PATHWAYS TO A VIABLE GOVERNMENT AFTER THE 2024 ELECTIONS

31 MAY 2024
Draft for Discussion
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following the results of the 2024 National and Provincial Elections, several pathways will
need to be considered to form a viable government. The African National Congress (ANC)
55th National Conference established clear principles upon which coalitions should be
negotiated, which should be consistently applied.
A coalition agreement that sets back the renewal and transformation agenda of the ANC
would be a marriage of convenience, and would prioritise political expediency over the
long-term effects on the ANC and on the country as a whole. For this reason, the ANC
should not consider the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) or Jacob Zuma’s Party/uMkhonto
weSizwe Party (MKP) as viable candidates for a coalition arrangement, as doing so would
risk reversing the important gains that have been made. Moreover, joining forces with
either party risks alienating large numbers of voters who view them as corrupt, and places
the ANC on a path to irreversible electoral decline.

Three options therefore remain to form a viable government that would be capable of
leading the country effectively and aligned with the principles of the renewal project:

1. A coalition with the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
2. A confidence-and-supply agreement with the DA and IFP
3. A Government of National Unity with all parties in Parliament, or those whose vote
share exceeds a defined threshold

Serious consideration should be given to a confidence-and-supply agreement with the DA

and IFP. A confidence-and-supply agreement refers to a formal arrangement with one or
more parties, in which those parties commit to support the government in confidence
motions (confidence) and to pass budgets in appropriation votes (supply). Unlike a coalition,
junior parties do not usually receive positions in Cabinet, and are free to vote independently
on other legislation.

An agreement of this kind would avoid the complexities and political risks of a coalition
while enabling the ANC to form a government. The ANC, DA and IFP would achieve a
majority nationally as well as in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. If extended to metros, it would
have the further advantage of achieving a majority in Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni,
eThekwini and Nelson Mandela Bay. This would provide the basis for a stable government
led by the ANC across the country.

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INTRODUCTION

The results of the 2024 National and Provincial Elections mean that no single political party
will hold a majority in Parliament, as well as in the two most populous provinces – Gauteng
and KwaZulu-Natal. Nevertheless, the ANC remains the largest party in South Africa by a
significant margin. Thus, it falls to the ANC to chart a way forward that enables a viable
government to be formed following the elections, and to ensure that the mandate of the
people is carried out.

This moment represents a critical inflection point for the ANC, where the very essence of
the organization and the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) is at stake. The choices
made in the coming days and weeks will determine whether we continue on the path of
renewal, embracing the NDR’s transformative agenda to win the trust of the people by
forming a government capable of effectively addressing their challenges. The significance of
the NDR cannot be overstated, as it encapsulates the ANC’s commitment to a deep-seated
change that goes beyond superficial reforms. It is the foundation upon which our core
values rest and the beacon that guides our way forward. At this defining juncture, the ANC
faces a stark choice between renewal or decline. We must reaffirm our commitment to the
NDR and ensure that it remains central to our mission and the South African democratic
project.

In line with section 86 of the Constitution, three broad options are available:

A. A coalition government
B. A minority government (or confidence-and-supply agreement)
C. Dissolution of the National Assembly and new elections

This discussion paper assesses these options, and proposes a strategic approach that would
support a viable and stable government, advance the progressive agenda of the ANC, and
accelerate the process of renewal towards future elections.

STRATEGIC APPROACH TO COALITION DISCUSSIONS

The ANC must ensure that any coalition is based on certain principles that put the interests
of the people first. Our primary goal is to establish a stable government with a minimum
programme that improves service delivery and advances the transformation agenda from
which the ANC will never retreat.
Coalitions must advance the people’s interests with regard to service delivery, defend the
gains of freedom and advance socio-economic transformation through a stable and
functional government. Any coalition must strengthen the renewal process, increasingly
isolating rent seekers from the state coffers. For the ANC, coalitions cannot be pursued at all
costs, and must rather focus on advancing the people's cause and the national democratic
revolution.
The ANC’s 55th National Conference established clear principles upon which coalitions
should be negotiated. These principles include:1

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1. Coalitions must be based on a common minimum programme – a Citizens’ Charter – that
focuses on measurable targets for service delivery and development in the communities.
2. Coalition partners must commit to shared values – stability, accountability, transparency,
ethics and integrity, community participation, good governance, respect for the constitution
and rule of law, social justice and equity, human dignity, non-racialism and non-sexism, etc.
3. The party that has won the largest votes should lead the coalition. Coalition governments
should reflect the will of the people, not elite deal-making among parties.
4. The law should be amended to ensure that public administration and the civil service is
insulated from coalition deal-making and bargaining. Motions of no-confidence should also
not be abused.
5. Coalitions should be transparent and accountable to the people in their jurisdiction by
providing regular report backs to citizens on service delivery progress and milestones.
6. The ANC will prioritise working with parties, community-based organisations, service
delivery forums, and independent candidates who are genuinely committed to stability,
social justice, and ending apartheid colonialism in all its forms. Those who are divisive and
seek to organize along tribal and racial lines should not be considered.
7. The ANC will not form a coalition merely for the sake of isolating other parties. Every
coalition we establish or join should be about advancing the people’s interests.
8. The ANC notes that we have ideological and political differences with several parties in
our political landscape (what we call “red lines”). However, we will not preclude the
possibility of working with any party in a coalition so long as it is in the public interest. If a
conjunction of circumstances exists where there is demonstrable readiness by various
parties to work together with the ANC in the public interest, grand coalitions could be
formed to stabilise governance in the same way that we worked with our arch enemies to
usher in a peaceful transition to democracy.
9. There should be an independent dispute resolution mechanism established to address
any disputes among coalition partners.
These core principles form the basis of any possible coalition arrangements now, to ensure
that the options pursued are aligned with the ANC’s values and ideals. Moreover, any
coalition agreement must not roll back the significant gains that have been made in the
ANC’s renewal process over the past five years, and must strengthen renewal.

AVOIDING A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE

1
ANC Strategic Framework on Coalitions adopted by the ANC NEC, April 2023.

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The outcome of the 2024 elections creates a risk of fragmentation in the political landscape
and the rise of ethnic politics and a politics of rent-seeking under the guise of ‘the left’. The
ANC must stand as a bulwark against these trends, and reassert its role as the leader of
society. Any coalition agreement must isolate rent-seekers and deny them access to state
coffers. A fundamental requirement for any potential coalition partners is that they should
respect and uphold the Constitution.
A coalition agreement that sets back the renewal and transformative agenda of the ANC, or
that incorporates partners that disrespect the Constitution, would be a marriage of
convenience, and would prioritise political expediency over the long term effects on the
ANC and on the country as a whole.
Both the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the uMkhonto weSizwe Party2 (MKP), while
claiming to advance some of the policy positions of the ANC, are in fact rent-seeking parties
centered on a single political leader whose values and ideals are in contradiction with the
Constitution. The kind of society that the MKP and EFF want to create is antithetical to what
the ANC and broader mass democratic movement stands for, and these parties therefore
should not be considered as viable partners. Joining forces with either party would risk
alienating large numbers of voters who view them as corrupt, and placing the ANC on a path
to irreversible electoral decline.
Economic Freedom Fighters
The EFF was founded on disagreements between Julius Malema and the leadership of the
ANC. This history is critical to highlight as it provides some explanation for Julius Malema’s
public obsession with the internal dynamics in the ANC. Malema remains the only
opposition leader who has called press conferences on several occasions to attempt to
intervene in internal ANC processes, creating a risk that Malema’s intention is ultimately to
influence leadership outcomes in the ANC. This is a basis for instability even before a
coalition agreement is reached.
Since 2016, the EFF has had an opportunity to govern at a local government level in several
municipalities across the country. In areas where the EFF is in coalition governments, we
have witnessed high levels of instability, rampant corruption and the complete collapse of
service delivery as a result of incompetence and the institution of patronage systems. This is
most notable in the cities of Ekurhuleni and Johannesburg. The EFF’s track record in
government has also been plagued by violence and disruption, as well as by a tendency of
EFF leaders to make unreasonable demands of coalition partners once in government,
destabilizing coalition arrangements. The EFF in many respects represents a cult of
personality characterised by sham democratic processes. The party leadership’s public
association with large-scale corruption, such as the VBS scandal, and with individuals in the
illicit economy would further compromise the legitimacy of the renewal project. Ultimately,
the EFF would be a dangerous coalition partner who would undermine the character and
guiding principles of the ANC to serve narrow interests.

2
Alternatively referred to as “Zuma’s party”

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The EFF often adopts populist stances on key issues. For instance, they favor nationalizing
land instead of our approach, which advocates for direct land redistribution to individuals.
Additionally, they selectively support the Rule of Law to fit a populist narrative, as seen in
their positions on the impeachment of Judge Hlophe and Busisiwe Mkhwebane.
The Zuma Party/uMkhonto weSizwe Party
Jacob Zuma's MKP was formed by disgruntled members of the ANC who could no longer
find expression in the ANC under the renewal project, many of whom are undergoing
investigation or facing criminal charges for their role in the state capture project. MKP is a
narrow, tribalist, ethnic nationalist formation. This party is a classical personality cult. The
party has taken stances which directly attack the fabric of the Constitution, something
which is inimical to the ANC. Broadly speaking, the MKP is against all the objectives of the
National Democratic Revolution.
The following examples illustrate this posture, among others:

● The threat contained in the MKP manifesto to place pregnant teenagers on Robben
Island to complete their studies there; the return of corporal punishment3
● The homophobic statement by Jacob Zuma in January 2024 that: "When I was
growing up an “ungqingili” (a queer person) would not have stood in front of me. I
would knock him out."4
● The call for greater power to be given to tribal authorities especially when it comes
to land and administration at the expense of elected representatives,5 which is
undemocratic and unconstitutional.
● The rejection of Constitutional democracy in favour of Parliamentary sovereignty6.
The ANC has worked hard to advance the rights of marginalised communities. A partnership
with the MKP would threaten this Constitutional imperative. This kind of discrimination is
indicative of the character of MKP and what they would advocate for in government.
Most importantly, we cannot in good conscience allow the architects of state capture and
corruption back into government, having made great strides in rebuilding the state from the
destruction of the state capture period. Such a coalition arrangement would further enable
patronage networks to erode state institutions and impact negatively on service delivery. In
addition, it would set a perverse precedent in which disgruntled members could form
breakaway parties in order to hold the ANC to ransom.

3
“Former president Jacob Zuma’s proposal to ‘exile teen parents’ resurfaces, amid high pregnancy rates”
https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/former-president-jacob-zumas-proposal-to-exile-teen-parents-resurfaces-amid-high-pregnancy-rates-
499b32b5-b203-46a9-a848-701654f5f5f9
4
“Zuma under fire for remarks about 'anti-democratic' same-sex laws,“
https://www.polity.org.za/article/zuma-under-fire-for-remarks-about-anti-democratic-same-sex-laws-2024-01-24
5
“Zuma says it's not right ward councillors have more powers than traditional chiefs”
https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/05/19/zuma-says-its-not-right-ward-councillors-have-more-powers-than-traditional-
chiefs#:~:text=JOHANNESBURG%20%2D%20Leader%20of%20the%20uMkhonto,Stadium%20in%20Soweto%20on%20Saturday
6
The party has adopted incendiary rhetoric, tinged with populist extremism. For example, it talks about doing away with the supremacy of
the country’s constitution and replacing it with “unfettered” parliamentary sovereignty. https://theconversation.com/south-africa-
elections-zumas-mk-party-has-hit-the-campaign-trail-with-provocative-rhetoric-and-few-clear-policies-228913

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For these reasons, the ANC should not consider the EFF or MKP as viable candidates for a
coalition arrangement, as doing so would risk reversing the important gains that have been
made in tackling corruption, reviving economic growth, and building a truly non-racial, non-
sexist and democratic society founded in the Constitution and the Freedom Charter.

A final consideration is that given their past track record and public statements, a coalition
with either MKP or the EFF would be inherently unstable and at risk of collapse. We would
likely experience extreme demands which seek to back the ANC into a corner or extract
concessions. This would create the risk of the coalition collapsing, triggering a motion of no
confidence in which government would not have a majority in Parliament. This would both
undermine the effectiveness of government and present an unacceptable political risk.

OPTIONS FOR A VIABLE GOVERNMENT

Opposition parties will not be able to form a government nationally or in any province
outside of Gauteng, unless all parties (including the DA and MKP) work together. This
outcome is not a realistic scenario.

Three options therefore remain to form a viable government that would be capable of
leading the country effectively and aligned with the principles articulated above. All three
options would require some form of agreement with the remaining major parties, namely
the DA and the IFP.

Democratic Alliance (DA)

The DA remains a neoliberal party dedicated to preserving the privileges of the white
minority. However, it is not a political formation that revolves around the personality cult of
an individual; it has strong institutional mechanisms. Furthermore its values and platform
are not antithetical to the Constitution as compared to the other parties. While not pro-
poor, the party is at least perceived by a considerable percentage of the electorate to have
the capacity for service delivery. There is a desire within the DA for federalism and a
completely different approach to addressing our socio-economic conditions; these are in the
main policy positions which in any event can be contested in the parliamentary arena.
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
The IFP is an ethno-nationalist party with a history of violently opposing the ANC. While still
mobilising on ethnic lines, since the late 1990’s the party has largely respected the
Constitution. The party is one of few in the country with a track record of governing at both
local and provincial level. Similar to the DA, they advocate for a centre-right approach to
addressing socio-economic challenges. These differences in policy positions can be
contested in the parliamentary arena.
While policy disagreements with both the DA and IFP would need to be addressed in any
coalition agreement, it would be possible to define a minimum area of agreement with both
parties based on a shared commitment to the Constitution.

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 1. A Coalition with the DA and the IFP

Based on current projections, a coalition between the ANC, DA and IFP would achieve a
majority at a national level as well as in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. If extended to metros,
it would have the further advantage of achieving a majority in Johannesburg, Tshwane,
Ekurhuleni, eThekwini and Nelson Mandela Bay.

The key benefit of such a coalition is that it would provide a higher level of stability and
would be more inclusive of the population, representing a plurality of close to 70% of voters
at a national level. As a ‘grand compact’ across all spheres of government, it could win
support from ANC structures in many places where unstable coalitions make it difficult to
govern. The inclusion of the IFP would also address concerns about Zulu alienation. This
arrangement would be positive for economic growth and stability, as well as for tackling
corruption and reforming the state.

The success of this coalition would depend on agreeing upon a minimum programme for
government that reflects the core policy commitments of the ANC. This programme would
need to include measures to support economic growth and address unemployment, rebuild
the capability of the state, and improve the delivery of basic services. While there are many
areas of disagreement on which the ANC would need to remain firm, such as advancing
economic transformation and black empowerment as well as key issues of foreign policy, it
would be possible to identify sufficient areas of agreement to form the basis of a pro-
growth and employment agenda that would inspire confidence in the economy. The ANC
would need to draw a red line on those policy issues on which we cannot compromise.

2. A Confidence-and-Supply Agreement with the DA and the IFP

A confidence-and-supply agreement refers to a formal arrangement with one or more

parties, in which those parties commit to support the government in confidence motions
(confidence) and to pass budgets in appropriation votes (supply). Unlike a coalition, junior
parties do not usually receive positions in Cabinet, and are free to vote independently on
other legislation. A confidence-and-supply agreement provides greater stability than a
minority government, as it assures the government of majority support in Parliament.

An agreement of this kind would avoid the complexities of a coalition while enabling the
ANC to form a government. It would have many of the advantages of the coalition described
in Option 1, while preserving the independence of all parties and enabling government to
carry out its policy agenda without the constraints of a formal coalition agreement.
However, the key disadvantage would be the absence of a majority in Parliament to pass
legislation (other than budgets). A significant amount of political work would also have to be
carried out within the ANC and broader Mass Democractic Movement (MDM) to ensure
buy-in of this approach as historically these parties have not been seen as allies of the
Congress agenda in the country. Broader ANC voting constituencies would also have to be
convinced of this approach given that it may be perceived as “selling out” for a neo-liberal

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agenda. There are however a number of advantages given the flexibility this option
provides.

Both the DA and IFP would be likely to agree to this arrangement in order to exclude the EFF
and MKP from government. If necessary to secure their participation in a confidence-and-
supply agreement, the DA and IFP could be offered greater control in Parliament, such as
through the position of Speaker and committee leadership. In Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal,
where the ANC majority is narrower, it may be necessary to allocate certain positions in the
provincial executive to junior parties, without relinquishing control of the province.

The table below summarises examples where this model has been used elsewhere in the
world, including the current Trudeau-government in Canada and the left-wing Sanchez
government in Spain.

Examples of confidence-and-supply agreements in selected countries

Country Head of Governing Confidence Seats Seats With

Government Party Partners Without Partners
Partners

Spain Pedro Sanchez Socialist Multiple 43.4% 51.1%

Workers parties
Party

Canada Justin Trudeau Liberal Party NDP 46.7% 54.1%

Turkey Recep Tayyip AKP Multiple 43.8% 53%

Erdogan parties

Australia Julia Gillard Labour Party Green Party 48% 50.6%

India Manmohan Congress Multiple 26.53% 61.6%

Singh Party

3. A Government of National Unity with all parties in Parliament, or those whose

vote share exceeds a defined threshold

A Government of National Unity (GNU) could be formed by inviting all parties with
representation in the National Assembly to join the government, or those parties whose
vote share exceeds a threshold (such as 2%, 5% or 10%). This would resemble the GNU
established through the Interim Constitution between 1994 and 1997 to oversee the
transition to democracy.

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The advantage of this approach would be its inclusiveness, providing an opportunity for all
parties who choose to do so to participate in government and thus broadening the electoral
mandate. This would also avoid the need to select one preferred coalition partner, reducing
the risk of alienating voters who might disagree with the chosen coalition agreement.

However, this approach would have several important disadvantages. First, it would result
in an unstable government and the need to manage many partners with widely varying and
competing interests. This would increase the risk that the government would collapse,
triggering a no confidence motion early in the Seventh Administration. Second, it would be
more difficult to agree a minimum programme for government with a greater number of
partners, rendering government ineffective and hamstrung. Third, there is a risk that the DA
would not participate in the GNU if it included either the EFF or MKP, leaving the ANC in an
effective coalition with those parties as well as smaller parties. This outcome would
significantly compromise the ANC, while allowing the DA to position itself as the only
opposition to an ineffective and unstable government with corrupt elements.

Should a GNU option be considered, it would need to include all parties in order to be
viable. This would need to be established upfront, before the decision was announced.
Furthermore, a well-defined minimum programme of government would need to be agreed
and structures established to manage potential disputes.

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Annexure: Comparison of Options
Option Advantages
Option 1: Coalition ● Majority at national level, in Gauteng
agreement with the DA and KwaZulu-Natal, and in metros
and IFP ● More inclusive of the population,
representing a plurality of close to 70%
of voters at a national level
● Stable government, with reduced risk of
no confidence motions
● Positive boost to confidence in the
economy and ability of government to
deliver
Option 2: Confidence- ● Same advantages as Option 1, while
and-supply agreement avoiding complexities of a coalition and
with the DA and IFP preserving distinct party identity
● Stability of government through support
in confidence motions and ability to pass
budgets
Option 3: Government ● Most inclusive government, contributing
of National Unity to national unity
● Avoid the need to select one coalition
partner
Disadvantages Recommendation
● Political risk of aligning with parties which Second best (if Option 2 is not
may be rejected by some ANC supporters possible)
● Canvassing support within ANC structures
and the greater MDM may prove
challenging
● Risk of inability to agree minimum
programme of government that
preserves key policy commitments
● Lack of a majority in Parliament would Preferred option
threaten ability to pass key legislation
● May not be enough time to successfully
create buy-in and understanding of this
option within ANC structures
● Highly unstable and likely to collapse, Third best (if Options 1 and 2
resulting in no confidence motion are not available)
● Harder to manage multiple partners with
competing objectives and to agree
minimum programme of government
● Risk that one or more parties withdraw,
leaving the ANC in an effective coalition
with the EFF and MKP
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