Bioethics: Principles, Issues, and

Cases 3rd Edition (eBook PDF)

Go to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebooksecure.com/product/bioethics-principles-issues-and-cases-3rd-edition-eb
ook-pdf/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

(eBook PDF) Bioethics: Principles, Issues, and Cases

4th Edition

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-bioethics-principles-
issues-and-cases-4th-edition/

(eBook PDF) Bioethics: Principles, Issues, and Cases

3rd Edition by Lewis Vaughn

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-bioethics-principles-
issues-and-cases-3rd-edition-by-lewis-vaughn/

(eBook PDF) Business Ethics: Contemporary Issues and

Cases

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-business-ethics-
contemporary-issues-and-cases/

(eBook PDF) Cases for Principles of Administrative Law

3rd Edition

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-cases-for-principles-of-
administrative-law-3rd-edition/
(eBook PDF) Human Heredity: Principles and Issues 11th
Edition

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-human-heredity-
principles-and-issues-11th-edition/

Human Heredity: Principles and Issues 11th Edition

(eBook PDF)

http://ebooksecure.com/product/human-heredity-principles-and-
issues-11th-edition-ebook-pdf/

(eBook PDF) Curriculum: Foundations, Principles, and

Issues 7th Edition

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-curriculum-foundations-
principles-and-issues-7th-edition/

Neuroethics and Bioethics: Neurodivergence and

Architecture 1st edition - eBook PDF

https://ebooksecure.com/download/neuroethics-and-bioethics-
neurodivergence-and-architecture-ebook-pdf/

(eBook PDF) Psychological Testing: Principles,

Applications, and Issues 9th Edition

http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-psychological-testing-
principles-applications-and-issues-9th-edition/
 Contents vii

In Depth: Two Views of Informed Consent 201 readings 259

Legal Brief: Important Informed Consent The Nuremberg Code 259
Cases 202 Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for
Applying Major Theories 203 Medical Research Involving Human Subjects,
Classic Case File: Jerry Canterbury 204 World Medical Association 260
Key Terms 205 “The Belmont Report,” The National
Summary 205 Commission for the Protection of
Cases for Evaluation 206 Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Further Reading 208 Behavioral Research 263
Notes 208 “Final Report: Human Radiation Experiments,”
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
readings 208
Experiments 266
“The Concept of Informed Consent,”
“Of Mice but Not Men: Problems of the
Ruth R. Faden and Tom L. Beauchamp 208
Randomized Clinical Trial,” Samuel Hellman
“Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy
and Deborah S. Hellman 272
Tale?” Jay Katz 213
“A Response to a Purported Ethical Difficulty
“Transparency: Informed Consent in Primary
with Randomized Clinical Trials Involving
Care,” Howard Brody 223
Cancer Patients,” Benjamin Freedman 278
“Informed Consent: Some Challenges to the
“How to Resolve an Ethical Dilemma
Universal Validity of the Western Model,”
Concerning Randomized Clinical Trials,”
Robert J. Levine 229
Don Marquis 282
Canterbury v. Spence, United States Court of
“Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee
Appeals 235
Syphilis Study,” Allan M. Brandt 285
“The Ethics of Clinical Research in the Third
Chapter 6
World,” Marcia Angell 297
human research 239 “Ethical Issues in Clinical Trials in Developing
The Science of Clinical Trials 240 Countries,” Baruch Brody 301
In Depth: The Tuskegee Tragedy 241
Beneficence, Science, and Placebos 242 Part 3. ​Life and Death
Science and Informed Consent 245
Chapter 7
In Depth: Women in Clinical
Trials 246 abortion 309
Research on the Vulnerable 247 Starting Point: The Basics 309
In Depth: Why Enter a Clinical Trial? 248 Fact File: U.S. Abortions 310
Applying Major Theories 251 In Depth: Abortion and Public
Key Terms 252 Opinion 312
Summary 252 The Legal Struggle 313
Classic Case File: The UCLA Schizophrenia In Depth: Late-Term Abortion 314
Study 253 Persons and Rights 314
Cases for Evaluation 254 In Depth: Does a Fetus Feel Pain? 317
Further Reading 258 Applying Major Theories 319
Notes 258 Key Terms 320

00-Vaughn-FM.indd 7 26/05/16 6:33 PM

 viii Contents

Summary 320 Classic Case File: Baby M 424

Classic Case File: Nancy Klein 321
Cases for Evaluation 322
Further Reading 324
Notes 325
readings 326
“A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis
Thomson 326
“Why Abortion Is Immoral,” Don Marquis 336
“An Almost Absolute Value in History,”
John T. Noonan, Jr. 348
“On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,”
Mary Anne Warren 352
“Virtue Theory and Abortion,” Rosalind
Hursthouse 363
“Abortion and the Concept of a Person,”
Jane English 377
“Abortion,” Margaret Olivia Little 383
“Abortion Through a Feminist Ethics Lens,”
Susan Sherwin 388
Roe v. Wade, United States Supreme Court 397
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, United States Supreme
Court 402
Chapter 8
reproductive technology 409
In Vitro Fertilization 409
Fact File: Assisted Reproduction 410
Surrogacy 415
In Depth: IVF and Children’s Future
Children 416
Cloning 417
In Depth: Cloning Time Line 420
Applying Major Theories 421
In Depth: Sherri Shepherd: How Surrogacy
Can Go Wrong 422
Key Terms 423
Summary 423
Cases for Evaluation 425
Further Reading 427
Notes 428
readings 429
“IVF: The Simple Case,” Peter Singer 429
“IVF and Women’s Interests: An Analysis
of Feminist Concerns,” Mary Anne
Warren 433
“‘Give Me Children or I Shall Die!’ New
Reproductive Technologies and Harm to
Children,” Cynthia B. Cohen 445
“Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its
Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation,”
Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith 456
“The Presumptive Primacy of Procreative
Liberty,” John A. Robertson 466
“Surrogate Mothering: Exploitation or
Empowerment?” Laura M. Purdy 473
“Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?” Elizabeth S.
Anderson 483
“Egg Donation and Commodification,” Bonnie
Steinbock 495
“The Wisdom of Repugnance,” Leon R. Kass 504
“Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment
of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con,”
Dan W. Brock 520
Opinion in the Matter of Baby M, New Jersey
Supreme Court 531
Chapter 9
genetic choices 539
Genes and Genomes 539
Genetic Testing 540
In Depth: Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests 543
Gene Therapy 547
Fact File: Available Genetic Tests for
Cancer Risk 548

00-Vaughn-FM.indd 8 26/05/16 6:33 PM


Fact File: Recent Research in Gene Therapy 551
Stem Cells 552
Applying Major Theories 554
Classic Case File: The Kingsburys 555
Key Terms 556
Summary 556
Cases for Evaluation 557
Further Reading 559
Notes 560
readings 560
“Implications of Prenatal Diagnosis for the
Human Right to Life,” Leon R. Kass 560
“Genetics and Reproductive Risk: Can
Having Children Be Immoral?”
Laura M. Purdy 564
“The Morality of Screening for Disability,”
Jeff McMahan 571
“Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an
Open Future,” Dena S. Davis 575
“Disowning Knowledge: Issues in Genetic
Testing,” Robert Wachbroit 585
“The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic
Harms—The Case of Wrongful Handicaps,”
Dan W. Brock 589
“Is Gene Therapy a Form of Eugenics?”
John Harris 593
“Genetic Enhancement,” Walter Glannon 599
“Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of
Enhancement of Human Beings,” Julian
Savulescu 604
“Germ-Line Gene Therapy,” LeRoy Walters and
Julie Gage Palmer 613
“What Does ‘Respect for Embryos’ Mean
in the Context of Stem Cell Research?”
Bonnie Steinbock 620
Declaration on the Production and the
Scientific and Therapeutic Use of Human
Embryonic Stem Cells, Pontifical Academy
for Life 623
00-Vaughn-FM.indd 9
Contents ix
Chapter 10
euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide 625
Deciding Life and Death 626
Legal Brief: Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide:
Major Developments 628
In Depth: Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
Suicide: What Do Doctors
Think? 629
Autonomy, Mercy, and Harm 630
In Depth: Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act 632
Applying Major Theories 634
In Depth: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Public
Opinion 635
Classic Case File: Nancy Cruzan 636
Key Terms 637
Summary 637
Cases for Evaluation 638
Further Reading 640
Notes 641
readings 642
“Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized
Decision Making,” Timothy E. Quill 642
“Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” Dan W. Brock 646
“When Self-Determination Runs Amok,”
Daniel Callahan 658
“Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View,”
John D. Arras 663
“Active and Passive Euthanasia,” James
Rachels 678
“Dying at the Right Time: Reflections on
(Un)Assisted Suicide,” John Hardwig 682
“The Philosophers’ Brief,” Ronald Dworkin, Thomas
Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas
Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson 693
“An Alternative to Brain Death,” Jeff
McMahan 701
Vacco v. Quill, United States Supreme Court 707
Washington v. Glucksberg, United States
Supreme Court 710
06/06/16 1:39 PM
 x Contents
Part 4. ​Justice and Health Care
Chapter 11
dividing up health care
resources 719
Health Care in Trouble 719
In Depth: Unequal Health Care for
Minorities 721
Fact File: U.S. Health Care 722
Theories of Justice 723
In Depth: Public Opinion: Obtaining
Adequate Health Care 724
A Right to Health Care 725
In Depth: Public Health and Bioethics 727
The Ethics of Rationing 727
Classic Case File: Christine deMeurers 730
Key Terms 731
Summary 731
Cases for Evaluation 732
Further Reading 735
Notes 735
00-Vaughn-FM.indd 10
readings 736
“Is There a Right to Health Care and, if So, What
Does It Encompass?” Norman Daniels 736
“The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health
Care,” Allen E. Buchanan 743
“Rights to Health Care, Social Justice, and Fairness
in Health Care Allocations: Frustrations in the
Face of Finitude,” H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. 749
“Health Care Reform: Lessons from Canada,”
Raisa Berlin Deber 757
“The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving
Therapy,” Nicholas Rescher 765
“QALYfying the Value of Life,” John Harris 774
“Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain,”
James F. Childress et al. 782
“Human Rights Approach to Public Health
Policy,” D. Tarantola and S. Gruskin 793
Appendix 805
Glossary 807
Index 809
26/05/16 6:33 PM
 P R E FAC E
A revision of a new textbook is supposed to main-
tain the best of the old, judiciously enhance where
possible, and prudently add where needed (without
raising the price). This third edition of Bioethics
does just that. Over the years, the text has been
judged by numerous teachers to be exactly suitable
to their teaching approach, and the aim of this new
edition is to keep it that way.
Bioethics provides in-depth discussions of the
philosophical, medical, scientific, social, and legal
aspects of controversial bioethical issues and
combines this material with a varied collection of
thought-provoking readings. But on this foundation
are laid elements that other texts sometimes forgo:
1. An extensive introduction to ethics, bioethics,
moral principles, critical thinking, and moral
reasoning
2. Full coverage of influential moral theories,
including criteria and guidelines for evaluat-
ing them (the focus is on utilitarianism,
­Kantian ethics, natural law theory, Rawls’
contract theory, virtue ethics, the ethics of
care, and feminist ethics)
3. Detailed examinations of the classic cases
that have helped shape debate in major issues
4. Collections of current, news-making cases for
evaluation
5. Many pedagogical features to engage students
and reinforce lessons in the main text
6. Writing that strives hard for clarity and con-
cision to convey both the excitement and
complexity of issues without sacrificing
accuracy
topics and readings
Nine chapters cover many of the most controversial
issues in bioethics, detailing the main arguments and
xi
00-Vaughn-FM.indd 11
filling out the discussions with background on the
latest medical, legal, and social developments. The
main issues include paternalism and patient auton-
omy, truth-telling, confidentiality, informed consent,
research ethics, clinical trials, abortion, assisted re-
production, surrogacy, cloning, genetic testing, gene
therapy, stem cells, euthanasia, physician-assisted
suicide, and the just allocation of health care.
Every issues chapter contains seven to ten read-
ings, with each selection prefaced by a brief summary.
The articles—old standards as well as new ones—
reflect the major arguments and latest thinking in
each debate. They present a diversity of perspectives
on each topic, with pro and con positions well rep-
resented. In most cases, the relevant court rulings
are also included.
special features
A two-chapter introduction to bioethics, moral
reasoning, moral theories, and critical thinking.
These chapters are designed not only to introduce
the subject matter of bioethics but also to add co-
herence to subsequent chapter material and to
provide the student with a framework for thinking
critically about issues and cases. Chapter 1 is an in-
troduction to basic ethical concepts, the field of
bioethics, moral principles and judgments, moral
reasoning and arguments, the challenges of rela-
tivism, and the relationship between ethics and
both religion and the law. Chapter 2 explores moral
theory, shows how theories relate to moral princi-
ples and judgments, examines influential theories
(including virtue ethics, the ethics of care, and
feminist ethics), and demonstrates how they can be
applied to moral problems. It also explains how to
evaluate moral theories using plausible criteria of
adequacy.
26/05/16 6:33 PM
 xii Preface
Helpful chapter elements. Each issues chapter
contains:
1. Analyses of the most important arguments
offered by the various parties to the debate.
They reinforce and illustrate the lessons on
moral reasoning in Chapter 1.
2. A section called “Applying Major Theories”
showing how the moral theories can be
­applied to the issues. It ties the discussions
of moral theories in Chapter 2 to the moral
problems and illustrates the theories’
relevance.
3. A section labeled “Classic Case File” that
­examines in detail a famous bioethics case.
The stories covered in these sections include
those of Elizabeth Bouvia, Jerry Canterbury,
Nancy Klein, Baby M, Nancy Cruzan, the
Kingsburys, Christine deMeurers, and the
UCLA Schizophrenia Study. These are in
­addition to many other controversial cases
covered elsewhere in the book—for example,
the Terri Schiavo controversy, the Tuskegee
tragedy, the Willowbrook experiments,
and the U.S. government’s human radiation
studies.
4. A bank of “Cases for Evaluation” at the end
of each chapter. These are recent news stories
followed by discussion questions. They give
students the chance to test their moral
­reasoning on challenging new scenarios that
range across a broad spectrum of current
topics.
A diverse package of pedagogical aids. Each
issues chapter contains a chapter summary, sugges-
tions for further reading, and a variety of text boxes.
The boxes are mainly of three types:
1. “In Depth”—additional information, illustra-
tions, or analyses of matters touched on in
the main text.
2. “Fact File”—statistics on the social, medical,
and scientific aspects of the chapter’s topic.
3. “Legal Brief”—summaries of important
court rulings or updates on the status of
legislation.
00-Vaughn-FM.indd 12
new to this edition
Eleven new readings
• Shelly K. Schwartz, “Is It Ever OK to Lie
to Patients?”
• Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints”
• “Patient Autonomy and Physician Responsi-
bility,” with ­commentaries by Patrick C.
Beeman and Ryan C. VanWoerkom
• Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and
Abortion”
• Margaret Olivia Little, “Abortion”
• Bonnie Steinbock, “Egg Donation and
Commodification”
• Julian Savulescu, “Genetic Interventions and
the Ethics of Enhancement of Human Beings”
• John Hardwig, “Dying at the Right Time:
­Reflections on (Un)Assisted Suicide”
• Jeff McMahan, “An Alternative to
Brain Death”
• James F. Childress et al., “Public Health
Ethics: Mapping the Terrain”
• D. Tarantola and S. Gruskin, “Human Rights
Approach to Public Health Policy”
New Topics
• Physician autonomy
• Truth-telling and cultural diversity
• Decision-making capacity
• Public health and bioethics
• Surrogacy: The Sherri Shepherd case
• Fetal pain
• Casuistry
Clarifications and Further Discussions
Topics: Religion and ethics, autonomy and con-
sent, moral principles, human rights and
health, enhancement, cultural issues, direct-
to-consumer genetic tests, and gene therapy
Updates
Updated further reading, opinion surveys,
­statistics, and legal developments
ancillaries
The Oxford University Press Ancillary Resource
Center (ARC) at www.oup-arc.com/vaughn-
bioethics-3e houses an Instructor’s Manual with
Test Bank and PowerPoint Lecture Outlines for
26/05/16 6:33 PM

instructor use. Student resources are available on
the companion website at www.oup.com/us/vaughn
and include self-quizzes, flashcards, and helpful
web links.
acknowledgments
This edition of the text is measurably better than
the first thanks to the good people at Oxford Uni-
versity Press—especially my editor Robert Miller
and assistant editor Alyssa Palazzo—and many
reviewers:
Keith Abney, Polytechnic State University
at San Luis Obispo
Kim Amer, DePaul University
Jami L. Anderson, University of Michigan
Carol Isaacson Barash, Boston University
Deb Bennett-Woods, Regis University
Don Berkich, Texas A&M University
Stephan Blatti, University of Memphis
William Bondeson, University of Missouri,
Columbia
Lori Brown, Eastern Michigan University
David W. Concepción, Ball State University
Catherine Coverston, Brigham Young
University
Russell DiSilvestro, Assistant Professor,
­California State University, Sacramento
John Doris, Washington University in St. Louis
Denise Dudzinski, University of Washington
School of Medicine
Craig Duncan, Ithaca College
Anne Edwards, Austin Peay State University
John Elia, University of Georgia
Christy Flanagan-Feddon, Regis University
Jacqueline Fox, University of South Carolina
School of Law
Leslie P. Francis, University of Utah
00-Vaughn-FM.indd 13
Preface xiii
Devin Frank, University of Missouri–Columbia
Kathryn M. Ganske, Shenandoah University
Martin Gunderson, Macalester College
Helen Habermann, University of Arizona
Stephen Hanson, University of Louisville
Karey Harwood, North Carolina State
University
Sheila R. Hollander, University of Memphis
Scott James, University of North Carolina,
Wilmington
James Joiner, Northern Arizona University
William P. Kabasenche, Washington State
University
Susan Levin, Smith College
Margaret Levvis, Central Connecticut State
University
Burden S. Lundgren, Old Dominion University
Joan McGregor, Arizona State University
Tristram McPherson, Virginia Tech
Jonathan K. Miles, Bowling Green State
University
James Lindemann Nelson, Michigan State
University
Thomas Nenon, University of Memphis
Laura Newhart, Eastern Kentucky University
Steve Odmark, Century College
Assya Pascalev, Howard University
Viorel Pâslaru, University of Dayton
David J. Paul, Western Michigan University
Anthony Preus, Binghamton University
Susan M. Purviance, University of Toledo
Sara Schuman, Washtenaw Community College
David Schwan, Bowling Green State University
M. Josephine Snider, University of Florida
Anita Silvers, San Francisco State University
Gladys B. White, Georgetown University
Joseph Wellbank, Northeastern University
David Yount, Mesa Community College
26/05/16 6:33 PM
00-Vaughn-FM.indd 14 26/05/16 6:33 PM
 Bioethics
Principles, Issues, and Cases

00-Vaughn-FM.indd 15 26/05/16 6:33 PM

00-Vaughn-FM.indd 16 26/05/16 6:33 PM
 1
Principles and Theories

01-Vaughn-Chap01.indd 1 26/05/16 4:25 PM

01-Vaughn-Chap01.indd 2 26/05/16 4:25 PM
 CHAP TER 1
Moral Reasoning in Bioethics
Any serious and rewarding exploration of bio­
ethics is bound to be a challenging journey.
What makes the trip worthwhile? As you might
expect, this entire text is a long answer to that
question. You therefore may not fully appreciate
the trek until you have already hiked far along
the trail. The short answer comes in three parts.
First, bioethics—​like ethics, its parent disci­
pline—​is about morality, and morality is about
life. Morality is part of the unavoidable, bitter­
sweet drama of being persons who think and feel
and choose. Morality concerns beliefs regarding
morally right and wrong actions and morally
good and bad persons or character. Whether we
like it or not, we seem confronted continually
with the necessity to deliberate about right and
wrong, to judge someone morally good or bad,
to agree or disagree with the moral pronounce­
ments of others, to accept or reject the moral
outlook of our culture or community, and
even to doubt or affirm the existence or nature
of moral concepts themselves. Moral issues are
thus inescapable—​including (or especially) those
that are the focus of bioethics. In the twenty-first
century, few can remain entirely untouched by
the pressing moral questions of fair distribution
of health care resources, abortion and infanti­
cide, euthanasia and assisted suicide, exploitative
research on children and populations in devel­
oping countries, human cloning and genetic en­
gineering, assisted reproduction and surrogate
parenting, prevention and treatment of HIV/
AIDS, the confidentiality and consent of patients,
the refusal of medical treatment on religious
grounds, experimentation on human embryos
and fetuses, and the just allocation of scarce life-
saving organs.
01-Vaughn-Chap01.indd 3
Second, it would be difficult to imagine moral
issues more important—​more closely gathered
around the line between life and death, health
and illness, pain and relief, hope and despair—​
than those addressed by bioethics. Whatever
our view of these questions, there is little doubt
that they matter immensely. Whatever answers
we give will surely have weight, however they fall.
Third, as a systematic study of such ques­
tions, bioethics holds out the possibility of an­
swers. The answers may or may not be to our
liking; they may confirm or confute our precon­
ceived notions; they may take us far or not far
enough. But, as the following pages will show,
the trail has more light than shadow—​ and
thinking critically and carefully about the prob­
lems can help us see our way forward.
ethics and bioethics
Morality is about people’s moral judgments,
principles, rules, standards, and theories—​a ll of
which help direct conduct, mark out moral prac­
tices, and provide the yardsticks for measuring
moral worth. We use morality to refer gener­
ally to these aspects of our lives (as in “Morality
is essential”) or more specifically to the beliefs
or practices of particular groups or persons (as
in “American morality” or “Kant’s morality”).
Moral, of course, pertains to morality as just
­defined, though it is also sometimes employed
as a synonym for right or good, just as immoral
is often meant to be equivalent to wrong or bad.
Ethics, as used in this text, is not synonymous with
morality. Ethics is the study of morality using the
tools and methods of philosophy. Philosophy is
a discipline that systematically examines life’s
26/05/16 4:25 PM
 4 PA R T 1: P R I N C I P L E S A N D T H E O R I E S
big questions through critical reasoning, logical
argument, and careful reflection. Thus ethics—​
also known as moral philosophy—​is a reasoned
way of delving into the meaning and import of
moral concepts and issues and of evaluating the
merits of moral judgments and standards. (As
with morality and moral, we may use ethics to
say such things as “Kant’s ethics” or may use
ethical or unethical to mean right or wrong,
good or bad.) Ethics seeks to know whether an
action is right or wrong, what moral standards
should guide our conduct, whether moral prin­
ciples can be justified, what moral virtues are
worth cultivating and why, what ultimate ends
people should pursue in life, whether there are
good reasons for accepting a particular moral
theory, and what the meaning is of such notions
as right, wrong, good, and bad. Whenever we try
to reason carefully about such things, we enter
the realm of ethics: We do ethics.
Science offers another way to study morality,
and we must carefully distinguish this approach
from that of moral philosophy. Descriptive
ethics is the study of morality using the meth­
odology of science. Its purpose is to investigate
the empirical facts of morality—​the actual be­
liefs, behaviors, and practices that constitute
people’s moral experience. Those who carry out
these inquiries (usually anthropologists, sociol­
ogists, historians, and psychologists) want to
know, among other things, what moral beliefs a
person or group has, what caused the subjects to
have them, and how the beliefs influence behav­
ior or social interaction. Very generally, the dif­
ference between ethics and descriptive ethics is
this: In ethics we ask, as Socrates did, How ought
we to live? In descriptive ethics we ask, How do
we in fact live?
Ethics is a big subject, so we should not be
surprised that it has three main branches, each
dealing with more or less separate but related
sets of ethical questions. Normative ethics is the
search for, and justification of, moral standards,
or norms. Most often the standards are moral
principles, rules, virtues, and theories, and the
lofty aim of this branch is to establish rationally
01-Vaughn-Chap01.indd 4
some or all of these as proper guides for our ac­
tions and judgments. In normative ethics, we
ask questions like these: What moral principles,
if any, should inform our moral judgments?
What role should virtues play in our lives? Is the
principle of autonomy justified? Are there any
exceptions to the moral principle of “do not
kill”? How should we resolve conflicts between
moral norms? Is contractarianism a good moral
theory? Is utilitarianism a better theory?
A branch that deals with much deeper ethical
issues is metaethics. Metaethics is the study of
the meaning and justification of basic moral be­
liefs. In normative ethics we might ask whether
an action is right or whether a person is good,
but in metaethics we would more likely ask what
it means for an action to be right or for a person
to be good. For example, does right mean has the
best consequences, or produces the most happi-
ness, or commanded by God? It is the business of
metaethics to explore these and other equally
fundamental questions: What, if anything, is
the difference between moral and nonmoral be­
liefs? Are there such things as moral facts? If so,
what sort of things are they, and how can they
be known? Can moral statements be true or
false—​or are they just expressions of emotions
or attitudes without any truth value? Can moral
norms be justified or proven?
The third main branch is applied ethics, the
use of moral norms and concepts to resolve
practical moral issues. Here, the usual challenge
is to employ moral principles, theories, argu­
ments, or analyses to try to answer moral ques­
tions that confront people every day. Many such
questions relate to a particular professional field
such as law, business, or journalism, so we have
specialized subfields of applied ethics like legal
ethics, business ethics, and journalistic ethics.
Probably the largest and most energetic subfield
is bioethics.
Bioethics is applied ethics focused on health
care, medical science, and medical technology.
(Biomedical ethics is often used as a synonym,
and medical ethics is a related but narrower term
used most often to refer to ethical problems in
26/05/16 4:25 PM

medical practice.) Ranging far and wide, bio­
ethics seeks answers to a vast array of tough
ethical questions: Is abortion ever morally per­
missible? Is a woman justified in having an abor­
tion if prenatal genetic testing reveals that her
fetus has a developmental defect? Should people
be allowed to select embryos by the embryos’ sex
or other genetic characteristics? Should human
embryos be used in medical research? Should
human cloning be prohibited? Should physicians,
nurses, physicians’ assistants, and other health
care professionals always be truthful with patients
whatever the consequences? Should severely im­
paired newborns be given life-prolonging treat­
ment or be allowed to die? Should people in
persistent vegetative states be removed from life
support? Should physicians help terminally ill
­patients commit suicide? Is it morally right to con­
duct medical research on patients without their
consent if the research would save lives? Should
human stem-cell research be banned? How
should we decide who gets life-saving organ trans­
plants when usable organs are scarce and many
patients who do not get transplants will die?
Should animals be used in biomedical research?
The ethical and technical scope of bioethics is
wide. Bioethical questions and deliberations
now fall to nonexpert and expert alike—​to pa­
tients, families, and others as well as to philoso­
phers, health care professionals, lawyers, judges,
scientists, clergy, and public policy specialists.
Though the heart of bioethics is moral philoso­
phy, fully informed bioethics cannot be done
without a good understanding of the relevant
nonmoral facts and issues, especially the medi­
cal, scientific, technological, and legal ones.
ethics and the moral life
Morality then is a normative, or evaluative, enter­
prise. It concerns moral norms or standards that
help us decide the rightness of actions, judge the
goodness of persons or character, and prescribe the
form of moral conduct. There are, of course, other
sorts of norms we apply in life—​nonmoral norms.
Aesthetic norms help us make value judg­ments
01-Vaughn-Chap01.indd 5
Chapter 1: Moral Reasoning in Bioethics 5
about art; norms of etiquette about polite social
behavior; grammatical norms about correct use
of language; prudential norms about what is in
one’s interests; and legal norms about lawful and
unlawful acts. But moral norms differ from these
nonmoral kinds. Some of the features they are
thought to possess include the following.
Normative Dominance. In our moral practice,
moral norms are presumed to dominate other
kinds of norms, to take precedence over them.
Philosophers call this characteristic of moral
norms overridingness because moral consider­
ations so often seem to override other factors.
A maxim of prudence, for example, may suggest
that you should steal if you can avoid getting
caught, but a moral prohibition against stealing
would overrule such a principle. An aesthetic (or
pragmatic) norm implying that homeless people
should be thrown in jail for blocking the view of
a beautiful public mural would have to yield to
moral principles demanding more humane treat­
ment of the homeless. A law mandating brutal
actions against a minority group would conflict
with moral principles of justice and would there­
fore be deemed illegitimate. We usually think
that immoral laws are defective, that they need to
be changed, or that, in rare cases, they should be
defied through acts of civil disobedience.
Universality. Moral norms (but not exclusively
moral norms) have universality: Moral princi­
ples or judgments apply in all relevantly similar
situations. If it is wrong for you to tell a lie in
a particular circumstance, then it is wrong for
everyone in relevantly similar circumstances to
tell a lie. Logic demands this sort of consistency.
It makes no sense to say that Maria’s doing
action A in circumstances C is morally wrong,
but John’s doing A in circumstances relevantly
similar to C is morally right. Universality, how­
ever, is not unique to moral norms; it’s a charac­
teristic of all normative spheres.
Impartiality. Implicit in moral norms is the
notion of impartiality—​the idea that everyone
26/05/16 4:25 PM
 6 PA R T 1: P R I N C I P L E S A N D T H E O R I E S
should be considered equal, that everyone’s inter­
ests should count the same. From the perspective
of morality, no person is any better than any
other. Everyone should be treated the same unless
there is a morally relevant difference between
persons. We probably would be completely baf­
fled if someone seriously said something like
“murder is wrong . . . except when committed by
myself,” when there was no morally relevant dif­
ference between that person and the rest of the
world. If we took such a statement seriously at all,
we would likely not only reject it but also would
not even consider it a bona fide moral statement.
The requirement of moral impartiality pro­
hibits discrimination against people merely be­
cause they are different—​different in ways that
are not morally relevant. Two people can be dif­
ferent in many ways: skin color, weight, gender,
income, age, occupation, and so forth. But these
are not differences relevant to the way they
should be treated as persons. On the other hand,
if there are morally relevant differences between
people, then we may have good reasons to treat
them differently, and this treatment would not
be a violation of impartiality. This is how phi­
losopher James Rachels explains the point:
The requirement of impartiality, then, is at
bottom nothing more than a proscription against
arbitrariness in dealing with people. It is a rule
that forbids us from treating one person differ­
ently from another when there is no good reason
to do so. But if this explains what is wrong with
racism, it also explains why, in some special
kinds of cases, it is not racist to treat people dif­
ferently. Suppose a film director was making a
movie about the life of Martin Luther King, Jr.
He would have a perfectly good reason for ruling
out Tom Cruise for the starring role. Obviously,
such casting would make no sense. Because there
would be a good reason for it, the director’s “dis­
crimination” would not be arbitrary and so
would not be open to criticism.1
Reasonableness. To participate in morality—​to
engage in the essential, unavoidable practices of
01-Vaughn-Chap01.indd 6
the moral life—​is to do moral reasoning. If our
moral judgments are to have any weight at all, if
they are to be anything more than mere per­
sonal taste or knee-jerk emotional response,
they must be backed by the best of reasons. They
must be the result of careful reflection in which
we arrive at good reasons for accepting them,
reasons that could be acknowledged as such by
any other reasoning persons.
Both logic and our commonsense moral ex­
perience demand that the thorough sifting of
reasons constitutes the main work of our moral
deliberations—​regardless of our particular moral
outlook or theory. We would think it odd, per­
haps even perverse, if someone asserted that
physician-assisted suicide is always morally
wrong—​and then said she has no reasons at all for
believing such a judgment but just does. What­
ever our views on physician-assisted suicide, we
would be justified in ignoring her judgment, for
we would have no way to distinguish it from
personal whim or wishful thinking. Likewise she
herself (if she genuinely had no good reasons for
her assertion) would be in the same boat, adrift
with a firm opinion moored to nothing solid.
Our feelings, of course, are also part of our
moral experience. When we ponder a moral
issue we care about (abortion, for example), we
may feel anger, sadness, disgust, fear, irritation,
or sympathy. Such strong emotions are normal
and often useful, helping us empathize with
others, deepening our understanding of human
suffering, and sharpening our insight into the
consequences of our moral decisions. But our
feelings can mislead us by reflecting not moral
truth but our own psychological needs, our own
personal or cultural biases, or our concern for
personal advantage. Throughout history, some
people’s feelings led them to conclude that
women should be burned for witchcraft, that
whole races should be exterminated, that black
men should be lynched, and that adherents of a
different religion were evil. Critical reasoning
can help restrain such terrible impulses. It can
help us put our feelings in proper perspective
and achieve a measure of impartiality. Most of
26/05/16 4:25 PM

I N D E P TH
MORALITY AND THE LAW
Some people confuse morality with the law, or iden-
tify the one with the other, but the two are distinct
though they may often coincide. Laws are norms
enacted or enforced by the state to protect or pro-
mote the public good. They specify which actions
are legally right or wrong. But these same actions
can also be judged morally right or wrong, and these
two kinds of judgments will not necessarily agree.
Lying to a friend about a personal matter, deliberately
trying to destroy yourself through reckless living, or
failing to save a drowning child (when you easily
could have) may be immoral—​but not illegal. Racial
bias, discrimination based on gender or sexual orien-
tation, slavery, spousal rape, and unequal treatment
of minority groups are immoral—​but, depending on
the society, they may not be illegal.
Much of the time, however, morality and the law
overlap. Often what is immoral also turns out to be
illegal. This is usually the case when immoral actions
cause substantial harm to others, whether physical
all, it can guide us to moral judgments that are
trustworthy because they are supported by the
best of reasons.
The moral life, then, is about grappling with a
distinctive class of norms marked by normative
dominance, universality, impartiality, and rea­
sonableness. As we saw earlier, these norms can
include moral principles, rules, theories, and
judgments. We should notice that we commonly
apply these norms to two distinct spheres of our
moral experience—​ to both moral obligations
and moral values.
Moral obligations concern our duty, what we
are obligated to do. That is, obligations are about
conduct, how we ought or ought not to behave.
In this sphere, we talk primarily about actions.
We may look to moral principles or rules to
guide our actions, or study a moral theory that
01-Vaughn-Chap01.indd 7
Chapter 1: Moral Reasoning in Bioethics 7
or economic. Thus murder and embezzlement are
both immoral and illegal, backed by social disapproval
and severe sanctions imposed by law. Controversy
often arises when an action is not obviously or seri-
ously harmful but is considered immoral by some who
want the practice prohibited by law. The conten-
tious notion at work is that something may be made
illegal solely on the grounds that it is immoral, re-
gardless of any physical or economic harm involved.
This view of the law is known as legal moralism, and
it sometimes underlies debates about the legalization
of abortion, euthanasia, reproductive technology,
con­traception, and other practices.
Many issues in bioethics have both a moral and
legal dimension, and it is important not to confuse
the two. Sometimes the question at hand is a moral
one (whether, for example, euthanasia is ever morally
permissible); whether a practice should be legal or
illegal then is beside the point. Sometimes the ques-
tion is about legality. And sometimes the discussion
concerns both. A person may consider physician-
assisted suicide morally acceptable but argue that it
should nevertheless be illegal because allowing the
practice to become widespread would harm both
patients and the medical profession.
purports to explain right actions, or make judg­
ments about right or wrong actions.
Moral values, on the other hand, generally
concern those things that we judge to be morally
good, bad, praiseworthy, or blameworthy. Nor­
mally we use such words to describe persons (as
in “He is a good person” or “She is to blame for
hurting them”), their character (“He is virtu­
ous”; “She is honest”), or their motives (“She did
wrong but did not mean to”). Note that we also
attribute nonmoral value to things. If we say that
a book or bicycle or vacation is good, we mean
good in a nonmoral sense. Such things in them­
selves cannot have moral value.
Strictly speaking, only actions are morally
right or wrong, but persons are morally good or
bad (or some degree of goodness or badness).
With this distinction we can acknowledge a
26/05/16 4:25 PM
 8 PA R T 1: P R I N C I P L E S A N D T H E O R I E S
simple fact of the moral life: A good person can
do something wrong, and a bad person can do
something right. A Gandhi can tell a lie, and a
Hitler can save a drowning man.
In addition, we may judge an action right or
wrong depending on the motive behind it. If
John knocks a stranger down in the street to pre­
vent her from being hit by a car, we would deem
his action right (and might judge him a good
person). But if he knocks her down because he
dislikes the color of her skin, we would believe
his action wrong (and likely think him evil).
The general meaning of right and wrong seems
clear to just about everyone. But we should be
careful to differentiate degrees of meaning in
these moral terms. Right can mean either “obliga­
tory” or “permissible.” An obligatory action is one
that would be wrong not to perform. We are obli­
gated or required to do it. A permissible action is
one that is permitted. It is not wrong to perform it.
Wrong means “prohibited.” A prohibited action is
one that would be wrong to perform. We are obli­
gated or required not to do it. A supererogatory
action is one that is “above and beyond” our duty.
It is praiseworthy—​a good thing to do—​but not
required. Giving all your possessions to the poor
is generally considered a supererogatory act.
moral principles in bioethics
As noted earlier, the main work of bioethics is
trying to solve bioethical problems using the
potent resources and methods of moral phi­
losophy, which include, at a minimum, critical
­reasoning, logical argument, and conceptual
analysis. Many, perhaps most, moral philoso­
phers would be quick to point out that beyond
these tools of reason we also have the consider­
able help of moral principles. (The same could be
said about moral theories, which we explore in
the next chapter.) Certainly to be useful, moral
principles must be interpreted, often filled out
with specifics, and balanced with other moral
concerns. But both in everyday life and in bio­
ethics, moral principles are widely thought to be
indispensable to moral decision-making.
01-Vaughn-Chap01.indd 8
We can see appeals to moral principles in
countless cases. Confronted by a pain-racked,
terminally ill patient who demands to have his
life ended, his physician refuses to comply, rely­
ing on the principle that “it is wrong to inten­
tionally take a life.” Another physician makes a
different choice in similar circumstances, insist­
ing that the relevant principle is “ending the suf­
fering of a hopelessly ill patient is morally
permissible.” An infant is born anencephalic
(without a brain); it will never have a conscious
life and will die in a few days. The parents decide
to donate the infant’s organs to other children
so they might live, which involves taking the
organs right away before they deteriorate. A
critic of the parents’ decision argues that “it is
unethical to kill in order to save.” But someone
else appeals to the principle “save as many chil­
dren as possible.”2 In such ways moral principles
help guide our actions and inform our judg­
ments about right and wrong, good and evil.
As discussed in Chapter 2, moral principles
are often drawn from a moral theory, which is a
moral standard on the most general level. The
principles are derived from or supported by the
theory. Many times we simply appeal directly to
a plausible moral principle without thinking
much about its theoretical underpinnings.
Philosophers make a distinction between ab­
solute and prima facie principles (or duties). An
absolute principle applies without exceptions.
An absolute principle that we should not lie de­
mands that we never lie regardless of the cir­
cumstances or the consequences. In contrast, a
prima facie principle applies in all cases unless
an exception is warranted. Exceptions are justi­
fied when the principle conflicts with other
principles and is thereby overridden. W. D. Ross
is given credit for drawing this distinction in his
1930 book The Right and the Good.3 It is essen­
tial to his account of ethics, which has a core of
several moral principles or duties, any of which
might come into conflict.
Physicians have a prima facie duty to be truth­
ful to their patients as well as a prima facie duty
to promote their welfare. But if these duties come
26/05/16 4:25 PM
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
works so quietly and easily. You see we have no sisters but
such as are of good family. We are not obliged to take up
with any riff-raff the king may choose to send us, as you
are over there."

I can't say I found the Superior a very apt scholar. I

never succeeded in teaching her how to turn off a heel, and
at last in despair, I suggested that she should knit a rug for
the cat, which was a great personage and much petted,
though she had no vocation whatever. The rug went off
better, but I rather doubt whether puss has had the benefit
of it to this day.

On the whole I was not unhappy during the two weeks I

remained at the Ursuline convent at Marseilles. I did my
best to please Mother Mary, and succeeded pretty well. I
think she appreciated my efforts, for really most of the
other girls were trials—idle, mischievous, and bending all
their efforts not to learn the arts the nuns tried to teach
them. I except Desirée, who was always docile, and the
poor girl whom I had thought I knew. I got into
conversation with her one day over our work, and at last
she told me she had seen me before.

"Do you not remember stopping in your travelling

carriage to speak to my aunt, the day after our vineyard
was destroyed? The lady with you gave my aunt some
money."

"Yes, I remember well," I answered. "What became of

your father?"

"He was not my father, but my mother's stepbrother,"

was the answer. "He had adopted me, and I was betrothed
to his son. My lord the marquis shot him dead with his own
hand. My betrothed was arrested on some pretext of
poaching, and sent to the galleys, and I, because I would
not give him up and go into service in the Marquis' family,
was sent here. It does not matter. Baptiste is dead, and I
would as soon be here as anywhere—rather a thousand
times than in the house of that wretch! I cannot be worse
off. Maybe they will let me live out as a servant."

This is a fair specimen of what may be done by a

tyrannical landowner in France. By all I hear, things must
have grown worse instead of better. It is a wonder if they
do not have an explosion some day which will blow them all
sky-high.
 CHAPTER XXII.
THE VOYAGE.

THE day at last came for our embarkation. Our luggage

was taken away in the first place, but we were allowed to
keep each a basket containing a change of linen and certain
other necessaries. Mother St. Stanislaus distributed among
us with a lavish hand biscuits, dried fruit, gingerbread, and
peppermint comfits, and the good Sister St. Anne smuggled
into my own basket a bottle of lavender and a flask of a
certain fragrant and spicy cordial which she had a great
reputation for making, and which was esteemed a sovereign
remedy for indigestion. There was a good deal of indigestion
among the nuns of St. Ursula.

Poor dear souls! They were all very good to me, and but
for the change in my religious views and the hope I still
cherished of meeting Andrew once more, I think I could
have made myself very content among them. The mothers
kissed me and made me various little presents, some of
which I have still, especially a medal containing some hairs
of St. Ursula, given me by the Superior. They are coarse
hairs, and are just the color of the tail of my chestnut mare.
I think she sincerely regretted my departure, but I don't
think she was at all sorry to get rid of Mother Mary, who
was a religious all through, taking a real delight in all sorts
of mortifications, and very ready to impose them on others;
besides that, she could not for the life of her help wishing to
take the management of matters into her own hands,
wherever she was. I know she ached to reform the Ursuline
Convent from top to bottom, and it was well for the comfort
of those concerned that she had not the power to do so.

We were taken in close carriages from the convent

through the city to the place of embarkation. The ship could
not be brought alongside the wharf, and we had to embark
a few at a time in the little boats. Mother Mary, who had
managed several such affairs, sent her two assistant nuns
first to receive the passengers as they came, and herself
remained on the wharf till the whole company were
dispatched. Desirée and I were among the last.

I was burning with impatience, for I saw David in the

crowd and close to me, and I longed to slip into his hand a
note I had written telling him of the fate of poor Lucille, and
begging him to lose no time in escaping to England. At last
the chance mine. Poor Louisonne, who was always doing the
wrong thing at the wrong time, did the right one for me and
slipped into the water. The bustle and alarm—for the poor
thing was nearly drowned—drew Mother Mary away for a
moment and gave me the desired opportunity. David drew
near, and as he brushed by me, I put the note into his
hand. Nobody saw me but a good-natured-looking
Franciscan, who only smiled and shook his head at me.

At last we were all on board and introduced to the

cabin, which was to be our lodging for at least six weeks.
Oh, what a hole it was!—dirty, ill-lighted, not half furnished.

Mother Mary was very angry, as I could see by her face;

and indeed I heard her remonstrating with the captain very
energetically on the subject; but he only shrugged his
shoulders and said it was not his fault. He had taken
command of the ship only a few days before, and that not
by any good-will of his own. He added, however, that now
he was appointed to the command, he meant to exercise it,
and intimated to Mother Mary very plainly that she had
better mind her own business.

She certainly had enough to mind. Half the girls were

crying or in hysterics; everything was in confusion. We were
dreadfully in the way on deck, but no one could bear the
idea of going below. Mother Mary at last restored some sort
of quiet, and calling me to help her, with the remark that I
seemed to have some spirit and sense, we began to try to
put our cabin into better order. It was discouraging work,
for everything was wanting for comfort or decency; but we
worked hard, and by night we had things in better trim. The
girls had had their cry out and felt for the time in good
spirits. We did not set sail till about six in the evening, being
kept by the state of the tide, but at last we were off.

The land gradually faded from view; we lost sight of the

lights in the city, and before bedtime we were out in the
open sea, and every soul but myself was overcome with the
first depressing feelings of sea-sickness. I had a busy time
enough for the next week. Every passenger was sick,
including Mother Mary herself, who was one of the worst,
though she strove against the weakness with all the force of
her strong will. But, in truth, a strong will does little for one
when one's heels are one moment higher than one's head,
and the next knocked violently on the floor, and every
portable article is sliding about trying its best to break
everything else.

We had a stormy voyage from the first, though the

winds were for the most part favorable, and the passage
promised to be short. But it was wretchedly uncomfortable.
The ship was ill-found and hardly seaworthy. She was
crammed with goods, which were thrust even into our
cabin, thus abridging the small room allotted to us. The
water was bad, and the sailors stole our wine; our
provisions were not fit for well people, not to say invalids,
and short as our passage was, we had more than one case
of scurvy. Poor Desirée succumbed under her hardships and
died when we had been out about three weeks. I had
become greatly attached to her, but I could not weep for
her death. It seemed a merciful deliverance.

For myself, I was not as unhappy as I should have been

if I had not been so busy. The only really well person of the
party, I had enough to do in waiting on the sick. I had made
friends with the cook, a great good-natured blackamoor, by
speaking to him in English, when I found that he
understood that language, and I cooked our miserable
provisions so as to make them as savory as possible, and
now and then secured a bit of something better than usual
to tempt the appetite of poor Sister Margaret, who seemed
likely enough to die of exhaustion.

Going about as I did, I was often free to take out my

little book and study its contents. The more I did so, the
more I recalled what I had learned of the other Scriptures,
the more I wondered how I could ever have so far departed
from the simplicity of the Gospel as to profess the Roman
Catholic religion. I never should have done so but for the
fact that my belief in all religion had been weakened by
intercourse with unbelievers, and my heart corrupted by
love of pleasure and of the world. I do not say by any
means that this is true of all perverts, but I know it was
true of me.

But now arose a grave question, which indeed had

troubled me before. I felt that I must confess my faith
before men; I could not go on serving God according to the
faith of my fathers and worshipping the saints at the same
time. I could not believe in and apply to the One Mediator,
amid at the same time invoke a hundred others. It may be
easy for any one who reads these lines, and who has never
been in any danger, to say what my conduct should have
been. But for me, in the midst of the conflict, it was not so
easy. I well knew what would be my fate, for the Jesuits
ruled in Canada, and that with a rod of iron, and I had seen
enough of Mother Mary to guess well that she would have
no compassion for a heretic.

I thought and prayed and wept, and at last strength

seemed to come to me. I had nothing to do just now but to
wait on my companions. When the time came for help, I
should have help. Sufficient unto the day was the evil
thereof.

Help did come, and, as so often happens, through

trouble. We had been out five weeks when we were
overtaken by a tempest, compared to which all we had
suffered before was as a summer breeze. I do not know
enough of nautical matters to describe it. I know that for
many days neither sun nor stars appeared; that we were
tossed up to the skies and then hurled down to the abyss;
that we lost sail and masts and were more than once in
imminent danger of sinking; and that when the storm
subsided at last we drifted in helpless wreck, having lost all
our boats, and having our ship so injured that the least
increase in the storm might send her to the bottom.

The captain, who had behaved like a hero, was busy in

overseeing the construction of rafts. He had ordered us all
on deck, sick and well together, in order to give us a last
chance, though a slender one. We sat huddled together,
some praying, some crying, others too miserable to do
either—silent, in hopeless despair. Such was our condition
when, happening to look up, I was the very first to descry a
sail, and almost at the same moment the shout was raised
by half a dozen at once. It was a British ship, and a large
one. She was rapidly coming up with us, and our despair
was changed into the certainty of succor.

It was a work of some danger to transfer so many

helpless women from one ship to the other, but it was
accomplished at last, the captain and Mother Mary being
the last to leave the poor wreck. Nobody but myself
understood English, and I was called upon to interpret. The
ship was the Good Hope, trading from Bristol to New
England, and now on her way to the town of Boston, from
which, according to the reckoning of Captain Mayhew, we
were but a short day's sail.

Mother Mary was quite in despair. She offered large

rewards to the captain to alter his course and sail for the St.
Lawrence, but in vain. The captain said his ship had been
damaged, and was in no state for such a voyage; that he
was overdue at Boston, and that his wife would be anxious
about him. He would engage that Mother Mary and her
companions should meet with every civility and
accommodation, but to the St. Lawrence, he could not and
would not go—"and that was all about it."

There was no opportunity to argue the matter further,

for poor Mother Mary was taken very ill once more and had
to be carried to the cabin which the sailors had hastily
arranged for us. The captain apologized for its narrowness,
saying that he had another small cabin which should be
ours so soon as its occupant, a gentleman passenger who
had been hurt in the storm, should give it up, adding,
however, that he hoped to set us all on dry ground before
that time to-morrow.

From the moment that I set foot on the deck of the

Good Hope my mind was made up. I would tell the captain
my story, throw myself on his mercy, and entreat him to
rescue me. If he refused to do so I would contrive to effect
my escape while we were in Boston. Surely in a town full of
Protestants there must be some one who would protect me.

I had very little rest that night, though Mother Mary

herself, the sickest of the party, scolded the others for their
demands on me, and at last bade me lie down and not mind
them. At daylight most of my charges were asleep, and I
stole on deck to compose myself and breathe a little fresh
air. Lo! There before me lay the land, green and fair, clothed
with forest for the most part, but with here and there a
clearing. How heavenly it all looked, but I had no time for
gazing. There stood the captain, as I thought, with his back
to me, looking toward the land. There was no time like the
present, and I went quickly up to him.

"Captain Mayhew!" said I.

The stranger turned, and I saw Andrew Corbet. He

looked at me with a bewildered, half-recognizing gaze, and
the thought darted into my mind that he did not mean to
know me. But it was no time for scruples or maiden
shyness. The need was too imminent.

"Andrew!" said I. "If ever you loved me or my mother,

save me!"

"Vevette!" said Andrew, still wondering. "It is Vevette."

Then catching me in his arms, he left me no doubt of

the state of his heart. He never asked me whether I still
loved him, and I don't think it ever occurred to him to doubt
it.

"Well!" said a voice close by. "I should say, Mr. Corbet,
that you had found some one you was kind of glad to see."
 "Glad is no word," said Andrew, while I released myself,
covered with blushes. "But how came you here?"

In a very few words, I told him of what had happened.

Andrew's brow grew dark, and Captain Mayhew expressed
the wish that he had that Frenchman on board.

"Will you not contrive to save me?" I said, in conclusion.

"I am a Protestant—as much as I ever was. I cannot go to
Canada. I only ask a safe asylum. They said I was a French
subject because my father was French."

"Plague the French!" said Captain Mayhew. "They shan't

keep you. Yes, we'll save you somehow. Never fear. But
how?"

He considered a moment, and then his thin, clever face

broke into a smile, and he turned to Andrew:

"You say this young lady was promised to you, with the
consent of her parents?"

"Yes," answered Andrew. "We might have been married

before this but for my own hardness and pig-headed
jealousies."

"You were not to blame," said I. "The fault has been all
mine."

"Reckon you'll have time to settle that," said the

captain. "Well, since all that is so, and you like the young
lady and she likes you, why, it appears to me that the best
way will be to call the good minister who came over with us,
and let him marry you on the spot. Then the lady will be the
wife of a British subject, which will make her one herself, I
take it; and if old King Lewy don't like it, let him come over
himself and see about it."
 "It would be much the best way, Vevette," said Andrew,
turning to me. "It would give me the right to protect you."

I faltered something, I know not what.

"The long and the short of it is, we will have a wedding

on the spot," said the captain. "As to the banns and all that,
we can settle it afterward. But we had better be in a hurry,
for we are getting into smooth water, and your Mother Mary
will be astir presently, making a fuss. Just call Mr. Norton,
and tell him to make haste, will you?" he said to the
steward. "Or, maybe we had better go into my cabin. Mr.
Norton is a regular Church of England minister," he
explained to me as he assisted me down the companion-
way. "He's going out to see his folks, but he don't calculate
to settle."

A few words put Mr. Norton in possession of the story.

The first mate was called in as an additional witness, and in
half an hour, I returned to the cabin the lawful wife of
Andrew Corbet of Tre Madoc.

I had not been away an hour, but how the world was
changed to me!

"Where have you been, and what kept you so long?"

asked Mother Mary as I brought her some coffee which the
steward had provided.

"I have been on deck for air, and the captain kept me to
answer some questions," I answered. And then, to hide my
confusion, I added, "We are in full sight of land, reverend
mother. The captain says we shall be at Boston by
afternoon."

"Oh that it were Quebec instead of that heretical

Boston!" sighed Mother Mary. "Is the captain quite obdurate
still?"

"Yes, reverend mother; but he says he is sure. We shall

receive every kindness from the people. Will you try to get
up? The ship does not roll much now."

I assisted her, and my companions, who were overjoyed

when they heard we were in sight of land, though it was a
land of heretics. A land of cannibals would have been
welcome to the poor souls just then. We were soon all on
deck, I keeping by Mother Mary's side as usual, for it had
been settled that I should say nothing till the time came for
disembarkation.

It came very soon. The anchor rattled down into Boston

harbor about three o'clock. We were at once boarded by the
harbor-master and another gentleman of goodly presence,
who, it seems, was a magistrate. He looked with surprise at
the unusual passengers, and Captain Mayhew explained to
them the state of the case. The gentleman, who could
speak French fluently, turned to Mother Mary, and with
much politeness assured her of every consideration. There
was a French ship in the bay, which would doubtless take
her and her companions to their destination. Meantime a
house on shore should be placed at her disposal and
furnished with every comfort.

Madame, hearing of the French ship, declined to go on

shore, saying that she should prefer going at once to the
ship, whereat three or four of the girls burst out crying with
disappointment. Mr. Folsom suggested that the ship would
not be prepared for our reception, and that at least they
must give the captain notice; but Mother Mary was
obstinate. She would remain where she was rather than set
foot on heretic ground. This, however, was shown to be
impossible, and at last she consented to go on shore,
provided she could have a house to herself, which Mr.
Folsom promised. Then, turning to Andrew, he asked if he
were ready to accompany him.

"I am quite ready, if my wife is," replied Andrew, and at

a signal from him, I left Mother Mary's side and went to
him, placing my arm within his. There was an exclamation
of horror from the nuns.

"Vevette, what does this mean?" exclaimed Mother

Mary. "Wicked, shameless girl, what are you doing?"

"Good words, madame," said Andrew in French. "This

lady was long ago betrothed to me by the consent of all our
parents. We have been separated a long time by the force
of circumstances; but having come together again, we
resolved to put it out of any human power to separate us,
and so we were married this morning by the Reverend Mr.
Norton, a Church of England minister, who is on board, as
Captain Mayhew can certify."

The captain bowed. "Oh, yes, he is a regular minister,"

said he. "I know him and all his folks. It is all right, Mr.
Folsom. Tell the lady so."

The lady was told so, but she refused to listen. With her
most majestic air she commanded me to return to her side.

"No, madame," I answered; "I thank you for all your

kindness, but my place is with my husband."

"Wretched, deluded child! Know you not that a marriage

by a heretic minister is no marriage, and is in itself a
crime?"

"In France, madame, no doubt; but we are not in

France. This is an English colony, and governed by English
laws."

"But a heretic," said Mother Mary; "a blasphemer of our

holy religion!"

"A heretic according to your thinking, but no

blasphemer, madame," said Andrew. "My wife is herself a
Protestant, as her fathers have been before her."

"It is true," said I; "I have been deluded for a time; but
I have seen my error. I am of the Reformed, heart and soul;
or rather," remembering our old family boast, "I am a
Waldensian—of that people who never corrupted the faith,
and so needed no reformation."

"And all this time you have been pretending to be a

good Catholic," said Mother Mary. "What a wolf in sheep's
clothing have I been entertaining among my lambs!"

"No, madame," I answered; "I confess that my

judgment was warped for a time by passion and self-
interest, and the stress of a great disappointment, and in
that frame I made a profession of your religion. But it is
long since my faith began to waver, and since I have been
on shipboard it hath been confirmed in the old way by
thought, prayer, and study of the Word of God. I was no
willing emigrant, but was betrayed into my present position
by the treachery of those who professed, for motives of
gain, to be my friends. I think it neither wrong nor shame
to leave that position for the protection of the man to whom
my father himself gave me."

Mother Mary was about to reply, when, glancing around,

she saw all the girls listening with open mouth and
exchanging significant glances with one another. So she cut
the matter short.
 "It is well," said she; "I wash my hands of you. Child of
wicked parents, you have followed in their steps! Go, then,
with your paramour, and remember that the vengeance of
Heaven dogs your steps! As to me and mine, we will not set
foot on this wicked shore. I demand to be taken to the
French ship immediately, without a moment's delay."

"Madame," said Andrew, bowing, "I trust I shall not

forget that I am a gentleman, and that I am speaking to a
woman who has been kind to my wife, and who is old
enough to be my mother."

I saw Mother Mary wince a little at this.

"Come, Vevette, Mr. Folsom's boat waits for us."

I would have taken a kind leave of my companions, but

Mother Mary would not allow it, fearing, I suppose, that
marriage might be catching. We descended into Mr.
Folsom's boat, and were soon at the shore.

We walked up through the green lane—oh, how

delicious seemed the firm ground and the grass to my feet!
—till we came to Mr. Folsom's house, which was not the
rude erection I expected to see, but a handsome square
mansion, partly of stone, and with a pretty garden beside it.
I am told that Boston hath grown to be quite a fine city. It
was even then a pretty town, with neat houses and some
good shops and a very decent church, which they called a
meeting-house, for the most part. For they say that the
name church belongs to the faithful who assemble there,
and not to the place. 'Tis a matter of small moment—just
one of those inconsequent things which people hold to with
the most persistence. In my grandmother's time Archbishop
Laud would have deposed a worthy minister because he did
not believe in St. George. However, I shall never get to Mr.
Folsom's house at this rate.

Mistress Folsom came to the door to meet us, having

been advertised by a special messenger. She was a comely
lady, richly but plainly dressed in a somewhat bygone
fashion. Her two pretty daughters stood behind her, as
sweet and prim as two pink daisies. She made me welcome
with a motherly kiss, and listened with great amaze and
interest while my husband made her acquainted with the
outline of our history.

"'Tis like something in a romance," said she. "But you

must be very weary, and hungry too. We will have supper
ready directly. Sweetheart, would you not like to change
your dress?"

I explained to her that I had no changes, all my luggage

having been lost in the wreck, except my basket, which
Sister St. Stanislaus had given me, and which I had clung to
through all. Without more ado, she carried me to a plain but
pretty and comfortable chamber, and sent her two
daughters hither and thither for clean linen, a gown, and
other necessaries. Then they left me to myself; but
presently a black wench came up with a great can of hot
water and an armful of towels. I do not remember in my life
any bodily sensation more delicious than that clean, well-
laundered linen.

When I was dressed, I took up a Bible which lay upon

my toilette-table and read the one hundred and third Psalm,
and then said my prayers, and having thus a little
composed myself, I went down-stairs. A most bountiful
supper was provided for us, and we sat down, waited upon
by a black servant. I had no notion of so much style and
ceremony in this remote corner of the world; but I soon
found that there were other colonists who kept up much
more state than Mr. and Mrs. Folsom.

After supper, Andrew and I were left to ourselves in the

parlor, and it may be guessed we did not want subjects for
talk. I told him my whole story, concealing nothing.

"You see what sort of wife you have taken in your

haste," said I, in conclusion. "All these things are much
worse than aiding and abetting poor Betty, even if I had
done so, which I never did."

"Ah, Vevette! Don't taunt me with my folly and

obstinacy," said Andrew, covering his face. "It was just that
which threw you into the hands of your enemies."

"My enemies would have had no power, if I had but kept

them at arm's length," said I. "It was not your fault that I
did not accept Theo's invitation instead of going with
Madame de Fayrolles; but the truth was that, when I heard
you were going to be married to the Jamaica lady, I thought
only of getting out of England before you came into it."

"So it was that piece of folly that drove you away," said
Andrew. "I wish you could see the Jamaica lady, Vevette.
She was indeed very kind to me when I lay ill at her father's
house; but she is fifty years old at least, and about as
handsome as old Deborah. Dear soul! She gave me a string
of beautiful pearls for you, and when I heard you were
married, I threw them into the sea."

"That was very wasteful; you might have given them to

the poor," I returned. "But who told you I was married?"

"Nobody said you were actually married; but when I

went to Stanton Court, to obtain news of you on my return,
I found my lord fuming over a letter he had just received,
saying that you were to be married on the morrow to some
Frenchman—I don't remember his name—of great wealth
and consequence."

"Monsieur de Luynes," said I. "They did try to make me

marry him afterward, but I had not heard of him at that
time. He was a good old man, and very kind to me."

"That was the name," continued Andrew. "My lord swore

you should not touch a penny till you were twenty-one,
whatever happened. But how came you to write yourself
that you were going to be married?"

"I did not," I answered.

"It was a forgery then. There was a note in your

handwriting, and signed with your name. I thought the
hand looked a little Frenchified, but the signature was yours
to a hair. Only for that I should have gone to Paris to find
you; but I thought if you were well married, and with your
own consent, I would not be a makebate between you and
your husband. So I even turned the old place over to
Margaret and her husband to care for, gathered together my
prize-money, and what else I could, and came hither
intending to turn settler. I was knocked down and hurt in
the storm, which was the reason I did not see you upon
your coming aboard. I was thinking on you when you came
and spoke to me, and for a moment I thought it was your
ghost."

"Ghosts don't come at that time of day," said I. "And so

Margaret is married?"

"Yes, and well married as I could desire—to Mr.

Treverthy, son of our good old knight. 'Tis an excellent
marriage in every way."
 "And your mother?"

"My mother lives with Margaret, and so does Rosamond

for the present. Betty and her husband are in London,
where he had some small office."

Our conversation was interrupted by the return of Mr.

Folsom.

"And do you know what has kept me abroad so late?"

said he, seeming much amused. "Even taking order for the
accommodation of your French madame and her flock of
lambs. I have them all safely and comfortably housed in the
new tavern, and have sent for a French woman who can
speak English to interpret for them."

"What! Did she come on shore after all?" I asked.

"She had no choice. The captain of the French ship

positively refused to receive her, till his ship should be made
ready for sea. So, as she could not well sleep in an open
boat, she was at length prevailed upon to hear reason. I
have been half over the town gathering beds and other
needful comforts for them, and I have left the poor things
at last happy over a hot supper."

"I am glad they are comfortable. They have had a hard

time of it. I don't know how they will bear to go to sea
again."
 CHAPTER XXIII.
CONCLUSION.

THE next day I went with Mrs. Folsom to carry some

additional comforts, in the shape of linen and so on, to my
old companions. I found them all comfortably housed in a
new tavern, which, though not quite finished, was clean and
cheerful. Mother Mary would not see us at all, but Sister
Margaret came to us, and was very grateful for what we
brought.

"Every one has been very good," said she. "I did not
know that heretics could be so kind. They used to tell us
that the English settlers murdered every Catholic, and
especially every nun that fell into their hands; but the