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 Contents vii

Traditional Functions of States 56 CHAPTER 5

Defense 56
Policing 56
Development 97
Taxation 57 Concepts 99
Order, Administration, and “Legibility” 58 Types 99
Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Poverty 100
­Expand? 58 Social Outcomes and Human Development 100
Political or Conflict Theories 59 Gender Relations and Racial and Ethnic Identities 101
Economic Theories 61 Satisfaction and Happiness 103
Cultural Theories 62 Cultural Development 104
Diffusion Theories 63 Sustainability 104
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Great Britain, the United Causes and Effects:
­ ingdom, or Neither? State and Nation in England
K Why Does Development Happen? 105
and Scotland 66 Institutions: The Market–State Debate, Revisited 105
Institutions: Beyond the Market–State Debate 107
CASES IN CONTEXT
Culture and Development 109
Mexico 57
Civil Society, Social Capital, and Trust 109
France 60
Religion 110
United Kingdom 63
Value Systems 111
Nigeria 64
Systems and Structures: Domestic and
International 112
CHAPTER 4
Domestic Economic Structures and Class Interests 112
Political Economy 71 International Economic Structures and Class Interests 112
Geography 114
Concepts 73
Inequality 74 Explaining the Development of
THINKING COMPARATIVELY

Employment and Inflation 76 North and South Korea 116

CASES IN CONTEXT
Types 77
Markets and States in Modern Economies 77 India 100
Markets and Economic Performance 78 Nigeria 102
States and Economic Performance 80 China 107
Economic Functions of Modern States 83 Brazil 113
States and Economic Management 83
Investments in Human Capital: Education and Health 84
Infrastructure and Other Public Goods 86 CHAPTER 6

Welfare State Functions 86 Democracy and Democratization 121

Causes and Effects: Why Do Welfare States Emerge? 87 Concepts 123
Cultural Changes 88 Democracy and Democratic Regimes 123
Industrial Capitalism 88 Procedural (Minimal) Definitions of Democracy 125
Mobilization and Political Action 90 Substantive Definitions of Democracy 126
International Learning Effects 93 Regime Change and Democratization 126
THINKING COMPARATIVELYWelfare States in the Types 128
Nordic Countries: What Can We Learn and How? 94 Types of Democracy 128
CASES IN CONTEXT Representative Democracy 128
United States 73 Direct Democracy 131
United Kingdom 79 Types of Democratization 131
Japan 85 Democratic Transitions 131
Germany 88 Democratic Consolidation 132
viii Contents

Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 133

Modernization 134
Culture and Democracy 135
The International System 137
Domestic Institutions 138 PART III: Institutions of Government
Agents and Actors: The Role of Individuals and Groups 139
Combining Arguments and Theories: Multiple Causes 141 CHAPTER 8
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Is American Democracy Constitutions and Constitutional
a Model? 143
­Design 174
CASES IN CONTEXT
Concepts 177
Brazil 133 Constitutions 177
China 134 Constitutional Design 178
India 136
United States 142 Types 179
Flexible and Rigid Constitutions 180
CHAPTER 7 Separation of Powers: Judicial Review and Parliamentary
Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic ­Sovereignty 181
Federalism and Unitarism 183
Breakdown 147 Federalism 183
Concepts 149 Unitarism 185
Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Regimes 149 Authoritarian and Democratic Constitutions 186
Transitions to Authoritarian Regimes 150
Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal and
Types 150 Unitary Constitutions? 187
Types of Authoritarianism 150 What Constitutional Designs Support Social Stability? 188
Totalitarian Regimes 150 What Constitutional Designs Support Democratic Rights? 190
Theocracies 151 What Constitutional Designs Support the Economy? 191
Personalistic Dictatorships 152 Judicial Review and Democracy 193
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes 153
THINKING COMPARATIVELYWhat Explains the ­Similarities
Hybrid and Semi-authoritarian Regimes 153
Between the Brazilian and South African
Types of Transition (or Nontransition) to Authoritarianism 154
C
­ onstitutions? 196
Authoritarian Persistence 154
Democratic Breakdown 156 CASES IN CONTEXT

Transition to Hybrid or Semi-authoritarian Regime 159 United Kingdom 184

Iran 188
Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to
Nigeria 190
Emerge and Persist? 161
India 192
Historical Institutionalist Theories 161
United States 195
Poverty and Inequality 162
State Weakness and Failure 165
CHAPTER 9
Political Culture Theories of Authoritarian Persistence 165
Barriers to Collective Action 167 Legislatures and Legislative Elections 201
Special Causal Circumstances Surrounding Hybrid and Concepts 203
­Semi-authoritarian Regimes 168 What Legislatures Are 203
Why Did Zimbabwe Become and
THINKING COMPARATIVELY What Legislatures Do 204
Remain Authoritarian? 169 Types 205
CASES IN CONTEXT Unicameral and Bicameral Legislatures 206
Iran 152 Electoral Systems 208
Russia 156 District Systems 208
Mexico 157 Proportional Representation (PR) 211
Germany 159 Mixed or Hybrid 212
France 160 Executive–Legislative Relations 214
 Contents ix

Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Types 260

R
­ epresentation? 216 Political Parties: Elite, Mass, and Catch-All Parties 260
Patterns of Representation 216 Party Systems: Dominant-Party, Two-Party, and Multiparty
Electoral Systems and Representation 218 ­Systems 261
Legislative Decision Making and Representation 221 Interest Groups: Pluralism and Corporatism 267
Executive–Legislative Relations and Representation 223 Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Representation in New Zealand What Effects Do They Have? 269
and Beyond 225 Party Systems and Representation 270
CASES IN CONTEXT
What Factors Shape Party Systems? 270
How Do Party Systems Shape Political Outcomes? 272
United Kingdom 209
Interest Groups and Representation 275
Brazil 212
Japan 213 THINKING COMPARATIVELY Party Systems in
Germany 215 Sub-Saharan Africa 277
United States 220 CASES IN CONTEXT
China 262
CHAPTER 10 Japan 263
Germany 265
Executives 229 Russia 268
Concepts 231 Mexico 269

Types 232
Executive Structures: Presidential and Parliamentary 233
Formal Powers 235
Partisan Powers 238
Coalitions 238
Informal Powers 243
Causes and Effects: What Explains PART IV: Politics, Society, and Culture
Executive S­ tability? 243
Stable and Unstable Regimes: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, CHAPTER 12
and Democracy 244
Stable and Unstable Executives: Styles of Presidential Rule 246 Revolutions and Contention 280
Stable and Unstable Executives: Patterns of Parliamentary Concepts 282
Rule 248 What Is “Contention”? 282
Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Beyond the American and British
Contention 283
Models 250
CASES IN CONTEXT
Types 283
Social Movements 283
France 234
Revolutions 288
United States 234
Insurgencies and Civil Wars 290
Russia 237
Terrorism 291
China 239
“Everyday Resistance” 293
Nigeria 244
Thinking About Contention: Summary 294

CHAPTER 11
Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen? 294
Relative Deprivation 294
Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Resource Mobilization and Political
Groups 254 Opportunities 295
Rational Choice 297
Concepts 257
Culture or “Framing” Explanations 299
Political Parties 257
Party Systems 257 THINKING COMPARATIVELY The “Arab Spring” of 2011 and Its
Interest Groups 258 Legacy 301
x Contents

CASES IN CONTEXT Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence

Brazil 285
the Political Representation of Women and
France 289
Minority Groups? 340
Social Movement Mobilization 340
Russia 295
Political Parties Based on Gender or Ethnicity 341
China 297
Institutions for Promoting Women’s and Minority Group
Iran 300
­Representation 345
CHAPTER 13 THINKING COMPARATIVELY Measuring Gender
Nationalism and National Identity 308 E­ mpowerment 347
CASES IN CONTEXT
Concepts 310
Identity 310 Iran 337
Nationalism, National Identity, and the Nation 311 Japan 338
Brazil 340
Types 314 Mexico 343
Types of Nationalism 314 India 344
Civic and Ethnic Nationalism 314
Jus Sanguinis and Jus Soli 316 CHAPTER 15
Limits of Typologies in the Study of National Identity 317
Ideology and Religion in Modern
Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National
C
­ onflict? 318 ­Politics 351
Primordial Bonds 320 Concepts 353
Cultural Boundaries 321 Modernity and Modernization 353
Material Interests 322 Ideology 354
Rational Calculation 322 Religion 354
Social Psychology 324 Secularization, Religion, and Modern Politics 355
Religious Conflict 356
THINKING COMPARATIVELY Ending Ethnic and
National V
­ iolence 325 Types 357
Modern Ideologies 357
CASES IN CONTEXT
Liberalism 357
United Kingdom 311
Fascism 358
Mexico 312
Socialism 359
Japan 313
Modern Forms of Religion in Politics 360
Germany 315
Lay and Religious States 361
Nigeria 320
Denominationalism 363
CHAPTER 14
Causes and Effects: Why Does Ideology Remain Prevalent
Race, Ethnicity, and Gender 328 in Modern Politics? 364
Why Didn’t Ideology (and History) End? 365
Concepts 330
Race and Ethnicity 330 THINKING COMPARATIVELY Is Twenty-First-Century Populism
Gender 331 an Ideology? 367
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 332 CASES IN CONTEXT
Types 332 Nigeria 356
Disentangling Race and Ethnicity 332 United Kingdom 358
Discrimination Based on Race and Ethnicity 335 Russia 360
Gender Discrimination 336 France 362
Empowerment of Women and Minority Groups 338 Iran 364
 Contents xi

CASE STUDIES 408

Does the Global Economy Help or Hurt Developing Nations like
Brazil? (Chapter 5) 408
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil (Chapter 6) 409
PART V: The Comparative-International Electoral Rules and Party (In)Discipline in Brazil’s Legislature
Nexus (Chapter 9) 410
Brazil’s Landless Movement (Chapter 12) 411
CHAPTER 16 Gender and Political Representation in Brazil: Where Has Progress
Come From? (Chapter 14) 411
Comparative Politics and International
­Relations 372 China 413
Concepts 375 PROFILE 413
Issues 376 Introduction 413
Globalization and Trade 376 Historical Development 415
International Institutions and Integration 380 Regime and Political Institutions 418
Immigration 382 Political Culture 419
Environment and Sustainability 385 Political Economy 420
Transnational Networks 387 CASE STUDIES 421
Nuclear Threats and Terrorism 388 How Did China Become an Economic Power? (Chapter 5) 421
Causes and Effects: What Are the Main Causes in Is China Destined for Democracy? (Chapter 6) 422
­International Relations? 391 Who Governs China? (Chapter 10) 424
Realism 392 The Chinese Party System (Chapter 11) 425
Liberalism 394 The Chinese Revolution (Chapter 12) 426
Constructivism 395
Marxism 395
France 428
THINKING COMPARATIVELY The EU and Levels PROFILE 428
of ­Analysis 396 Introduction 428
KAZAKHSTAN UZBEKISTAN
GEORGIA Historical Development 430
CASES IN CONTEXT
Regime and Political Institutions 432
AZERBAIJAN
United States 382
ARMENIA Political Culture 433
TURKEY France 384 Caspian Sea
TURKMENISTAN Political Economy 434
Japan 388
Iran 390 Tabriz CASE STUDIES 435
India 391 The State in France (Chapter 3) 435
Now Shahr
Mashhad
Authoritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France
Tehran
(Chapter 7) 436
Kermanshah Qom Electing the French President: What Do Runoffs Do?
AFGHANISTAN

I R A N (Chapter 10) 437

IRAQ Esfahan
Birjand The French Revolution (Chapter 12) 439
Dezful
Yazd
Religion and Secularism in France (Chapter 15) 439
PART VI: Country Profiles and Cases
Ahvaz
Abadan Globalization and Culture in France (Chapter 16) 440
Shiraz Kerman

BrazilKUWAIT
400 Bushehr
Zahedan
Germany 443
SAUDI Asaluyeh
PROFILE
ARABIA
400 Bandar Abbas
PROFILE 443
Introduction 400 Persian
PAKISTAN Introduction 443
Chabahar
Historical Development QATAR
402 Gulf
Historical Development 445
Gulf of Oman
Regime and Political Institutions 405 Regime and Political Institutions 448
U.A.E.
Political Culture 406 Political Culture 449
Political Economy 407 OMAN Political Economy 450
0 110 220 Kilometers

0 110 220 Miles

xii Contents

Political Culture 491

CASE STUDIES 451
Political Economy 491
The German State: Unification and Welfare (Chapter 4) 451
Democracy and Authoritarianism in Germany (Chapter 7) 452 CASE STUDIES 493
Institutional Design: Germany’s Bundestag and Bundesrat State-Led Development in Japan (Chapter 4) 493
(Chapter 9) 453 The Hybrid Electoral System of the Japanese Diet
Consensus-Based Politics in Germany (Chapter 11) 454 (Chapter 9) 494
Ethnic Boundaries of the German Nation? (Chapter 13) 455 How Has Japan’s Dominant Party Won for So Long?
(Chapter 11) 494
India 457 Importing National Identity in Japan? (Chapter 13) 496
Gender Empowerment in Japan? (Chapter 14) 497
PROFILE 457
Resource Management in Japan (Chapter 16) 497
Introduction 457
Historical Development 459 Mexico 499
Regime and Political Institutions 462
Political Culture 463 PROFILE 499
Political Economy 464 Introduction 499
Historical Development 501
CASE STUDIES 465
Regime and Political Institutions 504
What Explains India’s Recent Growth? (Chapter 5) 465
Political Culture 505
Democracy’s Success in India: What Can We Learn from a
Political Economy 506
“Deviant Case”? (Chapter 6) 466
Federalism and Differences in Development in India CASE STUDIES 507
(Chapter 8) 466 The Mexican State and Rule of Law (Chapter 3) 507
Ethnicity and Political Parties in India (Chapter 14) 467 Mexico’s “Perfect Dictatorship” and Its End (Chapter 7) 508
India in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic Politics, Identity, and The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico (Chapter 11) 509
Security (Chapter 16) 468 Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity in Mexico
(Chapter 13) 510
Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran) 471 Why Aren’t There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico?
(Chapter 14) 511
PROFILE 471
Introduction 471
Nigeria 514
Historical Development 473
Regime and Political Institutions 476 PROFILE 514
Political Culture 477 Introduction 514
Political Economy 477 Historical Development 516
Regime and Political Institutions 519
CASE STUDIES 478
Political Culture 519
Democratic Features of Authoritarian Systems? The Case of Iran
(Chapter 7) 478 Political Economy 520
Constitutional Design: Theocracy in Iran (Chapter 8) 479 CASE STUDIES 521
Iran’s Islamic Revolution and “Green Revolution”? What Is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed? The Case of Nigeria
(Chapter 12) 481 (Chapter 3) 521
Gender in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Politics Why Are Natural Resources Sometimes a Curse? The Nigerian
(Chapter 14) 482 Case (Chapter 5) 522
Religion and Politics in Iran (Chapter 15) 482 Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding Together or Tearing
Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chapter 16) 483 Apart? (Chapter 8) 523
The Presidency in Nigeria: Powers and Limitations
Japan 485 (Chapter 10) 525
The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War: Nationalism and
PROFILE 485 ­Ethno-National Conflict in a Post-colonial Society
Introduction 485 (Chapter 13) 526
Historical Development 487 Religious Difference and Conflict in Nigeria: Disentangling
Regime and Political Institutions 490 ­Ethnicity and Religion? (Chapter 15) 527
 Contents xiii

Russia (Russian Federation) 529 United States 558

PROFILE 529 PROFILE 558
Introduction 529 Introduction 558
Historical Development 531 Historical Development 560
Regime and Political Institutions 535 Regime and Political Institutions 563
Political Culture 536 Political Culture 564
Political Economy 536 Political Economy 565
CASE STUDIES 537 CASE STUDIES 566
Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich? Will They in the
(Chapter 7) 537 Future? (Chapter 4) 566
Executives in Russia: Formal and Informal Powers Is American Democracy in Trouble? (Chapter 6) 567
(Chapter 10) 538 Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem?
Personalism and the Party System in Russia (Chapter 11) 539 (Chapter 8) 568
The Russian Revolution (Chapter 12) 540 The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or Functioning by
Communist Ideology in Practice: Russia and the Soviet Union Design? (Chapter 9) 569
(Chapter 15) 541 “The Most Powerful Person in the World”? Checks on American
Presidents (Chapter 10) 571
United Kingdom 543 The United States and the World: A Love–Hate Relationship?
(Chapter 16) 572
PROFILE 543
Introduction 543
Notes 575
Historical Development 545
Glossary 589
Regime and Political Institutions 548
References and Further Reading 601
Political Culture 549
Credits 627
Political Economy 549
Index 629
CASE STUDIES 550
The State in the United Kingdom (Chapter 3) 550
Political Economy of Britain (Chapter 4) 551
No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality in the
United Kingdom (Chapter 8) 552
The Mother of Parliaments: The United Kingdom and the
­Westminster Model (Chapter 9) 553
National Identity in the United Kingdom (Chapter 13) 554
Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom (Chapter 15) 556
 Contents xv

Insights

CHAPTER 3 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States 61

Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework
for Interpreting Recorded Human History 62
Philip Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe 63
Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors 65
John Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and the
­Nation-State 66
CHAPTER 4 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 80
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation 82
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 90
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 91
Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 92

CHAPTER 5 Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery 108
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative
­Development 110
Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity 111
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System 114
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies 115

CHAPTER 6 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics and Some Social Requisites of
­ emocracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy 135
D
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 137
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 139
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead,
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 141
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy:
The Human Development Sequence 142
CHAPTER 7 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the
Modern World 163
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 164
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five N
­ ations 166
Timur Kuran, Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989 168
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism:
Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War 169
CHAPTER 8 William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance 189
Alfred Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model 189
Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism 192
Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Economic Management in
­Multi-Tiered Systems 193
Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 196

xv
xvi Insights

CHAPTER 9 Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America
216
Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 217
Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House 222
Morris Fiorina, Divided Government 224
Michael Mezey, Comparative Legislatures 225

CHAPTER 10 Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism and The Virtues of Parliamentarism 245
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy:
A Critical ­Appraisal 246
Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy 247
Kenneth Roberts, Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America:
The Peruvian Case 248
Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy 250

CHAPTER 11 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City 268
Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques [Political Parties] 271
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis 271
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 274
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups and The Rise and
Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 276
CHAPTER 12 Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest 287
Mark Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks 292
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, and Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel 296
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 297
Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma 299

CHAPTER 13 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 312

Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity 313
David Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence 323
 onald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 324
D
CHAPTER 14 Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and C
­ ulture 341
Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity 342
Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America 343
Mala Htun, Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups 345
Mona Lena Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform W ­ orldwide 347
CHAPTER 15 Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, Why Muslim Integration Fails in
Christian-­Heritage Societies 361
José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 362
Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey 363
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 365
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 366
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities 367

CHAPTER 16 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 387

Moisés Naím, The Five Wars of Globalization 389
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics 393
Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs 395
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 396
 Preface xvii

Preface

T he field of comparative politics is changing, not only in how it’s studied but
in how it’s taught. We set out to write this textbook because we saw the
need for a new approach—one that is truly comparative, that goes beyond a litany
of facts or abstract ideas. In the process, we had to rethink what a book for this
course should look like. We started with a central aim: to get students to think like
comparativists. Toward that end, we have integrated theories and methods with
a range of country case applications to address the big questions in comparative
politics today.
Many undergraduates take a course in comparative politics because they
are broadly interested in world affairs. They want to understand issues such as
democracy and democratization, economic and social development, transnational
social movements, and the relationship between world religions and conflict
around the globe, just as we did as students (and still do!). This book focuses
squarely on these big issues and offers a framework for understanding through
comparison.
Our job is to teach students how to think critically, how to analyze the world
around them. We want our students to do more than just memorize facts and
theories. Ultimately, we want them to learn how to do comparative politics. This
course is successful if students can use the comparative method to seek out their
own answers. We are successful as educators if we give them the analytical skills
to do so.

What’s New in This Edition?

We have updated this edition of Comparative Politics to reflect feedback we
received from numerous readers, instructors, and students, not to mention our
own ­experiences of teaching with the book. We are truly grateful to those who
have shared their perspectives with us, and we have made the following revisions
throughout the book:
• Amplified and enhanced discussions on the United States, Russia, China,
and North Korea to incorporate the most current developments
• Updated information on international elections and the Trump adminis-
tration in the United States, with further coverage on the growth of populist
and nationalist movements across the globe
• Revisions and updates to the Country Profiles and Thinking Comparatively
features
• New Case Studies and Insights, and revisions, where necessary, to existing ones
• Broad revisions to figure and table data, as well as maps.
xvii
xviii Preface

An Integrative Approach
One of the distinctive features of this book is the way we have integrated theories,
methods, and cases. Rather than focusing on either country information or themes
of comparative politics, we have combined these approaches while emphasizing
application and analysis. By providing students with the tools to begin doing
their own analyses, we hope to show them how exciting this kind of work can
be. These tools include theories (presented in an accessible way), the basics of the
­comparative method, and manageable case materials for practice, all in the context
of the big questions.
We thus take an integrative approach to the relationship between big themes
and country case studies. This text is a hybrid containing sixteen thematic chapters
plus linked materials for twelve countries of significant interest to comparativists.
The country materials following the thematic chapters include both basic country
information and a series of case studies dealing with specific thematic issues.
We link the country cases to the thematic chapters via short “call out” boxes—
“Cases in Context”—at relevant points in the chapters. For example, a “Case
in Context” box (titled “Democracy’s Success in India: What Can We Learn
from a Deviant Case?”) in a discussion of theory in chapter 6, “Democracy and
Democratization,” points students to a full case study on democratization in
India, included at the back of the text.

136 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

CASE IN CONTEXT
Democracy’s Success in India:
What Can We Learn from a Deviant Case? PAGE 466

India is a major anomaly for modernization theories of develop- 3. Can you think of a way to “save” modernization theory
ment. In essence, the relationship between its political and eco- in the face of the case of India?
nomic development has been the inverse of what modernization
theory would predict. India is the world’s second largest society
and its largest democracy—consider, therefore, the share that
Indian citizens hold in the world’s broader democratic popula-
tion. This anomaly has potentially serious implications and makes
the puzzle of Indian democratization all the more intriguing.
For more on the case of democratization in India, see the
case study in Part VI, p. 466. As you read it, keep in mind the
following questions:
1. What, if anything, does Indian anti-colonial resistance
have to do with the country’s democratization?
2. What, if anything, does Indian democratization sug-
gest about the importance of individual actors, leader- Indian Voters, 2017, in Uttar Pradesh state. India is
ship, and institutional design? the world’s largest democracy.

One prominent cultural argument is the “Asian values” argument, as articulated

by certain non-democratic leaders in Asia who argued why Asia is not conducive
466 India Preface xix

CASE STUDY
Democracy’s Success in India: What Can We Learn
from a “Deviant Case”? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 136

How does modernization theory account
for low-income democracies such as India?
As discussed in chapter 6, modernization
theory predicts that economic develop-
ment will lead to democratization and
democratic consolidation. Indeed, this
relationship generally holds. More often
than not, increasing economic develop-
ment increases the probability that any
given society will have democratic politics.
India, however, poses a major anomaly for
some versions of modernization theory.
Given that India’s population is approxi-
mately one-seventh of the world’s popu-
lation, this anomaly is not easily dismissed.
Why does India constitute an anom-
aly or “deviant case” for modernization
theory? India only recently began to see
notable economic development; and for
most of the twentieth century, the coun-
try was profoundly poor. Modernization
would lead us to suspect authoritarian
governance under these conditions. Yet
after decolonization, India defied pes-
simists and built the world’s largest de-
mocracy, one that has now endured for
decades. There are several conclusions
that one could draw from this. We could
decide that this anomaly disproves or
refutes modernization theory, and turn
to some other theory of democratization.
For example, we could turn to institu-
tional theories of democratization as an
alternative. Perhaps something about
the parliamentary form of government
rather than presidential government
contributed to India’s rather successful
democracy (as is discussed in chapter
10); one could consider the Indian case to
test this hypothesis. For example, has the
parliamentary system with its multiparty
coalitions and governments that are ac-
countable to the legislature resulted in
more power-sharing and less “winner-
take-all” politics? Has it resulted in a prime
ministerial “style” that is less centralized
than in presidential systems? There is evi-
dence both for and against the argument
that parliamentarism has been a cause of
India’s democratic success.
Another alternative, though, would
be to use a deviant case like India’s de-
mocracy to amend or clarify the nature
of the original theory. What if modern-
ization theory is not making the law-
like generalization that development
leads inevitably to democratization, but
rather a “weaker” claim that economic
development facilitates democratiza-
tion and democratic consolidation? Why
would this be different? Because the
theory would now say that it is unlikely
that India could successfully democra-
tize without first achieving a higher level
of economic development, but not that
it is impossible. A more flexible theory of
modernization might be compatible by
including insights from other theories. For
example, perhaps modernization theory
could be linked to institutional theories,
like the one on parliamentarism men-
tioned previously. Maybe parliamentarism
is particularly called for as a form of insti-
tutional design when the society in ques-
tion has a relatively low level of economic
development. We are speculating here for
the sake of argument and not proposing
this theory; India’s history of development
and democracy does not and cannot
prove this assertion. Rather, it might sug-
gest this hypothesis, which we could then
test through the examination of other
well-selected cases. In general, deviant
cases are useful. We should be pleased
when we find them, as they help us to criti-
cally assess existing theories, modifying or
rejecting them as appropriate.

CASE STUDY
Another “Case in Context” box in chapter 6 (titled “Is China Destined for
Democracy?”) invites Federalism
students to and Differences
consider in Development
whether democratization in Chinain India
is CHAPTER 8, PAGE 192
inevitable. Other boxes in that chapter focus on issues of democracy and democ-
ratization
One of the inmain
Brazil and theofUnited
advantages federal-States.
competition with one another while Brazil can have different policies in differ-
Using
ism these short
is purported “linking”
to be its impact onboxes
eco- has enabled
also ensuringus togovernment
that integrate adecisions
complete entset states,
of each adapted to local needs
case materials
nomic without
and social interrupting
development. As notedtheabout
narrative
taxesflow of the chapters.
and services are “closerThe
to kind
and of
demands. Yet this key advantage
reading we 8,suggest
in chapter with the
federal systems maystructure
allow of this
the textand
people,” is similar
thus moretoresponsive.
following hyper-
of federalism and decentralized govern-
links in online
different statestext—something
to engage in healthy students do easily.
A country like This
India,flexible design
the United States,feature
or alsois also one of its disadvantages:
ment
xx Preface

caters to the diversity of teaching styles in today’s political science. Instructors

can choose to have students follow these links to case studies as they go, using all
or just some of them, or they can choose to teach thematic chapters and country
materials separately.
The text integrates theories, methods, and cases in other ways as well. “Insights”
boxes make connections by briefly summarizing important scholarly works repre-
sentative of the major schools of thought. Concepts 313

Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity

INSIGHTS
by Liah Greenfeld

G reenfeld argues that nationalism is fundamentally cultural

and needs to be understood as an imaginative response to
such groups to serve their interests well. Greenfeld examines
Why Did Zimbabwe Become and Remain Authoritarian?
this hypothesis against a number of cases (including England,
social conditions. To understand nationalism’s emergence and France, Russia, Germany, and Japan), finding pronounced status
169

growth, we must understand why the idea spread that human-
Competitive Authoritarianism:
ity is divided into distinct “peoples”
INSIGHTS After the Cold War who are “sovereign” and
“equal.” For Greenfeld, the key preconditions
by Steven Levitskyforandthe develop-
Lucan A. Way
ment of national identity are problems in stratification systems
inconsistency in each case in the key groups that are most cen-
Hybrid Regimes
tral in redefining their societies as nations. At the same time,
Greenfeld acknowledges the importance of institutions like the
state prior to national identity’s emergence in helping to shape

L
through which societies
evitsky andhierarchically
of transitions
as the class structure. Elitethat are likely
status
divide
Way are interested themselves, the
in understanding such
to develop out ofcondition
inconsistency—a
sorts the
“competitive this
type to
linkages
firsttheory
that
thedevelops
is ongoing
in any
West, though, given
two main
authoritarianism
also
case.
paths
in the context
note that political
areScholars working with
possible. The
of a strong play
institutions
authoritarian” regimes, a term that they have coined to label This path is most likely, the authors argue, when (a) the state
state. an impor-

present when the stratification system breaks down and elites tant role in spreading and preserving national identity.
regimes that do allow (often problematic) elections alongside is strong at the beginning of the process and (b) the party or
are no longer other
sure non-democratic
of their status—leads
features. Assome groups
they note, to seekau- Liah
competitive other strongest
Greenfeld, organizational
Nationalism: vehicle
Five Roads in the competitive
to Modernity. Cambridge,au-
MA: Harvard
to transform thoritarian
identity, regimes
and national
should notidentity often
be thought seems
of as to University
transitional: thoritarianPress, 1992.
environment (which is the core of the competitive
there is no reason to assume that competitive authoritarian authoritarian regime) has lots of “organizational power.” The
regimes will become democratic or more fully authoritarian. second path is authoritarian persistence with lots of instability
However, certain characteristics do predict the likelihood of and turnover, which is more likely in the context of a weaker

An example of Each chapter after

transition from competitive authoritarianism to democracy
a constructivist the introduction chapter
and less stable state.
that(chapter
na- 1) closes with a “Thinking
or full-blown autocracy. First,theory is Liah
lots of linkages Greenfeld’s
to the West pre- argument
tional identitydict
is aan imaginative Comparatively”
response to feature,
contradictory
move toward democratization. If there are not so many
which
public focuses claims on a case
about aor set
After the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University
of cases to illustrate how
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
Press, 2010.

group’s status.11 Greenfeld emphasizesstudents can apply

social the theories
psychology, discussed
rather in the chapter.
than economics,
in analyzing the processes through which national identity emerges and thrives
(see Insights box on Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity).
These theories reveal just how different such structuralist and constructivist
approaches can
Why be, Did
but simultaneously
Zimbabwereveal points of
Become andsimilarity. For example, the THINKING
group status inconsistency that Greenfeld emphasizes may often be due to “struc- COMPARATIVELY
Remain Authoritarian?
tural” changes in society such as shifting ways of organizing social and economic

fact that such a

A
uthoritarian regimes come in many varieties, and they come from many
class or innovations
theory
in the
different ways
origins. Wethat
emphasizes
havestates recruit
emphasized
social
their
that
psychology
therestaff.
and
is noIn other
single
symbolic
words,
thing called theKEY METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS
construction
“authoritarianism” that one theory can explain. Rather, authoritarian regimes Evidence and
does not meanhavethat it ignores
distinct features structural
and exhibit characteristics of society.
many different types of transitions (and non-
Empirical Critiques
transitions). Scholars have developed a number of explanatory models to account
for these. Some of the main general factors in most cases, though, include (1) One reason that many theories
continue to endure in different areas
historical relationships between contending groups, (2) the strength and form of of comparative politics is that most
existing institutions,
CASE IN CONTEXT(3) a country’s level of economic development, (4) political- of the major theories have some
cultural traditions and tendencies, and (5) the strategic situations and choices of empirical support. This makes it chal-
Importing National Identity in Japan?
key actors. Of course, as we have seen in other chapters, it is not enough to merely lenging to determine which theory PAGE XXX
list such contributing factors; we must figure out how such factors interact and is the most accurate. In reality, most
theories will not be accurate under
which are most important. What do you think? And how could we test your ideas all circumstances, but rather each will
Japan had aempirically?
clear civilizational identity for centuries before For more on Japanese nationalism, see better
explain some outcomes the casethan study in
As we noted
modern nationalism. at the
Indeed, outsetthe
under of the chapter, modern-day
Tokugawa regime, Part Zimbabwe is an authori-
VI, p. XXX. As you read it, Sokeep
others. how doinyoumind the following
avoid simply

the countrytarian
turnedregime thatand
inward is characterized by many
sharply limited of the features
commercial we have discussed. It is making “laundry lists” (as noted earlier)
questions:
a “personalist” regime, the population of which is subject to many of the vagaries and saying, “Everything matters”? In
and cultural contact with the outside world. Yet many schol- 1. What does Japan show preparingus about
to make theargu-
theoretical relationship
of authoritarianism. It is characterized by repression, a lack of secure political ments, it is of course important for any
ars think that it only
rights, developed
seemingly modern
arbitrary rule,national identity
and so on. Eveninafter its recent
between nationalism
transition, and
au- particular other key
question to examine how
aspects of
 Preface xxi

In these features we highlight important methodological tools or strategies,

such as the use of deviant cases and the most-similar-systems (MSS) design. We
then model for students how to use these analytical tools in practice.

Organization
The sixteen thematic chapters of this book are divided into five parts:
• Part I (chapters 1 and 2) focuses on basic methods in comparative politics,
covering conceptualization, hypothesis testing, the formation of theories,
and the use of evidence. The goal in these first two chapters is not to focus
on the details of methodology, which can be taught in more specialized
courses, but on the overarching logic of comparative inquiry.
• Part II (chapters 3 through 7) focuses on the state (chapter 3), political
economy (chapter 4), development (chapter 5), democracy and democrati-
zation (chapter 6), and the various forms of authoritarian regimes (chapter 7).
• Part III (chapters 8 through 11) focuses on the analysis of political institu-
tions, giving students the tools to analyze institutional design in consti-
tutional structures and judiciaries (chapter 8), legislatures and elections
(chapter 9), executives (chapter 10), and political parties and interest groups
(chapter 11).
• Part IV (chapters 12 through 15) focuses on issues that link comparative
politics to political sociology, such as the study of revolution and other forms
of contention (chapter 12), national identities and nationalism (chapter 13),
race, gender, and ethnicity (chapter 14), and religion and ideology (chapter 15).
• Part V consists of a single chapter, 16, which links comparative politics to
international relations, emphasizing how global politics has produced new
sets of problems that both comparativists and international relations scholars
must analyze. As such, the book points to another kind of integration, pushing
students to see connections between comparative politics and other courses
in political science.
After chapter 2, the thematic chapters follow a common format. They are
divided into three main sections:
• Concepts: covers basic definitions and develops a working vocabulary.
• Types: discusses useful typologies, such as the major types of dramatic social
change that interest political scientists.
• Causes and Effects: walks students through the major theories that aim
to explain causes and effects, ending with the “Thinking Comparatively”
feature to model analysis.
The final part of the book, Part VI, comprises country “profiles” and
in-depth “case studies.” We selected twelve countries after surveying more than
xxii Preface Case Studies 439

CASE STUDY
The French Revolution CHAPTER 12, PAGE 289

The French Revolution took place amid
major structural problems in eighteenth-
century French society (Furet 1995; Doyle
2003). In this period, France, like much of
early modern Europe, remained an “estate
society,” divided into three groups: a no-
bility with special privileges, the clergy,
and commoners. The social status of the
nobility, however, was weakened by the
ongoing efforts of the centralizing, abso-
lutist crown. As the monarchy and its state
grew stronger, the nobility felt increas-
ingly marginalized. At the same time, the
French absolutist state, largely through its
involvement in foreign wars (especially
the American Revolution), faced major
fiscal difficulties (Doyle 2003). Indeed, by
the late eighteenth century, it was nearly
bankrupt. Meanwhile, periodic problems
in food distribution and rural poverty en-
sured that much of France’s rural popula-
tion felt discontent. Finally, the spread of
the Enlightenment and of nationalism
provided the bases for an intellectual cri-
tique of the old regime (Greenfeld 1992;
Bell 2001).
The revolution began as a series of
efforts to reform the French state. The
crown called an “Assembly of Notables,”
but the assembly declared that the Es-
tates General, which had not met since
the early seventeenth century, needed to
be called. When the Estates General con-
vened, it was divided in the customary
manner into the three estates mentioned
previously. However, before long, politics
and propaganda forced representatives
of the first two estates to join the latter
one, the core idea being that the French
nation shouldn’t be divided by estates
because all of its members should be
equal. The third estate was the nation,
as Sieyes declared (Furet 1995: 45–51).
In other words, the Estates General was
reinterpreted as being something like a
modern, national legislature (though the
leaders of the Estates General remained
bourgeois and nobles, along with some
clergy, and not “popular” actors).
Reform quickly devolved into a novel
form of collective behavior that was
surprising even to its most central par-
ticipants and those who attempted to
lead and control it. Street actions began,
and mobs attacked the Bastille prison
on July 14, 1789, wishing to destroy a
reviled symbol of the arbitrary authority
of the monarch to imprison opponents
at will. By 1792, the monarchy had fallen
amid increasing violence—much per-
petrated by mobs known as the “sans
culottes”—opening a period known as
the “Terror” in which perceived enemies
of the revolution were murdered in large
numbers. Robespierre was a key figure
in this period, perpetrating the para-
noid violence that ultimately consumed
him. This was followed by a period of
relaxation known as the “Thermidorian
reaction,” and, finally, by the rise of Na-
poleon. On one hand, Napoleon appears
a conservative figure, since, for example,
he declared himself emperor. But on the
other hand, he can be viewed as a revolu-
tionary whose mission was to spread the
French Revolution to the rest of Europe,
through an imperial war.
What struck so many contemporaries
was the Revolution’s destructive nature. It
seemed intent on an eradication of the
old society and the replacement of all of
its forms by new, “revolutionary” ones.
This included the creation of a new, revo-
lutionary calendar, the efforts to destroy
the Church and its teachings, the war on
the nobility, the destruction of many ar-
chitectural sites, and so forth. The French
revolution subsequently became the
model for many later revolutionaries
and its ideals inspirational for national-
ists and republicans everywhere. At the
same time, it surprised nearly everyone
involved, and those who attempted to
control it quickly learned that they had
helped to unleash social forces beyond
their ability to lead (Arendt 1963).

150 instructors of comparative politics to see which they considered most crucial
CASE STUDY
for inclusion. The cases are Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan,
Religion and Secularism
Mexico, in France
Nigeria, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. CHAPTERThis selection
15, PAGE 363
offers broad coverage of every major world region, democratic and authoritarian
France is the society most closely polities,
associ- every
of othermajor religious
societies tradition,
as well, including partshighly
time,varying levels
there had beenof economic
a relatively and
large
social
ated with the idea of laïcité, though one development, and quite different institutional
of Latin America (Blancarte 2008). France designs.
Protestant minority (the “Huguenots”),
encounters it prominently in a number was historically a Catholic society. For a but they were repressed and most fled
 Preface xxiii

For each country, we first provide a “profile”: an introduction with a table of

key features, a map, and pie charts of demographics; a timeline and historical
overview; and brief descriptions of political institutions, political culture, and
political economy.
Following each profile is a set of case studies (five or six for each country)
that we reference in the thematic chapters as described earlier (via the “Case in
Context” boxes).
The case sets end with research prompts to help students get started as
comparativists.

Flexibility in Instruction:
Ways of Using This Text
The chapters are arranged in a logical order yet written in such a way that
instructors might easily rearrange them to custom fit a course. Some instructors,
for example, may wish to pair chapter 3 (on the state) with chapter 13 (on nation-
alism and national identity). Others might wish to assign chapter 15 (on religion
and ideology) alongside chapters 6 and 7 (on democratic and authoritarian
regimes). We have written the book with the flexibility to facilitate such pairings.
Indeed, while we strongly suggest beginning with chapters 1 and 2, students will
be able to follow the text even without reading them first.
Similarly, the book’s structure supports a range of options for using the country
materials. Some instructors may wish to teach selected country materials at or
near the beginning of a course. Some may wish to make reference to country
materials as the course proceeds, assigning students to read them as they are clearly
and visibly “called out” in the text. One approach could require all students in a
course to familiarize themselves with only a subset of the countries detailed here,
rather than all twelve. Another might require each student to select three or four
countries, following rules or categories of countries as laid out by the instructor.
The book also works with or without supplemental materials chosen by the
instructor. The “Insights” boxes throughout the text provide indications of
excellent options for further readings. Many other choice readings are noted in
the “References and Further Reading” section at the back of the text, organized by
chapter. A companion book of classic and contemporary readings is available, in
addition to a reader on current debates (see Packaging Options, p. xxv). In short,
instructors can use this text alone or link it seamlessly to other readings.

Summary of Features
We have built a number of useful features into the text, some of which we have
already mentioned:
• “Case in Context” boxes tie in to the narrative of the main chapters,
pointing students to full case studies in the book’s final part.
• “Insights” boxes illustrate causal theories by describing the work of key
authors in the field, making this work accessible to introductory students.
xxiv Preface

• “Thinking Comparatively” sections at the end of every chapter (after

chapter 1) model the application of theories and the testing of hypotheses.
Each “Thinking Comparatively” section includes a “Key Methodological
Tools” feature, which introduces key skills and strategies for doing compar-
ative political analysis and reinforces lessons learned in the first two chapters.
• “Thinking It Through” questions close every chapter. These help students
test their ability to apply comparative politics theories to cases.
• Every section of case studies offers a series of “Research Prompts” that
can be used to develop comparative projects and papers, applying what
students have learned as they start to do comparative analysis.
• Every chapter ends with a “Chapter Summary,” enabling students and
instructors to review the main points at a glance.
• At the back of the text, we include “References and Further Reading” by
chapter that students can use to dig deeper into the issues raised or as they
begin their own research.
• A running glossary in the margin of the text highlights the meaning of
key terms as they appear and serves as a quick study reference.

Supplements
Oxford University Press offers instructors and students a comprehensive ancillary
package for qualified adopters of Comparative Politics: Integrating Theories, Methods,
and Cases.

Ancillary Resource Center

The Ancillary Resource Center (ARC) at https://arc2.oup-arc.com/ is a conve-
nient, instructor-focused, single destination for resources to accompany this book.
Accessed online through individual user accounts, the ARC provides instructors
with up-to-date ancillaries while guaranteeing the security of grade-significant
resources. In addition, it allows OUP to keep instructors informed when new
content becomes available.
The ARC for Comparative Politics contains a variety of materials to aid in
teaching:
• Instructor’s Resource Manual with Test Item File—The Instructor’s Resource
Manual includes chapter objectives, detailed chapter outlines, lecture sugges-
tions and activities, discussion questions, video resources, and Web resources.
The Test Item File includes more than eight hundred test questions selected
and approved by the authors, including multiple-choice, short-answer, and
essay questions.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Our visitors were really many of them very fine-looking fellows in
their long Tuareg bubus or mantles, with the red pocket on the
breast. Their naturally picturesque attitudes lent them a really regal
appearance, and they might very well have passed for proud, highly-
born nobles, when, leaning on their spears, they looked about them,
their great black eyes gleaming from the voluminous folds of their
veils. But when the distribution of presents began the glamour
disappeared, the haughty noble was gone, to be replaced by a
greedy, rapacious savage, until, his big pocket as full as it would
hold, he resumed his disdainful attitude.

OUR PALAVER AT SAKHIB’S CAMP.

All this is really very excusable. Imagine the effect in any

European country place, of the arrival of a wealthy nabob distributing
diamonds and other precious stones wherever he goes. I wager that
our own fellow-countrymen would not comport themselves in a more
worthy way than did these Tuaregs, and it must be borne in mind
that though our presents, such as pipes, small knives, bracelets and
rings, or white and coloured stuffs were of little intrinsic value, the
natives set as much store by them as we should by jewels.
Numerous as was the crowd, however, Sakhib was conspicuous
by his absence; neither did the women put in an appearance, a proof
that the Tuaregs were not quite sure of our good intentions. Only one
of the fair sex did we see, and she was a female blacksmith, who
said she was ill, and wanted the doctor to prescribe for her. Taburet
tried in vain to find out what was the matter with her, and my private
opinion is that her illness was only an excuse, that her motives in
visiting our camp were none of the best, and that she would be ready
to accept our hospitality for a night in return for a good fee.
We, however, with thoroughly British bashfulness, resisted the
blandishments of the siren, and when darkness fell all our visitors,
who had been less extortionate in their demands than Sakhaui’s
people, decided to withdraw.
Mohamed Uld Mbirikat alone remained on the beach with us, and
we talked together till far into the night. He really was a good fellow,
and it was no fault of his that we had not succeeded in seeing
Sakhib and Sakhaui, for he had put forth all his eloquence on our
behalf. His interests, moreover, are closely bound up with those of
the Igwadaren, amongst whom he lives without protection, buying
grain of them to sell it again in Timbuktu, so that any help he gave us
beyond a certain point would seriously compromise him. I gave him
a valuable present, and he in his turn presented me with a stock of
rice he owned at the village of Gungi on the islet of Autel Makhoren,
where we should be the next day.
After a quiet night we resumed our voyage, but the never-ceasing
enervating wind forced us to anchor soon, and we were presently
joined by a canoe in which was an unfortunate man in chains, a
brother of Sakhib, who had been out of his mind for five years. He is
quiet enough, they told me, when he is rendered powerless for harm
by being bound, but directly he is released he becomes furious, and
strikes and abuses every one about him. Taburet prescribed for him
as best he could, shower-baths and strait waistcoats being out of the
question in these parts. We passed the village of Agata, where lives
Hameit, a sheriff to whom we had a letter from Abiddin, and where
we saw some fifty canoes drawn up high and dry on the banks. In
the evening we halted near a little village on an islet, the chief of
which had had his arm broken by a blow from the spear of an
Igwadaren, whom he had refused to allow to carry off his store of
rice. There is no doubt that the natives on the right bank of the river
behave better than those on the left, and—which it is rather difficult
to understand—it is the negroes, that is to say the Songhay, who,
though more numerous and as well armed as their oppressors, allow
themselves to be ill-treated in this way without making any attempt at
defence. Their cowardice prevents me from feeling as much
sympathy as I otherwise should for their miserable condition.

THE VILLAGE OF GUNGI.

We started very early the next morning, but our guide got
confused, and did not know the way to Gungi. Some men in a canoe,
however, directed us, and we had to go up-stream again beyond
Agata, and get into another arm which we had passed on the left.
We then, though not without some difficulty, succeeded in reaching
the village, passing several artificial dykes, beyond which stretched
rice-fields now inundated. Gunga, a wretched little place, is peopled
by slaves taken in war by the sheriffs of Agata. Mohamed’s rice was
handed over to us, but it was all still in the husk, and it would take us
the whole of the next day to get it shelled.
During the night a Kel es Suk arrived, who, in a very important
manner, informed me that he had very serious news to
communicate. The whole of the tribes of the Sahara, he said, had
combined against the French, and were advancing upon Timbuktu.
Awellimiden, Hoggars and all the rest of them were up, and Madidu
himself was at Bamba at the head of his column. This was really too
big an invention, and the narrator overreached himself by going so
far. Without losing my sang-froid for a moment, I thanked my
informant, Father Hacquart acting as interpreter, for my visitor spoke
Arabic well, and begged him to take my best compliments to Madidu.
The old rogue then turned to the subject he really had most at heart,
and tried to make me give him a garment of some kind as a present,
but I was too deep for that, and sent him off empty-handed.
 OUR PEOPLE SHELLING OUR RICE AT GUNGI.

Directly we stopped we were inundated by visitors, all nearly as

worrying as the rain, which had been falling without ceasing since
the evening before. To begin with, on the morning of the 22nd came
messengers from Sakhaui to ask in his name for advice. The
Commandant of Timbuktu had sent him a letter announcing the
approaching arrival of Colonel de Trentinian, Governor of the French
Sudan. The Commandant ordered Sakhaui to go to Timbuktu, and
he was very much frightened. I did my best to reassure the
messenger, but I am very certain that Sakhaui does not mean to
budge. The message would, however, do us no end of harm, and
from my journal that day I perceive that I felt very indignant at the
policy pursued by our authorities in the Sudan. I find written there
—“We really are an extraordinary people, we seem to expect that the
Tuaregs will come and throw themselves into our arms of their own
accord, without our having employed any conciliatory or coercive
means to induce them to do so. But, good Heavens! if they could
send us to the Devil, from whom their marabouts tell them we come,
they would gladly do it. And really I don’t blame them, for I see well
enough what they have to lose by our presence in their land, though
I don’t quite see what they are to gain. Taking into account the
apathy with which commercial questions are treated, I do not yet
foresee the day when amends will be made for the imposts now
levied by force, by the granting of new rights of way, and the
supplying of new means of transport.”
Nor have I seen reason since to change my opinion, for to talk of
colonial questions in France is to preach in the desert. Nevertheless,
I am firmly convinced that then as now I wrote only the exact literal
truth.
It was now R’alli’s turn again. We had not seen the fellow for
some time, but I am willing to swear three times by Allah, that since
we treated him as we did at Zarhoi he had been our most faithful and
devoted adherent. He would never let us go anywhere without
preparing the way before us, so he had gone on in advance of our
barges now, and spread our fame amongst the sheriffs and other
idiots, who did not know us as he did, and who received his reports
by beating the tabala or war-drum; or, to speak with more strict
accuracy, he found the drum being beaten, and fearing that the
sound of that one instrument would lead to the beating of others, he
confiscated it at once. Then he, R’alli, having inquired what all the
noise meant, the owner of the drum replied that he was afraid the
white men were coming to take away his goods, his oxen, his sheep,
and so on. “Then,” added R’alli, with an air of extreme amiability, “to
show him he had nothing to fear, I took everything away from him.” I
began to shout at him—“And that is the way you make friends for
us!” “To give everything back when you have passed,” he went on
with a smile. If the story he told me is true, and I shouldn’t like to
swear that it was, I wouldn’t mind taking my oath that the poor sheriff
will not get all his property back. However, the unabashed R’alli
continued, “You ought to dress me now as you do your other
soldiers, for am not I now one of your troops?”
 SHERIFF’S HOUSE AT GUNGI.

I observed that I had already given him stuff enough to clothe his
whole family.
“But my bubu and breeches are dirty now!” he replied. “Well, go
and wash them, you wretch!” was the angry rejoinder. “What!” he
cried, “would you like a soldier under such a chief as you to demean
himself by such work as that?”
Sheriff Hameit, to whom I had sent Abiddin’s letter the evening
before, answered us very impolitely, declaring that his religion
forbade him to have anything to do with infidels.
I consoled myself for this fresh failure by having a chat with the
little Kunta Tahar, Mohamed’s companion, who had come on to
Gungi to see that the rice was duly handed over to us.
He told me of the death in 1890 near Saredina of Abiddin, the son
of Hamet Beckay, of whom he had been a faithful retainer when at
Gardio near Lake Debo.
 This Abiddin and his followers had come to make a pilgrimage to
the tomb of the great marabout, and also to try to win recruits against
the Toucouleurs of Massina, with whom Abiddin carried on the
struggle begun by his father. Two columns had marched forth
against them, one from Mopti, the other from Jenné, and surrounded
them. Abiddin was wounded and taken prisoner, but his faithful
Bambaras of Jenné, who had always followed his fortunes, rescued
him from the hands of the enemy. But, alas! no less than three
bullets hit the doomed man after this first escape, killing him on the
spot, and a great storm then arose which put an end to the battle,
only a few of those engaged in it escaping to tell the tale.
The wind, which was very violent and dry, whirled up such
quantities of sand that the corpse of Abiddin was buried beneath it,
and no one was ever able to discover the place where he lay, as if
Nature herself wished to protect his body from desecration and
insult.

WEAVERS AT GUNGI.
 Tornadoes play a great part in the histories of Kunta wars. Hamet
Beckay is supposed to have had the power of calling them up when
he liked, and to have by their means several times overwhelmed
armies sent to attack him, but that of Saredina came too late to save
his son.
Can it have been the story told to me by my friend the Kunta
which caused a tremendous tornado to sweep down upon us that
very evening, with thunder and lightning and torrents of rain all
complete, soaking everything and everybody on board?
Our rice shelled, put into bags, and stowed away in the hold, we
went on and anchored the next morning opposite Baruba to
breakfast there. The ancient town, the Kaaba of the Tuaregs, which
was still standing in the time of Barth, has since been destroyed, but
its site is marked by piles of rubbish such as are still characteristic of
the environs of Timbuktu, and from their vast extent prove that it was
a city of considerable importance.
The country round about is extremely picturesque. The
descendants of those who dwelt in the old city have moved a little
further down stream to a dune which is so completely surrounded
with water during inundations as to form an island. They bury their
dead beneath the shade of the thorny bush beyond their settlement.
At Baruba we saw some date trees which had reverted to the wild
state, and were very majestic looking. We visited the site of the old
town, and then anchored opposite its successor. Now that the waters
of the Niger were beginning to subside, and the island was becoming
a peninsula only, the inhabitants were losing their sense of security,
and talking of migrating to an islet in the river itself opposite their
present home. A few huts had already been put up on it, making
white spots amongst the dense green verdure.
There we received envoys from the chief named Abder Rhaman,
who brought us a letter in which we were informed that the reason
the writer did not come to see us was, that he was afraid we should
not understand each other, and bad results might ensue.
Then came a band of Kel-Owi, serfs of the Igwadaren, bringing
ten, twenty, or thirty sheep, which they informed us they meant to
give us. The number of animals seemed increasing at every
moment, and I at once feared there was some sinister intention
behind this unusual generosity. But no, I was wrong. They were
really good fellows these Kel-Owi, though the merit of their
munificence rather melts away when you examine closely into
motives. It was present for present, as of course they knew I should
not take their beasts without giving them something in exchange. I
had the greatest difficulty in making our visitors understand that our
boats were not sheep-pens, and that all I could do was to choose out
the five finest animals.

FATHER HACQUART AND HIS LITTLE

FRIEND.

All the imrads or serfs with whom I came in contact seemed to me

quiet, inoffensive folk, when one does not pick a quarrel with them, in
which they differ entirely from the Tuaregs of Algeria. They are of
much paler complexion than the nobles or Ihaggaren.
 In spite of what Abder Rhaman said in his letter, he decided to
come and see us. He was an Arma, or descendant of the old
conquerors from Morocco, with a proud, dignified bearing, and
seemed to be a good and energetic ruler.
We had a very friendly conversation with him, during which the
halt and lame, with all the sick people of the village, came to ask for
medical advice. The doctor really multiplied himself in an
extraordinary way, working miracles of healing.
During the night of the 23rd to the 24th of May we were roused by
a great commotion in the village, and prepared for every
contingency, but in the morning Abder Rhaman came to explain the
mystery, telling us that the Hoggars had made a raid on the
Igwadaren settlements. Sakhaui had sent ten men to reconnoitre,
one of whom was his brother. They had met the enemy, whose force
was superior to theirs, and had had to beat a retreat, with two of their
number wounded. Sakhaui’s brother had had his horse killed under
him.
On the rumour of the approach of the Hoggars, which had
reached Baruba, during the night, the village was deserted, every
one carrying off all the property he could, and the noise we had
heard was that made by the canoes taking over the wretched goods
and chattels of the poor people and the materials of their huts to the
point called Ansel Makkoren. They had not dared to warn us for fear
of being fired on by our sentry.
I greatly regret that I was not at Zarhoi when the news came of
the arrival of the Hoggars. We might have given Sakhaui timely aid
in repulsing them, and thus have aided to avenge the murder of
Flatters, whilst the danger he was in would very likely have driven
the Igwadaren chief into our arms.
Later, however, I had the satisfaction of hearing that the column of
Hoggars who had advanced towards Timbuktu had been surprised
and partly destroyed by the spahis of Captain Laperrine.
 LITTLE NEGROES AT EGUEDECHE.

A short march in the afternoon brought us to Eguedeche, where

we cast anchor opposite a little slave village on the very edge of the
river. At first the negroes all ran away, and when we landed we found
nothing but empty huts. Presently, however, a wail went up from
amongst the fugitives, for Father Hacquart made a sudden dash at
them, and emerged carrying a little boy of about a year old in his
arms, who screamed in terror, but was soon reassured by the
caresses of the father, and began playing with his long beard.
The little fellow’s parents were not far off, and they watched what
was going on from behind some dwarf palms, where they had taken
refuge with the rest of the villagers, and, their fears allayed, they now
came out followed by their comrades.
The large village of Eguedeche is some little distance from the
river, and is hidden behind a dune. The inhabitants, who are the
masters of the slaves in the little village near which we had
anchored, are Kuntas. They showed us the ruins of an earthen hut
which had belonged to Sidi el Amin, one of Hamet Beckay’s
brothers. The chief of Eguedeche came to meet us in person,
accompanied by one of his relations, who belonged to that part of
the tribe which was under the rule of Baba Hamet, a son of El
Beckay. I persuaded him to go back and tell his chief of our
approach, that I was the nephew of Abdul Kerim, and anxious to see
Baba Hamet and his brother Baye.
The news of the Hoggar raid was confirmed by the people here.
Though we were able to remain on pretty good terms with the
inhabitants of the left bank of the Niger, we felt that an obstinate
hostility to us was growing on the other side, and during the day of
the 25th an adventure occurred which proved that we were right.
We had to halt about 8 o’clock. The Aube was already anchored
at the base of a dune, and the Davoust was amongst the grass near
a village, the inhabitants of which had come to barter their eggs and
poultry for our glass beads. The wind had fallen, and I had already
given the signal to start, when from amongst a group of Tuaregs who
had been posted on the dune watching our boats without
approaching, a negro was sent to say they wished to speak to us.
In his hand the envoy held a red woollen coverlet which I had sent
from Rhergo to Mohamed Uld Mbirikat, and which he told me had
been taken from him partly by persuasion and partly by force by Abu,
a brother of Sakhib.
This coverlet, the messenger explained, was sent to prove that he
came from Abu, who exhorted us to keep away from the right bank
of the river, to go down stream if we liked, but to refrain from landing.
The Aube had already started, and on account of the tiresome
wind, which made us lose the best hours every day, we had very
little time to push on, so I resisted my desire to remain where I was
and see what Abu would do. I sent him an answer, however, to the
effect that I was going on, not because he ordered me to, but
because I wished to do so, as I had already made an arrangement
with his elder brother. I added, I had nothing at all to do with Abu,
and did not recognize him as having any authority whatever in the
country.
 In the evening we tried in vain to anchor near the village of
Moyadikoira, the weeds quite prevented our getting in, and we had
to content ourselves by stopping near a little island opposite to it. We
tried without success to attract the natives. They came, it is true, in
their canoes as far as the boundary of weeds and rushes, but they
would not land on our island. I was very anxious, however, to find out
what was in the wind among the Tuaregs, and also to buy some
wood for burning. In these parts, where weeds and grass often make
it impossible to land, the question of how to get fuel for cooking
purposes is often a very serious one, and we had to be very
economical with what we did succeed in obtaining. It is not that there
is not plenty of wood to be had, if there were not steam navigation
would be indeed difficult here; but in order to procure it, it is
necessary to go to the first line of dunes beyond the highest point of
the great inundations. There are plenty of gum trees there, and all
we have to do is to get the natives to cut them down, and carry the
wood to the boats. It throws out a great heat when burning.
On the 26th a canoe passed us in which were some people from
Bamba, who told us that the Tademeket Kel Burrum had met at
Dongoe with the intention of attacking us.
On hearing these tidings Sidi Hamet burst into tears, and in the
end he entreated me to let him leave us at Tosaye to go back to
Timbuktu.
Since we had passed through the Igwadaren districts, the
character of our guide had undergone a complete transformation,
which was anything but an improvement. I knew he had had a letter
from Timbuktu, but I did not know what was in it. I do know, however,
that the silly fellow is a great fool, and very jealous about his wife.
“She is such a beautiful woman,” he informed us one day, “and so
beautifully dressed. She carries the value of at least four bars of salt
on her back.” Is he afraid of the fate of the husband described by
Molière? Is his fear real or feigned? Anyhow he is, or pretends to be,
a constant prey to the greatest terrors. He who, till we reached
Kardieba, was always so gay and so bold, ready to carry out every
enterprise I entrusted to him, he, who had always expressed such
immovable confidence in the success of all our schemes of alliance
with the Awellimiden, could now only dwell on the melancholy fate
which awaited him and us: we should be murdered, he too of course,
and he should never see his dear wife again who has the value of
four bars of salt on her back, etc. I had tried by kindness and by
scolding to restore his moral tone, but it was no good, and feeling
how foolish it would be to place confidence in such a coward, who
was quite ready to deceive us if he could thus prevent us from going
further, I gave him the permission he asked for, seasoning my
compliance, however, with a few pretty severe remarks. This quieted
him for a bit, but he very soon recommenced his jeremiads on the
dangers he would incur on his way back to Timbuktu. To cut the
matter short, however, I at last forbid him ever to mention the matter
to me.
There was, however, some truth in all that Sidi Hamet said. The
natives we met grew more and more hostile. On the morning of the
27th we crossed the rocky pass known as Tinalschiden, and then
Dongoe, where rumour said we were to be attacked. We were, in
fact, followed on either bank by troops of mounted Tuaregs, some
thirty altogether, I should say, but this was not a very formidable
force, and after all they abstained from any hostile manifestation.
The wind compelled us to halt for a few minutes opposite Dongoe on
the left bank, and a horseman rode forward and hailed the Davoust. I
exchanged greetings with him, a necessary prelude to every
conversation, even if that conversation is to lead to a quarrel. I asked
him to give me the news of the country, and he told me I should get
them at Tosaye from Sala Uld Kara.
At about two o’clock we perceived in front of us two great masses
of rock. These were the Baror and Chalor mentioned by Barth, which
form land, or rather water-marks at the defile of Tosaye. A canoe at
once put out from the left bank, in which was a relation of Sala, who
came to offer his services as guide. The numbers of the Tuaregs on
the right bank now increased, and I wished to parley with them, but
our pilot prevented it. A few strokes of the oar soon brought us
opposite Sala’s town, known as Sala Koira or Tosaye. We landed.
TAKING ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATIONS.
TOSAYE, WITH THE BAROR AND CHABAR ROCKS.
 CHAPTER IV

FROM TOSAYE TO FAFA

Tosaye is a village of sheriffs. They are as pacific and timid a set

of people as can possibly be imagined, but for all that, they gathered
on the beach on our arrival in warlike array, trying to make up for the
courage they lacked by being armed to the teeth. Each marabout
was really a walking arsenal. This made us feel inclined to laugh; but
what was a far more serious matter, was the fact that groups of
Tuaregs, who seemed to be waiting for us, had gathered behind the
village. Our guide, who had sprung ashore directly we landed, had
disappeared, and no one seemed anxious to enter into conversation
with us. I told Sidi Hamet to come down and take me to Chief Sala,
or to one of his representatives; but our political agent at first stoutly
refused to do so. We had to drag him from the boat almost by force,
and then he went up to one of the groups which appeared the least
hostile, entered a hut, and kept us waiting outside for his return for
half-an-hour.
He came at last, with a brother of Sala, bearing very bad news.
Sala by an unlucky chance had gone on a journey, and the people of
the village, fearing that we were going to fight with the Tuaregs,
would be very glad if we did not land here at all. This was succeeded
by a whole rigmarole of information—much of it contradictory, but all
alarming. A great gathering of Awellimiden, Tademeket Kuntas, etc.,
was massed at the Tosaye defile to oppose our passage, etc. Sala
himself was amongst the rest of our enemies.
What was to be done? We were in need of provisions, our reserve
stores were beginning to give out, and I wanted to lay in a stock of
grain, for who could tell what we might expect further down the river?
 I also wanted guides. Ever since we had left Timbuktu the
narrowness and difficulties of the Tosaye defile had been dinned into
our ears. Even Dr. Barth is not very reassuring in what he says about
it, for he asserts that a stone could be flung by a vigorous hand from
one bank to the other, and speaks of the probable existence of very
strong currents, perhaps even of rapids.
We were told that some twelve years ago an army of Toucouleurs
had tried to descend the Niger in canoes. They were, however,
completely annihilated at Tosaye, crushed beneath masses of rocks
which the natives rolled down on them from the top of the cliffs. Of
course I knew that allowance must be made for exaggeration, but for
all that I feared that we should be at very great disadvantage in the
narrow pass if we did have a conflict with the natives. We must
therefore put out all our diplomacy to avoid a struggle.
Without seeming to give any credence to the alarmist reports of
Sidi Hamet, or to be in the least disconcerted by them, I entered into
conversation with Sala’s brother, and very soon managed to
introduce the subject of Abdul Kerim.
I revealed my relationship to him, and as usual it produced the
anticipated effect. Sala was not aware that I was the nephew of
Barth; he must at once be told. As a mark of gratitude and a token
that I really was speaking the truth, I gave him the name of the cook
of his former leader, El Beckay. Her name was Diko.
No doubt when Barth, with his usual German precision, registered
the name of that humble but useful personage, the information did
not seem likely to be of very great importance to future generations.
He little knew the service he would render nearly half-a-century
afterwards to his pretended nephew.
With such a proof as this who could fail to believe that I really was
the nephew of my “uncle,” especially as Diko was not yet dead, but
was living at a camp in the interior? The result of my news was that
Sala had not, after all, gone on a journey, and would perhaps visit
us. His brother at once hastened to land to take the tidings to him,
his whole manner and expression completely transformed.
 He soon came back to report that Sala was not gone, but still in
the village, and when his brother had told him who I was he had
wept, for he saw in my arrival the fulfilment of a prophecy made by
his leader.
The fact was, that when Barth, accompanied by El Beckay,
arrived at Tosaye, the German explorer had no doubt been in more
danger than at any other time during his adventurous expedition.
The Tademeket Kel Burrum had resolved on his death, and all the
eloquence, all the religious influence of his protector could not soften
their feelings of animosity towards him.
At this crisis, and seeing that a terrible outbreak of hatred and
fanaticism was imminent, El Beckay, in the interests of his friend,
came to a weighty resolution. He told the Tuaregs that neither they
nor he were powerful enough to decide a matter so important as the
fate of Barth, and that El Khotab, head of the great confederation of
the Awellimiden, alone had the right to final judgment.
Leaving the banks of the river, El Beckay then went alone to El
Khotab, and persuaded him to give a safe-conduct to Barth, whom
he looked upon as his own protégé.
Barth never knew the danger he had run. In his book he merely
mentions that El Beckay was away for four days to fetch fresh
camels to take the place of their weary animals, which was of course
a mere pretext on the part of his protector, and is a fresh proof of the
delicate tact and consideration for the doctor shown by the great
Kunta marabout.
Now it so happened, that whilst he was discussing the matter with
the Tademeket, El Beckay was seized with one of his attacks of
prophetic delirium, and prophesied that some day the son of Abdul
Kerim would return with three boats.
We had three boats. I claimed, giving irrefragable proofs, to be the
nephew of Barth; it was impossible to deny that the prophecy was
fulfilled. We must add, to round off the story, that Madidu is the son
of the very El Khotab who saved my “uncle.”