The Kasztner Trial

The survivors of the Hungarian holocaust in Israel were determined to seek revenge on
those who had collaborated in the deportation of their loved ones. Malchiel Greenwald, a 69
year old refugee from Austria, had been born in Hungary. Greenwald belonged to the
religious Zionist Mizrahi. He was fond of attacking public figures and he printed his own
news-sheet, which he personally handed out. In one issue he accused the Jewish Agency
of collaboration in the murder of thousands of Hungarian Jews. He specifically criticised
Kasztner for testifying on behalf of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg.
On 25th May 1953 proceedings for libel were initiated by Rudolph Kasztner, a senior Mapai
(Labour) official and a candidate in the next Knesset elections.1 Attorney General, Haim
insisted that Kasztner agree to sue Greenwald in an action which the state would finance.
Instead of dealing a decisive blow to allegations of Zionist-Nazi collaboration, Cohen had
unwittingly opened up a can of worms. The Zionist record during the Holocaust would be
scrutinised, particularly their role in Hungary. Kasztner had been the de facto leader of
Hungarian Zionism.
Lob identified the key question as ‘how much the Jewish Councils actually knew about
Auschwitz.’ Lobb accepted that ‘the most important document detailing the truth about the
death camps was the Auschwitz Protocols by two young Slovak Jews’.
Kasztner boasted that as President of the Zionist Organisation of Hungary he was the best
informed in Hungary about the perilous situation of the Jews at that time. ‘We had, as early
as 1942, a complete picture of what had happened in the east to the Jews deported to
Auschwitz and the other extermination camps.’ 2 Kasztner testified that:
“Toward the end of April, 1944, the German military agents informed me that they had
finally decided on the total deportation of Hungary’s Jews …. I also received
information from Auschwitz that they were preparing there to receive the Hungarian
Jews . . . Wisliczeny … told me that it had finally been decided - total deportation. He
asked that we should do everything we could to comply with the demands of the new
German Plan. Otherwise, he said, he could see no chance of helping Hungarian
Jews.” 3
The last sentence makes no sense. How could Hungarian’s Jews be helped by deporting
the vast majority to their deaths? What Kasztner really sought was to save the leadership.
Lobb suggests that the rescue of 300 Zionists in Cluj was meant to be ‘a test case’ and that
Kasztner ‘intended to use the rescue of a few hundred to save many thousands more’. But
the remainder of Cluj’s 20,000 Jewish population were being herded onto cattle trucks
destined for Auschwitz. Eichmann and Wisliceny never had any intention of allowing a large
scale rescue.4
The Kasztner trial dominated the headlines in Israel for five years. It lasted until 3 rd October
1954. Judge Benjamin Halevi took a further 9 months in which to consider the verdict and it
wasn’t until 1958 that the Supreme Court delivered its verdict on appeal. In 1955 the
government of Moshe Sharrett fell as a direct result of the verdict of the Jerusalem District
Court.5
1
Noah Lucas, The Modern History of Israel, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1975, p. 327.
2
Randolph Braham, p. 707. The Politics of Genocide – Holocaust in Hungary, 1981,
3
Hecht, pp. 59-60.
4
Lobb, pp. 80-81.
5
Lucas, p.327.
 Kasztner’s Testimony on behalf of Nazi war criminals
Kasztner testified twice. On 13th September 1945, ‘at the Jewish Agency’s expense” he flew
to London to give two affidavits before Warren F. Farr, Chief military attorney of the
American Committee for the Investigation of War Crimes. The first detailed the murderous
role of Eichmann and “Krumey’s tireless execution of Eichman’s plans in Hungary.’ as ‘head
of the (killing) operations in Hungary, Austria and Poland.’ 6 The second affidavit alleged
that Wisliceny’s actions at the end of the war were designed to save his skin. Likewise SA
Colonel Becher’s motive was ‘in order to establish an eventual alibi for himself.’7

By January 1946, Kasztner and his close friend Moshe Schweigger, whom Becher had
rescued from Mauthausen, were singing from a different hymn sheet. In Geneva they issued
a statement affirming Becher’s role in saving Jews.8
Why the sudden change? One clue lay in the statements that Kasztner and Schweigger gave
at the US Consulate in Geneva regarding the ‘Becher Deposit’,9 the 9 million Swiss Francs
that Kasztner testified Becher had received from Jews seeking to escape Hungary.10 The
Jewish Agency wanted to lay their hands on the confiscated wealth of Hungarian Jewry.
Other reasons including allegations that Becher was involved in arms purchases for Israel in
1948.11
Kasztner testified that: ‘There can be no doubt that Becher belongs to the very few SS
leaders having the courage to oppose the program of annihilation of the Jews and trying to
rescue human lives…’ 12 Kasztner signed this statement ‘not only in my name but also on
behalf of the Jewish Agency and the World Jewish Congress,’ describing himself as ‘former
chairman of the Zionist Organisation in Hungary; 1943-45.’ 13
Kasztner emphasised that, having ‘known Becher, from June 1944 until the middle of April
1945, … Becher did everything within the realm of his possibilities and position to save
innocent human lives from the blind fury of killing of the Nazis leaders….’’ 14
In mid-1946, in his report to the Jewish Agency, Kasztner reversed his position again.
Becher, Wisliceny and Krumey had been ‘actors in the Nazi killing machine’ who in the final
stages of war had been willing to save some Jews to provide themselves with an alibi.15
Krumey was second in command of Eichmann’s Sonderkommando in Hungary. He
murdered 86 children in Lidice, the Czech village that the Nazis wiped out in retaliation for
the assassination of Heydrich.16 His record in Poland, in charge of the SS extermination

6
Orr, p. 98.
7
Porter p. 374, Orr. p.98.
8
Linn p.43. citing Muller-Tupath, K. Reichsfuhrers gehorsamster Becher: Eiine deutsche Karriere
(Fulda: Konkret Litteratur Verlag, 1982) and Barri p.142.
9
Barri p. 143 citing Separate "joint" statements by Kasztner and Dr. Nikolaus (Moshe) Schweiger,
January 20, 1946, CZA, Eliezer Kaplan's Office Files S53/2128.
10
Porter, pp. 374. 396 citing Barri p?.
11
Porter p.392.
12
Perfidy, p.78.
13
Lobb pp.230-1.
14
Judgements of the Supreme [Appeal Court] Court in Israel, Vol. 79 p. 2210 Hebrew, State Publishing
House, Jerusalem 1958.
15
Barri p.142.
16
Perdition, p. 99.
batallions was similar. On 13th September 1945 Kasztner had charged Krumey with being in
charge of the operations in Hungary, Austria and Poland.
None of this stopped Kasztner writing, in February 1947, to Krumey asking how he could
help him and offering to testify on his behalf. On 4th August 1947. Kasztner swore an
affidavit affirming that Krumey had acted “in a comparatively humane way”. Barri claims
that ‘there seems to be no evidence that the Jewish Agency had any need of Krumey’s
services.’ Kasztner’s statements are therefore ‘unexplained.’ 17
Despite having arranged at least 6 transports from the Zamosc area to Auschwitz, Kasztner
signed, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, an affidavit in favour of Krumey on 5 May 1948.
This resulted in his release from Allied custody where he had been held since May 1945.
Kasztner now attributed the saving of the Jews at Strasshoff (the money for whose rations
Krumey had stolen fn) as well as 30,000 Jews in Thereinstadt and 29 Jews in Bratislava.18 ‘I
wish to stress that Krumey carried out his duty with commendable goodwill towards those
who depended decisively, on the manner in which he interpreted his orders.’ 19 Between
London in 1945 and his testimony in 1948 there had been ‘a transformation’.20
As a result, Krumey spent his post-war years in Germany as a free man.21 It was only after a
trial in Frankfurt in 1965, where Rudolf Vrba testified, that he was condemned to 5 years
hard labour later. On 29.8.69. this was increased, after Vrba was again a witness, to life
imprisonment.22 The Kasztner trial was unaware of his testimony on behalf of the other SS
leaders.
Kasztner had lied repeatedly to Joel Band telling him ‘I never defended members of
Eichman’s staff, since these were nothing but murderers of the worst kind. It was different
with people like Becher.’ 23 on 17.2.57. that ‘I cannot remember that I ever testified on behalf
of Krumey…. And when Eichman disappeared without a trace I demanded that Krumey
stand trial as the main culprit.’ As Brand comments: ‘Nobody knew better than Kasztner
that Krumey was the immediate deputy of the mass murderer Eichmann… Krumey arrived in
Hungary already crowned by glorious achievements. He was the commander in Poland of
the SS deportation battalions.’ 24
In a letter of 26th July 1948 to Eliezer Kaplan, the then Minister of Finance, Kasztner wrote
that Becher had been released ‘due to my personal intervention.’ 25 Kasztner described
meetings with Becher and Jüttner in Nuremburg ‘aimed at locating what Kasztner termed
"the Becher deposit.” 26
Halevi held that Becher, far from standing up against the deportations, merely obeyed
Himmler’s orders. ‘There is no truth and no innocence in his statement ‘I did not doubt for

17
Barri p. 163.
18
Barri p.144, Porter p.385.
19
Orr, Perdition, p. 98. Citing Brand, Satan and the Soul, p. 6.
20
Barri p.142, what Lobb p. 228 describes as a ‘‘spectacular change’.
21
Barri, p.145. “I do not easily forget those who showed understanding toward us at certain moments.”
22
Linn p.47.
23
Perdition p.99, citing Satan & the Soul, Joel and Hansi Brand. Hebrew. Ledori Pub Co Tel Aviv 1960
p. 107.
24
Perdition p. 98.
25
Orr, p.97, Judgments of the Supreme [Appeal] Court in Israel Vol 79, Hebrew, State Publishing House,
Jerusalem, p. 2210. This was entered into the record by Tamir during the trial, Hecht p.73, Exhibit 22, CC
124/53 in the D.C. Jerusalem.
26
Barri p. 163.
one moment the good intentions of Kurt Becher. That statement by Kasztner was a
deliberate lie given on behalf of a war criminal in order to save him from being tried and
punished at Nurenberg.’ 27
The Zionist historians have defended Kasztner’s testimony in favour of Kurt Becher who was
no ideological Nazi merely ‘a convinced if superficial and opportunist Nazi’28 who was ‘trying
to maintain his own position by saving lives.’ 29 In fact Becher hero worshipped Himmler,
who repeatedly drove forward the implementation of the final solution and refused to
countenance any delays for economic or military reasons. Fn On November 5th 1944 driving
back from the meeting with McLelland Becher described Himmler as ‘a goodhearted fellow,
not a mass murderer’.30 If Kasztner met him he would recognise ‘what a wonderful person
he is.’ 31
Yad Vashem has rehabilitated Kasztner. In a ceremony it received his personal archive of
papers. “There was no man in the history of the Holocaust who saved more Jews and was
subjected to more injustice than Israel Kasztner,” according to Yosef (Tommy) Lapid,
chairman of Yad Vashem's board of directors. Kasztner was ‘one of the great heroes of the
Holocaust.’ 32 That the most infamous of Zionist collaborators could be called a hero is proof
that Yad Vashem serves, above all, an ideological and political role in channelling the
holocaust into Zionist streams.
In Vienna, Becher informed Kasztner that Himmler was ‘deeply concerned about the fate of
the Jews’. Becher carried with him orders from Himmler that ‘Under no circumstances must
they be harmed.’33 Becher’s main job, as Chief of the Economic Department of the SS
Command in Hungary was to strip Hungarian Jews of their remaining wealth but ‘Becher’s
extortion machine could not have functioned without Eichman’s murder machine.’ 34
Kasztner testified at his trial that whereas Becher had not been involved in the actual
process of destruction, Wisliceny and Krumey had been key members of Eichmann’s
Jewish Department. ‘Kasztner said this in spite of the fact that he was aware, of course, that
he had testified on behalf of these very men.’ 35
Becher was, at the time of the Hungarian Occupation, the equivalent of Colonel (Standarten
Fuhrer) in the SS-Totenkopfverbände (Death-Heads Units). He was appointed Commissar of
all German concentration camps by Heinrich Himmler. Kasztner confirmed he was promoted
to Lt. General in January 1945. under cross-examination by Tamir.36

27
Orr, The Judgement, p.204.
28
Bauer, p.211.
29
Bauer, Jews for Sale, 250.
30
Bericht, The Report of The Jewish Rescue Committee From Budapest 1942-1945, Dr. Reszo Kasztner,
The Graduate Center, The City University of New York p. 153
31
Porter p.323.
32
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/yad-vashem-hopes-kasztner-archive-will-end-vilification-
1.226041, Ha’aretz, 23.7.07.
33
Porter p.339 citing Schiller, A Strasshofi Mentoakcio. Likewise Himmler instructed Eichmann that ‘"If
until now you have exterminated Jews, from now on, if I order you, as I do now, you must be a fosterer of
Jews.’ http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Testimony-Abroad/Kurt_Becher-
01.html accessed 31.5.10.
34
Lobb pp. 232-4. citing part 5 Kurt Emmeneger ‘Reichsfuhrer’s most obedient Becher. From SS soldier
to multi-millionaire – and whatever is behind it], in: Sie + Er, Zofingen: Ringier, December 1962-April 1963.
35
Barri, p.145.
36
Perfidy, pp. 67-68, 77.
 Wisliceny
In 1945 Kasztner had said of Dieter Wisliceny, the butcher of the Jews of Slovakia and
Salonika, that he ‘believed that by keeping me alive and by making some concessions in the
campaign against the Jews he might have a defence witness when he and his organisation
will have to account for their atrocities.’ By 1948 he had become “the first SS officer who
obtained concessions, however minor, that breached the principle of total annihilation.” 37
Just how true this was can be guaged from the Slovakia government response to Vatican
requests to cease the deportations in 1942, that the Nazis were exterting ‘indescribable
pressure on this matter.’ 38
Presumably these concessions were the October 1942 halt in the deportation of Slovakian
Jews after some 57,000 of Slovakia’s 88,000 Jews had already been deported. The
Slovakian Jewish Council, under Gizi Fleischman and Rabbi Weissmandel, believed that this
was because of a bribe of $50,000 that they had made to Wisliceny.39 In fact it was as a
result of the Apostolic Nuncio, Monsignor Martilotti that the Vatican interceded with Tiso.
The Papal Nuncio name? had learnt that the Jews were being deported to their deaths. The
Vatican under Pius XII, not without justification, is often accused of anti-Semitism for not
having condemned the extermination of the Jews but compared to the Zionist movement, the
Vatican can hold its head high. Given that the Vatican was located on enemy territory, its
record stands out in comparison with that of the Zionist movement. The deportations
resumed from September 1944, after the Slovakian Uprising had been crushed. The
cessation had nothing to do with Wisliceny.40
In 1947 Kasztner tried to save Wisliceny from the hangman by having the Czechs hand him
back to the Americans. Kasztner however was unsuccessful. But Kasztner was not alone.
Gideon Raphael and Dr. Steiner of the Jewish Agency were also trying to save Wisliceny,
‘fearing that the Slovaks would hang him.’ 41 Far from this being evidence of Kasztner’s
collaboration with the Nazis, as Tamir claimed, Barri suggests that ‘Kasztner’s appeal was…
a continuation of the Jewish Agency’s attempts to locate Eichmann.’ Yet in December 1944
in an interview with Ha'aretz, Gideon Raphael of the Jewish Agency, confirmed that the
Jewish Agency had turned down an offer by Wisliceny to help locate Eichmann in return for
his own life.42 It is clear that the main concern of the Jewish Agency was the ‘Becher
Deposit.’ and the treasure of the Jews of Hungary.43 It would also appear that there were

37
Ibid. p. 229.
38
S Beit Zvi, p 69.
39
Holocaust Victims Accuse, Reb Moshe Shonfeld, Neturei Karta, NY, 1977 pp. 75-81. This book is
based on Rabbi Michael Ber Weissmandel’s collection of essays Min HaMaitzar (I Accuse – From the Depths).
It is as passionate outpouring of grief and bitterness at the betrayals of the Zionist leaders. Written from an
Orthodox religious perspective, HVA is unfortunately error ridden and cavalier with the truth. For example
there is no mention of Weissmandel’s letter to the Hungarian Jewish leaders saying that they could trust
Wisliceny because of the cessation of the deportations in Slovakia. Although it rails against the Judenrat, it
fails to mention that Weissmandel was, with Zionist Gizzi Fleischmann, a member of the Jewish Council in
Slovakia.
40
Lobb. p.229.
41
Barri, p.155.
42
Barri p.154 citing Orit Galili, "Interview with Gideon Raphael" (Hebrew), Ha-Aretz, December 2,
1994.
43
The Question of Kasztner’s Testimonies on Behalf of the Nazis War Criminals, Shoshana Barri
(Ishoni), Journal of Israeli History vol. 18, nos 2& 3, pp. 155-163.
other economic contacts between the State of Israel and Becher via the reparations
delegation from Germany.44
But even Wisliceny had become a rescuer of Jews. ‘He talked fondly of Gizi Fleischmann
and nostalgically of the evenings he had spent in Budapest’s night-clubs with Kasztner.’ 45

The Jewish Agency and the Kasztner Trial

Barri notes that ‘It seems more than a coincidence that the people on whose behalf Kasztner
testified were precisely those people whose services the Jewish Agency needed after the
war. This, apparently, was the manner in which Kasztner understood his role at this point.’ 46
Kasztner named Maurice Perlsweig and Gerhard Riegner of the Jewish Congress and
Chaim Barlass and Eliahu Dobkin from the Jewish Agency as having specifically agreed to
his testifying on behalf of Becher.47 Yet when asked about Becher, Dobkin of the Jewish
Agency denied even having heard his name, still less that the Jewish Agency had authorised
Kasztner to give an affidavit exonerating Becher, despite the Jewish Agency sharing his
expenses.48 Barri concludes that Dobkin ‘did not expose the whole truth’. The Jewish
Agency had a ‘positive attitude’ to Kasztner’s testimony on behalf of Becher in 1948. This
was impossible to maintain in an open court in Israel in 1948.49 However Joel Brand claimed
that in 1944 he had been invited by Dobkin ‘to go with him to Lisbon to meet Becher.’ 50
before the Americans vetoed it. Dobkin’s denial was a clumsy attempt to distance the Jewish
Agency from Kasztner’s testimony on behalf of Becher.51
In 1944 Dobkin was due, together with the director of J.O.I.N.T. Joe Schwartz, to meet Becher
and Kasztner in Lisbon. All the preparations for that meeting were made, but at the last
moment it was cancelled since the Allies forbade their citizens to meet with a representative of
the Nazis.52
Barri concludes that Dobkin must have been familiar with Kasztner’s testimony.53 Yet even
though Becher was released from detention as a result, the JA refused to inform the Allies or
German authorities that the affdavit was given in its name without its knowledge or
approval.54
Barri suggested that according to ‘archival sources’ the Jewish Agency was probably aware
of all 7 interventions on behalf of Nazi war criminals by Kasztner.55 Kasztner gave
favourable evidence on behalf of 5 Nazis – Kurt Becher, SS Lt. Gen. Hans Juttner, Hermann
Krumey (5.2.47), Otto Wisliceny and Kettlitz (13.10.47).56

Kasztner was trapped and could only suggest, under cross-examination, that ‘I understood I

44
Barri p. 161.
45
Porter p. 338.
46
Barri pp. 162-3.
47
Lobb, p. 252, Barri p.262.
48
Barri, pp. 149-150 citing Dobkin's testimony in court, June 28, 1954 See Minutes of the trial, Trial
Boxes, 512/B2, Loeb p. 222.
49
Barri, p.151.
50
Lobb p.277 citing Akiva Orr, p.105.
51
Porter p.413.
52
Orr, Perdition, p. 104 citing Joel Brand, Satan and the Soul op. cit. p.146.
53
Barri p.150.
54
Hecht fn. 133, p.266.
55
Barri pp. 145, 151-152.
56
Bauer, Jews for Sale, p. 250.
was permitted to make the statements I made.’ 57 Kasztner had enough enemies without
taking on the Jewish Agency. To this day the Agency has never dissociated itself from the
testimony Kasztner gave on its behalf in favour of Nazi war criminals.58
The Americans had initially treated Becher as a war criminal. ‘American prosecutors Rapp
and Kempner claimed in the 1950s that Kasztner was eager to make many statements on
behalf of Nazi war criminals, and that he was in fact disruptive to their work.’ 59 Walter H
Rapp, attributed the failure to prosecute Becher as due ‘solely [to] the result of Kasztner’s
pleadings.’60
Kasztner made strenuous efforts to save Becher, literally putting words in his mouth. When
questioning him about his role as ‘saviour’ of the Budapest ghetto, Becher “appeared not to
recall his part in this act of mercy, but, after repeated prompts by Kasztner, he modestly
claimed the proffered credit.” 61 In fact it was Major-General Gerhard Schmidthuber, the last
German commander of Budapest, who forbade the destruction of the ghetto and to ensure
compliance posted Wehrmacht soldiers outside the wooden walls. Kasztner claimed that
Becher had instructed the SS Commander, Gen. Winkleman, to ensure the safety of the
Budapest ghetto. Kasztner himself was in Vienna at the time.62
However this did not stop the medical staff and patients of the being massacred by the
Arrow Cross. Only the hospital under the protection of SS officer Ara Jerezien remained
safe.63
We can best understand Becher’s role by recalling that his cavalry brigade operated in
conjunction with the Einsatzgruppen (killing squads). It distinguished itself during Operation
Barbarossa by conducting executions of civilians, mainly Jews, in the Pripet Marshes in
Russia during the summer and fall of 1941.64 For this Becher received the Iron Cross-2nd
class and the Iron Cross-1st class for his ‘cleansing’ of the areas.65 In the summer of 1941,
Becher was already an operations officer in the first SS cavalry regiment in Russia, where
his unit murdered at least 15,000 Jews.66
In May 1982, after Karla Muller-Tupath published his book The Reichsfuhrer’s Most
Obedient Becher: A German career, a judicial inquiry was launched into Becher, based on
the testimonies of two witnesses who said that the regiments had liquidated the Jewish
population in the Pripet Marshes area of Mosyr, Bobruysk and Rietschitza, in Russia. Both
witnesses accused Becher of having planned and led the massacres. Unfortunately both
witnesses died before charges could be laid.67
57
Hecht., p. 79.
58
Porter p.434, Hecht fn. 133, p.266.
59
Statement by Walter Rapp given in Tel-Aviv before attorney Zvi Kalmantinowsky, February 6, 1957,
STA; Joel Brand's account of his meeting with Kempner, Joel and Hansi Brand, p. 107, Barri pp. 141, 153. See
also Linn p. 51 citing Ishoni-Beri, S ‘The Kasztner Affair: Testifying on Behalf of War Criminals – An Attempt
to Provide a Different Explanation,’ Yalkut Moreshet, 59 (1995): 85-107 Hebrew.
60
Lobb p.239.
61
Porter p.381.
62
Porter p.351. Even Szalasi, the Arrow Cross leader, took credit for its safe deliverance!
63
Porter p.339.
64
Porter, pp. 158-9.
65
Becher alleged in his testimony for the Prosecution in the Eichmann Trial that he received his medals
for having taken part in ‘heavy fighting’ in Russia.
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Testimony-Abroad/Kurt_Becher-01.html
accessed 31.5.10.
66
Bauer, Jews for Sale, 208.
67
Porter p.393.
The question of whether Kasztner grew rich from the train and his role in dealing with the
Nazis has been the subject of much debate. It was widely believed that Kasztner had
enriched himself through his ‘humanitarian’ activities.68 But when in 1947 the US released
the money that Becher had with him, it came to only $65,000. It was widely believed that
this was only a fraction of the monies that Becher had extorted.69
The charge of having personally profited from the money extorted from Hungary’s Jews for a
place on the Prominents’ Train was the only charge not upheld by Benjamin Halevi, although
in failing to account for the large sums he collected he had only himself to blame for the
accusation.70

The Betrayal of Hannah Senesh and the Parachutists

During the trial it emerged that in the autumn of 1944, the Jewish Agency had sent
parachutists from Palestine into Europe, ostensibly to encourage the Jews to resist. Three
made it to Hungary – Hannah Senesh, Joel Palgi and Peretz Goldstein. All 3 were captured.
Kasztner put heavy pressure on Palgi and later Goldstein to surrender to the Hungarians,
stating that they were endangering others.
They were not merely abandoned but were betrayed by Kasztner, as their presence
threatened his agreement with Eichman. Indeed ‘he informed the Gestapo about Goldstein
and Nusbacher while they were still free, 2 days before they actually handed themselves
in….’ 71
Halevi found “That Kasztner informed the head of the Gestapo about the 2 paratroopers.
That Kasztner tried, … to make the paratroopers hand themselves to the Gestapo and
succeeded at that stage with Palgi (Nussbacher).… the real explanation for these acts of
Kasztner stems from his relations with the Nazi regime. Kasztner has put as he admits (end
of para 40), all his rescue operation on the Nazi card….Any Jewish resistance, particularly
Zionist, amongst Budapest’s Jews would have endangered immediately the chances of
success of his efforts… … Kasztner had long ago given his loyalty to the Nazi regime.’72
Hannah Senesh, who became a hero in Israel for her heroism was likewise abandoned by
Kasztner. Even when the Szotjay government was deposed in late August and when
Eichmann and the SS were expelled, Kasztner ignored entreaties by her mother Katherine
Senesh to help her. Kasztner refused to meet her mother or Hannah, take her food, find her
a lawyer or do anything to alleviate her plight. In November she was executed by the fascist
Nyilas government.73 This episode in particular had a marked effect in Israel. Hannah
Senesh, had been a brave woman who had ventured into Nazi occupied Hungary only to be
spurned by the Jewish Agency representative there. She too was a victim of Zionist
collaboration with the Nazis.

Selling his Soul to the German Satan

Benjamin Halevi, President of the Jerusalem District Court, formulated ‘Gruenwald’s
rambling diatribe’ into four charges:
(a) collaboration with the Nazis (b) preparing the ground for murder of Hungary’s Jews (c)
68
Porter p.377, citing CZA 20.1.45.
69
Porter p.379.
70
Orr, Perdition, p.94.
71
Orr. Perdition, p.91.
72
Orr, Perdition, p.92.
73
Perfidy pp. 118-126, Porter p.416.
sharing the monies and valuables looted from Hungary’s Jews with Becher and (d) saving a
war criminal (Becher) from punishment after the war. On 21st June 1955 Halevi found that all
except the third charge, that Kasztner had personally profited with Becher from the
payments of Hungarian Jewry to the Nazis, were proven.74 Halevi found that ‘when Kasztner
received this present [the Train of the Prominents] from the Nazis, he had sold his soul to the
German Satan.’ 75
Kasztner didn’t merely parley or hold talks with the Nazis. He concluded a ‘bargain’ – a
train out of Hungary with 600 Prominents, the elite in exchange for the masses, which he
was allowed to increase to 1684. The price, however, was silence and co-operation over the
fate of the deportees.. And in such a situation, Kasztner began to adopt the outlook of those
he was consorting with. The enemy would be anyone who might upset his arrangements.
Kasztner’s behaviour was in marked contrast to that of the Chairman of the Warsaw
Judenrat, Adam Czerniakow, who committed suicide on July 24 1942, as the Nazis began
rounding up the ghetto population for deportation to Treblinka. Czerniakow understood that
there was no purpose in further negotiations with the Nazis. Halevi described the ‘bargain’
thus:
‘Eichmann did not want a second Warsaw. For this reason, the Nazis exerted
themselves to mislead and bribe the Jewish leaders….
The Nazi patronage of Kasztner, and their agreement to let him save six hundred
prominent Jews, were part of the plan to exterminate the Jews. Kasztner was given
a chance to add a few more to that number. The bait attracted him. The opportunity
of rescuing prominent people appealed to him greatly. He considered the rescue of
the most important Jews as a great personal success and a success for Zionism.’ 76
On May 2nd, 13 days before the first trains started to roll for Auschwitz, Kasztner reached an
agreement with Herman Krumey. Halevy found that:
‘Kasztner possessed at that moment the first news about the preparation of the gas
chambers in Auschwitz for Hungary’s Jews…(he) could… warn the leaders and the
masses about the real danger of the imminent total deportation facing Hungary’s
Jews, and immunize them against Nazi deceptions…. The other way opened for
Kasztner by Krumey was the method of rescuing Jews by the Nazis themselves,
with their help, according to agreement with the heads of the SS… 77
Halevi found that ‘… Kasztner understood very well… that the prominents as a whole and
his friends in Kluj in particular would not be rescued from the holocaust if the mass heard a
hint about the real purpose of the operation; to save the leaders from the holocaust prepared
for the people.’
‘The association with the heads of the SS on which Kasztner placed the entire fate of the
rescue forced him to withhold his information about the extermination plans from the majority
of Hungary’s Jews.’78
Andre Biss, a devoted supporter of Kasztner and cousin of Joel Brand, who was involved in
choosing those on Kasztner’s list, defended the decision to conceal the Vrba-Wetzler report.
‘It was part of Clages’ job (head of Himmler’s Security Service in Budapest) … to keep an
eye on Eichmann and to see that everything was done to ensure that the secret behind the
74
Loeb p. 260.
75
Loeb, p.259, Perfidy, p.180.
76
Perfidy p.180.
77
Orr, Perdition, pp. 88-89.
78
Ibid., The Judgement of the District Court of Jerusalem pp. 54-5.
‘final solution’ should be completely guarded. It was therefore necessary that the object of
the deportations should remain unknown.’ Because if it had become known there would
have been no train.79
A glimpse of Kasztner’s world is evidenced by Judge Halevi’s question as to what Rudolf
Hoess view of the Death March from Budapest to Vienna that Eichman organised. ‘Hoess
said he thought the whole thing was swinish. He said he thought the things he saw happen
on the road between Budapest and Vienna were utterly swinish.’ 80
As Hecht notes, ‘a hush is in the court room as Kasztner pins his valentine on this vilest of
Germans.’ Kasztner explained that Hoess ‘would take immediate steps to have the Death
March stopped.’ At which point Halevi ‘who seems to feel he wasn’t hearing alright’ asked
who Hoess was, to which Kasztner replied that ‘he was Commander of Auschwitz.’
But Hoess was not the only one concerned with the plight of the Jews. Tamir, Malcheil
Greenwald’s counsel asked Kasztner, in the course of his cross-examination
Tamir: ‘Becher helped you save Jews?
Kasztner : Yes.
Tamir: And Himmler helped you save Jews?
Kasztner : (firmly) Yes.’ 81
It would appear that apart from Hitler and Eichmann, all the leading Nazis had become
saviours of Jews. Although Kasztner claimed to have secured an improvement in conditions
for the Jewish survivors of the concentration camps, Tamir got him to admit that up to and
including May 1945 Jews were still being exterminated and that ’there was no favorable
treatment of the Jews.’ 82
Although Kasztner appeared to have lost touch with reality, this was merely the product of
the situation Kasztner was in. Kasztner operated on behalf of the Jewish Agency who both
approved and financed his activities. After the war, Kasztner was cleared of charges of
collaboration by a Jewish Agency investigation fn. Kasztner’s apologies for the leading Nazis
was a consequence of the fact that he was concerned only with saving the Zionist elite. In
that respect they were saviours, even though the price was the rest of Hungarian Jewry.
Since the Zionist movement had written off Hungarian Jewry in toto, a deal to save the elite
was better than nothing.
If Kasztner had written off Hungarian Jewry as ‘a branch which long ago dried up on the
tree.’ 83 then he was following in the footsteps of the Zionist Organisation President, Chaim
Weizmann. .At the 20th Zionist Congress in Zurich on 4th August 1937, Dr Weizmann, told
the delegates how, when he was asked whether he could bring six million to Palestine, he
replied:
No. …. The old ones will pass. They will bear their fate or they will not. They were dust,
economic and moral dust in a cruel world. . . . Only a remnant shall survive. . . . We have to
accept it . . . . The rest we must leave to our future, to our youth. If they feel and suffer as we
do they will find the way - beacharit hayamim - in the fullness of time . . .” 84
79
Linn. p.80 citing Jacob Robinson, And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straigh, p. 61.
80
Perfidy, p. 154.
81
Perfidy, p. 152.
82
Perfidy pp. 155-6.
83
Perfidy, p.20.
84
The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Series B Papers, Vol. 2, p. 286, December 1931-April
1952, ed. Barnet Litvinoff, Transaction Books, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, 1984. See also Rabbi
Moshe Shonfield, The Holocaust Victims Accuse, Neturei Karta, Brooklyn, NY, 1977 and Perfidy, p.4 citing
In January 1958, the Appeal Court unanimously upheld the charge that Kasztner lied in
giving testimony on behalf of a war criminal, Kurt Becher. But they rejected the charges of
having collaborated with the Nazis by 4-1, Justice Moshe Silberg dissenting. None of the
judges disagreed with the facts as found by Judge Benjaim Halevi. What persuaded Justice
Goiten, who was sympathetic to Greenwald, was a legal point that if one charge was not
upheld (gaining financially) you couldn’t then uphold the other points. The libel case either
falls or succeeds on all counts. Justice Olashan, President of the Court, agreed.
Justice Silberg took issue with the Attorney General’s argument that:
‘‘Kasztner was convinced and believed that there is no shred of hope for Hungary’s Jews: not
even for one, and if he, as a result of this absolute despair, didn’t reveal the secret of the
extermination in order not to undo or endanger the rescue of the few, then he acted innocently
and cannot be charged with collaboration with the Nazis in facilitating the extermination of the
Jews, even if he, de facto, contributed to this result.
I must say that I cannot accept this argument. Is this ‘innocence’? Is there ‘representation’ of
despair? Can a single individual, even jointly with some friends, despair on behalf – and
without the knowledge – of 800,000 people?…. The burning question of ‘By what authority’
and ‘quo warranto’ is an adequate answer to such a claim of Bona Fide.’ 85
Silberg’s judgment recalls Kasztner’s statement in 1943: ‘The problem is whether we have
the right to act like God, namely to decide who is to be saved and who is not.’ 86
Judge Cheshin however spoke for the majority.
A person sees that an entire community is doomed, is he allowed to make efforts to save the
minority, although some of the efforts consist of hiding the truth from the majority, or must he
reeval the truth to all even though to the best of his knowledge all will be destroyed by this. 87
Cheshin spelt out the dilemma for his fellow judges very clearly:
‘… if we rule that Kasztner collaborated with the enemy because he failed to inform those who
boarded the trains in Kluj that they were heading for extermination, then it is necessary to bring
to court today also Dantzig, Herman, Hanzi Brand, Rahbes and Marton and many other leaders
and half leaders who also kept silent in times of crisis, who didn’t inform others about what
they knew.’ 88
It was this danger, exposing the leaders of the Israeli state to the allegation of having kept
silent and worse, that frightened the judges the most.

Selectivity
If Kasztner were convicted,89 according to Haim Cohen, then the Zionist leadership also
stood condemned. Cohen argued that if Kasztner believed there was no hope left for the
majority of Hungarian Jews then he was entitled to keep Auschwitz a secret in order that he
could rescue the few. Indeed it was an obligation.
“Eichmann, the chief exterminator, knew that the Jews would be peaceful and not
resist if he allowed the prominents to be saved, that the ‘train of the prominents’
was organized on Eichmann’s orders to facilitate the extermination of the whole
people.” … if all the Jews of Hungary are to be sent to their death he is entitled to

The New Judea (official organ of the Zionist Organization of England) XIII (April, 1937).
85
Criminal Case 124 Perdition p.100 and Hecht, p. 273.
86
Lynn, p.44 citing Weitz’s, Man Who Was Murdered Twice’, 23 (author’s translation from Hebrew).
87
Orr, Perdition, p.102.
88
Orr, Perdition, p.102.
89
Although by this time he had been assassinated.
 organize a rescue train for 600 people. He is not only entitled to it but is also bound to
act accordingly.” 90 (my emphasis)
If Eichmann permitted the TotP to leave because it helped ‘facilitate the extermination of the
whole people’ then it is clear that far from saving anyone (bar the 1684 people on it) the TotP
actually resulted in far more Hungarian Jews being exterminated. In opening the Appeal on
20th January 1957 Cohen based his arguments on political rather than legal grounds. If
Kasztner were to be indicted then so too should Zionism. It was a powerful argument that
as we see above struck a chord with Judge Chesin. Israel’s Supreme Court was being
asked to question the founding ideology of the state that had led to it being set up in the first
place:
“He [Kasztner] was entitled to make a deal with the Nazis for the saving of a few
hundreds and entitled not to warn the millions…. that was his duty…. It has always
been our Zionist tradition to select the few out of the many in arranging the
immigration to Palestine [the Weizmann Blueprint]. Are we therefore to be called
traitors?” 91 say who said this
The Zionists were no more than 5% of Hungary’s Jewish population.92 They had no
mandate to play god. Despite the Zionist attempt to suppress them, the Auschwitz
Protocols helped save ¾ of Budapest’s Jews. The ToTP saved none bar the Zionist and
Jewish elite.
Judge Shimon Agranat, who gave the leading opinion for the Supreme Court majority,
accepted this argument wholesale.93 Kasztner ‘had the right to keep silent.’ and his decision
to include a high number of Zionists on the train was ‘perfectly rational.’94
Henry Montor, Executive Vice President of the United Jewish Appeal, in a letter of
1st February 1940, outlined the Zionist approach to rescue and immigration policy to
Palestine. He confirmed that Zionism could never have been in a position to rescue
Europe’s Jews and the idea that Zionism was a movement of refuge and escape was a cruel
deception:
‘There could be no more deadly ammunition provided to the enemies of Zionism,
whether they be in the ranks of the British Government or the Arabs, or even in the
ranks of the Jewish people, if Palestine were to be flooded with very old people or with
undesirables…’ 95
Eichman confirmed that Kasztner ‘wanted only biologically valuable material. It was a good
bargain.’ 96 Hansi Brand objected that the term ‘biologically valuable material’ was only be
used by the Nazis.97 However this concept lay at the heart of Selectivity. Amos Morris-
Reich98 refers to an article by Arthur Ruppin, known as the Father of Jewish Settlement.
“Selection of the Fittest” which supported adopting ‘a selective policy for immigration to Eretz
90
Hecht fn. 160, p.268 see also Judge Cheshin, Perdition p.101.
91
Ben Hecht, Perfidy, p. 195.
92
Linn, p.40.
93
The Supreme Court unanimously accepted the facts as found by Judge Halevi, they simply refused to
accept his interpretation of them.
94
Lobb p. 280.
95
Hecht, p. 255.
96
Life Magazine, 5.12.60. cited in Lenni Brenner, 51 Documents – Zionist Collaboration with the Nazis,
p. 280.
97
Porter p.150 supports Brand. In fact careful reading of the above makes it clear that it is Eichmann’s
phrase.
98
Arthur Ruppin’s Concept of Race’, Israel Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 pp. 8-9.
Israel. The article opens with a discussion on the importance of the selection of human
material…. The framework of the entire article, as can be seen from the title, evokes
eugenics.’ [Visit to hans gunther]

The Train of the ‘Prominents’

On the night of June 30/July 1st 1944 the Train of the Prominents [TotP] departed from
Budapest. After spending time in the Privileged Camp at Belsen-Bergen, its passengers
were taken, in two stages, to Switzerland. One group of 318 left on August 18 th and the
remainder on December 5th.
By the time that Kasztner’s train had left Budapest, nearly 400,000 Hungarian Jews had
been murdered. Kasztner’s Report to the Jewish Agency is dominated throughout by his
concern for the safety of the TotP. The fate of the rest of Hungarian Jewry was barely
mentioned.99
Despite this, Anna Porter sees Kasztner as having been motivated primarily by the need to
rescue Hungarian’s Jews.100 Porter’s attention to detail and her creativity with dialogue leave
a lot to be desired. For example she names the ship carrying illegal Jewish immigrants,
which Hagannah blew up, as the Atlantic whereas it was The Patria.101
Lobb admits that the Train of the Prominents [TotP] ‘was too heavy with the elite of
Hungarian Jewry.’ 102 The official statistics of who was on the train were inaccurate. Lobb’s
own father was listed as a ‘farmer’ when he was actually a businessman, because Palestine
required farmers not businesmen. 103
There were non-Zionists too, because 150 places had to be sold to rich Jews in order to
purchase the rest of the places, at a cost of $1,000 each. Becher had also done his own
crooked deals, reserving 50 places for those who had paid him directly.
The leadership of the group always remained in the hands of the Zionists though.104 The Red
Cross nutrient Starkosan was reserved for the leadership headed by Joseph Fisher,
Kasztner’s father in law. 105 Even the most comfortable train coaches were seized for the
train’s leadership.106

The Nazis try to Open Channels of Communication with the West

The government of General Géza Lakatos lasted from August 29th, when the Szotjay
government was overthrown with the aid of a single tank, until October 15th 1944. For
Budapest’s Jews it was an interlude before the storm. The Regent, Admiral Horthy and
Lakatos had officially informed the Nazis of their intention to end the alliance with Germany.
In response, the SS kidnapped Horthy’s son fn and installed the fascist Arrow Cross
government under Ferenc Szalasi. This was the period when the Kasztner and Becher

99
Wisliceny estimated that 475,000 Jews were deported to Auschwitz, whereas the head of the
Hungarian Gendarmes, Ferenczy gave the number as 434,351 who were transported in 147 trains.
Collie in Holocaust City estimates that 437,402 were deported, Porter p.264.
100
Kasztner ’s Train, p.5, Anna Porter, Constable, 2007. It is a book with a singular political purpose
which ends up proving the opposite.
101
Porter, p.28.
102
Ibid. p.270.
103
Lobb, p.117.
104
Ibid. p.137. Porter likewise accepts that Zionists ‘dominated our entire group’ p.100, p.146.
105
Ibid. p.139
106
Lobb. p.201.
relationship flowered. Some quarter of a million Jews, apart from those in the Labour
Corps107 and others in hiding, were living in Budapest.

The Brand Mission

th
On May 17 , two days after the deportations began, when 23,363 Hungarian Jews were
deported to Auschwitz,108 Kasztner’s deputy Joel Brand, flew with a Gestapo double-agent,
Bandi Grosz, to Turkey. The purported purpose was to negotiate with the Allies over the so-
called ‘Blood for Trucks’ proposals. Himmler had instructed Eichmann to offer 1 million Jews
in exchange for ten thousand winterised trucks and other materials for use on the Eastern
front.
The Brand mission was however a cover for the real mission, which was an attempt by
Grosz to secure a diplomatic opening with the West. In Himmler’s (and Hitler’s) fantasies the
West would, at the last moment, agree to a ceasefire with the Nazis, allowing them to fight
only on the Eastern Front. Becher assumed that Kasztner would understand this. 109 When
Grosz testified in the Kasztner trial that his had been the real mission, no one believed that
this ‘small, ugly, balding, toothless old man’ had been Himmler’s personal emissary.110
Much has been written about the difficulties Brand encountered in Turkey before finally being
arrested by the British in Aleppo, after having been warned by the Revisionists he was
walking into a trap. Fn About how the Zionist leaders either ignored him or were powerless
to stop the British transferring him to Egypt where he was detained. Certainly Brand himself
blamed the Zionist leaders for having ignored if not sabotaged his mission. But the evidence
suggests otherwise.
Himmler ordered the closure of the remaining extermination camps and the destruction of
evidence within them. Fn Auschwitz ceased extermination by gas by late November 1944.
Himmler ordered Becher to ensure that the survivors were not killed. To a great extent the
latter order was countermanded by Hitler. fn Those left behind in Auschwitz were saved by
Soviet troops. Death marches were organised when the different camps were closed.
Becher was clearly unsuccessful at for example Neungamme and Mauthausen where his
representations had no effect.111
As the military situation continued to deteriorate and Hitler retreated into his bunker, Himmler
became desperate to establish links with the West. This was the context for four meetings
that took place between Becher, his entourage and Kasztner and the representative of the
JDC, Saly Meyer, at the border between Germany and Switzerland. The first meeting took
place on August 21st 1944.112 Meyer, who had been forced to resign from the Association of
Swiss Jews because of his opposition to the immigration of Jewish refugees, [fn] understood
what was motivating the Nazi negotiators and he was unwilling to dance to Becher’s tune.
Kasztner was ‘appalled’ at the ‘deadly consequences of being rude to a man who held lives
in his hands.’ Meyer ‘seemed unable to grasp the seriousness of the situation’ .113

107
Porter p.352 states that less than 1/10 of Jewish men in the labour corps survived, though other
accounts put this somewhat higher.
108
Porter p.176.
109
Porter pp. 186, 200, 340, 421.
110
Porter p.420.
111
Porter, 357-8, 361. At Mauthausen, Himmler’s order was countermanded by Ernst Kaltenbrunner,
successor to Heydrich as head of the RSHA.
112
http://www.kasztnermemorial.com/aug44.html accessed 31.5.10.
113
Porter, p. 285.
The talks themselves were a charade. The establishment of contact with the West was
achieved with the meeting between Becher and McLelland. The transfer of money was
merely the pretext. Becher’s adjutant, Max Gruson, pleaded: ‘Herr Mayer, I ask you, please
give this promise. Otherwise my boss Kurt Becher won’t be able to do anything for the Jews
and the gassings will go on. At least promise! It’s only words!’ 114 Kasztner was a ‘walking
life insurance’ for Becher and his associates.115
What Kasztner didn’t appreciate was that Becher too was playing his own game. The
negotiations had to be seen to succeed for the sake of appearances. Becher therefore
decided, whilst headed to Vienna, not to tell Himmler the truth of what had happened at the
Swiss border.116
At the third meeting with Mayer, on September 28th, Becher did not attend but sent his
representative Herbert Kettlitz, who was reduced to asking for something '‘my chief could
use. Otherwise’ he warned ‘it will be impossible for him to intervene further with the
Reichsfuhrer-SS on behalf of the Jews.’ 117 As Peretz Revesz observed regarding his own
negotiations with Becher, neither of them would admit to the fact that the Jews could not
deliver on their promises.118
On November 5th Becher finally secured a meeting with an American representative, David
McLelland of the War Refugee Board. The meeting produced little that was concrete but it
was the first channel of communication with the Allies that had been established.119
Kasztner was at this time travelling around Europe with Becher ‘rescuing’ a few Jews here
and there, even if they didn’t want to be rescued by the SS, in order to establish Becher’s
post-war alibi. Kasztner stayed in Berlin and visited Belsen-Bergen, Mauthausen and
possibly other concentration camps with him.

114
Lobb p.179.
115
Ibid. p.187.
116
Porter p. 288.
117
Porter p. 298.
118
Porter p.459.
119
Porter p.321.