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p ro d u ce.
, d o n ot re
se onl y
a l u 9-03
Person
Modern Latin America
2 0 2 0 -0
NINTH EDITION
p r oduce.
t r e
o n l y, do no
s o n a l use Peter H.-0Smith 9 - 03
P e r 0 2 0
University of2California, San Diego (emeritus)
James N. Green
Brown University
p ro d u ce.
, d o n ot re
l u s e only
Person
a
2 0 -0 9 -03
20
e p ro d uce.
, d o n ot r
se onl y
a l u 9-03
Person 2 0 2 0 -0
o duce .
ot r e p r
o n l y, do n
r s o n a l use - 0 9 - 03
P e 20 2 0
Independence and Its Aftermath
Creating Political Parties
Rafael Núñez and the Politics of Regeneration
uce.
The Loss of Panama
e p ro d
not r
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change
l
Politics and Policy: Patterns of Change
y, d o
l u se on
Gaitán, Reaction, and La Violencia
n a -03
e r s o 0 - 0 9
P
The National Front
202
The Contemporary Scene (2000–Present)
Kinder and Gentler
8 Venezuela: The Perils of Prosperity

From Colony to Nationhood
Coffee and Caudillos
Gunboats and Diplomacy
r o d u c e.
Punto Fijo Democracy
d o n o t rep
l u se only,
Ossification of the System
e r s o n a - 0 9 - 03
0
P 20 2
Conflicts with Uncle Sam
The Limits of Participatory Democracy
Chavismo without Chávez?
9 Argentina: Progress, Stalemate, Discord

Struggles for Supremacy
ro d u c e.
The Military Turns Back the Clock
d o n o t rep
only,
Peronism and Perón
l u
Stop-and-Go Politics
n a se -03
Pe r s o 2 0 - 0 9
20
The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Solution
Peronists Back in Power
The Military Returns
Back to the Future: Democracy Again
The Unperonist Peronist
10 Chile: Repression and Democracy

ro d u c e.
, d o n ot rep
l u se only
From Instability to Popular Front
Person
a
The Era of Party Politics
2 0 - 0 9 -03
Socialism via Democracy? 20
Countdown to a Coup
The Pinochet Regime
11 Brazil: The Awakening Giant
Dom Pedro I (1822–31)
Dom Pedro II (1840–89)
ep r o d uce.
End of the Empire
l y, d o not r
n a l u se on
- 03
r s o - 0 9
e 0
P 202
The First Republic (1889–1930)
Getúlio Vargas and the Estado Novo
The Second Republic (1946–64)
Military Rule
From Liberalization to Redemocratization
Cardoso in Charge
End of an Era?
PART THREE THEMES AND REFLECTIONS

ro d u c e.
d o n o t rep
12
l u s e only,
Strategies for Economic Development
Narrativeseofrs o n a 0 - 0 9 -03
P Backwardness
The Liberal Era (1880s–1920s) 2
0 2
Social Transformations under Liberalism
Import-Substitution Industrialization (1930s–70s)
Import-Substitution Industrialization in Theory
Import-Substitution Industrialization in Practice
The Socialist Alternative (1950s–80s)
Revolutionary Movements
Neoliberalism (1980s–present)
Free Trade
ro d u c e.
Countermoves
d o n o t rep
The Crash of 2008
l u se only,
Poverty and Inequality
e r s o n a 0 - 0 9 -03
P 20
Inequality and Income Distribution 2
13 Dynamics of Political Transformation
Categories for Analysis
Oligarchic Rule and Top-Down Reform (1880s–1920s)
Co-optative Democracy
Populism and Dictatorship (1930s–70s)
Women and Politics
A Surge of Democracy
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes
r o d u c e.
d o n ot rep
The Revolutionary Path (1950s–80s)
,
se only
Liberation Theology
l u
Person
a 0 - 0 9 -03
An Expansion of Democracy (1980s–Present)
2
20
Empowerment of Women
The Rise—and Apparent Decline—of the New Left
The Pulse of Democratic Change
Dangers of Democracy
Democracy Made Safe
Democracy Turns Left, Then Right?
14 Culture and Society

From Colonies to Nations
e p ro d uce.
not r
National Identities and Internal Divides
l y, d o
e on
Literature, Art, and New Ideas in a World Economy
n a l u s
Realism and Naturalism
o 9 -03
Pe r
Modernisms 202 0 - 0
Nationalism, Radical Politics, and Turbulent Times
Brazilian Modernism
Revolutionary Art and Literature
Rethinking Race
The Making of Mass Media
Popular Culture, Theater, and Sports
Latin American Culture Enters a World Market
Innovative Architecture
Revolutionary Culture
ro d u c e.
The Literary Boom
d o n o t rep
l u se only,
Dictatorship, Democracy, and New Social Movements
e r s o n a
Films, Pop Music, and the Internet
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P 20 2
15 Latin America in the World Arena, 1800s–1990s
Imperialism in the Americas
America’s Aspirations
The Rise of U.S. Influence
Consolidating U.S. Power
The Cold War
The Logic of Cold War
Cold War in Latin America
r o d u c e.
The Nationalist Impulse
d o n o t rep
only,
The Revolutionary Challenge
l u se
The Alliance for Progress
n a - 03
P e r s o 2 0 - 0 9
20
Development and Debt
The Post–Cold War Era
Bill Clinton and Latin America
16 Latin America in the World Arena, 2000–Present

George Bush and Latin America
Barack Obama’s War
Obama and Latin America
Donald Trump and Latin America
Confronting the United States
ro d u c e.
Mexico
, d o n ot rep
Brazil
l u se only
Person
Venezuela a
2 0 - 0 9 -03
20
Seeking outside Allies
The Intermestic Agenda
Immigration
Drug Trafficking
Drug Policy Debates
Perspectives on the Future
GLOSSARY
INDEX
PREFACE
p r o d u ce.
, d o n ot re
s e onl y
a l u 03
Pe n
rsorewritten 0-0We9-have
this2book.
of 0
W e have not merely much 2 also used it in our classes and received extremely constructive
comments from students. We have not only sought to bring the contents up to date but also determined to make the
book more accessible and teachable. In short, we have tried anew to imagine the kind of book that would best meet the needs
of colleagues and students. We would like to thank Jonathan D. Ablard, Thomas Whigham, Joel Wolfe, Stanley E. Blake,
Michael T. Arguello, Kim Richardson, and the two anonymous reviewers whose valuable feedback helped shape this new
edition.
e p r o d uce.
NEW TO THIS
l y, d o not r
EDITION
u s n
ethisochallenge
o
As our conversations progressed,swe
r n a l - 0 9 - 3 extensive rewriting of Modern Latin America.
0require
Toward this end, we have P e realized that
20 2 0 would
• Carefully reviewed our coverage of the colonial era (Chapter 2);

• Revised and updated every one of the individual country studies (Chapters 3–11);
• Developed a uniform format for country studies to encourage and facilitate comparative analysis (Chapters 3–11);
•
ro d u ce.
Strengthened our analysis of the internet and social media in our treatment of culture and society (Chapter 14);
p
•
o n ot re
Extended our treatment of Latin America’s changing place in the world arena and relations with the United States—with
, d
l u s e only
particular attention to the roles of U.S. president Donald J. Trump (Chapters 15 and 16);
Person
a -0 9 -03
• Substantially revised our full-color “photo album” of people and scenes from all over Latin America; and
2 0
• Added new documents 20
and other material to the companion website,
https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/.
Throughout the text we have added maps and illustrations, reorganized the presentation, and done everything within our
powers to enhance clarity and parsimony of expression. This represents our very best effort.
e p r o d uce.
ot r
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
y , d o n
u s
We are pleased to acknowledge the very
l e onl research assistance
capable
3 of Owen Parr and Julia Rock, undergraduates at Brown
University, and Casey s
e r o
Van n a
Sise, a graduate
0
student-0
in 9 - 0
international studies at the University of Denver. Professor Jennifer
P 0 2
2 extremely helpful suggestions for revisions on core sections of this book.
Lambe from Brown University offered numerous
We also wish to acknowledge constant encouragement and support from Felicity Skidmore, a scholar in her own right, who
provided dear Tom with tender and loving care in his final stages—all the while urging us to get on with our work. You owe
him that, she never quite said, but her message was poignantly clear. We have been happy to comply.
Last, we extend our gratitude and admiration to the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean. This is their story. As
foreign scholars, we can only hope to have done it justice.
o duce .
ot r e p r
o n l y, do n P. H. S.
l use
J. N. G.
e r s o n a 0 - 0 9 - 03
P 20 2 April 2018
p ro d u ce.
, d o
PARTn ot re
ONE
se onl y
a l u 9-03
Person 2 0 2 0 -0
Questions and Contexts
p r oduce.
t r e
o n l y, do no
s o n a l use - 0 9 - 03
P e r 20 2 0
p ro d u ce.
, d o n ot re
l u s e only
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a
2 0 -0 9 -03
20
e p ro d uce.
, d o n ot r
se onl y
a l u 9-03
Person 2 0 2 0 -0
o duce .
ot r e p r
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P e 20 2 0
1
r o d u ce.
Why Latin , d o nAmerica?
ot re p
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L atin America inspires and requires imagination. While steeped in persisting tradition, its social orders are undergoing
processes of never-ending change. Demographic profiles have emerged from centuries of conflict and accommodation
between peoples of divergent backgrounds, races, and worldviews. Theirs is a tale of enduring struggle. Cruelty and violence
have met with heroism, valor, resistance, and survival. Illusions of stability have succumbed to unexpected alterations—in
politics, economics, social relations, and cultural production. In the face of apparently overwhelming odds, human sensibility
has prevailed against grim reality. Domination has given way to liberation, repression to rebellion, censorship to creativity. It is
a land of the improbable, a society where truth and fiction interact in unsuspected ways. Thus the Nobel Prize–winning
novelist Gabriel García Márquez has called for sympathetic appreciation for “the unearthly tidings of Latin America, that
boundless realm of haunted men and historic women, whose unending obstinacy blurs into legend.”
It is not an easy place to understand. The region embraces more than twenty sovereign nations, all of the “developing”
p ro d u ce.
world, each with its own endowments and historical trajectory. Geographically, Latin America includes the land mass
, d o n ot re
extending from the Rio Grande (between Texas and Mexico) to the southern tip of South America, plus several Caribbean
l u s only
islands: a total area two and a half times the size of the United States. Physical features present sharp differences: from the
e
a
2 0 -0 9 -03
Andean mountain range, stretching the full length of western South America, to the tropical forest of the Amazon basin, from
Person 20
the arid deserts of northern Mexico to the fertile grasslands of the Argentine pampa. It does not lend itself to facile
generalization.
It is, moreover, an area of great ethnic and demographic diversity. The people of Latin America contain elements and
mixtures of varied racial groups—native Indians, white Europeans, black Africans, Chinese, Japanese, and immigrants from all
over the world. Nations differ importantly in population size (Brazil being four and a half times larger than Argentina, for
instance, and more than ten times larger than Chile). By 2017 the total population of Latin America and the Caribbean came to
more than 647 million, compared with about 324 million in the United States. As an expression of this cultural mosaic,
languages abound. Spanish is spoken almost everywhere, one might think—except in Brazil (Portuguese), part of the Andes
(Quechua, Aymara, and other indigenous languages), the Caribbean (French, English, and Dutch), Mexico (scattered pockets
of indigenous languages), and Guatemala (over twenty Indian languages).
Political life has displayed enormous variety. The European conquests elevated levels of political violence in ways that
p ro d ce.
erupted in coups, assassinations, armed movements, military interventions, and (more rarely) social revolutions. Ideological
u
ot re
encounters between liberalism, positivism, corporatism, anarchism, socialism, communism, fascism, and religious teachings of
, d o n
every doctrinal hue have sharpened the intensity of struggle. Dictatorship became a dominant form of political rule throughout
u se only
most of the twentieth century. Despite the differing forms of political conflict, old social and economic structures have
l
Person
a 0 - 0 9 -03
persisted. Even where modern revolutions have struck, as in Mexico (1910), Bolivia (1952), and Cuba (1959), many aspects of
2
20
traditional society survive. While the advent of political democracy in recent years might look like an abrupt departure from
the past, underlying continuities linger nonetheless. Even the rise of a radical “new left” through free and fair elections has
sounded echoes from earlier times. The pull of history continues to be strong.
Similarly, economic conditions have ranged from very good to very bad. Periods of prolonged growth have given way to
eras of depression and decline. The search for sustained development has led to unceasing experimentation with a broad
variety of economic models: classical mercantilism, laissez-faire liberalism, state-led industrialism, revolutionary socialism,
and contemporary neoliberalism. Appropriate roles for the state have been highly charged issues at all times. Poverty and
inequality have posed persisting and serious problems. Recent challenges to neoliberal orthodoxy have led to radical policies,
as in Venezuela, and to more modest reforms, as in Brazil. As the global economy undergoes change, governments continue
searching for effective partnerships and policies.
e.
The contradictions and complexities of life in Latin America have inspired remarkable intellectual and aesthetic creativity.
ro d u c
No fewer than six writers—from Chile, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru—have won the Nobel Prize for literature.
o n o t rep
Often inspired by indigenous or African legacies, visual artists have captured the dramas and ironies of social life in murals,
d
l u s only,
paintings, and other forms of expression. Latin American actors and films have gained worldwide attention and applause.
e
o n a 9 -03
Similarly, music and dance from the region—from samba to salsa—have gained enormous popularity. Supremely gifted
e rs 0 - 0
P 20 2
athletes have displayed remarkable prowess in such diverse arenas as soccer, the most popular sport in the world, and baseball,
officially known as America’s pastime. This has proven to be a lively, energetic, and inventive society.
What’s in a Name?
Why is this place called “Latin America”?
The name has linguistic, racist, and political origins. A French writer in the 1830s initially proposed that Romance language–
speaking peoples of the “Latin” race in the Americas should become allies of “Latin” Europe in its continuing struggles with
“Teutonic Europe,” “Anglo-Saxon America,” and “Slavic Europe” (there was no mention of Asia). Thereafter, intellectual and
political leaders within the region embraced the idea to distance themselves from Spain and Portugal and to emphasize cultural
connections with France. The term was further exploited during the 1860s under Napoleon III, when France was seeking to expand its
p ro d u ce.
influencein the Western Hemisphere (and impose Maximilian of Hapsburg as the emperor of Mexico). In subsequent years the label
ot re
gained wide usage throughout the region as a means of (1) asserting autonomy and independence from the United States and (2)
y, d o n
upholding ideals of solidarity and cooperation among nations of the area.
u s e onl
In contemporary usage, the term Latin America usually refers to parts of the Americas where Spanish or Portuguese languages
l
Person
a 0 -0 9-03
prevail (also French, if the concept extends to Romance languages). Strictly speaking, it does not include English- or Dutch-speaking
0 2
2
territories—Belize in Central America or the Guianas in South America—or such islands as Jamaica or St. Maartens. The islands can
be accommodated instead by reference to Latin America and the Caribbean. We follow these conventions in this book.
Names do not fall from the sky. They result from human invention. The point is to use them with precision and care.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Notwithstanding geographical proximity, most U.S. citizens know very little about their neighbors to the south. Stereotypes
abound. Many “North Americans” (as they are commonly called in Latin America) believe that the United States can impose
its will on the region through “big-stick” diplomacy or military might. Others do not care. Still others entertain obsolete
notions about the peoples of the region: the devious Mexican “greaser,” the “Latin lover,” the “Frito Bandito,” the soulful Che
ro d u ce.
Guevara, vicious and violent drug traffickers, lightly clad Brazilian carnival queens—such are the images that often come to
p
, d o n ot re
mind. They are pervasive but misleading. As prominent columnist James B. Reston of the New York Times once said, “The
l u s only
U.S. will do anything for Latin America, except read about it.”
e
Person
a
0 2 0 - 0 9-03
The region is important to the United States in a variety of ways. Take economics, for instance. Latin America is a major
2
trading partner. It is the site of much U.S. investment and a source for oil and other critical raw materials. It provides American
consumers with such basic everyday goods as coffee, sugar, fruit, vegetables, and wine. An acceleration of growth in key
countries—such as Mexico and Brazil—may soon produce significant new powers on the world scene.
p ro d u ce.
, d o n ot re
l u s e only
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2
p ro d u ce.
, d o n ot re
l u s e only
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2
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e p ro d uce.
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n a l u s e on -03
P e rs o 2 0 - 0 9
20
Map 1 Latin America and the Caribbean
In the political realm, revolutionary upheavals and anti-American movements in Latin America have posed significant
challenges for U.S. foreign policy. They have raised serious questions about how best to define, protect, and promote
America’s national interests. United States presidents of both political parties have consistently acknowledged the importance
of the region. President George H. W. Bush, a Republican, sought a special relationship with Mexico and in 1990 proposed a
e p ro d uce.
free trade agreement that would tighten economic bonds between all of Latin America and the United States. Bill Clinton, a
l y, d not r
Democrat, followed up in 1994 by hosting a hemispheric “Summit of the Americas.”
o
e on
George W. Bush, another Republican, selected Mexico as the site for his first foreign visit in 2001. As president-elect,
n a l u s 9-03
Barack Obama, a Democrat, held a private meeting with Mexico’s chief executive before taking office in 2009. Throughout his
Perso 2 0 2 0 -0
first term in office, however, Obama proved awkward in dealing with the ola rosada (pink tide) of left-wing governments then
sweeping through the region. But during his second term, in 2014, Obama formally began the process of normalizing U.S.
relations with long-time adversary Cuba. In 2016 presidential candidate Donald Trump, a Republican, met with Mexican
president Enrique Peña Nieto (though he did so after announcing his intention to have Mexico pay for the construction of a
wall to stymie undocumented immigration across the bilateral border, to the chagrin of many Mexicans and other Latin
Americans). Once in office, Trump also pledged to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico (and
Canada) and sent vice president Mike Pence on a goodwill tour of Panama, Colombia, Argentina, and Chile to curry support
for his policies.
Over time, significant parts of U.S. society have become Latinized by the influence of migrants from Mexico, Puerto Rico,
Central America, the Caribbean, and even Brazil. This is in addition to the Hispanic descendants of the original Spanish-
speaking population of what was once part of Mexico. Migration has brought peoples and customs from Latin America to the
uce.
American Southwest (from Texas to California), Florida, New York, and, more recently, other parts of the nation. Many major
e p ro d
ot r
U.S. cities now have more children from Spanish-speaking families than from any other group. By 2010 the overall Latino
d o n
community amounted to more than fifty million persons—U.S.-born and foreign-born, young and old—more than 13 percent
y,
se onl
of the total population in the United States. Because so many hard-working migrants lacked appropriate legal status,
l u
Person
a
0 2 0 - 0 9-03
immigration reform has become a hot-button issue in the U.S. political arena.
2
Similarly ardent debates concern illicit drugs—cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and synthesized “designer” drugs. Demand for
these substances in the United States has been strong for generations and rising within the past decade. Latin America is the
sole source of cocaine for the American market (cultivated in the Andes, processed in Colombia, and smuggled mainly through
Mexico). Traffickers have also profited from the sale of marijuana, a traditional item, and from designer drugs. Their gross
annual income amounts to billions of dollars, which they use to bribe local officials, build paramilitary armies, and purchase
dangerous weapons (including assault weapons, mainly from U.S. gun dealers). In consequence, these criminal gangs have
often proved able to outwit, outspend, and outshoot law enforcement authorities. Violence has become endemic. This has
posed a serious challenge to state capacity for governance, especially in Mexico and increasingly in Central America. The
prospect of political instability across the U.S.–Mexico border—or of a “failed state” within the nearby neighborhood—has
prompted U.S. officials to rethink policy alternatives.
p ro d u ce.
, d o n ot re
l u s e only
a CONTRAST 03 PARADOX
-AND
Person 20 2 0 - 0 9
As these observations suggest, Latin America resists straightforward categorization. It is a region rich in paradox. This feature
yields a number of instructive insights.
First, Latin America is both young and old. Beginning in 1492, its conquest by the Spanish and Portuguese created a totally
new social order based on domination, hierarchy, and the intermingling of European, African, and indigenous elements. The
European intrusion profoundly and ineradicably altered indigenous communities. Compared with the ancient civilizations of
Africa and Asia, these Latin American societies are relatively young. In contrast, most nations of Latin America obtained
political independence—from Spain and Portugal—in the early nineteenth century, more than one hundred years before
successful anticolonial movements in Africa, Asia, and other developing areas. By the standard of nationhood, therefore, Latin
America is relatively old.
Second, Latin America has been both independent and dependent, autonomous and subordinate. The achievement of
d u ce.
nationhood by 1830 in all but parts of the Caribbean basin represented an assertion of sovereignty rooted in Enlightenment
p ro
, d o ot re
thought. Yet a new form of penetration by external powers—first Britain and France, then the United States—jeopardized this
n
only
nationhood. Economic and political weakness vis-à-vis Europe and North America has frequently limited the choices available
l u s e -03
to Latin American policy makers. Within Latin America, power has become ironically ambiguous: it is the supreme
a
Person 2 0 -0 9
commodity, but at times it has only a limited effect.
20
Third, Latin America is both prosperous and poor. Ever since the Conquest, the region has been described as a fabulous
treasure house of natural resources. First came the European lust for silver and gold. Today the urge may be for petroleum, gas,
copper, iron ore, coffee, sugar, soybeans, or expanded trade in general, but the image of endless wealth remains. At the same
time, Latin American society displays startling contrasts—between rich and poor, between city and country, between learned
and illiterate, between the powerful lords of the hacienda and deferential peasants, between wealthy entrepreneurs and
desperate street urchins. Widespread poverty has enveloped peasants without tools, workers without jobs, children without
food, mothers without hope. According to economic criteria, Latin America has the highest rate of inequality of any region in
the world. An oft-repeated aphorism summarizes the scene: “Latin America is a beggar atop a mountain of gold.”
INTERPRETATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA

ro d u c e.
d o n o t repand this is what we offer in this
s e onownly,interpretation but also acquainting our readers with
To understand Latin American history and society requires a flexible, broad-gauge approach,
s o n a l u
book. We draw on the work of many scholars, presenting our
- 0 9 - 03
alternative views.
For generations, most analysts P e r 2 0
0 the area’s political instability, marked frequently by
of modern Latin America2stressed
dictatorship. North American and European observers were especially fascinated by three questions: Why dictatorships? Why
not democracy? Why so much disorder? In 1930 a prominent American social scientist observed that “the years roll on and
there arise the anxieties and disappointments of an ill-equipped people attempting to establish true republican forms of
government.” A contemporary British scholar also noted that “the political history of the republics has been a record of
alternating periods of liberty and despotism.” Implicitly assuming or explicitly asserting that their style of democracy is
superior to all other models of political organization, foreign writers frequently asked what was “wrong” with Latin America . .
. or with the people themselves.
Explaining Authoritarianism
ro d u c e.
What passed for answers was for many years a jumble of racist epithets, psychological simplifications, geographical platitudes,
d o n o t rep
and cultural distortions. According to such views, Latin America could not achieve democracy because dark-skinned peoples
l u s only,
(Indians and blacks) were unsuited for it, because passionate Latin tempers would not stand it, because tropical climates
e
a
somehow prevented it, or because Roman Catholic doctrines inhibited it.
Person
9 03
Per -03
2 0 -0 9
Each charge had its refutation: dictatorial rule flourished in predominantly white countries, such as Argentina, as well as
20
among mixed-race societies, such as Mexico; it appeared in temperate climes, such as Chile, not only in the tropics, such as
Cuba; it gained support from non-Catholics and nonpracticing Catholics, while many fervent worshippers fought for liberty;
and, as shown by authoritarian regimes outside Latin America, such as Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union, dictatorship
is not restricted to any single temperament. Such explanations did not merely prove to be inadequate. When carried to
extremes, they also helped justify rapidly increasing U.S. and European penetration—financial, cultural, military—of the
“backward” republics to the south.
The discourse shifted in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when North American social scientists formulated “modernization
theory.” Drawing largely on the experiences of Europe and the United States, this approach held that economic growth would
generate the social change that would in turn make possible more “developed” politics. For Latin America, the transition from
p ro d ce.
a rural to an urban society would bring a change in values. People would begin to relate to and participate in the voluntary
u
ot re
organizations that authentic democracy requires. Most important, a middle class would emerge to play both a progressive and a
d o n
moderating role. Latin America and its citizenries were not so inherently “different” from Europe and North America. Instead
,
s e only
they were simply “behind.” Sooner or later, they would catch up.
l u
Person
a
0 2 0 -0 9-03
Harsh realities undermined this optimistic view. Instead of spreading general prosperity, economic growth in the 1960s and
2
1970s generally made income distribution more unequal. The gap in living standards between city and countryside grew. The
middle strata, relatively privileged, forged a sense of “class consciousness” that, in critical moments of decision, led them to
join the ruling classes in opposition to the popular masses. Politics took an authoritarian turn, producing military governments.
And in stark contradiction of modernization theory, these patterns emerged in the most developed—and most rapidly
developing—countries of the continent. What had gone wrong?
Two sets of answers came forth. One group of scholars focused on the cultural traditions of Latin America and their
Spanish and Portuguese origins. These analysts argued, in effect, that antidemocratic politics was a product of a Roman
Catholic and Mediterranean worldview that stressed the need for harmony, order, and the elimination of conflict. Latin
America’s constitutions were never as democratic as they appeared; party politics was not as representative as it might have
looked. The North American and European academic community, afflicted by its own myopia and biases, had simply misread
the social facts.
ro d u ce.
A second group of scholars accepted modernization theory’s linking of socioeconomic causes with political outcomes but
p
, d o n ot re
turned the answer upside down: Latin America’s economic development was qualitatively different from that of North
l u s only
America and western Europe, and therefore it produced different political results. Specifically, these scholars argued, Latin
e
Person
a
0 2 0 - 0 9-03
America’s experience was determined by the pervasive fact of its economic dependence on world power centers. As Brazilian
2
social scientist Theotonio dos Santos explained, “By dependency, we mean a situation in which the economy of certain
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. . . . [This
relationship] assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining,
while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive
or a negative effect on their immediate development.” By its intrinsic character, “dependent development” generated social
inequities, allocating benefits to sectors participating in the global economy and denying them to other groups. It favored
upper- and middle-class elites at the expense of workers and peasants and, as a consequence, it reinforced and exacerbated
preexisting inequalities.
The proponents of this approach maintained that economic dependency led to political authoritarianism. According to this
view, the “dependent” location of Latin America’s economics placed inherent limitations on the region’s capacity for growth,
especially in industry. The surest sign of this economic trouble was a crisis in the foreign accounts and the country’s ability to
p ro d u ce.
pay for needed imports. Exports lagged behind imports, and the difference could only be made up by capital inflow. But the
, d o ot re
foreign creditors—firms, banks, international agencies such as the World Bank—denied the necessary extra financing because
n
only
they believed the government could not impose the necessary “sacrifices.” Political strategy fell hostage to the demands of
foreign creditors.
a l u s e -03
Person 20 2 0 - 0 9
The most frequent solution in the 1960s and 1970s was a military coup. The resulting dictatorship could then take “hard”
decisions, usually highly unpopular anti-inflation measures. Worst off were the lower classes. Implementation of such policies
therefore required a heavy hand over the popular sectors. Thus, in this view, the coups and repressive authoritarian regimes that
emerged in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile came about not despite Latin America’s economic development, but because of it.
Understanding Democracy
Then began a cycle of democracy. Starting in the late 1970s, country after country replaced authoritarian regimes with civilian
leaders and elected governments. Explanations for this trend took many forms. Once thought to be dominant and monolithic,
authoritarian regimes came to display a good deal of incoherence and fragility. Everyday citizens rose up in protest
movements, formed civic organizations, and demanded popular elections. Confronted by severe economic crisis, people from
Argentina and Chile to Central America sought to express their political rights. By the year 2000, the vast majority of countries
p ro d u ce.
were holding relatively free and fair elections. Despite their imperfections, these new democracies represented considerable
, d o n ot re
improvement over the blatantly dictatorial patterns of previous eras.
nly
l use o 03
l u s e on y
e r o n a 0 -0 9 - 03
Scholars approached these new developments with intellectual caution. Instead of launching grand theories, such as
s
P 202
modernization or dependency, political analysts stressed the role of beliefs, ideas, and human conviction. Some interpreted the
initial transitions toward democracy as a global triumph of U.S. values, especially in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union
(and the discrediting of Marxist ideology). Others emphasized the importance of leadership and tactical maneuvers at the elite
level. Still others stressed the emergence of “civil society,” especially the networks of grassroots organizations that gave shape
and coherence to antiauthoritarian sentiments.
Subsequent inquiries sought to examine the durability and quality of Latin America’s new electoral regimes. One strand of
research explored the role of political institutions. Some prominent scholars advocated the wholesale adoption of
“parliamentary” forms of democracy, rather than the “presidentialist” systems long in place throughout the region (and in the
United States). Others focused on more modest reforms, such as the rules for deciding elections, emphasizing the desirability
of ensuring popular mandates for eventual winners. Still others called attention to the need to enliven and strengthen the roles
of legislatures in search of a balance of power and to guarantee effective representation of the popular will. Because waves of
o d uce.
criminal activity posed threats to public security, attention also fastened on the need to strengthen judicial systems and uphold
e p r
l y, d not r
the rule of law. Democratic practices at the national level did not always extend to local levels, where old-time bosses often
o
e on
held sway over “pockets” of authoritarianism. According to one formulation, systematic constraints on citizens’ liberties (such
o n a l u s 9 -03
as freedom of speech and of the press) led to the construction of “illiberal” democracy in many countries of the region.
P e r s 20 2 0 - 0
Other works focused on the cultural and popular foundations of democracy. Public opinion research flourished throughout
Latin America, as survey researchers sought to identify and monitor the basis for democratic rule. Principal findings showed
that popular support for democracy was essentially contingent—that it depended in large part on effective governmental
performance, especially the provision of economic benefits, not just on abstract principle. By 2016, 54 percent of respondents
in a Latinobarómetro survey agreed with the statement that “democracy is preferable to any other form of government.” Such
results upended the traditional focus on culture, which argued in effect that authoritarianism had prevailed in Latin America
because the people had consented to it. Either that explanation was incorrect or popular culture was undergoing substantive
change.
Seeking to uncover deep-rooted traditions, historians reexamined the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in search of
foundational terms of political competition and the acceptance of protodemocratic rules of the game. Although elections took
place under tightly regulated conditions, there were elections nonetheless—and contemporary actors took them very seriously.
e p ro uce.
And it was noted, too, that since the 1820s ideological traditions had enshrined the ideal of democracy as a widespread
d
not r
aspiration throughout Latin America, even if it had been systematically denied for decades on end.
, d o
Economic prospects finally brightened as well. Under pressure from international creditors throughout the 1980s, Latin
on l y
u s e
American leaders imposed far-reaching measures designed to “liberalize” their national economies—reducing tariffs and other
l
Person
a 0 - 0 9-03
barriers to trade, selling state-supported companies to private investors, and curtailing deficit spending. Inflation declined and
0 2
2
foreign investment increased. As a result, average growth in Latin America rose from a scant 1.5 percent per year in 1985–89
to 3.2 percent in the 1990s. But the unexpected onset of financial crisis in Mexico in late 1994 and in Brazil in early 1999,
followed by Argentina’s disastrous economic collapse in 2001, led to disenchantment and confusion. Hopes for economic
development picked up from 2004 through 2007, when overall growth rates approached or exceeded 5 percent, thanks in large
part to the emergence of China as a major market for Latin American exports. The global economic crisis of 2008–9 imposed a
temporary setback, but regional growth jumped back to nearly 6 percent in 2010. Growth rates thereafter weakened,
culminating in a 2015–16 recession, but Latin America began a modest recovery in 2017.
Within the economic realm, some experts regarded the growth spurt of the early 1990s as vindication for pro-capitalist,
free-market policy reforms. Others noted that the surge tended to reflect the ebb and flow of international investments and that
capital promptly vanished in the face of crisis—leaving Latin America just as “dependent” as before. Of continuing concern
uce.
for many was the problematic relationship between economic and political transformation. Does economic liberalization lead
ro d
to political democracy? Or might it be the other way around? Recent developments in Latin America thus raise new questions
e p
and pose continuing intellectual challenges.
, d o n ot r
s e onl y
a l u
son AND2THEMES -03
PerIDEAS 020-09 IN THIS BOOK
This book is a survey of Latin American society and history, not a formulation of abstract theory, but we cannot escape the
need for a conceptual framework in approaching our material. From modernization theory we borrow two central ideas:
• the causal premise that economic transformations induce social changes, which, in turn, lead to political consequences;
and
• the related idea that shifting alliances among social class groups give shape to changing patterns of political conflict
over time.
For these reasons, each of our case study chapters includes an overview section on economic growth and social change that
precedes the discussion of politics.
pr o d u ce.
not re
n o t r e pro
ly, do 03
While the original dependencia approach has long since disappeared from academic fashion, we still regard its basic
s e o n
framework as a useful heuristic device. Accordingly, we adopt the notions that
u
e r s o n aofl labor 2 0 2 0 - 09of- available paths to economic growth;
• P
a country’s place in the international division defines the shape
• functional location on the “periphery” of the world system, as distinct from the commercial–industrial “center,” and
development at a stage when the North Atlantic system was already far advanced, meant that economic transformations
in Latin America would be different from patterns traversed earlier in Europe and North America;
• these differences in economic processes would produce different forms of social change—with respect, for example, to
the nature of the “middle classes,” the urban and rural working classes, and the relationship among these classes; and
• this combination of social and economic forces would define the options available to political leaders and would help
explain the alteration of democratic and authoritarian regimes.
In this context it is essential to acknowledge the great variations in resources, capacities, and circumstances of nations in
u c e.
the region. Those with large populations and diversified natural resources (Mexico and Brazil) were eventually able to
ro d
d o n t rep
undertake substantial programs of industrialization. Those with essential raw materials, such as petroleum (Venezuela) and
o
only,
natural gas (Bolivia), managed at times to benefit from rising prices on world markets. Elsewhere, the presence of copper and
l u s e -03
other industrial metals (Chile and Peru) led foreign companies to establish large-scale mining operations. And in tropical and
a
Person 2 0 - 0 9
semitropical areas, conditions of climate and soil encouraged the cultivation of sugar (especially in the Caribbean) that gave
20
rise to what we refer to as “plantation societies.” A key challenge for all countries has been how to transform the earnings from
commodity exports into processes of economic diversification and self-sustaining development.
We also deal with political issues and, in particular, with processes of democratization. From extensive work in political
science and public policy, we accept the basic ideas that
• full democracy requires not only free and fair elections but also fundamental respect for citizens’ rights;
• organizational capacity is crucial for political empowerment, especially of popular groups;
• questions about representation pose central issues for imperfect democracies—especially pertinent are concerns about
legislatures and political parties; and
• institutions provide incentives for political behavior—effective institutional design can affect prospects for the survival
and consolidation of democracy.
ro d u c e.
o n o rep and politics within an international
t economics,
d
y, entire modern era. We shall be looking for such connections
All in all, we intend to examine the relationship between society,
onto lthe
culture,
n a l u s e
context. We believe that this approach can be applied
- 03
throughout the book.
e r so
P in this (or any) approach. 2 0 -0 9
We acknowledge limitations 20 We believe that historical transformations are complex processes,
and to understand them we must adopt a multicausal approach. Ideas and ideology, for example, are not merely adornments or
superstructures; they also have important effects on the perceptions, attitudes, and actions of the people who make history.
Anyone who has ever tried to compare the political traditions of Argentina and Brazil can vouch for this truth. Demographic
factors, such as rapid population growth, also have far-ranging social and political effects. In our portrait of Latin American
society, we hope to integrate an “international political economy” approach with consideration of cultural and noneconomic
forces.
Our narrative begins by describing first the Conquest and the colonial period, 1492–1825, when Latin America entered the
periphery of the capitalist world system through subordination to Spain and Portugal. We then describe how the disruption of
this connection led to independence, followed by a phase of economic and political consolidation between 1830 and 1880.
The core of the book presents in-depth case studies of long-term transitions from the nineteenth century to the present. We
have deliberately adopted a longitudinal focus on individual nations (or clusters of nations) to facilitate the detection and
analysis of historical change over time. In addition, the material in this section provides empirical evidence for testing,
evaluating, and creating broad conceptual frameworks (any theoretical framework, we insist, not only the ones that we employ
here). Chapters appear in the following order:
• Mexico, a close neighbor to the United States, the scene of a major popular upheaval in 1910 and a gradual process of
democratization over the past twenty-eight years;
• Central America, an area characterized by plantation economies and long-standing U.S. domination;
• Cuba, an island so dependent on sugar and so close to the Florida shore, the one Latin American society that has
undergone a full-fledged socialist revolution;
• The central Andes (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador), a subregion with strong indigenous traditions and uncertain steps toward
stability and nationhood;
• Colombia, a nation where political democracy has coexisted with extensive drug trafficking in an atmosphere of
systemic violence that has recently given way to peace negotiations with insurgent groups;
Venezuela, a world-class producer of oil with a formerly stable two-party democracy that has given way to populist
• authoritarian rule;
• Argentina, a country blessed by fertile and productive pampas, wracked by internal strife and military intervention prior
to a resumption of democracy;
• Chile, a leading source of nitrates and copper, the site of an abortive socialist experiment and a long-standing military
regime preceding the restoration of democracy; and
• Brazil, an expansive nation well known for its traditional emphasis on coffee and, more recently, its rapid industrial
growth under both authoritarian and democratic regimes.
We give full consideration to social and political themes in each case study, and each chapter can be read independently.
A subsequent section offers analytical syntheses and summaries. The subjects are
• economic strategies and policies;

• patterns of political transformation;
• cultural trends and forms of artistic expression; and
• Latin America’s changing position in the world order and its relationship with the United States (in two chapters).
This book offers a picture of Latin American society, not a definitive catalog of facts. Our goal is to trace patterns and
trends that help us to understand the complexities and variations in Latin America’s paths to the present. We hope our
presentation will stimulate discussion and debate, and we expect that students and colleagues will disagree with many of our
interpretations. Above all, we want to introduce our readers to the excitement and fascination of an area that is intriguing in its
own right and has a vital role to play on the world stage.
2
d u c e.
The Colonial d o
Foundations
n ot re p ro
e only ,
l u s -03
P e r sona 2 0 -0 9
20 have cast ever-lengthening shadows over modern Latin America. Three
H istorical realities of conquest and colonization
centuries of imperial rule inflicted deep and painful wounds on cultures of the region, imposing hierarchical
relationships of subordination and restricting possibilities for socioeconomic development. At the same time, heroic episodes
of resistance to injustice and rebellion against oppression bequeathed legacies of popular identity, personal pride, and
collective self-empowerment. Complex colonial societies emerged at the juncture of domination and resistance in everyday
forms of accommodation between and among European colonizers, indigenous peoples, and imported African slaves that
forged complex societies with hybrid traditions, enormous energy, and limitless capacity for change. Although independent
nations would later traverse separate paths, they all shared lingering effects of European domination, popular rebellion, and
multilayered cultural formations. As the story of Latin America unfolds, we encounter endless tales of creative adaptation to
inauspicious circumstance, enduring and uplifting testaments to human fortitude and ingenuity.
r o d u c e.
PRELUDE TO CONQUEST
d o n o t rep
l u s e only,Although Europeans
3 identity.tended
r s o n a
Pre-Columbian America held remarkably diverse populations.
0 - 0 9 - 0 to lump them together into a single
Pe
category—“Indians”—in reality, indigenous peoples
202indigenous
had
tremendous social and cultural diversity of the different
no sense of common Although current scholars recognize the
peoples of the America, the word Indian has become a
generic term referring to peoples living in this region prior to the European arrival. Numbering in the tens of millions and
spread over two continents, they effectively exploited every type of environment, from arid deserts to tropical rainforests to
mountain ranges. They lived in nomadic bands, peasant farming villages, and crowded cities, creating a wide range of cultures
and speaking numerous languages. In the area of modern-day Mexico alone, there were over two hundred different linguistic
groups.
Three particularly important civilizations emerged from this mosaic: Mayan, Aztec, and Incan. The Maya people, who
occupied the Yucatán Peninsula, southern Mexico, and most of present-day Guatemala, began to build their civilization around
500 B.C.E. Their most famous cultural achievements occurred in the Classic era (ca. 300–900 C.E.)—not only the building of
exquisite temples but also pioneering accomplishments in architecture, sculpture, painting, hieroglyphic writing, mathematics,
astronomy, and chronology (including the invention of calendars). Growing social and ecological strains caused the collapse of
o d uce.
Maya society in the southern lowlands, but important polities developed in Yucatán from the ninth century on. The Mayans
e p r
l y, d not r
forged complex societies in a series of independent city states, but they never created an empire. For instance, when the
o
l u s on
Spaniards arrived, they found Yucatán divided into sixteen provinces ruled by competing lineages.
e
a 9-03
Mexico’s spacious central valley, in contrast, became the seat of several empires, culminating in Aztec rule. Also known as
Person 0 2 0 -0
the Mexica, the Aztecs were one of several indigenous groups that migrated from the north in the twelfth and thirteenth
2
centuries. They came into constant conflict with their neighbors, finally taking refuge on an island in the midst of the valley’s
lakes, where they constructed the city of Tenochtitlán around 1325 (on the site of contemporary Mexico City). After gaining
control of the entire valley of Mexico in the mid-fifteenth century, they created a major empire—one that was just reaching its
peak as Columbus touched shore in the Caribbean.
Aztecs were noted for their military organization and prowess at ceremonial city building. Over time, Aztec society became
rigidly stratified, offering little chance for personal mobility. At the bottom were slaves and at the top was a hereditary nobility.
Education, marriage, and labor were meticulously programmed. Hereditary rulers, such as Moctezuma II, exercised immense
political power and directed the military campaigns that drove imperial expansion. Warfare brought the Aztecs wealth and
prisoners of war, whose sacrificed blood fueled the sun and kept the cosmos in balance. Conquered states, however, were not
generally incorporated into the empire. They retained their local rules and communal lands but paid onerous tributes. In
addition, some communities—notably nearby Tlaxcala—remained independent and kept up a perpetual state of war with
Tenochtitlán.
p ro d u ce.
, d o ot re
The Incas adopted a very different pattern of organization. Their empire stretched for three thousand miles along the
n
onl y
Andes, from northern Ecuador through Peru to southern Chile and into the interior as well. After consolidating their hold in the
s e
a l u 9-03
Cuzco Valley in Peru, the Incas began expanding their empire in the early 1430s and continued until the Spanish Conquest in
Person 0 2 0 -0
1532. (The term Inca means ruler or king and also refers to the people of Cuzco.) Once defeated, groups became integrated
2
into the empire in various ways. The Incas brought local nobles from conquered areas to Cuzco and treated them as royal
guests. They also requisitioned young women (acllas) to serve as wives for Inca rulers and nobles or as special weavers,
enhancing the empire’s productive and reproductive capability. Resistant elements in recently conquered zones were
transferred to areas controlled by loyal followers. Political power belonged to a tightly organized, highly disciplined
bureaucracy, with teams of local officials on the bottom and a single supreme emperor at the top. Incas were thereby able to
command effective authority over most of the Andes.
The Incas were master engineers, building a vast road system (for human and animal transit, since they did not use the
wheel), an intricate irrigation system, and impressive terraced agriculture on mountainsides. They maintained vast granaries
that supported their armies, as well as local populations in times of failed harvests. The Incas also excelled in textile design and
in treating head injuries, the latter made possible by extraordinary skills at trepanning the human skull.
The Aztec and Inca Empires, the most densely populated and highly organized regions in the Americas, would in turn
o d u c e.
become the sites of the conquistadors’ most brilliant victories and the core of Spain’s New World possessions.
r
d o n o t rep
The European Context
l u s e only, 3 were) was part of a remarkable expansion in the
o
Europe’s “discovery” of Americas(the
e r n a presumably knew
Indians
0 - 0 9 -
where 0they
2
P coming to know the rest2of0the world, as its navigators and explorers pushed back the frontiers of
fifteenth century. Europe was
then-current knowledge of the globe. By the early 1600s they had woven a network of communications all the way around the
earth and had established the economic dominance that would shape the modern world.
Many factors made this burst of European expansion possible. One was technical skill. Improvements in shipbuilding,
mapmaking, and celestial navigation allowed Europeans to sail the open ocean and find their way home again. Another
technology was long-range weaponry, which fortified the Europeans against sometimes well-armed native peoples, as in the
case of Mexico.
A second factor was the economic base, which furnished capital for the maritime and military enterprise. Technology alone
was not enough. Vikings had shown the technical ability to reach America but lacked the resources to carry out settlement and
colonization, which required men and money.
Third, there had to be European powers ready to pursue the unknown with exceptional determination. Spain and Portugal
duce.
fit this description. These Catholic monarchies, with their crusading ideal of converting pagan masses to the true religion, had a
r e p ro
not
unique motivation. Spain in particular had come late to the consolidation of its territory against the Muslims who had ruled the
y, d o
Iberian Peninsula since the eighth century. Portugal, although earlier rid of Muslim rule, was equally committed to the militant
l
n a l u s e on
spread of the Christian faith. Their boldness set a precedent for European intruders into Latin America over centuries to come.
-03
P e rs o 2 0 -0 9
20
COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA
It was no coincidence that Columbus reached America in the same year that the Spaniards liquidated the last Muslim
stronghold in Spain. The reconquest down the Iberian Peninsula saw the warring Christian nobles acquiring land and the
Crown strengthening its political control. The result by 1492 was a nobility and would-be nobility anxious for more conquests
and a monarchy ready to direct these subjects overseas.
Spaniards therefore reached the New World in a conquest spirit already well developed at home. Spain had presented
moderate opportunity for upward social mobility, and considerable evidence suggests that the conquerors—Hernán Cortés,
Francisco Pizarro, and their followers—came to America to win social status as well as wealth. Spanish motivation was no
doubt complex. Ferdinand and Isabella and successive monarchs thought the wealth of the New World could strengthen their
p ro d u ce.
hand in Europe. Many dedicated missionaries hoped to save the souls of heathen Indians. The conquerors had multiple
, d o ot re
purposes in mind: as one soldier said, “We came here to serve God and the King, and also to get rich.” But their central motive
n
onl y
appears to have been the achievement of noble rank and wealth. The conquistadores typically organized and financed their
s e
a l u
own campaigns; as a modern scholar has noted, they were less soldiers than “armed entrepreneurs” willing to risk everything
9-03
Person 0 -0
for a better future. (About one-third of the conquerors of Peru came from the lesser or “common” nobility; two-thirds were of
2 0 2
plebeian origin. These were people with status to gain.) In a few short years they had toppled the mighty empires of the Aztecs
and the Incas.
How did they do it? When Cortés set out from Cuba toward Mexico in 1519, he had only 550 men and sixteen horses.
Within two and a half years, he and his battered Spanish contingent (bolstered by several hundred reinforcements) reduced to
rubble the magnificent Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán, forced the capitulation of the disheartened and bewildered god-king,
Moctezuma, and crushed the final resistance of forces led by the courageous Cuauhtémoc.* One explanation for their feat was
the superiority of Spanish equipment and technology: gunpowder (for muskets and cannons), horses, organization, ships that
linked them to wider support networks. Indigenous peoples did not necessarily see the Spaniards as threatening; indeed, the
Tlaxcalans, who had long resisted and resented Aztec domination, supplied the Spaniards with troops, carriers, and advice on
appropriate military tactics. (The large majority of the “Spanish” forces that captured Tenochtitlán consisted of such native
allies.) Finally, an outbreak of smallpox, previously unknown in the Americas, ravaged a native population lacking natural
immunity. By 1521, two years after the start of the Cortés campaign and less than thirty years after Columbus’s first voyage,
p r o d u ce.
not re
n o t r e pro
l0y-, 0d9o-03
the Aztec Empire had fallen under Spanish control. Cortés lost no time in asserting his authority. He extracted pledges of
s e o n
2
allegiance from neighboring chieftains and directed a vigorous reconstruction effort.
rs o n al u 20
Some factors that favored the Spaniards in Mexico operated also in Peru, but Pizarro’s task was simplified by the civil war
e
P
then wracking the Incan Empire: the Inca Atahualpa, preoccupied by this conflict, gravely underestimated Pizarro and his 168
men. After Atahualpa’s capture and execution, the small Spanish band carted off as their booty a hoard of gold and silver large
enough to fill a twelve- by seventeen-foot room to the height of a man’s extended arm. The dream of El Dorado had come true
in the Andes.
It did not take long for Spaniards to recreate many aspects of their own society in the Americas. They laid out typically
Spanish designs for cities and created richly complex societies. Coopers, bakers, scribes—people from all walks of life in
Spain—came, under tight immigration control, to make their way in the New World.
Men dominated this diaspora. According to a study on Peru, for instance, white males outnumbered white females by at
least seven to one during the first few decades of colonization. This not only created intense competition for the hands of
Spanish women, but also led Spaniards to take Indian women as their consorts. Children born to them, often illegitimate, came
u c e.
to be known as mestizos. In time, mestizos would become the dominant ethnic component of much of Spanish America,
ro d
including Mexico, Central America, and the Andean countries.
d o n o t rep
only,
The Spanish Crown soon realized it had a conflict of interest with the independent-minded conquerors and created an
n a l u s e
elaborate bureaucracy, designed to keep the New World economy and society under firm control. In Spain the key institution
-03
e rs o 0 -0 9
for imperial affairs was the Council of the Indies. Overseas the main unit of organization was the viceroyalty, headed by a
P 2
20
viceroy (vice king) appointed by the monarch. The first viceroyalty was established in Mexico (then known as New Spain) in
1535 and the second in Peru in 1544; two others were set up in the eighteenth century. The church had parallel structures, led
by the archbishop and by officials of the Inquisition.
In practice, this bureaucracy led to intense conflict over matters of jurisdiction, but the genius of the system was that
stalemates, once they developed, could always be transmitted to a higher authority, such as the viceroy or the Council of the
Indies. This meant that the various institutions would serve as watchdogs over each other (in addition to periodic reviews and
investigations of performance in office). Another feature of the system was, surprisingly, its flexibility. Virtually all groups had
some measure of access to the bureaucracy. And though the Crown retained ultimate authority, local officials possessed
considerable autonomy, as shown by their occasional response to royal decrees—obedezco pero no cumplo (roughly, “I accept
your authority but will not execute this law”). Despite its seeming idiosyncrasies, the Spanish bureaucracy operated rather well
in the New World, keeping this immense territory under royal control for nearly three hundred years.
e p ro uce.
Underpinning this political structure was a set of values and assumptions that legitimized monarchical, elitist rule. They
d
ot r
stemmed from the fundamental Roman Catholic premise, most clearly articulated by Thomas Aquinas, that there were three
, d o n
kinds of law: divine law, that is, God’s own heavenly will; natural law, a perfect reflection or embodiment of divine law in the
y
u s e onl
world of nature; and human law, man’s thoroughly imperfect attempt to approximate God’s will within society. Born in
l
Person
a 0 -0 9-03
original sin, humanity was fallible by definition, and it was only by the grace of God that some people were less fallible than
0 2
2
others. The goal of political organization, therefore, was to elevate the less fallible to power so they could interpret and execute
God’s will in a superior way. The ruler, once in power, had a duty to ensure the welfare of his subjects (the “common good”),
but this was defined in a top-down fashion: he was responsible to his own conscience and to God—not to the will of the
people.
This rationale provided convincing justification for the supremacy of the Spanish monarch. Its theological origin revealed
and fortified close links between church and state. Resuscitated in the postcolonial era, as it has often been, the code also
furnished a devastating critique of democratic theory. In time, political rulers would thus legitimize their power through
residual aspects of traditional Roman Catholic doctrine.
The empire’s economic structure reflected the prevailing mercantilist theory that economic activity should enhance the
power and prestige of the state, measured on the basis of gold or silver bullion. The good mercantilist was supposed to run a
favorable balance of trade, thus acquiring species or bullion in payment. This called for extensive government intervention in
p ro d ce.
economic matters. The Crown insisted that all transatlantic trade take place in periodic fleets escorted by Spanish warships.
u
ot re
Silver production and colonial commerce were closely monitored, regulated, and taxed. Agriculture, by contrast, received little
, d o n
initial attention from Crown officials (except for export products), and manufacturing, when later considered, was actively
y
discouraged.
l u s e onl
Person
a
0 2 0 - 0 9-03
The central foundation for this economy was coerced Indian labor. (As a colonial saying had it, “the Indian’s cloak covers
2
us all.”) Since cheap labor was so critical, the Spanish Crown, colonists, and clerics fought bitterly for control of the Indians.
In 1542, seeking to curtail the colonists, the king decreed the “New Laws,” aimed at protecting the natives by removing them
from the tutelage of the conquistadores and bringing them under the direct jurisdiction of the monarchy. By 1600 the Crown
had largely succeeded in this task, at least in legal terms. In reality, however, these changes altered only the legal form of
oppression; the fact of oppression persisted. Government officials could be severe taskmasters in their own right; in the 1570s
the Peruvian viceroy, Francisco de Toledo, established a labor draft that annually forced thousands of Indians to travel to and
toil in the region’s famed silver mines.
For the Indians, the Conquest meant above all a drastic fall in population. Scholars have argued long and hard about the
size of the indigenous population when the Spaniards arrived. The most reliable studies of central Mexico place the pre-
Conquest populations, as of 1519, at 16 to 18 million; for 1580 the figure was just 1.9 million, and for 1605 it was 1 million—a
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In seeking rest vnwares wee fall in trap,
In groping flowres with nettels stong wee are,
In labring long wee reape the crop of care.
4.
Oh darke disceite, with painted face for sho,

Oh poysned bayte, that makes vs eger still,
Oh fayned frend, deceiuing people so,
Oh world, of thee, we cannot speake too ill:
Yet fooles wee are that bend so to thy skill:
The plague and scourge that thousands dayly feele,
Should warne the wise to shun thy whirling wheele.
5.
But who can stop the streame that runnes full swift?
Or quench the fyre that is crept in[1970] the strawe?
The thirsty drinkes, there is no other shift,
Perforce is such that neede obayes no lawe:
Thus bounde wee are in worldly yokes to drawe,
And cannot stay, nor turne agayne in tyme,
Nor learne of those that sought too high to clyme.
6.
My selfe for proofe, loe, here I now appeare,

In woman’s weede, with weeping watred eyes,
That bought her youth and her delights full deare,
Whose Iowde reproch doth sound vnto the skies:
And bids my corse out of the graue to ryse,
As one that may no longer hyde her face,
But needes must come and shew her piteous case.
7.
The sheete of shame, wherein I shrowded was,

Did moue mee oft to playne before this daye,
And in myne eares did ring the trompe of brasse,
Which is defame, that doth each thing[1971] bewraye:
Yea, though full deade and lowe in earth I laye,
I heard the voyse, of mee what people sayde,
But then to speake, alas, I was affrayde.
8.
And nowe a tyme for mee I see preparde,

I heare the lyues and falles of many wights:
My tale therfore the better may bee harde,
For at the torch the litle candell lights:
Where pageants bee, smale things fill out the sights:
Wherefore geue eare, good Churcheyard,[1972] do thy
best
My tragedy to place among the rest.
9.
Because the[1973] truth shall witnes well with thee,

I will rehearse in order, as it fell,
My lyfe, my death, my dolefull desteny,
My wealth, my woe, my doing euery deale,
My bitter blisse, wherein I long did dwell:
A whole discourse by[1974] mee, Shore’s wife by name,
Now shalt thou heare as thou hadst seene the same.
10.
Of noble bloud I cannot boast my byrth,

For I was made out of the meanest molde,
Mine heritage but seuen foote of th’earth,[1975]
Fortune ne gaue to mee the gifts of golde:
But I could brag of nature, if I wolde,
Who fild my face with fauour fresh and fayre,
Whose beauty shon like Phœbus in the ayre.
11.*
By beautie blas’d like torch of twinckling starre,

A lively lamp that lends darke world some light,
Faire Phœbus beames scarse reacheth halfe so farre
As did the rayes of my rare beautie bright:
As summer’s day exceedes blacke winter’s night,
So Shore’s wive’s face made foule Brownetta blush,
As pearle staynes pitch, or gold surmounts a rush.
12.*
The damaske rose or Rosamond the faire,

That Henry held as deere as jewells be,
Who was kept close in cage from open ayre,
For beautie’s boast could scarse compare with me:
The kindly buds, and blosomes of brave tree,
With white and red and deckt my cheekes so fine,
There stoode two balles, like drops of claret wine.
13.*
The beaten snow, nor lily in the field,

No whiter sure then naked necke and hand:
My lookes had force to make a lyon yeld,
And at my forme in gase a world would stand:
My body small, fram’d finely to be span’d,
As though dame Kind had sworne, in solemne sort,
To shrowd herselfe in my faire forme and port.
14.*
No part amisse, when nature tooke such care

To set me out, as nought should be awry,
To fornish forth, in due proportion rare,
A peece of worke should please a prince’s eye:
O would to God, that boast might prove a lie!
For pride youth tooke in beautie’s borrowde trash,
Gave age a whippe, and left me in the lash.
15.
My shape, some sayde, was seemely to ech sight,

My countenaunce did shew a sober grace,
Mine eyes in lookes were neuer proued light,
My tongue in words was[1976] chast in euery case:
Mine eares were deafe and would no louers place,
Saue that, alas, a prince did blot my browe,
Loe, there the strong did make the weake to bowe.
16.
The maiesty that kings to people beare,

The stately port, the awefull cheere they showe,
Doth make the meane to shrinke and couch for feare,
Like as the hounde that doth his maister knowe:
What then? since I was made vnto the bowe,
There is no cloake can serue to hide my fault:
For I agreede the fort hee should assault.
17.
The eagle’s force subdues ech bird that flies,

What metall may resist the flaming fire?
Doth not the sun dasill the clearest eyes,
And melt the yse, and make the frost retyre?
Who can withstand a puissaunt king’s disire?
The stiffest stones are perced through with tooles,
The wisest are with princes made but fooles.
18.
Yf kynde had wrought my forme in common frames,

And set mee forth in coulours blacke and browne,
Or beauty had beene percht in Phœbus’ flames,
Or shamefast wayes had pluckt my fethers downe,
Then had I kept my fame and good renowne:
For nature’s gifts were[1977] cause of all my greefe:
A plesaunt pray entiseth many a thiefe.
19.
Thus woe to thee that wrought my peacock’s pryde,

By clothing mee with nature’s tapestry:
Woe worth the hewe wherein my face was dyde,
Which made mee thinke I pleased euery eye:
Like as the sterres make men beholde the skye,
So beautye’s showe doth make the wise full fond,
And brings free harts full oft to endlesse bond.
20.
But cleare from blame my frends can not be founde,

Before my time my youth they did abuse:
In mariage a prentise was I bounde,
When[1978] that meere loue I knew not how to vse:
But, welaway, that can not mee excuse,
The harme is mine though they deuisde my care,
And I must smart and sit in slaundrous snare.
21.
Yet gieue mee leaue to pleade my cause at large:

Yf that the horse do run beyond his race,
Or any thing that keepers haue in charge,
Doe breake theyr course where rulers may take place:
Or meate bee set before the hungrye’s face,
Who is in fault, th’offender,[1979] yea, or no,
Or they that are the cause of all this woe?
22.
Note well what strife this forced mariage makes,

What lothed liues do come where loue doth lacke,
What scratching breers do growe vpon such brakes,
What common weales by it are brought to wracke,
What heauy loade is put on pacient’s backe,
What straunge delights this braunch of vice doth
breede,
And marke what grayne springs out of such a seede.
23.
Compell the hauke to sit that is vnmande,

Or make the hound vntaught to drawe the dere,
Or bring the free against his will in band,
Or moue the sad a pleasaunt tale to here:
Your time is lost and you no whit the[1980] nere:
So loue ne learnes of force the knot to knit,
She serues but those that feele sweete fancie’s fit.
24.
The lesse defame redounds to my disprayse,

I was entiste by traynes, and trapt by trust:
Though in my powre remayned yeas, and nayes,
Unto my frends yet needs consent I must,
In euery thing, yea, lawfull or vniust:
They brake the bowes and shakte the tree by sleight,
And bent the wand that mought haue growne full
streight.
25.
What helpe in this, the pale thus broken downe,

The dere must needs in daunger run astray:
At mee therefore why should the worlde so frowne?
My weakenes made my youth a prince’s pray:
Though wisdome should the course of nature stay,
Yet try my case, who list, and they shall proue
The ripest wits are soonest thralles to loue.
26.
What neede I more to clere my selfe so[1981] much?

A king me wan, and bad mee at his call,
His royall state, his princely grace was such,
The hope of will, that women seeke for all,
The ease and wealth, the gifts which were not small,
Besieged mee so strongly round about,
My powre was weake, I could not holde him out.
27.
Duke Hanniball in all his conquest great,

Or Cæsar yet, whose triumphes did exceede,
Of all theyr spoyles which made them toyle and sweate,
Were not so glad to haue so rich a meede,
As was this prince when I to him agreede,
And yeelded mee a prisoner, willingly,
As one that knewe no way away to fly.
28.
The nitingale, for all his mery voyce,

Nor yet the larke, that still delights to sing,
Did neuer make the hearers so reioyce,
As I with words haue made this worthy king:
I neuer iarde, in tune was euery string,
I tempred so my tongue to please his eare,
That what I sayde was currant euery where.
29.*
Sweete are the songs that merry night crow[1982] singes,

For many parts are in those charming notes:
Sweete are the tunes and pipes that pleaseth kings:
Sweete is the love wherein great lordings dotes:
But sweetst of all is fancie where it flotes,
For throwe rough seas it smoothly swimmes away,
And in deepe flouds where skulles of fish doe play.
30.*
And where love slides, it leaves no signe nor showe,

Where it hath gon the way so shuts againe:
It is a sport to heare the fine night crow
Chaunt in the queere upon a pricke-song plaine:
No musicke more may please a prince’s vaine
Than descant strange, and voice of faurets breest,
In quiet bower when birds be all at rest.
31.*
No such consort as plaine two parts in one,

Whose rare reports doth carry cunning clean,
Where two long loves and lives in joy alone:
They sing at will the treble or the meane,
Where musicke wants the mirth not worth a beane:
The king and I agreed in such concorde,
I rul’d by love, though he did raigne a lord.
32.
I ioynde my talke, my iestures, and my grace,

In witty frames, that long might last and stand,
So that I brought the king in such a case,
That to his death I was his chiefest hand:
I gouernd him that ruled all this land:
I bare the sword, though hee did weare the crowne,
I strake the stroke that threw the mighty downe.
33.
Yf iustice sayd that iudgement was but death,

With my sweete wordes I could the king perswade,
And make him pause and take therein a breath,
Till I with suite the fautor’s peace had made:
I knewe what way to vse him in his trade,
I had the arte to make the lyon meeke,
There was no poynt wherein I was to seeke.
34.*
I tooke delight in doying each man good,

Not scratting all myselfe as all were mine,
But lookt whose life in neede and danger stoode,
And those I kept from harme with cunning fine
On prince’s traine I alwayes cast mine eine:
For lifting up the servants of a king,
I did throw court myselfe in fauour bring.
35.*
I offered ayde before they sued to me,

And promis’d nought, but would performe it streight
I shaked downe sweete fruit from top of tree,
Made aples fall in laps of men by sleight:
I did good turnes whiles that I was a height,
For fear a flawe of winde would make mee reele,
And blowe me downe when fortune turn’d her wheele.
36.*
I fil’d no chests with chynks to cherish age,

But in the harts of people layde my gold,
Sought love of lord, of maister, and of page,
And for no bribbe I neuer fauour solde:
I had inough, I might doe what I would,
Saue spend or give or fling it on the ground,
The more I gave the more in purse I found.
37.
Yf I did frowne, who then did looke awrye?

Yf I did smile, who would not laugh outright?
Yf I but spake, who durst my words denye?
Yf I pursude, who would forsake the flight?
I meane, my powre was knowne to euery wight:
On such a height good hap had built my bowre,
As though my sweete should nere[1983] haue turnde to
sowre.
38.
My husband then, as one that knewe his good,

Refusde to keepe a prince’s concubine,
Forseeing th’end,[1984] and mischiefe as it stood,
Against the king did neuer much repine:
Hee sawe the grape whereof hee dranke the wine:
Though inward thought his heart did still torment,
Yet outwardly hee seemde hee was content.
39.
To purchase prayse, and win the people’s zeale,

Yea rather bent of kinde to do some good,
I euer did vpholde the common weale,
I had delight to saue the guiltles blood:
Each suter’s cause, when that I vnderstode,
I did prefer as it had bene mine owne,
And help[1985] them vp, that might haue bene
orethrowne.
40.
My powre was prest to right the poore man’s wrong,

My hands were free to geue where neede required:
To watch for grace I neuer thought it long,
To do men good I neede not bee desyred:
Nor yet with gyfts my heart was neuer hyred:
But when the ball was at my foote to guyde,
I playde to those that fortune did abyde.
41.
My want was wealth, my woe was ease at will,

My robes were rich, and brauer then the sunne,
My fortune then was far aboue my skill,
My state was great, my glasse did euer runne:
My fatall threede so happely was spunne,
That then I sate in earthly pleasures clad,
And for the tyme a goddesse’ place I had.
42.
But I had not so soone this lyfe possest,

But my good hap began to slyp asyde,
And fortune then did mee so sore molest,
That vnto playnts was tourned all my pryde:
It booted not to rowe agaynst the tyde,
Myne oares were weake, my heart and strength did
fayle,
The wynde was rough I durst not beare a sayle.
43.
What steps of stryfe belong to high estate?

The climing vp is doubtfull to endure,
The seate it selfe doth purchase priuy hate,
And honour’s fame is fickle and vnsure,
And all shee brings is flowres that bee vnpure:
Which fall as fast as they do sprout and spring,
And cannot last they are so vayne a thing.
44.
Wee count no care to catch that wee doe wishe,

But what wee win is long to vs vnknowen,
Tyll present payne bee serued in our dishe,
Wee scarce perceiue wheron our greife hath growen:
What grayne proues well that is so rashly sowen
Yf that a meane did measure all our deedes,
In steede of corne wee should not gather weedes.
45.
The setled mynde is free from fortune’s power,

They neede not feare who looke not vp aloft:
But they that clyme are carefull euery hower,
For when they fall they light not very softe:
Examples hath the wisest warned oft,
That where the trees the smalest braunches bere,
The stormes do blowe and haue most rigoure there.
46.
Where is it strong but nere the ground and roote?

Where is it weake but on the highest sprayes?
Where may a man so surely set his foote,
But on those bowes that groweth lowe alwayes?
The litle twygs are but vnstedfast stayes,
Yf they breake not, they bend with euery blast:
Who trusts to them shall neuer stand full fast.
47.
The wynde is great vpon the highest hylles,

The quiet lyfe is in the dale belowe,
Who treades on yse shall slyde agaynst their wills,
They want not cares[1986] that curious artes would
knowe:
Who liues at ease and can content him so,
Is perfect wise, and sets vs all to schoole,
Who hates this lore may well bee calde a foole.
48.
What greater griefe may come to any life,

Then after sweete to taste the bitter sowre?
Or after peace to fall at warre and strife,
Or after myrth to haue a cause to lowre?
Under such props false fortune buildes her bowre,
On sodayne chaunge her flittering[1987] frames bee
set,
Where is no way for to escape the net.[1988]
49.
The hasty smart that fortune sendes in spite,

Is harde to brooke where gladnes wee embrace,
Shee threatens not, but sodaynly doth smite,
Where ioy is most there doth shee sorrow place:
But sure I thinke, this is too straunge a case
For vs to feele such griefe amid our game,
And know not why vntill we taste the same.
50.
As erst I sayde, my blisse was tournde to bale,

I had good cause to weepe and wring my hands,
And showe sad chere with countenaunce full pale,
For I was brought in sorrowe’s wofull bands:
A pirry came and set my ship on sands,
What should I hyde, or coulour care and noy?
King Edward dyde in whome was all my ioy.
51.
And when the earth receiued had his corse,

And that in tombe this worthy prince was layde,
The worlde on mee began to showe his force,
Of troubles then my parte I long assayde:
For they, of whome I neuer was afrayde,
Undid mee[1989] most, and wrought mee such dispite,
That they bereft mee from my[1990] pleasure quite.
52.*
Brought bare and poore, and throwne in worlde’s

disgrace,
Holds downe the head that never casts up eye:
Cast out of court, condemn’d in every place,
Condemn’d, perforce, at mercie’s foote must lye:
Hope is but small when we for mercie crye:
The birde halfe dead, that hauke hath fast in foote,
Lay head on blocke where is no other boote.
53.*
The rowling stone that tumbleth downe the hill,

Fynds none to stay the furie of his fall:
Once under foote for euer daunted still:
One cruell blowe strikes cleane away the ball:
Left once in lacke feeles alwayes want of will:
A conquerd mind must yeeld to every ill,
A weake poore soule, that fortune doth forsake
In hard extreames, from world her leave may take.
54.*
From those that fall, such as doe rise doe run:

The sound with sicke doe seldome long abide:
Poore people passe as shadowes in the sun,
Like feeble fish, that needes must follow tyde:
Among the rich a beggar soone is spied:
When weake Shore’s wife had lost her staffe of stay,
The halt and blind went limping lame away.
55.*
The poore is pincht and pointed at indeed,

As baited bull were leading to a stake:
Wealth findes great helpe, want gets no friend at neede,
A plaged wight a booteles mone may make,
A naked soule in street for colde may quake:
But colde or hot, when mischiefes comes a roe,
As falles the lot, the back beares of the bloe.
56.*
Prefarment past, the world will soon forget:

The present time is daily gaz’d upon:
Yf merchant rich from wealth doe fall in debt,
Small count is made of his good fortune gon:
We feede on flesh, and fling away the bone,
Embrace the best and set the worst aside,
Because faire flowers are made of in their pride.
57.*
You yonglings nowe, that vaine delights lead on

To sell chaste life for lewd and light desires,
Poore gaine is got when rich good name is gon:
Foule blot and shame lives under trimme attires:
Worlde soone casts off the hackney horse it hiers:
And when bare nagge is ridden out of breath,
Tibbe is turn’d loose to feed on barren heath.
58.*
Of flowers a while men doe gay poses make:

The sent once past, adue dry withered leaves:
Love lasts not long, prickt up for pleasure’s sake:
Straw little worth, when corne forsaks the sheaves:
A painted post the gazar’s eye deceives:
But when foule fauts are found that blear’d the sight,
The account is gone of girlls or gugawes light.
59.*
Young pooppies play, small season lasts you see:

Old appish sportes are quickly out of grace:
Fond wanton games will soone forgotten be:
As sowre as crabbe becomes the sweetest face:
There needes no more be spoken of this case:
All earthly joyes by tract of time decayes:
Soone is the glase runne out of our good dayes!
60.*
My fall and facte makes proofe of that is spoke,

Tels world to much of shadowes in the sunne,
Dust blowne with winde, or simple proofe of smoake,
That flies from fire and fast throwe aire doth run:
It ends with woe that was with joy begun:
It turnes to teares that first began with sport:
At length long paine finds pleasure was but short.
61.
As long as lyfe remaynde in Edward’s brest,

Who was but I? who had such frends at call?
His body was no sooner put in chest,
But well was hee[1991] that could procure my fall:
His brother was myne enmye most of all,
Protectour then, whose vice did still abound,
From yll to worse tyll death did him confound.
62.
Hee falsely faynde[1992] that I of counsell was

To poyson him, which thing I neuer ment,
But hee could set thereon a face of brasse,
To bring to passe his lewde and false entent:
To such mischiefe this tyrant’s heart was bent,
To God, ne man, hee neuer stoode in awe,
For in his wrath hee made his will a lawe.
63.
Lord Hastings’ bloude for vengeaunce on him cryes,
And many moe, that were to long to name,
But most of all, and in most woefull wise,
I had good cause this wretched man to blame:
Before the worlde I suffred open shame,
Where people were as thicke as is the sand,
I penaunce tooke, with taper in my hand.[1993]
64.
Each eye did stare and looke mee in the face,

As I past by the rumours on mee ran,
But patience then had lent mee such a grace,
My quyet lookes were praysde of euery man:
The shamefast bloud brought me such coulour than,
That thousands sayde, which sawe my sober chere,
It is great ruth to see this woman here.
65.
But what preuaylde the people’s pitie there?

This raging wolfe would spare no giltless blood:
Oh wicked wombe that such ill fruit did beare,
Oh cursed earth, that yeeldeth forth such mud:
The hell consume all things that did thee good,
The heauens shut their gates agaynst thy spreete,
The world tread downe thy glory vnder feete.
66.
I aske of God a vengeaunce on thy bones,

Thy stinking corps corrupts the ayre I knowe:
Thy shamefull death no earthly wight bemones,
For in thy lyfe thy workes were hated so,
That euery man did wish thy ouerthroe:
Wherfore I may, though parciall now I am,
Curse euery cause whereof thy body came.
67.
Woe worth the man that fathered such a childe,

Woe worth the howre wherein thou wast begate:
Woe worth the brests that haue the world begylde,
To norish thee, that all the worlde did hate:
Woe worth the gods that gaue thee such a fate,
To lyue so long, that death deserude so oft:
Woe worth the chaunce that set thee vp aloft.
68.*
Woe worth the day, the time, the howre, and all,
When subiects clapt the crowne on Richard’s head:
Woe worth the lordes, that sat in sumptuous hall,
To honour him that princes blood so shead:
Would God he had bin boyld in scalding lead,
When he presumde in brother’s seat to sit,
Whose wretched rage rul’d all with wicked wit.
69.
Yee princes all, and rulers euerychone,

In punishment beware of hatred’s yre:
Before yee scourge, take heede, looke well thereon:
In wrothes ill will, if mallice kindle fyre,
Your hearts will burne in such a hote desyre,
That in those flames the smoke shall dim your sight,
Yee shall forget to ioyne your iustice right.
70.
You should not iudge till things bee well discerned,

Your charge is still to mayntayne vpright lawes,
In conscience rules yee shoulde bee throughly learned,
Where clemency bids wrath and rashnes pause,
And further sayth, stricke not without a cause:
And when yee smite doe it for iustice sake,
Then in good parte ech man your scourge will take.
71.
Yf that such zeale had mou’d[1994] this tyrant’s minde,

To make my plague a warning[1995] for the rest,
I had small cause such fault in him to fynde,
Such punishment is vsed for the best,
But by yll will and powre I was opprest:
Hee spoylde my goods, and left mee bare and pore,
And caused mee to beg from dore to dore.
72.
What fall was this, to come from prince’s fare,

To watch for crums among the blynde and lame?
When almes were delt I had[1996] an hungry share,
Because I knew not how to aske for shame,
Tyll force and neede had brought mee in such frame,
That starue I must, or learne to beg an almes,
With booke in hand, to[1997] say S. Dauid’s psalmes.
73.
Where I was wont the golden chaines to weare,

A payre of beades about my necke was wound,
A lynnen cloth was lapt about my heare,
A ragged goune that trailed one the ground,
A dish that clapt and gaue a heauy sound,
A staying staffe and wallet therewithall,
I bare about as witnesse of my fall.
74.*
The fall of leafe is nothing like the spring,

Ech eye beholdes the rising of the sunne,
All men admire the fauour of a king:
And from great states growne in disgrace they run,
Such sodaine claps ne wit nor will can shun:
For when the stoole is taken from our feete,
Full flat on floore the body falls in streete.
75.
I had no house wherein to hyde my heade,

The open streete my lodging was perforce:
Full oft I went all hungry to my bed,
My flesh consumde, I looked lyke a corse:
Yet in that plight who had on mee remorse:
O God, thou knowste my frends forsooke mee than,
Not one holpe mee, that succred many a man.
76.
They frownd on mee that fawnd on mee before,

And fled from mee, that followde mee full fast:
They hated mee, by whome I set much store,
They knew full well, my fortune did not last,
In euery place, I was condemnde and cast,
To pleade my cause at bar it was no boote,
For euery man did treade mee vnder foote.
77.
Thus long I liu’d, all weary of my lyfe,

Tyll death approcht, and rid mee from that wo:
Example take by mee, both mayde and wyfe,
Beware, take heede, fall not to folly so:
A Mirour make by[1998] my greate ouerthro,
Defy the[1999] world and all his wanton wayes,
Beware by mee, that spent so yll her dayes.
Tho. Churchyard.[2000]

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8 Venezuela: The Perils of Prosperity

9 Argentina: Progress, Stalemate, Discord

10 Chile: Repression and Democracy

PART THREE THEMES AND REFLECTIONS

14 Culture and Society

16 Latin America in the World Arena, 2000–Present

• Carefully reviewed our coverage of the colonial era (Chapter 2);

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Map 1 Latin America and the Caribbean

INTERPRETATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA

• economic strategies and policies;

Oh darke disceite, with painted face for sho,

My selfe for proofe, loe, here I now appeare,

The sheete of shame, wherein I shrowded was,

And nowe a tyme for mee I see preparde,

Because the[1973] truth shall witnes well with thee,

Of noble bloud I cannot boast my byrth,

By beautie blas’d like torch of twinckling starre,

The damaske rose or Rosamond the faire,

The beaten snow, nor lily in the field,

No part amisse, when nature tooke such care

My shape, some sayde, was seemely to ech sight,

The maiesty that kings to people beare,

The eagle’s force subdues ech bird that flies,

Yf kynde had wrought my forme in common frames,

Thus woe to thee that wrought my peacock’s pryde,

But cleare from blame my frends can not be founde,

Yet gieue mee leaue to pleade my cause at large:

Note well what strife this forced mariage makes,

Compell the hauke to sit that is vnmande,

The lesse defame redounds to my disprayse,

What helpe in this, the pale thus broken downe,

What neede I more to clere my selfe so[1981] much?

Duke Hanniball in all his conquest great,

The nitingale, for all his mery voyce,

Sweete are the songs that merry night crow[1982] singes,

And where love slides, it leaves no signe nor showe,

No such consort as plaine two parts in one,

I ioynde my talke, my iestures, and my grace,

Yf iustice sayd that iudgement was but death,

I tooke delight in doying each man good,

I offered ayde before they sued to me,

I fil’d no chests with chynks to cherish age,

Yf I did frowne, who then did looke awrye?

My husband then, as one that knewe his good,

To purchase prayse, and win the people’s zeale,

My powre was prest to right the poore man’s wrong,

My want was wealth, my woe was ease at will,

But I had not so soone this lyfe possest,

What steps of stryfe belong to high estate?

Wee count no care to catch that wee doe wishe,

The setled mynde is free from fortune’s power,

Where is it strong but nere the ground and roote?

The wynde is great vpon the highest hylles,