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CO N T EN T S
v
Preface xv
PLATO
Introduction 1
Richard Kraut
*Defence of Socrates 5
*Crito 22
Republic 31
ARISTOTLE
Introduction 137
Richard Kraut
Nicomachean Ethics 142
Politics 165
CICERO
Introduction 223
Richard Kraut
On the Republic 227
On the Laws 234
AUGUSTINE
Introduction 239
Paul J. Weithman
The City of God 243
vii
THOMAS AQUINAS
Introduction 252
Paul J. Weithman
Summa Theologiae 256
NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI
Introduction 268
Steven B. Smith
The Prince 273
Discourses 293
THOMAS HOBBES
Introduction 309
Jean Hampton
Leviathan 312
BARUCH SPINOZA
Introduction 344
Steven B. Smith
Theologico-Political Treatise 348
JOHN LOCKE
Introduction 360
A. John Simmons
Second Treatise of Government 365
Letter Concerning Toleration 393
MONTESQUIEU
Introduction 401
Mark Hulliung
The Spirit of the Laws 405
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU
Introduction 418
Joshua Cohen
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 422
Of the Social Contract 437
DAVID HUME
Introduction 466
Arthur Kuflik
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 470
*Of Parties in General 474
Of the Original Contract 477
*Of the Origin of Government 485
ADAM SMITH
Introduction 488
Charles L. Griswold, Jr.
The Wealth of Nations 492
IMMANUEL KANT
Introduction 507
Paul Guyer
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 513
On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory
But It Won’t Work in Practice 521
Perpetual Peace 534
EDMUND BURKE
Introduction 603
Burleigh T. Wilkins
Reflections on the Revolution in France 606
Speech to the Electors of Bristol 618
JEREMY BENTHAM
Introduction 620
Jeremy Waldron
Principles of Legislation 623
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE
Introduction 644
Steven B. Smith
Democracy in America 649
G. W. F. HEGEL
Introduction 667
Steven B. Smith
Philosophy of Right 671
Introduction to the Philosophy of History 686
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
Introduction 825
Richard Schacht
Beyond Good and Evil 829
HANNAH ARENDT
Introduction 841
Michael McCarthy
The Origins of Totalitarianism 845
F. A. HAYEK
Introduction 857
David Schmidtz
The Road to Serfdom 861
ISAIAH BERLIN
Introduction 871
Robert B. Talisse
Two Concepts of Liberty 875
CHARLES TAYLOR
Introduction 895
Robert B. Talisse
*What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty? 899
JOHN RAWLS
Introduction 911
Joshua Cohen
A Theory of Justice 917
Political Liberalism 932
MICHAEL J. SANDEL
Introduction 940
Robert B. Talisse
*The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 944
ROBERT NOZICK
Introduction 953
Thomas Christiano
Anarchy, State, and Utopia 957
MICHEL FOUCAULT
Introduction 970
Thomas A. McCarthy
Power/Knowledge 974
JÜRGEN HABERMAS
Introduction 988
Thomas A. McCarthy
*Three Normative Models of Democracy 992
*On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy 999
VIRGINIA HELD
Introduction 1006
Cheshire Calhoun
*Non-contractual Society: A Feminist View 1010
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM
Introduction 1024
Eva Feder Kittay
*The Feminist Critique of Liberalism 1028
PERICLES
*Funeral Oration 1087
*THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1091
*THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1094
*THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN 1106
ABRAHAM LINCOLN
*Gettysburg Address 1108
*Second Inaugural Address 1108
JOHN DEWEY
Democracy 1109
*THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1113
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
*Letter from a Birmingham City Jail 1117
*The March on Washington Address 1126
*Complete works.
Political philosophy explores the nature and justification of government. The inquiry consid-
ers the strengths and weaknesses of different forms of polity, the relationship between the
individual and the social order, and such ideals as rights, justice, liberty, equality, and
community.
Those who embark on the study of the field soon become aware that a small number of
historical and contemporary texts are widely regarded as central to the inquiry. This volume
brings together in convenient form as many as feasible of these crucial works, either com-
plete or in substantial excerpts. Unlike other collections in political philosophy that focus
exclusively on either the history of the discipline or recent contributions to it, this reader
contains both. Also unlike other anthologies in the field, this one includes significant materi-
als concerning the growth of American democracy, including The Declaration of Indepen-
dence, The Constitution of the United States, sixteen of The Federalist Papers, two central
chapters from Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Abraham Lincoln’s
“Gettysburg Address” and “Second Inaugural Address,” a talk on democracy by John
Dewey, as well as Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from a Birmingham City Jail” and his
“March on Washington Address.”
• Readings have been added from Cicero, Montesquieu, Spinoza, Burke, Bentham,
Tocqueville, Nietzsche, Arendt, Hayek, Berlin, Sandel, Nussbaum, Young, Appiah, and
Dewey.
• Re-edited selections include Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and
Politics, Machiavelli’s Discourses, Hobbes’s Leviathan, Locke’s Second Treatise,
and The Federalist Papers.
• The complete text of Mill’s On Liberty has been included.
• Excerpts from Hume’s Treatise have been replaced by those from his An Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals, and his complete essay “Of the Origin of Govern-
ment” has been added.
• Excerpts from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments have been omitted, and
his The Wealth of Nations has been re-edited.
xv
• Arnulf Zwieg’s translation of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals has
replaced that of Mary Gregor; the work has also been re-edited, as has Kant’s On the Old
Saw and his Perpetual Peace.
• Excerpts from Value, Price and Profit by Marx and Engels have been added.
• Mill’s Utilitarianism has been re-edited, and excerpts from Considerations on Represen-
tative Government have been omitted.
• Taylor’s essay “Atomism” has been replaced by his essay “What’s Wrong with Negative
Liberty?”
• An address by Elizabeth Cady Stanton has been omitted.
• The selection from Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has been re-edited, and sections from his
Political Liberalism have been added.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to my editor Robert Miller for his continuing support and advice, to assistant
editors Kristin Maffei and Emily Krupin as well as editorial assistants Kaitlin Coats and Alyssa
Palazzo for their generous help, to project editor Marianne Paul for her conscientiousness, and
to others on the staff of Oxford University Press for assistance throughout production.
I also appreciate suggestions from reviewers chosen by the Press: Abigail Aguilar (University
of Nevada at Las Vegas), Carrie-Ann Biondi (Marymount Manhattan College), Adam Cureton
(University of Tennessee at Knoxville), Justin DePlato (University of North Florida), David
Estlund (Brown University), Brent Gilchrist (Brigham Young University), Jacob Held
(University of Central Arkansas), Eric Manchester (Caldwell College), Zachary Simpson
(University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma), James Skidmore (Idaho State University),
James Sorens (State University of New York, University at Buffalo), and Matthew Weidenfeld
(Elon University).
I relied ofttimes on the advice of my friend and thrice co-editor, Professor Robert B.
Talisse, chair of the Department of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University. Our books Political
Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century, containing the most recent influential work in po-
litical philosophy, and Political Problems, offering defenses of opposed positions regarding
today’s most controversial political issues, can be used to supplement this volume.
I owe special thanks to those who provided introductions: Bernard E. Brown (The City
University of New York Graduate Center), Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University),
Thomas Christiano (University of Arizona), Joshua Cohen (Stanford University), Ann Cudd
(University of Kansas), Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (Boston University), Paul Guyer (Brown
University), the late Jean Hampton, Mark Hulliung (Brandeis University), Eva Feder Kittay
(State University of New York at Stony Brook), Richard Kraut (Northwestern University),
Arthur Kuflik (University of Vermont), Michael McCarthy (Vassar College), Thomas A.
McCarthy (Northwestern University), Richard Miller (Cornell University), Richard Schacht
(University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign), David Schmidtz (University of Arizona),
Tommie Shelby (Harvard University), A. John Simmons (University of Virginia), Steven B.
Smith (Yale University), Robert B. Talisse (Vanderbilt University), Jeremy Waldron
(New York University), Paul J. Weithman (University of Notre Dame), and Burleigh T. Wilkins
(University of California at Santa Barbara).
The list of contributors is a reminder that this work is a product of the learning and gen-
erosity of the community of scholars.
R ich a r d K r au t
Plato (427–347 bce) was born into an aristocratic and wealthy Athenian family, and during
his early years he experienced the intellectual and political ferment of his time and place.
Many of the plays of Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes were written during the last
quarter of the fifth century, and the moral and political conflicts they dramatized for their
fellow Athenians became his problems as well. Plato’s youth also roughly coincided with the
Peloponnesian War (431–404), which ended in the defeat of democratic Athens at the hands
of Sparta. At the close of the war, Sparta installed in Athens a government of thirty rulers
(called “Thirty Tyrants” by later generations), who were selected for their antidemocratic
sympathies. One of the most ruthless among them, Critias, was the cousin of Plato’s mother;
another, Charmides, was her brother. Both appear as interlocutors in some of Plato’s
dialogues.
Like many young people of his time, Plato fell under the spell of Socrates (469–399), an
Athenian philosopher whose way of life is vividly preserved in Plato’s Apology. Socrates
wrote nothing and professed ignorance, but his suspicion that no one possesses moral
knowledge, and his conviction that we must spend our lives searching for it, inspired many
of his followers, Plato among them, to abandon their worldly ambitions and to live a philo-
sophical life.
The Thirty who had been installed by Sparta were overthrown and democracy was re-
stored in 403; but a few years later, in 399, Socrates was brought to trial and found guilty of
not believing in the city’s gods, of introducing new gods, and of corrupting the young. Some
scholars believe that the prosecution of Socrates was motivated partly by the perception that
he was a danger to the restored democracy. It is noteworthy that Plato’s account of the speech
Socrates gave in his own defense, the Apology (apologia means “defense”), contains both
antipopulist elements (31–32) and a reminder that Socrates disobeyed the Thirty (32). Evi-
dently, he could not easily be classified as a democrat or an antidemocrat. Similarly, in the
Crito, Socrates is described as a man so satisfied with the Athenian legal system that he has
hardly left the city’s walls (52–53), and yet he insists that one should follow the commands
of an expert and pay no attention to the opinions of the many (47). But were not the laws of
democratic Athens an expression of the opinion of the many? Socrates does not explain the
basis for his high regard for Athenian law.
Still more perplexing is an apparent inconsistency between the willingness Socrates ex-
presses in the Apology to engage in various forms of disobedience and the arguments he
accepts in the Crito for obeying one’s city and its laws. He tells the jury that he will obey the
god who has commanded him to philosophize rather than any orders they give him (29), and
yet in the Crito he refuses to escape from jail because he accepts the idea, proposed by the
personified Laws of Athens, that he is subordinate to Athens as a child is to a parent or a
slave to a master (50–51). If Socrates is willing to disobey his jurors, then why is he not
equally willing to disregard their decision that he is to be punished by death?
It is unlikely that Plato means to portray Socrates as a muddled thinker. On the contrary,
the impression he means to create is that Socrates is a man of penetrating insight and great
argumentative skill. The apparent difficulties in Socrates’ ideas are the devices Plato uses to
provoke his readers into philosophical reflection. Just as his conversations with Socrates led
him to philosophy, so he uses Socrates in his works to produce the same effect in us. Plato’s
dialogues create a sense of unfinished business: lines of thought are disrupted, and gaps in
the argument remain unfilled. It is often difficult to know what Plato intends, because he
never speaks in his own voice. He uses dramatic characters and portrays a clash of views
because he regards the written word as a stimulus to philosophical insight rather than as the
embodiment of wisdom.
We are told by ancient sources that after the death of Socrates in 399, Plato left Athens
and spent time in Sicily, North Africa, and Egypt. Several of the thinkers he visited were
associated with the Pythagorean school—a group of philosophers (named after the school’s
sixth-century founder, Pythagoras) who held that the human soul is reborn into other
human and animal bodies after death. They were also intensely interested in the mathemat-
ical relationships (for example, in musical scales) that underlie many physical phenomena.
As Plato moved beyond such early works as the Apology and Crito, both of these Pythago-
rean ideas—the transformation of the soul in its many lives and the mathematical nature of
reality—came to the fore in his writings. When he returned to Athens in 387, he established
a school (called the “Academy,” after the grove beyond the city walls that was sacred to the
hero Academos) devoted to the study of philosophical and scientific problems. Ancient
writers describe two further visits of Plato to Sicily, in 367 and 361, undertaken to influence
the course of Syracusan politics, both ending in failure. He remained the head of the Acad-
emy until his death in 347.
Although Socrates insists in the Apology that we cannot know what comes after death, in
the Phaedo (a dialogue in which he holds his final conversation, before drinking a poison
and dying) he presents a series of arguments for the immortality of the soul. One of the most
striking components of this dialogue and others that were written during this period is their
affirmation of the existence of a new kind of objective reality, which Socrates calls a “form”
or “idea.” (Capital letters—“Form,” “Idea”—are sometimes used to name these objects, al-
though this is not Plato’s practice.) For example, the form of equality (Plato is thinking of
the mathematical relationship) is not something that can be observed by the senses, but it
exists nonetheless. It is an eternal and changeless object that can be known only by means of
reason. The equal objects we observe are in some way defective copies of the perfect form;
they are called equal because they somehow share in or participate in the form of equality.
Plato does not attempt to give a complete list of the forms, but he believes that many of the
words we use in mathematics (“triangle,” “line,” “two”) and in evaluative discourse (“jus-
tice,” “beauty,” “good”) are really names of these abstract objects. Whenever we speak, we
are referring to forms, though most people assume that they are merely talking about a visible
and perishable world. They are, Plato thinks, living in a dream world: they fail to realize that
what they observe is a mere appearance and that a greater reality—the world of the forms—
stands behind the appearances.
In The Republic (composed after the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo), Plato pursues a ques-
tion that lies at the heart of Socrates’ life and death. Although Socrates was a man of the
highest moral integrity, he was thought to be so dangerous to his community that the major-
ity of a jury of 501 fellow citizens condemned him to die. Since just action sometimes leads
to death, since it can lie hidden from others and even be misinterpreted as injustice, does that
not cast the most serious doubt on its value? Plato’s guiding assumption, which he inherits
from Socrates, is that no progress can be made in answering this question until we come to
a fuller understanding of what justice is. (The Greek word is dikaiosune; in some contexts,
its meaning is broader than that of our “justice” and encompasses any kind of right treatment
of others.) Book I of The Republic portrays a series of unsuccessful attempts to define jus-
tice. Socrates here plays the role of someone who lacks knowledge and whose mission it is
to reveal to others that they are equally ignorant. Although Thrasymachus, the most formi-
dable interlocutor Socrates faces, is eventually defeated in argument, he plays a crucial role
in the dialogue: any attempt to vindicate the life of a just person must address itself to the
cynicism and immorality that Thrasymachus represents. Plato seems to be saying, in effect,
that there is a Thrasymachus in all of us and that we can exorcise him only by means of a
philosophical inquiry as wide ranging as The Republic.
Starting with Book II, Socrates sheds his role as an ignorant inquirer who merely poses
problems for others. For the remainder of the dialogue, he becomes a systematic philosopher
who puts forward a grand theory about the nature of human beings, the ideal state, the soul,
mathematics, knowledge, and the highest realities. His main interlocutors (Glaucon and
Adeimantus—Plato’s brothers) occasionally interact with him, but they play a role far differ-
ent from the ones assigned to Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus in Book I. The
strategy pursued throughout the remainder of The Republic is to exploit the fact that it is not
merely individuals who can be characterized as just or unjust. We also use these terms to
praise or discredit certain forms of government. Perhaps, then, we can grasp the nature of
justice by asking what leads to the existence of a political community and what the justice
of such a community consists in. This attempt to construe political and individual justice as
the same property eventually leads to the proposal that justice consists in each part of a thing
doing its own activity. In a just city or state, each position is filled by a person who is quali-
fied to contribute to the good of the whole community. Similarly, in a just human being, each
part of the soul operates in a way that best serves the whole human being.
By the end of Book IV, Socrates seems to be on the verge of completing his demonstra-
tion of the great value of justice—but, in a sense, his argument has only begun. The institu-
tions of the ideal city—particularly abolition of the traditional family among rulers and
eugenic sharing of sexual partners—have not yet been fully discussed. Plato’s aim is to
foster the greatest possible unity in the city, and he is willing to go to the greatest lengths to
guarantee that his citizens owe their strongest allegiance to each other, rather than to blood
relatives. But the topic that looms largest in Books V, VI, and VII is the proposal that the
best political community is one that gives complete authority to rigorously trained and mor-
ally flawless philosophers. Strictly speaking, the only real philosophers are those whose
understanding of value is based on their study of the forms, and in particular the form of the
“good.” Socrates refrains from saying how good is to be defined, and in this sense the entire
project of The Republic is radically incomplete. But he seems to be suggesting that goodness
has a mathematical nature: that is why it is so important that philosophers first be trained as
mathematicians before they undertake the study of the highest form.
The dialogue reaches its culminating point with its depiction of the philosopher, for he or
she is the human being of perfect justice. The search for the value of “justice” has led to the
conclusion that this virtue is most fully present in those who understand the nature of the
highest realities. Justice is the greatest good because the best sort of life is one in which
the structure of one’s soul is guided by one’s love and understanding of the most valuable
and real objects there are—the forms. Books VIII and IX round out Plato’s argument by
portraying the diseased political structures and fragmented psychologies that arise when
worldly values—the love of honor, domination, wealth, and sexual pleasure—take priority
over all others. In Book X, the peripheral and external rewards of justice, having been dis-
missed in Book II, are allowed to return and provide the finishing touches on Socrates’
portrait of justice. Since the soul (or at least the rational part of it) does not perish, the good
of justice does not come to an end when the body perishes. By postponing the question of
posthumous existence to the end of The Republic, Socrates leads us to see that a life of jus-
tice would be worth living even if there were no afterlife.
Essays on many aspects of Plato’s thought can be found in Richard Kraut, The Cam-
bridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and in Gail
Fine’s two volumes, Plato 1 and Plato 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Full dis-
cussions of the Apology are provided by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith,
Socrates on Trial (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), and C. D. C. Reeve,
Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989). Detailed analysis of the Crito is pre-
sented by Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1989), and Roslyn Weiss, Socrates Dissatisfied (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998). For studies of The Republic, see Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), Nicholas P. White, A Companion to Plato’s Republic (In-
dianapolis: Hackett, 1979), C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1988), and Richard Kraut, Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays (Lanham,
Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political
Thought, edited by Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield, in association with Simon
Harrison and Melissa Lane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), contains seven
chapters on Plato’s politics.
From Defence of Socrates, Euthyphro, and Crito, translated by David Gallop. Copyright @ 1997 by Oxford University Press.
Reprinted by permission of the publisher and translator. The notes are the translator’s.
are numerous, and have been denouncing me for and in the sky, turns the weaker argument c
a long time now, and they also spoke to you at an into the stronger, and teaches others to do the
age at which you would be most likely to believe same.’
them, when some of you were children or young The charges would run something like that.
lads; and their accusations simply went by de- Indeed, you can see them for yourselves, en-
fault for lack of any defence. But the most absurd acted in Aristophanes’ comedy: in that play, a
thing of all is that one cannot even get to know character called ‘Socrates’ swings around,
d their names or say who they were—except per- claims to be walking on air, and talks a lot of
haps one who happens to be a comic playwright. other nonsense on subjects of which I have no
The ones who have persuaded you by malicious understanding, great or small.
slander, and also some who persuade others be- Not that I mean to belittle knowledge of
cause they have been persuaded themselves, are that sort, if anyone really is learned in such
all very hard to deal with: one cannot put any of matters—no matter how many of Meletus’ law-
them on the stand here in court, or cross-examine suits I might have to defend myself against—
anybody, but one must literally engage in a sort but the fact is, fellow Athenians, those subjects
of shadow-boxing to defend oneself, and cross- are not my concern at all. I call most of you to d
examine without anyone to answer. You too, witness yourselves, and I ask you to make that
then, should allow, as I just said, that I have two quite clear to one another, if you have ever
sets of accusers: one set who have accused me heard me in discussion (as many of you have).
e recently, and the other of long standing to whom Tell one another, then, whether any of you has
I was just referring. And please grant that I need ever heard me discussing such subjects, either
to defend myself against the latter first, since you briefly or at length; and as a result you will real-
too heard them accusing me earlier, and you ize that the other things said about me by the
heard far more from them than from these recent public are equally baseless.
critics here. In any event, there is no truth in those
charges. Moreover, if you have heard from
Very well, then. I must defend myself, anyone that I undertake to educate people and
19a fellow Athenians, and in so short a time must charge fees, there is no truth in that either—
try to dispel the slander which you have had so though for that matter I do think it also a fine
long to absorb. That is the outcome I would thing if anyone is able to educate people, as
wish for, should it be of any benefit to you and Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos, and
to me, and I should like to succeed in my Hippias of Elis profess to. Each of them can
defence—though I believe the task to be a dif- visit any city, gentlemen, and persuade its
ficult one, and am well aware of its nature. But young people, who may associate free of
let that turn out as God wills: I have to obey charge with any of their own citizens they 20a
the law and present my defence. wish, to leave those associations, and to join
Let us examine, from the beginning, the with them instead, paying fees and being
b charge that has given rise to the slander against grateful into the bargain.
me—which was just what Meletus relied upon On that topic, there is at present another
when he drew up this indictment. Very well expert here, a gentleman from Paros; I heard of
then, what were my slanderers actually saying his visit, because I happened to run into a man
when they slandered me? Let me read out their who has spent more money on sophists than
deposition, as if they were my legal accusers: everyone else put together—Callias, the son of
‘Socrates is guilty of being a busybody, in Hipponicus. So I questioned him, since he has
that he inquires into what is beneath the earth two sons himself.
IT was not until the last afternoon of her stay that Emily Scarborough
broached the subject nearest her heart. The day was a perfect one
in early November, after a night of frost. The children were all in the
fields helping their father, Dosia had moved her wheel to the porch,
and the guest was with her there. After sitting silent for some time,
Miss Scarborough said abruptly:
“I have a boon, a great boon, to ask of you, Dosia: I want Emily.”
Dosia’s yarn snapped, and the loose end whirled about the
spindle.
“You mean to visit?” she asked.
“No, I mean to keep, all the time, for my own.” Miss
Scarborough’s voice vibrated strangely. Then she said more calmly:
“I will give her all she ought to have; the best possible education,
travel, culture, opportunity to develop her artistic instincts. She shall
take my full name and inherit my possessions. The old Virginia
plantation after long years has become a valuable property, and
there is more beside.”
Dosia listened silently, a line of painful thought in her forehead.
“And not these alone; better things shall be hers,” continued Miss
Scarborough. “I have long been weary of teaching; I shall stop now
and make a home for Emily. And as my adopted daughter, the best
social life of two continents will be open to her. My very first act shall
be to take her to Scarborough Castle; I have the greatest desire to
show her to our kinsman the earl before she is in any way changed.
All this, Dosia, I can do for her, and you never can.”
Dosia listened, troubled and pale.
“I desire that my children shall get l’arning and see the world,”
she said slowly. “I feel as Scarboroughs they ought to. But has
payrents ever a right to lay down their responsibilities? I allow not. I
allow that me and Edwin is the ones accountable for Emily, and her
proper guardeens. I would gladly send her to visit with you a spell;
but to stay, that is different.”
“No,” interrupted Emily Scarborough in her imperious way; “it
must be for all time. I must have her for my own.”
Dosia deliberated for a long while, then she answered quietly, but
firmly:
“Well, then, Cousin, if all the time it must be, I can only say that is
more than I can consent to—that, as her mother, I don’t feel called to
part with my child.”
Miss Scarborough’s face flushed with sudden anger and
resentment.
“But with all you have!” she exclaimed. “Nine children—nine!” Her
voice trembled.
“Twelve I have,” corrected Dosia, quietly, “nine living and three
dead,”—she lifted eyes and hand to a near-by hill-shoulder, where
three small grave-houses were plainly visible,—“but not one to
spare. I love the children God has give me, and I don’t aim ever to
part with them till I have to. If things was different with us, I might feel
it my duty to give up one; but my man is the workingest in this
country, and being not far behind him myself, we prosper and have
plenty, as you see. And now the women’s school has come, our
young ones can get l’arning and still be under our admonition. No,
Cousin Emily; I am greatly beholden to you for your kindness, I thank
you from the deeps of my heart; but, as her mother, I cannot give up
my child.”
Miss Scarborough had been leaning forward, body tense, face
flushed, eyes feverishly bright. At Dosia’s final words she sank back
in her chair, her face suddenly paled and aged, and her eyes sought
the mountain-sides yesterday so glowing, but to-day dimmed as by a
prophecy of death.
“It is ever the way,” she said at last slowly and bitterly. “‘From him
that hath not shall be taken even that which he thinketh he hath.’ You
women who have everything never consider those of us who have
nothing.”
Dosia lifted startled eyes upon her kinswoman.
“Have nothing,” she repeated. “You!”
“Yes, I,” exclaimed Emily Scarborough. Her voice rang sharply.
“You, that the school women said was the knowingest and most-
looked-up-to woman in all the land!”
“I that have knowledge, temporary fame, and what the world calls
success, still lack the one thing necessary: I have no life for my
heart,” cried Emily Scarborough.
Dosia gazed at her kinswoman, fascinated, dumb.
“Do you think a woman can be just a mind?” demanded the
essayist, passionately, “that such husks as honors, flattery, success,
can feed one’s real life? Do you not see that I am hideously alone,
without a tie to link me to the race, and that the loneliness and
isolation are killing me?”
After this outburst, Emily Scarborough sat a long while fronting
the dimmed mountains, struggling for calmness. When she spoke
again, it was with controlled utterance:
“You know, Dosia, that I was an only child, born at the close of
the Civil War, and brought up by my father, a general of the
Confederate army. Broken in health and spirit by the war, he found
his chief solace afterward in handing down to me a portion of his ripe
scholarship. On the next plantation lived a boy, a year or two older
than I, of whom my father was fond, and whom he taught along with
me. As we grew up, the comradeship between Godfrey and me
became love. My father planned for me a college education. To this
Godfrey could not look forward. Not only were all the old families
land-poor in those days, but, as eldest son, he must stay and run the
plantation and provide for a widowed mother and his sisters and
brothers. When I left home, it was with the hope of marrying him on
the completion of my course.
“I arrived at college just at the time when there came to the
women of America, especially to the little band then receiving the
higher education, the first thrilling realization of their own
possibilities. To stand alone, to achieve, to prove to the world what
woman’s unaided strength could do, seemed to many not only a
worthy ambition, but a sacred duty. One of my professors, a brilliant
woman and a leader in the new movement, hailed my gifts with joy.
‘Assuredly, Emily, if your development is not interfered with, you will
one day be a torch-bearer of the new womanhood,’ she declared.
‘Marriage,’ she would say at other times, ‘is for the ungifted, the
uninspired. Let the drudgery of home-making and child-bearing be
performed by women incapable of higher things.’ When I ventured to
tell her of my engagement to Godfrey, she was horrified. ‘Bury your
talents, your gifts for speaking and writing, in the mud of a Virginia
plantation!’ she exclaimed; ‘never shall you be guilty of such
weakness!’”