1991 SCMR 1041

1991 S C M R 1041 about:reader?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pakistanlawsite.com%2Flo...
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1991 S C M R 1041
163–208 minutes
1991 S C M R 1041
Present: Saad Saood Jan, Ajmal Mian, Rustam S. Sidhwa,
Muhammad Afzal Lone and Sajjad Ali Shah, JJ
I.A. SHARWANI and others---Petitioners
versus
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary,
Finance Division, Islamabad and others---Respondents.
Constitutional Petitions Nos.15-R, 16-R of 1989, 2-R and 5-R of

1990, heard on 16th January, 199f.
Per Ajmal Mian; Muhammad Afzal Lone and Sajjad Ali Shah,
JJ. agreeing; Saad Saood Jan and Rustam S. Sidhwa, JJ. also
agreeing but adding separate notes---
(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art. 212---Interpretation.
Under clause (1) of Article 212, Constitution of Pakistan (1973) the

appropriate Legislature has been empowered to enact for the
establishment of one or more Administrative Courts or Tribunals for
exercising exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the matters referred to
in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the above clause, which inter alia
include the matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons
(who are or have been) in the service of Pakistan including in
respect of disciplinary matters. It may further be noticed that clause
(2) of the above Article provides that notwithstanding anything
hereinbefore contained, where any Administrative Court or Tribunal
is established in terms of clause (1), no other Court shall grant an
injunction, make any order or entertain any proceedings in respect
of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Administrative Court
or Tribunal extends. It also provides for the abatement of the
pending proceedings in respect of such matters except those
appeals, which were then pending in the Supreme Court. The
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proviso to clause (2) contemplates that the above clause shall not
be applicable to an Administrative Court or Tribunal established
under an Act of a Provincial Assembly unless at the request of that
Assembly made in the form of a Resolution, Majlis-e-Shoora by law
extends the provisions to such a Court or Tribunal, whereas clause
(3) provides an appeal to Supreme Court with leave from a
judgment, decree, order or sentence of an Administrative Court or
Tribunal provided the case involves a substantial question of law of
public importance.
(b) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---
----Ss. 4 & 3---Interpretation.
Subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973

provides right of an appeal before the Service Tribunal to a civil
servant if he is aggrieved by any final order, whether original or
appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of his
terms and conditions of the service within 30 days of
communication of such order to him or within six months of the
establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later,
subject to sub-clause (a) which provides a precondition for filing of
a service appeal by providing that an aggrieved civil servant before
approaching the Service Tribunal should file an appeal, review or
representation as may be provided for under the relevant Rule's
before the departmental authority and should wait for the expiry of
90 days from 'the date on which such appeal, review or
representation was preferred, if the same is not decided before the
expiry of the above period. Whereas sub-clauses (b) and (c)
provide the cases in which no appeal shall lie to the Service
Tribunal, namely, (i) against an order or decision of a departmental
authority determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be
appointed to or hold a particular post or to be promoted to a higher
post or grade, and (ii) against an order or decision of a
departmental authority made at any time before the 1st July, 1969.
It may further be noticed that under clause (a) of subsection (2) in
case of a penalty of dismissal from service, removal from service,
compulsory retirement or reduction to a lower post or time-scale or
to a lower stage in a time-scale, the appeal shall lie to a Tribunal
referred -to in subsection (3) of section 3 of the Act, and in any
other case under clause (6) to a Tribunal referred to in subsection
(7) of section 3 of the Act. It may also be noticed that the
explanation to subsection (2) of section 4 defines the term
"departmental authority" as means an authority other than a
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Tribunal which is competent to make an order in respect of any of

the terms and conditions of the civil servant.??
(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art. 212---Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S.

4---Jurisdiction of Courts is excluded only in respect of the cases in
which the Service Tribunal under S. 4(1) of the Service Tribunals
Act, 1973 has the jurisdiction---If the Service Tribunal does not
have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a particular type of grievance,
the jurisdiction of the Courts remains intact---Service Tribunal has
jurisdiction against a final order, whether original or appellate, made
by a departmental authority in respect of any terms and conditions
of service.
(d) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---
----S. 4---Appeal---Jurisdiction---Civil servant when aggrieved by a

final order, whether original or appellate, passed by a departmental
authority in respect of his terms and conditions, his remedy, if any,
is by way of an appeal before the Service Tribunal even where the
case involves vires of a particular Service Rule or a Notification or
the question, whether an accused civil servant can claim the right to
be represented by a counsel before the Enquiry Officer---If a
statutory rule or a notification adversely affects the terms and
conditions of a civil servant, the same can be treated as an order in
terms of S. 4(1) in order to file an appeal before the Service
Tribunal.
M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another P L

D 1980 S C 22; Iqan Ahmed Khurram v. Government of Pakistan
and others P L D 1980 S C 153; The Controller, Central Excise and
Land Customs and others v. Aslam Ali Shah P L D 1985 S C 82;
The Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore and 2 others v.
Muhammad Latif P L D 1988 S C 387; Abdul Wahab Khan v.
Government of the Punjab and 3 others P L D 1989 S C 508 and
Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan and 2 others P L D 1981 Kar.
290 ref.
(e) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---
----S. 4---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.

25---Appeal---Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal---Civil servant cannot
by-pass Service Tribunal by adding a ground of violation of the
Fundamental Rights---Service Tribunal will have jurisdiction in a
case which is founded on the terms and conditions of the service
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even if it involves the question of violation of the Fundamental

Rights.
M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another P L

D 1980 S C 22; Iqan Ahmed Khurram v. Government of Pakistan
and others P L D 1980 S C 153; The Controller, Central Excise and
Land Customs and others v. Aslam Ali Shah P L D 1985 S C 82;
The Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore and 2 others v.
Muhammad Latif P L D 1988 S C 387; Abdul Wahab Khan v.
Government of the Punjab and 3 others P L D 1989 S C 508 and
Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan and 2 others P L D 1981 Kar.
290 ref.
(f) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court, under Art. 184(3), is competent to

entertain a Constitutional petition if it considers that a question of
public importance is involved with reference to the enforcement of
any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chap. 1 of Part II of
the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), notwithstanding that there
might be an alternate remedy.
(g) Constitution-of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court can take cognizance of any matter

under Art. 184(3) if it involves a question of public importance with
reference to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights
conferred .by Chap. 1 of Part II, Constitution of Pakistan (1973) at
the behest of an individual person or a group of persons
represented through an association or a political party.?
(h) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art.184(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0.1, R.8---Original

jurisdiction of Supreme Court---Provisions of 0.1. R.8, C.P.C. have
no application if Supreme Court takes cognizance of any matter
under Art. 184(3) invoking a question of public importance with
reference to enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. deals with filing of a representative suit and

contemplates obtaining of permission from the Court for filing of
such a suit and service of the notice by a public advertisement etc.
It also provides that any person desiring to become a party to such
a suit, may apply for being impleaded as a party. The provisions of
Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. have no application as Supreme Court can
take cognizance of any matter under clause (3) of Article 184 of the
Constitution if it involves a question of public importance with
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reference to the enforcement of any Fundamental Rights conferred

by Chapter 1 of Part II at the behest of an individual person or a
group of persons represented through an association or a political
party.
When proceedings are in the nature of public interest litigation in

order to advance the cause of justice and public good, the power
conferred on Supreme Court under clause (3) of Article 184 of the
Constitution is to be exercised liberally unfettered with
technicalities.?
Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and

others P L D 1970 S C 1 and Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of
Pakistan and another P L D 1988 S C 416 ref:
(i) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art. 184---Original jurisdiction of Supreme Court---Public interest

litigation--?In order to advance cause of justice and public good, the
power conferred on Supreme Court under Art. 184(3) has to be
exercised liberally unfettered with technicalities.?
Anjuman Araian, Bhera v. Abdul Rashid and 5 others P L D 1973

Lah.500 distinguished.
D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India A I R 1983 S C 130 and

People's Union for Democratic Rights and others v. Union of India
and others A I R 1982 S C 1473 ref.
(j) Words and phrases---
...... Pension"---Definition and object of the term---Civil Servants Act

(LXXI of 1973), S. 19---[Civil service].
Pensions are periodic payments, usually for the natural life of a

person who retires because of age or disability. Sometimes the
term refers to periodic payments to wives, widows or children of a
primary or deceased person or pensioner; occasionally, a pension
will be conveyed solely as an honour for conspicuous service or
valour. Pensions are provided by Government in three guises: (1)
as compensation or recompense to war veterans and families for
old age or for disability or death, usually from service causes; (2) as
disability or old age retirement benefits for civilian employees of
government; (3) as social security payments for the age, disabled
or deceased citizenry based on past employment history of subject
to current evidence of need. Pensions are also provided by many
non-governmental employers as a means of protecting workers
retiring for age or disability and for relieving the payroll of
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superannuated personnel. They are sometimes provided by

union-management welfare funds, associations or trusteeships.
Only rarely do employees in groups, associations or unions
undertake their own pension programme without employer or
Government assistance.
Except as limited by the Constitution the establishment of a pension

system is within the scope of the legislative power. The granting of
pensions to public officers or public employees serves the public
purpose, and is designed to induce competent persons to enter and
remain in the public service or employment, and to encourage the
retirement from public service of those who have become
incapacitated from performing their duties as well as they might be
performed by younger or more vigorous persons. It has also been
stated that a pension system is intended to promote efficient,
continued and faithful service to the employer and economic
security to the employees and their dependents, by an arrangement
under which, by fulfilment of specified eligibility requirements,
pensions become property of the individual as a matter of right
upon the termination of public service.
A pension is a periodical allowance of money granted by the

Government in consideration or recognition of meritorious past
services, or of loss or injury sustained in the public service. A
pension is mainly designed to assist the pensioner in providing for
his daily wants, and it presupposes the continued life of the
recipient.
The right to a pension depends upon statutory provisions and

therefore, the existence of such right in particular instances is
determinable primarily from the terms of the statute under which the
right or privilege is granted. The right to a pension may be made to
depend upon such conditions as the grantor may see fit to
prescribe. Thus, it has been held that it may be provided, in a
general Pension Act, that any person who accepts the benefits
thereof shall forfeit his right to a special pension previously granted.
Summing up it can be said with confidence that pension is not only

compensation for loyal service rendered in the past, but pension
also has a broader significance, in that it is a measure of
socio-economic justice which inheres economic security in the fall
of life when physical and mental prowess is ebbing corresponding
to aging process and, therefore, one is required to fall back on
savings. One such saving in kind is when you give your best in the
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hey day of life to your employer, in days of invalidity, economic

security by way of periodical payment is assured. The term has
been judicially defined as a stated allowance or stipend made in
consideration of past service or a surrender of rights or emoluments
to one retired from service. Thus the pension payment to a
Government employee is earned by rendering long and efficient
service and therefore can be said to be a deferred portion of the
compensation for service rendered. In one sentence one can. say
that the most practical raison deter for pension is the inability to
provide for oneself due to old age. One may live and avoid
unemployment but no senility and penury if there is nothing to fall
back upon.?
There are various kinds of pension schemes which are obtaining in

various countries of the world: However, the same can be divided
into two broad categories, namely, (i) Government Pension
Schemes; (ii) Non-Government Pension Schemes. Each of the
above category can be sub-divided into a number of sub-categories
according to the object for which a particular scheme is designed.?
A pension is intended to assist a retired civil servant in providing for

his daily wants so long he is alive in consideration of his past
services, though recently the above benefit has been extended
inter alia in Pakistan to the widows and the dependent children of
the deceased civil servants. The raison d'etre for pension seems to
be inability to provide for oneself due to old-age. The right and
extent to claim pension depends upon the terms of the relevant
statute under which it has been granted.?
A person who enters Government service has also something to

look forward after his retirement, to what are called retirement
benefits, grant of pension being the most valuable of such benefits.
Pension like salary of a civil servant is no longer a bounty but is a
right acquired after putting in satisfactory service for the prescribed
minimum period. A fortiori, it cannot be reduced or refused
arbitrarily except to the extent and in the manner provided in the
relevant rules. Conversely full pension admissible under the rules is
not to be given as a matter of course unless the service rendered
has been duly approved. If the service has not been thoroughly
satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the pension is empowered to
make such reduction in the amount as it may deem proper. This
power is however exercisable only before pension is actually
sanctioned.?
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Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 17, 1963 Edn., p. 488; Corpus Juris

Secundum, Vols. 67, 70, pp. 423, 763-764; American
Jurisprudence, Vol. 40, pp. 980-981; The State of Pakistan and
another v. Mehrajuddin P L D 1959 SC (Pak.) 147; The
Government of N: W.F.P. through The Secretary to the Government
of N.-W.F.P. Communication and Works Departments, Peshawar v.
Muhammad Said Khan and another P L D 1973 SC 514;
Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and others A I R 1971 SC
1409 and State of Punjab and another v. Iqbal Singh A I R 1976 SC
667 ref.
(k) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---
----S. 19--Civil Service Regulations, Reglns. 4 &

486---Pension---Civil servant, on retirement from service, shall be
entitled to receive such pension or gratuity as may be
prescribed---Officer's claim to pension is regulated by the Rules in
force at the time when officer resigns or is discharged from the
'service of Government---New ground or a new avenue can be
explored on the basis of some legal principle and not merely on the
ground what appears to be just and equitable.
The right and extent of the pension amount depends on the

language of the relevant statute or the rules framed thereunder. In
order to link revision of pension amount with the revision of pay
scales, there should be a statutory provision to that effect. The Civil
Servants Act does not contain any such provision, on the contrary,
section 19 of the latter Act expressly provides that on retirement
from service, a civil servant shall be entitled to receive such
pension or gratuity as may be prescribed. The above entitlement
has been prescribed in the form of the C.S.R. 4, which inter alia
lays down that an officer's claim to pay and allowances is regulated
by the rules in force at the time in respect of which the pay and
allowances are earned; to leave by the, rules in force at the time
the leave is applied for and granted; and to pension by the rules in
force at the time when the officer resigns or is discharged from the
service of Government.?
A new ground or a new avenue can be explored on the basis of

some legal principle and not merely on the ground what appears to
be just and equitable.
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 67 and D. S. Nakara and others v.

Union of India AIR 1983 S C 130 distinguished.
(l) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
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----Art. 25(1)---All citizens are equal before law and entitled to equal
protection of law---State, however, is not prohibited to treat its
citizens on the basis of a reasonable classification ---Reasonable
classification---Basis or criterion for classification as to avert
violation of Art. 25(1).
Clause (1) of Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973)

enshrines the basic concept of religion of Islam. However, this is
now known as the golden principle of modern Jurisprudence, which
enjoins that all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to
equal protection of law.?
However, the above clause does not prohibit treatment of citizens

by a State on the basis of a reasonable classification.?
Following are the principles with regard to equal protection of law

and reasonableness of classification:
(i) that equal protection of law does not envisage that every citizen
is to be treated alike in all circumstances, but it contemplates that
persons similarly situated or similarly placed are to be treated alike;
(ii) that reasonable classification is permissible but it must be

founded on reasonable distinction or reasonable basis;
(iii) that different laws can validly be enacted for different sexes,
persons in different age groups, persons having different financial
standings, and persons accused of heinous crimes;
(iv) that no standard of universal application to test reasonableness

of a classification can be laid down as what may be reasonable
classification in a particular set of circumstances may be
unreasonable in the other set of circumstances;
(v) that a law applying to one person or one class of persons may
be constitutionally valid if there is sufficient basis or reason for it,
but a classification which is arbitrary and is not founded on any
rational basis is no classification as to warrant its exclusion .from
the mischief of Article 25;
(vi) that equal protection of law means that all persons equally
placed be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed;
(vii) that in order to make a classification reasonable, it should be

based--
(a) on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or

things that are grouped together from those who have been left out;
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(b) that the differentia must have rational nexus to the object sought
to be achieved by such classification.
Principles as to classification are as under:
(a) A law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single

individual ~ if, on account of some special circumstances, or
reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single
individual may be created as a class by himself.
(b) There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality

of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show
that there has been a clear- transgression of the constitutional
principles. The person, therefore, who pleads that Article 25, has
been violated, must make out that not only has he been treated
differently from others but he has been so treated from persons
similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis and such
differential treatment has been unjustifiably made. However, it is
extremely hazardous to decide the question of the constitutional
validity of a provision on the basis of the supposed existence of
facts by raising a presumption. Presumptions are resorted to when
the matter does not admit of direct proof or when there is some
practical difficulty to produce evidence to prove a particular fact;
(c) it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and

correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds;
(d) the Legislature is free to recognize the degrees of harm and

may confine its restriction to those cases where the need is
deemed to be the clearest;
(e) in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court

may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters
of common report, the history of the times and may assume every
state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of
legislation;
(f) while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the
part of the Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the
face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the
notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be
regarded as based, the presumption of the constitutionality cannot
be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some
undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals
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or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation;
(g) a classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically

complete;
(h) the validity of a rule has to be judged by assessing its overall

effect and not by picking up exceptional cases. What the Court has
to see is whether the classification made is a just one taking all
aspects into consideration.?
Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali and another v. The State P L D 1975 SC 506;
Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior
and Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad v. Abdul Wali Khan, M.NA. former
President of Defunct National Awami Party P L D 1976 SC 57; Mst.
Aziz Begum and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others P L D
1990 SC 899; Shrin Munir and others v. Government of Punjab
through Secretary Health, Lahore and another P L D 1990 SC 295;
Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of Inida and others A I R
1951 SC 41; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and others v. Shri Justice
S.R. Rendolkar and others A I R 1958 SC 538; The Anant Mills Co.
Ltd. v. State of Gujrat and others (1975) 2 SCC 175; State of Kerala
and another v. N.M. Thomas and others (1976) 2 SCC 310; In re:
Special Courts Bill, 1978 (Special Reference No.l of? 1978) A I R
1979 $C 478; Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others
A I R 1981 SC 48'x; D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India A I R
1983 SC 130 and V.N. Shukla on Constitution of India, 7th Edn. ref.
(m) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---
----S. 19---Civil Service Regulations, Regln. 41---Constitution of

Pakistan (1973), Art. 25---Pension---Pensioners and serving civil
servants---Reasonable classification will be that all the pensioners
as a group are to be treated as one class and all serving civil
servants as a group are to be treated as a separate class---If the
pay scales of serving civil servants are raised, the civil servants
who have by then already retired cannot have any legitimate
grievance to agitate for notional revision of their pay scales for
recomposing their pension amounts for any purpose and there
cannot be any uniformity in the amounts of pension among the civil
servants despite of having equal rank and equal length of service, if
they retire not on one date but on different dates and in between
such dates pay scales are revised---Pensioner can, however, have
a legitimate grievance if he is not treated alike with other
pensioners.
Reasonable classification will be that all the pensioners as a group
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are to be treated as one class and all serving civil servants as a

group are to be treated as a separate class. In this view of the
matter, if the pay scales of serving civil servants are revised, the
civil servants who have by then already retired cannot have any
legitimate grievance to agitate for notional revision of their pay
scales for re-computing their pension amounts for any purpose as
the pension amount is to be computed as above C.S.R.4 on the
basis of the pension rules in force on the date of retirement of a civil
servant. The pension rules contain formula as to the method of
computation of pension amount with reference to the salary drawn
by him till the date of retirement and, therefore, there cannot be
uniformity in the amounts of pension among the civil servants
despite of having equal rank and equal length of service, if they
retire not on one date but on different dates and in-between such
dates pay scales are revised. However, a pensioner may have a
legitimate grievance if he is not treated alike with other pensioners,
for example, if the Legislature/Government increases pension
amount by 10%, say on 1-1-1991, but provides that this benefit will
be available to those pensioners who have retired on or after
1-1-1989. In other words, the pensioners who had retired prior to
1-1-1989 are deprived of the above benefit. This would be violative
of Article 25 of the Constitution unless the Government can
demonstrate that the above sub-classification within the class of
pensioners is based on an intelligible differentia and that the latter
has rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the
relevant classification under the statute or statutory rule.?
(n) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
?-Art., 25---Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), S. 19---Equal

protection of law--- Reasonable classification---Whether a special
date fixed for availability of any privilege or benefit can be the basis
of classification.
As a general proposition it cannot be laid down that in no case a

specked date can be made basis for classification. It will depend on
the facts of each case and if the specification of a particular date is
based on an intelligible differentia, which in turn has nexus to the
object for which the relevant statute has been enacted, such
classification will be legal and valid but if the' specification of a date
is arbitrary or whimsical, it cannot be made basis for classification.?
A distinction is to be drawn between a case in which a date is

specified for the purpose of qualifying for certain benefit under
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certain enactment/scheme and a date which may be specified for

the enforcement of a particular taxing statute or a notification
granting certain concession from payment of taxes and excise duty.
The former category should pass the test of reasonable
classification, whereas for the latter category, there is no such
requirement as the legislature or the Government has the
discretion/power to fix a date for the enforcement of a particular
statute or for granting certain concession in respect of tax or excise
duty, and for that purpose, there cannot be any mathematical or
logical way of fixing a date except that the Legislature or the
Government may fix the same according to its own need and
convenience.
D.R. Nim v. Union of India A I R 1967 S C 1301; Jaila Singh and

another v. State of Rajasthan and others A I R 1975 S C 1436; D.S.
Nakara and others v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 130; Union of
India and another v. Messrs Parameswaran Match Works etc. A I R
1974 S C 2349; D.G. Gouse and Co., (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Kerala and another A I R 1980 S C 271 and The
Accountant-General, Punjab and another v. Ch. Qadir Bakhsh and
another P L D 1983 Lah. 246 ref.
(o) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
---Art. 205 and' Fifth Sched.---Judges (Leave) Pension and

Privileges (Amendment) Order (5 of 1983)---Benefit of Presidential
Order 5 of 1983 would be applicable to those Judges who had
retired prior to 1st July, 1981.
The plain reading of the Presidential Order No.5 of 1983 makes it

clear that nowhere in this Order, it has been stated that the benefit
of this Order would not be applicable to those Judges who had
retired prior to 1st July, 1981. It has also not been provided in this
Order that the maximum limit would only be applicable to the
Judges who had retired on or after 1st July, 1981. Under Article 205
of the Constitution, remuneration and other terms and conditions of
service of a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court shall be
as provided in the Fifth Schedule. There is a constitutional provision
fixing remuneration and other terms and conditions of a High Court
Judge. In accordance with such provisions, the pay and pension of
the Judges of the superior Courts are fixed by a constitutional
instrument. The Fifth Schedule relates to remuneration and terms
and conditions of service of Judges. This Schedule is not to be read
in isolation, as it is a part of the Constitution. The salary and other
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privileges of the superior Courts Judges are allowed under a

constitutional provision, in order to keep the judiciary independent.
The basic principle of interpretation of statutes is that if the words
are clear and unambiguous, then literal construction must be
followed. The intention of the law-giver can be seen from the words
themselves and no foreign element is to be introduced. The
interpretation must be harmonious and reasonable:?
M. A. Rashid v. Pakistan through Finance Division Government of

Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others P L D 1988 Quetta 70 approved.
Per Saad Saood Jan agreeing with Ajmal Mian, J.---
(p) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---
----S. 19---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.

25---Pension---Retired civil servants form a class by themselves in
relation to those who are still in service--?In the absence of any
special circumstances it will be discriminatory to grant a privilege or
benefit to one sub-class of retired civil servants and withhold the
same from another sub-class of retired civil servants by fixing a
date with regard to its availability.?
(q) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---
----S. 19---Civil Service Regulations, Regln. 4---Constitution of

Pakistan (1973), Art. 25---Pension---Benefit of any improvement in
pension which may be granted to a civil servant retiring in future
must not invariably be extended to already retired civil servants
who held the same or corresponding appointment at the time of
their retirement---If the Government improves the pensionary
privileges and benefits for its serving employees or future entrants it
cannot be said that it is guilty of discriminatory treatment towards
those who have already retired.
Per Rustam S. Sidhwa, J. agreeing with Ajmal Mian,

J.---
(r) Islamic Jurisprudence---
---- State---Obligations of an Islamic State towards its employees

stated.?
(s) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Arts. 25, 27(2), 31, 37, 38 & 29---State is bound, as respects the
14 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
Muslims of Pakistan to promote observance of the Islamic moral

standards; make provision for securing just and humane conditions
of work; secure the well-being of the people inter alia by raising
their standard of living and ensuring equitable adjustment of rights
between employers and employees--Government servant after
retirement earns no augmentation in his pension with every revision
in pension that takes effect thereafter after he has retired, unless
his case is specifically provided for---With every revision in the pay,
the entitlement of the serving Government servant to receive
pension after retirement stands enhanced, for basic pay con1titutes
an essential element of emoluments in the different formulas that
are used to determine pension.
The only question of paramount importance that arises in the

present case is whether all the pensioners should form a class
apart for purposes of pensionary benefits so that whenever salary
scales or pensions are augmented, their consequent benefits are
also available to all retired pensioners, apart from those that will
retire on or after the date of augmentation takes effect, or there can
be sub-classes, each sub-class being constituted by a group of
pensioners who have retired on or after a date when some change
in the rules relating to salary scales or pension has taken place till
the date the next change takes place, subject to any amendments
in the rules that may be made from time to time augmenting their
pensionary benefits. Speaking from an ideological point of view, the
answer to the question can only be in the affirmative, for that would
be the highest socio-economic goal that a State could achieve
under Article 38 of the Principles of Policy as set out in Chapter 2 of
Part II of the Constitution, but if the economic position is feeble and
weak, the same is not economically feasible and the fulfilment of
this particular principle of policy, in view of Article 27(2), can be
deferred due to non-availability of resources, the next question
therefore that would arise is whether any legislation affecting
pension does not violate any fundamental right, such as the Article
guaranteeing equality, which strikes down any form of classification
which is unreasonable and arbitrary.
To appreciate this matter it is necessary to view in their proper

perspective the rights and liabilities of the Government regarding
pay and allowances and pensionary benefits. The obligations of the
Government relating to pay and allowances are regulated by the
rules in force at the time in respect of which the pay and allowances
are earned; and that relating to pensionary benefits by the rules in
15 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
force at the time when the Government servant resigns or is

discharged from service. The Government reserves to itself the
right of changing the rules and regulations regarding pay and
allowances and pensions, from time to time; and their discretion in
the matter- and their right of interpreting their meaning in case of
dispute. Pay and allowances are earned by a Government servant
each month during service according to the rules in force on the
dates they fall due. In the event of any upward revision, he is
entitled to the benefit of the revised pay and allowances if he is in
service on the date they fall due each month immediately after the
revision. When such a Government servant retires, he ceases to
earn any pay and allowances, as his entitlement in that respect
comes to an end. In the matter of pension, the entitlement to
receive the same, according to the rules in force, exists and
remains effective as a continuing entitlement, so long as the
Government servant is in service and has ,not retired. In the event
of any upward revision, the entitlement to receive the same,
according to the amended rules arises immediately after such
revision and remains effective as a continuing entitlement, so long
as he is in service. When such a Government servant retires, he
earns the pension according to the rules in force on the date of his
retirement. Should any revision or revisions take place thereafter
augmenting the pensionary benefits, he is not entitled to them,
unless any of them specifically or retrospectively covers his case.
Thus, whilst the Government servant in employment earns
augmentation in his pay and allowances with every revision that
takes effect whilst he is in service, the Government servant after
in pension that takes effect thereafter he has retired, unless his
case is specifically provided for. With every revision in the pay, the
entitlement of the serving Government servant to receive pension
after retirement stands enhanced, for basic pay constitutes an
essential element of emoluments in the different formulas that are
used to determine pension.
(t) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---
----S. 19---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 25---Object of Art.

25 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---Pension---Payment
of---Legal instruments augmenting salaries or indexation on
salaries cannot be struck down as violating Art. 25 of the
Constitution if they indirectly happen to affect pension---Every time
increase in salary or indexation to salary takes place, a sins Mass
16 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
would be created, each sub-class being constituted by a group of

pensioners who have retired on or after the date when some
change in the legal instruments has taken effect till the date the
next change in the salary or indexation takes place.
The object of Article 25 is not to force Government to legislate over

a matter which is silent, but to strike down a legislation or a legal
instrument which creates classification which is unreasonable or
arbitrary. The fact that salaries are increased or indexation is
allowed thereon, is legislation pertaining to salary which specifically
deals with serving Government servants and has no connection
with pension which specifically deals with Government servants
who have retired. Merely because the legal instruments are directly
intended to augment salaries of serving Government servants, the
fact that indirectly they may tend to affect emoluments and, thus
augment pensionary benefits or affect other allowances which are
allowed as a percentage of the wages and thus augment such
allowances, cannot be treated as creating an unreasonable
discrimination against recipients of pensions and allowances. The
rule is that where a particular legislation tends to create an arbitrary
distinction or unreasonable discrimination, the principle that all
persons similarly circumstances or matters evenly placed should be
treated or dealt with alike is enforced. But where a legislation
dealing with one subject has the effect of indirectly affecting other,
persons or matters covered by another legislation dealing with
another subject, the violation of the rule of equality cannot be
blindly enforced, unless there is some strong ground which could
make it almost mandatory for the Court to do so. Legislation also
treats salary and pension separately. Just because one indirectly
affects the other, it does not become a case of unreasonable
discrimination. If such a rule were to be applied, it would open up a
pandora's box of illusive and unintelligible classification, having no
rationale nor reason, and all forms of legislation would be thrown
into utter confusion.?
Legal instruments augmenting salaries or indexation on salaries

cannot be struck down as violating Article 25 of the Constitution if
they indirectly happen to affect pension. Thus, every time increase
in salary or indexation to salary takes place, a sub-class would be
created, each sub-class being constituted by a group of pensioners
who have retired on or after the date when some change in the
legal instruments has taken effect till the date the next change in
the salary or indexation takes place.?
17 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
D. S. Nakara v. The Union-of India A I R 1983 S C 130 ref.
(u) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---
----S.19---Pension---Any liberalised change in pension scheme has

to be made available to past retired pensioners prospectively.
D.S.Nakara v. The Union of India A I R 1983 S C 130 and George

G. Eichelberger v. City of Berkeley 46 C. 2d 182 = 293 P. 2d 1 ref.
(v) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)--
----S. 19---Civil Service Regulations, Chap. 1, Regln.

4---Pension---Term "emoluments"---Connotation---Liberal doctrine
cannot be imposes'.' in the pension system prevailing presently.
It is clear from the definition of the term "emoluments"' that they are
to be calculated upon what the officer was receiving immediately
before his retirement and since inter alia basic pay, dearness
allowance, indexation pay, etc., are some of the constituents that go
to make up emoluments, that pay or allowance etc., alone would be
taken into consideration which the employee was receiving
immediately before his retirement. The prospects of subsequent
increases in pay or allowances being taken into consideration in the
term "emoluments" therefore does not arise. In view of the law
being strict and clear, the liberal doctrine cannot be imposed in the
pension system prevailing presently.?
(w) Islamic Jurisprudence-
---- Conduct of State administration---Government's duty towards its

retired employees detailed.?
(x) Civil service---
----Pension---Kinds of pensions enumerated and their object and

purpose elaborated---All form of pensions, including the
superannuation pension, payable by Government, are dependent
upon statutory provisions.?
(y) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---
---S. 19---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts: 23 &

24(1)---Pension---Payment of---Right to receive pension by a
Government servant is property so as to attract Arts. 23 & 24(1) of
the Constitution of Pakistan.
A Government employee's claim to pay and allowances is regulated

by the rules in force at the time in respect of which the pay and
allowances are earned, whilst his claim to pension is regulated by
18 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
the rules- in force at the time when he retires, resigns, or is

invalided, or is compulsorily retired, or is discharged from service,
or is injured, or killed whilst in service, depending upon the type of
pension claimed. In respect of superannuation pension, the amount
of pension payable is determined by the length of completed years
of qualifying service put in by the Government servant, subject to
the formula then in existence providing the mode of calculation of
pension as prescribed by the rules. The right to receive pension
flows directly out of the rules applicable and not out of any order of
any officer or authority, though for the purposes of determining or
quantifying the amount it may be necessary for the authorities to
pass such order. The right to receive pension by a Government
servant is property so as to attract Articles 23 and 24(1) of the
Constitution and any illegal denial to a Government servant to
receive tie same would affect his fundamental right granted under
the said provisions of the Constitution.?
Deokinanken Prasad v. The State of Behar A I R 1971 S C 1409;

Bhagwant Singh v. Union of India A I R 1962 Punj. 503 and K.R.
Erry v. The State of Punjab I L R 1 Pb. 278 ref.
(z) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---
----S. 19---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 29 to

40---Pension---Payment of---Rights and obligations of Government
for payment of pension to its retired employees---Whilst the
Government servant in employment earns augmentation in his pay
and allowances with every revision that takes effect whilst he is in
service---State is bound inter alia 3to provide for all. citizens, within
available resources facilities for work and adequate livelihood with
all reasonable rest and ,leisure; provide for all persons in the
service of Pakistan or otherwise, social security by compulsory
social insurance or other means, and provide basic necessities of
life for all citizens as are permanently or temporarily unable to earn
their livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness. or
unemployment---Where the observance of any particular principle
of policy contained in Arts. 29 to 40 of the Constitution of Pakistan
is dependent upon resources being available for the said purpose,
the principle is to be regarded as being subject to the availability of
resources.
K.MA. Samdani, Advocate Supreme Court and Manzoor Illahi, Ex

Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners. (in all cases).
19 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
Aziz A. Munshi, Attorney-General for Pakistan (on notice) and Ch.

Ejaz Ahmed, Deputy Attorney-General for Respondents (in all
cases).
Date of hearing: 16th January, 1991.
JUDGMENT
AJMAL MIAN, J.---By this common judgment, we intend to dispose

of the above four petitions, which have been entertained directly by
this Court under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution, as they pertain to the enforcement of the Fundamental
Rights and involve common questions of fact and law of public
importance.
2. Factual matrix may be referred to in brief. The petitioner in C.P.

No.15-R .of 1989 joined civil service in 1940 and retired from the
rank of Joint Secretary (Grade 20) with effect from 15-11-1976.
Whereas the petitioner in C.P. No.5-R of 1990 joined civil service in
1958, but from 1966 till July. 1974, he performed duties in the
Judicial Branch of the Civil Service of Pakistan. He was elevated as
an Additional Judge to the then Sindh and Balochistan High Court
on 7-10-1974, where he worked as such up to 31-12-1976 when
the above High Court was bifurcated into two High Courts, namely,
Sindh and Balochistan High Courts. After that, he performed his
duties as an Additional Judge from 1-12-1976 to 6-10-1977 of the
Balochistan High Court and thereafter as its permanent Judge from
7-10-1977 till 7-4-1981, when he was retired with effect from
25-3-1981 under the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. The
petitioner in C.P. No.16-R of 1989 is an Association of the G.H.O.
retired civilian officers, whereas the petitioner in C.P. No.2-R of
1990 is a registered Association for the welfare of retired persons.
The grievance of the above petitioners and the Associations is that

the retired civil servants and the retired Judges, hereinafter referred
to as the pensioners, are being discriminated in payment of
enhanced pension in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution
inasmuch as certain increases in the pension have been denied to
some of them on the ground that they had retired prior to a
specified date. However the case of the respondents, besides
preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the petitions, is
that no discriminatory treatment has been meted out and that the
pensioners are paid pensions according to the Rules applicable to
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them.
3. Mr. Aziz A. Munshi, learned Attorney-General, who has appeared

in response to the Court notice, has raised a preliminary objection
as to the maintainability of the above petitions on the ground that
the same are barred under Article 212 of the Constitution. Ch. Ejaz
Ahmed, learned Deputy Attorney ?General, who has appeared for
the Federal Government, adopted the arguments of the learned
Attorney-General on the above preliminary objection and has
further urged that the above two petitions riled by the two
Associations were also not competent as the Associations could
not have agitated the personal grievance of the pensioners without
complying with the provisions of Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C.
On the other hand, Mr. K.M.A. Samdani, learned Advocate

Supreme Court appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that the
above petitions have been competently filed.
4. Before touching upon the merits of the cases, it may be pertinent

to dilate upon the above two legal objections.
5. In furtherance of his above objection Mr. Aziz A. Munshi, learned

Attorney-General, has invited our attention to Article 212 of the
Constitution and section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973,
hereinafter referred to as the Act, which read as follows:--
"Article 212 of the Constitution:
212.---(1) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the

appropriate Legislature may by Act provide for the establishment of
one or more Administrative Courts or Tribunals to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of---
(a) matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons who are
or have been in the service of Pakistan, including disciplinary
matters;
(b) matters relating to claims arising from tortious acts of

Government, or any person in the service of Pakistan, or of any
local or other authority empowered by law to levy any tax or cess
and any servant of .such authority acting in the discharge of his
duties as such servant; or
(c) matters relating to the acquisition, administration and disposal of

any property which is deemed to be enemy property under any law.
(2) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, where any

Administrative Court or Tribunal is established under clause (1), no
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other Court shall grant an injunction, make any order or entertain

any proceedings in respect of any matter to which the jurisdiction of
such Administrative Court or Tribunal extends and all proceedings
in respect of any such matter which may be pending before such
other Court immediately before the establishment of the
Administrative Court or Tribunal, other than an appeal pending
before the Supreme Court, shall abate on such establishment:
Provided that the provisions of this clause shall not apply to an

Administrative Court or Tribunal established under an Act of a
Provincial Assembly unless, at the request of that Assembly made
in the form of a resolution, Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) by law
extends the provisions to such a Court or Tribunal.
(3) An appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment, decree, order

or sentence of an Administrative Court or Tribunal shall lie only if
the Supreme Court, being satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law of public importance, grants leave to
appeal."
Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act. 1973:
4. Appeals to Tribunals.--(1) Any civil servant aggrieved by any

final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental
authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service
may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him or
within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal,
whichever is later, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal:
Provided that--
(a) where an appeal, review or representation to a departmental

authority is provided under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 (LXXI of
1973), or any rules against any such order, no appeal shall lie to a
Tribunal unless the aggrieved civil servant has preferred an appeal
or application for review or representation to such departmental
authority and a period of ninety days has elapsed from the date on
which such appeal, application or representation was so preferred;
(b) no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a

departmental authority determining the fitness or otherwise of a
person to be appointed to or hold a particular post or to be
promoted to a higher post or grade; and
(c) no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a

22 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
(2) Where the appeal is against an order or decision of a

departmental authority imposing a departmental punishment or
penalty on a civil servant, the appeal shall be preferred---
(a) in the case of a penalty of dismissal from service, removal from

service, compulsory retirement or reduction to a lower post or
time-scale, or to lower stage in a time-scale of a Tribunal referred to
in subsection (3) of section 3; and
(b) in any other case, to a Tribunal referred to in subsection (7) of

that section.
Explanation.---In this section, "departmental authority" means any

authority, other than a Tribunal, which is competent to make an
order in respect of any of the terms and conditions of civil servants."
6. A perusal of the above-quoted Article 212 of the Constitution

indicates that under clause (1), the appropriate Legislature has
been empowered to enact for the establishment of one or more
Administrative Courts or Tribunals for exercising exclusive
jurisdiction in respect of the matters referred to in sub-clauses (a),
(b) and (c) of the above clause, which inter alia include the matters
relating to the terms and conditions of persons (who are or have
been) in the service of Pakistan including in respect of disciplinary
matters. It may further I be noticed that clause (2) of the above
Article provides that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore
contained, where any Administrative Court or Tribunal is
established in terms of clause (1), no other Court shall grant an
injunction, make any order or entertain any proceedings in respect
of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Administrative Court
or Tribunal extends. It also provides the abatement of the pending
proceedings in respect of such matters except those appeals,
which were then pending in this Court. It may also be noticed that
the proviso to clause (2) contemplates that the above clause shall
not be applicable to an Administrative Court or Tribunal established
under an Act of a Provincial Assembly unless at the request of that
Assembly made in the form of a Resolution, Majlis-e-Shoora by law
extends the provisions to such a Court or Tribunal, whereas clause
(3) provides an appeal to this Court with leave from a judgment,
decree, order or sentence of an Administrative Court or Tribunal
provided the case involves a substantial question of law of public
importance.
7. It may also be pointed out that subsection (1) of section 4 of the

Act provides right of an appeal before the Service Tribunal to a civil
23 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
servant if he is aggrieved by any final order, whether original or

appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of his
terms and conditions of the service within 30 days of
communication of such order to him or within six months of the
establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later,
subject to sub-clause (a) which provides a precondition for filing of
a service appeal by providing that an aggrieved civil servant before
approaching the Service Tribunal should file an appeal, review or
representation as may be provided for under the relevant Rules
before the departmental authority and should wait for the expiry of
90 days from the date on which such appeal, review or
representation was preferred, if the same is not decided before the
expiry of the above period. Whereas sub-clauses (b) and (c)
provide the cases in which no appeal shall lie to the Service
Tribunal, namely, (i) against an order or decision of a departmental
authority determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be
appointed to or hold a particular post or to be promoted to a higher
post or grade, and (ii) against an order or decision of a
It may further be noticed that under clause (a) of subsection (2) in
case of a penalty of dismissal from service, removal from service,
compulsory retirement or reduction to a lower post or time-scale or
to a lower stage in a time-scale, the appeal shall lie to a Tribunal
referred to in subsection (3) of section 3 of the Act, and in any other
case under clause (b) to a Tribunal referred to in subsection (7) of
section 3 of the Act. It may also be noticed that the explanation to
subsection (2) of section 4 defines the term "departmental
authority" as means an authority other than a Tribunal which is
competent to make an order in respect of any of the terms and
conditions of the civil servant.
8. It has been urged by the learned Attorney-General that since

pension is a term of service in view of section 19 of the Civil
Servants Act, 1973, which provides that on retirement from service,
a civil servant shall be entitled to receive such pension or gratuity
as may be prescribed, the remedy, if any, of the petitioners was to
file an appeal before the Service Tribunal and not a Constitution
Petition directly under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution,
particularly keeping in view that above Article 212 contains non
obstante clause. On the other hand, Mr. Samdani, learned
Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the petitioners, has urged,
firstly, that the petitioners are not aggrieved by any order passed in
24 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
terms of subsection (1) of section 4 of the Act as the relevant

enactments/notifications cannot be treated as an order, either
original or appellate, made by a departmental authority and,
secondly, that the petitioners' case is founded solely on the ground
of discriminatory treatment in violation of Article 25 of the
Constitution.
9. From the above-quoted Article 212 of the Constitution and

section 4 of the Act, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Courts is
excluded only in respect of the cases in which the Service Tribunal
under subsection (1) of section 4 has the jurisdiction. It must,
therefore, follow that if the Service Tribunal does not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a particular type of grievance, the
jurisdiction of the Courts remains intact. It may again be pointed out
that the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction against a final order,
whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in
respect of any terms and conditions of service. The question,
therefore, arises, whether the relevant enactments/notifications
containing the provision for payment of enhanced pension, which
have been denied to the pensioners, can be treated as a final order,
original or appellate, passed by a departmental authority in respect
of any terms and conditions of service. Messrs Aziz A. Munshi and
Ch. Ejaz Ahmed, have referred to the following cases in support of
their above contention:--
(i) M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another (P

L D 1980 S C 22);?
in which the appellant was dismissed from service under Martial

Law "Regulation 58 in May, 1970. Upon the establishment of the
Federal Service Tribunal, he filed a service appeal which was
dismissed by the Tribunal for want of jurisdiction. Upon appeal
before this Court, it was held that the Constitution specifically
contemplated competence of a civil servant to tile an appeal before
the Service Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental
authority made at any time after the 1st July, 1969, and that the
orders or acts done without jurisdiction, coram non judice or mala
fide were not protected under clause (4) of Article 270 of the
Constitution and that the appellant's appeal was competent before
the Service Tribunal, which could examine the above question.
(ii) Iqan Ahmed Khurram v. Government of Pakistan and others (P L

D 1980 S C 153);
in the above case this Court, while maintaining the judgments of the
25 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
Sindh High Court dismissing the Constitutional petitions of the civil

servants on the ground of want of jurisdiction in view of Article 212
of the Constitution, observed as follows on the question, whether
the Tribunal could go into the question of vires of the Rules framed
by the department:--
"As to the ground concerning the non-maintainability of the petition,

the High Court has held, and it is also the case of the petitioner,
that the effect of the Rules is that it has altered the terms and
conditions of service. This being so, the bar of Article 212 of the
Constitution would be applicable with full force as in that exercise
the question of vires of the Rules vis-a-vis section 25 of the Act
would necessarily be considered. In this behalf the High Court has
relied on the statement of law enunciated in Muhammad Hashim
Khan and others v. Province of Balochistan and others (P L D 1976
Quetta 59) and Fazal Elahi Ejaz and others v. Government. of the
Punjab and others with which I agree."
(iii) The Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs and others v.
Aslam Ali Shah (P L D 1985 S C 82);
in which this Court, while setting aside the judgment of the Lahore
High Court passed in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction, held
that the question that an accused employee, while defending his
case before the Enquiry Officer, was entitled to be represented by a
counsel was a matter relating to the terms and conditions of the
service and could only be adjudicated upon by the Service Tribunal.
(iv) The Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore and 2

others v Muhammad Latif (P L D 1988 S C 387);
in the above case this Court, while dismissing an appeal against

the judgment of the Lahore High ,Court passed in exercise of writ
jurisdiction, repelled the contention that the jurisdiction of the
Courts under Article 212(2) of the Constitution was barred only at
the stage before an appeal is brought before the Service Tribunal
and not when the Tribunal disposed of the same. It was held that
against an order of the Service Tribunal, the only remedy available
is under clause (3) of Article 212 of the Constitution and not a writ
petition.
(v) Abdul Wahab Khan v. Government of the Punjab and 3 others

(P L D 1989 S C 508);
in which the facts were that the appellant, who was facing the
enquiry proceedings, filed a Constitution petition before any final
26 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
order was passed against him, which was dismissed by a learned

Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on the ground of want of
jurisdiction. Appeal filed against the above judgment, was also
dismissed by a Division Bench of the said Court. Thereupon, the
petitioner filed a petition for leave against the above judgment,
which was declined inter alia with the following observations:--
with regard to the filing of appeals. The petitioner would have to

satisfy all the conditions for filing such an appeal. One of the
conditions being that the order impugned before the Tribunal should
be such which is appealable in accordance with the relevant
Service Tribunals Act. But the order impugned before the High
Court vis-a-vis the stage at which it has been passed, is not
appealable, the petitioner would have to wait till such an order is
passed against him which is appealable before the tribunal."
(vi) Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan and 2 others (P L D 1981

Kar. 290)
in the above case, a Full Bench of five Judges of the Sindh High,
Court, while dealing with the questions referred to it, repelled the
contention that an order of retirement passed after completion of 25
years service was not covered by section 4(1) of the Act, and held
that the expression "in respect of any matter to which the
jurisdiction of such Administrative Court or Tribunal" used in Article
212 of the Constitution makes ouster of jurisdiction of the High
Court correspond with the matters placed within the ambit of
jurisdiction conferred on Tribunal.
10. From the above-cited cases, it is evident that it has been

consistently held inter alia by this Court that a civil servant if is
aggrieved by a final order, whether original or appellate, passed by
a departmental authority in respect of his terms and conditions, his
remedy, if any, is by way of an appeal before the Service Tribunal
even where the case involves vires of a particular Service Rule or a
notification or the question, whether an accused civil servant can
claim the right to be represented by a counsel before the Enquiry
Officer. We are inclined to hold that if a statutory rule or a
notification adversely affects the terms and conditions of a civil
servant, the same can be treated as an order in terms of subsection
(1) of section 4 of the Act in order to file an appeal before the
Service Tribunal. However, in the present case, the petitioners'
case is founded solely on the ground of discriminatory treatment in
violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and not because of any
27 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
breach of any provision of the Civil Servants Act or any service rule.
Furthermore, the question involved is of public importance as it
affects all the present and future pensioners and, therefore, falls
within the compass of clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution.
However, we may clarify that a.: civil servant cannot bye-pass the
jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal by adding a ground of violation of
the Fundamental Rights. The Service Tribunal will have jurisdiction
in a case which is founded on the terms and conditions of the
service even if it involves the question of violation of the
Fundamental Rights.
11. It was also contended by Ch. Ejaz Ahmed that since this Court
under Article 184(3) of. the Constitution exercises jurisdiction
similar to that of Article 199 of the Constitution, the above
constitution petitions are incompetent as the petitioners have
adequate alternate remedy in the form of an appeal before the
Service Tribunal. This contention is. untenable in view of what we
have held hereinabove while dealing with the first contention.
However, we may observe that even otherwise under clause (3) of
Article 184 of the Constitution, this Court is competent to entertain a
constitution petition if it considers that a question of public
importance is involved with reference to the enforcement of any of
the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part lI of the
Constitution notwithstanding that there might be an alternate
remedy.
12. Adverting to Ch. Ejaz Ahmed's contention that the above two
petitions riled by the two Associations are not competent, it may be
observed that in furtherance of his above submission he has urged
that since the proceedings under clause- (3) of Article 184 of the
Constitution are similar to that of under Article 199 before a High
Court, the same being civil proceedings, are subject to the
application of C.P.C. and hence the above two Associations could
not have filed the above two petitions without complying with the
provisions of Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. Reliance was placed by him on
the case of Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner,
Rawalpindi and others (P L D 1970 S C 1), in which this Court,
while dealing with the question, whether the C.P.C. was applicable
to Constitution petitions under Article 98 of the late Constitution of
Pakistan 1962, held that they were civil proceedings and as such
were governed by the provisions of the C.P.C. except those
provisions which-have been specially excluded. It may be observed
that Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. deals with riling of a representative suit
28 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
and contemplates obtaining of permission from the Court for filing

of such a suit and service of the notice by a public advertisement
etc. It also provides that any person desiring to become a party to
such a suit, may apply for being impleaded as a party. In our view
the provisions of Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. have no application to the
instant cases as we are inclined to hold that this Court can take
cognizance of any matter under clause (3) of Article 184 of the
Constitution if it involves a question of public importance with
reference to the enforcement of any Fundamental Rights conferred
by Chapter 1- of Part II at the behest of an individual person or a
group of persons represented through an association or a political
party. The above question has been the subject-matter of
discussion in the case of Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of
Pakistan and another (P L D 1988 S C 416), in which Muhammad
Haleem, C J made the following observation on the above aspect:--
"The plain language of Article 184(3) shows that it is open-ended.

The Article does not say as to who shall have the right to move the
Supreme Court nor does it say by what proceedings the Supreme
Court may be so `" moved or whether it is confined to the
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights of an individual which are
infracted or extends to the enforcement of the rights of a group or a
class of persons whose rights are violated. In this context the
question arises whether apart from the non-incorporation of
sub-Article 1(a) and 1(c) of Article 199, the rigid notion of an
"aggrieved person" is implicit in Article 184(31 as because of the
traditional litigation which, of course, is of an adversary character
where there is a lis between the two contending parties, one
claiming relief against the other resisting the claim. This rule of
standing is an essential outgrowth of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence in
which only the person wronged can initiate proceedings of a judicial
nature for redress against the wrong-doer. However, in contrast to
it, this procedure is not followed in the civil law system in vogue in
some countries. The rationale of this procedure is to limit it to the
parties concerned and to make the rule of law selective to give
protection to the affluent or to serve in aid for maintaining the status
quo of the vested interests. This is destructive of the rule of law
which is so worded in Article 4 of the Constitution as to give
protection to all citizens. The inquiry into law and life cannot, be
confined to the narrow limits of the rule of law in the context of
constitutionalism which makes a greater demand on judicial
functions. Therefore, while construing Article 184(3), the
29 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
interpretative approach should not be ceremonious observance of

the rules or usages of interpretation, but regard should be had to
the object and the purpose for which this Article is enacted, that is,
this interpretative approach must receive inspiration from the triad
of provisions which saturate and invigorate the entire Constitution,
namely, the Objectives Resolution (Article 2-A), the Fundamental
Rights and the Directive Principles of State policy so as to achieve
democracy, tolerance, equality and social justice according to
Islam."
13. Even otherwise, the above proceedings are in the nature of

public interest litigation and, therefore, in order to advance the
cause of justice and public good, the power conferred on this Court
under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution is to be exercised
liberally unfettered with technicalities. In this regard, reference may
be made to the case of D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India A I
R 1983 SC 130, on which Mr Samdani has heavily relied upon in
support of his case on merits and in which inter alia the following
observations have been made in para. 64 of the judgment on the
point in issue, which read as follows:--
"64. Locus standi of third petitioner was questioned. Petitioner No.3

is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860.
It is a non-political non-profit and voluntary organisation. Its
members consist of public spirited citizens who have taken up the
cause of ventilating legitimate public problems. This Society
received a large number of representations from old pensioners,
individually unable to undertake the journey through labyrinths of
legal judicial proceeds, costly and protracted and, therefore,
approached petitioner No.3 which espoused their cause. Objects
for which the third petitioner-Society was formed were not
questioned. The majority decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta v.
Union of India, 1981 (Supp) SCC 87: (A 1 R 1982 S C 149 at p.
194), rules that any member of the public having sufficient interest
can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising
from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the
Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty
and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. Third
petitioner seeks to enforce rights that may be available to a large
number of old infirm retirees. Therefore, its locus standi is
unquestionable. But it is a point of academic importance because
locus standi of petitioners Nos.1 and 2 was never questioned."?
14. The same view was taken by the Indian Supreme Court in an
30 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
earlier case, namely, People's Union for Democratic Rights and

others v. Union of India and others (A I R 1982 S C 1473).
However, Ch. Ejaz Ahmed has relied on the case of Anjuman
Araian, Bhera v. Abdul Rashid and 5 others PLD 1973 Lah. 500, in
which a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, while dealing with
a constitution petition under Article 98 of the late Constitution of
Pakistan, 1962, inter alia held that a petition under the above
provision can be filed by a party and the party should be one
competent to maintain an action and since the Anjuman which had
riled the above petition was unregistered body, it should have
complied with the procedure contained in Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C.
The above case is distinguishable from the present case for more
than one reason, firstly, in the instant case at least one of the
Associations is a registered body, whereas the above Anjuman
which was the petitioner in the above referred case, was not a
registered body, secondly, the petition did not involve the
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights under clause (3) of Article
184 of the Constitution, and thirdly, the above-cited case did not fall
within the category of the public interest litigation.
15. Having dealt with the above legal preliminary objections, we

may now revert to the merits of the case. Before dealing with the
respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, we
may first refer to the definition and raison d'etre of the term
"pension" and the nature of right in respect thereof. In this regard,
reference may be made to Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 17,
1963 Edition, page 488, Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 67,
pages 763 and 764, Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 70, page
423, American Jurisprudence, Volume 40, pages 980 and 981, and
para. 29 from the judgment in the case of D.S. Nakara and others v.
Union of India (supra), which read as follows:--
Extract from Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 17 1963

Edition Page
488.---"Pensions are periodic payments, usually for the natural life

of a person who retires because of age or disability. Sometimes the
term refers to, periodic payments to wives, widows or children of a
primary or deceased person or pensioner; occasionally, a pension
will be conveyed solely as an honour for conspicuous service or
valour. Pensions are I provided by Government in three guises: (1)
31 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
as compensation or recompense to war veterans and families for

old age or for disability or death, usually from service causes; (2) as
disability or old age retirement benefits for civilian employees of
government; (3) as social security payments for the aged, disabled
or deceased citizenry based on past employment history or subject
to current evidence of need. Pensions are also provided by many
non-Governmental employers as a means of protecting workers
retiring for age or disability and for relieving the payroll of
superannuated personnel. They are sometimes provided by
union-management welfare funds, associations or trusteeships.
Only rarely do employees in groups, associations or unions
undertake their own pension programme without employer or
Government assistance."
Extract from Corpus Juris Secundum. Vol. 67. pages

763-764.---"Except as limited by the Constitution the establishment
of a pension system is within the scope of the legislative power.
The granting of pensions to public officers or public employees
serves the public purpose, and is designed to induce competent
persons to enter and remain in the public' service or employment,
and to encourage the retirement from public service of those who
have become incapacitated from performing their duties as well as
they might be performed by younger or more vigorous persons. It
has also been stated that a pension system is intended to promote
efficient, continued and faithful service to the employer and
economic security to the employees and their dependents, by an
arrangement under which, by fulfilment of specified eligibility
requirements, pensions become property of the individual as a
matter of right upon the termination of public service."
Extract from Corpus Juris Secundum. Vol. 70, page 423.---"A

pension is a periodical allowance of money granted by the
Government in consideration or recognition of meritorious past
services, or of loss or injury sustained in the public service. A
pension is mainly designed to assist the pensioner in providing for
his daily wants, and it presupposes the continued life of the
recipient."
Extract from American Jurisprudence, Vo1.40, pages 980 and

981.---"The right to a pension depends upon statutory provisions
therefore, and the existence of such right in particular instances is
determinable primarily from the terms of the statute under which the
right or privilege is granted. The right to a pension may be made to
depend upon such conditions. as the grantor may see fit to
32 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
prescribe. Thus, it has been held that it may be provided, in a

general Pension Act, that any person who accepts the benefits
thereof shall forfeit his right to a special pension previously
granted."
Para. 29 from the judgment in the case of D.S. Nakara and

others v. Union of India (supra.---"Summing-up it can be said with
confidence that pension is not only compensation for loyal service
rendered in the past, but pension also has a broader significance,
in that it is a measure of socio-economic justice which inheres
economic security in the fall of life when physical and mental
prowess is ebbing corresponding to aging process and, therefore,
one is required to fall back on savings. One such saving in kind is
when you give your best in the hey day of life to your I employer, in
days of invalidity, economic security by way of periodical payment is
assured. The term has been judicially defined as a stated
allowances or stipend made in consideration of past service or a
surrender of rights or emoluments to one retired from service. Thus
the pension payable to a Government employee is earned by
rendering long and efficient service and therefore can be said to be
a deferred portion of the compensation for service rendered. In one
sentence one can say that the most practical raison d'etre for
pension is the inability to provide for oneself due to old-age. One
may live and avoid unemployment but not senility and penury if
there is nothing to fall back upon."
16. It seems that there are various kinds of pension schemes which
are obtaining in various countries of the world. However, the same
can be divided into two broad categories, namely, (i) Government
Pension Schemes; (ii) Non-Government Pension Schemes. Each of
the above category can be sub-divided into a number of
sub-categories according to the object for which a particular
scheme is designed. In the instant case, we are mainly concerned
with the pension schemes meant for public employees/public
officers, who are known in the Sub-Continent as civil servants.
A pension is intended to assist a retired civil servant in providing for

his daily wants so long he is alive in consideration of his past
services, though recently the above benefit has been extended
inter alia in Pakistan to the widows and the dependent children of
the deceased civil servants. The raison d'etre for pension seems to
be inability to provide for oneself due to old-age. The right and
extent to claim pension depends upon the terms of the relevant
statute under which it has been granted.
33 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
17. In the Sub-Continent during the British Rule since it was

considered that the salary which a -civil servant drew was a bounty,
the same view was held in respect of the pension. However, the
above controversy has been settled inasmuch as this Court in more
than one case; has held that the concept that the salary which a
civil servant drew was a bounty, was no longer the law of the
country. Reference may be made to the case of The State of
Pakistan and another v. Mchrajuddin (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 147).
As regards the right to claim pension, the controversy has been set
to rest by this Court inter alia in the case of The Government of
N-W.F.P. through The Secretary to the Government of N.-W.F.P..
Communication and Works Departments, Peshawar v. Muhammad
Said Khan and another (P L D 1973 S C 514), wherein the following
view has been taken:--
"It must now be taker as well-settled that a person who enters

Government service has also something to look forward after his
retirement, to what are called retirement benefits, grant of pension
being the most valuable of such benefits. It is equally well-settled
that pension like salary of a civil servant is no longer 'a bounty but
is a right acquired after putting in satisfactory service for the
prescribed minimum period. A fortiori, it cannot be reduced or
refused arbitrarily except to the extent and in the manner provided
in the relevant rules. Conversely full pension admissible under the
rules is not to be given as a matter of course unless the service
rendered has been duly approved. (See Article 470, Civil Service
Regulations). It is equally well-settled that if the service has not
been thoroughly satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the pension
is empowered under the said Article to make such reduction in the
amount as it may deem proper. This power is however exercisable
only before pension is actually sanctioned."
The same view has been taken by the Indian Supreme Court in the
case of Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and others (A I R
1971 S C 1409) and the case of State of Punjab and another v.
Iqbal Singh (A I R 1976 S C 667).
However, the right to claim pension has now been made subject to
a statutory provision contained in section 19 of the Civil Servants
Act, 1973, which reads as follows:--
"19. Pension and gratuity.--(1) On retirement from service, a civil

servant shall be entitled to receive such pension or gratuity as may
be prescribed.
34 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
(2) In the event of the death of a civil servant, whether before or

after retirement, his family shall be entitled to receive such pension,
or gratuity, or both, as may be prescribed.
(3) No pension shall be admissible to a civil servant who is

dismissed or removed from service for reasons of discipline, but
Governments may sanction compassionate allowance to such a
civil servant, not exceeding two-thirds of the pension or gratuity
which would have been admissible to him had he been invalidated
from service on the date of such dismissal or removal.
(4) If the determination of the amount of pension or gratuity

admissible to a civil servant is delayed beyond one month of the
date of his retirement or death, he or his family, as the case may
be, shall be paid provisionally such anticipatory pension or gratuity
as may be determined by the prescribed authority, according to the
length of service of the civil servant which qualifies for pension or
gratuity; and over-payment consequent on such provisional
payment shall be adjusted against the amount of pension or
gratuity finally determined as payable to such civil servant or his
family."
18. From the above-quoted section 19 of the Civil Servants Act,

1973, it is evident that upon retirement from service, a civil servant
is entitled to receive such pension or gratuity as may be prescribed.
It has been candidly conceded by Mr. Samdani, learned Advocate
Supreme Court appearing for the petitioners that the pensioners
have been paid and are being paid as per prescribed Rules, but
their grievance is that they have not been given the benefits of
certain increases in the pension amount.
In order to understand the controversy in issue, it may be pertinent

to quote para. 3(b), (c) and (d) of the grounds of C.P. No.15-R of
1989 and para.l-A of the written-statement filed by the Federal
Government to the same, para. 20 and para. (iii) of the Grounds in
C.P. No.5-R of 1990, and para.l(14) and 1(15) of the
written-statement filed by the Federal Government to the above
petition, which read as follows:--
Extract from para. 3(b)_(c) and (d) of the grounds of

C.P. No.15-R of 1989
"3(b) that the principle that pay and pension benefits, which are a
deferred portion of the compensation for service rendered, accrue
to civil servants by virtue of the post they hold and not according to
35 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
the date on which a person joins or retires from services has been
recognized by the Government in that the 1966 Pension Rules, or
the abolition of the cut-off point in 1985 and indexation of pensions
did not draw a distinction between those who retired before and
those who retired after the introduction of these changes. The
Government similarly in revising pay scales for civil servants does
not discriminate between those who joined service before the
introduction of such revision in pay scales and those who joined
thereafter. Therefore the discrimination between pensioners who
retired before a particular date and those who retired later in the
various aforesaid revisions of the Pension Rules is arbitrary and
capricious.
(c) That the absurd and discriminatory effect of the aforementioned

provisions can be illustrated thus:--
"Suppose that A, B and C were born in June, 1926, July, 1926 and
July, 1927. All of them joined the CSS together and all of them
retired in Grade 20. A would get a pension of Rs.3,668 on retiring in
June, 1986, whereas B on retiring in July, 1986; would get Rs.4,025
because of the various improvements in pension benefits which
were introduced for all those who retired after 1st July, 1987. C on
retiring in July, 1987, would get an even higher pension of Rs,5,220
by virtue of the revision in pay scales introduced with effect from 1st
July, 1987.
(d) That the upward revision of pay and pensions by the

Government has been in recognition of the rising cost of living and
escalating inflationary tendencies in the economy, and also
decrease in the economic value of rupee, and, therefore, the same
considerations should apply to all the pensioners irrespective of
their dates of retirement."
Para. 1-A of the Written-Statement filed by the Federal Government

to C.P. No.15-R of 1989:
"Para. 1(a) Denied. Pension is allowed to civil servants in

accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Regulations
(CSR). The CSR, inter alia, provides as under:--
"CSR-4. The Government of Pakistan reserve to themselves the

right of changing the rules in these Regulations regarding pay and
acting allowances and leave and pension, from time to time at their
discretion, and of interpreting their meaning in case of dispute.
An officer's claim to pay and allowances is regulated by the rules in
36 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
force at the time in respect of which the pay and allowances are
earned; to leave by the rules in force at the time the leave is applied
for and granted; and to pension by the rules in force at the time
when the officer resigns or is discharged from the service of
Government."
"CSR-486.-- The term emoluments means the emoluments which

the officer was receiving immediately before his retirement and
shall include--
(a) pay as defined in FR 9(21)(a)(i);
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
FR 9(21)(a)(i) `pay' means the amount drawn monthly by a

Government servant as--
(i) the pay, other than special pay or pay granted in lieu of his
personal qualifications which has been sanctioned for a post held
by him substantively or in an officiating capacity, or to which he is
entitled by reason of his position in a cadre."
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Therefore, pensions of retired Government servants are not

recalculated on revision of pay scales of serving employees:'
Para. 20 of the Grounds in C.P. No.5-R of 1990:
"(20) That the discriminatory aspect of P.O. No.5 of 1988 whereby

the petitioner has been and continues to be denied the benefit of
Cost of Living Allowance payable under the said Order, is liable to
be declared void and quashed by this august Court in the exercise
of its powers under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to enforce
fundamental rights contained in Chapter 1 of Part 11 of the
Constitution, inter alia, on the following grounds."
Para. (iii) of the Grounds in C.P. No. 5-R of 1990
"(iii) That the. discriminatory effect of the impugned provision in P.O.

No.5 of 1988 can be seen from the following:
Maximum monthly pension (including indexation/CLA) of High

Court Judge who retired before 1-7-1987:
________________________________________________________________________
From??????????????????????????????????????? Indexation/
CLA ?????????????????????????????????? Aggregate amount
________________________________________________________________________
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1-7-1985???????????????????????????????? @
1.100?????????????????????????????????????????????
4620
1-7-1986???????????????????????????????? @
1.135?????????????????????????????????????????????
4767
??????????? (inclusive of previous indexation)
1-7-1987???????????????????????????????? @ 4% on
pension???????????????????????????????? 4935
1-7-1988???????????????????????????????? @ 7% of gross
pension???????????? 5229
Maximum monthly pension (including indextation/CLA) of High

Court Judge who retired on or after 1-7-1987:
_______________________________________________________________________
From??? Indexation/CLA ?????????? Aggregate amount
________________________________________________________________________
1-7-1987???????????????????????????????? @ Rs.2,640
subject to????????????????????????????????????? 6,300
??????????? max. of Rs.6,300
1-7-1988???????????????????????????????? @ 7% of gross
pension subject to ??????????????????? 6,300
max. of Rs.6,300
Thus a Judge who retired before 1-7-1987 would get Rs.4,935 from
1?7-1987 and Rs.5,229 from 1-7-1988 as aggregate of pension and
indexation as compared to Rs.6,300 in the case of a Judge who
retires on or after 1-7-1987. The difference is bound to further
increase in case of any subsequent upward revision of CLA, the
benefit of which is similarly denied to a Judge because of his
having retired from a date earlier than that specified for the purpose
of the grant of the benefit."
Para. 1(14 and 1(15) of the Written-Statement riled by the Federal

Government in C.P. No.5-R of 1990:
"Under powers conferred on the President of Pakistan vide para.2

of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution (reproduced above) the
serving Judges of High Court and Supreme Court were allowed
cost of living allowance in pay from 1-7-1987 pending revision of
rates of pay. Therefore, Judges retiring on or after 1-7-1987 have
38 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
been allowed cost of living allowance in pension under the order of

the President. Judges retired prior to 1-7-1986 are entitled to
pension on rates provided in Fifth Schedule and indexation on
pension (10% from 1-7-1985, 3/1/2 % from 1-7-1986, 4% from
1-7-1987 and 7% from 1-7-1988) allowed by the President under
power conferred on him."
19. At this juncture, it may be pertinent to refer to the various

increases made by the Government in the form of revision of
salaries and pensions in respect of civil servants and the Judges of
the High Courts:
(a) The following revisions have been made in respect of the civil
servants/pensioners:--
(i) From 1-7-1966, pension raised from 50% to 60% of average pay
during last 36 months of service.
Finance Division's O.M. No.OB.2/12/63-IMP(1) dated 18-8-1966.
Applicable to all pensioners irrespective of date of retirement
(ii) New National Pay Scales introduced in 1972-73 effective from

1st March, 1972.
(i) Schedule ,to Finance Division's O. M. No. 1(2)-NG-Imp/71 dated

8-3-1972.
(ii) Finance Division's Office Memo. No.F.l (36) Gaz-Imp 1/73 dated
18th? August, 1973.
(iii) Pension raised from 60% to 70% in February, 1977.
Applicable to all pensioners who retired on or after

1-3-1972
(iv) National Pay Scales revised in 1977.
Finance Division's O.M. No.F.l(1)-IMP-1/77 dated 28th April, 1977.
(v) From 1-7-1980 cut off point of Rs.1,000 (pension in excess of

Rs.1,000 was to be halved) raised to Rs.2,000.
Finance Division O.M. No. F.6(3)-Reg. (6)/79 dated 28th June,

1980.
Made applicable only to pensioners who retired after 30-6-1980.
(vi) From 1-7-1980, pensioners who retired before 1-7-1980 were

given the following ad hoc increase:--
Scale 1 to
39 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
10???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? Rs. 40 p.m.
Scale 11 to
16?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Rs. 70 p.m.????
Scale 17 to
18?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Rs: 100 p.m.????
Scale 19 to
20?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Rs. 150 p.m
Scale 21 to
22?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? Rs. 200 p.m.
Finance Division's O.M. No.F.6(3)-Reg(6)/79 dated 28th June,

1980.
(vii) From 1-7-1981 National Pay Scales were revised raising

maximum in all scales and giving one advance increment.
Finance Division O.M. No.F.2(18)-R-3/81 dated 27th June, 1981.
(viii) From 1-7-1981 increase of 10% of gross pension granted to

pensioners. (Max. Rs.200).
Finance Division O.M. No.F.12(1)-Reg(6)/81 dated 25th July, 1981.
(ix) From 1-7-1982 increase of 10% of gross pension (Max. Rs.200)

granted to pensioners.
Finance Division O.M. No.F.2(2)-85/82 dated 17th June, 1982,

identical increase given to serving officials.
(x) From 1-7-1983 National Pay Scales revised raising salaries in

some cases by 50%.
Finance Division O.M. No.l(1) IMP/83 dated 18th August, 1983.
(xi) From 1-7-1983 increase of 10% (Max. Rs.200) of gross pension

granted to pensioners.
Finance Division O.M. No.F.12(13)-Reg(6)/82(B) dated 18th

August, 1983.
(xii) From 1-7-1983 cut off point was raised from Rs.2,000 to
Rs.2,500.
Finance Division O.M.No.F.12(13)-Reg(6)/82(C) dated 18th August,
40 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
1983.
Pensioners who retired prior to 1-7-1983 were excluded.
(xiii) From 1-7-1983 cut off point was abolished. All pensioners.
irrespective of date of retirement, were allowed to draw pension
without any reduction.
Finance Division O.M. No.10(7)-Reg(6)/85 dated 25th June, 1985.
(xiv) From 1-7-1985 commuted value of 1/4 of pension was

restored after completing the period for which commuted value was
paid. Applicable to all pensioners.
Finance Division O.M. No.F.10(8)-Reg(6)/85 dated 25th June,

1985.
(xv)????? From 1-7-1985 all pensions indexed at the rate of 1.135

for pensions up to Rs.1,500. Finance Division's Office Memo.
No.F.l(1)-Reg(6)/85 dated 26-6-1985. Identical indexation
sanctioned for serving officials.
(xvi) From 1-7-1986 pension allowed to be calculated on last pay

drawn instead of average pay during last 12/36 months.
Applicable only to pensioners retiring after 30 6

1986
Finance Division O.M. No.F.16(4)-Reg(6)/86 dated 1st July, 1986.
(xvii) From 1-7-1986 additional benefit of 2% of pension for each

year of service exceeding 30 years subject to a maximum of 10% of
pension sanctioned.
Applicable only to pensioners who retired after 30-6

1986
Finance Division O.M. No.F.11(2)-Reg(6)/86, dated 1st July, 1986.
(xviii) From 1-7-1986 pensions indexed at the rate of 18% for

pensions up to Rs.1,500 and 13.5% for pensions exceeding
Rs.1,500.
Finance Division O.M. NO.R.11-6(A) dated 1-7-1986.
(xix) From 1-7-1987 National Pay Scales revised awarding

increases in all Scales.
Finance Division O.M. No.F.l(7)/IMP.11/87 dated 1-7-1987.
(xx) From i-7-1987 pensions indexed at the rate of 4%.
41 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
Finance Division O.M. No.F.11(4)-8.6/87 dated 1-7-1987.
(xxi) From 1-7-1988 minimum gross pension fixed at Rs.300 p.m.
Finance Division O.M. No.F.9(12)Reg(6)/88-A dated 1-7.1988.
(xxii) From 1-7-1988 pensions indexed at the rate of 7%.
Finance Division O.M. No.F.9(10)/Reg(6)/88 dated 1-7-1988.
Identical indexation granted to serving officials.
(Applicable to all pensioners).
(xxiii) From 1-7-1990 ad hoc relief of 5% of pension granted to

pensioners.
Finance Division O.M. No.F.6(7)/Reg(6)/90 dated 15-7-1990.
(b) Through the following President Orders/notifications, the

revision in pay and pension of the Judges of the Superior Courts
were made. Since the dispute relates to the pension of a retired
High Court Judge, reference herein below has been made to
revision of pay and pension of the High Court Judges:--
(i) Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1983. (P.O.No.4 of 1983).
The pension of a High Court Judge was revised with effect from
1-7-1981, the maximum being raised to Rs.3,600 per month in
place of Rs.1,750, and minimum Rs.2,100 in place of Rs.1,000.
(ii) The High'-Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Order,

1983. (P.O. No.5 of 1983).
The above amendments in the High Court Judges (Leave, Pension

and Privileges) Order, 1983, were made as to give effect to the
above Constitutional amendments in the Fifth Schedule to the
Constitution by above P.O. No.4 of 1983.
(iii) Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1985 (P.O. No.6 of 1985).
By the above P.O. the salary and the pension inter alia of the
Judges of the High Court were revised inasmuch as for the figure of
Rs.5,800, the figure of Rs.7,200, for figure Rs.5,000, the figure
Rs.6,500, for the figure Rs.2,100, figure Rs.2,400, and for the figure
Rs.3,600, the figure Rs.4,200, were substituted.
(iv) High Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Order,

1970. (P.O. No.1 of 1986).
The pension allowed was indexed in relation to the cost of living at

the rate of 1.100 with effect from 1-7-1985.
(v) Notification No.F.2(1)/86-AII(PT)A, dated 3-12-1986.
42 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
Under the latter notification the pension was further indexed at the
rate of 1.135 (inclusive of the previous indexation) with effect from
1-7-1986.
(vi) The High Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges)

(Amendment) Order, 1988. (P.O. No.5 of 1988).
By this P.O. cost of living allowance in addition to the pension was

allowed to a High Court Judge who retires on or after the 1st day of
July, 1987. Under the above P.O. C.LA. admissible to a High Court
Judge was Rs.2,640 subject to the maximum aggregate amount of
such allowance and pension of Rs.6,300.
(vii) Notification No.F.5(2)/88-AII) dated 10-10-1988.
Under the above notification, further indexation was allowed at the

rate of 7% of gross pension with effect from 1-7-1988 to all the
Judges of the High Court who retired on or before 30-6-1988.
20. A perusal of the above-quoted revisions indicate that the benefit

of the revisions in the pension referred to hereinabove at S. Nos. (i)
(iii), (vi), (ix), (xi), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xviii), (xx), (xxi), (xxii) and (xxiii)
of above para. 19(a) was extended to all the pensioners
irrespective of the date of retirement. It may also be pointed out that
the benefit of raising the amount of cut off point from Rs.1,000 to
Rs.2,000 with effect from 1-7-1980 and from Rs.2,000 to Rs.2,5Q0
with effect from 1-8-1983 referred to hereinabove at S. Nos. (v) and
(xii) of para. 19(a) was not extended to the pensioners who retired
prior to the above two specified dates and, therefore, they could
have a legitimate grievance on the ground of discrimination.
However, this anomaly and the discriminatory treatment was
rectified by abolishing the cut off point with effect from 1-7-1985
referred to hereinabove at S. No.(xiii) of above para. 19(a), which
benefit was extended to all the pensioners irrespective of the date
of retirement.
It may also be noticed that with effect from 1-7-1986 an additional

benefit of 2% of pension for each year of service exceeding 30
years subject to a maximum of 10% pension sanctioned was given
to the pensioners, who retired after 30-6-1986 referred to
hereinabove at S. No.(xvii) of para.19(a). According to the list of
documents furnished by Mr. Samdani, this benefit has not been
extended to the pensioners who retired prior to 1-7-1986. It may
further be noticed that new National Pay Scales were introduced
with effect from 1-3-1972 and were revised in April, 1977, then in
June, 1981 with effect from 1-7-1981, then with effect from
43 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
1-7-1983 and then with effect from 1-7-1987, referred to

hereinabove at Serial Nos. (ii), (iv), (vii), (x) and (xix).
Whereas the case of the petitioner in C.P. No.5-R of 1990 is that he

has been given benefit of all the above revisions except that he has
been denied benefit under P.O. No.5 of 1988, which benefit was
extended inter alia to the High Court Judges, who retired on or after
1-7-1987.
21. The main grievance of the retired civil servants/pensioners,

which has been canvassed at the Bar by Mr. Samdani is that the
pensioners have not been given the benefit of the introduction of
new National Pay Scales with effect from 1-3-1972 and thereafter
its revision from time to time. According to him as the pension is to
be computed on the basis of pay, any increase in pay scales
enhances pension of those pensioners, whose pension is to be
calculated on the basis of the revised pay scales. His further
submission was that since the pension scheme enforced in
Pakistan is salary related, any revision in the pay scales should
also be made applicable to the pensioners as the reason for
revision of pay scales in the rising cost of living and escalating
inflationary tendencies in the economy and also decrease in the
economic value of rupee, which reasons do not affect the serving
civil servants alone, but affect more adversely the retired civil
servants/the pensioners. It was also urged by him that providing
certain date for qualifying for certain benefits under the pension
scheme is arbitrary and discriminatory and is violative of Article 25
of the Constitution. According to him, all the civil servants who held
equal rank and had equal length of service, should get same
amount of pension irrespective of their dates of retirement.
22. On the other hand, Mr. Aziz A. Munshi, learned

Attorney-General, has submitted that there has not been any
discriminatory treatment in granting benefits to the pensioners as to
attract Article 25 of the Constitution and that the legal right to
receive pension is relatable to the date of retirement as per Civil
Service Regulation 4 referred to hereinabove in para. 18 and that
the revision of the pay scales in fact is a benefit granted to the
serving civil servants and not to the pensioners.
23. Mr. Samdani has relied upon the following passage from Corpur
Juris Secundum, Volume 67:--
"A pensioner ordinarily has no right to a specific sum, and the

amount payable to him is subject to change, by way of decrease or
44 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
increase, in accordance with the rank of the pensioner at the time

of retirement, or in accordance with a change in statute. Where a
pension statute states that the pension shall be a percentage of the
average salary attached to the rank held by an employee before
retirement, it is construed as providing for a fluctuating pension
which increases or decreases as salaries paid to active employees
increase or decrease."
The above observation seems to be based on the judgment in the

case of George G. Eichelberger et al v. City of Berkeley et al and
Lewis Wescott v. City of Berkeley et al 46 C. 2d 182; 293 p.2d 1
decided by an appellate Court of a State of U.S.A. in an appeal
against a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County
arising out of claim brought by the pensioners who had served as
firemen. The facts were that the defendant passed Ordinance No:?
188-N.S. effective from April 28, 1938. It authorised retirement and
pension for members of its Fire Department, who had theretofore,
served or who thereafter served for a specified number of years.
For those retiring, the pension was to be one-half of the average
salary attached to the rank or ranks held during the three years
immediately preceding the date of retirement and in the case of
widow of a fireman killed in line of duty, the percentage was to be
one-third. Section 24 of that Ordinance provided that `The,
pensions granted under the terms of this Ordinance shall not
increase nor decrease with any changes in salary subsequent to
the date of the granting of the pension for the rank or ranks upon
which the pension was based nor shall any changes of title or rank
in the active service affect an increase or reduction in the existing
pension'. By amending Ordinance No.2254-N.S. which came into
effect from 20-4-1939, the. above portion of the above section
which prohibited increase or decrease in the pension on account of
increase or decrease in the salary, was deleted. The question
arose, whether the pensioners who retired prior to 20-4-1939 were
entitled to the benefit of the above amendment. The appellate Court
has held that there was no reason not to extend the benefit of the
above amendment to those pensioners who retired prior to
20-4-1939. Incidentally I may mention that in 19:14 again
amendments were made, whereby the position obtaining prior to
the enactment of the above amending Ordinance No.2254-N.S.
was restored as is indicated from the note given at the bottom of
page 184 of the above report. The reasoning in the above judgment
seems to be in line which I am inclined to adopt, namely, that the
45 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
pensioners inter se cannot be discriminated on the basis of date of

retirement.
He has also extensively referred to and relied upon the judgment of

the Indian Supreme Court m the case of D.S. Nakara and others v.
Union of India (supra). It may be pertinent to refer the facts of the
above case and the controversy which was the subject-matter of
the above decision. The facts were that on 25-5-1979 the
Government of India, Ministry of Finance,, issued an Office
Memorandum, whereby the formula for computation of pension was
liberalized but made it applicable to Government servants who
were in service on 31-3-1979 .and retired from service on or after
that date. The formula introduced a slab system for computation of
pension. The, above pension scheme was also made applicable to
the defence personnel who became/become non-effective on or
after 1-4-1979. Consequently those who retired prior to the
specified date, were not entitled to the benefit under the above
liberalized pension formula: The above action of the Government of
India to confine the benefit of the above pension scheme to the civil
servants/the defence personnel who retired after the specified date,
was impugned by some pensioners as well as by a Society,
registered under the Societies Registration Act, of which object was
to ventilate legitimate public problems. The question before the
Indian Supreme Court for consideration was as under:--
"Do pensioners entitled to receive superannuation or retiring

pension under Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 (1972
Rules for short) form a class as a whole? Is the date of retirement a
relevant consideration for eligibility when a revised formula for
computation of pension is ushered in and made effective from a
specified date? Would differential treatment to pensioners related to
the date of retirement qua the revised formula for computation of
pension attract Art.14 of the Constitution and the element of
discrimination liable to be declared? unconstitutional as being
violative of Art.14?"
D.A. Desai, J., who delivered the judgment, after tracing the
historical background of the pension and its raison d'etre (i.e.
reason for being or justification for existing), inter alia made the
following observations, on which Mr. Samdani has heavily relied
upon:--
"Proceeding further, this Court observed that where all relevant

considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may
46 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
not be treated differently in the matter of their pay merely because

they belong to different departments. If that can't be done when
they are in service, can that be done during their retirement?
Expanding this principle, one can confidently say that if pensioners
form a class, their computation cannot be by different formula
affording unequal treatment solely on the ground that some retired
earlier and some retired later."
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------
"Now if pension as we view it, is some kind of retirement wages for

past service, can it be denied to those who retired earlier, revised
retirement benefits being available to-future retirees only.
Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the Court by
its approach would be making the scheme retroactive, because it is
implicit in theory of wages."
The Indian Supreme Court concluded that the Government of

India's decision of introducing an arbitrary eligibility criteria; `being
in service and retiring subsequent to the specified date' for being
eligible for the liberalized pension scheme, was violative of Article
14 of the Indian Constitution (which corresponds to Article 25 of the
Constitution). It was further held that the benefit of the above
liberalized scheme would be available to all the - pensioners on the
date of its enforcement irrespective of the date of retirement.
24. IC may be observed that even from the above quoted extract
from the Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 67 referred to
hereinabove in para 23, it is evident that the right and extent of the
pension amount depends on the language of the relevant statute or
the rules framed there-under. In order to link revision of pension
amount with the revision of pay scales, there should be a statutory
provision to that effect. The Civil Servants Act does not contain any
such provision, in the contrary, section 19 of the latter Act expressly
provides that on retirement from service, a civil servant shall be
entited to receive such pension or gratuity as may be prescribed.
The above entitlement has been prescribed in the form of the
aforesaid C.S.R. 4, which inter alia lays down that an officer's claim
to pay and allowances is regulated by the rules in force at the time
in respect of which the pay and allowances are earned; to leave by
the rules in force at the time the leave is applied for and granted;
and to pension by the rules in force at the I time when the officer
47 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
resins or is discharged from the service of Government (Underlining

is of ours). In this view of the matter, the principle enunciated in the
above quoted passage from Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 67, is
not applicable to the present case. The above judgment of the
Indian Supreme Court also does not lay down the proposition that if
pay scales of serving civil servants are revised, the pension of the
civil servants who have already retired by then, is to be recomputed
on the basis of the revised pay scales. The ratio of the above cited
case seems to be that pensioners as a whole are one class and are
entitled to be treated alike and any discriminatory treatment by
specifying a qualifying date, is violative of Article 14 of the Indian
Constitution. To reinforce the above conclusion, it has been
highlighted that the persons holding identical posts having same
length of service, cannot be discriminated while in service, then
how they can be discriminated on the basis of date of retirement
upon retirement. Mr. Samdani has candidly conceded that it is so,
but submitted that this Court should break a new ground by linking
revision of pension with the revision of pay scales. In our view, a
new ground or a new avenue can be explored on the basis of some
legal principle and not merely on the ground what appears to be
just and equitable.
25. As pointed out hereinabove earlier that the case of the

petitioners is not 'founded on the ground of violation of any
provision of the Civil Servants Act or the relevant statutory rules but
is grounded on the violation of Article 25 of the Constitution. It
would, therefore, be advantageous to reproduce here in below the
above Article, which reads as follows:--
"25. (1) All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal
protection of law.
(2) There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone.
(3) Nothing in. this Article shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for the protection of women and children."
It may be noticed that above-quoted clause (1) enshrines the basic

concept of religion of Islam. However, this is now known as the
golden principle of Modern Jurisprudence, which enjoins that all
citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of
law. The above clause corresponds to 14th Constitutional
Amendment of the American Constitution, which inter alia provides
that `no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of law' However, the above clause does not
48 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
prohibit treatment of citizens by a Stage on the basis of a

reasonable classification. The question, therefore, arises what
should be the basis or criterion for classification as to avert violation
of the above clause. In this regard, it may be pertinent to refer the
following cases of this Court and of the Indian Supreme Court:--
(i) Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali and another v. The State P L D 1975 SC
506;
in which this Court considered the scope of Fundamental Right

No.15 of the late Constitution of 1962 in context with Article 25 of
the Constitution and Hamoodur Rehman, C.J. who delivered the
leading judgment, made the following observations:--
"Equal protection of the laws does not mean that every citizen, no
matter what his condition, must be treated in the same manner. The
phrase `equal protection' of the laws means that no person or class
of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other class of persons in like
circumstances in respect of their life, liberty, property, or pursuits of
happiness. This only means that persons, similarly situated or in
similar circumstances, will be treated in the same manner. Besides
this, all law implies classification, f6r, when it applies for' a set of
circumstances, it creates thereby a class and equal protection
means that this classification should be reasonable. To justify the
validity of a classification, it must be shown that it is based on
reasonable distinctions or that it is on reasonable basis and rests
on a real or substantial difference of distinction. Thus different laws
an validly be made for different sexes, for persons in different age
groups e.g. minors or very old people; different taxes may be levied
from different classes of persons on the basis of their ability to pay.
Similarly, compensation for properties acquired may be paid at
different rates to different categories of owners. Such differentiation
may also be made on the basis of occupations or privileges or the
special needs of a particular locality or a particular community.
Indeed the bulk of the special laws made to meet special situations
come within this category. Thus, in the field of criminal justice, a
classification may well be made on the basis of the heinousness of
the crime committed or the necessity of preventing certain
anti-social effects of a particular crime. Changes in procedure may
equally well be effected on the ground of the security of the State,
maintenance of public order, removal of corruption from amongst
public servants or for meeting an emergency."
49 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
(ii) Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of

Interior and Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad v. Abdul Wali Khan, M.NA.
former President of Defunct National Awami Party P L D 1976 SC
57;
In the above case, Hamoodur Rehman, CJ. while dealing with the
reference made by the Government against the National Awami
Party, touched upon the question of equal protection of law and
made the following observations:-
" ....What is unreasonable in one given set of circumstances may

well be reasonable in another different set of circumstances. In
order to test the reasonableness of such restrictions, therefore, no
general standard exists. It will depend upon a variety of
circumstances including the interest and urgency of the action
proposed and the nature of the safeguard, if any, provided to
prevent possibilities of abuse of power. The investment of arbitrary
power in the executive to put to an end to the existence of a
political party on the basis of its own satisfaction which may or may
not be capable of being proved in a Court of Law may well be an
unreasonable restriction having regard to the importance of the
right of association guaranteed by the Constitution. The safeguard
that such a declaration by the Executive will be subject to the
decision of the Supreme Court is, however, a sufficient safeguard of
the interest of the political party and adequately protects it from
being dealt with either arbitrarily or whimsically or out of political
vengeance. This can, in no sense, be considered to be an
unreasonable restriction:'
(iii) Mst. Aziz Bepum and others v. Federation of Pakistan and

others P L D 1990 SC 899;
in which, this Court has dilated upon Article 25 of the Constitution

and observed as follows:--
"Article 25. also is 4,Qt attracted to the claim made by the

petitioners in the Constitution petition. It relates to equality of
citizens before law and the equality enjoined by the Constitution
permits reasonable classification and the adjudication by the
Shariat Appellate Bench, recognises and gives effect to the
categories where the rights are to be protected as a class and not
so protected as a class. There is no element of discrimination or
arbitrariness in the same. The decision follows an elaborate line of
reasoning for giving effect to or for declaring a portion of the law or
the whole of it repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam."
50 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
(iv) Shrin Munir and others v. Government of Punjab through

Secretary Health, Lahore and another P L D 1990 SC 295;
In the above case this Court, while declaring reservation of lesser

seats for girls in Medical Colleges of Punjab as compared to boys
as violative of Article 25 of the Constitution, observed as follows as
to reasonable classification:---
"17. The harmony and the consistency between Article 25 and

Article 22 of the Constitution is obvious notwithstanding the
generality of the one and the particularity of the other, only if we
keep this important fact in view that `classification based on
intelligible and reasonable standards is permissible within the
framework of Article 25 on the ground of sex and sex alone. If in
Article 22 the word `sex' had also been introduced then there would
nave occurred a conflict instead of consistency between Article
25.and Article 22 inasmuch as the classification permissible under
Article 25 would have become impermissible in educational
institutions with regard to admission therein. The girls would have
sought admission in institutions exclusively reserved for boys and
the boys would have sought admission in institutions reserved
exclusively for girls unless it was shown as a fact that the institution
for girls was kept exclusive for the purpose of and within the
limitation of clause (3) of Article 25. As the two Articles 25 and 22
stand at present, the general rule is that `sex' cannot be' adopted
as the sole criteria for discrimination except for advancing the
cause of women and children as permitted by clause (3) of Article
25. On that principle of reasonable and intelligible classification it is
possible to have educational institutions exclusively catering to the
needs of the male population land also educational institutions
catering exclusively the female population in our context and in our
society. However, when an educational institution is thrown open for
co-education, as has been done in the case of six medical
institutions excluding Fatima Jinnah Medical College, then a further
restriction of numbers on the ground of sex is permissible only as a
protective measure of women and children but in no case so as to
protect comparatively less meritorious boys to the prejudice and
exclusion of women. This amounts to gross violation of
constitutional mandate:'
(v) Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others (A I R

1951 SC 41);
in which Fazl AIL J. of the Indian Supreme court, while dealing with
51 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, made the following

observations:-
"Having summed up the law in this way, the same learned author
adds:
"Many different classifications of persons have been upheld as

constitutional. A law applying to one person or one class of persons
is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it.-
There can be no doubt that Article 14 provides one of the most

valuable and important guarantees in the Constitution which should
not be allowed to be whittled down, and, while accepting the
statement of Professor Willis as a correct exposition of the
principles underlying this guarantee, I wish to lay particular
emphasis on the principle enunciated by him that any classification
which is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no
classification and a proper classification must always rest upon
some difference and must bear a reasonable and -just relation to
the things in respect of which it is proposed."
(vi) Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and others v. Shri Justice S.R.
Rendolkar and others (A.I.R.1958 S.C. 538);
In the above case; the Indian Supreme Court repelled the

contention that the reference made by the Government for holding
enquiry against the appellant-company under section 3 of the
Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952, was violative of Article 14 of the
Indian Constitution.
(vii) The Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and others [(1975)
2 S C C 175);
In the above case section 406(2) (e) of the Bombay Municipal

Corporation Act, which was amended by Gujarat Act No.5 of 1970,
and which provided making deposit of the tax amount in dispute as
a precondition for filing of an appeal, was impugned as being
violative of Article 14 but the Indian Supreme Court held that it was
not so and that the provision has not the effect of making invidious
distinction or creating two classes with the object of meting out
differential treatment to them but it only spelled out the
consequences flowing from the omission and default of a person.
(viii) State of Kerala and anoth8r v. N.M. Thomas and others

[(1976) 2 S C C 310);
In the above case inter alia the question before the Indian Supreme
Court was, whether a rule whir provides that given the necessary
52 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
requisite merit, a member of the backward class shall get priority to

ensure adequate representation, was violative of Articles 14 and 16
of the Indian Constitution. It was held that the classification of
employees belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes for
allowing them as extended period of two years for passing the
specified test for promotion is a just and reasonable classification
having rationale nexus to the object of providing equal opportunity
for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment of
public office.
(ix) In re: Special Courts Bill, 1978 (Special Reference No.l of 1978)
(A I R 1979 SC 478):
In the above case also inter alia Article 14 of the Indian Constitution
'was the subject-matter before the Indian Supreme Court. In this
regard, the following observations are pertinent:-
4. The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that

the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the
Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available
to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It only means
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both
in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would
have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be
no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the
subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the
same."
(x) Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others (A I R

1981 SC 487);
in which the question was, whether the procedure adopted by the

Society for granting admission to its educational institutions not to
take into account marks obtained by the candidate in the qualifying
examination but to regulate admission by relying on entrance test
was violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, it was held it
was not so. However, it was also held that allocation of a high
percentage as 33-1/3 of the total marks for the oral interview, was
arbitrary and consequently, allocation of more than 15% marks was
struck down as constitutionally invalid.
(xi) D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 130);
in which the Indian Supreme Court made the following observation

as to the reasonable classification with reference to Article 14 of the
Indian Constitution:-
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"The fundamental principle is that Art. 14 forbids class legislation

but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation
which classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the
group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object
sought to be achieved by a statute in question."
26. From the above cited cases the following principles of law are
deducible:-
(i) that equal protection of law does not envisage that every citizen
is to be treated alike in all circumstances, but it contemplates that
persons similarly situated or similarly placed are to be treated alike;
(ii) that reasonable classification is permissible but it must be

founded on reasonable distinction or reasonable basis;
(iii) that different laws can validly be enacted for different sexes,
persons in different age groups, persons having different financial
standings, and persons accused of heinous crimes;
(iv) that no standard of universal application to test reasonableness

of a classification can be laid down as what may be reasonable
classification in a particular set of circumstances, may be
unreasonable in the other set of circumstances;
(v) that a law applying to one person or one class of persons may
be constitutionally valid if there is sufficient basis or reason for it,
but a classification which is arbitrary and is not founded on any
rational basis is no classification as to warrant its exclusion from the
mischief of Article 25:-
(vi) that equal protection of law means that all persons equally
placed be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed;
(vii) that in order to make a classification reasonable, it should be

based--
(a) on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or

things that are grouped together from those who have been left out;
(b) that the differentia must have rational nexus to the object sought
to be achieved by such classification.
27. The learned Attorney-General has also referred in extenso

certain passages from V.N. Shukla's Constitution of India, 7th
Edition. Suffice to refer a passage wherein the learned author has
54 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
inferred following principles as to classification with reference to

various judgments of the Indian Supreme Court on Article 14 of the
Indian Constitution:-
"(a) A law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single

individual if, on account of some special circumstances, or reasons
applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual
may be treated as a class by himself.
(b) There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality

of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show
that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional
principles. The person, therefore, who pleads that Article 14
(corresponding to Art. 25 of Pakistan Constitution) has been
violated, must make out that not only has he been treated
differently from others but he has been so treated from persons
similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis and such
differential treatment hag been unjustifiably made. However, it is
extremely hazardous to decide the question of the constitutional
validity of a provision on the basis of the supposed existence of
facts by raising a presumption. Presumptions are resorted to when
the matter does not admit of direct proof or when there is some
practical difficulty to produce evidence to prove a particular fact.
(c) It must be presumed that the Legislature understands and

correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds.
(d) The Legislature is free to recognise the degrees of harm and

may confine its restriction to those cases where the need is
deemed to be the clearest.
(e) In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court

may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters
of common report, the history of the times and may assume every
state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of
legislation.
(f) While good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the
part of the Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the
face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the
notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be
regarded as based, the presumption of the constitutionality cannot
be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some
undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals
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or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.
(g) A classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically

complete.
(h) The validity of a rule has to be judged by assessing its overall

effect and not by picking up exceptional cases. What the Court has
to see is whether the classification made is a just one taking all
aspects into consideration."
28. The question which requires consideration is, as to whether in

the instant cases classification is founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes one group of pensioners from others
and whether the above differentia has rational nexus to the object
or raison d'etre sought to be achieved. According to Mr. Samdam,
civil servants who have already retired and who will retire in future
should be treated as a class and that there cannot be any
sub-classification within the above class on the basis of date of
retirement, as it would not fall within permissible reasonable
classification. On the other hand, Mr. Aziz A. Munshi learned
Attorney-General, has urged that various groups of pensioners are
to be classified on the basis of applicability of relevant pension
rules. We are unable to subscribe to Mr. Samdani's above
submission that civil servants who have already retired and who will
retire in future, are to be treated as one class nor we are inclined to
agree with the above submission of the learned Attorney-General.
In our view, reasonable classification will be that all the pensioners
as a group are to be treated as one class and all serving civil
servants as a group are to be treated as a separate class. In this
view of the matter, if the pay scales of serving civil servants are
revised, the civil servants, who have by then already retired cannot
have any legitimate grievance to agitate for notional revision of their
pay scales for re-computing their pension amounts for any purpose
as the pension amount is to be computed as above C.S.R. 4 on the
basis of the pension rules in force on the date of retirement of a civil
servant. The pension rules contain formula as to the method of
computation of pension amount with reference to the salary drawn
by him till the date of retirement and, therefore, there cannot be
uniformity in the amounts of pension among the civil servants
despite of having equal rank and equal length of service, if they
retire not on one date but on different dates and in-between such
dates pay scales are revised. However, a pensioner may have a
legitimate grievance if he is not treated alike with the other
pensioners, for example, if the Legislature/Government increases
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pension amount by 10%, say on 1-1-1991, but provides that this

benefit will be available to those pensioners who have retired on or
after 1-1-1989. In other words, the pensioners who had retired prior
to 1-1-1989 are deprived of the above benefit. This would be
violative of Article 25 of the Constitution unelss the Government
can demonstrate that the above sub-classification within the class
of pensioners is based on an intelligible differentia and that the
latter has rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the
relevant classification under the statute or statutory rule.
29. The question, whether a specked date can be the basis of

classification, has been the subject-matter of judicial
pronouncements. In this regard, it may be pertinent to refer to the
following cases:--
(i) D.R. Nim v. Union of India (A I R 1967 SC 1301);
in which the Indian Supreme Court, while construing Rule 3 of the

Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954, held
that date of 19-5-1951 fixed by the Government for reckoning the
service of promoted Indian Police Officers was invalid since the
same had nothing to do with the application of R.3 (3) provisos 1
and 2 of the above Regulation.
(ii) Jaila Singh and another v. State of Rajasthan and others (A I R

1975 SC 1436);
In the above case, the Indian Supreme Court, while construing

Condition No.3 of the Rajasthan Colonisation (Rajasthan Canal
Project) which provided that pre-1955 tenants would be entitled to
the allotment of more land as compared to the post-1955 temporary
tenants, held that the difference in the period of occupation
between pre-1955 and post-1955 tenants is not of such an extent
as to justify allotment of larger extent of land to the pre-1955
tenants than to the post-1955 tenants nor for the discrimination
among pre-1955 tenants between those holding more than 25
bighas and those holding less than 25 bighas.
(iii) The reference to the case of D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of
India (supra) may again be made as in the above case, the Indian
Supreme Court has inter alia held that the Government action to
specify a date for qualifying for the benefit under the slab pension
scheme was arbitrary and unconstitutional as it was not covered by
reasonable classification.
(iv) Union of India and another v. Messrs Parameswaran Match
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Works etc. (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2349);
In the above case, the Indian Supreme Court was considering the
vires of a notification issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise
Rules (1954) providing for concessional rate of duty on match
boxes only to those manufacturers who had filed declarations as
required by the above proviso before 4-9-1967. It was held that the
choice of the above date for granting concessional rate of duty was
not discriminatory as to violate Article 14 of the Constitution as the
purpose of the notification was to prevent the larger units who were
producing and clearing more than 100 millions matches in the
financial year 1967-68 and which could not have filed the
declarations, from splitting up into smaller units in order to avail of
the concessional rate of duty by making declarations subsequently.
It was further held that the choice of a date as a basis for
classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no
particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to
be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances.
(v) D.G. Gouse & Co. (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala and
another (A I R 1980 SC 271);
In the above case, the question before the Indian Supreme Court
was, whether the choice of 1-4-1973 as the date for imposition of
tax under the Kerala Building Tax Act (7 of 1975) was
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
The Indian Supreme Court reiterated the principle enunciated by it
in the above case of Union of India and another v. Messrs
Parameswaran Match Works etc. referred to hereinabove at S. No.
(iv) and held that in view of the factual aspect of the case referred
to therein, the above dote was not discriminatory as to violate
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
30. It may be stated that as a general proposition it cannot be laid

down that in no case a specified date can be made basis for
classification. It will depend 4n the facts of each case and if the
specification of a particular date is based on an intelligible
differentia, which in turn has nexus to the object for which the
relevant statute has been enacted, such classification will be legal
and valid but if the specification of a date is arbitrary or whimsical, it
cannot be made basis for classification as has been held in the
above case of D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India (supra) by
the Indian Supreme Court. Furthermore, a distinction is to be drawn
between a case in which a date is specified for the purpose of
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qualifying for certain benefit under certain enactment/scheme and a

date which may be specified for the enforcement of a particular
Taxing Statute or a notification granting certain concession from
payment of taxes and excise duty. In our view, the former category
should pass the test of reasonable classification, whereas for the
latter category, there is no such requirement as the Legislature or
the Government has the discretion/power to fix a date for the
enforcement of a particular, statute or for granting certain
concession in respect of tax or excise duty, and for that purpose,
there cannot be any mathematical or logical way of fixing a date
except that the Legislature or the Government may fix the same
according to its own need and convenience.
31. We have already pointed out hereinabove in para. 20 that in the

instant case the Legislature/Federal Government had extended
benefits of the various revisions in the pension to all the pensioners
irrespective of the date of retirement inasmuch as the petitioner of
C.P. No.15-R of 1989 is now drawing Rs.3,051 per month as
pension in place of Rs.1,457 per month which he was drawing upon
retirement in 1976. However, the benefit of increase in the amount
of cut off point from Rs.1,000 to Rs.2,000 with effect from 1-7-1980
and then from Rs.2,000 to Rs.2,500 with effect from 1-8-1983, was
not extended to the pensioners who had retired prior to the above
two specified dates. But, this discriminatory treatment was done
away with effect from 1-7-1985 and, therefore, now the pensioners
cannot have any legitimate grievance in this regard. The question,
whether the Government could deprive the above benefit to the
pensioners who had retired prior to the specified date has been
subject-matter of judicial proceedings. In this behalf, reference may
be made to the case of The Accountant-General, Punjab and
another v. Ch. Qadir Bakhsh and another (P L D 1983 Lah. 246), in
which a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court headed by A.S.
Salam, J. (as his Lordship then was), while dismissing an Intra ?
Court Appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge
passed by him in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction directing the
Punjab Government to give benefit of increase in the amount of cut
off point with effect from 1-7-.1980 from Rs.1,000 to Rs.2,000 under
memo dated 15-7-1980' to the petitioner, observed as follows:--
.....Therefore, from 1st of July, 1980, "pension" shall be calculated

in the .prescribed manner and any amount in excess of Rs.2,000
shall be reduced by 50%. Obvious it is that from 1st July, 1980
"pension" will be calculated of persons who were getting pension or
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were eligible. They were not to be barred. It is for them that

decision was being taken. Therefore, the contention that the benefit
will be derivable by `people' who will retire on 1st of July, 1980 or
thereafter, is without force. It was patently for the `pensioners'. The
contention that the decision of the Government has been differently
construed by the Finance Department is neither here nor there.
Decision of the Government cannot be varied or modified by
interpretation by an officer in one of the departments of the
Government, even if it be Finance."
32. However, we may again point out that with effect from 1-7-1986
an additional benefit of 2% pension for each year of service
exceeding 30 years subject to a maximum of 10% of pension
sanctioned was given to the pensioners who retired after 30-6-1986
and not to those pensioners who retired earlier and, therefore, the
above withholding of the benefit from the pensioners who had
retired prior to 1-7-1986 without having any basis as to bring the
case within reasonable classification, cannot be sustained in view
of the ratio decidendi of the cases referred to hereinabove.
According to the list of documents submitted by Mr. Samdani, the
Punjab Government has already extended the above benefit to all
the pensioners irrespective of the date of retirement. Similarly the
with-holding of the benefit of P.O. No.5 of 1988 from the petitioner
in C.P. No.5-R of 1990 was not warranted by law. In this regard,
reference may be made to the case of M.A. Rashid v. Pakistan
through Finance Division Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, and
3 others (P L D 1988 Quetta 70), in which the facts were that the
petitioner in above C.P.No.5-R/90 happened to be the petitioner. He
impugned Government action of with-holding the benefit of P.O.
No.5 of 1983 on the ground that he had retired earlier. A Division
Bench of the Balochistan High Court headed by Abdul Qadeer
Chaudhry, J. (as his Lordship then was), allowed the above petition
and observed as follows:-
"The plain reading of the Presidential Order No.5 of 1983 makes it

clear that nowhere in this Order, it has been stated that the benefit
of this order would not be applicable to those Judges who had
retired prior to 1st July, 1981. It has also not been provided in this
Order that the maximum limit would only be applicable to the
Judges, who had retired on or after 1st July, 1981. Under Article
205 of the Constitution, remuneration and other terms and
conditions of service of a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High
Court shall be as provided in the Fifth Schedule.. There is a
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constitutional provision fixing remuneration and other terms and

conditions of a High Court Judge. In accordance with such
provision, the pay and pension of the Judges of the superior Courts
are fixed by a constitutional instrument. The Fifth Schedule relates
to remuneration and terms and conditions of service of Judges.
This Schedule is not to be read in isolation, as it is a part of the
Constitution. The salary and other privileges of the superior Court
Judges are allowed under a Constitutional provision, in order to
keep the judiciary independent. The basic principle of interpretation
of statute is that if the words are clear and unambiguous, then
literal construction must be followed. The intention of the law-giver
can be seen from the words themselves and no foreign element is
to be introduced. The interpretation must be harmonious and
reasonable:"
The view taken in the above case by the Balochistan High Court
seems to be in consonance with law and the reasoning contained
therein is equally applicable to the instant case.
33. We would, therefore, allow the above petitions to the extent of

declaring that denial of additional benefit of 2% of pension for each
year of service exceeding 30 years subject to a maximum of 10% of
pension sanctioned referred to hereinabove in para. 19 (a)(xvii) to
the pensioners who retired prior to 1-7-1986, and denial to the
petitioner in C.P. No.5-R of 1990 of the benefit under P.O. No.5 of
1988 referred to hereinabove in para. 19(b)(vi) on' the ground that
he retired prior to 1-7-1987 founded on above eligibility criteria as to
the date of retirement, being discriminatory and violative of Article
25, and, they are entitled to the same (if not already granted) so
long other pensioners are paid.
The petitions stand disposed of in the above terms with no order as

to costs.
(Sd.)
AJMAL MIAN, J.
?MUHAMMAD AFZAL LONE, J.
?SAJJAD ALI SHAH, J.
SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.---I am in respectful agreement with the

judgment proposed to be delivered by my learned brother Ajmal
Mian, J. As pointed out by him the retired civil servants form a class
by themselves in relation to those who are still in service. In the
absence of any special circumstances it will be discriminatory to
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grant a privilege or benefit of one sub-class of retired civil servants

and withhold the same from another sub-class of retired civil
servants by fixing a date with regard to its availability.
I am unable to subscribe to the contention of Mr. Samdani that the

rule of equality as incorporated in Article 25 of the Constitution
requires that the I benefit of any improvement in pension which may
be granted to a civil servant retiring in future must invariably be
extended to already retired civil servants who held the same or
corresponding appointment at the time of their retirement. It is to be
noticed that in order to attract or retain talent for maintenance of its
services the Government is in competition with the private sector.
While fixing the terms and conditions of service---which of necessity
include the pensionary benefits as well---the Government has to
take this aspect of the matter also into account. In the
circumstances if the Government improves the pensionary
privileges and benefits for its serving employees or future entrants it
cannot be said that it is guilty of discriminatory treatment towards
those who have already retired.
It is no boubt true that those serving civil servants whose terms and
conditions are improved would be, on retirement, better placed than
those who have already retired after holding equivalent
appointments but then it can hardly be called a case of
discriminatory treatment violating the provisions of Article 25 of the
Constitution. On the other hand, it will be a case of giving effect to
different contracts of employment.
RUSTAM S. SIDHWA, J.---I have read the judgment of my learned

brother Ajmal Mian J., and would like to add a few words.
2. The obligations of an Islamic State towards its employees first

needs to be stated. According to Dr. Mahmood A. Ghazi of the
International Islamic University, Islamabad, in his research paper, a
Hadith reported by Abdur Razzaq and Baihaqi quotes the Holy
Prophet (p.b.u.h.) as stating "Anybody who hires the services of a
person should identify beforehand what remuneration he would
receive". Muslim jurists have held that an agreement or contract
would be invalid if the remuneration of the employee was not fixed
beforehand. Dr. Ahmad Al Assal of the International Islamic
University, Islamabad, in his research paper mentions that the Holy
Qur'an clearly enforces fulfilment of obligations. "O ye who believe
Fulfil (all) obligations" (Chapter 5, verse 1). According to various
Hadiths, proper wages should be determined in a manner so that
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they are commensurate with basic needs and prices prevalent. Dr.
Mahmood A. Ghazi sums up these traditions as follows:
"(i) A labourer should be paid food and clothing according to the

established and accepted norms (al-Maruf) and they should be
charged with work according to their capacity". (Muwatta of Imam
Malik). (ii) "Anybody who becomes our (State's) employee should
marry if he does not have a wife; should have a servant if he does
not have one; should have a house if he does not have one. But if
he transgresses this limit he is a treacherous". (Abu Daud, Sunan).
(iii) "Fulfil the needs of your subordinates according to their
satisfaction". (Majmaal-Zawa'id, Vol. IV, p.236), (iv) Hazrat Umar
used to pay his employees and functionaries according to their
needs and the requirements of the city in which they lived. (Islam
ka Iqtisadi Nizam, p.94). Discussing the principles governing wages
payable by an Islamic State to its employees, Ibn Nujaim, a Hanari
jurist of the 10th Century A.H., states: "The final decision in this
matter is to be taken by the Government: ?????????? For nothing
is admissible to the employees except on the basis of their needs
and the needs of their associates in accordance with the known
and normal standard". (Ibn Nujaim, Al-Asbah Wa'1-Naza'ir, p.130).
Under the Pakistan Constitution 1973 the State inter alia is bound,
as respects the Muslims of Pakistan, to promote observance of the
Islamic moral standards [see Article 31(2)], make provision for
securing just and humane conditions of work [see Article 37(c)],
secure the well being of the people inter alia by raising their
standard of living and ensuring equitable adjustment of rights
between employers and employees [see Article 38 (a)], provide for
all citizens, within available resources, facilities for work and
adequate livelihood with all reasonable rest and leisure [see Article
38(b)], provide for all persons in the service of Pakistan or
otherwise, social security by compulsory social insurance or other
means [see' Article 38(c)] and provide basic necessities of life for all
citizens as art; permanently or temporarily unable to earn their
livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness or unemployment [see
Article 38 (d)]. Under Article 29(2), where the observance of any
particular Principle of Policy contained in Articles 29 to 40 is
dependent upon resources being available for the said purpose, the
principle is to be regarded as being subject to the availability of
resources.
3. In an Islamic State the Government also has a duty towards its

retired employees. The Holy Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) said
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"every one has some responsibilities of looking after those who are
under his care. The ruler has a civic duty to his nation, the way
husband is responsible to wife and children and the employer is
responsible to employees etc." One of the important responsibilities
of the State is to look after the needs of the homeless and shelter
less. Bukhari has reported the Holy Prophet as saying "Anybody
who bequeaths a property, it will go to his heirs. But if he leaves
shelterless children or any liability (without anything to pay there-
from) he should come to me (here appropriately the reference
points to the State) as 1 am his guardian." The Hadith points to the
obligation of the State to provide basic necessities to all citizens in
impecunious circumstances. Dr. Mahmood A. Ghazi of the
International Islamic University, Islamabad, in his research paper
clearly points out that the liability of the State has to be in keeping
with the resources of the State because "Allah does not charge
anybody with any responsibility except according to his capacity
(the Holy Qur'an 2: 286) and that in respect of financial
responsibilities "the wealthy according to his means and the poor
according to his means" (the Holy Qur'an 2:? 236). During the
period of the first Caliph of Islam it was provided in the agreement
with the people of Himyar, who were Christians, that the State will
fulfil all their needs in case of any distress or inability to earn
(Kitab-al-Kharaj by Imam Yusuf, p. 172). The duty of the State to
provide adequate pensionary benefts is reflected in Article 38(c)
and (d), subject to availability of resources as pointed out in Article
29(2). The duty under the Shariah to provide pensionary benefits in
the same manner as service benefits, according to the needs of this
particular class, brings to the fore the socio-economic obligation of
the State to fix from time to time certain minimum standards which
should govern the determination of pension of the Government
servants retiring at different steps in varying basic pay scales.
4. In Government service, there are many kinds of pensions

admissible to Government servants, such as Superannuation
pension, Retirement pension, Invalid pension, Compensation
pension, Extraordinary pension and Family pension; chief of them
being the Superannuation pension and the Retirement pension
which serves the majority of the retired Government servants.
5. The superannuation pension is that granted to a Government

servant who retires or is retired from Government service on or
after attaining the age fixed for superannuation retirement. The
retirement pension is that granted to a Government servant who not
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being eligible for superannuation pension opts to retire after 25

years qualifying service or such less time as may for any special
class of Government servants be prescribed, or is compulsorily
retired from service by the authority competent to remove him from
service on grounds provided by law. The invalid pension is that
awarded to a Government servant who is retired from service on
medical grounds before reaching the age of superannuation. The
compensation pension is that awarded to a Government servant
who is discharged from Government service owing to the abolition
of his post. The Extraordinary pension is that granted to a
Government servant who is injured, or is struck with a severe
disease whilst exposed to the same in the course of his duty, or is
killed whilst performing his duties. The family pension is admissible
to the family of a Government servant in the case of his death
whilst in service or after his retirement.
6. Whilst the different pensions serve different and varying

purposes, the first two pensions, i.e. the superannuation pension
and the retirement pension serve three main purposes. First, it
provides economic and social security to the Government
employee during his old age and protects him from financial want
and social despair. Second, it enables the Government employee to
maintain himself at some level commensurate with the dignity of the
post or office last held by him and thus indirectly preserve the
honour of the State. Third, it serves to attract and induce competent
persons to join Government service, as opposed to private service,
where security of tenure and retirement benefits are not so
attractive, though salary and other terms may be more favourable,
and also provides incentive to serving Government employees for
more better and sustained work in the face of rising inflation. The
first purpose recognises the socio-economic obligation of the State
to assist its retired employees to maintain themselves by providing
economic security in the fall of life when their ability to find work or
employment in the private sector begins to fade and their life's
savings also tend to diminish. The second purpose recognises the
honour of the State to assist its retired employees from falling into
such impecunious circumstances as may push them into insolvency
or crime and thus impair their honour and thus indirectly tarnish that
of the State. The third purpose recognises the necessity of the
State, in keeping with modern trends, to compete with the private
sector to secure the best talent available for its public service, by
offering liberal retirement and other financial terms and conditions
65 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
as inducement or reward for joining service, and also providing

incentive to the serving employees for more better and sustained
work. Thus, though at the time of retirement the retiring
Government servant receives pension at the rate then available
under the rules, which is then the highest that the State can offer,
which includes the three elements stated above, but as time
progresses and the value of the currency gets eroded by inflation,
the element of attraction first disappears, then the element of the
honour of the State and lastly the element of economic and social
security, with the result that the pension hardly provides a bare
subsistence allowance to keep body and soul together, primarily
amongst the lower grade pensioners.
7. All forms of pensions, including the superannuation pension,

payable by Government, are dependent upon statutory provisions.
Under Article 240 of the Pakistan Constitution 1973 the terms and
conditions of service of persons working with the Federal
Government are determined by law passed by Majlis-e-Shoora
(Parliament) and that of persons working with the Provincial
Governments by law passed by the respective Provincial
Assemblies. Section 19 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and similar
provisions in the different Provincial Civil Servants Acts provide for
payment of pensions to civil servants of the Federal and the
Provincial Governments as may be prescribed, that is to say as
prescribed by the rules. Likewise, under section 25(2) of the Civil
Servants Act, 1973, and similar provisions in the different Provincial
Civil Servants Acts, read with Article 241 of the Constitution, all
rules, orders or instructions in force in respect of terms and
conditions of civil servants competently made, are to be deemed to
be rules made under the Act and as continuing in force. A host of
rules deal with different types of pensions payable to different types
of Government servants working at the Federal level. Likewise,
separate rules deal with different types of pensions payable to
Government servants working at the Provincial level in the four
provinces. A Government employee's claim to pay and allowances
is regulated by the rules in force at the time in respect of which the
pay and allowances arc earned, whilst his claim to pension is
regulated by the rules in force at the time when he retires, resignes,
or is invalided out, or is compulsorily retired, or is discharged from
service, or is injured, or killed whilst in service, depending upon the
type of pension claimed. In respect of superannuation pension, the
amount of pension payable is determined by the length of
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completed years of qualifying service put in by the Government

servant, subject to the formula then in existence providing the mode
of calculation of pension as prescribed by the rules. The right to
receive pension flows directly out of the rules applicable and not out
of any order of any officer or authority, though for the purposes of
determining or quantifying the amount it may be necessary for the
authorities to pass such order. The right to receive pension by a
Government servant is property so as to attract Articles 23 and
24(1) of the Constitution and any illegal denial to a Government
servant to receive the same would affect his fundamental right
granted under the said provisions of the Constitution. If any
authority is required for this view, Deokinanden Prasad v. The State
of Behar (A I R 1971 SC 1409), Bhagwant Singh v. Union of India
(A I R 1962 Punj. 503) and K.R. Erry v. The State of Punjab (I L R 1
Pb. 278) may be referred with advantage.
8. According to rough estimates provided by the learned

Attorney-General, in 1988-89 there were 2,487,675 civil servants in
the employment of the State, both at the Federal and the Provincial
levels, and roughly 1,084,304 pensioners. In short, for every 100
civil servants there were roughly 44 pensioners. There is thus an
inactive service force on the payroll of the State, which this Islamic
State basically as a first step under the Sharia is obliged to protect
on the principle of socio-economic justice, apart from other
considerations stated above which it may desire to foster. Like all
third world countries struggling under financial constraints arising
out of depleting foreign reserves and mounting economic
pressures, the difficulties faced by the State to constantly meet from
time to time extra expenditure to vamp up its salary structures and
other financial benefits admissible to its employees, needs no
publicity. However, the Governments at the Federal and Provincial
levels, subject to financial constraints, have been effecting
increases in salaries and other financial benefits of its employees,
including pensions and retirement benefits. Not only have
pensionary and retirement benefits been augmented from time to
time, but increases in the pensions payable to those who have
retired earlier have also been made from time to time, sometimes
almost simultaneously with the augmentation made in pensionary
benefits. The State therefore under its obligation to meet
socio-economic justice to its retired personnel, has constantly been
attending to their requirements.
9. The only question of paramount importance that arises in this
67 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
case is whether all the pensioners should form a class apart for
purposes of pensionary benefits so that whenever salary scales or
pensions are augmented, their consequent benefits are also
available to all retired pensioners, apart from those that will retire
on or after the date the augmentation takes effect, or there can be
sub-classes, each sub-class being constituted by a group of
pensioners who have retired on or after a date when some change
in the rules relating to salary scales or pension has taken place till
the date the next change takes place, subject to any amendments
in the rules that may be made from time to time augmenting their,
pensionary benefits. Speaking from an ideological point of view, the
answer to the question can only be in the affirmative, for that would
be the highest socio-economic goal that a State could achieve
under Article 38 of the Principles of Policy as set out in Chapter 2 of
Part II of the Constitution, but if the economic position is feeble and
weak, the same is not economically feasible and the fulfilment of
this particular principle of Policy, in view of Article 27(2), can be
deferred due to non-availability of resources, and the next question
therefore that would arise is whether any legislation affecting
pension does not violate any fundamental right, such as the article
guaranteeing equality, which strikes down any form of classification
which is unreasonable and arbitrary.
10. To appreciate this matter it is necessary to view in their proper

perspective the rights and liabilities of the Government regarding
pay and allowances and pensionary benefits. The obligations of the
Government relating to pay and allowances are regulated by the
rules in force at the time in respect of which the pay and allowances
are earned; and that relating to pensionary benefits by the rules in
force at the time when the Government servant resigns or is
discharged from service. The Government reserves to itself the
right of changing the rules and regulations regarding pay and
allowances and pensions, from time to time; and their discretion in
the matter and their right of interpreting their ' meaning in case of
dispute. Pay and allowances are earned by a Government servant
each month during service according to the rules in force on the
dates they fall due. In the event of any upward revision, he is
entitled to the benefit of the revised pay and allowances if he is in
service on the date they fall due each month immediately after the
revision. When such a Government servant retires, he ceases to
earn any pay and allowances, as his entitlement in that respect
comes, to an end. In the matter of pension, the entitlement to
68 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
receive the same, according to the rules in force, exists and

remains effective as a continuing entitlement, so long as the
Government servant is in service and has not retired. In the event
of any upward revision, the entitlement to receive the same,
according to the amended rules, arises immediately after such
revision and remains effective as a continuing entitlement, so long
as he is in service. When such a Government servant retires, he
earns the pension according to the rules in force on the date of his
retirement. Should any revision or revisions take place thereafter
augmenting the pensionary benefits, he is not entitled to them,
unless any of them specifically or retrospectively covers his case.
Thus, whilst the Government servant in employment earns
augmentation in his pay and allowances with every revision that
takes effect whilst he is in service, the Government servant after
in pension that takes effect thereafter after he has retired, unless
his case is specifically provided for. Again, it must not be forgotten,
that with every revision in the pay, the entitlement of the serving
Government servant to receive pension after retirement stands
enhanced, for basic pay constitutes an essential element of
emoluments in the different formulas that are used to determine
pension.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners appearing in Constitution

Petitions Nos. 15 of 1989 and 3 of 1990 have drawn our attention to
the various modes by which the Government of Pakistan has been
increasing the pensionary benefits of some of its employees,
without granting the same benefits to those who have retired
earlier. They are (A) Increase in salaries of the serving employees,
without grant of corresponding benefits to the retired employees.
The petitioners' claim that for calculation of pension their last
salaries drawn in their old time scales should figuratively be treated
as corresponding to those drawn in the new time scales at the
stages where they retired and thus they should be given the benefit
of enhanced pensions. These increases in salaries have been set
out by my learned brother Ajmal Mian, J., in clauses (ii), (iv), (vii),
(x) and (xix) of sub-para. (a) of para. 19 of his judgment. (B)
Indexation allowed on the salaries of the serving employees,
without grant of corresponding benefits to the retired employees, on
the same basis as stated above. These increases have been set
out by my learned brother in clauses (xv) and (xxii) of sub-para. (a)
of para. 19 of his judgment. (C) Revision of mode of calculation of
69 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
pension on the basis of last pay drawn instead of on average pay

during last 12/36 months applicable to pensioners retiring on or
after 1-7-1986. This has been set out by my learned brother in
clause (xvi) of sub-para. (a) of para. 19 of his judgment. (D) Grant
of additional benefit of 2% of pension for each year of service
exceeding 30 years, subject to a maximum of 10% pension
sanctioned, applicable to pensioners retiring on or after 1-7-1986.
This has been set out by my learned brother in clause (xvii) of
sub-para. (a) of para. 19 of his judgment. (E) Revision of cut-off
points, applicable to pensioners who retired on or after 1-7-1980
and 1-7-1983. This has been set out by my learned brother in
clauses (v), (xii) and (xiii) of sub-para. (a) of para. 19 of his
judgment.
12. It is admitted between the parties that the other increases

referred to by my learned brother in clauses (i), (iii), (vi), (viii), (ix),
(xi), (xiv), (xv), (xviii) and (xx) to (xxiii) of sub-para. (a) of para. 19 of
his judgment were applicable to past pensioners and the petitioners
have no grievance against the same.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner appearing in Constitution

Petition No. 5-K of 1990 only challenges President's Order No.5 of
1988, whose benefit has been denied to his client.
14. I will now take up the case of legislation effecting increase in

salaries and indexation on salaries. This cannot be treated as
legislation creating a classification which is arbitrary just because
the retired pensioners have not been given higher pensions by
figuratively treating them as entitled to such higher salaries or
indexation. The object of Article 25 is not to force Government to
legislate over a matter which is silent, but to strike down a
legislation or a legal instrument which creates classification which is
unreasonable or arbitrary. The fact that salaries are increased or
indexation is allowed thereon, is legislation pertaining to salary
which specifically deals with serving Government servants and has
no connection with pension which specifically deals with
Government servants who have retired. Merely because the legal
instruments are directly intended to augment salaries of serving
government servants, the fact that indirectly they may tend to affect
emoluments and thus augment pensionary benefits or affect other
allowances which are allowed as a percentage of the wages and
thus augment such allowances, cannot be treated as creating an
unreasonable discrimination against recipients of pensions and
allowances. The rule is that where a particular legislation tends to
70 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
create an arbitrary distinction or unreasonable discrimination, the

principle that all persons similarly circumstances or matters evenly
placed should be treated or dealt with alike is enforced. But where
a legislation dealing with one subject has the effect of indirectly
affecting other persons or matters covered by another legislation
dealing with another subject, the violation of the rule of equality
cannot be blindly enforced, unless there is some strong ground
which would make it almost mandatory for the Court to do so.
Legislation also treats salary and pension separately. Just because
one indirectly affects the other, it does not become a case of
unreasonable discrimination. If such a rule were to be applied, it
would open up a pandora's box of illusive and unintelligible
classification, having no rationale nor reason, and all forms of
legislation would be thrown into utter confusion. In State
Government Pensioners' Association v. State of Andhra Pradesh (A
I R 1986 S C 1907) the Supreme Court of India was considering the
question whether a provision providing for payment of enhanced
gratuity with prospective effect from a specified date offended
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution if it did not provide for payment
under the revised basis to all those who had already retired, the
Indian Supreme Court answered the question in the negative. In
dealing with this question the Supreme Court held :--
"Improvements in pay scales by the very nature of things can be

made prospectively so as to apply to only those who are in the
employment on the date of the upward revision. Those who were in
employment say in 1950, 1960 or 1970, lived, spent, and saved, on
the basis of the then prevailing cost of living structure and pay scale
structure, cannot invoke Article 14 in order to claim the higher
pay-scale brought into force say, in 1980. If upward pay revision
cannot be made prospectively on account of Article 14, perhaps no
such revision would ever be made."
I do not therefore think that legal instruments augmenting salaries

or indexation on salaries can be struck down as violating Article 25
of the Constitution if they indirectly happen to affect pension. Thus,
every time increase in salary or indexation to salary takes place, a
sub-class would be created, each sub-class being constituted by a
group of pensioners who have retired on or after the date when
some change in the legal instruments has taken effect till the date
the next change in the salary or indexation takes place.
15. At this stage it would not be out of place to mention that when
the pension scheme was substantially revised and augmented,
71 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
which has been referred to by my learned brother in clauses (i) and

(iii) of sub-para. (a) of para. 19 of his judgment, the enhanced
benefits were made available to past pensioners by virtue of para.
11 of Finance Division O.M. dated 18-8-1966 and para. 8 of
Finance Division O.M. dated 7-1-1977 respectively. This accords
with the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in the case of D.S.
Nakara v. The Union of India (A I R 1983 SC 130) wherein it was
held that any liberalised change in pension scheme should be
made available to past retired pensioners prospectively, the
Supreme Court making it abundantly clear that the arrears were not
required to be paid because to that extent the scheme was
prospective. In the two instant cases cited above -the benefits of
the liberalised pension scheme were made available to past
pensioners prospectively.
16. At this stage it may also be mentioned that apart from the
above two substantial revisions in the pension scheme that took
place which augmented and liberalised pensions, other minor
increases that were granted to pensioners were in almost all cases
granted to past pensioners, other than cases relating to cut off
points or amendment to the rules of the pension scheme. '
17. With regard to item (C) as stated in para. 11 above, there can
be no complaint, because the definition of the expression "average
emolument", as last defined in Article 486 in section IV of Chapter
XIX of the Civil Service Regulation (relating to pensions) having
been impliedly omitted by Finance Division O.M. dated 1-7-1986,
the same obviously would take effect only prospectively.
18. With regard to item (D) as stated in para. 11 above, I agree with
the views of my learned brother and would not like to add anything.
19. With regard to item (D) as stated in para. 11 above, my learned

brother has dealt with this matter appropriately in paras. 20 and 31
of his judgment and no relief is available to the petitioners on this
score.
20. With regard to Constitution Petition No.5-R of 1990, the

petitioner is not entitled to any relief other than relating to
President's Order No.5 of 1988. The position in his case is the
same as that of the other petitioners in the other two Constitution
Petitions, which have been dealt with by me in para. 17 above. My
learned brother Ajmal Mian, J., has dealt with this matter
appropriately in para. 32 of his judgment. I would not therefore like
to drag a greater length of chain.
72 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
21. One of the learned counsel for the petitioners in C.P.No.15 of

1989 and C.P. No.2 of 1990 has further drawn our attention to the
fact that where a pension statute states that the pension shall be a
percentage of the salary attached to an office or rank held by an
employee before retirement, it must be construed as providing for a
fluctuating pension which increases or decreases as the salaries
paid to active employees increase or decrease. In this connection
learned counsel has referred to George G. Eichelberger v. City of
Berkeley (46 C. 2d 182 = 293 P. 2d 1). In this case the pension
statute of the City of Berkeley stated that the pension would be a
percentage of the average salary attached to the rank held by the
employee before retirement. Section 24 of the Ordinance read:
"The pensions granted under the terms of this Ordinance shall not
increase nor decrease with any changes in salary subsequent to
the date of the granting of the pension for the rank or ranks upon
which the pension was based nor shall any changes of title or rank
in the active service affect an increase or reduction in the existing
pensions:"
In April 1939 an amending Ordinance inter alia eliminated the

words underlined above. The Court held, following the rule laid
down in Terry v. City of Berkeley (41 Cal. 2d. 698) and other cases,
that it was settled that where a pension statute stated that the
pension was a percentage of the average salary attached to the
rank held by the employee before retirement, it was construed as
providing for a fluctuating pension which increased or decreased as
the salaries paid to active employees increased or decreased. The
amendment to section 24 was held to clearly indicate that the
Ordinance was intended to apply to existing pensioners specially
when it was borne in mind that the pension laws had to be literally
construed-to achieve their beneficent purposes (Terry's case
supra).The Court held that prior to the 1939 amendment, the
plaintiffs were not entitled to any increase in their pension by
reason of any pay increase, but after the 1939 Ordinance the
amendment removed the language in section 24 which prevented
the application of the rule announced in Terry's case. It also held
that whilst the amendment barred any decrease, it did not prevent
any increase in the pension and therefore increase in the pension
with increase in the salary was permissible.
22. The basic question is what is the law here which governs
payment of pensions. Under Article 4 of Chapter I of the Civil
Service Regulations (relating to pensions), an officer's claim to
73 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
pension is regulated by the rules in force at the time when the

officer resigns or is discharged from the service of Government.
Under Article 468 in Section I of Chapter XIX of the said
Regulations the amount of pension that may be granted is
determined by length of service as set forth in Articles 474 to 485.
Article 486 in Section IV of the same Chapter defines the
expression "emoluments". Though it has undergone slight changes,
the present definition reads:
"The term "emoluments" means the emoluments which the officer

was receiving immediately before his retirement and shall include:
(a) Pay as defined in FR 9 (21)(a)(i);
(b) Senior Post Allowance;
(c) Special Pay of all types and nature;
(d) Personal Pay;
(e) Technical Pay:
(f) Dearness Allowance (now Indexation Pay);
(g) Increments accrued during leave preparatory to retirement;
(h) Any other emoluments which may be specially classed as Pay."
The words "the emoluments which the officer was receiving

immediately before his. retirement" have always been present. It is
clear from the definition of the term "emoluments" that they are to
be calculated upon what the officer was receiving immediately
before his retirement and since inter alia basic pay, dearness
allowance, indexation pay, etc., are some of the constituents that go
to make up emoluments, that pay or allowance etc., alone would be
taken into consideration which the employee was receiving
immediately before his retirement. The prospects of subsequent
increases in pay or allowances being taken into consideration in the
term "emoluments" therefore does not arise. In view of the law
being strict and clear, the liberal doctrine cannot be imposed in the
pension system prevailing presently.
23. Before concluding, I consider it my duty to draw the attention of

the Government to the appalling minimum ceiling fixed in respect of
pensions, which is Rs.300 per mensem. As stated earlier, it is the
foremost socio-economic obligation of an Islamic State to fix
minimum pensions as meet the basic needs of its retired personnel.
The need therefore to fix certain standards which should govern the
determination from time to time of the minimum pensions payable
74 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM
to Government servants who have retired in the past, in the light of

their minimum basic needs, assumes prominence. Likewise, the
need to remove all disparity between past pensioners and new
pensioners in the same pay grades or ranks by, gradual steps
spread over a stated period of time also requires serious attention,
for under the Shariah the State has an obligation to treat equally
persons evenly placed by virtue of equal length of faithful and loyal
service in the same or equivalent pay grades, posts or ranks. It is
hoped that the Government shall address itself to these questions.
Perhaps the Federal Shariat Court at some stage will look into
these matters.
24. For the foregoing reasons, I agree with the final order proposed
by my learned brother in para. 33 of his judgment.
M.BA./I-141/
S??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Order accordingly.
75 of 75 3/4/2024, 5:01 PM

1991 SCMR 1041

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1991 SCMR 1041

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1991 S C M R 1041 about:reader?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pakistanlawsite.com%2Flo...

Present: Saad Saood Jan, Ajmal Mian, Rustam S. Sidhwa,

Muhammad Afzal Lone and Sajjad Ali Shah, JJ

I.A. SHARWANI and others---Petitioners

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary,

Finance Division, Islamabad and others---Respondents.

Constitutional Petitions Nos.15-R, 16-R of 1989, 2-R and 5-R of

(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---

Under clause (1) of Article 212, Constitution of Pakistan (1973) the

(b) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---

----Ss. 4 & 3---Interpretation.

Subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973

Tribunal which is competent to make an order in respect of any of

(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---

----Art. 212---Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S.

(d) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---

----S. 4---Appeal---Jurisdiction---Civil servant when aggrieved by a

M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another P L

(e) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---

----S. 4---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.

even if it involves the question of violation of the Fundamental

M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another P L

(f) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---

----Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court, under Art. 184(3), is competent to

(g) Constitution-of Pakistan (1973)---

----Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court can take cognizance of any matter

(h) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---

----Art.184(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0.1, R.8---Original

Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. deals with filing of a representative suit and

reference to the enforcement of any Fundamental Rights conferred

When proceedings are in the nature of public interest litigation in

Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and

(i) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---

----Art. 184---Original jurisdiction of Supreme Court---Public interest

Anjuman Araian, Bhera v. Abdul Rashid and 5 others P L D 1973

D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India A I R 1983 S C 130 and

(j) Words and phrases---

...... Pension"---Definition and object of the term---Civil Servants Act

Pensions are periodic payments, usually for the natural life of a

superannuated personnel. They are sometimes provided by

Except as limited by the Constitution the establishment of a pension

A pension is a periodical allowance of money granted by the

The right to a pension depends upon statutory provisions and

Summing up it can be said with confidence that pension is not only

hey day of life to your employer, in days of invalidity, economic

There are various kinds of pension schemes which are obtaining in

A pension is intended to assist a retired civil servant in providing for

A person who enters Government service has also something to

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 17, 1963 Edn., p. 488; Corpus Juris

(k) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---

----S. 19--Civil Service Regulations, Reglns. 4 &

The right and extent of the pension amount depends on the

A new ground or a new avenue can be explored on the basis of

Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 67 and D. S. Nakara and others v.

(l) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---

Clause (1) of Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973)

However, the above clause does not prohibit treatment of citizens

Following are the principles with regard to equal protection of law

(ii) that reasonable classification is permissible but it must be

(iv) that no standard of universal application to test reasonableness

(vii) that in order to make a classification reasonable, it should be

(a) on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or

Principles as to classification are as under:

(a) A law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single