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Instant Download PDF Behavioral Corporate Finance 2nd Edition Shefrin Solutions Manual Full Chapter
Instant Download PDF Behavioral Corporate Finance 2nd Edition Shefrin Solutions Manual Full Chapter
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Chapter 07 - Capital Structure
CHAPTER 7
Capital Structure
market timing would lead them to sell new stock, even if they have no immediate need for
the cash. In line with the remark made by Amgen’s first CEO, George Rathmann, Google
has an opportunity to take some hors d’oeuvres from the tray, even though it’s not hungry.
Managers of firms whose shares are highly overvalued serve the interests of their current
shareholders by issuing new equity. The behavioral APV of issuing highly overvalued shares,
and making no additional new investments with the funds raised, is positive. The APV of
issuing fairly valued shares, paying the investment bankers a flotation fee, and making no
As for the number of shares proposed in the seasoned equity offering, those digits
correspond to the first eight digits that follow the decimal in the value of π (which is
3.14159265), a number representing the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter.
This is intended as an inside joke by Google executives for quantitatively oriented investors.
2. Broadly speaking, the experience is typical. The average market response to the
announcement of an open market repurchase is 3.5 percent. In the case of Cypress, the
market response was 2.5 percent (=0.25/(10.125-0.25)). As was mentioned in the chapter,
managers actually announce that they are repurchasing shares because they believe that their
firms are undervalued. This was the case with Cypress. In general, investors appear to
underreact to repurchases, in that stock prices drift upwards when firms repurchase shares.
When averaged over all firms, the average abnormal return after the initial announcement is
1
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Chapter 07 - Capital Structure
12.1 percent. This was roughly the case with Cypress, in that its stock outperformed the S&P
3. Share repurchases make sense when the firm’s managers perceive their firms to be
undervalued in the market. And the market generally does interpret a share repurchase to
mean that the firm’s managers perceive the stock of their firm to be underpriced, especially if
managers indicate that this is the case. Share repurchase does not make sense when the firm’s
managers perceive their firms to be overvalued in the market. Buffet’s criticism was that
managers repurchased shares when those shares were overvalued. Managers might have held
incorrect perceptions of value, and did not recognize the overvaluations. In other words, the
decision to repurchase, and pump up the stock price, might have been appropriate, had
4. Sun was a cash rich firm. Both theory and empirical evidence suggests that excessively
optimistic, overconfident managers of cash rich firms adopt negative NPV projects. The
response of Sun’s executives is consistent with this phenomenon, and would not alleviate the
5. The APV of the project is the sum of the project NPV and the value of the side effects
2
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Chapter 07 - Capital Structure
AutoNation’s managers have concluded that the minimum that new shareholders should
demand for the $200 million is 5.3 percent of the firm. Therefore, managers estimate that
new investors overpay by $11.4 million (= (0.053 – 0.050) x $3.8 billion). This overpayment
represents the side effect of equity financing, and is captured by the firm’s original
shareholders. Therefore the APV of equity financing is $48 million + $11.4 million = $59.4
million
The financing side effect associated with mispricing of debt is zero, in that the debt is
intrinsically priced. The traditional formula for the value of the tax shields is the product of
the corporate tax rate and the size of the debt. This product is $70 million = 0.35 x $200
million. Therefore, the APV associated with financing with debt is $118 million.
Because financing with debt features a higher APV than financing with equity, the
firm’s managers will create more value for the firm’s original shareholders by financing with
6. Managers believe that new shareholders underpay by $949 million = (0.285 – 0.212) x $13
billion). Therefore the financing side effect associated with equity funding is -$949 million.
Adaptec managers believe that the project NPV amounts to $466 million. Therefore the
managers of cash poor, financially constrained Adaptec reject a positive NPV project.
7. The leveraged buyout left J. Crew with high leverage, and its executives with substantial
ownership of the firm’s equity. Leverage amplifies equity returns, and therefore its CEO
Millard Drexler bore a lot of risk. The chapter explains that excessively optimistic,
3
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Chapter 07 - Capital Structure
overconfident executives underestimate the expected costs of financial distress, which can
induce them to take on imprudent levels of debt for their firm, despite the agency benefits
The text states: “The general finding is that excessive optimism and overconfidence
are positively related to both leverage and investment activity. This feature is accentuated by
the finding that leverage and investment debt levels increase in the years following the start-
special industry award by the Council of Fashion Designers of America, which described him
as “the Merchant Prince.” In commenting on the firm’s prospects, Drexel sent out an emailed
statement to say that he continues “to have confidence” in the company’s future growth, and
that the company is making the adjustments necessary to deliver the products its customers
want.”
The text states: “Given the experimental findings, it is perhaps not surprising that the
Duke/CFO survey evidence indicates that CFOs’ estimates of internal rate of return (IRR) for
their own firm’s projects also reflect extremely low estimates of future volatility, relative to
reasonable benchmarks. Nor is it surprising that CFOs who are overconfident about market-
wide returns also tend to be overconfident about the returns to their own firms’ projects.” The
question provides no evidence on this point, although Drexel’s use of the word “confidence”
On the topic of debt, the text states: “As was discussed in section 7.3, overconfidence
is also an important phenomenon when it comes to debt. The specific finding is that a one
4
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Chapter 07 - Capital Structure
book leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total capital employed, relative to a
sample mean of 22.3 percent. For long-term overprecision, the effect is approximately half
that of short-term overprecision. The results using market leverage are similar to the results
using book leverage, although slightly weaker.” In this regard, J. Crew’s high level of debt is
8. The text in Chapter 7 describes the evidence that firms with excessively optimistic
overconfident CEOs overinvest and take on imprudent debt. Solyndra’s high debt and
investment are consistent with these features. However, that alone would not explain
Solyndra’s building a second facility in the face of negative information about its future
Certainly, spending money left and right after the cash infusion is consistent with
sensitivity of investment to cash flow. That it built the second facility in the face of unsold
5
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Chapter 07 - Capital Structure
Minicase
1. The Forbes story contains a description of Schrader, stating that “implacable self-
confidence helped Bill Schrader transform a few leased phone lines into a sprawling global
Consistent with being run by an excessively optimistic and overconfident CEO, PSINet made
very large investments, including a new headquarters building, corporate jet, and named
stadium. In addition, the firm’s financing policy led it to be heavy on the debt side, under the
belief that they could be successful and eventually retire the debt.
2. During the dot.com bubble, investor sentiment for technology stocks was very high. In
regard to BPV, plausibly, PSINet’s rapid growth catered to that sentiment, leading the stock
confidence in the future prospects of their firms. Notably, such signaling is premised on the
idea that managers make rational choices about their firm’s debt levels. This case is not
3. There is good reason to believe that Schaeffer is optimistic and confident, but at levels less
extreme than Schrader. As the minicase explains, Schaeffer spent less to build his firm’s
network than he originally estimated, did so shrewdly, and was conservative about leverage.
6
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Chapter 07 - Capital Structure
4. Cogent initially raised $26 million from six venture capital firms. In and of itself, this
timing. What is different is the nature of the debt financing, with Congent’s lenders being led
many large equipment manufacturers that offered vendor financing deals tying the amount of
Cogent might have engaged in some market timing in its acquisition policy, such as
in merging with Allied Riser by trading 13 percent of Cogent for $132 million in cash and
100 percent of Allied Riser’s fiber network. A similar statement applies to its acquisition of
that Cogent was under-leveraged. Presumably, this means that the firm was paying more
taxes than tradeoff theory might suggest. Nevertheless, Panel E of Exhibit 7.3 indicates that
Cogent was paying very little in taxes, which raises the question as to what benefits would
arise from having higher leverage. Panels B and C of Exhibit 7.3 indicate that Cogent’s stock
underperformed the S&P 500 before 2010, and outperformed the S&P 500 after 2010. One
possibility is that market signaling, with Cogent signaling that its prospects remained strong,
CEO Schaeffer commented that Cogent had generated free cash for the previous six
years, which Panel A of Exhibit 7.3 bears out. In buying back 15 percent of its “float,” and
paying out an additional $10 million to investors every quarter either through a buyback or a
special dividend, Cogent was not just generating cash available to be paid to its investors, but
actually paying out cash to its investors, both debt holders and stock holders.
7
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Chapter 07 - Capital Structure
5. Schaeffer noted that he measured leverage as the ratio of net debt -to-trailing 12-month
EBITDA, where net debt is defined as debt minus cash. He then stated that the target value
for the ratio is 2.5, while the current value of the ratio is 1.6. The ratio net debt-to-EBITDA is
akin to the inverse of times-interest-earned (TIE), as TIE is the ratio of EBIT to interest paid,
Leverage is also measured using ratios such as assets over equity, debt-to-equity, and
debt-to-assets. Panel D of Exhibit 7.3 displays the time series for Cogent’s debt-to-assets
ratio, using both book value and market value. In book value terms, Cogent does appear to be
increasing its leverage. However, in market value terms, it has been decreasing its leverage.
8
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új, egy kiválasztott faj keletkezni? Úgy látszik, hogy Nietzsche
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azon elméletet, mely által Renan101 genie-jét neki megmagyarázza:
«a homályos ősök hosszú sorozata takarította meg számomra az
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egy kevéssé tökéletlenek ugyan, de amelyekből mégis világosság
árad ki: «Esztelenség azt képzelni, hogy az értékek (az alacsony
értékek?) mindezen győzelme élettanellenes lehet; életbevágó
érdekkel kell megmagyarázni, az «ember» typusának fenntartását,
még akkor is, ha a gyengék és kitagadottak túlsúlyával kellene is azt
elérni. Ha talán a dolgok más módon folynának, – ember nem is
volna többé. A typus felemelkedése veszélyes az emberi faj
megőrzésére. Miért? Az erős fajok – tékozlók. Egy gazdasági
kérdéssel állunk itt szemben».
Ebből látjuk, hogy mire számít vagy erőlködik számítani
Nietzsche, egy természetes folyamatra, a természet bűvös erejének
(vis medicatriae naturae) egy nemére. Leereszkedve,
megkissebbedve, az emberfajok megkímélik magukat, előrelátólag
és gazdaságosan és mindig ugyanannyi észbeli-erkölcsi erőt
tételezve fel az emberi értékekben és magában az emberiségben,
egy tartalékot kreálnak, amely egy napon természetszerűleg egy
kiválasztott osztállyá fog testesülni, tehát saját kebelükből egy
kiválasztott osztályt kreálnak, amely ebből így kiválik; méhükben
hordják öntudatlanul az arisztokráciát, amely onnan ki fog lépni,
hogy uralkodjék rajtuk.