Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Week 3-5
Week 3-5
Week 3-5
Contracts — Genuineness
of Assent
Introduction
Contract may be unenforceable if the
parties have not genuinely assented
to its terms by:
• Mistake.
• Misrepresentation.
• Undue Influence.
• Duress.
2
§1: Mistakes
• Unilateral vs. Bilateral Mistakes of Fact.
• Unilateral Mistakes: One party mistaken
as to some Material Fact.
• Does not afford the mistaken party any right to
relief from the contract.
3
Mistakes [2]
• Exceptions:
• If other party to the contract knows or should have
known that a mistake of fact was made.
• If mistake was due to mathematical mistake in addition,
summation, subtraction, division, or multiplication and
was made inadvertently and without gross negligence.
• Bilateral Mistakes of Fact.
• Mutual mistake as to some Material Fact, the contract
can be rescinded by either party.
4
Mistakes of Value
• Contract enforceable by either party.
• Unilateral or Bilateral mistake are not
basis for avoiding a contract.
• Exception:
• Mistake of value because of a mistake of
material fact.
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§2: Fraudulent
Misrepresentation
• Contract Voidable by Innocent Party.
• Elements:
• Misrepresentation of Material Fact.
• Intent to Deceive.
• Reliance on Misrepresentation.
• Injury to the Innocent Party.
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Misrepresentation
Has Occurred
Misrepresentation can be express or
implied.
• Concealment.
• Misrepresentation of future facts and statements
of opinion are not fraud, unless person
professes to be an expert.
• Misrepresentation of Law is not fraud, unless
person has greater knowledge of the law.
• Silence is not fraud, unless serious problem or
defect.
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Intent to Deceive
• Scienter is an Intent to Deceive.
• Party knowledge that fact is not as stated.
• Party makes a reckless statement with disregard
of the truth.
• Party implies that statement is based on
personal knowledge or investigation.
• Gross negligence is considered intent.
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Reliance on Misrepresentation
• Deceived party must have Justifiable
Reliance.
• Depends on the knowledge and experience of
the party relying.
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Injury to the Innocent Party
• No proof of injury is required when the
action is to rescind contract.
• Proof of injury is universally required to
recover damages.
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§3: Nonfraudulent
Misrepresentation
• Innocent Misrepresentation.
• Negligent Misrepresentation.
• Equal to Scienter.
• Is treated as fraudulent misrepresentation, even
though the misrepresentation was not
purposeful.
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§4: Undue Influence
Contract is Voidable.
• Confidential or Fiduciary Relationship.
• Relationship of dependence.
• Influence or Persuasion.
• Weak party talked into doing something not
beneficial to him or herself.
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§5: Duress
• Forcing a party to enter into a contract under
fear or threat.
• Contract is Voidable.
• Threatened act must be wrongful or illegal.
• Improper Threat.
• Threat to exercise legal rights (criminal or civil suit).
• Economic or physical.
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§6: Adhesion Contracts
and Unconscionability
• Adhesion Contracts.
• Preprinted contract in which the adhering party has no
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract.
• Unconscionability.
• One sided bargains in which one party has substantially
superior bargaining power and can dictate the terms of
the contract.
• “Standard-form.”
• “Take-it-or-leave-it” adhesion contracts.
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Case 1: Vokes v. Arthur Murray
(Misrepresentation)
• FACTS:
• Arthur Murray operated dancing schools
through local, franchised operators.
• At a “dance party” at one of the schools, Vokes
was praised by an instructor for her potential as
“an excellent dancer.”
• The instructor sold her eight half-hour dance
lessons for $14.50 each. Over the next 16
months, Vokes spent $31,090.45 on dance
lessons but finally realized she did not have the
potential to be an excellent dancer.
• Vokes sued Arthur Murray and the court
dismissed the case based on fraud. She 15
Case 1: Vokes v. Arthur Murray
(Misrepresentation)
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Case 2: Sarvis v.
Vermont State College
• FACTS:
• In 1995 Sarvis was convicted of bank fraud and ordered to
pay more than $12 million in restitution, and sentenced to
forty-six months in prison.
• While incarcerated, he worked in the prison’s electric
department.
• After his release in 1998, Sarvis applied for an adjunct
professor position at Community College of Vermont
(CCV) stating that during “1984-1998” he was “President
and Chairman of the Board” of “CMI International Inc.,
Boston, Massachusetts,” where he was “[r]esponsible for
all operations and financial matters.” 17
Case 2: Sarvis v.
Vermont State College
• FACTS (Cont’d)
• Sarvis was hired at CCV as an academic
coordinator, teacher, and independent studies
instructor.
• After he began work, his probation officer
alerted CCV to Sarvis’s criminal history, and
CCV terminated his employment.
• Sarvis sued CCV alleging breach of contract.
CCV filed a motion for summary judgment, in
part on the ground of fraud, seeking rescission.
The court granted CCV’s motion, and Sarvis
appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court.
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Case 2: Sarvis v.
Vermont State College
• HELD: AFFIRMED. FOR CCV.
• The Vermont Supreme Court rescinded
the contract between Sarvis and CCV.
• The court explained that “[t]he
misrepresentation in this case occurred
through plaintiff’s partial disclosure of
his past work history and references and
his effort to limit defendant’s inquiry into
his past.”
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Case 3: Meade v. CedarRapids
• FACTS:
• Meade was offered a job at the El-Jay Division of
Cedarapids, Inc., in Eugene, Oregon. During the
interview, Meade asked about El-Jay’s future and was
told that El-Jay was growing. In fact, however,
Cedarapids management already planned to close El-
Jay.
• Meade signed an at-will employment agreement, quit
the job he was doing or passed up other employment
opportunities, and moved his family to Eugene.
• When El-Jay closed soon after, Meade sued Cedarrapids
alleging fraudulent misrepresentation based on the
statements made to them during the interviews. 20
Case 3: Meade v. CedarRapids
• HELD: FOR MEADE.
• Ninth Circuit held that employer may be liable
for misrepresenting its future to prospective
employees if they act to their detriment in
reliance.
• The plaintiffs’ “injuries were suffered as a result
of the fraudulent inducement to enter
employment, not the premature termination of
that employment.”
• The court reasoned that “allowing at-will
employment to defeat Plaintiffs’ reliance would
effectively allow employers to make any
representations to prospective employees and 21
then not fulfill those representations once