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Taking Turns:
Sequential Games with Perfect Information 8
1. Return to the situation described in Chapter 2 in which Galileo Galilei might be con-
fronted by the Inquisition. Let us describe what actually transpired. First, Pope Urban
VIII referred Galileo to the Inquisition, and he was brought to trial on April 12, 1633.
After verbal persuasion from the commissary general of the Inquisition, Galileo con-
fessed that he had gone too far in supporting the Copernican theory in one of his books
(even though he hadn’t). Galileo was then given an “examination of intention,” which
involves showing the instruments of torture to the accused. The final hearing by the
Inquisition was held on June 22, 1633, at which time the 69-year-old Galileo pleaded for
mercy because of his “regrettable state of physical unwellness.” With the threat of tor-
ture and imprisonment lurking in the background, the Inquisitors forced Galileo to
“abjure, curse, and detest” his work. Galileo complied in every way and was convicted
and sentenced to life imprisonment and religious penances. Due to his age (and possibly
his fame), the sentence was commuted to house arrest. He was allowed to return to his
villa near Florence, where he would remain for the last years of his life. That is history,
and now we turn to our simple modeling of it. The extensive form game in Figure 2.3 is
reproduced here.
Galileo Galilei and the Inquisition

Urban VIII
Do not Refer
refer
Galileo
Urban VIII 3
Galileo 5
Do not
Inquisitor 3 Confess
confess
Inquisitor
5
3
Do not
4 Torture
torture
Galileo
2
4
Do not
Confess 2
confess
4 1
1 2
5 1
8-1
8-2 SOLUTIONS MANUAL CHAPTER 8: TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
a. Find all Nash equilibria. (Hint: First derive the strategic form game.)
ANSWER: The strategic form games are shown in the figure below.
Inquisitor: Torture
Galileo
C/C C/DNC DNC/C DNC/DNC
DNR 3,5,3 3,5,3 3,5,3 3,5,3
Urban VIII
R 5,3,4 5,3,4 4,1,5 1,2,1
Inquisitor: Do Not Torture

Galileo
C/C C/DNC DNC/C DNC/DNC
DNR 3,5,3 3,5,3 3,5,3 3,5,3
Urban VIII
R 5,3,4 5,3,4 2,4,2 2,4,2
The Nash equilibria are (DNR, DNC/DNC, torture), (R, C/C, torture), (R, C/DNC,
torture), (DNR, DNC/C, do not torture), (DNR, DNC/DNC, do not torture).
b. Find all of the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
ANSWER: In his last decision node (which is associated with the path refer S do
not confess S torture), Galileo chooses do not confess. Given this choice, the
Inquisitor chooses do not torture. At his first decision node (associated with Urban
VIII having chosen refer), Galileo chooses do not confess. Finally, using the result
just shown, Urban VIII chooses do not refer, as it produces payoff 3, which is
greater than payoff 2 from playing refer. Hence, the unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is (DNR, DNC/DNC, do not torture).
c. For each Nash equilibrium that is not an SPNE, explain why it is not a SPNE.
ANSWER: There are four Nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect Nash
equilibria. In Nash equilibria (DNR, DNC/DNC, torture) and (R, C/DNC, tor-
ture), the Inquisitor is making a nonoptimal decision by choosing to torture
Galileo given Galileo plays do not confess in his last decision node. In Nash
equilibria (R, C/C, torture) and (DNR, DNC/C, do not torture), Galileo is making
a nonoptimal decision at his last decision node. He should play do not confess
instead.
2. There were still pirates in the 1980s, although they tended to appear in corporate board-
rooms rather than the open seas. These swashbuckling financiers would engage in a
“hostile takeover” by acquiring a company through the purchase of shares on the open
market and against the will of the target company’s existing management (thus making
the takeover “hostile”). Such investors were known as “raiders” and included people
such as T. Boone Pickens, Sir James Goldsmith, Henry Kravis, and Victor Posner. All this
was fictionalized in the movie Wall Street, with Michael Douglas portraying the raider
Gordon Gekko, who famously espoused “Greed is good.” The time was full of jocular
jargon, as management could consume a “poison pill” by taking on a costly financial
structure that would make it difficult to consummate a hostile takeover. In some cases,
a raid could be fought against by buying a raider’s shares back at a premium; this tack
became known as “greenmail,” a takeoff on blackmail. To get a gist of the strategizing
that occurred between a raider and management, consider the figure below. The raider
makes an initial stock purchase, in response to which management decides whether to
SOLUTIONS MANUAL CHAPTER 8: TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION 8-3
buy the shares back at a premium (pay greenmail) or not. If no greenmail is paid, then
the raider decides whether to purchase additional shares in order to take control of the
target company.
Greenmail
Raider
Do not Buy
buy
Management
Raider 10
Management 10
Greenmail No greenmail
Raider
15
7
Do not
Take over
take over
8 6
4 11
a. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
ANSWER: Using backward induction, the Raider chooses takeover at the final decision
node. At the decision node for Management, the optimal action is greenmail since
that brings a payoff of 7 versus a payoff of 4 from no greenmail (which induces
the Raider to take over the company). At the initial decision node, the Raider
will then buy some shares as that will result in a payoff of 15, which exceeds the
payoff of 10 from not buying shares. There is then a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in which the Raider’s strategy is to choose buy shares at the first deci-
sion node and takeover at the second decision node, and the Management’s strat-
egy is greenmail.
b. Find a Nash equilibrium that is not an SPNE, and explain why it is not an SPNE.
ANSWER: The strategic form of the game is shown in the figure below. There
are three Nash equilibria: (do not buy/take over, no greenmail), (do not buy/do not
take over, no greenmail), and (buy/take over, greenmail). The first two are then
Nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect Nash equilibria. (do not buy/take
over, no greenmail) is not subgame perfect because management says it won’t
pay greenmail in response to the raider’s buying some shares when, in fact, it
would be optimal for it do so. However, since the raider doesn’t call this bluff,
management’s strategy is optimal, though not credible. (do not buy/do not take
over, no greenmail) is not subgame perfect because the raider says it won’t take
over the company when greenmail is not paid when, in fact, it would be optimal
for it to do so.
Management
Greenmail No greenmail
Do not buy/Take over 10,10 10,10
Do not buy/Do not take over 10,10 10,10
Raider
Buy/Take over 15,7 8,4
Buy/Do not take over 15,7 6,11
3. Return to the Kidnapping game from the film Ransom (first discussed in Chapter 2),
which is reproduced here. Solve for all subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Extensive Form for the Film Ransom

Jimmy Shaker
Do not Kidnap
kidnap
John Mullen
Jimmy Shaker 5
John Mullen 7
Pay Offer
ransom bounty
Do not
pay
ransom
JS JS JS
Kill Release Kill Release Kill Release
7 6 4 3 1 2
3 4 1 6 2 5
ANSWER: If Shaker chose kidnap and Mullen chose pay ransom, it is optimal to
choose kill for Shaker. At the decision node associated with Shaker having chosen
kidnap and Mullen having chosen do not pay ransom, it is also optimal to play kill
for Shaker. At the decision node associated with Shaker having chosen kidnap and
Mullen having chosen offer bounty, Shaker will choose release. The game is now as
shown in the figure below.
Jimmy Shaker
Do not
kidnap Kidnap
John Mullen
Jimmy Shaker 5
John Mullen 7
Pay Offer
ransom Do not bounty
pay
ransom
7 4 2
3 1 5
Mullen prefers offer bounty as it produces the highest possible payoff, 5. Hence,
the decision for Shaker at the initial node is as shown in the following figure, and
he will choose do not kidnap. The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (do
not kidnap/kill/kill/release, offer bounty).
Jimmy Shaker
Do not
kidnap Kidnap
5 2
7 5
4. Benjamin Franklin once said, “Laws too gentle are seldom obeyed; too severe, seldom
executed.” To flush out what he had in mind, the following game on page 298 has
three players: a lawmaker, a (typical) citizen, and a judge. The lawmaker chooses
among a law with a gentle penalty, one with a moderate penalty, and a law with a
severe penalty. In response to the law, the citizen decides whether or not to obey it. If
she does not obey it, then the judge decides whether to convict and punish the citizen.
Using SPNE, find values for the unspecified payoffs (those with letters, not numbers)
that substantiate Franklin’s claim by resulting in a lawmaker’s choosing a law with a
moderate penalty.
Punishments: Severe or Gentle?

Lawmaker
Gentle Moderate Severe
Citizen
Do not Do not Do not

Obey Obey Obey
obey obey obey
Judge
Lawmaker 10 10 10
Citizen 4 4 4
Judge 8 8 8
Do not Do not Do not
Convict Convict Convict
convict convict convict
8 6 8 6 8 6
a b e f i j
c d g h k l
ANSWER: The objective is to find values so that a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium has the following properties: (1) when the law is gentle, the citizen disobeys
the law even though he will be convicted; (2) when the law is moderate, the citi-
zen obeys the law because he will be convicted; and (3) when the law is severe,
the citizen disobeys the law because he will not be convicted. For (1) to occur, we
need c d (so the judge will convict the citizen) and a 4 (so the citizen pre-
fers to disobey the law and be convicted than to obey the law). For (2) to occur,
we need g h (so the judge will convict the citizen) and 4 e (so the citizen
prefers to obey the law rather than disobey it and be convicted). For (3) to occur,
we need l k (so the judge will not convict the citizen) and j 4 (so the citizen
prefers to disobey the law and not be convicted rather than obey it). By backward
induction, the lawmaker then faces these three alternatives: (1) choose a gentle
law and receive a payoff of 8 because the citizen disobeys the law and is con-
victed; (2) choose a moderate law and receive a payoff of 10 because the citizen
obeys the law; and (3) choose a severe law and receive a payoff of 6 because the
citizen disobeys the law and is not convicted. The lawmaker optimally chooses a
moderate law.
5. Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling once proposed a solution to the problem of how a kid-
nappee can induce his kidnapper to release him after the kidnappee has learned the iden-
tity of the kidnapper. Let’s return to the kidnapping scenario, but instead have the players
be Guy (kidnapper) and Orlando (kidnappee). The problem is that one would expect Guy
to be inclined to kill Orlando once Orlando sees Guy’s face, since then Orlando, if released,
would be able to help the police capture Guy. The situation is as depicted on page 299. Guy
starts off by deciding whether to kidnap Orlando. Orlando then decides whether to reveal
some incriminating details about himself that are unknown to the rest of the world.
(Perhaps Orlando stole funds from his church or had an affair unbeknownst to his wife.)
Then Guy decides whether to kill or release Orlando. If he releases Orlando, then Orlando
has to decide whether to inform the police of his kidnapper’s identity. If he does, and if
Orlando revealed his dirty secret to Guy, Guy must then decide whether to share that
secret with the world. Find the unique SPNE, and you’ll find Schelling’s proposed solution.
Revised Kidnapping Situation

Guy
Do not
Kidnap
kidnap
Orlando
Guy 3
Orlando 5
Tell dirty Do not tell
secret dirty secret
Guy Guy
Kill Release Kill Release
Orlando Orlando
4 4
0 0
Tell Do not Tell Do not
police tell police tell
Guy
5 1 5
2 4 2
Do not
Tell
tell
2 1
1 3
ANSWER: Consider the decision node faced by Guy when he kidnapped

Orlando, Orlando told him the dirty secret, Guy released Orlando, and Orlando
informed the police. If Guy chooses to tell the world about Orlando’s dirty secret,
then Guy’s payoff is 2, and if he keeps quiet, then his payoff is 1; hence, he
chooses tell. In other words, Guy takes pleasure in sticking it to Orlando for turn-
ing him in.
Now consider Orlando’s two final decision nodes. For the path kidnap S tell
dirty secret S release, Orlando’s payoff is 1 from telling the police (as that action
induces Guy to spill the beans about Orlando) and 2 from keeping quiet. Thus,
Orlando chooses do not tell police. For the path kidnap S do not tell dirty secret S
release, Orlando’s payoff is 4 from telling the police about Guy and only 2 from
protecting Guy, so he chooses tell police. (In the latter situation, Guy can’t retaliate
against Orlando, so Orlando has no incentive to keep quiet.) The game now looks
like that in the figure below. Examining the final decision nodes, Guy should release
Orlando when Orlando told Guy his dirty secret, and should kill him when he did
not. Thus, the payoff to Orlando from baring his soul to Guy is 2, as it results in
Guy’s releasing him, and his payoff from keeping quiet is 0, as then Guy kills him.
Hence, Orlando chooses tell dirty secret.
Finally, at the initial decision node, Guy chooses kidnap, since it means a payoff
of 5 (associated with Orlando telling Guy his dirty secret, Guy releasing Orlando,
and Orlando keeping his mouth shut about Guy). The unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium is (kidnap/release/kill/tell) for Guy and (tell dirty secret/do not tell
police/tell police) for Orlando.
Guy
Do not
kidnap Kidnap
Orlando
Guy 3
Orlando 5 Tell dirty Do not tell
secret dirty secret
Guy Guy
Kill Release Kill Release
4 5 4 1
0 2 0 4
6. In 1842, the Sangamo Journal of Springfield, Illinois, published letters that criticized James
Shields, the auditor of the State of Illinois. Although the letters were signed “Rebecca,”
Shields suspected that it was state legislator Abraham Lincoln who penned the letters.
As shown in the figure on page 300, Shields considered challenging Lincoln to a duel,
and, as history records, Shields did challenge Lincoln. In response to a challenge,
Lincoln could avoid the duel, or, if he chose to meet Shields’s challenge, he had the right
to choose the weapons. We will also allow Lincoln to decide whether to offer an apology
of sorts. (Actually, it proved to be a bit more complicated than that, so allow me some
poetic license here. An “apology of sorts” means making some remarks that could
provide an honorable retreat for Shields—something which Lincoln ultimately did.)
If he decides to go forward with a duel, then Lincoln has four choices: propose guns,
propose guns and offer an apology, propose swords, and propose swords and offer an
apology. (Shields was known to be a good shot, so Lincoln chose cavalry broadswords
of the largest size, as it gave the 6-foot, 4-inch Lincoln a sizable advantage against the
much shorter Shields.) In response to any of the four choices, Shields must decide to
either go forward with the duel or stop the duel. (In the latter case, Shields accepts
Lincoln’s apology if, indeed, Lincoln offered one.) Find all subgame perfect Nash
equilibria. As a closing note, Lincoln once said, “If all the good things I have ever done
are remembered as long and as well as my scrape with Shields, it is plain I shall not
be forgotten.”
Lincoln–Shields Duel
Shields 5 Shields
Do not challenge 6 Lincoln
Challenge
Lincoln
Avoid Guns Guns Swords Swords

& apology & apology
Shields
10
1
Stop Go Stop Go Stop Go Stop Go
0 8 6 8 0 2 6 2
5 2 4 2 5 3 4 3
ANSWER: Begin with Shields’s final four decision nodes. If Lincoln proposes guns,
then Shields will go forward with the duel, as his payoff is 8, while it is 0 if he were
to back down. If Lincoln proposes guns with an apology, then Shields still goes
forward with the duel, as his payoff is 8 again, while it is 6 if he were to back down.
If Lincoln proposes swords, then Shields will go forward with the duel as his payoff
is 2, while it is 0 if he were to back down. (These payoffs obviously reflect the great
loss in honor by backing down without an apology from Lincoln.) Finally, if
Lincoln proposes swords but with an apology, then Shields will stop the duel and
accept the apology as the payoff is 6, while it is 2 if he were to actually battle
Lincoln using swords. Substituting that part of the game with the associated pay-
offs derived using backward induction, the game is as shown in the following figure.
Shields 5 Shields
Do not challenge 6 Lincoln
Challenge
Lincoln
Avoid Guns Guns Swords Swords

& apology & apology
10 8 8 2 6
1 2 2 3 4
Lincoln chooses between his five choices in the event that Shields has chal-
lenged him to a duel. Lincoln’s optimal choice is to accept the challenge, propose
that they use swords, and offer an apology. In response to that choice, Shields will
accept the apology and the duel will be avoided, which means a payoff of 4 for
Lincoln. If he makes any of the other three choices that involve going forward with
the duel, his payoff is no higher than 3, as the duel will commence. Avoiding the
duel is even worse, with a payoff of 1. Moving up to Shields’s initial decision node,
his payoff is 5 from not challenging Lincoln and is 6 from doing so (as he recog-
nizes that Lincoln will offer an apology—and propose that they use swords—and
Shields will optimally accept the apology). Thus, Shields challenges Lincoln. The
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile is then challenge/go/go/go/stop
for Shields and swords and apology for Lincoln.
7. An infamous event that came to be known as the Saturday Night Massacre took place during
the second term of the presidential administration of Richard Nixon. Though no one was
fired upon, many were effectively fired from their high-level positions in the federal govern-
ment. The Nixon White House was in the midst of covering up crimes committed by close
aides to the president. As part of the investigation, Attorney General Elliot Richardson (who
was not part of the cover-up) named Harvard Law professor Archibald Cox as a special
prosecutor. During the investigation, President Nixon was acutely concerned with Cox’s
investigation and contemplated ordering Richardson to fire Cox (expressed as the initial
decision node in the figure on page 301. When Nixon’s intent was expressed to Richardson,
the latter conveyed that if he did fire Cox, he might feel compelled to resign, but also that he
might be inclined not to fire Cox and, in that case, might also resign. Richardson’s four pos-
sible combinations of firing Cox or not and resigning or not are depicted in the extensive
Saturday Night Massacre

Nixon 2
Do not order
Richardson 12 Nixon
Ruckelshaus 12
Order
Richardson
Do not fire & Do not fire &

Resign Do not resign
Fire & Fire &
Resign Do not
resign
Ruckelshaus Nixon
11 12
2 1
Do not fire & 6 5
Resign
Fire & Do not fire & Do not fire
Fire & Do not Do not resign Fire
Resign resign
6 9 10 5
10 6 5 8
10 4 2 9 Ruckelshaus
1
11
Do not fire & Do not fire & 11
Resign Do not resign
Fire & Fire &
Resign Do not
resign
4 7 8 3
9 4 3 7
8 3 1 7
form. If Richardson did choose to resign and not fire Cox, then Nixon would still be left with
the matter of getting rid of Cox. And if Richardson chose not to fire Cox and did not resign,
then Nixon would have to decide whether to fire Richardson. Upon Richardson’s departure,
Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus would assume the position of acting attorney
general and would face the same four options as Richardson. If Ruckelshaus also chose to
resign and not fire Cox, then Solicitor General Robert Bork would become acting attorney
general, and again, he would have the same four choices. To simplify matters, we’ll not
model Bork, even though what happened was that Richardson refused to fire Cox and
resigned and Ruckelshaus did the same, at which point Bork came in and did fire Cox and
did not resign. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
ANSWER: Let us begin with the choices of Ruckelshaus. If Richardson chooses

not to fire Cox and resigns, then Ruckelshaus’s optimal action is also to not fire
Cox and resign. If Richardson chooses not to fire Cox but does not resign and is
fired by Nixon, then again Ruckelshaus’s optimal action is also to not fire Cox and
resign. Moving to Nixon’s decision node associated with the decision of whether or
not to fire Richardson, Nixon realizes that if he fires Richardson, then Ruckelshaus
will come in and still not fire Cox. Nixon’s payoff is only 4, but that is higher from
not firing Richardson, which is only 1, as it means Cox remains as special prosecu-
tor. At Richardson’s decision node, he can either not fire Cox and resign and get a
payoff of 10 (as Ruckelshaus will act similarly), fire Cox and resign and get a pay-
off of 2, fire Cox and not resign and get a payoff of 1, or not fire Cox and not resign
and get a payoff of 9 (as Nixon will fire Richardson and then Ruckelshaus will not
fire Cox and resign). Thus, Richardson optimally does not fire Cox and resigns.
Finally, at the initial decision node, Nixon can order Cox to be fired and receive a
payoff of 6 (as both Richardson and then Ruckelshaus respond by not firing Cox
and resigning) or not place the order and get a lowly payoff of 1. Thus, Nixon
orders Richardson to fire Cox. The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
Nixon is order Cox to be fired/fire Richardson, for Richardson it is do not fire and
resign, and for Ruckelshaus it is do not fire and resign/do not fire and resign.1
8. Seven goblins are deciding how to split 100 galleons. The goblins are named Alguff,
Bogrod, Eargit, Griphook, Knadug, Ragnuk, and Uric, and they’ve been rank-ordered in
terms of magical power, with Alguff the weakest and Uric the strongest. The game starts
with Alguff, who proposes an allocation of the 100 galleons coins, where an allocation
is an assignment of an amount from {0,1, . . . , 100} to each goblin and where the sum
across goblins equals 100. All goblins then vote simultaneously, either “yea” or “nay,” on
the allocation. If at least half of them vote in favor of the allocation, then it is made and
the game is over. If less than half vote for the proposed allocation, then the other goblins
perform a spell on Alguff and transform him into a house elf for a week. In that event,
it is Bogrod’s turn to put forth an allocation for the remaining six goblins. Again, if at
least half vote in favor, the allocation is made; if not, then Bogrod is made into a house
elf for a week and it is Eargit’s turn. This procedure continues until either an allocation
receives at least half of the votes of the surviving goblins or all but Uric have been trans-
formed into house elfs, in which case Uric gets the 100 galleons. Assume that the payoff
to a goblin is 1,000 if he is made into a house elf and that it equals the number of galleons
if he is not. Using the solution concept of SPNE, what happens? (Focus on subgame
perfect Nash equilibria in which a goblin votes against an allocation if he is indifferent
between voting for it and against it.)
ANSWER: Suppose the first five proposals have been rejected, so only Ragnuk and
Uric are left. Ragnuk should then propose that he get all 100 of the galleons and
then vote for his proposal. Even if Uric votes against it, the proposal receives at
least half of the votes and thus is approved. Ragnuk’s payoff is 100, while Uric’s is 0.
This and the ensuing equilibrium proposals are shown in the table below. Now
suppose that the first four proposals have been rejected, so it is Knadug’s turn to
propose. If he offers 1 to Uric, then Uric will vote for it as he knows that if it is
rejected then he’ll get 0 in the next round since Ragnuk will propose that he gets
it all. Offering 0 to both Uric and Ragnuk means the proposal will be rejected.
Thus, the most that Knadug can get while having his allocation accepted is 99.
Thus, the equilibrium proposal is (99, 0, 1).
1
This game is based on the Saturday Night Massacre game in Douglas Muzzio, Watergate Games: Strategies, Choices,
and Outcomes, New York: New York University Press, 1982.
Now suppose three proposals have been rejected, so it is Griphook’s turn. If he offers
1 to Ragnuk, then Ragnuk will vote for it. That is enough votes to get the proposal
approved and it delivers a payoff of 99 to Griphook. Offering instead 0 to all three of the
other goblins results in the proposal being rejected. Also note that Griphook would have
to offer 2 to induce Uric to vote for it. Thus, the equilibrium proposal is (99, 0, 1, 0).
Now suppose two proposals have been rejected, so it is Eargit’s turn. He needs to
convince two other goblins to vote for his proposal. This can be accomplished by
offering 1 to Knadug and 1 to Uric. The equilibrium proposal is (98, 0, 1, 0, 1). Now
suppose one proposal has been rejected, so that it is Bogrod’s turn. He needs two
other votes, so he offers 1 to Griphook and 1 to Ragnuk. The equilibrium proposal is
(98, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0). Finally, when Alguff proposes, he needs three other votes, so he offers
1 a piece to Eargit, Knadug, and Uric. The winning proposal is then (97, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1).2
Proposer
Ragnuk Knadug Griphook Eargit Bogrod Alguff
Alguff - - - - - 97
Bogrod - - - - 98 0
Eargit - - - 98 0 1
Goblin
Griphook - - 99 0 1 0
Knadug - 99 0 1 0 1
Ragnuk 100 0 1 0 1 0
Uric 0 1 0 1 0 1
9. Consider the four-player game displayed below. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
1
a1 b1 c1
2 3 4
a2 b2 a3 b3 a4 b4
1 1
6 0 4 1
1 4 1 3
d1 e1 d1 e1 2 2 2 1
3 1 3 0
3 2 1 5
4 1 2 4
1 3 3 0
1 2 1 0
2
This game is a version of the Pirates game, which can be found in Ian Stewart, “Mathematical Recreations,” Scientific
American, May 1999, pp. 98–99.
ANSWER: Start with the final decision nodes for player 1. If player 1 chose a1 and
player 2 chose a2, then player 1 will optimally choose d1. If player 1 chose a1 and
player 2 chose b2, then player 1 will optimally choose e1. Substituting the derived
payoffs, the game is now as shown in the following figure.
1
a1 b1 c1
2 3 4
a2 b2 a3 b3 a4 b4
3 5 6 0 4 1
4 4 1 4 1 3
1 0 2 2 2 1
1 0 3 1 3 0
Examining player 2, both a2 and b2 produce a payoff of 4, so either strategy is opti-

mal. At player 3’s decision node, both a3 and b3 produce a payoff of 2, so either strategy
is optimal. At player 4’s decision node, a4 is preferred. When there are multiple
optimal actions, one has to consider each of them in turn in order to derive all sub-
game perfect Nash equilibria. There are four situations to consider corresponding to
the four combinations of player 2 choosing a2 and b2 and player 3 choosing a3 and b3.
Suppose player 2 chooses a2 and player 3 chooses a3 . Player 1 is then faced with
the game in the figure below, in which case her optimal move is b1 . The subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium is (b1/d1/e1, a2, a3, a4 ).
1
a1 b1 c1
3 6 4
4 1 1
1 2 2
1 3 3
Suppose player 2 chooses b2 and player 3 chooses a3. Player 1 is then faced with
the game in the following figure, in which case her optimal move is again b1 . The
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (b1/d1/e1, b2, a3, a4 ).
a1 b1 c1
5 6 4
4 1 1
0 2 2
0 3 3
Suppose player 2 chooses a2 and player 3 chooses b3. Player 1 is then faced with
the game in the following top figure, in which case her optimal move is now c1 .
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (c1/d1/e1, a2, b3, a4 ).
1
a1 b1 c1
3 0 4
4 4 1
1 2 2
1 1 3
Suppose player 2 chooses b2 and player 3 chooses b3. Player 1 is then faced with
the game in the following bottom figure, in which case her optimal move is now
a1 . The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (a1/d1/e1, b2, b3, a4 ).
1
a1 b1 c1
5 0 4
4 4 1
0 2 2
0 1 3
10. Their rich uncle left 100 pounds of gold to Todd and Steven. The negotiating process for
allocating the treasure between them was also laid out in their uncle’s will. They have
three rounds by which to come to an agreement. In an odd (even) round, Todd (Steven)
is required to propose an allocation. (Isn’t it clever how Todd moves in odd rounds and
Steven moves in even rounds?) In response to a proposal, the other nephew can accept
or reject it. If he accepts the proposal, the process is ended and the proposed allocation
is made. If he rejects the proposal, the game moves to the next round. Failure to agree by
the end of the third round means that all of the gold goes to charity, so none of it lands
in the pockets of Todd and Steven. Furthermore, at the end of each round in which an
agreement has not been reached, a fraction 1 d of the allotment of gold is given to char-
ity, where 0 d 1. Thus, there are 100d pounds of gold at the beginning of round 2
(after an agreement was not reached in the first round) and only 100d2 pounds of gold at
the beginning of round 3 (after an agreement was not reached in the first two rounds). In
other words, there is a cost to delaying agreement and, of course, a cost to failing to
agree. Each nephew’s payoff equals the number of pounds of gold he ends up with, so
neither cares about the other or about their uncle’s favorite charity. For notational pur-
poses, assume that a proposal in round t is a value for xi, where xi is the share of the
remaining amount of gold for Todd and, therefore, Steven’s share is 1 xi. Note that
0 xi 1 and thus is any number between 0 and 1 inclusive. Find an SPNE.
ANSWER: This game is known as the alternating offer model.3

Round 3 game: Recall that the amount of gold at this point is 100d2 , so if Todd
proposes that he gets a share x3 , then, if Steven accepts, Todd’s payoff is 100d2x3
and Steven’s payoff is 100d2 (1 x3 ).
Stage 2: Steven should accept all offers. He strictly prefers to accept when
x3 1 as then his payoff is 100d2 (1 x3 ), which is better than the zero
payoff from rejecting. When x3 1, Steven gets a zero payoff whether or
not he accepts, but we’ve assumed that he accepts when indifferent. Hence,
backward induction implies that Steven accepts all offers in round 3.
Stage 1: Todd should propose x3 1. Since Steven accepts all offers,
Todd’s payoff from proposing x3 is 100d2x3, which is maximized by x3 1.
Backward induction implies that Todd sets x3 1.
Round 2 game: If the game moves to round 3, Todd’s payoff is 100d2 and Steven’s
payoff is 0, since backward induction implies that Todd proposes he gets the entire
allocation and Steven accepts. At the start of round 2, the amount of gold is 100d,
so if Steven proposes x2, then, if Todd accepts, Steven’s payoff is 100d (1 x2 ) and
Todd’s payoff is 100dx2.
Stage 2: Todd will accept Steven’s proposal if and only if 100dx2 100d2
since Todd can always earn a payoff of 100d2 by rejecting the offer and mov-
ing to the final round. Dividing both sides of that inequality by 100d, we have
that Todd accepts Steven’s proposal when x2 d and rejects it otherwise.
Stage 1: Steven should propose x2 d, which will generate a payoff of
100d(1 d). If x2 d, then the proposal is accepted and Steven’s payoff
is 100d(1 x2 ). If x2 d, then the proposal is rejected and, according to
the equilibrium payoffs derived for the round 3 game, Steven’s payoff is 0.
He should then make the minimum proposal that will be accepted by Todd.
Round 1 game: If the game moves to round 2, Todd’s payoff is 100d2 and Steven’s
payoff is 100d(1 d), since backward induction implies that Steven proposes Todd
gets a share d of the remaining 100d pounds of gold and Todd accepts that proposal.
Stage 2: As Steven’s payoff is 100d(1 d) from rejecting, he should accept

Todd’s proposal of x1 if and only if
100(1 x1 ) 100d(1 d) 1 1 x1 d(1 d) 1 1 d(1 d) x1.
Thus, Steven should accept if and only if x1 1 d(1 d).
3
The classic paper on the alternating offer model is Ariel Rubinstein, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,”
Econometrica, 50 (1982), 97–110.
Stage 1: Todd should propose x1 1 d(1 d). When x1 1 d(1 d),

Todd’s offer is accepted and he earns 100x1. When x1 d(1 d), Steven
rejects the offer and his payoff is 100d2. It is preferable to offer the maxi-
mum share that is accepted if and only if
10031 d(1 d) 4 100d2 1 1 d d2 d2 1 1 d
which is indeed true. Hence, Todd should propose that his share of the
initial 100 pounds of gold is d(1 d) and Steven will accept this proposal.
Pulling all this together, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile is:
Strategy for Todd:
In round 1, propose x1 1 d(1 d).
In round 2, accept if and only if x2 d.
In round 3, propose x3 1.
Strategy for Steven:
In round 1, accept if and only if x1 1 d(1 d).
In round 2, propose x2 d.
In round 3, accept all proposals.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is Todd proposes 1 d(1 d) in

the first round and Steven accepts. There is no delay in reaching an agreement.
11. Consider the following passage from Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil:4
There’s a woman here, a grande dame at the very apex of society and one of the richest
people in the Southeast, let alone Savannah. She owns a copper mine. She built a big
house in an exclusive part of town, a replica of a famous Louisiana plantation house
with huge white columns and curved stairs. You can see it from the water. Everybody
goes ‘Oooo, look!” when they pass by it. I adore her. She’s been like a mother to me. But
she’s the cheapest woman who ever lived! Some years ago she ordered a pair of iron
gates for her house. They were designed and built especially for her. But when they were
delivered she pitched a fit, said they were horrible, said they were filth. “Take them
away,” she said, “I never want to see them again!” Then she tore up the bill, which was
for $1,400—a fair amount of money in those days. The foundry took the gates back, but
they didn’t know what to do with them. After all, there wasn’t much demand for a pair
of ornamental gates exactly that size. The only thing they could do was to sell the iron
for its scrap value. So they cut the price from $1,400 to $190. Naturally, the following
day the woman sent a man over to the foundry with $190, and today those gates are
hanging on her gateposts where they were originally designed to go. That’s pure
Savannah. And that’s what I mean by cheap. You mustn’t be taken in by the moonlight
and magnolias. There’s more to Savannah than that. Things can get very murky.
Using backward induction, can you explain where the foundry went wrong?
ANSWER: Once the foundry built the pair of custom iron gates, the value to the
foundry if the grande dame did not buy them was nothing more than their value as
scrap. Thus, the foundry would be willing to sell them for any price at least as great
as their scrap value. The foundry failed to realize that once the gates were built, its
bargaining position was seriously weakened. They should have written a contract that
either required payment prior to the gates’ construction or that specified that if the
grande dame did not make the payment of $1,400 upon delivery, then the foundry
would destroy them. With that latter contract, after the gates were built, the grande
dame’s choices would be to not have the gates or pay the $1,400 and have the gates.
Presuming the latter is preferred, the foundry would receive payment. With either of
these contracts, the negotiations are done upfront before the foundry builds the gates;
at that point, the parties’ bargaining powers are comparable. Without a contract and
once the gates are built, it is the grande dame who has much of the bargaining power.
4
John Berendt, Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 10. Quoted on the back
cover of the Journal of Political Economy, 107 (1999), no. 1.
12. The haggling game from Chapter 2 is reproduced here. Solve for all subgame perfect
Nash equilibria for which a player chooses accept whenever that is an optimal action.
That is, if a player’s payoff is maximized by either choosing accept or choosing some
other action, he or she chooses accept.
Haggling at the Auto Dealer

Marcus
pL pM pH
Donna Donna Donna
Accept Reject
Marcus 0 0
A pL Leave A pL pM Leave
Donna 0
Marcus Marcus Marcus

0 0
0 0 0
A R A R
A pM
0 0 0
0 0 0
Donna
0
A R
0
0 0
ANSWER: The strategy template for Marcus is:

At initial node, then
If Marcus proposed pM and Donna rejected and proposed pL, then
If Marcus proposed pH and Donna rejected and proposed pL, then
If Marcus proposed pH and Donna rejected and proposed pM , then
The strategy template for Donna is:
If Marcus proposed pL, then
If Marcus proposed pM , then
If Marcus proposed pH, then
If Marcus proposed pH and Donna rejected and proposed pL and Marcus
rejected and proposed pM , then
When we state a player’s strategy as a 4-tuple of actions, the sequence of those
actions will correspond with the sequence just given.
At the decision node in which Marcus proposed pL, Donna’s optimal action is
to accept the offer.
At the decision node in which Marcus proposed pM and Donna rejected his
proposal and proposed pL, Marcus gets a zero payoff from either accepting or
rejecting Donna’s proposal. Thus, we presume he accepts it, so the payoffs associ-
ated with Marcus proposing pM are zero for Marcus and pM pL for Donna.
At the decision node in which Marcus proposed pH, Donna rejected and pro-
posed pL, and Marcus rejected and proposed pM, Donna is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting pM. Thus, we suppose she chooses to accept it. At the
decision node in which Marcus proposed pH and Donna rejected and proposed pL,
Marcus optimally chooses to reject pL and propose pM as he gets a payoff of
2(pM pL ) from doing so (which presumes that Donna will accept Marcus’s offer)
and a payoff of 0 from accepting Donna’s proposal of pL.
At the decision node in which Marcus proposed pH and Donna rejected and
proposed pM , Marcus optimally accepts pM .
With that derived behavior, we can now examine the decision node in which
Marcus proposed pH. Donna has four choices: (1) if she accepts, her payoff is
pM pH 0; (2) if she rejects and proposes pL, then Marcus rejects and proposes
pM and Donna accepts, so her payoff is zero; (3) if she rejects and proposes pM, then
Marcus accepts and her payoff is zero; and (4) if she chooses to leave, her payoff is
zero. The last three choices all produce a zero payoff, which is superior to accepting
the proposal. Thus, there are (at least) three subgame perfect Nash equilibria; they
differ in terms of Donna’s strategy at the decision node in which Marcus proposed pH.
Suppose that if Marcus proposed pH, Donna’s strategy has her reject it and
propose pL. The game faced by Marcus at the initial node is then as shown in the
figure below. Marcus optimally proposes pH. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
Marcus: Propose pH/Accept/Reject and propose pM /Accept.
Donna: Accept/Reject and propose pL/Reject and propose pL/Accept.
Marcus
pL pM pH
0 0 2(pM pL)
pM pL pM pL 0
Suppose that if Marcus proposed pH, Donna’s strategy has her reject it and pro-
pose pM. The game faced by Marcus at the initial node is still that shown in the above
figure. Marcus optimally proposes pH. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
Marcus: Propose pH/Accept/Reject and propose pM /Accept.
Donna: Accept/Reject and propose pL/Reject and propose pM /Accept.
Suppose that if Marcus proposed pH , Donna’s strategy has her leave. The
game faced by Marcus at the initial node is then as shown in the figure below. Any
Marcus
pL pM pH
0 0 0
pM pL pM pL 0
of the three prices are optimal for Marcus. There are then three subgame perfect
Nash equilibria:
(1) Marcus: Propose pL/Accept/Reject and propose pM /Accept.
Donna: Accept/Reject and propose pM /Leave/Accept.
(2) Marcus: Propose pM /Accept/Reject and propose pM /Accept.
(3) Marcus: Propose pH/Accept/Reject and propose pM /Accept.
13. A scientist works in a lab with four summer interns and, as it is the end of the summer,
he anticipates the head of the lab will ask him which of them he wants to retain. In terms
of quality, the scientist and the head of the lab agree that intern A is better than intern B
who is better than intern C who is better than intern D. The scientist would like to keep
as many interns as possible and, given any number, the highest-quality ones. However,
due to funding restrictions, the head of the lab wants to limit the number of interns that
are retained. The head of the lab initially tells the scientist to select two interns to retain.
After the scientist chooses two interns, the head of the lab decides whether to allow the
scientist to retain a third intern. Thus, the sequence of moves is: 1) the scientist chooses
two interns (both of whom are then retained); 2) the head of the lab decides either to
allow the scientist to choose a third or not; and possibly 3) if the head of the lab chose to
allow the scientist to retain a third intern, the scientist chooses a third intern to retain.
There are 10 possible outcomes in terms of the number of interns that are retained at the
end of the game (two or three) and who they are. These outcomes and the associated
payoffs for the head of the lab and the scientist are shown in the accompanying table.
a. Write down the extensive form of the game (though you can exclude payoffs) and
describe what a strategy looks like for the scientist, and for the head of the lab.
ANSWER: This exercise is based on the strategizing of Dr. Gregory House (“scien-
tist”) with respect to hospital administrator Dr. Lisa Cuddy (“head of the lab”). In
an episode entitled “Games” from the television series House, House is told by Cuddy
to choose two of the resident fellows from among the four he currently has, who are
Amber, Kutner, Taub, and Thirteen. House wants to keep as many as possible and fires
the two women—Amber (or, as he likes to call her, “cutthroat bitch”) and Thirteen—
after which Cuddy insists that House keeps at least one woman on his team. She
then allows him to hire back one of those fired and he chooses Thirteen. In our
example, B and D are the two male fellows—Taub and Kutner—and A is Thirteen.
House
AB AC AD BC BD CD
Cuddy
Third? Third?
Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
yes no
House
6 5 3 4 2 1
10 9 7 8 4 2
C D B D B C A D A C A B
House 10 9 10 8 9 8 10 7 9 7 8 7
Cuddy 6 5 6 7 5 3 6 1 5 1 3 1
A is Thirteen B is Taub
C is Amber D is Kutner
For the scientist, there are seven information sets in which case a strategy is a
7-tuple of actions. There is the initial node—at which an intern pair is selected (of
which there are six possible pairs)—and there is an information set associated
with having selected an intern pair and the head of the lab having decided to allow
the scientist to choose a third intern. There are six of those latter information sets
as there are six possible intern pairs that could have been selected. At each of those
information sets, the scientist selects among the two interns that have not yet been
retained. The head of the lab has six information sets—corresponding to the six
possible intern pairs selected by the scientist at the first stage—and, for each of
them, she must decide whether or not to allow the selection of a third intern.
b. What does SPNE predict as to whether the scientist ends up with two or three
interns? Which interns are selected? (Hint: Watch the episode entitled “Games” from
the fourth season of the television series House.)
Interns retained Payoff–Head of Lab Payoff–Scientist

A, B 10 6
A, C 9 5
A, D 7 3
B, C 8 4
B, D 4 2
C, D 2 1
A, B, C 6 10
A, B, D 5 9
A, C, D 3 8
B, C, D 1 7
ANSWER: If the scientist chooses AB, AC, AD, or BC then he will not get a third
position because the head of the lab prefers each of those pairs to the addition of
any third member. If he chooses BD then the chair will give him a third position
knowing the scientist will use it to choose A; note the head of the lab prefers ABD
to BD. If the scientist chooses CD then again the head of the lab will give him a
third position knowing the scientist will use it to choose A, and the head of the lab
prefers ACD to CD. Since the scientist prefers ABD to ACD, he’ll choose BD and
end up with ABD, and that is preferable to any pair of interns. The SPNE outcome
then has the scientist choose B and D in the first round, the head of the lab permit-
ting the selection of a third intern, and the scientist then choosing intern A. The
unique SPNE is: scientist chooses BD at the initial node and (reading his informa-
tion sets from left to right) C, B, B, A, A, A; while the head of the lab’s strategy is
(reading her information sets from left to right) no, no, no, no, yes, yes.
14. An instructor for a class that meets on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays announces
on Friday that there will be a pop quiz next week. The students have to decide what day
to study. In terms of performance, it is best to study the evening before the pop quiz.
Thus, on each of the evenings before the possible day of the quiz, students decide
whether or not to study. (Note that a student may end up studying more than one eve-
ning if at first she thinks the test is on, say, Wednesday and thus studies Tuesday evening,
but it turns out the quiz is on Friday in which case she’ll study Thursday evening as well.)
The instructor, who is an unpleasant sort, wants to minimize students’ grades and thus
would most like to have it on a day when the students did not study the evening before.
Everything else the same, he prefers to give it earlier in the week. Find the SPNE.
ANSWER: If there has not been a pop quiz on Monday or Wednesday then the
instructor must give it on Friday. Hence, students should study Thursday evening. If
there has not been a pop quiz on Monday then the instructor knows if he does not
give it on Wednesday then students will know it will be given on Friday and hence
will have studied for it on Thursday evening. The instructor then prefers to give it on
Wednesday than not, since either students studied Tuesday evening in which case
whether the quiz is given on Wednesday or Friday students will have studied for it
(and the instructor prefers to give it earlier in the week), or they did not study
Tuesday evening in which case the quiz on Wednesday is better as it catches the stu-
dent unprepared. Thus, if the quiz was not given on Monday then students will know
it’ll be given on Wednesday which implies the students will study Tuesday evening.
Now suppose it is Monday. If the instructor does not give the quiz on Monday, stu-
dents will know it’ll be given on Wednesday and thus study Tuesday evening. Hence,
the instructor prefers to give it on Monday. The SPNE then has the instructor give the
quiz at each of his decision nodes, which means on Monday, on Wednesday if he did
not give it on Monday, and Friday if he did not give it on Monday or Wednesday. The
SPNE strategy for a student is to study at each of her decision nodes, which means
on Sunday evening, on Tuesday evening if the quiz was not given on Monday, and on
Thursday evening it if was not given on Monday or Wednesday. The SPNE outcome
is for students to study Sunday evening and for the quiz to be given on Monday.
15. In the opening sequence of the film Raiders of the Lost Ark, Indiana Jones is at the
Temple of the Chachagoyan Warriors and holds the golden idol of which he was in
search. He and his not-to-be-trusted assistant Satipo are in the sacred cave on either side
of a wide cavernous pit. The escape route is on Satipo’s side and Indy needs Satipo to
toss him his whip so that he can wrap it around a beam above the pit and swing to the
other side. At the same time, a thick stone slab is gradually closing behind Satipo and,
once shut, will cut off their escape route. Satipo says to Indy: “No time to argue. Throw
me the idol, I throw you the whip.” Indy hesitates, which causes Satipo’s tone to become
frantic: “You have no choice! Hurry!” Not seeing any alternative, Indy tosses him the
idol. Satipo tucks the idol away and says to Indy: “Adios, amigo!” In modeling this situ-
ation, Indy is deciding whether or not to throw the idol and, in response to what Indy
does, Satipo is deciding whether or not to throw the whip. As soon as the whip is thrown,
the game is over as both escape with Indy having the idol. If Indy has thrown the idol
and Satipo keeps the whip then the game ends as Satipo departs with the idol. At some
point, the game ends because the stone slab has closed the exit. The extensive form is in
the accompanying figure. Using SPNE, does Indy escape?
Temple of the Chachagoyan Warriors

Indi a na Jones
Throw idol Retain idol
S a ti po S a ti po
Throw Retain Throw Retain

whip whip whip whip
Indiana Jones 4 1 4 IJ
Satipo 7 8 7
TI RI
S S
TW RW TW RW
IJ
4 1 4
7 8 7 TI RI
S S
TW RW TW RW
3 1 3 2
5 8 5 6
ANSWER: By backward induction, there are two SPNE. Both SPNE have Indiana
Jones using strategy RI/RI/RI. One SPNE has Satipo using strategy RW/TW/RW/
TW/RW/RW and the other has him using RW/RW/RW/TW/RW/RW. The first SPNE
has Indy retaining the idol at the first decision node and Satipo immediately throw-
ing the whip. The second SPNE has Indy initially retaining the idol, Satipo initially
retaining the whip, Indy still retaining the idol, and then Satipo tossing the whip.
16. It is Halloween evening and Nick and Rachel have just returned home after trick-or-
treating. They have been dividing up the candy and are now down to four candy bars:
Snickers, Milky Way, Kit Kat, and Baby Ruth. The allocation procedure is that Nick gets
to choose one of the four candy bars, then Rachel can choose one of the three remaining
candy bars, then Nick chooses one of the two remaining candy bars, and finally Rachel
gets the remaining candy bar. Nick’s preferences are that he most likes Snickers (assign-
ing it a payoff of 5) then Milky Way (payoff of 4), then Kit Kat (payoff of 3), and lastly
Baby Ruth (payoff of 1). Rachel most likes Milky Way (payoff of 6), then Kit Kat (payoff
of 5), then Baby Ruth (payoff of 4), and finally Snickers (payoff of 2). Using SPNE, how
are the candy bars allocated between Nick and Rachel?
ANSWER: In their second choice, a person will choose what is most preferred in
terms of what remains. For each possible pair of initial choices, the table below
states the optimal second round choices of Nick and Rachel along with their pay-
offs for the game.
Nick–1st Rachel–2nd Nick–3rd Rachel–4th Nick’s payoff Rachel’s payoff

S M K B 8 10
S K M B 9 9
S B M K 9 9
M S K B 7 6
M K S B 9 9
M B S K 9 9
K S M B 7 6
K M S B 8 10
K B S M 8 10
B S M K 5 7
B M S K 6 11
B K S M 6 11
If Nick chose Snickers in stage 1 then Rachel can choose either Milky Way, Kit Kat,
or Baby Ruth. If she chooses Milky Way then, as stated in the table, Nick will choose
Kit Kat which leaves Rachel with Baby Ruth. Thus, Rachel’s payoff is 10 from choos-
ing Milky Way (as she ends up with Milky Way and Baby Ruth) in response to Nick
choosing Snickers. By an analogous logic, if she chooses Kit Kat after Nick chooses
Snickers then she ends up with Kit Kat and Baby Ruth with a payoff of 9; and if she
chooses Baby Ruth then she again ends up with Kit Kat and Baby Ruth with a payoff
of 9. Hence, if Nick chooses Snickers then Rachel’s best choice is Milky Way. Now
consider Nick having chosen Milky Way in stage 1. Rachel’s payoff is 6 from Snickers
and 9 from either Kit Kat or Baby Ruth, so she’ll choose either Kit Kat or Baby Ruth.
If Nick chose Kit Kat in stage 1 then Rachel should choose Baby Ruth or Milky Way
in stage 2 and get a payoff of 10. Finally, if Nick chose Baby Ruth in stage 1 then
Rachel should choose Milky Way or Kit Kat in stage 2 and get a payoff of 11.
Having derived how Rachel will respond to each of Nick’s initial choices, let us
derive Nick’s optimal initial choice. If Nick chooses Snickers then he ends up with
Snickers and Kit Kat (as Rachel will respond by choosing Milky Way and then
Nick will choose Kit Kat) which delivers a payoff of 8; if he chooses Milky Way
then he ends up with Milky Way and Snickers and a payoff of 9; if Nick chooses
Kit Kat then he ends up with Kit Kat and Snickers and a payoff of 8; and if Nick
chooses Baby Ruth then he ends up with Baby Ruth and Snickers and a payoff of
6. Thus, Nick optimally chooses Milky Way in stage 1. In sum, Nick ends up with
Milky Way and Snickers, and Rachel takes home Kit Kat and Baby Ruth.
17. Samiyah and DeAndre decide to play the following game. They take turns choosing
either 1, 2, or 3. As each number is chosen, it is added to the previously chosen numbers.
The winner is the player who chooses a number that brings the cumulative number to
10. For example, if Samiyah chooses 3 and DeAndre chooses 2 (so the cumulative num-
ber is 5) and Samiyah chooses 2 and DeAndre chooses 3 then DeAndre wins as his choice
of 3 results in the sum equaling 10. Using SPNE, who wins?
ANSWER: By backward induction, let’s start with 9 as the cumulative number.

Whichever player has the choice (and we can’t say which player it is without speci-
fying how we got to 9) will choose 1 so that the sum is 10. Similarly, if the cumulative
number is 8 then the player will choose 2 and win, and if the cumulative number
is 7 then the player will choose 3 and win. Thus, if the cumulative number is 7, 8,
or 9 then the player whose turn it is to choose wins. Let us next argue that if the
cumulative number is 6 then the player whose turn it is to choose will lose. If he
chooses 1 then the sum will be 7 for the other person who will choose 3 and win; if
he chooses 2 then the sum will be 8 for the other person who will choose 2 and win;
and if he chooses 3 then the sum will be 9 for the other person who will choose 1
and win. Thus, if a player faces a sum of 6 then he loses. It follows that if the player
faces 5, he can ensure victory by choosing 1 so that the other player faces 6; if he
faces 4 then he can ensure victory by choosing 2 so that the other player faces 6;
and if he faces 3 then he can ensure victory by choosing 3 so that the other player
faces 6. Hence, a player who faces 3, 4, or 5 will win. Now suppose a player faces
2. Whether he chooses 1, 2, or 3, the other player will face a winning sum (3, 4, and
5, respectively) in which case the other player wins. Thus, a player who faces 2 will
lose. A player who faces 1 can choose 1 which means the other player faces 2 and
faces 1 can thus will lose. Hence, a player who faces 1 will win. Finally, a player who
faces 0 can choose 2 and thus win. In conclusion, the player who moves first wins.
18. There have been some burglaries in a neighborhood so the residents of the n 2 houses
on the block are each deciding whether to install an alarm system. For a resident, the cost
of installing an alarm system is x 0 and the cost of his or her house being broken into is
y 0. Assume y x y/n. A burglar will decide which house to break into and is able to
determine which houses have alarm systems. The burglar will avoid all homes with an
alarm system and randomly choose to break into one of the houses without an alarm sys-
tem (if any). Thus, if m homes install alarm systems then each of the n m unprotected
homes have a probability of 1/(n m) of being burglarized, which means an expected cost
of (1/(n m)) y. In deciding whether to buy an alarm system, a resident chooses an alarm
system if and only if the cost of the system is less than the expected cost of a burglary. The
residents sequentially decide whether or not to install an alarm system. Resident 1 moves
first and either installs one or doesn’t. After observing what resident 1 did, resident 2 then
decides. After observing what residents 1 and 2 chose, resident 3 decides, and so forth.
a. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
ANSWER: First note that if a resident expects m other homes to install an alarm
system then the expected cost to that resident of not having one is y/(n m) In that
case, an alarm system is optimal if y/(n m) x. Define m* as the smallest number
of homes whereby if that many other homes have alarm systems then a home
without an alarm system wants one as well:
1 1
a by x a by
n m* n m* 1
In explaining the condition, if m* other residents buy a system then the cost from not
1
having one is ( n m* ) y which exceeds the cost of the system so she wants to buy one.
However, if m* 1 other residents buy a system then the cost from not having one is
1
( n m* 1 ) y which is less than the cost of the system so she does not want to buy one.
Consider resident n. If m* or more of the other n 1 residents have bought an
alarm system then it is optimal for resident n to do so; otherwise, not. Consider
resident n 1. If m* or more of the other n 1 residents have bought an alarm
system then it is optimal for resident n 1 to do so, and that is regardless of what
resident n does. If m* 1 residents have bought an alarm system then resident
n 1 prefers not to do so if resident n does not which will indeed be optimal for
resident n if resident n 1 does not have one because there are only m* 1 resi-
dents with systems. If there are fewer than m* 1 residents with systems then
resident n 1 will not buy one since, regardless of what resident n does, there will
be fewer than m* residents with systems. By the same argument, backward induc-
tion has each resident not buying an alarm system. Thus, the SPNE outcome has
no one buying an alarm system. The SPNE strategy profile has a resident buy an
alarm system only if, at the time that the resident is making her choice, at least m*
residents have an alarm system.
b. Find a Nash equilibrium that is not an SPNE.
ANSWER: Consider the strategy profile in which a player buys an alarm system for
all decision nodes; that is, regardless of how many residents have an alarm system at
the time that a resident decides. Given that the other n 1 players are going to buy
an alarm system, a player’s payoff from not buying is y and, given that y x, she
prefers to buy the system. Thus, it is a Nash equilibrium but it is not an SPNE because
all of the SPNE were derived in part (a) and that is not one of them. If we had not
derived the subgame perfect Nash equilibria, we can still argue that it is not an SPNE
by finding one decision node in which prescribed play is not optimal. Consider
player n for the decision node in which none of the n 1 players bought a system.
Player n’s cost from not buying a system is y/n and, given that y/n x, it is optimal for
him not to buy a system, which is contrary to what his strategy prescribes. Thus, his
strategy of buying an alarm system for all decision nodes is not optimal for at least
one decision node and thus violates the condition for a strategy to be part of an SPNE.
19. It is Thursday, which means local handymen Val and Earl have to empty the septic tank
of a neighbor down the road. Neither wants to be the one to connect the hose and turn
on the pump, as there is always a bit of sludge that comes squirting out. As a result, they
engage in what is called mamihlapinatapai in the Yagán language of Tierra del Fuego,
which means: “a look shared by two people with each wishing that the other will initiate
something that both desire but which neither one wants to start” (Wikipedia). The longer
they wait and look at each other, the longer until they can head to Mo’s Tavern and down
a cold Bud. The extensive form in the figure describes the situation they are facing. Using
SPNE, who will turn on the pump?
Val and Earl from “Tremors”

Va l
Do it Stall
Ear l
Val 5
Do it
Earl 10 Stall
Va l
9
Do it Stall
4
Ear l
4
7 Do it Stall
Va l
6
3 Do it Stall
1 0
2 0
ANSWER: Earl will do it, which we’ll derive by backward induction. Starting from
the last decision node in which Val decides either to do it or stall, he finds it is
better to do it (with a payoff of 1) rather than to stall (with a payoff of 0). Turning
to Earl’s last decision node, he finds it is better to do it (with a payoff of 3) than to
stall, which leads to Val doing it and Earl’s payoff is 2. Continuing by backward
induction, we find that at every decision node except for the last one, Val decides
to stall, while Earl chooses to do it at his two decision nodes. The SPNE outcome
is that Val initially stalls and then Earl does it. The SPNE is Val chooses strategy
stall/stall/do it, and Earl’s strategy is do it/do it.
20. Return to the American Idol game in Chapter 4.4. Now suppose that Alicia, Kaitlyn, and
Lauren move sequentially. Lauren decides whether to wear the shirt with the letter A or the
top from Bebe. Having observed Lauren’s choice, Kaitlyn decides whether to wear the shirt
with the letter C or the top from Bebe. Finally, Alicia chooses between wearing the shirt with
the letter E or the Bebe top, while knowing what Lauren and Kaitlyn are wearing. Find the
subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
ANSWER: Consider Alicia’s decision. If both Lauren and Kaitlyn did not choose
the Bebe tops then Alicia’s payoff from not choosing the Bebe top is 2 and from
choosing the Bebe top is 1; hence, Alicia chooses to wear the shirt with the letter
E. If Lauren and/or Kaitlyn are wearing their Bebe tops then Alicia’s payoff from
not choosing the Bebe top is 0 and from choosing the Bebe top is 1; hence, Alicia
chooses to wear her Bebe top. Going up the tree to Kaitlyn’s decision nodes, if
Lauren has chosen to wear the letter A and if Kaitlyn wears the letter C then she
knows that Alicia will optimally respond by wearing E, which delivers a payoff of
2 to Kaitlyn. As that exceeds the payoff she gets from the Bebe top then Kaitlyn
will wear the letter C when Lauren is wearing the letter A. If Lauren is wearing the
Bebe top then Kaitlyn will do so as well. Turning to Lauren’s decision, if she wears
the letter A then, as just derived, Kaitlyn will respond by wearing C and Alicia will
respond by wearing E. Hence, Lauren wears the letter A and gets a payoff of 2.
The SPNE strategy profile is: Lauren wears the shirt with letter A; Kaitlyn wears
the shirt with letter C if Lauren is wearing the shirt with letter A, and wears her
Bebe top if Lauren is wearing her Bebe top; and Alicia wears the shirt with letter
E if Lauren is wearing the shirt with letter A and Kaitlyn is wearing the shirt with
letter C; otherwise, she wears her Bebe top. The SPNE outcome is that they spell
out ACE.
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have taken the food out of it. Much of this water passes out through
the leaves.
You know when you are very warm, you feel a moisture come on
your skin. That was once water in your blood. It creeps out through
tiny pores over all your skin.
The plant skin has such pores. The water goes off through them.
When the plant breathes out this water, then more hurries up through
the cells to take its place. So the sap keeps running up and down all
the time.
Plants not only send out water through the pores of the leaves, but
also a kind of air or gas. If they did not do that, we should soon all be
dead. Can I make that plain to you?
Did you ever hear your mother say, “The air here is bad or close”?
Did you ever see your teacher open a door or a window, to “air” the
schoolroom? If you ask why, you will be told “So many people
breathing here make the air bad.”
How does our breathing make the air bad? When our blood runs
through our bodies it takes up little bits of matter that our bodies are
done with. This stuff makes the blood dark and thick. But soon the
blood comes around to our lungs.
Now as we breathe out, we send into the air the tiny atoms of this
waste stuff. It is carbonic acid gas. As we breathe in, we take from
the fresh air a gas called oxygen. That goes to our lungs, and lo! it
makes the blood fresh and clean, and red once more.
So you can see, that when many people breathe in one room they
will use up all the good clean air. At the same time they will load the
air of the room with the gas they breathe out.
That is why the window is opened. We wish to sweep away the bad
air, and let in good air.
But at this rate, as all men and other animals breathe out carbonic
acid gas, why does not all the air in the world get bad? Why, when
they all use oxygen, do they not use up all the oxygen that is in the
world?
Just here the plants come in to help. Carbonic acid gas is bad for
men, it is food to plants. Oxygen is needed by animals, but plants
want to get rid of it. Animals breathe out a form of carbon and
breathe in oxygen. Plants do just the other thing. They breathe out
oxygen and take in carbonic acid gas.
The air, loaded with this, comes to the plant. At once all the little leaf-
mouths are wide open to snatch out of the air the carbonic acid gas.
And, as the plants are very honest little things, they give where they
take away. They take carbon from the air, and breathe into the air a
little oxygen.
Where did they get that? The air they breathe has both carbon and
oxygen in it. So they keep what they want,—that is, carbon,—and
send out the oxygen.
Now it is only the green part of the plant that does this fine work for
us. It is the green parts, chiefly the leaves, that send out good
oxygen for us to breathe. It is the green leaf that snatches from the
air those gases which would hurt us.
It is the green leaf that changes the harmful form of carbon into good
plant stuff, which is fit for our food. How does it do that? Let us see.
What makes a leaf green? Bobby who crushed a leaf to see, told me
“a leaf was full of green paint.”
Inside the green leaves is a kind of green paste, or jelly. Now it is this
“leaf-green” that does all the work. The “leaf-green” eats up carbon.
The “leaf-green” turns carbon into nice safe plant material. It is “leaf-
green” that sets free good oxygen for us.
“Leaf-green” is a good fairy, living in every little cell in the leaf. Leaf-
green is a fairy which works only in the day-time. Leaf-green likes
the sun. Leaf-green will not work in the dark, but goes to bed and
goes to sleep!
In such simple lessons as these, I can tell you only a little of what is.
The deep “how” and “why” of things I cannot explain. Even the very
wisest men do not know all the how and the why of the “leaf-green”
fairy.
I have told you these few things that you may have wonders to think
of when you see green leaves. After this lesson, will you not care
more for seeds and leaves than you ever did before?
LESSON VIII.
THE COLOR OF PLANTS.
Almost the first thing that you will notice about a plant is its color. The
little child, before it can speak, will hold out its hands for a bright red
rose, or a golden lily. I think the color is one of the most wonderful
things about a plant.
Come into the field. Here you see a yellow buttercup, growing near a
white daisy. Beside them is a red rose. Close by, blooms a great
purple flower. All grow out of the same earth, and breathe the same
air. Yet how they differ in color.
Some flowers have two or three colors upon each petal. Have you
not seen the tulip with its striped blossoms, and the petunias spotted
with white and red?
The flower of the cotton plant changes in color. Within a few days
this flower appears in three distinct hues. The chicory blossom
changes from blue to nearly white as the day grows warm.
Look at your mother’s roses. Some are white, others are red, pink, or
yellow. None are ever blue.
Then look at a wild-rose tree. The root and stem are brown. The
green color is in the leaves, and in some of the stems. The petals
are red. The stamens and pistils are yellow.
You never saw the red color get astray and run into the leaves. The
leaf-green did not lose itself, and travel up to the petals. The
stamens and pistils did not turn brown instead of golden.
Does not that seem a wonder, now that you think of it? Perhaps you
never noticed it before. It is one thing to see things, and another to
notice them so that you think about them.
Here is another fact about color in plants. All summer you see that
the leaves are green. In the autumn they begin to change. You wake
up some fine frosty morning and the tree leaves are all turned red,
yellow, brown, or purple. It is a fine sight.
It is the going away of the leaf-green from the leaf that begins the
change of leaf-color in the fall. The leaves have done growing. Their
stems are hard and woody. They do not breathe as freely as they
did. The sap does not run through them as it did early in the season.
The leaf-green shrinks up in the cells. Or, it goes off to some other
part of the plant. Sometimes part of it is destroyed. Then the leaves
begin to change.
Sometimes a red sap runs into the leaf cells. Or, an oily matter goes
there, in place of the “leaf-green.”
The leaf-green changes color if it gets too much oxygen. In the
autumn the plant does not throw out so much oxygen. What it keeps
turns the leaf-green from green to red, yellow, or brown.
The bright color in plants is not in the flower alone. You have seen
that roots and seeds have quite as bright colors as blossoms. What
flowers are brighter than many fruits are?
The cherry is crimson, or pink, or nearly black. What a fine yellow,
red, purple, we find in plums! Is there any yellow brighter than that of
the Indian corn? Is there a red gayer than you find on the apples you
like so well? What is more golden than a heap of oranges?
If you wish to find splendid color in a part of a plant, look at a water-
melon. The skin is green marked with pale green, or white. Next,
inside, is a rind of pale greenish white. Then comes a soft, juicy,
crimson mass. In that are jet black seeds.
Oh, where does all this color come from? Why is it always just in the
right place? The melon rind does not take the black tint that belongs
to the seeds. The skin does not put on the crimson of the pulp. See,
too, how this color comes slowly, as the melon ripens. At first the
skin is of the same dark green as the leaves, and inside all is of a
greenish white.
Let us try to find out where all this color comes from. Do you know
we ourselves can make changes in the color of flowers? Take one of
those big hydrangeas. It has a pink flower. But give it very rich black
earth to grow in. Mix some alum and iron with the earth. Water it with
strong bluing water. Lay soot and coal-dust upon the earth it grows
in. Very soon your hydrangea will have blue flowers, instead of pink
ones.
Once I had a petunia with large flowers of a dirty white color. I fed it
with soot and coal-dust. I watered it with strong bluing water. After a
few weeks my petunia had red or crimson flowers. Some of the
flowers were of a very deep red. Others were spotted with red and
white.
Now from this you may guess that the plant obtains much of its color
from what it feeds on in the soil.
But you may give the plant very good soil, and yet if you make it
grow in the dark, it will have almost no color. If it lives at all, even the
green leaves will be pale and sickly.
This will show you that the light must act in some way on what the
plant eats, to make the fine color.
The plant, you know, eats minerals from the earth. In its food it gets
little grains of coloring stuff.
But how the color goes to the right place we cannot tell. We cannot
tell why it is, that from the same earth, in the same light, there will be
flowers of many colors. We cannot tell why flowers on the same
plant, or parts of the same flower, will have different colors. That is
one of the secrets and wonders that no one has found out.
There are many plants which store up coloring matter, just as plants
store up starch, or sugar. The indigo, which makes our best blue
dye, comes from a plant. Ask your mother to show you some indigo.
When the plant is soaked in water the coloring stuff sinks to the
bottom of the water, like a blue dust.
Did you ever notice the fine red sumac? That gives a deep yellow
dye. The saffron plant is full of a bright orange color. Other plants
give other dyes.
Sometimes children take the bright petals of plants, or stems, that
have bright color in them, to paint with. Did you ever do that? You
can first draw a picture, and then color it, by rubbing on it the colored
parts of plants.
Some trees and plants, from which dyes are made, have the coloring
stuff in the bark or wood. That is the way with the logwood tree. The
best black dye is made from that.
You have seen how much dark red juice you can find in berries. Did
you ever squeeze out the red juice of poke or elder berries? It is like
red ink. Did you ever notice how strawberries stain your fingers red?
Grapes and blackberries make your lips and tongue purple.
No doubt you have often had your hands stained brown, for days,
from the husks of walnuts. All these facts will show you what a deal
of color is taken up from the soil by plants, changed by the sun, and
stored up in their different parts.
But the chief of all color in the plant is the leaf-green. We cannot
make a dye out of that.
Leaf-green is the color of which there is the most. It is the color
which suits the eye best of all. How tired we should be of crimson or
orange grass!
Though leaves and stems are generally green, there are some
plants which have stems of a bright red or yellow color. Yellow is the
common color for stamens and pistils. In some plants, as the tulip,
the peach, and others, the stamens are of a deep red-brown, or
crimson, or pink, or even black color.
LESSON IX.
THE MOTION OF PLANTS.
If I ask you what motion plants have, I think you will tell me that they
have a motion upward. You will say that they “grow up.” You will not
say that they move in the wind. You know that that is not the kind of
motion which I mean.
Some plants grow more by day, some by night. On the whole, there
is more growing done by day than by night. At night it is darker,
cooler, and there is more moisture in the air. The day has more heat,
light, and dryness. For these causes growth varies by day and by
night.
Warmth and moisture are the two great aids to the growth of plants.
Heat, light, and wet have most to do with the motion of plants. For
the motion of plants comes chiefly from growth.
The parts of the plant the motion of which we shall notice, are, the
stems, leaves, tendrils, and petals. Perhaps you have seen the
motion of a plant stem toward the sunshine.
Did you ever notice in house plants, that the leaves and branches
turn to the place from which light comes to them? Did you ever hear
your mother say that she must turn the window plants around, so
that they would not grow “one-sided”?
Did you ever take a pot plant that had grown all toward one side, and
turn it around, and then notice it? In two or three weeks you would
find the leaves, stems, branches, bent quite the other way. First they
lifted up straight. Then they slowly bent around to the light.
Perhaps you have noticed that many flower stems stoop to the east
in the morning. Then they move slowly around. At evening you find
them bending toward the west.
This is one motion of stems. Another motion is that of long, weak
stems, such as those of the grape-vine or morning-glory. They will
climb about a tree or stick.
Such vines do much of their climbing by curling around the thing
which supports them. If you go into the garden, and look at a bean-
vine, you will see what fine twists and curves it makes about the
beanpole.
Such twists or curves can be seen yet more plainly in a tendril. A
tendril is a little string-like part of the plant, which serves it for hands.
Sometimes tendrils grow out of the tips of the leaves.
Sometimes they grow from the stem. Sometimes they grow from the
end of a leaf-stem in place of a final leaf.
Tendrils, as I told you before, are twigs, leaves, buds, or other parts
of a plant, changed into little, long clasping hands.
Now and then the long slender stem of a leaf acts as a tendril. It
twists once around the support which holds up the vine. Thus it ties
the stem of the vine to the support.
You have seen not only climbing plants, such as the grape-vine. You
have seen also creeping plants, as the strawberry and ground-ivy.
You will tell me that a climbing plant is one which travels up
something. You will say, also, that a creeping plant is a vine which
runs along the ground.
The climbing plant helps itself along by tendrils. The creeping plant
has little new roots to hold it firm.
Look at the strawberry beds. Do you see some long sprays which
seem to tie plant to plant? Your father will tell you that they are
“runners.”
The plant throws out one of these runners. Then at the end of the
runner a little root starts out, and fastens it to the ground. A runner is
very like a tendril. There are never any leaves upon it. But the end of
a tendril never puts out a bud. The end of the runner, where it roots,
puts out a bud.
This bud grows into a new plant. The new plant sends out its
runners. These root again, and so on. Thus, you see, a few
strawberry plants will soon cover a large space of ground.
There is a very pretty little fern, called the “walking fern,” which has
an odd way of creeping about. When the slender fronds[8] reach their
full length, some of the tallest ones bend over to the earth. The tip of
the frond touches the ground. From that tip come little root-like
fibres, and fix themselves in the earth. A new plant springs up from
them.
When the new plant is grown, a frond of that bends over and takes
root again. So it goes on. Soon there is a large, soft, thick mat of
walking fern upon the ground.
This putting out new roots to go on by is also the fashion of some
climbing plants. Did you ever notice how the ivy will root all along a
wall? Little strong roots put out at the joints of the stem, and hold the
plant fast.
All this motion in plants is due to growth. In very hot lands where
there is not only much heat, but where long, wet seasons fill the
earth with water, the growth of plants is very rapid.
In these hot lands, there are more climbing plants than in cool lands.
Some trees, which, in cool lands where they grow slowly, never
climb, turn to climbers in hot lands.
Some plants will twine and climb in hot weather, and stand up
straight alone in cool weather. This shows that in hot weather they
grow so fast that they cannot hold themselves up. When it is cool,
they grow slowly, and make more strong fibre. But we must leave the
stem motions of plants and speak of the motion of other parts.
Let me tell you how to try the leaf motion of plants. Take a house
plant to try, as that is where wind will not move the leaf. Get a piece
of glass about four or five inches square. Smoke it very black.
Lay it under the leaf, so that the point of the leaf bent down will be
half an inch from the glass.
Then take a bristle from a brush and put it in the tip of the leaf. Run
the bristle in the leaf so that the end will come beyond the leaf, and
just touch the glass. Leave it a night and a day. Then you will find the
story of the leaf’s travels written on the glass. As the leaf moves, the
bristle will write little lines in the black on the glass. Try it.
As you have proved the motion of the leaf with your smoked glass,
let us look at leaf motion. There is, first, that motion which unfolds or
unrolls the leaf from the bud. That is made because, by feeding, the
plant is growing larger, and the leaf needs more room.
The leaf often has, after it is grown, a motion of opening and
shutting. Other leaves have a motion of rising and falling. But of
these motions I will tell you in another lesson.
Flowers have, first, the motion by which the flower-bud unfolds to the
full, open blossom. That, as the leaf-bud motion, comes from
growing. Did you ever watch a rose-bud, or a lily-bud, unfold?
Then the flowers of many plants have a motion of opening and
shutting each day. I shall tell you of that, also, in another lesson.
Besides these motions in plants, there are others. Did you ever see
how a plant will turn, or bend, to grow away from a stone, or
something, that is in its way?
If you watch with care the root of one of your bean-seeds, you will
see that it grows in little curves, now this way, now that. It grows so,
even when it grows in water, or in air, where nothing touches it.
People who study these changes tell us that the whole plant, as it
grows, has a turning motion. In this motion all the plant, and all its
parts, move around as they grow.
The curious reasons for this motion of plants, you must learn when
you are older. I can now tell you only a little about it. I will tell you that
the plant moves, because the little cells in it grow in a one-sided way.
Thus the air, light, heat, moisture, cause the cells on one side of the
plant to grow larger than the others. Then the plant stoops, or is
pulled over, that way. It is bent over by the weight. Then that side is
hidden, and the other side has more light, heat, and wet. And as the
cells grow, it stoops that way.
This is easy to understand in climbing plants. Their long, slim stems
are weak. They bend with their own weight. They bend to the side
that is slightly heavier. Their motion then serves to find them a
support. As they sweep around, they touch something which will hold
them up. Then they cling to it.
Now, there is another reason for a tendril taking hold of anything.
The skin of the tendril is very soft and fine. As it lies against a string,
or stick, or branch, the touch of this object on its fine skin makes the
tendril bend, or curl.
It keeps on bending or curling, until it gets quite around the object
which it touches. Then it still goes on bending, and so it gets around
a second time, and a third, and so on. Thus the tendril makes curl
after curl, as closely and evenly as you could wind a string on a stick.
Some plants, as the hop, move around with the sun; other plants
move in just the other direction. It is as if some turned their faces,
and some their backs, to the sun.
FOOTNOTES:
[8] What you call the leaf of a fern is, properly speaking, a frond.
LESSON X.
PLANTS AND THEIR PARTNERS.
Did I not tell you that the plants had taken partners and gone into
business? I said that their business was seed-growing, but that the
result of the business was to feed and clothe the world.
In our first lessons we showed you that we get all our food, clothes,
light, and fuel, first or last, from plants. “Stop! stop!” you say. “Some
of us burn coal. Coal is a mineral.” Yes, coal is a mineral now, but it
began by being a vegetable. All the coal-beds were once forests of
trees and ferns. Ask your teacher to tell you about that.
If all these things which we need come from plants, we may be very
glad that the plants have gone into business to make more plants.
Who are these partners which we told you plants have? They are the
birds and the insects. They might have a sign up, you see, “Plant,
Insect & Co., General Providers for Men.”
Do let us get at the truth of this matter at once! Do you remember
what you read about the stamens and pistils which stand in the
middle of the flower? You know the stamens carry little boxes full of
pollen. The bottom of the pistil is a little case, or box, full of seed
germs.
You know also that the pollen must creep down through the pistils,
and touch the seed germs before they can grow to be seeds. And
you also know, that unless there are new seeds each year the world
of plants would soon come to an end.
Now you see from all this that the stamens and pistils are the chief
parts of the flower. The flower can give up its calyx, or cup, and its
gay petals, its color, honey, and perfume. If it keeps its stamens and
pistils, it will still be a true seed-bearing flower.
It is now plain that the aim of
the flower must be to get
that pollen-dust safely
landed on the top of the
pistil.
You look at a lily, and you
say, “Oh! that is very easy.
Just let those pollen boxes
fly open, and their dust is
sure to hit the pistil, all right.”
But not so fast! Let me tell
you that many plants do not
carry the stamens and pistils
all in one flower. The
stamens, with the pollen
boxes, may be in one flower,
and the pistil, with its sticky
cushion to catch pollen, may
be in another flower.
More than that, these
flowers, some with stamens, THE THREE PARTNERS.
and some with pistils, may
not even be all on one plant! Have you ever seen a poplar-tree? The
poplar has its stamen-flowers on one tree, and its pistil-flowers on
another. The palm-tree is in the same case.
Now this affair of stamen and pistil and seed making does not seem
quite so easy, does it? And here is still another fact. Seeds are the
best and strongest, and most likely to produce good plants, if the
pollen comes to the pistil, from a flower not on the same plant.
This is true even of such plants as the lily, the tulip, and the
columbine, where stamens and pistils grow in one flower.
Now you see quite plainly that in some way the pollen should be
carried about. The flowers being rooted in one place cannot carry
their pollen where it should go. Who shall do it for them?
Here is where the insect comes in. Let us look at him. Insects vary
much in size. Think of the tiny ant and gnat. Then think of the great
bumble bee, or butterfly. You see this difference in size fits them to
visit little or big flowers.
You have seen the great bumble bee busy in a lily, or a trumpet
flower. Perhaps, too, you have seen a little ant, or gnat, come
crawling out of the tiny throat of the thyme or sage blossom. And you
have seen the wasp and bee, busy on the clover blossom or the
honeysuckle.
Insects have wings to take them quickly wherever they choose to go.
Even the ant, which has cast off its wings,[9] can crawl fast on its six
nimble legs.
Then, too, many insects have a long pipe, or tongue, for eating. You
have seen such a tongue on the bee.[10] In this book you will soon
read about the butterfly, with its long tube which coils up like a watch
spring.
With this long tube the insect can poke into all the slim cups, and
horns, and folds, of the flowers of varied shapes.
Is it not easy to see that when the insect flies into a flower to feed, it
may be covered with the pollen from the stamens? Did you ever
watch a bee feeding in a wild rose? You could see his velvet coat all
covered with the golden flower dust.
Why does the insect go to the flower? He does not know that he is
needed to carry pollen about. He never thinks of seed making. He
goes into the flower to get food. He eats pollen sometimes, but
mostly honey.
In business, you know, all the partners wish to make some profit for
themselves. The insect partner of the flower has honey for his gains.
The flower lays up a drop of honey for him.
In most flowers there is a little honey. Did you ever suck the sweet
drop out of a clover, or a honeysuckle? This honey gathers in the
flower about the time that the pollen is ripe in the boxes. Just at the
time that the flower needs the visit of the insects, the honey is set
ready for them.
Into the flower goes the insect for honey. As it moves about, eating,
its legs, its body, even its wings, get dusty with pollen. When it has
eaten the honey of one flower, off it goes to another. And it carries
with it the pollen grains.
As it creeps into the next flower, the pollen rubs off the insect upon
the pistil. The pistil is usually right in the insect’s way to the honey.
The top of the pistil is sticky, and it holds the pollen grains fast. So
here and there goes the insect, taking the pollen from one flower to
another.
But stop a minute. The pollen from a rose will not make the seed
germs of a lily grow. The tulip can do nothing with pollen from a
honeysuckle. The pollen of a buttercup is not wanted by any flower
but a buttercup. So of all. The pollen to do the germ any good must
come from a flower of its own kind.
What is to be done in this case? How will the insect get the pollen to
the right flower? Will it not waste the clover pollen on a daisy?
Now here comes in a very strange habit of the insect. Insects fly
“from flower to flower,” but they go from flowers of one kind to other
flowers of the same kind. Watch a bee. It goes from clover to clover,
not from clover to daisy.
Notice a butterfly. It flits here and there. But you will see it settle on a
pink, and then on another pink, and on another, and so on. If it
begins with golden rod, it keeps on with golden rod.
God has fixed this habit in insects. They feed for a long time on the
same kind of flowers. They do this, even if they have to fly far to
seek them. If I have in my garden only one petunia, the butterfly
which feeds in that will fly off over the fence to some other garden to
find another petunia. He will not stop to get honey from my sweet
peas.
Some plants have drops of honey all along up the stem to coax ants
or other creeping insects up into the flower.
But other plants have a sticky juice along the stem, to keep crawling
insects away. In certain plants the bases of the leaf-stems form little
cups, for holding water. In this water, creeping insects fall and drown.
Why is this? It is because insects that would not properly carry the
pollen to another flower, would waste it. So the plant has traps, or
sticky bars, to keep out the kind of insects that would waste the
pollen, or would eat up the honey without carrying off the pollen.
I have not had time to tell you of the many shapes of flowers. You
must notice that for yourselves.
Some are like cups, some like saucers, or plates, or bottles, or bags,
or vases. Some have long horns, some have slim tubes or throats.
Some are all curled close about the stamens and pistils.
These different kinds of flowers need different kinds of insects to get
their pollen. Some need bees with thick bodies. Some need
butterflies with long, slim tubes. Some need wasps with long, slender
bodies and legs. Some need little creeping ants, or tiny gnats.
Each kind of flower has what will coax the right kind of insects, and
keep away the wrong ones. What has the plant besides honey to
coax the insect for a visit? The flower has its lovely color, not for us,
but for insects. The sweet perfume is also for insects.
Flowers that need the visits of moths, or other insects that fly by
night, are white or pale yellow. These colors show best at night.
Flowers that need the visits of day-flying insects, are mostly red,
blue, orange, purple, scarlet.
There are some plants, as the grass, which have no sweet perfume
and no gay petals. I have told you of flowers which are only a small
brown scale with a bunch of stamens and pistils held upon it. And
they have no perfumes. These flowers want no insect partners. Their
partner is the summer wind! The wind blows the pollen of one plant
to another. That fashion suits these plants very well.
So, by means of insect or wind partners, the golden pollen is carried
far and wide, and seeds ripen.
But what about the bird partners? Where do they come in?
If the ripe seed fell just at the foot of the parent plant, and grew
there, you can see that plants would be too much crowded. They
would spread very little. Seeds must be carried from place to place.
Some light seeds, as those of the thistle, have a plume. The maple
seeds have wings. By these the wind blows them along.
But most seeds are too heavy to be wind driven. They must be
carried. For this work the plant takes its partner, the bird.
To please the eye of the bird, and attract it to the seed, the plant has
gay-colored seeds. Also it has often gay-colored seed cases. The
rose haws, you know, are vivid red. The juniper has a bright blue
berry. The smilax has a black berry. The berries of the mistletoe are
white, of the mulberry purple.
These colors catch the eye of the bird. Down he flies to swallow the
seed, case, and all. Also many seed cases, or covers, are nice food
to eat. They are nice for us. We like them. But first of all they were
spread out for the bird’s table.
Birds like cherries, plums, and strawberries. Did you ever watch a
bird picking blackberries? The thorns do not bother him. He swallows
the berries fast,—pulp and seed.
You have been told of the hard case which covers the soft or germ
part of the seed, and its seed-leaf food. This case does not melt up
in the bird’s crop or gizzard, as the soft food does. So when it falls to
the ground the germ is safe, and can sprout and grow.
Birds carry seeds in this way from land to land, as well as from field
to field. They fly over the sea and carry seeds to lonely islands,
which, but for the birds, might be barren.
So by means of its insect partners, the plant’s seed germs grow, and
perfect seeds. By means of the bird partners, the seeds are carried
from place to place. Thus many plants grow, and men are clothed,
and warmed, and fed.
FOOTNOTES:
[9] See Nature Reader, No. 2, Lessons on Ants.
[10] No. 1, Lesson 18.
LESSON XI.
AIR, WATER, AND SAND PLANTS.
Most of the plants which you see about you grow in earth or soil. You
have heard your father say that the grass in some fields was scanty
because the soil was poor. You have been told that wheat and corn
would not grow in some other field, because the soil was not rich
enough.
You understand that. The plant needs good soil, made up of many
kinds of matter. These minerals are the plant’s food. Perhaps you
have helped your mother bring rich earth from the forest, to put
about her plants.
But beside these plants growing in good earth in the usual way, there
are plants which choose quite different places in which to grow.
There are air-plants, water-plants, sand-plants. Have you seen all
these kinds of plants?
You have, no doubt, seen plants growing in very marshy, wet places,
as the rush, the iris, and the St. John’s-wort. Then, too, you have
seen plants growing right in the water, as the water-lilies, yellow and
white; the little green duck-weed; and the water crow-foot.
If you have been to the sea-shore, you have seen green, rich-looking
plants, growing in a bank of dry sand. In the West and South, you
may find fine plants growing in what seem to be drifts, or plains of
clear sand.
Air-plants are less common. Let us look at them first. There are
some plants which grow upon other plants and yet draw no food
from the plant on which they grow. Such plants put forth roots,
leaves, stems, blossoms, but all their food is drawn from the air.
I hope you may go and see some hot-house where orchids are kept.
You will see there splendid plants growing on a dead branch, or

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Games Strategies and Decision Making

2nd Edition Harrington Solutions

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