTER PAGE

I. Halemano, Love-sick Through a Dream-infatuation,

Dies—Is Restored to Life by His Sister Laenihi—She
Visits Puna in Search of Halemano’s Ideal—Meets Her
and Reveals Her Errand—With Tokens She Returns
Home—Halemano Instructed, Sets Out to Win
Kamalalawalu—Abducts Her and Returns to Oahu—
Hookupu in Kamalalawalu’s Honor 228
II. Aikanaka, King of Oahu, Hearing of Kamalalawalu’s
Beauty, Sends for Her—Refusing to Comply with the
Mandate, Aikanaka Sends an Army Against Halemano
—With Wife and Grandmother They Flee to Molokai,
Thence to Kaupo, Kohala and Hilo—Kamalalawalu
Taken by Huaa—Halemano Returns to Kohala—His
Wife Follows 238
III. Kamalalawalu Enticed Away—Death of Halemano—Is
Brought to Life Again by Laenihi, His Supernatural
Sister 242
IV. How Halemano Was Restored to Life—Halemano
Seeks to Win His Wife Back—Engaging in a Kilu
Contest Is Victorious—Kamalalawalu Is Supplanted by
Kikekaala 244
V. Halemano Returns to Oahu, thence to Kauai—
Kamalalawalu Follows Him—She Leaves and Settles on
Oahu—Huaa and King of Hilo Send an Army to Secure
Her—After a Slaughter of Oahu Forces She Is Taken to
Hawaii 258
Legend of Keaweikekahialii 262

Legend of Hinaaimalama 266

Legend of Maikoha 270

Legend of Namakaokapaoo.

I. Namakaokapaoo Rifles Pualii’s Potato Field—He Threatens

to Behead the Boy but is Killed Instead—Amau the King
Sends a Force to Kill Him—He Slays Them and the King 274
II. The Subjugation of Hawaii by Namakaokapaoo 278

Legend of Iwa.

Messengers of Umi Obtain Keaau’s Famed Cowries—Keaau

Seeks a Smart Thief to Recover Them—Learns of Iwa, a Boy on
Oahu, and Secures His Aid—Falling in with Umi Fishing with the
Shells, the Boy Dives Down and Cuts Them from the Line—
Reaching the Canoe They Set Out for Hilo—Umi, at loss of the
Shells, Hears of and Finds Iwa, Who Steals Them Back from
Keaau—Is Engaged to Steal Umi’s Lost Axe from the Waipio
Temple, Then Wins in a Thieving Contest Against Six Experts
284

Legend of Punia.

Punia at the Lobster Cave Finds the Sharks Asleep—Cunningly

he Causes the Death of Ten—Kaialeale the King Shark Alone Left
—Punia Traps It to Enter Its Stomach—Propping Its Jaws Open
He Fires Its Inwards—The Shark Gets Weak and Punia Bald-
headed—Stranded on a Sand Shore, the Shark is cut Open—
Punia Meets a Number of Ghosts—He Traps Them to Their Death
in the Water, Till One Only is Left 294

Legend of Pamano.
 I. Pamano Becomes a Famed Chanter—King Kaiuli Adopts 302
Him and Places His Daughter Keaka in His Care—Passing
Her House He Is Invited to Enter—Koolau, His Companion,
Informs the King—Decree of Death by Awa Is Passed on
Pamano—While Surf-Riding Is Bid to the Awa Feast—Is
Suspicious of Its Portent—His Spirit-Sisters Remove the
Awa’s Intoxicant for a Time, But Eventually He is Overcome
II. Waipu Prepares the Axe for Pamano’s Death—He Is Buried
in a Pile of Cane-Trash—His Spirit-Sisters Remove the Body
and Restore It to Life—They Meet a Prophet Who Tests His
Ghost Character by an Ape Leaf—Keaka and Koolau—At
Kilu Attended by Pamano and Others, Keaka Recognizes
Him by His Chant—He Declines Relations While Kaiuli,
Waipu and Koolau are Alive—All Three are Killed and Put
Into the Oven 310

Tradition of Kamapuaa.

I. Kamapuaa’s Exploits in Koolau—Escape from Olopana at

Kaliuwaa—Capture at Waianae—The Deposed Priest
Lonoaohi Aids in Overthrow of Olopana 314
II. Relating to Lonoaohi the Priest 322
III. Battle Between Kamapuaa and Lonokaeho—The Second
Battle—Battle Between Kamapuaa and Kuilioloa 326
IV. Fourth Battle, Between Kamapuaa and Pele 332
V. Fifth Battle, Between Kamapuaa and Makalii 342
VI. Relating to Kahikiula and Kahikihonuakele 354
VII. How the Parents Failed to Recognize Kamapuaa, Which
Action Almost Cost Them Their Lives 356

[iv]

Legend of Kaulu.
 Kaulu Seeks His Kind Brother—Encounters Ghosts and Other
Obstacles—He Drinks up the Sea—Awakes Makalii for Aid—
Kaaona Foiled—Shark Kalakeenuiakane—The Sea Restored—Of
Haumea—Lonokaeho of Eight Foreheads Overcome—Mokolii,
the Wizard, Killed 364

Story of Palila.

Palila a Noted Warrior—His Second Battle—Of Olomana and

Palila’s Third and Fourth Battles 372

Story of Piimaiwaa.

Piimaiwaa a Famous Warrior—Sails for Maui—Kawalakii Image

Guard of Kauiki—Piimaiwaa Climbs the Hill, Overthrows the
Image and Is Victor Over Maui’s Forces—Of Imaikalani the Blind
Warrior—Omaokamao and Koi Engage the Sightless Chief—
Omaokamao Learns the Source of Imaikalani’s Strength and
Slays Him 376

Legend of Kepakailiula.

I. Search for a Suitable Wife 384

II. Relating to Kakaalaneo 386
III. The Battle 392
IV. Relating to Kaikipaananea 398
V. Relating to Kukaea 400

Stories from the Legend of Laieikawai.

I. Relating to Aiohikupua—Haunaka 406

II. Kihanuilulumoku—Ulili and Aikeehiale 410
III. Kalahumoku—Battle Between the Dog and Lizard 414

Brief Stories of Ghosts and Cunning.

 Relating to Wakaina—Kapunohu 418
Waawaaikinaaupo and Waawaaikinaauao—Lepe 422
Maiauhaalenalenaupena—Kuauamoa 426
Hanaaumoe—Halalii 428
Death of Halalii and Ghosts 432
Eleio—Kanaiahuea 434

Legend of Pupukea.

I. Pupukea and Makakuikalani—Kamalalawalu and

Lonoikamakahiki Surf-Riding—Pupukea’s Promptness—
Dialogue Between Makakuikalani and Pupukea 436
II. Kauhiakama—Kamalalawalu-Lonoikamakahiki War—
Kumaikeau and Kumakaia—Hill of Hokuula—Numbers of
Men—Pupukea-Makakuikalani Combat 440

Legend of Kekuhaupio.

Kekuhaupio, Expert Spearman—Oulu, Champion Slingthrower—

Kalaiopuu-Kahekili Contest on Maui—Kekuhaupio Contends with
Maui’s Men—His Stand Against Oulu 452

Story of Peapea.

Peapea, Famed Warrior—His Battle and Victory over Kahahana’s

Forces—Kekuapoi of Rare Beauty—Peapea’s Display of Courage
458

Brief Sketch of Kamehameha I.

His Wars and Celebrities of His Time—Kalaiopuu’s Words to

Kiwalao and Kamehameha 464
Mokuohai, First Battle 466
Kauaawa, Second Battle—Kamehameha’s Great Strength in 468
 Fighting
Third War, Kepaniwai 470
Fourth Battle, at Koapapaa—Fifth Battle, Ke-pu-waha-ulaula 472
Sixth Battle, Kaieiewaho—Pihana—Sixth Battle 474
Seventh Battle by Kamehameha—Administration of
Kamehameha 476
Chief Kekuaokalani and His Insurgency 478
Of Hema 482

Famous Men of Early Days.

Of Kekuawahine 486
Makaioulu 488
Makoa—Kaneakaehu—Keliimalolo 490
Kamoeau—Pahia 494
Kawaaiki—Kaohele 496
Kahahawai—Uma 498
Napuelua 500
Hawae—Kahauolopua 502

[227]
[Contents]

Kaao no Halemano.
 PART II

[228]
 Legend of Halemano.
CHAPTER I.
Halemano, Love-sick Through a
Dream-infatuation, Dies.—Is
Restored to Life by His Sister
Laenihi.—She Visits Puna in
Search of Halemano’s Ideal.—
Meets Her and Reveals Her
Errand.—With Tokens She
Returns Home.—Halemano
Instructed, Sets Out to Win
Kamalalawalu.—Abducts Her
and Returns to Oahu.—
Hookupu in Kamalalawalu’s
Honor.
Wahiawa 1 and Kukaniloko 1 were
the father and mother of
Halemano. 1 Kaukaalii was the
mother of Kukaniloko, 2 and the
land of Halemano, 3 which is next
to Lihue in Waianae, is the place
where Halemano was born.
Through the married life of
Wahiawa and Kukaniloko, his
MOKUNA I.
Make o Halemano Mamuli o ka
Aikahaula.—Hoola Hou ia e
Kona Kaikuahine e Laenihi.—
Makaikai Oia ia Puna no ka Huli
ana i ko Halemano Lua.—
Halawai me ia, a Hoike e Pili ana i
Kana Huakai.—Me na Mea
Hoomanao, Huli Hoi Oia.—Pau
ka A’o ia ana o Halemano, Hele
Oia e Kii ia Kamalalawalu.—Lawe
Malu Iaia a Hoi i Oahu.—
Hookupu no ko Kamalalawalu
Hanohano.
O Wahiawa ka makuakane, o
Kukaniloko ka makuahine, o
Kaukaalii ka makuahine o
Kukaniloko, o Halemano e pili la
me Lihue ka aina, i Waianae. Ma
ka noho ana o Wahiawa me
kana wahine o Kukaniloko, ua
hanau ka laua mau keiki eono,
eha kane, elua wahine. Eia na