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LIST OF FIGURES
4.3 Gross domestic product as a percentage of the 1989 level: Baltic republics
and SEECs 51
4.4 Gross domestic product as a percentage of the 1989 level: Oil exporters 51
4.7 Gross domestic product as a percentage of the 1989 level: Selected FYRs 53
4.8 Machinery/complex (SITC 7, 54, 87, 88): Share in total exports in CEECs
(%) 71
4.10 Light industry (SITC 8, without 87 and 88): Share in total exports in
CEECs (%) 72
4.11 Nonfuel raw materials (SITC 0, 1, 2, 4): Share in total exports in CEECs
(%) 72
4.13 Machinery/complex (SITC 7, 54, 87, 88): Share in total exports in SEECs,
the Baltic states, and Croatia (%) 73
4.15 Light industry (SITC 8, without 87 and 88): Share in total exports in
SEECs, the Baltic states, and Croatia (%) 74
4.16 Fuels (SITC 3): Share in total exports in SEECs, the Baltic states, and
Croatia (%) 75
4.17 Nonfuel raw materials (SITC 0, 1, 2, 4): Share in total exports in SEECs,
the Baltic states, and Croatia (%) 75
LIST OF FIGURES • vii
4.18 Machinery/complex (SITC 7, 54, 87, 88): Share in total exports in CIS
countries (%) 76
4.20 Light industry (SITC 8, without 87 and 88): Share in total exports in CIS
countries (%) 77
4.21 Nonfuel raw materials (SITC 0, 1, 2, 4): Share in total exports in CIS
countries (%) 78
4.22 Fuels (SITC 3): Share in total exports in CIS countries (%) 78
2.1 Per capita GDP of state Socialist countries compared with Western
Europe and growth rates, 1950 to 1990 12
2.2 Per capita GDP levels in state Socialist countries relative to 29 Western
European countries 13
2.3 Per capita GDP of Soviet republics compared with Western Europe and
growth rates, 1973 to 1990 14
3.1 Percentage share of industry value added in GDP at the start of transition 42
3.3 Percentage share of exports from state Socialist countries to key markets,
1989 43
5.1 Years in which transition economies reached EBRD score levels of 4 for
liberalization of prices and of foreign exchange and trade 103
9.4 Tertiary education: Enrollment rates and student-teacher ratios, 2007 168
10.6 Increase in poverty (national poverty lines) without social transfers (%) 210
15.1 Stock of FDI in U.S. dollars per capita and relative to GDP for selected
transition economies 279
15.2 The place of foreign-owned firms in the Czech economy, 2006 281
15.3 Potential positive and negative effects of FDI in host countries 283
15.5 The evolution of the ownership structure of Russian industrial enterprises 292
x • LIST OF TABLES
16.1 Surpluses on the financial account, including and excluding the contri-
bution from FDI, as a percentage of GDP 308
9.1 Perspectives on economic intervention: Beyond state and market failures 160
13.1 Corporate governance and the separation of ownership from control 240
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT value added tax
VAZ Volzhskii avtomobilnyi zavod (Volga Automobile Plant: Russian
automobile manufacturer)
WB World Bank
WC Washington Consensus
WEF World Economic Forum
WTO World Trade Organization
ZAZ Zaporizkyi avtomobilebudivelnyi zavod (Zaporizhzhia Automobile
Plant: Ukrainian automobile manufacturer)
MAP OF THE REGION
© iStockphoto
DETAILED MAP OF THE REGION
Detail from From H.J. deBlij and P.O. Muller, The World Today: Concepts and Regions in Geography, 5th edition. Originally
rendered in color. H.J. deBlij and P.O. Muller. Reprinted with Permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
INTRODUCTION
This book follows the momentous transformations of the economies of the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 20 years after 1989. In that period,
they abandoned their Socialist economic systems. They moved from economies
based on state ownership and, with the partial exception of Yugoslavia, central
planning—meaning that a central body allocated resources between producing
units—to market economies with, in all but a very few cases, a predominance of
private ownership. Alongside changes in their internal systems, they also opened their
economies to a wide range of external contacts and influences. The impact of the
world financial crisis, however, demonstrated the vulnerability of the growth models
that developed in individual countries.
The so-called economics of transition is not a new subject. A great deal has
been written on it from several different perspectives. On the basis of 20 years of
development, it is possible to reassess past judgements and interpretations. It is
possible to show how and why countries developed along a diversity of routes and
why the end points, or at least the points reached after 20 years, deviated both from
the systems of the past and from the market economies of advanced countries that
served as an example for the development of transition strategies.
With so much diversity, it is an open question as to how the process should
be characterized. The terms ‘‘transition’’ and ‘‘transition economy’’ gained currency
from those who saw the process as simple and linear and leading to a clear and
settled outcome. Reality proved more complex, with twists and turns that differed
between countries and culminated in different outcomes. The term ‘‘transformation’’
was preferred by others who saw a more open-ended process, probably leading to a
novel outcome that contained elements reflecting the heritages of the state Socialist
past.
Neither term is ideal. The term ‘‘transition’’ emphasizes the common features in
end results, and these were important. All the countries had moved toward market
economies, generally with the dominance of private ownership, and all had become
integrated in some way into the world economic system. The term ‘‘transformation’’
emphasizes the diversity and unpredictability of these outcomes and the powerful
effects of starting points and past heritages. These, too, were important. Nevertheless,
we stick with ‘‘transition,’’ albeit partly as a convenient shorthand that has gained
such wide currency as to be difficult to avoid. It also allows for convenient terms such
as ‘‘transition economy.’’
Similarities and differences between countries, both in outcomes and in the
course of changes, are recurrent themes in the following chapters. A striking common
feature was a decline in gross domestic product (GDP) in the early years, widely
referred to as the ‘‘transformation depression.’’ Official data point to an exceptionally
serious downturn. Only a few countries had passed their GDP levels of 1989 before
2000, and some still had not reached that level in 2008, albeit mostly ones affected
at some point by internal wars. Any grouping of countries risks overgeneralizing,
whether based on geography or economic structures, but the general picture was
for shorter and shallower depressions in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe
INTRODUCTION • xvii
(referred to throughout the book as CEECs, as explained in the box below) and for
longer and deeper depressions in countries emerging from the breakup of the Soviet
Union. Thus, using approximate figures that are discussed in Chapter 4 (see also
Tables 18.1 and 18.2), the low point of GDP in Poland was 18 percent below its 1989
level, and that was reached in 1991, with recovery coming before other countries and
the 1989 level passed in 1996. This was among the most successful countries with
the fastest recovery. Among the worst performers was Ukraine, which reached a low
point at 60 percent below the 1989 level, and that occurred as late as 1999. Gross
domestic product was still almost 30 percent below the 1989 level in 2008.
The countries covered in this book include all the successor states to the Soviet
Union, the Soviet Union’s former allies in Eastern Europe, and the countries of the
former Yugoslavia. References are also made to Albania and Mongolia. However,
no attempt is made to provide a comprehensive coverage of every country. That
would be both tedious and unnecessary. Countries are given the greatest emphasis
where they stand out or where their experiences illustrate general points for the
overall discussion of transition.
At many points in this book, it is useful to classify countries into geographical
groupings. This does not mean that all within one group followed the same course of
development at all times. There were differences within, and frequent overlaps on
specific issues between, these groups. At times, groupings that transcend geography
prove more meaningful—for example, in relation to export structures when oil
and gas exporters constitute a definable grouping. With that said, the following
geographical groupings are frequently referred to:
The Central-Eastern European countries are grouped together with Slovenia,
a part of Yugoslavia until 1991, as CEECs. This group also includes Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, which split in January 1993 into the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. Czechia is the grammatically correct geographic name
for the Czech Republic, but we use the latter version throughout the book.
These CEECs became European Union (EU) members in 2004 and shared
many common features, including the highest per capita GDP levels and the
best contacts to Western Europe.
The Baltic republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—broke from the
Soviet Union in 1991 and became EU members in 2004. They were all
small countries that had been forcibly incorporated into the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1940 and were quick to re-establish contacts
with Western Europe.
The South-Eastern European countries (SEECs) comprise Bulgaria and
Romania and joined the EU in 2007. They were less developed than the
CEECs, both economically and in terms of traditions of political democracy.
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) incorporates all former
Soviet republics apart from the Baltic republics. It was formed in December
xviii • INTRODUCTION
1991 with eleven members. Georgia joined in December 1993 and withdrew
in August 2008. The CIS was a very loose organization with no significance
for economic policies, but the countries had common features deriving from
their pasts, from the experience of the collapse in state authority as the Soviet
Union broke up, and from their limited heritage of contacts with the outside
world. It is sometimes helpful to distinguish as a group the Central Asian
republics (CARs) of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.
They shared common features in their pasts, but there were important
differences in their paths of development.
For some countries, geographical or historical groupings are of practically
no relevance. Yugoslavia split up in 1991, and the successor states went
through vastly different experiences. Slovenia belongs with the CEEC group.
Croatia fits in some features with SEECs, as does Macedonia, referred to with
its provisional name, the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia.
Others were seriously hampered by instability, regional wars, and internal
conflicts. This was most destructive in Bosnia-Herzegovina and had long-term
consequences in Serbia. Montenegro declared independence from Serbia in
June 2006. Other countries that do not fit easily are Albania and Mongolia,
comparable to some poorer CIS countries in terms of income levels, but
here, geography distinguished them, as Albania had much easier contacts
with Western Europe.
Geography was also important, helping those countries that were closest to the
economic heart of Europe. However, that cannot be separated from the political tra-
ditions that gave the CEECs the best prospects for democratic political consolidation.
Inherited economic structures also helped countries starting from a higher economic
level. This was most significant in CEECs, countries that had undergone a degree of
industrialization decades earlier, and in countries with raw-material reserves, espe-
cially the oil-producing countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), made up of most of the former Soviet Union. Many others, with weaker
industrial bases inherited from their pasts, faced a more difficult road out of the
transformation depression.
Political development and, above all, the nature of the states were important in the
depression and in determining forms of recovery and subsequent development. This
marked important dividing lines between countries. A market system cannot function
without state activity, which, at the minimum, ensures a stable legal environment.
The experience in much of the CIS included substantial weakening of the state’s
administrative apparatuses such that these preconditions could not be met in the
early years of transition.
It can be added that even the minimum requirement of a functioning state
apparatus is not enough on its own. Laws and rules have to be accepted and applied,
and, as argued by institutionalist economists, this is not an automatic process but one
that takes considerable time. That point can be illustrated from the slow evolution
of institutions in the history of mature market economies. The exact processes that
need time to develop are referred to at various points in the book, notably in relation
to corporate governance and finance systems.
The effect of economic policies has been one of the most controversial issues
in discussions of transition. Within countries, too, debates from the early 1990s
led to entrenched positions, as individuals, including economic advisers, academic
economists, and politicians, tied their colors to particular masts. The international
aspect was particularly important. Transition was not a matter for the transi-
tion economies alone. It became a testing ground for the major international
institutions— the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank—and their
prestige was tied in with the success of particular transition strategies from the start.
They developed their conception of the appropriate policy approach, and this set the
agenda. They proved successful in influencing—often decisively and always to some
degree—policy making in individual countries. This made transition an extraordinary
experiment in the attempted application of a similar policy model across a range of
very different countries. However, although they had considerable leverage with their
prestige and with their ability to impose conditions, there were differences of opinion
within those organizations, and their efforts met varying degrees of opposition within
individual countries.
Debate focused on the broad strategy to be adopted, the speed with which
measures should be implemented, and also the desired outcomes. Two opposing
positions were caricatured as ‘‘shock therapy’’ and ‘‘gradualism.’’ The former, focusing
on speedy price and trade liberalization and macroeconomic restraint to limit inflation,
was broadly the approach of the IMF and World Bank. The latter developed partly
as a continuation of reform polices from before 1989 and partly as a reaction against
shock therapy. In practice, policy mixes often appeared as a combination of the two.
xx • INTRODUCTION
The core of the policy package promoted by the IMF and World Bank was
developed from the so-called Washington Consensus (referred to in what follows
as WC), which had been the basis of advice to, and conditions for, Latin American
countries previously seeking IMF assistance in the face of external and internal
disequilibrium. Adaptation into a strategy for transition required a greater focus on
privatization, and there were also references to the need to develop a framework of
laws and other preconditions for a functioning market economy. It was not a rigid
strategy and developed through adaptation in the light of experience, but in practice,
the main focus at the start was on the liberalization and stabilization measures. In
following years, the focus was on privatization alongside general liberalization and
deregulation of business activities.
A discussion of the early years of transition, therefore, requires substantial
discussion of the WC strategy. It was the basis for policies in many countries, starting
with Poland in 1990, and it dominated much of the early analytical and academic
writing on transition. Success was said to go with application of the WC strategy,
while poor results were interpreted as penalties for deviating from that strategy. As
already indicated, the conclusions of this book do not confirm so simple a relationship
between one policy package and successful outcomes. Reality was more complex
because other factors apart from policies were important, because other policies were
also important, because application of the WC strategy varied between countries, and
finally, because the effects of the WC strategy were not all positive. Its strengths and
weaknesses, therefore, require a more careful assessment.
The WC strategy contained some clearly positive elements that would belong in
any serious transition strategy. Some were embedded in part of the reform thinking
in state Socialist countries before 1989, but their victory was not assured until the
political changes of that and the following years. However, the application of the WC
strategy revealed weaknesses that reflected a simplified and abstract view of a market
system that was common to much of mainstream economics at the time. This was the
era of ‘‘neoliberal’’ domination in economic thinking, meaning support for policies of
deregulation, privatization, and free markets wherever possible.
Behind the WC strategy was an implicit assumption that a market needed very
little more than liberalization and private ownership. The need for an active state
and for a framework of laws and relationships within which a market system could
function was sometimes given formal recognition but, in practice, was soon either
given lesser prominence or ignored in total. That justified a mistaken emphasis on
the need for speed above all else in reaching features recognized in mainstream
economic theory.
Individual aspects of the WC strategy figure prominently in several chapters in
this book, but a blanket assessment of the package as a whole is not possible. However,
it is helpful to set out some key points at the start, outlining assessments that emerge
from discussion in later chapters. Judgment on the strengths and weaknesses of the
Washington Consensus strategy, and of the thinking that lay behind or came with it,
can be set out under the following six points.
First, it was right to emphasize liberalization of prices and of international trade.
The benefits of market-determined prices are beyond dispute. That is clear from
the experience of central planning. Opening of trade to the external world was also
clearly desirable in view of the experience of isolation under central planning.
INTRODUCTION • xxi
Despite pressure for speed, these steps did not need to be adopted in total
at once. In practice, price liberalization started in several countries before 1989,
and all countries retained some central controls over some prices, typically energy
and housing, over the following years. There was even more scope for a gradual
approach toward trade liberalization. Countries that in the past have caught up with
the most advanced in the world have always relied on forms of state help to protect
new industries. Indeed, in practice, there was some protection in early years in all
transition economies, although the pressure from the outside was to minimize this
and to keep any period of significant protection as short as possible.
Second, it was right to emphasize the benefits of a stable macroeconomic
environment, but it was wrong to set stabilization as an overarching priority. This was
to be one of the most controversial parts of the WC strategy. The problem is that
stabilization is never fully achieved—there are always some signs of macroeconomic
imbalance—and driving down state spending and the money supply can be very
harmful to other policy objectives.
Fiscal restraint by cuts in public spending threatened unnecessary destruction
of productive capacity and further social costs from reductions in state spending. It
could contribute to the destructive weakening of state apparatuses. Here, underlying
theoretical positions influenced policy choices, as such concerns were not relevant to
those who could not see a state ever playing a positive role.
Reducing and restricting the money supply was similarly problematic, as an
overzealous approach undermined the development of a market economy. The
heritage of central planning actually left enterprises poorly equipped to cope with
restrictive monetary policies. However, that approach was pressed from the outside
on the basis of a mistaken view that the principal problem was one of excess demand
and an excess of money. In practice, many governments, by fudges and retreats,
quietly relaxed restrictive policies as problems became apparent. In some cases,
restrictive policies led to the strengthening of informal and barter relations between
enterprises.
Third, it was right to remove restrictions on private enterprise as quickly as
possible. This was underway in many countries before 1989 and hardly needed
emphasis in international advice. It was a step justified by the evidence of inflexibility
and failures to satisfy and respond to consumer demand under central planning.
As long as the new enterprises could operate in a normal legal environment and
as long as they were built genuinely from scratch and not by expropriation of
state assets—neither of which was always the case—they were clearly beneficial to
transition economies. The positive effects, therefore, depended on maintenance of a
functioning state.
Fourth, it was wrong to emphasize the need for the maximum speed with privati-
zation. This led, for a time, to active support for so-called mass privatization, based on
distribution of vouchers that were then exchanged for shares in formerly state-owned
enterprises. Support for this measure reflected two questionable theoretical views.
The first was the view that institutional and legal forms could wait until after
privatization. That downplays the importance of the wider environment in which an
economic system operates. An ingenious, but unconvincing, argument was developed
to fill this gap. Privatization, it was suggested, should come first. That would create
effective owners who would then demand new institutions to protect their property
xxii • INTRODUCTION
and regulate their relationships with each other. The state would then provide a
framework demanded by private property, but there would never be much need
for any larger role. This bears little relationship to the development of market
economies in the past in which state authority always played an important role.
The discussion in later chapters provides clear evidence of the negative effects of
speedy privatization resulting in weak legal environments. These were particularly
damaging when international financial flows were weakly regulated, making it easy
for individuals and businesses to transfer wealth to other countries.
The second questionable view was that a successful market economy depends on
incentive structures alone. A private firm, it was believed, would maximize efficiency
so as to maximize profits. Managements would be forced to set this aim by private,
profit-oriented owners. That ignores much of the complexity of modern businesses.
They have complex internal lives in which different actors have varied incentives.
Moreover, success does not depend on incentives alone. Managers need to know how
to manage, how to develop new products, and how to access markets and networks.
These are not simple tasks. Experience was to show that privatization alone often
contributed nothing to solving these problems and in many cases left enterprises
worse placed than under state ownership. Indeed, the incentive to seek quick profits
was often highly damaging, leading to asset stripping and transfers of wealth abroad.
There were clear alternatives to mass privatization, and a varied array of countries
avoided, or kept to a minimum, the reliance on that approach. One alternative was
to target privatization so that it did help overcome the problems just mentioned,
and the most promising way to do this was to seek out established multinational
companies (MNCs) as buyers. This form of opening to the outside world did bring
substantial benefits, although only when it was clearly associated with commitments
to investment and development. That was not always the case. Simply selling off
to foreign companies as quickly as possible and without attention to the terms was,
therefore, not a wise policy. It can be added that finding desirable buyers was possible
only for enterprises that were attractive to a potential buyer, and that was true only
of some. Foreign ownership was, therefore, not a universal panacea.
Another alternative was commercialization under state ownership, allowing for
later or gradual sale of shares as a means to raise finance and guarantee independence
from political interference as the business environment developed and improved.
That would have been in line with the significant levels of state ownership that
persisted in many Western European countries in the years after 1945. There is
some empirical evidence that private ownership has advantages over state ownership,
although there are difficulties with comparing like with like under different ownership
forms and strong evidence that other factors, such as a competitive environment, can
be more important. There is no evidence that private ownership must be better in all
circumstances, particularly not for the kinds of private ownership that emerged out
of mass privatization in the 1990s.
Fifth, it was wrong to opt for speedy liberalization of banking. Hopes of creating
a successful finance system in a short space of time were one of the most serious
mistakes in transition strategies inspired by the WC, leading to substantial losses as
new banking systems were engulfed by damaging crises. There was a theoretical basis
for this policy in the view that banks are no different from any other business and
would, therefore, similarly benefit from private ownership and minimal regulation.
INTRODUCTION • xxiii
In fact, their business activities can be very risky and the costs to the economy of
their failure very large. The banking system is an area in which the institutionalist
message—that the free market alone is not enough—has particular force.
The alternative here was clear. There could have been a much longer period
of state ownership, ensuring that banks kept to the role of financing productive
investment and to the gradual establishment of deposit bases as members of the
public grew to trust this form of saving. This would have been consistent with practice
in many market economies that developed with substantial state involvement in, and
regulation of, banking. Comparisons between transition economies also show that
there was greater stability where the growth of a private banking system was not
rushed. New private banks came and went, often leaving the state to pick up the
pieces.
Finally, it was wrong to argue against an active state role. The theoretical
justification for this was the belief that a market system leads to an ideal allocation
of resources such that any state intervention is an unnecessary distortion. It is seen
as yielding to sectional lobbies or ‘‘rent seekers,’’ meaning individuals and businesses
seeking an income from state favors and subsidies without making any productive
contribution. This ignores the many ways in which state intervention contributes to
the functioning of a market economy, as justified by theories of market failure and
as demonstrated by the history of active state roles in many countries’ development
and by state activity in mature market economies. Pressure for a greater state role
was therefore likely in many cases to contribute to, rather than restrict, economic
development.
There were businesses that survived thanks to state subsidies. In this sense, rent
seeking was a real and important phenomenon. However, minimizing the role of the
state and relying on private business often led to further problems. Apart from rent
seeking as normally understood, it was often very easy to make rapid fortunes by
exploiting the extreme freedom given to new private businesses and individuals.
In later years, policy debates shifted away from the early emphasis on shock
therapy versus gradualism and on the WC strategy. That was partly because the WC
strategy had itself developed, with parts from early versions universally accepted,
parts implemented, and parts adapted or superseded. Problems caused by early policy
choices had been handled and left in the past. New themes appeared more important,
and policy debates were conducted on less-general themes—for example, shifting to
tax and welfare policies and measures to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).
However, underlying theoretical differences continued to influence policy
choices. There was continuing, lasting pressure from an approach that empha-
sized the benefits of the freest possible market with the smallest possible state role.
Advocates of the neoliberal approach focused on new issues. These included low
welfare spending and the ‘‘flat tax,’’ which meant very limited progressiveness in tax
systems. This was propagated and spread across transition economies, marking them
out as still distinct in policy ideas from advanced market economies.
Another important theme was the liberalization of financial systems and opening
to inflows of capital. These were to become more dangerous as economies developed,
but the dangers were underestimated. There was an assumption that state debt
could present a danger, but in fact, it was private debt that contributed most to the
effects of the 2008 world financial crisis. These effects were quite devastating for
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Il tourna dans une allée bordée de lilas. Derrière la maison, un noyer
d’Amérique, léger feuillage agité et mêlé de jaune, avait jonché la pelouse
de grosses noix vertes. Il en ramassa une, respira son odeur de poivre, et la
rejeta.
Il se tint à l’écart des communs, ne voulant pas être reconnu. Un coin du
jardin était marqué par un colombier, en bas duquel se trouvait une pièce
remplie de ferraille et de vieux outils. Un pigeon posé sur une planchette le
regarda passer; il était blanc, la queue relevée; son œil paraissait dur dans
une peau rouge.
En un quart d’heure, il eut tout revu. Que ce jardin paraissait désert!
Mais puisque sa mère n’était plus là, puisque jamais ne reparaîtraient sur la
prairie son parasol de coutil rayé et sa chaise longue, que venait-il chercher
ici? Valmont n’existait plus que dans sa mémoire. Que valait la réalité
auprès de tant d’images descendues en lui, parmi lesquelles son cœur
n’épuiserait jamais la déchirante douceur de se souvenir?
I
Lorsque Gérard Seguey, descendant du train, se trouva au bout du pont
de pierre, il remarqua tout de suite que les pêcheurs de morue étaient
arrivés.
Huit jours avant, quand il avait quitté Bordeaux, il n’y avait encore, dans
le port, que deux goélettes. Maintenant, elles étaient une quinzaine, rangées
deux par deux et formant une file, comme un grand convoi ancré au milieu
du fleuve. Autour d’elles, dans la lumière ambrée d’un après midi de
septembre, crépitait comme pour une danse infatigable l’étincellement de
petites vagues. Ce clapotis éblouissant courait sur leurs flancs. Les unes,
hautes sur l’eau, allégées, découvraient une ligne de flottaison de couleur
ocre; d’autres s’enfonçaient, appesanties par leur lourd butin. Quelques
bricks-goélettes y étaient mêlés. Les coques battues par la mer se
détachaient presque uniformément d’un gris de saumure, avec de grandes
traînées rouilleuses; les ponts étaient encombrés de toiles roulées, de
cordes, de doris enchâssées les unes dans les autres; de ces épaisseurs de
choses jaunâtres jaillissaient les hautes mâtures—deux mâts, trois mâts, en
bois clair, luisant, montant d’un seul jet ou croisés de vergues, et entre
lesquels s’élançaient les drisses. Leurs gréements dessinaient, dans le grand
paysage de la rade, d’aériennes figures de géométrie: pyramides nettes des
haubans, aux faces tendues comme des échelles; losanges multiples, toute
une architecture élégante et sèche dressée pour le vent et pour les oiseaux.
Ses traits audacieux semblaient sur le ciel tracés au burin.
Chaque année, à la même époque, le cortège besogneux remontait le
fleuve, ayant drainé dans les brouillards de l’océan l’antique richesse des
poissons salés. Il avançait dans l’immense croissant formé par la rade,
laissant derrière lui les bassins de réparation, les quais verticaux où
s’amarrent les paquebots massifs des grandes Compagnies. Il passait devant
la longue façade du dix-huitième siècle, coupée de loin en loin par de
grands cours et de vastes places; la plus belle, l’esplanade des Quinconces,
encadrée d’arbres, luxe royal d’air et d’espace, au cœur d’une ville toute
commerçante, lui présentait son double phare, sa terrasse dressée au-dessus
du port, sa rampe à balustres que l’on pourrait voir au fond d’un tableau de
Claude Lorrain ou de Véronèse; la place Richelieu, avec ses hôtels où
siègent les sociétés de navigation; l’ancienne place Royale, symétrique et
harmonieuse, d’une noble architecture Louis XV, qui a gardé sous les
fumées les belles lignes de Gabriel, et où l’âme même de la Cité règne
vigilante et laborieuse. La Bourse et la Douane y ont été bâties face à face,
comme à Venise la Libreria vis-à-vis du palais des Doges. Ce décor
classique, d’un goût sobre et pur, s’accorde avec l’idéal de mesure,
d’ordonnance régulière et de correction que l’aristocratie bordelaise impose
à sa ville. Mais le vieux quartier est proche, pittoresque et sale, tout
grouillant de vie populaire. C’est devant lui que les goélettes viennent
s’amarrer sur les bouées de corps mort.
Il y a là, pour les attendre, de grosses gabares qui s’attachent au flanc des
bateaux pêcheurs. Une fourmilière d’hommes se font passer de main en
main les grands poissons plats qui n’apparaissent que pour disparaître. La
ville réveille les portefaix, couchés sur le seuil des portes ou assis le long
des trottoirs; les charretiers mettent en branle les longs camions bas que
tirent plusieurs chevaux attelés en flèche. Les chargements s’engouffrent
dans l’ancien Bordeaux où serpente, sombre et célèbre depuis des siècles, la
rue de la Rousselle. Un relent de morue y flotte; les grands-parents de
Montaigne, plusieurs générations d’Eyquem, s’y sont enrichis.
Les hommes de la mer débarquent. Ils ont revu de loin, en bas des
maisons rangées sur le port, une bordure lépreuse de bars équivoques. Leurs
larges carrures encombrent l’entrée toujours ouverte. Un perroquet enchaîné
la garde. Des lanternes vénitiennes, orange, vertes, multicolores, s’y
allument le soir dans la fumée, au-dessus des filles qui versent à boire. Ils se
groupent aussi, le long des trottoirs, devant les petites voitures drapées
d’andrinople où les marchands ambulants débitent des foulards, des
bretelles et des pipes mélangés aux porte-monnaie. Par derrière cette
façade, à la fois princière et sordide, les maisons louches entr’ouvrent sur
des ruelles leur corridor noir où l’on trouve parfois au petit jour de grands
corps couchés.
Seguey aimait ce tableau du port.
Il habitait sur le quai de Bourgogne, en face de la montée du pont: une
longue terrasse en pente douce, plantée comme une promenade de quatre
rangs de tilleuls. Les femmes, l’été, y cousent des voiles, les sandaliers y
transportent leur établi. Un marché s’y tient le samedi, et le lundi la foire
aux guenilles. Le grand effort monumental du dix-huitième siècle a élevé
tout à côté un hémicycle de façades, la place Bourgogne, avec l’ouverture
béante d’un arc de triomphe. Mais ce quartier bruyant, animé et dépenaillé,
garde une physionomie que la vie moderne entame avec peine.
C’est Saint-Michel. Il se tasse au pied de ce monument populaire qui est
son église. Il a son clocher, haut de cent huit mètres, planté sur la rade. Dans
cette ville où les églises dressent dans le ciel tant de tours inégales, la sienne
est unique. C’est la flèche, mot que toutes les bouches modulent d’un
accent affreux. Un caveau s’ouvre dans sa base, recélant des momies qui
passent pour une des curiosités de la ville. Mais, en réalité, elle est
gardienne et symbole des choses vivantes; autour d’elle tettent en plein
terroir les vieilles racines.
La flèche... Elle est la reine de l’esprit local, d’un vocabulaire qui fait
parfois sursauter d’horreur l’oreille délicate ou non prévenue; un monde
spécial s’accroche à elle, la foule des vanniers, des marchands de filets, des
gagne-petit, et aussi la clientèle du bateau-soupe mouillé à côté des bains
sur le bord du fleuve. La halle voisine déborde à ses pieds. Chaque matin
dresse autour d’elle des parapluies de toile grise abritant des légumes, des
viandes entassées, des quartiers de lard. Les oignons et les têtes d’ail
s’accumulent par terre sur de vieilles toiles. Les ruisseaux traînent des
détritus et des troncs de choux. Autour d’elle s’agite la nuée bruyante des
portanières qui soutiennent en équilibre sur leur tête une corbeille ronde, ou
reviennent couronnées de leur coussinet.
C’est alors, dans l’encombrement des caisses renversées, des paniers
ouverts, que sa vraie vie éclate. Elle est dans le rire des jeunes filles, qui ont
sur un peigne de strass un chignon déployé comme un éventail; elle est dans
l’assemblée des femmes assises au milieu de leur déballage, les hanches
rebondies, la poitrine grasse, et qui ont, pour interpeller, des roulements
d’yeux, des rengorgements, toute une mimique inimitable. Son âme joyeuse
se répand en cris, renouvelant derrière les tréteaux une séculaire comédie
d’appels et d’insultes. Son âme misérable est dans l’éventail des petites rues
souillées où des loques pendent aux fenêtres. L’Espagne est là aussi, avec
ses femmes rondes comme des tourelles dans des entrepôts de grenades;
l’Afrique y mêle ses grands diables de nègres en bourgeron bleu et
casquette sombre, balançant leurs bras, quand ils ne pressent pas sur leur
cœur des paquets enveloppés de gros papier jaune. Et voilà que la marée
humaine roule encore parmi tous ceux-là, énormes et enfantins,
accompagnés parfois par une coiffe blanche, ceux qu’on appelle ici les
«Terre-Neuviens».
II
Les bureaux de M. Lafaurie se trouvaient au premier étage d’une maison
du quai, entre les Quinconces majestueux et la petite place encombrée,
bruyante, fermée au fond par l’Entrepôt, près de laquelle débouche le cours
aristocratique entre tous: le Pavé des Chartrons. Le «Pavé» comme les
Bordelais l’appellent par une abréviation qui n’implique aucune familiarité,
planté d’arbres, bordé d’hôtels aux portes cintrées, aux façades brodées de
fines guirlandes, et au bout duquel apparaît le Jardin Public éclatant de
gaieté derrière ses grilles aux lances dorées.
Seguey, qui avait marché presque jusqu’aux docks pour tromper son
impatience, revint lentement en suivant les quais. Il s’arrêta un moment
devant un paquebot que l’on déchargeait: c’était l’Ausone, récemment sorti
des chantiers, avec trois ponts superposés et deux énormes cheminées
orange. Une nuée d’hommes s’agitait le long de son flanc noir amarré au
quai, comme une fourmilière à côté d’un monstre. Avec sa masse énorme
qui écrasait tout son entourage, ses moignons de mâts, il s’opposait
vigoureusement aux fines goélettes dressées dans le fleuve qui ont l’élan et
la liberté des oiseaux de mer. Un peuple tumultueux de machines et
d’hommes le prenait d’assaut pour le vider jusqu’aux entrailles. Deux
grues, dont la tourelle tournait à la hauteur d’un entresol, dévidaient une
chaîne au fond de la cale et en arrachaient des grappes de sacs. Il y avait là,
pour les recevoir, le troupeau puissant des hommes de peine que la hâte de
jeter leur charge pourchasse comme un fouet à travers le quai. Deux
mécaniciens nègres, en cotte bleue, indolemment accoudés à un bastingage,
levaient au-dessus d’eux des faces joyeuses.
Les portefaix étaient toujours ceux qu’a sculptés Puget: des faces
d’ivrogne aux cheveux trempés par la sueur; des encolures de taureau que le
poids du sac tasse entre les épaules; des bras nus aux muscles gonflés, des
mains qui s’accrochent à la charge inerte. L’un d’eux, énorme, tendait une
tête contractée. Quelques malingres, la respiration courte, la peau collée,
dépensaient précipitamment leur force nerveuse. L’un d’eux, aux
moustaches gauloises, quand la charge tombait sur lui, semblait s’écraser.
Tout autour se pressaient des camions, les autos grondaient, un train long
de cent cinquante mètres dévidait la file de ses plates-formes; des
pauvresses, glissées entre les sacs comme des rats d’égout, balayaient
hâtivement quelques grains perdus; d’autres, accroupies, misérables paquets
de guenilles grises, grattaient avec leurs ongles dans des tas d’ordures. En
face, quelques maisons inclinaient au-dessus de la chaussée les hampes
nues où monte, aux jours de fête, le pavillon des grandes Compagnies. De
l’autre côté, lisière du ciel éblouissant, s’étalait le bleu des coteaux; et dans
tout cela, brume dorée du soir, fumées et relents, clameur du travail,
affiches immenses, grues encrassées et infatigables, s’exhalait la puissante
poésie du port.
Quand Seguey eut passé devant l’Entrepôt, ses yeux se tournèrent vers
les fenêtres des bureaux où présidait M. Lafaurie. Il était à la fois irrité et
respectueux de cette grandeur. Ses sentiments étaient ceux que peut avoir,
devant le monument d’une victoire, le fils du chef qui a succombé. Que de
fois, à cette place, il avait été mordu au cœur par le sentiment de son
impuissance! Il enviait cette force qu’il avait perdue. Sa pensée se portait
vers les grands paquebots, les grandes affaires; une ardeur d’action le
tourmentait, fatigante et vaine, comme cette fièvre de réussite qui consume
l’étudiant pauvre sur ses mornes livres. Puis il passait, il oubliait... avec ses
pensées, il se composait un autre univers. Mais, aujourd’hui, M. Lafaurie,
tendant vers lui une main ouverte, pouvait le remettre à sa vraie place. Le
voudrait-il?... Trouverait-il en lui assez de ressources et d’habileté pour l’y
décider?
Les bureaux comprenaient plusieurs pièces claires, sobrement garnies de
meubles anglais et de cartonniers, dans lesquelles une quinzaine
d’employés étaient répartis. Un garçon se tenait à l’entrée dans un vestibule
arrangé en salon d’attente. Ce personnage en veste bleu barbeau toisait de
très haut les nouveaux venus. La prétention de voir M. Lafaurie lui
paraissait exorbitante. Le cabinet du chef de la maison était dans son esprit
un lieu redoutable et presque sacré, devant lequel étaient dressés plusieurs
barrages qu’il devait défendre. Mais à peine eut-il présenté la carte de
Seguey qu’il reparut transformé des pieds à la tête, presque obséquieux.
Seguey attendit quelques minutes. Une porte entrebâillée découvrait une
grande pièce partagée en deux parties inégales par une boiserie. Le
crépitement des machines à écrire vous assourdissait. Deux dactylographes,
tapant sur leur clavier à toute vitesse, le regardèrent curieusement....
M. Lafaurie représentait heureusement dans le monde le type du galant
homme. Dans son bureau, il faisait figure de souverain. Son cabinet de
travail, net et déblayé, avec une table d’acajou Empire, quelques larges
fauteuils en cuir, donnait une haute idée de son importance. Bien des jeunes
gens, entrés en solliciteurs dans ce sanctuaire des grandes affaires, y avaient
immédiatement perdu leurs moyens et donné la plus piètre idée de leur
caractère. L’empressement, qui est un signe de vulgarité, y tombait dans le
vide d’un profond dédain; la timidité succombait sous l’indifférence. Mais,
rien qu’à regarder Gérard Seguey entrer et s’asseoir, M. Lafaurie fut
confirmé dans l’idée qu’aucun autre ne pourrait correspondre aussi
parfaitement à ses propres vues.
M. Lafaurie, comme presque tout le monde, avait deux visages. Pour
accueillir son futur «collaborateur», il avait arboré le plus séduisant, cette
bonne grâce dans le sourire qui est une première suggestion d’entente. La
confiance émanait de lui. «Tout cela n’est rien», semblait-il dire, devant le
jeune homme un peu soucieux qui ne renonçait évidemment pas à ses
objections.
Il est rare qu’un sujet difficile soit abordé immédiatement. Lorsque deux
adversaires se trouvent en présence, une convention tacite leur accorde
quelques minutes pour s’observer. M. Lafaurie reprit le cigare qu’il avait un
instant posé à côté de lui, dans un cendrier. Il en regarda l’extrémité pour
s’assurer que quelques points rouges y vivaient encore. Un œillet violet,
cueilli le matin à Belle-Rive, fleurissait son veston noir un peu élimé.
Depuis la guerre, il mettait une sorte d’ostentation à faire durer ses vieux
vêtements. Mais sa cravate se détachait, souple et moelleuse, dans
l’ouverture d’un gilet moucheté de gris.
Le préambule languit un peu, M. Lafaurie se tenant à des considérations
générales de sympathie et de bienveillance. Seguey, assis dans un fauteuil
qu’il lui avait désigné près de sa table, attendait que la conversation prît un
autre tour; ce n’était pas pour entendre cela qu’il était venu. Ses manières,
un peu créoles, trompaient sur la ténacité cachée de son caractère. Lorsqu’il
écoutait, ses paupières se fermaient à demi. Ses cheveux ondulés aux