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ELECTRIFICATION
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ELECTRIFICATION
ACCELERATING THE ENERGY
TRANSITION
Edited by

Pami Aalto
Faculty of Management and Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Academic Press is an imprint of Elsevier
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Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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This book and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by the Publisher (other than as
may be noted herein).
Notices
Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our
understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatment may become necessary.
Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any
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any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any
use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data


A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-0-12-822143-3

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Typeset by TNQ Technologies


Contents

Contributors ix 3. How to accelerate electrification? The


Preface xi leverage of policies
PAMI AALTO, KIRSI KOTILAINEN, BENJAMIN SOVACOOL,
MERT BILGIN, AND KIM TALUS

I 3.1 Introduction 57
3.2 The interests driving policy-makers 59
Framework for transition to 3.3 How policy-makers can catalyze change: Types of
electrification policy instruments 63
3.4 How do policy-makers formulate policies? 67
1. Introduction: electrification and the energy 3.5 From policies to solutions 71
References 72
transition

PAMI AALTO, TERESA HAUKKALA, SARAH KILPELAINEN,
AND MATTI KOJO

1.1 Electrification as the “new oil” 3


1.2 Why and how to accelerate electrification? 9 II
1.3 Technological part-solutions 12
1.4 How to engage the wider field of stakeholders? 13 Part-solutions
1.5 Structure of the book 17
References 21 4. How can society accelerate renewable energy
production?
2. Globally and locally applicable technologies
TERESA HAUKKALA, HANNELE HOLTTINEN,
to accelerate electrification JUHA KIVILUOMA, AKIHISA MORI, SIRJA-LEENA PENTTINEN,
€ €
SARAH KILPELAINEN, KIM TALUS, AND PAMI AALTO
C. JOHANNES MUTH, PAMI AALTO, FANNI MYLLARI,

TOPI RONKK € AND PIRKKO HARSIA
O,
4.1 Introduction 79
2.1 Introduction 25 4.2 The problem: Constraints on accelerating wind and
2.2 Wind power 26 solar power generation 80
2.3 Solar energy 29 4.3 Policies 86
2.4 Hydropower 33 4.4 Case study: Policies for accelerating renewable energy
2.5 Marine power 36 in the EU 88
2.6 Bioenergy 37 4.5 Case study: Federal and state-level policies in the
2.7 Geothermal energy 44 USA 93
2.8 Small modular nuclear reactors 47 4.6 Case study: The battle against nuclear power in
2.9 Conclusion 48 Japan 95
Appendix 1: Overview of technology features of low carbon 4.7 Conclusion: Policy mixes for different phases of RES
energy sources 49 integration 97
References 50 References 98

v
vi Contents

5. The role of energy storage and backup 7.7 Case study: Emission reduction in the heavy-duty
solutions for management of a system with a transport sector by means of biogas 165
7.8 Conclusions: Policy lessons 167
high amount of variable renewable power
References 170
JUHA KOSKELA, SIRJA-LEENA PENTTINEN, TAIMI VESTERINEN,
HANNELE HOLTTINEN, JUKKA KONTTINEN,

PERTTI JARVENTAUSTA, JUHA KIVILUOMA, PAMI AALTO, 8. Electrification and energy efficiency in
AND KIM TALUS buildings: Policy implications and interactions
SIRJA-LEENA PENTTINEN, KARI KALLIOHARJU, JAAKKO SORRI,
5.1 Introduction 105 JUHANI HELJO, AND PIRKKO HARSIA
5.2 Energy storage options and features in flexible
systems 107 8.1 Introduction: What does electrification mean in the
5.3 Battery storage in the USA 109 context of buildings? 175
5.4 Gas engines and heat storages in future power 8.2 The problem: Policies for electrification and energy
systems 112 efficiency 177
5.5 The case of household-level batteries 118 8.3 Case study: The EU’s “energy efficiency first” principle
5.6 Conclusion 121 in the electrification of buildings 178
References 122 8.4 Case study: Implementation of EU legal rules in
Finland 181
6. Toward smarter and more flexible grids 8.5 Interlinkages of energy-efficiency policies with the

SAMI REPO, HANNELE HOLTTINEN, TOMAS BJORKQVIST, electrification of buildings 189
KIMMO LUMMI, JUSSI VALTA, LASSE PELTONEN, AND 8.6 Conclusion 193

PERTTI JARVENTAUSTA References 194

6.1 Introduction 125


9. From energy consumers to prosumersdhow
6.2 Smart grids in electrical energy system
transformation 127 do policies influence the transition?
6.3 Need for flexibility 129 KIRSI KOTILAINEN, JUSSI VALTA, ULLA A. SAARI, MATTI KOJO,
6.4 Case study: Large-scale industrial loads as flexible AND ILKKA RUOSTETSAARI
resources 132
6.5 Case study: Smart metering 134 9.1 Introduction 197
6.6 Case study: Power-based grid tariffs 136 9.2 What is energy prosumerism? 198
6.7 Case study: Energy communities and microgrids 138 9.3 The problem: How to engage consumers in the energy
6.8 Conclusion and implications 144 system transition? 200
References 145 9.4 Case studies 206
9.5 Conclusions 212
References 213
7. Policies for climate-neutral road transport
MATTI KOJO, KALLE ARO, KIRSI KOTILAINEN, 10. Anticipating future trends in energy
€ AKK
AKIHISA MORI, ANNA PA € ONEN,
€ ANTTI RAUTIAINEN,
JUSSI VALTA, PAMI AALTO, JUKKA KONTTINEN, AND
transition: Multilevel dynamics in energy policy
BENJAMIN SOVACOOL agenda-setting
JARI KAIVO-OJA, JARMO VEHMAS, AND JYRKI LUUKKANEN
7.1 Introduction 149
7.2 What do we know? 150 10.1 Introduction 217
7.3 The problem: Constraints on electrification in road 10.2 The problem: Path dependency in a large technical
transport 153 system 218
7.4 Policies 155 10.3 Trend pyramid framework combined with the
7.5 Case study: Policies for accelerating the EV sector in multilevel perspective 220
the Nordic countries 157 10.4 The national level: Discursive struggles on energy
7.6 Case study: EV policies in China and Japan 161 policy in Finland 221
Contents vii
10.5 From national to global level: Big data References 270
analyses 225 Further reading 270
10.6 From micro-level niches to global level: Scientific
debates 240 12. Analyzing electrification scenarios for the
10.7 Conclusions 240 northern European energy system
References 242
ESA PURSIHEIMO AND JUHA KIVILUOMA

III 12.1 Introduction 271


12.2 Scenarios for 2030 273
Combining part-solutions 12.3 A scenario for 2050 277
12.4 Results: the scenario for 2030 278
11. How to combine various solutions in a 12.5 Results: the 2050 case 283
national context? 12.6 Conclusions 286
References 288

TOMAS BJORKQVIST, € MAJANNE, AND MATTI VILKKO
YRJO

11.1 Introduction 247 13. Toward a roadmap for electrification


11.2 Case study: The Finnish power system 248 PAMI AALTO, MATTI KOJO, AND AKIHISA MORI
11.3 Scenarios for future electric power system
development in Finland 254 13.1 Introduction 289
11.4 Analysis of scenarios for future electric power system 13.2 Electrification and phases of transition 292
development in Finland 257 13.3 How to move from one phase to another:
11.5 Discussion 265 electrification in practice 298
11.6 Policy recommendations 268 References 299
Appendix 1. Hot water heat storages connected to district
heating networks in use and already decided Index 301
projects 269
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Contributors

Pami Aalto Faculty of Management and Business/ Juha Kiviluoma VTT Technical Research Centre of
Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland Ltd., Espoo, Finland
Finland Matti Kojo Faculty of Management and Business/
Kalle Aro Faculty of Management and Business/ Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland Jukka Konttinen Faculty of Engineering and Natu-
Mert Bilgin Department of Political Science and ral Sciences/Materials Science and Environmental
International Relations, School of Humanities and Engineering, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Social Sciences, Medipol University, Istanbul, Juha Koskela Faculty of Information Technology
Turkey and Communication Sciences/Electrical Engineer-
Tomas Bj€ orkqvist Faculty of Engineering and Natu- ing, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
ral Sciences/Automation and Mechanical Engineer- Kirsi Kotilainen VTT Technical Research Centre of
ing Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland Finland Ltd., Espoo, Finland
Pirkko Harsia Faculty of Building Services Engi- Kimmo Lummi Faculty of Information Technology
neering, Built Environment and Bioeconomy Unit, and Communication Sciences/Electrical Engineer-
Tampere University of Applied Sciences, Tampere, ing, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Finland
Jyrki Luukkanen Finland Futures Research Centre,
Teresa Haukkala Aalto University School of Busi- University of Turku, Tampere, Finland
ness, Espoo, Finland
Yrj€
o Majanne Faculty of Engineering and Natural
Juhani Heljo Faculty of Built Environment, Civil Sciences/Automation and Mechanical Engineering
Engineering Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Finland
Akihisa Mori Graduate School of Global Environ-
Hannele Holttinen Recognis Oy, Espoo, Finland mental Studies, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Kyoto
Pertti J€arventausta Faculty of Information Technol- Prefecture, Japan
ogy and Communication Sciences/Electrical Engi- C. Johannes Muth Faculty of Management and
neering, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tam-
Jari Kaivo-oja Finland Futures Research Centre, pere, Finland
University of Turku, Tampere, Finland; Kazimiero Fanni Myll€ari Faculty of Engineering and Natural
Simonaviciaus University, Vilnius, Lithuania Sciences/Physics, Tampere University, Tampere,
Kari Kallioharju Faculty of Built Environment, Civil Finland
Engineering Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Anna P€ a€
akk€onen Enmac Oy, Tampere, Finland;
Finland; Faculty of Building Services Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences/Mate-
Built Environment and Bioeconomy Unit, Tampere rials Science and Environmental Engineering, Tam-
University of Applied Sciences, Tampere, Finland pere University, Tampere, Finland
Sarah Kilpel€ainen Faculty of Management and Lasse Peltonen Faculty of Information Technology
Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tam- and Communication Sciences/Electrical Engineer-
pere, Finland ing, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland

ix
x Contributors

Sirja-Leena Penttinen Faculty of Social Sciences and Jaakko Sorri Faculty of Built Environment, Civil En-
Business Studies/Law School, University of Eastern gineering Unit, Tampere University, Tampere,
Finland, Joensuu, Finland Finland
Esa Pursiheimo VTT Technical Research Centre of Benjamin Sovacool Center for Energy Technolo-
Finland Ltd, Espoo, Finland gies, Department of Business Development and
Antti Rautiainen Faculty of Information Technol- Technology, Aarhus University, Herning,
ogy and Communication Sciences/Electrical Denmark; Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU),
Engineering, Tampere University, Tampere, University of Sussex Business School, Falmer, East
Finland Sussex, United Kingdom
Sami Repo Faculty of Information Technology and Kim Talus Faculty of Social Sciences and Business
Communication Sciences/Electrical Engineering, Studies/Law School, University of Eastern Finland,
Tampere University, Tampere, Finland Joensuu, Finland
Topi R€onkk€o Faculty of Engineering and Natural Jussi Valta Faculty of Management and Business/
Sciences/Physics, Tampere University, Tampere, Industrial Engineering and Management, Tampere
Finland University, Tampere, Finland
Ilkka Ruostetsaari Faculty of Management and Jarmo Vehmas Finland Futures Research Centre,
Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, University of Turku, Tampere, Finland
Tampere, Finland Taimi Vesterinen Faculty of Engineering and Natu-
Ulla A. Saari Faculty of Management and Business/ ral Sciences/Materials Science and Environmental
Industrial Engineering and Management, Tampere Engineering, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
University, Tampere, Finland; J€
onk€
oping Interna- Matti Vilkko Faculty of Engineering and Natural
tional Business School, J€ onk€
oping University, Sciences/Automation and Mechanical Engineering
J€
onk€oping, Sweden Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Preface

This book focuses on a subject that is little dis- outcome of the globally ongoing transition to
cussed on its own termsdthe electrification of new renewable energy sources such as wind
energy systems and societies. Such a focus dif- and solar power that produce “only” electricityd
fers from most studies examining the electric en- but not heat, unlike fossil fuels, biomass, or
ergy system as such or its future development. geothermal energy. This switch to renewable en-
Indeed, studies abound in various engineering ergies is also a pervasive topic in the predomi-
disciplines on the evolution of electric energy nantly social scientific field of sustainability
systems. Often these studies also mention how transitions, but very rarely do these studies
electricity is becoming the main energy carrier, extend to questions such as what electrification
notably replacing the combustion of fossil fuels is ultimately all about, how it might develop,
for power and heat. A burgeoning field of what such development presupposes, what prob-
studies also concentrates on how electric energy lems will likely be encountered on the way, and
systems are developing toward “smart grid” what the consequences of all this may be.
type “systems of systems,” where the manage- In this book, electrification is considered from
ment of electricity flows becomes central not the perspective of climate neutrality. Climate
only for the production, distribution, and con- neutrality is a grand policy goal set by human
sumption of power but also for energy use in beingsdan increasing number of societies, com-
transport, buildings, and industry. Such studies panies, and civil society actorsdone that envis-
span perspectives from several engineering, in- ages renewable electricity generation with
formation, and communication sciences with “electricity-only” resources as the main means
research on computer science, artificial intelli- to that end. Because of this essentially societal
gence, software, as well as studies on innovation aspect of electrification, studies on this subject
and technology development, for example. The should not be limited to the characteristics of
technical insights of such studies will naturally the energy system. Ultimately, research should
be surveyed in this book but chiefly to help us reach out to address the implications of electrifi-
better understand electrification as a megatrend cation for society, economy, and politics and
that transforms energy systems and societies. likewise to international relations and what is
The field of research on electricity markets is often called the geopolitics of energy in a world
already well established in economics and busi- where oil or natural gas matter less than they
ness studies. However, electrification as an over- once did. In other words, electrification becomes
all megatrend reshaping the energy markets and a relevant subject of enquiry in multiple fields
business in several ways has so far received scant because of the outcome of climate neutrality it
explicit attention. This is surprising, given that can deliver, although its character as a technical
electrification is a logical yet game-changing phenomenon also remains important.

xi
xii Preface

Moreover, the world is anxiously hastening find some sections of this book familiar terrain,
the efforts for climate neutrality. This means some other sections should guide them to new
that most societies will for a long time be seeking territories. For policy analysts, professionals,
ways to speed up their actions. Accelerated tran- and practitioners, this book is intended to serve
sition therefore becomes urgent. Hence, the focus as an accessible handbook on the state-of-the-
here is on how the adoption of various electrifi- art of technologies, infrastructures, and policies,
cation measures could be accelerated by means and no less of their interrelationships, illustrated
of developing and implementing policies and by means of several case studies. Overall, the
policy instruments. Approaching electrification role of various policy instruments and their use
from the perspective of how its introduction in suitable combinations is what differentiates
could be accelerated in the interests of achieving this book from most studies on electric energy
climate neutrality is the new path of research this systems and climate-neutral transitions.
book seeks to pioneer. The agenda of energy systems transitioning
Naturally there are many important transition toward climate neutrality via electrification in
paths toward climate neutrality meriting atten- an accelerated manner, and the related policies,
tion in parallel with and apart from electrification. is a very broad field we can probe only selec-
However, hardly any of these offer equal mea- tively. Our case studies mostly concern devel-
sures of globally scalable potential. One of them oped countries. In many of them, electrification
is the frequently mentioned field of power-to-X is progressing satisfactorily. Some references
technologies and the associated hydrogen econ- are made, however, to more challenging cases,
omy, where gas-based fuels replace fossil fuels where either material or social structures, or
in several energy end-use sectors and open up their combinations, inhibit similar development.
promising new value chains. While those pros- In prospective studies, more attention will be
pects are indeed great, we wish to accentuate needed on the world’s numerous emerging and
that these will mostly likely be outcomes of wide- developing countries. This is especially the
spread electrification that first needs to advance. case, given that the patterns of inherited energy
Large-scale hydrogen economy has to be climate infrastructures and societal constraints are to
neutral or sustainable in the wider sense, and it some extent case-specific, requiring follow-up
may best be achieved when based on hydrogen work on a number of cases. The implications of
produced by renewably generated electricity. electrification for development policy and inter-
This book is intended for several reader national relations are another area in need of
segments. Energy engineers will learn of the further research. Likewise is the wider circle of
interface between technologies, infrastructures, policy processes from policy formation and
society, and policy. With this, this book refers development to implementation, evaluation,
to societal path-dependencies, lock-ins, vested and follow-up, to which this book can only
interests, and other constraints along the way make passing reference.
to new technologies and infrastructures, elabo- The field opened up for enquiry here is decid-
rating policy instruments to overcome these, edly interdisciplinary and should be even more
and describing some unsuccessful attempts to so in the future. In many of the chapters that
do so. Social scientists and energy lawyers will follow, engineers and social scientists represent-
learn of the technologies and infrastructures for ing a variety of specializations have worked
electrifying energy systems, their mutual inter- together, in the capacity of codesign of the
dependencies, and how they both constrain research reported, co-authorship, or interdisci-
and enable societal choices and policy options. plinary commentary and debate. This is not yet
In other words, while readers will undoubtedly the new normal, but it should indeed become
Preface xiii
so for many questions on electrification. The coordinated by Tampere University, 2016e18,
need for more disciplinary studies naturally con- with 15 companies involved); this project
tinues to exist simultaneously, but such studies comprised an Internet-of-Things (IoT)-based
cannot exist alone. technology platform for the exploitation of
The authors are grateful for several sources of various distributed energy resources, taking
funding that have enabled the efforts reported into account both the electricity market and po-
here. The bulk of the work was supported by wer system management perspectives. The proj-
the large-scale consortium “Transition to a ect “Prosumer Centric Energy
Resource Efficient and Climate Neutral Elec- Communitiesdtowards Energy Ecosystem”
tricity System” (EL-TRAN, funded by the Stra- (ProCemPlus, 2019e21), with Tampere Univer-
tegic Research Council at the Academy of sity, Tampere University of Applied Sciences,
Finland, project no. 314319, 2015e21, and led and VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
by Pami Aalto). The partners comprised Tam- involved alongside 11 companies. This project
pere University, Tampere University of Applied examined the formation of individual energy
Sciences, the University of Eastern Finland, the communities into broader business-oriented en-
University of Turku, and VTT Technical ergy ecosystems through several research
Research Centre of Finland, with several public, themes and concrete pilot cases related to the
private, and NGO sector stakeholders playing development of energy communities, and ana-
key roles as part of the consortium’s interaction lysed the role of microgrids and energy commu-
panel. This wide stakeholder involvement was nities in the future energy ecosystem.
invaluable for the consortium’s work and helped Several chapters of this book have also
to make it more relevant for the ongoing energy benefited from work within the Business
transition. Many colleagues not directly Finlandefunded consortium “Black Carbon
involved in this book have also greatly sup- Footprint” (BCfp, 2019e22, coordinated by Tam-
ported the consortium’s work in various capac- pere University and Finnish Meteorological
ities and through invaluable cooperation: Institute, Topi R€ onkk€o and Hilkka Timonen),
Karoliina Auvinen, Marika Hakkarainen, with several universities and companies as part-
Mikael Hilden, Kaisa Huhta, Iida Jaakkola, ners. The research for Chapter 10 is also linked to
Jari Ihonen, Johanna Kirkinen, Maria the project “Platforms of Big Data Foresight
Kopsakangas-Savolainen, Timo Korpela, Aki (PLATBIDAFO),” which has received funding
Kortetm€ aki, Heidi Krons-V€ alim€aki, Raimo from the European Regional Development
Lovio, Anna M. Oksa, Ontrei Reipala, Armi Fund (Project No 01.2.2-LMT-K-718-02-0019) un-
Temmes, Pasi Toivanen, Sanna Uski, and Seppo der a grant agreement with the Research Council
Valkealahti. of Lithuania. For speedy and reliable language
We also wish to acknowledge the Business revision work, we would like to warmly
Finland funded project that has supported our acknowledge Virginia Mattila.
work on energy use in buildings: the Center for Finally, the authors wish to thank numerous
Electrical Engineering and Energy Efficiency colleagues and commentators for critical com-
STEK (co-operation project “Future Energy Solu- ments and detailed observations in conferences
tions for the Urban Environment”). Our work on and seminars, and our significant others for all
producer-consumers (prosumers) has been sup- their support and tolerance in the fairly chal-
ported by two further Business Finlandefunded lenging times of lockdown owing to the
projects. The project “Social Energyd Prosumer COVID-19 pandemic under which this book
Centric Energy Ecosystem” (ProCem, was prepared.
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P A R T I

Framework for transition to


electrification
This page intentionally left blank
C H A P T E R

1
Introduction: electrification and the
energy transition
Pami Aalto1, Teresa Haukkala2, Sarah Kilpel€ainen1, Matti Kojo1
1
Faculty of Management and Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland; 2Aalto
University School of Business, Espoo, Finland

1.1 Electrification as the “new oil” conceptions of the role of resources in interna-
tional relations. We briefly survey each of these
Electricity is frequently referred to as the “new changes in order to outline the scope of this
oil” or the new backbone of energy systems book.
globally. Electricity powers an increasing number
of activities, making electrification a megatrend
1.1.1 What changes will electrification
decisively shaping our social and material
environments. While this implies drastic changes
bring about?
and entails new questions to answer, it will First, in the production phase of the energy
also help to address some thorny problems we system, the globally ongoing turn to renewable
are facing. energy sources acts as a major catalyst of electrifi-
We characterize the megatrend of electrifica- cation. There are sufficient renewable energy
tion by referring to seven interrelated changes. resources to replace our current use of fossil fuels,
The first three relate to the energy system, where since renewables are plentiful in various forms
the production, distribution, and consumption throughout the planet; likewise a wide range of
phases are becoming increasingly electrified. technological solutions for their exploitation are
The fourth change pertains to indirect electrifica- also available (Yahyaoui, 2018a,b). Despite this
tion, whereby electricity is used to produce for great potential, several problems remain to be
example synthetic fuels. The last three changes solved to actually build and operate energy
widen the perspective considerably. At the soci- systems based entirely on renewable sources.
etal level, electrification has several highly trans- Many of these problems are tackled in this
formative repercussions. On the wider book, where we proceed from the observation
international level, electrification has develop- that globally the most potent and fastest expand-
mental implications while it also shapes our ing sectors of renewable energy, wind power, and

Electrification
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-822143-3.00006-8 3 © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
4 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

solar PV power are “electricity-only” resources. fossil fuels. The climate benefits of divestment
Emerging resources such as tidal and wave are undeniably contested; some think it may
power, alongside traditional hydropower, are hamper the industry’s conversion into less
also electricity-only resources. By contrast, climate burdening business. Nevertheless, the
burning fossil fuels releases heat that can be con- greater problem from the perspective of climate
verted into mechanical energy and further into neutrality is the ever-increasing global energy
electricity. At the same time burning creates demand. This increase is fueled predominantly
emissionsdincluding waste heat from inefficient by the growing energy needs of developing
conversion processesdand noise from the com- (and emerging) countries, which consume
bustion engines used for instance in the vehicles most of the expanding fossil fuels supply while
that populate our streets and roads. simultaneously increasing their own renewable
We will propose several reasons for this turn production. In other words, the absolute
to electricity-only renewable resources. Howev- volume of fossil fuel consumption may increase
er, we contend that this transition is particularly globally, despite divestment, alongside expan-
warranted because it can support the ambitious sion in the absolute volume of renewables and
goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate an increase in their share of the energy mix.
policy. In this Agreement, 175 countries agreed This would mean de facto higher cumulative
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases GHG emissions. Such scenarios are possible,
(GHGs) into the atmosphere to jointly delimit for instance, in Southeast Asia, India, and the
long-term global warming to 1.5 C (UN, 2015). Middle East (IEA, 2019a, Annex A). Finally,
The Agreement expresses a political commit- when contemplating who should reduce emis-
ment to pursue climate neutrality, by which the sions and by how much, a solution fully serving
International Panel on Climate Change refers to the principles of distributive justice is elusive.
a state of affairs where human actions have The developed member countries of the Organi-
zero effect on climate change. These include zation of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
not only CO2 emissions but also emissions of ment (OECD) remain responsible for roughly
other GHGs, of which Short-Lived Climate a half of the historically accumulated CO2 emis-
Pollutants (SLCPs) such as methane, black car- sions (Kolstad et al., 2014, pp. 217e19; Blanco
bon, and ozone are most crucial (UNEP, 2019). et al., 2014, p. 359).
Land-use issues are inseparable from GHG emis- Alongside the transition to electricity-only
sions, and refer to the “carbon sink” or the ability renewables, we also need to recognize the other
of forests, crops, swamps, seas, and, for example, transition paths to climate neutrality, some of
wood products to bind CO2 (IPCC, 2018, p. 545). which are complementary or built on electrifica-
Yet the transition to electricity-only renew- tion while others, at least to some extent, may
ables is hampered by several issues, primarily compete with widespread electrification. Each
that they have to compete with the continuously of these paths has its own benefits and associated
expanding supply of fossil fuels. This expansion problems (see Box 1.1).
results from the production of unconventional The transition path based on electricity-only
oil and natural gas and the ability of the oil renewables offers high climate neutrality gains,
and natural gas industries to develop better geographically wide applicability, and high
methods of fully exploiting old, depleting scalability. These features may well make it the
fields (Covert et al., 2016). Fossil fuel industries predominant path, but it is not problem-free.
nevertheless face constraints of their own. By Regarding climate neutrality, the biggest prob-
the end of 2020, more than 1200 institutional lem in the production phase is high raw mate-
investors had announced long-term divestment rials intensity. In life cycle analysis, wind and
plans (withdrawing their investments) from solar power face questions of environmental

I. Framework for transition to electrification


1.1 Electrification as the “new oil” 5

BOX 1.1

Transition paths to climate neutrality


The electrification path is often linked to Retrofitting existing fossil fuel power plants
several gas-based paths, which can also be with CCUS technologies is often proposed as a
viewed as advanced phases of electrification. pragmatic means of reducing emissions without
Perhaps the most potent is the energy use of early phasing out of power plants so incumbent
hydrogen. A high volume of renewably gener- actors can recover their sunk cost investments.
ated electricity necessitates storing the occasion- CCUS would enable the continued use of fossil
ally generated excess electricity that cannot be fuels without large emissions, for example, in
fed into the grid, exported via electricity intercon- China, where the fleet of coal plants is relatively
nectors, or instantly consumed. Such excess young, or in the USA, where unconventional
electricity can via electrolysis be converted into natural gas is plentiful, widely exploited, and
a gaseous storable resource by splitting water relatively inexpensive as long as its environ-
molecules into hydrogen and oxygen. The mental implications are not fully appreciated.
hydrogen can be reconverted to electricity upon In the industrial sector, CCUS can help reduce
demand and despatched to the electricity grid, emissions, for example, in the heavily emitting
stored in transportable fuel cells, or distributed cement and metal industries. In the bioenergy
via pipelines for use as fuel, for example, in the segment, CCUS could decrease the CO2 emitted
transport or industrial sectors. Alongside such in power, heat, and biofuel applications. In this
renewable or “green” hydrogen, nonrenewable context CCUS is often viewed as a means to
“gray” hydrogen can be produced directly from achieve “negative emissions” as carbon emitted
fossil fuels and “blue” hydrogen, when carbon in the combustion process is removed from the
capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technol- atmosphere and new biomass is expected to
ogies (see below) are added into the system. The replace the utilized biomass, eventually binding
different types of hydrogen have implications carbon (REN21, 2020, p. 91). However, for both
for climate neutrality targets. fossil fuel and biomass-based CCUS applica-
Renewably generated electricity can further- tions, uncertainty persists on the availability of
more be used to produce synthetic fuels. Overall, large-scale carbon storage and demand for its
the paths where electricity is converted to other use on a global scale, likewise on costs and
energy carriers, either gaseous or liquid formats, low policy support, especially with the rapidly
are often called “power-to-X” technologies. All falling costs of wind and solar power (IEA,
such technologies offer benefits in terms of 2019a). The climate neutrality status of various
storability while concerns relate to the efficiency CCUS technologies depends on whether the
of conversion and identifying the additional origin of the carbon is fossil fuel or biomass
value in relation to the direct use of electricity. based, whether the carbon is stored, for how
Finally, the gas-based paths include the option long, and whether it is used or not. These differ-
of using organic matter to produce hydrogen or ences also shape the compatibility of CCUS tech-
renewable biogas (which can be upgraded into nologies with emission trading or carbon pricing
biomethane that is compatible with natural gas schemes.
infrastructures; see Chapters 2 and 7).

I. Framework for transition to electrification


6 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

sustainability, as do all energy technologies (see gradual drift away from that world will decrease
Chapters 2 and 10). Moreover, wind and solar the strategic significance of oil and natural gas
power are weather-dependent. Fortunately, in resources and their respective infrastructures
many regions, their use can be combined with including pipelines, tankers, and fuel terminals.
the use of traditional renewable technologies The networks of filling stations will also be un-
such as hydropower, or biomass-based or der pressure. Yet in the natural gas sector, invest-
geothermal facilities producing both power and ment in transmission and distribution pipelines,
heat, improving their attractiveness in environ- as well as liquefaction and regasification termi-
ments requiring space heating. In some regions, nals for liquefied natural gas (LNG) are expected
concentrated solar power (CSP) plants can pro- to proliferate until the end of the 2020s in devel-
vide heat, cool, and power, while in others, solar oping and developed countries alike, and partic-
thermal collectors or small-scale geothermal ularly in the USA. Natural gas infrastructure
systems can supply heat to buildings. Further may also serve the potential expansion of the
transition paths include hydrogen and other use of biogas, which is largely an unexploited
gas-based technologies, synthetic fuels, and car- resource (IEA, 2019a, pp. 583e7; see also Chap-
bon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) ters 2 and 7). Weather-dependent resources
technologies (see Box 1.1), as well as traditional may also need access to gas-based infrastructure
nuclear power alongside small-scale modular if, for example, excess wind power is converted
nuclear reactors (SMRs) (see Chapter 2). In fact, into hydrogen to be fed into a pipeline network
no form of production represents a “silver bul- (see Box 1.1).
let” on its own. Hence electricity-only At the same time, enormous investment is
renewables alone do not have to completely expected in electricity gridsdglobally, in the
solve the climate neutrality challenge and are IEA’s “stated policies” scenario, $354 bln annu-
likely to be combined with other modes of ally during 2019e30, and $455 bln during
production (see Chapters 2, 4, 5, 11, and 12). In 2031e40. In the “sustainable development” sce-
many cases, “sector-coupling” solutions are nario, the cumulative needs are even greater
applicable whereby electricity is converted to (IEA, 2019a, pp. 748e9). Roughly a quarter of
heat, used directly in the heating of buildings this investment need would be for Transmission
or in industrial sectors in place of other fuels, System Operators (TSOs) to enhance transmis-
or stored in gaseous or liquid form to be used sion networks, for example, to connect offshore
later in transport, building or industrial sectors wind power parks with large-scale consump-
(Pilpola and Lund, 2018). tion in cities. The remaining three-quarters
Second, in the distribution phase, electrification would be invested by Distribution System
reforges the global chains of energy as once they Operators (DSOs) (Petit, 2019, pp. 116e117).
were knowndbased on unevenly distributed, Such needs may arise because DSOs must rein-
point-source fossil fuel resources (van der Ploeg, force their grids because of the extra demand for
2011). The nature of these resources enables grid capacity created by the electrification of
generating high revenue from long chains of heating. Further needs may arise from the inte-
value creation where minerals are extracted gration into the grid of decentralized electricity
onshore and offshore, transported over long dis- infrastructure such as rooftop solar panels.
tances, converted into various fuels, and finally Such changes profoundly affect the manage-
burned at high temperatures to produce power ment practices of electric energy grids, as in
and heat. These end products are then distrib- developed countries the grids are generally
uted for consumption, with emissions trans- centralized, one-way systems built to deliver
mitted locally, nationally, and globally. The electricity from large or medium-scale power

I. Framework for transition to electrification


1.1 Electrification as the “new oil” 7
plants to the points of consumption. By fails to meet demand, even when combined
contrast, in the rural parts of many developing with other generation options, and sometimes
countries, off-grid alternatives can be poten- it exceeds the demand, necessitating different
tially highly useful, in the form of small-scale levels of storage of electricity (see Chapter 5).
installations of solar power combined with bat- Fourth, beyond these direct electrification
tery storage for night-time use, for households, trends in the energy system as such, in the
communities, or farms. Such solutions offer various industrial sectors, indirect electrification
short-term installation periods and low upfront can occur. This term refers to processes where
costs. This is important, especially when institu- direct electrification is neither possible nor
tional capacity to develop centralized grids is feasible. This means the use of electricity, by
low, investment capacity of the utility com- means of electrolysis, to produce energy carriers
panies low, grid connection relatively expensive such as chemicals and fuels in gaseous or liquid
and expected energy demand relatively low, form: hydrogen or hydrogen-rich fuels and
and where local resources can generate elec- chemicals such as ammonia and methanol that
tricity directly onsite with low upfront cost are traditionally produced from fossil fuels. In
(Levin and Thomas, 2016). this way, it is possible to use energy products
Third, in the consumption phase, we witness in other economic sectors, store electricity long-
further examples of sector coupling in the term, or enable long-haul energy transport in
form of transitions to electricity in transport, chemical format (Philibert, 2019). For example,
heating, industry, businesses, and households. the iron and steel industries, which account for
In the transport sector, switching to electric one-third of global industrial CO2 emissions,
vehicles (EVs) can replace a large share of oil- can switch from coal burning to the use of
consuming vehicles. In the residential heating hydrogen generated from renewably produced
sector, electricity-consuming heat pumps can electricity (Karakaya et al., 2018). Hydrogen
replace the burning of oil and natural gas (see produced by electrolysis can also be reacted
Chapters 7 and 8). In the various industrial with CO2 captured from thermal power genera-
sectors, electrification can replace fossil fuels tors, industrial processes such as fuel use or
in the generation of the heat required in the pro- other chemical processes, or from the atmo-
duction processes, via technologies such as sphere (direct air capture). This yields electro-
infrared heating, ultraviolet curing, microwave fuels in the form of methane, methanol, or
and radio frequency heating, induction heating, Fischer-Tropsch (FT) hydrocarbons that can be
melting or hardening, and electric arc furnaces. refined to make them compatible with existing
The globally increasing electricity access fossil fuel infrastructure (Lehtonen et al., 2019).
enables the use of new electric appliances and Such conversion processes imply the use of
facilitates new use cases such as cooling and CCUS technologies, which have limitations of
digitalization (IEA, 2017, pp. 234e5; Philibert, their own (see Box 1.1).
2019, p. 202). This is dependent on the price of Fifth, there are wider, relatively little discussed
electricity in relation to alternative fuels, in social dimensions to electrification. In many “smart
particular when overall annual subsidies for visions” with new electricity generation, distribu-
fossil fuels amounted globally to over $400 bln tion technologies, and related IT infrastructure
in 2018 (IEA, 2019b). Subsidies for electricity (Taşcikaraoglu and Erdinç, 2019), humans are
access would have to be well targeted to mostly absent. Sometimes they are somewhat
avoid subsidizing better-off large consumers technocratically referred to as users or consumers.
(IEA, 2019a, p. 471). Sometimes increasingly Such roles do exist, but since human beings are
weather-dependent production of electricity the performers of the new practices the new

I. Framework for transition to electrification


8 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

solutions enable, we should also think of them running into familiar problems of producing
as people: citizens or members of the public ambiguous outcomes and reproducing unequal
with a stake in the changes (cf. Labuissiere power relations (Ahlborg, 2018). Energy justice
and Nada€i, 2018). In a word, changes in issues are pivotal here. In terms of distributive
everyday practices are required if households justice, it matters if everyone within the same
are to offer “flexibility services” in the same jurisdiction is offered similar access to electricity.
way as industries have traditionally done in In terms of procedural justice, the concerns
some countries. For example, several funda- involve transparency and participation in
mental social dimensions emerge when home decision-making over solutions, siting, financing,
automation technologies use real-time data on and capacity transfer (Delina, 2018, pp. 155e7).
electricity consumption (on the loads caused Seventh, electrification ultimately changes the
by certain appliances), to adjust electricity role of energy resources in international relations
consumption in response to the variation in as we know it. Resource conflicts typical for
weather-dependent production or to ameliorate unevenly distributed point-source fossil fuels,
peak demand situations (Strengers, 2013, pp. as seen, for example, in the Middle East and
5e9). Such behavioral aspects are not insignifi- Africa (Colgan, 2013), should not repeat. Yet
cant since buildings in the residential and the literature on the “geopolitics of renewables”
business sectors account for over half of global addresses new types of interdependencies where
electricity demand (Philibert, 2019). Further producers of renewable energy technology can
electrification is the most important solution become dependent on trade flows of rare earths
for reducing emissions in this sector, followed and minerals used as raw material in the produc-
by the use of renewable sources in heating and tion of the technology (Scholten and Bosman,
improvements in building design and efficiency 2016). So far, these flows go in particular from
standards set for home appliances (Wang et al., China to companies in the USA, Europe, and
2018). Yet such electrification requires full Japan. These flows are combined, for example,
comprehension of the controversies between with the expected increase in flows of cross-
these policy domains and the related interest border electricity trade, helping to balance
groups (see Chapters 3 and 8). In summary, to production and consumption across regions
fully understand residential consumption, the and countries. This is necessary as variable,
analysis needs to extend to everyday practices, weather-dependent production increases. Such
life course practices, and societal structures a wider region where production is shared and
shaping these (Yamaguchi, 2019). traded can also support the technical quality of
Sixth, electrification can also advance develop- electricity by helping to maintain sufficient levels
ment. Many studies describe rural electrification of inertia in the electric energy grids when they
projects and programs, and small-scale decen- are chiefly supplied by variable production
tralized off-grid solutions in developing coun- (Aalto and Muth, 2019). Together, such trade
tries (Kirchhoff et al., 2016; Mandelli et al., flows alter the power relations among major
2016). A typical argument is that developing fossil fuel exporters and their traditional cus-
countries or some of their more remote regions tomers in North America, Europe, and Asia.
can in this way leapfrog the historical patterns Trade in renewable energy technologies and
of energy system development in the industrial- equipment may also involve more traditional
ized countries where economies of scale have protectionism, as seen in the “solar protection-
supported the building of fossil fuelebased ism” of the USA, the EU, and India, where they
centralized systems with high upfront costs impose tariffs on Chinese solar PV technologies
(Levin and Thomas, 2016). If such electrification as antidumping measures. Overall, however, the
projects involve development aid, they risk emerging agenda of “geopolitics of renewables”

I. Framework for transition to electrification


1.2 Why and how to accelerate electrification? 9
will for various reasons quite likely differ from Because electricity represents “network energies”
that of the geopolitics of oil (Øverland, 2019). (Tagliapietra, 2017, pp. 18e9), concerning several
We summarize the wide agenda of electrifica- flows within “energy ecosystems” (Goldthau
tion as follows: et al., 2018), electrification has far-reaching impli-
cations within energy systems as such and several
Electrification is a mega-trend whereby less fuel is repercussions beyond them.
eventually burned to produce energy, with the con-
In this book we can address only part of this
nectivity of goods, services and people becoming
more reliant on electricity, a larger share of the energy wide agenda, and will concentrate mostly on
we use taking the form of electricity, industrial pro- electrification of the energy system and society
cesses becoming more dependent on electricity, while in developed countries. In developing countries,
many social and economic activities are also infiltrated by contrast, electrification is often inseparable
with electricity, which furthermore has implications
from issues of energy access, energy justice,
for global development in the form of energy access
and to the role of resources in international relations and poverty alleviation, and indeed, from
and perceptions of (energy) justice. many other issues on the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals agenda of the United Nations
The mega-trend of electrification means that (Delina, 2018; Filho et al., 2020). We will examine
electricity gradually pervades not only energy sys- mostly direct electrification within the electric
tems, but also our lives as human beings from the energy system and its wider social conse-
scale of everyday life to the global level. In other quences. While our overall focus in this book
words, electrification is about much more than will be on various solutions leading to electrifica-
the end product of electricity itself. Compared to tion, we have a particular interest in how these so-
fossil fuels or biomass sources, electricity is a lutions can be accelerated in order to support the
very peculiar type of energy carrier because it work on climate neutrality.
can be both readily used and transported over
long distances, and also converted into mechanical
work with almost 100% efficiency (Goldemberg,
2012, pp. 149e150). Although electricity in this 1.2 Why and how to accelerate
sense is a very convenient material commodity, electrification?
its extensive use entails challenges. To be sensi-
tive to the multifaceted character of electricity, In this book we propose that accelerated elec-
we treat it as thoroughly material, meaning that trification is both a possible and desirable policy
while electricity comprises physical flows, we goal. First, it is possible in the technical sense.
are also interested in the actors and networks Some voices in this debate suggest a need
that underpin and facilitate these flows and for “bridge fuels” during the transition period
benefit from them (Spaargaren et al., 2006). (Delborne et al., 2020).1 Yet several modeling

1
On a global scale, natural gas is the most often mentioned fuel, since it has lower combustion emissions than coal or oil.
However, the final emissions depend on the type of natural gas. In the USA, increasing shale gas production partly replaced
coal-generated electricity and doubled natural gas plant liquids (NGPL) production from the late 2000s to 2016. Yet studies
disagree on whether the emissions from extraction processes from shale, when combined with combustion emissions, cause
greater or less overall GHG emissions (methane) than the use of coal. This controversy originates in the imprecision of
measurements from widely varying drilling conditions, which cannot reliably report the methane leakage nationwide (Smil,
2015, pp. 175e180). Toward the 2020s, biogas and hydrogen-based alternative fuels forcefully entered global policy debates,
used either independently or alongside natural gas (IEA, 2019a, p. 578).

I. Framework for transition to electrification


10 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

studies suggest that this is not necessary for any TABLE 1.1 Climate neutrality targets in selected
technical reasons. By 2050, a world with close to countries.
100% of electricity supplied by renewable Country Target year Target status
resources is technically feasible (e.g., Breyer
et al., 2018). Some modeling studies even claim Suriname Achieved Already carbon negative
that such systems with intermittent resources Bhutan Achieved Already carbon negative
like wind, solar, and hydro would be operable
Norway 2030 Legal obligation
with no load losses across the world (Jacobson
et al., 2018). Several country-specific modeling Uruguay 2030 Policy commitment;
submitted to the UN
studies also support their technical feasibility
(Mathiesen et al., 2015). Finland 2035 Policy commitment
Second, accelerated electrification is possible Austria 2040 Policy commitment
in the political sense. Dozens of countries aim
Iceland 2040 Policy commitment
at an electricity supply based 100% on renewable
resources by 2050 or earlier. Hundreds of com- Sweden 2045 Legal obligation
panies, many of them global leaders, commit to Denmark 2050 Legal obligation
a similar pledge, for example, through the
EU (26 Member 2050 Policy commitment
RE100 initiative. The boldest targets comprise
States)
not only 100% renewably produced electricity,
but renewable sources replacing fossil fuels in Canada 2050 Policy commitment
the overall energy system (see Table 1.1). In Chile 2050 In policy document
Europe, in 2019, the Member States (MS) of the
China 2060 Policy commitment
EU accepted a 100% climate neutrality target
by 2050, with the sole exception of Poland; at Costa Rica 2050 Policy commitment;
submitted to the UN
the same time, many MS will retain nuclear
power as part of their generation portfolio. All Fiji 2050 Policy commitment;
this would nevertheless mean renewables submitted to the UN
becoming globally predominant not only in Japan 2050 Policy commitment
energy production but also in the consumption
Marshall 2050 Policy commitment
sectors of transport, heating, industry, and agri- Islands
culture. In this way, these consumption sectors
New Zealand 2050 Legal obligation
would also become to a large extent electrified.
However, because technical feasibility and po- South Africa 2050 Policy commitment
litical targets do not necessarily translate into South Korea 2050 Policy commitment
transition outcomes (Roberts and Geels, 2019),
Switzerland 2050 Policy commitment
our main question in this book is how can
renewable-based electrification of the overall energy UK 2050 Legal obligation
system be achieved in practice, and how can it be accel-
Based on (Climate Home News, 2020). Which Countries Have a Net Zero
erated? A sobering thought here is how in the Carbon Goal? https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/06/14/countries-net-
“stated policies” and “sustainable development” zero-climate-goal/. (Accessed 13 November 2020). EU Member States are listed
scenarios of the International Energy Agency separately in case their national target is stricter than that of the whole EU.

(IEA), by 2040, the share of electricity would,


respectively, reach “only” a quarter or less than figure of less than a tenth in the early 1970s and
a third of the final consumption of energy. That 19% in 2018 (IEA, 2017, p. 234; 2019a,b, p. 42).
would nevertheless compare favorably with the Yet a large gap clearly prevails between the

I. Framework for transition to electrification


1.2 Why and how to accelerate electrification? 11
profound electrification implied in the above- incremental and eventually results in a new
mentioned ambitious policy targets and the equilibrium (Durrant et al., 2018; Kanger and
scenarios of the IEA. This gap may eventually Schot, 2019). However, niche acceleration does
be bridged given how the renewable energy not always proceed linearly and may instead
scenarios of the IEA have previously proven far backlash or lock-in as a niche (Kivimaa et al.,
too cautious. Moreover, the renewable energy 2019); neither are cost reductions automatic,
transition, and with it electrification, may follow but require RDI and incremental improvement
the s-shaped curve typical for technology adop- (Harvey et al., 2018, p. 38). Patterns of boom
tion, as seen historically, for example, in how and bust are also possible.
electricity access and mobile phones reached Widespread electrification will not only create
nearly everyone in the developed world. Such new realities by supporting the evolution of the
an s-curve development would see the creation niches, but will also abolish many existing
of a niche market, followed by widespread solutions as pointed out by a rich literature on
diffusion, and finally saturation of the market creative destruction. Some of the incumbent
(McMillan, 2018). companies and whole industries may vanish
Several phases of technology development when new concepts, products, and technologies
may be discerned on the way to widespread emerge (Schumpeter, 2010 [1942]). The change
electrification. First, in an early emergence may be slow or fast, and involves technological
phase, new technological solutions develop and organizational changes inherent in capital-
within a protected niche. Successful technolog- ism (Lovio et al., 2011). Creative destruction
ical niches can yield improvements in terms may be very necessary for the transition to
of price or performance. These can emerge as accelerate (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016), given the
a result of research, development, and innova- political urgency of climate neutrality. David
tion (RDI) activities; demonstration projects; (2018) speaks of exnovation, a process in which
community-level experiments; pilot areas; and the physical infrastructure of an existing technol-
so on, enabling the nurturing of new technolo- ogy is deliberately removed from use to avoid
gies and affording them a space protected dual infrastructure.
against mainstream market selection until they At this point, we can propose that accelerated
are ready to compete (Verbong and Geels, electrification is technically possible, politically
2007). Second, in the acceleration phase niche increasingly supported, and can be pushed
technologies generate knockon effects. These further by new innovations emerging from the
make the new technology more competitive in niches. But because all this will involve creative
relation to incumbent technologies (Bauknecht destruction, creating losers, it may appear
et al., 2020). It is possible to differentiate doubtful whether this mega-trend is desirable.
between early acceleration or a take-off phase, However, losers can be directly compensated
whereby actors start clustering in support of by means of public policies (see Chapter 3),
the new technology, sharing a vision of its and indirectly by virtue of the co-benefits of
future, and a late phase, where it makes a break- accelerated electrification. What might such
through (Kivimaa et al., 2019). Third, in the co-benefits be? Here it is instructive to look at
stabilization phase the technology matures, the work of the United Nations Environmental
becomes mainstreamed, and widely adopted. Program (UNEP) on air quality and climate
Here the effects of economies of scale may be change in Asia (UNEP, 2019). For the UNEP,
important, comprising falling production costs the co-benefits relate to how measures to reduce
and further learning by doing (Harvey et al., GHG and SLCP emissions bring alongside
2018, p. 38). Thereafter the transition becomes climate benefits improved air quality and hence

I. Framework for transition to electrification


12 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

health benefits, reduced healthcare costs, better At the other end, we have to take into account
crop yield, reduced flooding risks as global the wider field of economic, social, and political
warming is combatted, while they also augment stakeholders necessary for the development,
extreme weather patterns associated with adoption, and implementation of the technolo-
warming (Arif et al., 2014). In other words, the gies (Kilpel€ainen et al., 2019). This means that
co-benefits or “win-win” policy approach in order for a technology to be actually adopted,
promises something for everyone, which may we need to consider how it “fits” with society
help to involve more actors. A closely related and its stakeholders to ensure the desirability
policy approach is issue-linkage (Eikeland and of the transition.
Skjærseth, 2016). These approaches can dramat- This leads to our main argument: since acceler-
ically improve the desirability of change by ated electrification depends not only on the technolog-
multiplying the options for successful resolu- ical and infrastructural part-solutions, but also on
tion or new lock-in to renewable resources, political support and social desirability, it requires
although the risks of hampering or prolonging interaction between the key actors of the electric
decision-making remain (Stevenson, 2018).2 energy system and the wider field of stakeholders for
The big question is how to remedy the prob- actually accepted and functioning solutions to
lems inherent in accelerated transitions. One emerge. Such interaction can be detected on
possibility, elaborated in detail by Fouquet various levels of analysis ranging from the micro
(2010), is that those pushing for the transition to the meso and macro-levels. A brief survey of
can draw upon the lessons learned from past some established literatures will elucidate this
energy transitions. Although our focus here is wide research agenda and help us to develop
not on past transitions as such, we will go an interdisciplinary framework for the study of
through some case studies on experiences during accelerated electrification.
the 2000 and 2010s. We will address the balance
between technical feasibility, policy instruments
to support change, the innovation and destruc- 1.3 Technological part-solutions
tion involved and the prospects for delivering
co-benefits. Studies in the natural scientific and engineer-
At one end, we have to pay attention to the ing disciplines form the backbone for any analysis
technological, infrastructural, and further part- of accelerated electrification, as they explain
solutions in the production, distribution, and the different technological and infrastructural
consumption sectors, and on how to combine part-solutions. Here our main message is that,
these in the context of a particular electric energy although absolutely crucial, technologies are
system. Each electric energy system has its own rarely the main problem, even if some major
key actors such as power producers, TSOs, RDI work and scaling-up is still due for some
DSOs, service providers, and energy consumers. individual technologies (see Chapters 2 and 5).

2
In the East Asian case, the familiar pattern features the regional states each bringing their own concerns onto the nego-
tiation table, multiplying both cross-sectoral policy linkages and the number of affected stakeholders. At the same time, the
region’s states delegate insufficient powers to the regional organizations and task forces set up to deal with the policy issues at
stake. This results in real difficulties to adopt any binding decisions for policy change (Aalto, 2014). Similar problems of how
multiple actors weigh different co-benefits and ultimately fail to decide will emerge beyond this East Asian case.

I. Framework for transition to electrification


1.4 How to engage the wider field of stakeholders? 13
The main problem is how to combine individual or possible market failures involved (H€ ubler
technologies in the production, distribution, and et al., 2015). For these reasons, a comprehensive
consumption phases to develop a climate neutral framework on the acceleration of electrification
system in a particular place that is operable and needs to extend toward the social and political
meets the needs and interests of its users. disciplines (Cherp et al., 2018), and also to the
In the various engineering disciplines, one humanities (Foulds and Robison, 2018), where
standard methodological approach is to quantify the wider field of stakeholders of the electric en-
and model the individual technological compo- ergy system and the leverage of policy are more
nents of national energy systems in order to deliberately integrated into the analysis.
explore possible transition paths. Most studies
on national electric energy systems feature such
“bottom-up” or “engineering” modeling. These 1.4 How to engage the wider field of
approaches seek to produce a detailed picture stakeholders?
of the system, its power production units, and
energy conversion technologies delivering There is a burgeoning literature on energy
“useful energy,” as well as of the distribution transitions, drawing upon several social-
and consumption sectors. Typically these studies scientific disciplines, history, and the study of
employ simulation methodologies to yield innovations, concentrating particularly on
optimization results or “best possible results.” technological change within society. It adds a
Such results seek to balance quantifiable social dimension to the insights of technolog-
outcome variables, for example, the costs and ical, infrastructural, and economics studies.
competitiveness of different technological solu- The “socio-technical” studies do not explicitly
tions, with their capacity to meet the expected address electrification, but rather diverse topics
demand, cater for the security of supply, and within the remit of “sustainability transitions”
limit emissions. Macro-economic modeling for or transitions to renewable energy (Hess, 2014;
its part focuses on how the aggregate flows of Kern and Markard, 2016). Yet their merit here
energy goods from the different production units is how they reiterate the significance of the con-
are connected to taxation, prices, incomes, and sumption phase of the system and more broadly
other interactions among economic actors in the involvement of society in the transition
the markets (Rodrigues et al., 2011). (Geels, 2002; Kivimaa et al., 2019).
This is all necessary information prior to mak- To become desirable and eventually adopted,
ing technology choices or investment decisions, new solutions require a societal debate with
but does not alone suffice for the purposes of positive messages on how these solutions can
accelerated transition. That is, these literatures become part of everyday life in order to equip
are not intended to conceptualize the associated everyone to contribute to the transition. Such a
innovation mechanisms, inertia within society, message stands in contrast to scenarios of
or how, why, and under what conditions actors unavoidable climate change disaster where
would make the required political decisions only large-scale technological measures and
which for their own part crucially frame invest- major emission cuts matter. Disseminating a
ment decisions. The political decisions are of positive message requires an awareness of
paramount importance as market logic alone is cultural perceptions and knowledge of social
unlikely to deliver sufficiently accelerated transi- behavior alongside more technical user engage-
tion (see Chapter 3). Moreover, within actual so- ment. For example, in the transport sector, it is
cietal contexts, “second-best” choices are usually relevant how interest in acquiring a driving li-
realistic, anticipating the institutional constraints cense or ownership of private vehicles may be

I. Framework for transition to electrification


14 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

dwindling among young people in some devel- property owners, cooperatives, and physical as
oped countries, and what kind of consumer well as virtual energy communities, which may
decisions they may make if given access to benefit from renewable energy installations on
information on the GHG footprint of products buildings, farms, and fields (see Chapter 9).
and services (see Kanger and Schot, 2019, pp.
63e4). In brief, accelerated electrification entails
treating people not only as economic rationally
1.4.2 The meso-level
behaving consumers, but as active agents of Niche actors seek to challenge and eventually
change in multiple roles (see Chapter 9). Ulti- replace the incumbent actors such as energy
mately, the research agenda extends to routines, utilities with existing investments in the fossil
social practices, and norms (e.g., Strengers, fuel or nuclear power sectors (Geels, 2004). The
2013; Yamaguchi, 2019). However, not all cluster of incumbent actors, or what the socio-
responsibility for making the choices for climate technical literature calls the socio-technical regime,
neutrality can be delegated to individuals consists of (a) networks of actors and social
(Stevenson, 2018). groups, which in the case of the electric energy
Here, for analytical purposes, we can discern system consist of utility companies providing
three levels of transition: the micro-, meso-, and power (heat and increasingly in some places
macro-levels, as commonly presented in the cooling); government ministries in charge of
context of the so-called multilevel perspective energy questions, local governments, regulators
(Geels, 2002). Since then, several literatures and public sector agencies, and large industrial
have further developed this research agenda. energy users. The regime also includes (b) the
formal rules such as regulations and standards,
which for their part are interlinked with informal
1.4.1 The micro-level
or normative and cognitive rules such as belief
On this level we find that not only is the systems and behavioral norms and practices,
energy consumption and future behavior of users working as a social glue as noted in the institu-
and consumers becoming vital, since an acceler- tional literature (Aalto, 2014; Andrews-Speed,
ated transition is not possible by concentrating 2016). Finally, the regime comprises (c) the tech-
solely on production side technologies. There is nologies and infrastructures including resources
the activism of consumer-producers (prosumers) and the networks of TSOs and DSOs (Verbong
with small-scale production, for example, via and Geels, 2007). Several types of regime are
solar PV panels, and resource providers offering, discernible in electrification: the energy regime
for example, the batteries of their EVs for with its own actors, rules, and technologies; the
the use of the electric energy network (see transport regime with a view to EVs, a wider
Chapters 7e9). Early adopters of new solutions industry regime vis-a-vis the industry’s electrifi-
are the targets of those who develop new cation, and the building regime in relation to the
solutions in the niches of innovation (Schot and electrification of residential, commercial, and
Geels, 2008; Verbong and Geels, 2007). The public sector buildings (Kotilainen et al., 2019;
strategic niche management studies elucidate see Chapters 4e9).
how innovative niche actorsdscientists, agencies, To fully analyze the meso-level, socio-
institutes, companies including start-ups, equip- technical studies frequently draw upon institu-
ment manufacturers, service providers, consul- tional literature, originally developed in the field
tancies, etc.dcan respond to the global of political economy and today widely applied
transition pressures by developing new solutions. in several economic organization studies
Furthermore, the micro-level includes land and and policy disciplines. Institutionalism helps to

I. Framework for transition to electrification


1.4 How to engage the wider field of stakeholders? 15
enhance the conceptualization of the inertia of source of revenue in the course of the transition
regimes, in terms of stabilizing mechanisms (Kern and Markard, 2016, pp. 308e9).
such as path dependence and lock-in (Unruh, We propose that vested interests can be
2000; Walker, 2000). Path-dependence implies conceptually separated from generic interests in
how actors are bound to historically institution- almost any society and its diverse groups of
alized paths of conduct since “what happened stakeholders in relation to the electric energy
at an earlier point in time will affect the possible system. Such generic interests imply what the so-
outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a cietal stakeholders expect the electric energy sys-
later point in time” (Sewell, 1996). In other tem to provide for society. The more the
words, path-dependencies are large-scale histor- transition concerns the whole of society, the
ical patterns caused by lock-ins in specific more important do such generic interests
sectors, or technological pathways that become become. While climate neutrality is increasingly
self-reinforcing. Such lock-ins can be discerned becoming the “master interest” driving the
not only in the sectors of technology and infra- development of energy systems, many other
structure but also in the institutional sectors, as interests simultaneously underpin this work.
well as in everyday behavior. The lock-ins limit These include interest in resource efficiency
the options of actors, institutions, and networks (“to do more with less”); the promotion of RDI
(Kotilainen et al., 2019). Yet they are rational and capacity building; interest in competition
and can, for example, provide increasing returns and energy market development, including pri-
from the adoption of a certain technology. This ces; and interest in developing energy business,
gives incumbent technologies an advantage including its wider socioeconomic effects on
over new entrants (Arthur, 1994). employment and taxation, and finally, security
The inertia of path-dependence and lock-in of supply (see Fig. 1.1 below; Toivanen et al.,
exist since the incumbent actors and other stake- 2017; Kilpel€ainen et al., 2019; see Chapter 3).
holders have vested interests in particular technol- The precise weight assigned to each interest
ogies and solutions. The Nordic countries offer a varies across countries and time. With this reiter-
useful example of the variety of vested interests. ation of the centrality of interests (Hughes and
In Denmark, wind power has developed into a Lipscy, 2013), institutional approaches help us
vested interest, as around half of electricity is to recognize the challenges in the simultaneous
generated from wind, with a flourishing export realization of all co-benefits.
industry (Moe, 2015). In Finland, by contrast, Insights from political science and the policy
the presence of a large forestry industry has sciences in general can shed further light not
created a vested interest within society in only on policy formation and implementation
biomass solutions. This comprises the use of (Hoppe et al., 2016; see Chapter 3) but also on
biomass for electricity and heat production the roles of political, industrial, and grassroots
from the side-products of the forestry industry, coalitions mobilizing in support of transition or
a biofuel production and export industry and a resisting certain technological solutions. In the
strong role for biofuels in national energy strate- USA in particular, financial coalitions may also
gies (Kilpel€ainen et al., 2021; Toivanen et al., play a decisive role vis-a-vis election results
2017). Political economy approaches moreover and hence in the prospects for policy change
point at the little examined distributional (Hess, 2014). Moreover, transition policies may
conflicts in transitions (Kuzemko et al., 2019; have either positive or negative feedback effects,
Moe, 2015). Vested interests do not yield similar also unintended, in terms of new groups
benefits to all groups within society. In the short emerging in support of or opposed to change,
run at least, some groups are likely to fare better affecting the mid- or long-term prospects of tran-
economically. Some others lose their immediate sition (Roberts et al., 2018).

I. Framework for transition to electrification


16 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

Electrifica on

n
The energy system & society tio
t r uc efits
s n
de -be
Interests t ive Co
ea
-vested interests Cr
Path- -generic interests
dependencies -na onal interests
and lock-ins Technological solu ons:
their ’fit’ with the
society & stakeholders;
wider socio-economic,
Consumers developmental and
Service, TSOs, Power & Governmental global implica ons
Prosumers Start-up
consultancy DSOs, heat (& and municipal
Resource companies
& IT microgrid cool) actors incl.
providers RDI actors
companies owners producers regulators

Micro-level (niche) Meso-level (regime) Macro-level

FIGURE 1.1 Electrification: preliminary analytical framework.

1.4.3 The macro-level beyond the immediate reach of the regime


On this highest level of aggregation, we find (Salonen, 2020). To take but one example, the
the megatrend of electrification influencing emergence of new technologies and their
national energy systems and the multiple take-off in a growing number of countries can
actors and stakeholders there. Socio-technical represent one such external development that
studies treat this level as the “landscape,” refer- is not under the control of one single regime.
ring to structures external to the regime. These Yet this all has to start from somewhere. For
comprise developments capable of exerting example, German actors first adopted wind
pressure on the regime, potentially weakening power technologies from Denmark in the 1990s
its grasp. In turn, the niche actors can exploit (Cherp et al., 2017, p. 615), and then, with the
such pressures (Verbong and Geels, 2007). support of federal investment, developed and
Overall, it is expected that successful transitions helped to diffuse these further, facilitating RDI
need to comprise sufficiently coordinated and cost reduction alongside similar effects
changes on the micro-, meso-, and macro- ensuing from RDI in America (Moe, 2015). That
levels alike (Raven et al., 2010). However, how these technologies become globally competitive
these levels become precisely aligned to pro- opens up new choices for many countries despite
duce a transition in a given country warrants their existing lock-ins in other technologies.
more attention (Mori, 2018). Here the international political economy (IPE)
The conceptualization of the macro-level literature becomes relevant by stressing the
continues to be debated in the socio-technical consequences of divergent national interests that
literature, as the landscape can comprise all sorts can withhold the prospects of technology
of national, transnational, and global structures diffusion, or hamper countries in efforts to reach

I. Framework for transition to electrification


1.5 Structure of the book 17
agreement on climate and energy policies while it can also bring several co-benefits along-
(Hughes and Lipscy, 2013). At the same time, side climate neutrality gains (Fig. 1.1).
such agreements would be necessary to avoid
the problem of the commons and prevent unfair
competition. For example, national interests 1.5 Structure of the book
surface when countries are trying to make sense
of how to nationally implement the Paris com- While the attempted transition is underway
mitments, prompting them to favor different globally, with country-specific variations, and
combinations of technological part-solutions also some deviant cases, the grand policy ques-
in order to create their own transition path- tion is how to accelerate it in order to combat
ways. This interplay between national and climate change. This leads to several questions
international transactions is also influenced by addressed in the remaining chapters in this book.
the local level, where many energy infrastruc- Chapter 2 describes various technologies for
ture decisions are actually made. Overall, the climate-neutral or low-carbon energy produc-
interconnections between different levels neces- tion, and compares their global and local appli-
sitate both country-specific analyses and com- cability, phase of technology development, and
parisons among them (Kern and Markard, prospects for accelerated deployment. Attention
2016; Kuzemko et al., 2019). is paid to the economic, social, and environ-
The relative dearth of studies on this highest mental implications of each technology that
level of aggregation of energy transitions in influence these prospects. The chapter highlights
general (Cherp et al., 2018) and electrification wind and solar resources as being globally the
in particular (Aalto and Muth, 2019) shows best scalable renewables. The traditional renew-
how the effects of this level are difficult to grasp ables, namely hydropower and the various
not only for academic transition literatures but forms of bioenergy, are not as widely applicable
also for the niche and regime actors alike “on globally, but are set to continue in significant
the ground.” We will discuss this problem of roles in dozens of countries. Due to the energy
how actors perceive the macro-level, relate to storage and dispatch options they offer, they
it, and develop policies promoting accelerated can easily be combined with variable output
electrification in Chapter 3. of wind and solar power. Some countries also
At this point, we can offer a preliminary sum- have similar prospects with respect to
mary of our analytical framework in terms of the geothermal energy. The mainstreaming of other
micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. Moving on technologies is expected to take more time. Over-
from the niches of innovation on the micro- all, the chapter reiterates how each technology
level and the actors found therein, we encounter remains a partial solution in its own right. The
the regime-level actors, interest groups, and chapter concludes by drawing attention to
incumbent industries, alongside existing path- possible changes to many of the technologies dis-
dependencies, lock-ins, and interest structures. cussed and the effects of external events that
On the macro-level we find the megatrend of may both accelerate or disrupt the ongoing
electrification. Policies promoting accelerated transformation.
electrification are expected to yield notable Chapter 3 first situates the climate neutrality
climate neutrality benefits nationally and more target in the context of further objectives and
widely. At the same time, electrification as a interests within society that also shape actors’
landscape-level megatrend may also result in expectations vis-a-vis the energy system. In this
creative destruction on the national (meso) level, way, the chapter builds on the rationalist tenet

I. Framework for transition to electrification


18 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

that the study of energy policy formation in tran- by stressing how a relevant policy mix for main-
sition processes can usefully proceed bottom-up, streaming renewables typically includes a vari-
from the interests of the actors, and in this way ety of policy instruments, including economic
probe the fundamental factors driving their incentives, climate and/or renewable energy tar-
conduct. For example, in addition to climate gets, and RDI policies to develop enabling tech-
neutrality, actors may value security of supply nologies; policies targeting grid integration of
or affordable energy prices while they may also renewables and local acceptance of renewable
prefer the energy sector to serve socioeconomic energy installation are also important.
needs in terms of, say, providing jobs. The au- The pivotal role of energy storages and back-
thors argue that policies need to be relevant for up solutions in systems largely based on variable
the multiple needs of actors and stakeholders power is discussed in Chapter 5. The power sys-
in order to have realistic prospects of eventually tem must be constantly balanced to avoid severe
gaining acceptance and achieving implementa- blackouts and paralysis of business and society.
tion, delivering targeted outcomes such as Power systems have traditionally used flexibility
climate neutrality. Second, the chapter surveys provided by generation assets such as fossil fuel
the types of policy instruments available to power plants that can adjust production to the
policy-makers for catalyzing and accelerating changing demand. As fossil fuel plants are
the transition and then discusses how policy- increasingly replaced with variable output
makers assess their policy environment and, on renewablesdwind and solar powerdenergy
that basis, eventually choose between competing storages and back-up solutions become indis-
policy options. Overall, for the transition to suc- pensable to maintain a balance between supply
ceed, the set of policy instruments has to be and demand. The chapter presents several types
tailored to the needs of each county and sector of energy storages that help to respond to the
of the electric energy system. needs of such electrification, ranging from fast
The ways of accelerating the deployment of response to long-term, seasonal, and annual
wind and solar power, the two most potent balancing needs. The case studies consider
renewable energy resources, are scrutinized in utility-scale bioenergy and battery solutions, as
Chapter 4. As these are relatively mature tech- well as small-scale battery storage installed in
nologies, the fundamental issue concerns a suit- residential buildings, to improve the cost-
able mix of policy instruments to accelerate efficiency of solar PV. Battery storages in partic-
their development in different socio-technical ular are found to benefit from several types
and institutional contexts. In addition, it is neces- of policy instruments to become more widely
sary to pay attention to the integration of wind deployed, while bioenergy solutions may
and solar resources into existing energy systems, require support from policies to adjust their busi-
where many other resources and infrastructures ness models to the changing energy system and
are already operational. The chapter introduces market.
case studies on the EU context, contrasting these Chapter 6 probes deeper into the flexibility
with the American, Moroccan, and Japanese solutions required by electrifying energy sys-
cases, to illustrate different policy development tems with a large share of variable power. The
strategies. The authors point out that because chapter first discusses the concepts of smart
wind and solar power are weather-dependent, grids and flexibility that become crucial in such
variable output resources, their scaling up contexts. These concepts are illustrated by means
ultimately requires enabling technologies such of case studies on large-scale industrial loads as
as energy storage and various solutions for flexible resources, smart metering, power-based
more flexible demand. The chapter concludes grid tariffs, and energy communities and

I. Framework for transition to electrification


1.5 Structure of the book 19
microgrids, which offer useful insights into the attention should also be paid to sector coupling
development of smart grids measures. Smart solutions linking EVs with electric energy grids
grid delivers not only energy, but also services and the electrification of the building sector.
enabling the efficient and secure operation of Chapter 8 argues that the electrification of
an electricity system, simultaneously presuppos- buildings is an essential component in climate
ing new business models and the emergence of neutrality strategies, because residential and
new actors. The chapter argues that flexibility commercial buildings account for a fifth of
can be improved by means of several technolog- global energy consumption. Moreover, the tech-
ical part-solutions commonly related to the nical potential for electrification in buildings is
concept of smart grids. Although smart grids very high. While space and water heating repre-
comprise a fairly technical landscape, the transi- sent the largest energy end uses in buildings,
tion toward a flexible and resource-efficient grid, energy is also consumed for lighting, air condi-
they entail trade-offs and are therefore also polit- tioning, and appliances. The authors state that
ical and contested. the challenge of electrification in the building
Chapter 7 examines how the electrification of sector does not relate to technological con-
road transport could be accelerated. Transport is straints but rather to how the infrastructure
a hard nut to crack as globally this sector ac- and technology transition costs involved are
counts for a quarter of CO2 emissions from direct managed. Investigating these issues in more
fuel combustion. Road vehicles account for detail in the context of the EU, the chapter con-
nearly three-quarters of these emissions. The tends that many appliances are already highly
prospects of accelerated electrification are illus- energy efficient due to EU-level regulation.
trated by references to the cases of EV policies Therefore, optimization within and between
in the Nordic countries, China, and Japan. The systems is an obvious area in the quest for
chapter also examines the prospects of bio- energy savings. Policy-makers should also
methane as an alternative solution to reduce bear in mind that efficient electrification in the
GHG emissions in the heavy transport sector, building sector can serve a range of related
where electrification is more challenging. The interests, with several co-benefits expected. If
chapter argues that the electrification of road buildings are required to be equipped with
transport needs to accelerate rapidly in order to appropriate control and monitoring capabil-
contribute to the transition toward climate ities, electrified and automated end uses can
neutrality. At the same time, fossil fuelebased be treated as “smart loads” in the electricity
transport requires serious destabilization if not system.
outright creative destruction. The absence of a The focus in Chapter 9 shifts from technolo-
“silver bullet” necessitates tailoring a context- gies and infrastructures more markedly to their
sensitive combination of policy instruments users, in particular, prosumers in energy transi-
and part solutions. Four policy lessons are iden- tion, comparing prosumer-related policies in
tified: first, strong institutional signals help to five European countries; Finland, France,
steer existing operators in the desired direction. Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. Small-scale
Second, economic instruments will be crucial to resources, such as households and apartment
support the transition. It is recommended to buildings, can have a major role in electrifica-
redirect subsidies from fossil fuels to RDI on tion. Smart power grids and affordable renew-
clean technology. Third, the need for behavioral able energy technologies empower consumers
change should not be overlooked. Finally, policy to produce, store, and sell energy, but technical

I. Framework for transition to electrification


20 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

readiness alone is not sufficient for a more deci- The future development of the energy system
sive shift toward prosumerism. An appropriate can alternatively be examined with the help of
policy mix including incentives can remove modeling approaches, illustrating how different
behavioral obstacles. Three key proposals are part-solutions can be combined in particular
presented. First, the diffusion of renewable contexts and how such part-solutions influence
energy technologies needs to be accelerated. one another. In Chapter 11, the authors pay
Second, the prosumer policy mix should foster attention particularly to the functionality and
flexibility and technology interoperability. For operability of the system in conditions of an
instance, EVs and home battery storages can increasing share of variable power with expand-
be utilized as flexibility resources during the ing wind and solar generation. They propose
peak moments of electricity demand. Third, that generating a sufficient volume of climate-
prosumers need to be incentivized to use their neutral and low carbon energy is not the real
resources and to participate actively in energy problem, but that the challenge relates more to
markets and flexibility schemes. producing and delivering electricity to meet
The global and regional trends and debates on demand at a given time and place. The Finnish
energy transition are the subject of Chapter 10. electric energy system is used as a case study
The authors first examine the discourses framing to present scenarios on how to ensure a balance
the agenda-setting for energy policies in transi- between the production and consumption of
tions to climate-neutral power systems. They power in a transitioning system, mindful of the
argue that hegemonic discourse is crucial for fact that storing electricity in large amounts in-
the agenda-setting of energy policy and can curs costs. The authors model the main contours
decisively shape the direction of transition. In of the system at 2030, expecting many resources
other words, technology change also involves a of the present energy system to persist in a future
discursive change that can shed important light system as well. However, some further flexibility
on the contours of technology change. Since will be needed to accommodate the increasing
discursive trends decisively frame future energy share of variable power. The chapter suggests
transitions, research focusing on such trends can that policies and investment should indeed focus
provide vital information for future policy on such flexibility investments in generation and
planning. Such research can moreover expose consumption.
potential discord in the ways in which the trends Chapter 12 for its part models the wider
may interact in what is essentially a complex northern European region where several coun-
system where multiple industries interact. The tries have announced ambitious targets for
chapter also introduces further theoretical per- climate neutrality. The case study with three
spectives to examine the interaction between geographical layers explores how most of the
national level debates and global transition, energy systems, including power, heat, industry,
alongside a big data approach to enable studies and transport, could be decarbonized through
on how, for example, key words such as EVs, electrification. The year 2030 is examined to illus-
digitalization, and artificial intelligence occur in trate the short-term policy options and 2050
transition debates. In this way, the chapter pro- to scrutinize almost total decarbonization. The
vides new insights into how various technolo- chapter demonstrates how decarbonization
gies are debated on these levels and how may take place in techno-economic terms and
socially and political significant framings of the on this basis prepares the ground for questions
global technology landscape gradually emerge regarding policy targets, policy coordination
from such debates. between countries, as well as the design of

I. Framework for transition to electrification


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I. Framework for transition to electrification


C H A P T E R

2
Globally and locally applicable
technologies to accelerate electrification
C. Johannes Muth1, Pami Aalto1, Fanni Myll€ari2, Topi Rönkkö2,
Pirkko Harsia3
1
Faculty of Management and Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland; 2Faculty of
Engineering and Natural Sciences/Physics, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland; 3Faculty of Building
Services Engineering, Built Environment and Bioeconomy Unit, Tampere University of Applied Sciences,
Tampere, Finland

2.1 Introduction it for thousands of years. The first solution was


to burn biomass for heating, cooking, and
In this chapter we review different technolo- light. At the end of the 19th century, the first
gies for climate-neutral energy production. The electricity-generating wind machines, water tur-
review will cover well-established technologies, bines, and solar cells powered small utilities and
those in the acceleration phase, and emerging remote regions. Thereafter, the development of
“niche” technologies. From a global perspective, renewable energy has been tied to the availabil-
several technologies will be part of future energy ity and prices of fossil fuels. Several factors
systems, since in most societies no single energy paved the way for the dominance of carbon-
production technology can alone deliver climate based energy: the availability of fossil fuels and
neutrality. Furthermore, several technologies are advances in their exploitation, their relatively
required not only for the production phase but easy storability, and multiple uses, alongside
also for the distribution and consumption phases relatively low prices. This “carbon lock-in” refers
of energy systems (see Chapters 4e9). Technolo- to a situation where the diffusion of alternative
gies only become solutions once taken into use energy sources or technologies is high-risk,
and accepted by societies and stakeholders (see slow, and cost-intensive (see Unruh, 2000).
Chapter 1). Hence, renewables, excluding hydropower,
Our primary focus will be on renewable sour- long remained niche technologies primarily uti-
ces of energy and related technologies. It is lized in off-grid solutions, for example, in the
important to note that renewable energy is not Arctic, on remote islands, and at offshore loca-
a recent phenomenon, since humans have used tions. They were initially adopted on a larger

Electrification
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-822143-3.00005-6 25 © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
26 2. Globally and locally applicable technologies to accelerate electrification

scale in frontrunner countries such as Denmark energy systems and societies. This would mean
and Germany, as well as some US states, after extensive sector coupling whereby renewably
the 1970s oil crisis (see Chapter 4). produced electricity also becomes the main en-
Since the 2000s, increasing awareness of the ergy source in the transport, heat, and industrial
climate change effects of fossil fuels, coupled sectors, which so far have proven less amenable
with the vulnerabilities associated with fossil to reform. No single renewable energy technol-
fuel imports and a possible “peak oil” situation, ogy will suffice alone as each energy source
has caused attention to return to renewables. In and technology entails both benefits and con-
2019, the power-producing sector was the pri- straints. Thus, to achieve maximum impact,
mary source (41%) of energy-related CO2 emis- combining different technologies requires care-
sions (IEA, 2020b). Large-scale change in the ful examination, taking into account existing en-
power sector is hence crucial for a transition to ergy systems and society-specific needs.
climate neutrality, and renewable energy is Our chapter will cover the most promising
well suited for this purpose. Indeed, it is widely renewable energy technologies, namely wind
expected that by 2050 renewable energy will power, solar power, hydropower, marine power,
regain its historical primacy. The respective tech- several forms of bioenergy, and geothermal
nological solutions will range from small-scale power. We will also discuss small-scale nuclear
residential PV rooftop and micro-hydro systems reactors (SMRs), which do not represent renew-
to the gigantic Noor Solar Power Plant in able energy technology but which are low-
Morocco or the Three-Gorges Dam in China. At carbon in terms of power production and as
the same time, existing and proposed nuclear po- such offer one possible part-solution in the pur-
wer plants will be important part-solutions in suit of climate neutrality. A basic description of
several countries. each technology will be complemented by a dis-
Obviously, external events may decisively cussion on its accelerated deployment with an
shape the transformation. The lockdown occa- eye to meeting the emission reduction targets
sioned by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, for of the 2015 Paris Agreement. To this end we
example, reduced global economic activity, use the Sustainable Development Scenario
halted some energy projects, and temporarily (SDS) of the International Energy Agency (IEA)
decreased energy consumption as well as emis- as a shorthand. Particular emphasis is placed
sions. This event may afford an opportunity as on how the economic, social, and environmental
did the oil crisis of the 1970s (Aklin and Urpelai- implications of each technology shape the pol-
nen, 2018). For example, 30% of the EU’s icies needed for their accelerated development
2021e27 recovery package of EUR 1.8 trillion is (see Chapter 3).
earmarked for “green transition.”
With several renewable energy sources and
technologies available, it is important to 2.2 Wind power
acknowledge the global and local variation in
their applicability. Some are more global, some In 2019, wind power accounted for nearly 6%
more local. Nevertheless, in most countries, of global power generation. Wind power is
either wind or solar PV power technologies, or becoming more competitive and more widely
their combination, will assume key roles. adopted than hydropower, with 651 GW in ca-
Because wind and solar PV power are pacity and commercial wind power plants in at
“electricity-only” technologies and do not pro- least 102 countries (REN21, 2020). This accelera-
duce any heat, their increasing adoption will tion builds on the growing maturation of
strengthen the global trend of electrification of onshore wind power technologies. Offshore

I. Framework for transition to electrification


2.2 Wind power 27
applications are widely expected to mature dur- A wide selection of large onshore turbine de-
ing the 2020s (IEA, 2019, pp. 614e5). Both signs is available, suited for different locations,
onshore and offshore wind power are weather and ranging from 1.5 MW to over 6 MW capac-
(and to some extent season)-dependent technolo- ity. A typical system consists of a tower, rotor
gies. Wind power nowadays offers an inexpen- (blades and hub), nacelle covering the gearbox,
sive source of electrical energy in many electrical generator, and controls. As the gearbox
locations. However, its variability detracts from is the turbine’s most vulnerable part, direct-drive
its value for power and energy systems, but turbines have been developed with gearless
this can be partially compensated by flexible drive trains, increasing efficiency and reliability,
resources (see Chapters 5e6) including the elec- and reducing costs for maintenance and down-
trification of the other sectors (see Chapters time. However, such technologies entail higher
11e12). The text below reviews wind power investment costs (Klinger and M€ uller, 2017a).
technology in isolation from these options. Despite vast potential, several constraints
inhibit the acceleration of onshore wind power.
First, aging and uneconomical old turbines
must be removed and replaced (repowered) by
2.2.1 Onshore wind power newer generations (Nelson and Starcher, 2019).
In 2019, 95% of globally installed wind power Although this offers efficiency benefits, it neces-
capacity was onshore. Within that year, around sitates repermitting processes, which in many
51 GW of new wind power was deployed. China instances still need some streamlining. Second,
accounted for half of this, being the fastest- the new designs (direct-drive system with a per-
growing and largest wind power market and ex- manent magnet generator) require less maintai-
pected to reach more than 400 GW by 2030, from nance but large amounts of rare earth elements
229 GW in 2019. Europe is the second-largest, (circa 200 kg/MW REE);1 which raises the cost
albeit saturating market (REN21, 2020), with a of the system. Wind turbine systems are in gen-
high share of wind power already: in some coun- eral material-intensive, requiring large amounts
tries half of power generation and in many, over of steel and aluminum (towers), concrete (foun-
20%. Globally, however, onshore wind deploy- dations), copper (electronics), fiberglass (blades),
ment was not on track with the IEA’s Sustainable and other materials (Zepf, 2020). The incinera-
Development Scenario (SDS), which requires a tion of fiberglass upon the eventual decommis-
tripling of annual wind generation from sioning of the turbine produces high emissions,
1323 TWh in 2018 to 3749 TWh in 2030 (IEA, complicating the recycling of turbines from the
2020b). Accelerated deployment is nevertheless 1980 and 1990s (Albers et al., 2009). Third, the
possible, since in many regions the cost- adjustment of subsidy policies and the prolifera-
competitiveness of onshore wind is the best tion of subsidy-free deployment produces
among the alternatives to fossil fuels. To mea- intense price competition (see Chapter 4), chal-
sure this, it is commonplace to use the levelized lenging manufacturers and leading to market
cost of energy (LCOE) as a proxy, which yielded consolidation (REN21, 2020).
an average global cost of 0.053 USD/kWh for Fourth, numerous citizen initiatives oppose
onshore wind in 2019 (see Appendix 1). In gen- wind turbines due to the impact on people, wild-
eral, the costs are falling and, in several regions, life, and land use. Some of this criticism falls into
much lower. the “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) category, for

1
Neodymium (circa 170 kg/MW) and Dysprosium (circa 24 kg/MW) (Zepf, 2020).

I. Framework for transition to electrification


28 2. Globally and locally applicable technologies to accelerate electrification

example, arguments about wind turbines dis- The basic concept of offshore installations is
turbing the landscape, especially near human close to that of onshore turbines, although
settlements. There have also been allegations some new offshore systems utilize permanent
about health hazards due to low-frequency noise magnets in place of a gearbox. The more uniform
from the turbines (Usher, 2019), which, however, wind speeds on the sea not only offer greater
some studies report to be fairly low (see Chapter 4). wind resources but also cause lower turbulence,
Some environmental groups moreover point to increasing the lifetime of components (Dinh and
avian mortality caused by wind turbines. Yet McKoegh, 2019). Offshore installations run up to
the annual collision rates per turbine vary from 4500 full load hours per year, more than double
0.01 to 23, of which the highest figure was from that of onshore turbines (Klinger and M€ uller,
a turbine at a coastal site with a large population 2017b). The higher capacity factor and remote
of gulls, terns, and ducks (Drewitt and Langston, location allow large turbine sizes, with designs
2006). New turbines should therefore not be sited extending to over 14 MW in capacity with height
near birds’ migration pathways or habitat. How- and diameter spanning well over 200 m and ex-
ever, wind turbines account for the deaths of less pected to increase.
than 600,000 birds per year in the USA, signifi- The technical constraints increase with the
cantly lower than for cats (up to 4.7 billion/ water depth. Most of the technology for con-
year), buildings (365e988 million/year), or fossil structing the foundations of offshore turbines
fuel power plants (14 million/year) (Sovacool, comes from the oil and gas sector. From the
2013). At the same time, some opponents may typical foundation of a monopile bottom-fixed
simply have a vested interest in their backyard concept (<30 m), the trend is toward deeper wa-
or in competing technologies. ter offshore wind power plants based on tripods
(<50 m) or jacket structures (<60 m). Floating
designs allow the installation of wind turbine
structures in water depths of several hundred
2.2.2 Offshore wind power meters, offering wind exploitation in larger sea
The deployment of offshore wind power only areas (O’Kelly and Arshad, 2016). Such wind po-
began during the early 1990s. Despite its vast po- wer plants could, in principle, generate over 18
tential, it is only gradually becoming main- times of global electricity demand, which in
streamed. In 2019, the total installed capacity 2019 was around 27,000 TWh (IEA, 2020b; BP,
reached 29 GW (þ5.9 GW), with over 6000 tur- 2020).
bines connected to grids in 18 countries, most The main constraints for accelerated deploy-
in the UK, China, and Germany. ment include costs. In 2019, the global average
While this accounts less than 1% of global LCOE of approximately 0.115 USD/kWh for
electricity supply (REN21, 2020), the best new installations significantly exceeded that of
offshore wind sites in shallow water (<60 m) other renewable energies (see Appendix 1). The
and near the shore (<60 km) could potentially foundation represents only one driver of the
supply almost 36,000 TWh, which almost equals costs alongside exposure to strong waves and
the expected global electricity demand in 2040 high wind speeds, which cause increased mate-
(IEA, 2019). To meet the IEA’s SDS targets for rial and maintenance costs. Repair or restoration
2030, annual capacity additions would have to work is time-consuming and expensive due to
quadruple from 2019. The maturing of the tech- the remote location (Poudineh et al., 2017).
nology brings economies of scale, further sup- Offshore wind power plants also require longer
ported by standardization and industry and more expensive connections to onshore
clustering (IEA, 2020b). grids. In Germany and the Netherlands auctions

I. Framework for transition to electrification


2.3 Solar energy 29
have produced projects where the sole subsidy energy systems such as concentrated solar power
has consisted of grid connection provided to (CSP) plants exist in several countries with inten-
the sea. Yet in most regions offshore wind power sive radiation and little precipitation. However,
is expected to remain costlier than onshore but most of the existing applications are solar PV sys-
coming close to onshore installations with its tems with variable output similar to the case of
less controversial local impacts. wind power. CSP plants, however, can have en-
Some environmental and citizen groups have ergy storage features that increase their value as
nevertheless opposed offshore wind power. a flexible resource for energy systems.
Although the noise impact on the coastal popu-
lation is minimal, underwater noise from the 2.3.1 Solar PV power
construction and operation of offshore wind tur-
bines can cause behavioral disturbance or even At the turn of the 2020s, solar PV was the
damage to marine mammals’ hearing (Tougaard world’s fastest-growing energy technology in
and Mikaelsen, 2018). Offshore wind power terms of absolute generation growth (when
plants near coastlines may moreover give rise considering onshore and offshore wind sepa-
to opposition from the tourism industry. rately). Solar PV is widely expected to become
Accelerated offshore wind deployment ulti- the main energy source globally by the 2050s.
mately depends on long-term governmental In 2019, the generation of solar electricity
strategies, including policies to support increased by 22% (þ131 TWh) to 720 TWh, rep-
technology-specific capacity tenders, and financial resenting close to 3% of the global power gener-
aid and regulatory efforts to support grid develop- ation (REN21, 2020; IEA, 2020b). Together with
ment (REN21, 2020). For example, the EU has biogas, it is the only renewable energy on track
acknowledged the potential of offshore wind, with the IEA’s SDS target requiring average
and to meet the Paris targets, the Union would annual growth of 15% to reach 3268 TWh in
have to install between 230 and 450 GW of capac- 2030 (IEA, 2020b).
ity by 2050 (European Commission, 2018b). This From 2000, the global installed solar PV ca-
would necessitate opening sea areas for wind pacity rose from 1.3 GW to 627 GW in 2019,
exploitation that are currently earmarked for na- boosted by increasing efficiency and the use of
ture conservation, fishing, or military purposes. economic instruments such as feed-in tariffs
(REN21, 2020; see also Chapter 4). By 2020, at
least 39 countries had a cumulative capacity of
2.3 Solar energy 1 GW or more, with most installations in Asia
and the largest capacity found in China,
The largest energy source on earth is electro- 205 GW in 2019, followed by the USA (76 GW),
magnetic radiation emitted by the sun. The so- Japan (63 GW), and Germany (49 GW). China
called insolation or irradiance reaches up to is also a global leader in PV manufacturing
1000 W/m2 depending on several factors such (REN21, 2020). However, its rise has affected
as time of day, season, location, topography, the foreign (economic) trade interests of its com-
and weather (Zekry et al., 2018). The term solar petitors. In 2013, the EUdformerly the leader in
energy refers to the energy harvested directly this marketdaccused China of illegally subsidiz-
from the sun using photovoltaic (PV) cells, con- ing its solar PV manufacturers and imposed tar-
centrators, or other devices to generate electricity iffs on Chinese exports to Europe. In 2018, a
or produce heat. Silicon-based solar PV cells are minimum price for solar PV panels was finally
a mature, globally applied technology. Applica- established. Similar disputes occurred between
tions range from small residential rooftop sys- China and the USA during the 2010s (Hajdukie-
tems to utility-scale power plants. Solar thermal wicz and Pera, 2020).

I. Framework for transition to electrification


30 2. Globally and locally applicable technologies to accelerate electrification

Solar cells are based on the photovoltaic effect Solar PV power is also applicable to remote
which converts electromagnetic radiation (light) areas and developing countries with no strong
into electric current (power) through the absorp- central grids. Off-grid applications can range
tion of photons by a semiconducting material from a single home to a village and on to mega-
(e.g., silicon). In other words, solar energy is con- watt scale installations. Most off-grid (“behind-
verted directly into electricity with no emissions the-meter”) systems can be connected with a
or noise. In 2017, around 95% of all panels pro- battery or function as a hybrid power system
duced used silicon variations (Fraunhofer ISE, combined with a fuel generator to ensure con-
2019), with polycrystalline used in more than stant power supply. With grid connection, they
half of these. It is cheaper and causes less silicon can sell excess energy (“net-metering”). These
waste than monocrystalline, but its temperature so-called producer-consumers (prosumers) have
tolerance and efficiency (11%e16%) are low. significantly driven the market in Europe and
Monocrystallines last for up to 25 years, have the USA despite the small size of their systems,
high-efficiency rates (15%e20%), but are expen- often called distributed generation. Commercial-
sive (IRENA, 2019a; Pavlovic, 2020). Thin-film scale applications can supply electricity to build-
solar cells are the third-most used PV technol- ings or businesses and include both off-grid and
ogy. They offer a flexible material but have low on-grid types. Utility-scale applications feature
efficiency (7%e12%, Fraunhofer ISE, 2019; grid-connected production with an installed
IRENA, 2019a). Ongoing RDI work is devel- capacity of at least 1 MW but often reach over
oping other primary materials (e.g., organic or 500 MW, combining millions of panels and
perovskite) and building-integrated photovol- stretching over an area of several thousands of
taics (BIPV) such as flexible panels, transparent hectares (Usher, 2019). In such systems, solar
solar cells for windows, and vertically installed power in fact features centralized rather than
PV panels (IRENA, 2019a). However, energy distributed generation.
analysis should consider that laboratory tests Floating solar photovoltaic (FPV) started as
usually produce better results than actual small-scale pilot projects (20 kW) in 2007, reach-
installations. ing utility scale (150 MW) within a decade. In
The high learning curve of solar PV and over- 2019, 35 countries had such systems with a total
supplies in China have significantly reduced the capacity of 2.4 GW, and China dominating the
cost of solar panels from 300 USD/Watt in the market (REN21, 2020). FPVs are driven by land
1950s to 2 USD/Watt in 2010 and 0.36 USD/ constraints in densely populated areas. Their
Watt in 2019 (Penna, 2020; REN21, 2020). In benefits include readily accessible cooling,
addition, operation and maintenance costs are reduced evaporation of freshwater reservoirs,
low. The first unsubsidized solar PV systems and compatibility with existing hydropower
had bid prices below 0.020 USD/kWh (REN21, infrastructure. However, they need to be robust
2020). The global average LCOE remained to withstand waves and strong winds. Problems
much higher at around 0.068 USD/kWh (see Ap- include limited experience and proper licensing
pendix 1). The costs depend on the level of solar and permitting (REN21, 2020; IRENA, 2019a).
radiation, the maturity of the PV market, and the The environmental constraints of solar PV
local policy environment. In many developing relate to land-use requirements unless incorpo-
regions, specific financial and institutional con- rated in buildings and to the waste in panel pro-
straints may include inadequate financing; lack duction and its energy intensity. Furthermore,
of available transmission capacity for larger pro- solar panels contain toxic materials (e.g., lead,
jects; lack of skilled workforce, information, and cadmium) that may be washed out by rainwater
consumer awareness (Pedraza, 2015). from panels damaged during natural events

I. Framework for transition to electrification


Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Ampio cappuccio gli ricade sulla fronte, interamente celandogli la
faccia, se non che trasforato in due parti lascia libero vibrare lo
sguardo. Impugna colla destra una spada che tien sollevata in atto
imperante, minaccioso.
Ad un di lui cenno, mortale grandine di dardi e di sassi piomba sugli
attoniti guerrieri. Scossi questi e furenti pei colpi che li flagellano,
non badando a periglio, entrano nelle spumose acque del torrente e
lo varcano, trovando però non pochi ne’ suoi gorghi la morte.
Pervenuti al di là, svaginati gli acciari, s’arrampicano su pei greppi e
le rupi onde raggiungere e punire gli audaci feritori. Ma ad un nuovo
segno del loro misterioso condottiero, gli alpigiani, che di semplici
panni coverti mai sostenere potevano la pugna da vicino con nimici
tutti irti e lucenti di ferro, guadagnano le alture e spariscono.
I Sanguigni dopo tal fatto tennero tra essi consiglio; alcuni opinarono
doversi far ritorno; ma i più, inanimiti dalle parole dell’intrepido
Ubaldo, ripeterono il voto di dar compimento all’impresa e
procedettero arditi, benchè più cauti, nell’interno della valle.
Non sempre lucente splendette l’estivo raggio. Si viddero a mezzo il
dì passare di prospetto frettolose le nubi, ed accavallarsi poscia sulle
erette e nude cime delle torreggianti montagne. Vaste volute salirono
a coprire la faccia del sole: cominciò a fremere il vento e sorse indi a
poco il soffio delle propinque ghiacciaje, che rimescolando quelle
masse di nebbia, abbassavale talora sino al fondo della valle.
Camminano i guerrieri taciturni in ordinanza lungo i margini scoscesi
della Sesia che rumoreggia più cupa. Ma avanzatisi di poco, freccie
e pietre scendono a furia dall’alto e molti gravemente ne percuotono
per gli elmi e le corazze. Vano è per essi alzare gli scudi e dar di
piglio alle spade: invisibile è il nemico.
Squarciasi però ad un tratto il vaporoso velo e mirano sull’irradiato
fianco del monte la schiera formidabile del camuffato Monaco che
stende ver loro la punta del ferro e li fa segno agli incessanti colpi.
Trascorsi brevi momenti si ricongiungono e frammischiano le rotte
nubi e tutto s’invola di nuovo alla vista.
Uno sgomento s’impossessa dell’animo dei guerrieri che vorrebbero
arretrare, ma imperterrito Ubaldo fa sacramento di muovere da solo
al castello se i suoi sono sì vigliacchi da abbandonarlo. Nessuno più
ardisce mostrarsi restìo e riprendono più spediti il viaggio.
Continuamente or da destra or da manca essi vengono saettati, e
sempre al sollevarsi delle nebbie scorgono il Monaco colle sue
bande che sul pendìo dei monti laterali procede a pari passo con
essi.
Raggiunta finalmente è la meta, chè tocco hanno il confine della
valle. Le montagne di fianco divergono allargandosi in anfiteatro
chiuso in fondo dal Rosa che innalza al cielo i suoi candidi gioghi. Al
principiare dell’erta sorge un quadrato castello che va agli angoli ed
al centro munito di rotonde torri colle acute piramidali sommità
vestite di piombo. Ne bagna un lato la nascente Sesia e dietro è
cinto da una selva di larici i cui rami frangiati in verdebruno stanno
vergenti al suolo. È il castello de’ Boniprandi.
Finiva il giorno; eransi dissipate le nebbie, taceva il vento. Quasi si
fosse sciolto nell’aure o l’avessero inghiottito le rupi, il Monaco fatale
era scomparso con tutti i suoi e completa ivi regnava la solitudine.
Gli ultimi fuochi del sole, abbandonato il rimanente della terra,
splendevano ancora sulle nevi dell’alpe e lo pingevano di quel colore
soave che gli fe’ prendere il nome dal più vago de’ fiori.
Condusse Ubaldo i guerrieri e li collocò a conveniente distanza
intorno al castello la cui ferrata porta era serrata saldamente; benchè
non si scorgesse per le mura o sulle torri traccia di sentinella o
d’abitante.
Furono alzate le tende; s’accesero ampie cataste, e molti militi
raccolti nel bosco de’ larici trascelsero gli alberi che venir dovevano il
mattino atterrati onde formare le macchine murali. Inoltratasi la notte,
poste che furono le scolte di spazio in ispazio, posarono i guerrieri
presso i fuochi che s’andavano spegnendo, e giacquero nel sonno.
Quando venne l’ora che salita la luna sopra le più alte vette mandò
obbliquo dai nereggianti monti l’argenteo raggio al fondo della valle,
e biancheggiarono le merlate muraglie, splendettero i plumbei
culmini delle torri, l’audace Ubaldo, cui agitava il desìo di penetrare
l’arcano di che pareva cinto quel castello, volle mirarlo vicino mentre
tutto era silenzio. Colà quindi s’avvia a lenti passi, quand’ecco al suo
appressarsi sorgere sulle mura il Monaco tremendo.
Arretra Ubaldo d’un passo, ma poi quasi da malìa incatenato si
ferma, fiso tenendo lo sguardo a contemplarlo. Terribile allora non
era quanto misterioso il di lui aspetto; le fosche lane che
ricoprivamo, fatte men rudi dalla pallida notturna luce, segnavano
perfetti contorni e parevano l’involucro d’un genio in umane forme.
Immobile rimaneva in mesto e fiero atteggiamento.
Ubaldo sbandita prestamente ogni apprensione, alzata la destra con
voce ferma, esclamò: «Invano, chiunque tu sii, ti ostini a difendere
queste mura: esse hanno ricettato l’iniquo nostro nemico e debbono
cadere. Cedi ai valorosi Sanguigni; cedi e risparmia la vita dei tuoi»
— Giammai — fu l’unica parola che dalle labbra del Monaco
pronunciare s’intese.
Due giorni dopo ogni cosa trovossi in pronto per l’assalto. Le mura
del castello difese da risoluti alpigiani non offrirono agevole
conquisto ai guerrieri d’Ubaldo. Il combattimento fu lungo,
sanguinosissimo. Il Monaco presente per tutto infiammava il
coraggio dei vassalli di Guido che tenevano con eroiche prove
lontani gli assalitori. Ma dai cozzi tremendi d’un ferreo ariete
sconquassata va a terra la porta e i guerrieri si scagliano precipitosi
per entro, nel tempo stesso che superato il muro in più parti altri
padroneggiano il vallo. Si pugna pei portici e nel cortile. Ubaldo che
all’entrare erasi scontrato nel Monaco, nella folla lo perdette di vista.
Ansioso di rinvenirlo ascese le scale seguìto dai più fidi, e lo scorse
all’ingresso della sala d’armi circondato dai pochi tra suoi
sopravvissuti. Questi vengono tosto atterrati dai guerrieri e le spade
del Monaco e d’Ubaldo s’incrocicchiano e si ribattono. Ma sia
lassezza o riportate ferite debole è il braccio del Monaco che
l’avversario incalza vigorosamente. Si va desso ritraendo,
difendendosi, sin che urta in una porta che si spalanca, e nel punto
stesso Ubaldo d’un colpo furioso lo trapassa col ferro. Dà un grido,
vacilla e abbandonata la spada cade ai piedi d’un letto su cui giace
un cadavere.
Commosso e inorridito Ubaldo impone agli accorsi guerrieri di
porgere ogni aita al languente. Vien egli tosto rialzato, gli si
sciolgono le lane, si rigetta dalla fronte il cappuccio, e... oh vista!...
un volume di treccie scende lungo il candido collo sulla maglia
d’acciajo... È la contessa Adelberta! Riapre gli occhi, si sforza a
sollevarsi, e si trascina verso le coltri, ove ricadendo spira sopra la
salma dello sposo, che sottratto vivente alle acque del fiume, venne
dai fidi vassalli portato al suo castello in cui dalla ferita morì.
Ai Sanguigni fece poscia pagar cara quella vittoria il Torniello, che
scampato di là seppe ottenere da Napo Torriano protezione ed
armati.

FINE.
MACARUFFO VENTURIERO
O LA CORTE DEL DUCA FILIPPO MARIA VISCONTI

Portano a’ lor cappucci le visiere


E mantelline a la cavalleresca
E capezzali, e strette alle ventriere
Coi petti vaghi alla guisa inghilesca
Qualunque donna è più gaja e più fresca
Più tosto il fa per esser fra le belle.
Pecor. Giorn. XVIII.

Se come vennero personificate altre città e nazioni nascesse in capo


ad un poeta epico o lirico o a chi si voglia, di personificare Milano
onde far narrare da lui stesso le proprie vicende dal suo nascere
sino ai nostri dì, egli è certo che s’aprirebbe un campo di cui non vi
sarebbe il più vasto per esaurire tutti gli stili, tutte le immagini, le
figure, i giuochi d’affetto, insomma tutto quanto è possible ottenere
coll’arte del dire. Esso infatti avrebbe nel suo amplissimo monologo
a descrivere i Romani in tutte le fasi della loro grandezza; farebbe
passare in mostra i Galli e i Germani qui discesi, prima seminudi
colle barbe arruffate, armati di clavi e di scuri; poi ricoperti di fitte
maglie e pesanti armature colle lande e le mazze; indi calati di nuovo
con penne agli elmi, loriche dorate, conducendo pesanti bombarde;
ritornati in seguito con cappelli a tre punte e larghi stivali, portando
moschetti e colubrine; e discesi finalmente colle assise succinte, la
bajonetta al fucile, le artiglierie volanti. Avrebbe eziandio a ragionare
a lungo della baldanza spagnuola, e far cenno persino delle aquile
russe e delle lancie cosacche.
Il proposto soggetto dovrebbe poi essere specialmente fecondo di
quelle pagine che la moderna scuola oltremontana chiama palpitanti,
poichè racchiudono descritte con tutta evidenza le angoscie della
disperazione, gli strazj della tortura, del fuoco e dei patiboli. Poche
città per vero dire ebbero nei fasti de’ tormenti a vantarne del genere
della quaresima di Galeazzo o dei forni di Monza, senza parlare
delle gabbie di ferro, delle tanaglie, degli aculei, delle ruote, ch’erano
leggiadrìe sociali, un giorno comuni a tutti i popoli europei. — E chi
potrebbe in tale argomento dimenticare i mastini del duca Giovan
Maria, che venivano unicamente nutriti onde squarciassero gli
uomini, e coi quali inseguiva di notte i cittadini nelle contrade a guisa
di animali feroci? — Il solo nome di lui faceva inorridire, eppure (ch’il
crederebbe!) egli contava appena ventiquattr’anni quando cadde
esanime sotto il ferro de’ congiurati.
Non erano trascorsi che due giorni da che aveva resa l’anima quel
giovine sanguinario, secondo fra i Visconti nella linea Ducale [2],
allorchè l’eroe di questa narrazione, Macaruffo, veniva di buon
mattino alla volta di Milano con un drappello de’ suoi commilitoni,
tutti soldati venturieri, appartenenti alle bande di Facino Cane, il più
celebre e possente condottiero di ventura che fosse allora in Italia.
Il loro numero era di diciotto o venti; marciavano a piedi, disgiunti e
senz’ordine. Portavano gli elmi, le corazze, i cosciali, ma scorgevasi
che non curavano gran fatto il pulimento e la lucentezza di quegli
arnesi, poichè oltre d’essere pieni d’intacchi e d’ammaccature
apparivano tutti neri e irruginiti. Tenevano le spade a bandoliera e
recavano neglettamente abbandonate sulle spalle all’indietro chi le
alabarde e chi le partigiane.
Macaruffo fra quegli uomini d’armi poteva chiamarsi primus inter
pares, vale a dire, che sebbene non avesse un grado speciale,
poichè quella milizia non ammetteva distinzioni subalterne, pure a
causa della predilezione del Conte Facino e della confidenza che gli
era accordata, godeva verso gli altri di una supremazìa che sapeva
esercitare a tempo debito, e, vuolsi dirlo, con profitto di tutti. Le sue
forme però erano poco vantaggiose; una rilevata prominenza che
aveva sul dosso lo faceva apparire tozzo della persona; il suo volto
abbrunito dal sole mostrava lineamenti irregolari e rozzi sebbene i
suoi occhi fossero sommamente vivi e penetranti. Era dotato di
grande scaltrezza; instancabile nella fatica, d’un coraggio senza
limiti, e consacrato con tutta l’anima agli interessi del suo Capo, di
cui la moglie, la contessa Beatrice di Tenda, era stata sua antica
signora.
Nato egli nelle alpi marittime entro il castello dei Lascari conti di
Tenda, era cresciuto insieme alla Contessa, e fanciullo soleva
prestarle ufficio di palafreniero, di guida, di porta-astore, quand’ella
seguiva la caccia nei monti nativi, solendo ella trasceglierlo fra gli
altri valletti, quantunque deforme, siccome il più pronto in ubbidire e
il più destro di tutti. Divenuta sposa di Facino Cane, Beatrice ottenne
dal padre che Macaruffo facesse parte del suo seguito; onde questi
le stette lungo tempo ancora d’appresso, e palesava per lei in ogni
incontro, misto alle memorie di patria e di famiglia, un sentimento di
riconoscenza indistruttibile. Da ciò più grande sembrava rendersi il
suo attaccamento verso lo stesso condottiero Facino, pel quale
sentiva eziandìo quell’enfatica venerazione che sempre ispira nel
soldato avido di gloria un capitano esperto, ardimentoso, che lo
conduce spesso alla vittoria.
Camminava quella mattina Macaruffo di buon passo innanzi agli altri,
e sembrava assorto in pensieri di tale natura che tutta gli
occupassero la mente. La novella dell’uccisione del Duca era
pervenuta al suo orecchio nella rocca di Canturio in Brianza, ove
Facino lo aveva spedito coi compagni tre mesi addietro a rinforzo dei
signori di quel paese, di fazione ghibellina, minacciati dai guelfi
d’Incino; e quasi contemporaneamente aveva ricevuto avviso da
parte di Facino stesso, il quale trovavasi ammalato in Pavia,
d’abbandonare quella rocca e recarsi nel castello di Milano, lo che
appunto eseguiva.
Dopo avere alquanto meditato tra sè allentò il passo, e lasciatosi
raggiungere dal soldato che gli veniva subito dietro, gli disse a
mezza voce:
«Che ne pensi, Uguccio, di queste novità?
«Io per me ci ho un gusto pazzo (rispose l’altro) ch’abbiano fatta la
festa a quel ragazzaccio frenetico di Giovan Maria.
«Sì: meritava veramente di finir male i suoi giorni. Ha fatto
ammazzare tanti bravi signori e cavalieri che a dirlo è incredibile.
«Per lui far morire un cristiano se lo aveva come una bagatella. È
arrivato per sino a dare il tossico alla stessa sua madre in Monza.
«Lo so; e poi uccise il Pusterla come se ne fosse stato il reo.
«Altro che uccidere! lo fece mangiare dai cani insieme coi suoi figli.
Ma per provare s’era un’anima scellerata, senti che brutto giuoco si
prese un giorno di me. Trovandomi io colle squadre a Milano, il
nostro conte Facino mi comandò lo seguissi al palazzo negli
appartamenti della Duchessa, ch’egli si recava a visitare. Entrati colà
m’appostò per guardia in un camerone a cui mettevano capo due
scale. Io passeggiava quivi sbadatamente con questa partigiana così
in ispalla, gettando un’occhiata di quando in quando entro i vetri
della finestra d’una stanza ove stavano alcune damigelle che
attendevano a varii lavori. Ad un tratto sento un abbajamento
infernale e vedo comparire da una scala e corrermi addosso sei o
sette mastini che sembravano lupi affamati. Balzarono per
addentarmi al collo, alle braccia, alle gambe e gran mercè ch’aveva
l’armatura intiera colla buffa al viso e le manopole, altrimenti non
avanzava di me neppure un osso; intanto ch’io mi dibatteva a tutte
forze contro quelle bestie inferocite, indovina?... il Duca stava ad uno
spiatojo e mi guardava ridendo smascellatamente insieme a quel
satanasso di Squarcia Giramo. Liberatomi appena dai mastini ritornò
il nostro Conte, e vedendomi ansante e rabbuffato mi addomandò
che fosse avvenuto; io glielo narrai, ed egli portossi tosto dal Duca e
lo minacciò di unirsi ai guelfi e di assediarlo nel suo castello, se non
rendeva tostamente ragione dell’ingiuria a me fatta che prendeva
come fatta a sè stesso, ed ebbe termine la faccenda con dieci fiorini
d’oro dati a me, e cento colpi di curlo al canattiere che non aveva
una colpa al mondo.
«Se non fosse stato il nostro Conte avrebbero invece appiccato te
per avere malconci i cani del Duca, e sarebbe stato dato un premio a
quell’altro. Questi principi della razza del biscione sono tutti d’una
pasta velenosa, ed io li odio a morte, e ne vorrei vedere distrutta la
stirpe. Quando spirò Giovan Galeazzo primo Duca, che fu padre di
questo Giovan Maria, le nostre bande trovavansi a Parma e mi
ricordo che il nostro Conte ragionando colla signora Beatrice
manifestò certi pensieri sopra Milano, che mi davano la più gran
consolazione del mondo, e sì che a quel tempo il Conte non era
padrone di Pavia, Alessandria, Novara e tante altre città che
possiede adesso e da cui può trarre molto maggior numero d’uomini
e di danari.
«Per San Matteo! (esclamò Uguccio) quello era un colpo degno di
lui: oh perchè non l’ha tentato?
«Nacquero in quell’incontro altri trambusti gravissimi e dovette
recarsi altrove. Il bel momento (proseguì Macaruffo più piano, con un
sorriso significante e aggrottando le ciglia) il bel momento, caro
Uguccio, sarebbe questo! Chi ha forze bastevoli per poterglisi
opporre? I ghibellini sono per lui; Ottobon Terzo, il Casati e gli altri
guelfi se li mangia come la balena i pesciolini. Filippo Maria ch’è
fratello di quegli che hanno scannato e che dovrebbe diventar Duca,
se lo tiene in Pavia nelle sue unghie. Tutto presentemente andrebbe
a meraviglia, ma farebbe d’uopo muoversi alla spedita onde non
lasciar campo ai partigiani di Filippo d’unirsi e farsi forti.
«Ti giuro che per un’impresa di questa sorta non vi sarebbe uno solo
de’ nostri uomini che non ci metterebbe allegramente la pelle.
Diventare padroni di Milano! d’una cittadona sì splendida, ricca, così
piena di belle donne!
«E salutare per duca il nostro Conte, e per duchessa la signora
Beatrice. Ella sì saprebbe bene occupare quel posto come si deve.
Io darei il sangue per vederle in capo la corona ducale. Mi punge
però il pensiero che pare che il demonio vi ci si caccia per entro,
poichè il messo venuto jeri sera mi disse che appunto in questi giorni
il nostro Conte assalito dalla sua doglia al fianco, giace tormentato
senza potersi levare.
«La doglia che lo prende di consueto. Ma sai che suole presto
sparire, e giuocherei che a quest’ora è al tutto risanato e cammina e
cavalca come potremmo far noi.
«Così fosse, che non frapporrebbe indugio a porsi a capo alle
squadre, per venire a dar l’ultimo scacco alla malnata vipera
divoratrice.
Facendo tali e simili discorsi erano giunti a vista di Milano, ed
appressatisi alla Porta Comasina trovarono chiuso il ponte e calata
la saracinesca, onde dovettero penare assai a farsi aprire ed
intromettere coi compagni nella città.
Nelle contrade era un subuglio, una confusione, un movimento di
popolo straordinario. Pressochè tutti, i signori, gli artieri, la plebe
mostravansi muniti d’armi e ve n’aveva d’ogni specie; parte di essi
n’andavano in compagnie ordinate; parte movevano in turba per le
vie. Gli uni passavano gridando — Viva Estore; vivano i figli di
Bernabò; viva Baggi e il Pusterla che ci hanno vendicati [3]. — Altri
seguivano imprecando invece morte a questi ed acclamando —
Filippo Maria legittimo Signore — Alcuni volevano s’andasse ad
assalire il castello per ammazzare il Marliano che lo teneva per
Filippo, altri all’incontro facendo sventolare le bandiere cercavano di
formare grossa massa onde muovere alla volta di Pavia a prendere il
nuovo Duca e qui condurlo in trionfo. Ve n’avevano eziandio di quelli
che non andavano esclamando che — Viva Milano — e volevano si
proclamasse la repubblica come nei primi tempi, ma questi essendo
in pochissimo numero non esercitavano sulla moltitudine alcuna
influenza. Per le piazze e pei crocicchii, sui gradini delle colonne o
sovra carri e trabacche eranvi frati, magistrati, cavalieri che
arringavano a tutta voce il popolo; ciascuno però oppostamente ed a
norma soltanto dell’interesse di quei capi il cui dominio poteva
essere per loro una fonte di migliori speranze. Or qua or là udivansi
urli furiosi ed acutissime grida, e le campane di questa o di quella
parrocchia suonare a stormo, e ciò perchè scontrandosi le contrarie
fazioni nascevano risse sanguinose, e si moltiplicavano gli
ammazzamenti. Insomma tutto concorreva a presentare il quadro
d’una città senza alcun regime, abbandonata al furore dei partiti e
nella quale l’ambizione, la forza, l’astuzia gareggiano con ogni
mezzo onde afferrare il potere.
Il nostro venturiero Macaruffo sebbene durasse non poca fatica ad
aprirsi la via col suo drappello frammezzo a tanto tumulto, pure
godeva internamente alla vista di quel disordine ch’ei sperava
propizio al progetto che aveva supposto volersi eseguire dal suo
signore. Due o tre volte fu serrato d’appresso dalla plebe che lo
inseguiva gridando — Dàlli al gobbo co’ suoi sgherri; ammazza,
ammazza — ma le punte delle partigiane abbassate a tempo, le
fisonomie intrepide e risolute, il non avere assise che indicassero a
quale delle parti appartenevano li sottrassero dal periglio.
Pervenuti al castello di Porta Giobia, n’andarono lungo la fossa sino
al Portello detto del Pozzo: quivi Macaruffo diede alla scolta che
stava sul battifolle la parola d’ordine; questa comunicò l’avviso al
Castellano e fu indi a poco calata la trave e que’ soldati ricevuti
dentro.
Il dì seguente Macaruffo avido ed impaziente di conoscere a qual
termine inclinassero le cose andò con arte interrogando or questo or
quell’altro de’ capitani di masnada ch’erano nel castello, ma tutti
ignoravano al pari di lui la somma delle vicende, nè potevano che
abbandonarsi a fantastiche congetture. Vedendo riuscire vana
l’opera sua, salì sul vallo, e quivi appoggiato neghittosamente alla
torre fisava sulle campagne che gli si stendevano alla vista, uno
sguardo acuto per iscoprire se mai qualche vessillo spuntasse sulla
via dalla parte di mezzodì, o si vedessero luccicare punte di lancie
od elmi, ch’ei teneva per fermo che il suo conte Facino non dovesse
star guari a presentarsi sotto le mura di Milano e non dubitava, a
causa di quanto aveva veduto il giorno passato, che, compresse le
fazioni, si sarebbe prontamente impossessato della città.
Ogni qual volta questo pensiero gli si affacciava alla mente, i bruni e
ruvidi tratti del suo viso esprimevano una soddisfazione, un contento
singolarissimo. Ed in ciò, all’opposto di quello che naturalmente
arguire si dovea, l’orgoglio e la brama delle prede o degli onori
avevano lievissima o nessuna parte. Un sentimento indiviso, senza
speranze, celato all’aria stessa, pur sempre vivo e profondo quanto
essere lo può in anima umana, formava da lunghi anni la cura
assidua e l’unico movente di quel Venturiero, il cui sformato aspetto,
i costumi e la vita sprezzata e soldatesca facevano rassembrare il
più duro ed insensibile degli uomini.
Mentre pure guardando dall’elevato baluardo nei sottoposti piani
lasciava errare lo spirito fra le sue consuete idee, che i casi recenti
vestivano di più lusinghieri colori, ode venire dalla parte della città
rumore di grida festose e di plausi vivissimi. Discende frettoloso dal
vallo, e scontra nel cortile vairii cittadini pervenuti a fatica a
ricoverarsi nel castello, i quali circondati da una folla d’uomini d’armi
narravano, che all’alba di quello stesso giorno era venuto a Milano
da Monza Estore Visconti con molti armati ed aveva sconfitto i
ghibellini che parteggiavano per Filippo Maria; e che sendo già gli
animi disposti in favore di Estore dalle calorose ed incessanti
prediche di frate Bartolomeo Caccia, presso i popolari avuto in
estimazione di santo, venne il medesimo accolto e proclamato
signore di Milano insieme al nipote Giovan Carlo Visconti nato dal
sangue di Bernabò.
A tale notizia Macaruffo indispettì gravemente, ma pure non depose
la lusinga che da un istante all’altro potessero arrivare le masnade
del conte Facino a rovesciare quella nuova signorìa, priva d’ogni
valido appoggio ed alla quale rimaneva a compiere la più ardua
impresa ch’era quella d’impadronirsi del castello.
Assiso la sera con Uguccio sopra un pancone presso la porta dello
stemma (la maggiore della fortezza, dalla larga volta della quale
pendeva accesa un’affumicata lucerna), andava ragionando sui fatti
stati riportati là dentro, ed esponeva con fervore gli argomenti che
s’aveva per non dubitare che il loro Condottiero avrebbe mosso il
campo ed ottenuta la vittoria. Interruppe quell’animato dialogo la
voce della sentinella che s’udì dallo spalto annunziare che
s’appressava al castello un soldato a cavallo. Tosto l’araldo
s’affaccia alla feritoja del ponte, e vedendo giungere vicino il
cavaliere, gli grida chi sia, e cosa voglia. «Sono messaggiero e reco
dispacci da Pavia» fu la risposta che venne data. Il capitano d’armi
fece disporre gli arcieri di guardia in ordinanza, poi ordinò
s’abbassasse il picciolo ponte levatojo laterale, e il messaggiero
entrò.
Appena ebb’egli posto piede a terra, e consegnato all’araldo un
involto suggellato di carte dirette al Castellano, il nostro Venturiero e
il compagno gli balzarono con tutta cupidigia d’intorno, giacchè in lui
riconobbero un commilitone, un uomo delle loro bande a cavallo.
«E così vengono i nostri? — gli domandarono sommessamente ad
una voce.
«Chi diavolo volete che sappia se si va o si viene; per me credo che
sia tutto finito.
«Il Conte non vorrebbe forse...
«Oh! con lui a quest’ora già si sarebbero fatte gran cose.
«Ma dunque perchè non si muove?
«Perchè non si muove?... Oh bella!... domandate a un morto perchè
si sta fermo.
«Che?... dici tu il vero?... (chiesero pure entrambi colpiti come da un
fulmine).
«E voi non lo sapete?... Pur troppo è la verità!... Il nostro povero
Conte chiuse gli occhi per sempre l’altro jeri a sera.
«Io non posso persuadermene (esclamò Uguccio).
«L’ho veduto io nel suo palazzo in Pavia disteso sopra un catafalco
col padiglione di broccato oscuro ricoperto delle sue armi più ricche.
Tutti gli uomini delle squadre recavansi a rimirarlo, e vi dico ch’era
una compassione a pensare che un battagliero come il nostro Conte
dovesse essere serrato giù a marcire fra quattro pietre. Per noi la
sua perdita è la piu grande delle disgrazie. Egli era la perla de’
condottieri di ventura; il soldato con esso lui doveva bensì menare
delle braccia, ma poteva poi essere certo del fatto suo, e le coreggie
si foderavano spesso di buoni zecchini. I principi, le città andavano a
gara onde trarlo dalla loro, e per averlo bisognava che mettessero lì
pile d’oro e d’argento da riempierne le staja.
«Quando però egli s’era collocato agli stipendi d’una parte ci si
adoperava davvero (disse Uguccio), e chi l’assoldava poteva
incominciare a cantar vittoria; nè egli ritiravasi colle schiere prima
che si ponesse capo alla guerra, come fecero il Branda e molt’altri, i
quali dopo numerate le caparre passarono co’ loro uomini dal lato
del nemico perchè offriva più grosse paghe.
«No: il conte Facino non commise mai di queste ribalderie. A Novi,
Ziaratone che non fece per toglierlo al marchese Teodoro? Soltanto
per determinarlo a levarsi dall’assedio gli promise in danaro il carico
di quattro muli, e davagli il figlio in ostaggio. Ma tutto fu inutile, anzi ti
ricorderai che Ziaratone rimase ucciso nell’assalto da Facino stesso.
«E fu adunque quella maledetta doglia nel fianco la cagione dalla
morte del nostro Conte?
«Ohibò: i signori della veste negra, i dottori, che in Pavia son più
numerosi delle zanzare, sostengono che è morto per il colpo nella
testa che prese due anni sono qua in Milano, quando a motivo della
sommossa del popolo, spingendo a corsa il cavallo, urtò nell’arco
della porta interna del palagio del Duca, e perdette molto sangue.
Vogliono che quella botta macinasse dentro dentro, sin che gli diede
l’ultima stretta.
«Qual malavventura!... Ora che non abbiamo più il nostro capo che
faremo noi? (proferì Uguccio con voce addolorata)... Staremo qui
con questi Visconti a rischio qualche giorno da farci mangiare dai
cani, e senza sapere nemmeno chi di loro comanda?... Si getteremo
alla campagna coi banditi, o andremo ad offrirci a qualch’altro
capitano? Vi sarebbero veramente lo Sforza, Braccio, e...
«Che osi tu dire? Saresti tu mai un traditore? (l’interruppe
esclamando Macaruffo ch’era stato silenzioso sino a quel momento,
immerso ne’ proprii pensieri). Perchè è morto Facino dovremo noi
abbandonare vigliaccamente la sua casa, e lasciare che sfumino in
un lampo tutte le conquiste che abbiamo fatte seco lui, spendendo
tanto sangue e fatica? Non rimane forse Beatrice di Tenda, la nostra
Contessa da noi sempre obbedita come Signora? Vorremo noi
permettere che la vedova d’un Capo sì glorioso sia scacciata da’
suoi dominii, e venga oppressa ed avvilita come una femmina da
trivio?
«A quanto pretendi dovremmo noi dunque rimanere sotto il comando
d’una donna?
«Non vi sono con lei ancora molti capitani ed i migliori d’Italia? Non
v’è Castellino? non v’è Carmagnola? questo solo ne vale dieci dei
più famosi che vivono al presente.
«Io credo bene (disse il soldato messaggiero) che la contessa
Beatrice abbia prescelto il Carmagnola per comandare le nostre
bande. Da che è morto Facino tutti gli ordini vengono dati da lui. Egli
fu che ingiunse all’armata ch’era intorno a Bergamo di levare il
campo e condursi a Pavia, ed io mi sono qui recato perchè mi vi
spedì egli stesso.
«La signora Beatrice non poteva fare una scelta più lodevole e
giudiziosa (disse Macaruffo con satisfazione). Francesco
Carmagnola era la mano destra del Conte, ei lo considerava come
un altro sè stesso, quindi nessuno rifiuterà di obbedirgli.
Stette muto alcun tempo, poi aggiunse: «Quand’è che tu fai ritorno a
Pavia?
«Ho l’ordine di non retrocedere se non quando mi vien consegnata
la risposta dal signor Castellano.
«Ebbene ora va e bada che il tuo cavallo sia governato a dovere; ma
ti prego di non partire di qua senza parlare nuovamente con me».
Ciò detto si separarono.
Macaruffo trovò modo, alcuni giorni dopo, d’abbandonare il castello
seguendo il messaggiero, e uscito sull’alba per istrade appartate da
Milano, arrivò la sera senz’altri inciampi a Pavia.
Quella città era ingombra di soldati che appartenevano alle squadre
di Facino, ed ivi giungevano da ogni parte, siccome aveva ordinato il
Carmagnola, il quale divenuto supremo comandante calcolò tosto
essere opportuno di adunare tutte le forze in un punto solo, onde più
facilmente dominarle, e dirigerle là dove lo stato degli eventi l’avesse
richiesto. Il nostro Venturiero recossi tosto al palazzo dell’estinto
Conte. Stanziavano continuamente colà numerose guardie, poichè
continuavansi a rendere i principeschi onori alla vedova Contessa,
divenuta per la morte del marito sovrana signora di Pavia e di gran
numero d’altre città appartenenti prima al Ducato.
Macaruffo da lunga mano conosciuto da tutti quegli uomini d’armi,
scambiò, passando in mezzo a loro, parole di saluto ed entrò
liberamente nelle camere inferiori del palazzo. Al vederlo i servi gli
furono intorno festeggiandolo e Matteo, vecchio scalco, uno de’ piu
antichi suoi compagni, che scendeva in quell’atto dagli appartamenti
superiori, venutogli lentamente incontro dimenando il capo, gli
strinse la mano, poi s’asciugò gli occhi e disse:
«Vedi qual cangiamento, Macaruffo? Siam tutti vestiti a bruno; non
regna che lutto nella casa di Facino, quello che ne formava la gloria
è andato sotto terra.
«Pur troppo! (rispose Macaruffo) lo seppi nel castello di Milano con
indicibile cordoglio e m’affrettai a qui venire per conoscere quali
provvedimenti la signora Beatrice....
«Oggi avrai fatto lungo cammino (l’interruppe lo Scalco) e
abbisognerai di refiziamento e di riposo?
«No per ora veramente, e vorrei prima udire appunto da te....
«Voi altri sfaccendati (gli troncò di nuovo la parola Matteo
rivolgendosi ai servi) state qui a guardarlo come babbuini e non gli
avrete nemmeno esibito da cena? Sapete pure che questa è la
prima offerta che il Conte voleva sempre si facesse a chi arrivava:
possibile che s’abbia già da perdere ogni buona usanza? Presto
andate a preparare la tavola nel salotto vicino alla mia camera,
portatevi l’occorrente poi lasciateci colà tranquilli».
Invitò Macaruffo a seguirlo, precedendolo col lume su per lo scalone;
passò varie loggie e da un andito riuscì in una stanza ove stavano
appesi alcuni quadri. Quivi accesa una lucerna sopra un doppiero di
ferro gli accennò di sedere e passò in una contigua cameretta.
Allorchè fu disposta la mensa Matteo ritornò portando una
damigiana che andava spolverando con un pannolino; la depose
sulla tavola, quindi chiuse l’uscio a chiave; venne poi a sedersi in
faccia a Macaruffo, e nello sturare la damigiana disse:
«Non ho amato d’entrare in alcun ragionamento là abbasso alla
presenza di quelle gazze scilinguate, che ripetono tutto ciò che
ascoltano e potrebbero farmi cadere addosso qualche mala
tempesta. Ma sappi che ho desiderato ansiosamente il tuo ritorno
per comunicarti delle novelle che ti faranno stupire.
«Ben temeva che la morte del Conte sarebbe stata cagione di molte
novità (profferì in tuono dolente il Venturiero). Al certo v’ha discordia
tra i capitani, i soldati disertano, od i vassalli minacciano d’insorgere
contro la Contessa...?
«Nulla di questo (rispose lo Scalco versando il vino in due bicchieri e
riempiendo di vivande il piatto di Macaruffo), anzi per grazia del cielo
tutte le bande armate e i loro capi rinnovarono il giuramento di
fedeltà alla nostra padrona, e questa città ha già protestato della sua
devozione, lo che pure faranno prestamente le altre. Alla testa de’
soldati v’è quel sì eccellente ed avveduto...
«Il Carmagnola, lo so (disse Macaruffo con impazienza). E dunque
quali sono queste novelie che vuoi narrarmi?
«Le teneva sepolte qui (ed indicò il gorgozzule), e sono sì importanti
che non oserei dirle con alcuno. Ma tu sei di quelli della vecchia
stampa, tu ami sinceramente la casa, con te posso parlare.
Si guardò d’intorno quasi volesse meglio accertarsi che nessun altro
lo stesse ad ascoltare; MacarufFo gli affisò in volto uno sguardo
acuto, indagatore, ed ei proseguì con voce bassa in aria misteriosa.
«Si sta per combinare un matrimonio! (e comprimendo un labbro
coll’altro rimase a ciglia inarcate).
«Un matrimonio... e con chi?
«Sai che nella Rocca qui di Pavia v’è quel giovine che il Conte
teneva, non veramente come prigioniero, ma poco meno, perchè lo
faceva custodire da Antonio Bogero il cremonese, onde non avesse
colle sue pretensioni alla signoria della città a far nascere tumulti.
«Sì: è Filippo Maria fratello del Duca che hanno ammazzato a
Milano. Ebbene?
«Si tratta (pronunciò Matteo piu pianamente, data di nuovo
un’occhiata all’uscio) si tratta di farlo sposare alla contessa Beatrice.
«Sarebbe ciò possibile? (esclamò Macaruffo cui salì una fiamma al
volto).
«Non v’ha ombra di dubbio. Facino era appena sepolto quando ne
venne fatta la proposta alla Contessa.
«Ed ella come l’accolse? (disse con freddezza e impallidendo il
Venturiero).
«Sulle prime esitò; ma poi vi s’inframmise un tale che la trasse ben
presto al suo partito.
«Chi è costui?
«Oh! l’uno de’ grandi della cappa pavonazza e la croce di gemme:
un Arcivescovo.
«Quel di Milano?
«Sì quello.
«È un fautore acerrimo de’ ghibellini. Moverà cielo e terra per far
trionfare il figlio di Giovan Galeazzo. Chi sa con quali armi assalì il
cuore della Contessa; e quali mezzi adoperò per guadagnarla!
«Domilda che le sta sempre al fianco, mi accertò che non gli fu
d’uopo usare grande fatica a farla persuasa; s’arrese ai primi assalti.
Quest’è una prova dell’amore che portava al suo sposo!
«Ma Filippo Maria conta poco piu di venti anni ed ella ne oltrepassa
quaranta...
«Ecco forse la ragione che l’ha più fortemente e più presto convinta
(s’espresse lo Scalco con sorriso sdegnoso e maligno). D’altronde
quel giovine è di sangue ducale, ha faccia bianca, pelle fina, begli
occhi; tutto ciò insomma che vale ad appagare i capricci d’una
donna.
«Non credo che la signora Beatrice possa essere stata sedotta da
così semplici e leggiere apparenze, che son frascherie da pulcella
(rispose con risentimento Macaruffo). Ella ha pensato ognora
nobilmente e fu degna compagna dell’uomo potente e famoso che
venne a sceglierla in moglie nel castello paterno.
«Sia come tu vuoi, ma, diciamolo in estrema confidenza, essa
mostra soverchia inclinazione pei giovinetti ch’hanno visi leccati e
capigliature che sembrano di lino.
«Matteo tu eccedi (esclamò fremendo il Venturiero e vibrandogli
un’occhiata minacciosa). Pensa che le tue parole offendono l’onestà
della nostra padrona, e se non fosse l’amore che portavi al Conte
ch’ora a torto ti slega la lingua...
«Se parlo è perchè le veggo le cose (replicò lo Scalco più piano ma
in tuono d’asseveranza). Non ha ella sempre tra piedi quel Michele
Orombello qui mandato dai Conti di Ventimiglia onde divenisse
valente cavaliero alla scuola di Facino? invece di lasciare che si
eserciti nel maneggio delle armi e che il poltroncello sudi e s’addestri
col cavallo e la lancia, se lo tiene tutto il giorno vicino a strimpellare il
liuto e canticchiare alla provenzale.
«Sono i suoni e le canzoni del suo paese nativo e vuoi fargliene
accusa se dopo tanto tempo ama sentirle ripetere da un fanciullo?
chi sarà sì temerario d’immaginarsi che in ciò vi sia colpa? Ella non
ebbe il diletto di dirsi madre e quindi predilige l’età di chi le potrebbe
essere figlio.
«Anche Filippo Maria, quanto agli anni, potrebbe essere suo figlio,
eppure se lo prende per isposo, e non è quasi freddo ancora il letto
di Facino.
«Se ciò avvenisse mai, egli è, mi credi, per la forza degli intrighi e
della violenza esercitata sul di lei animo dal Ghibellino venuto qui
appositamente da Milano. — E dopo essere rimasto alquanto
taciturno riprese: — «L’astuzia sua è profonda; ben m’avveggo
ch’egli pensò che collo stringere le nozze tra Filippo Maria e la
contessa Beatrice, i sudditi e le bande armate ch’ella possiede
diventeranno del marito, e questi potrà con tali mezzi ricuperare lo
Stato e farsi proclamare nuovo Duca, mentre da solo, misero e
derelitto come egli è, non sarebbe mai divenuto in grado di farlo.
«Che la nostra padrona fosse vittima d’una trama sì iniqua?... Ma, or
che ci penso, ella a fine del conto diverrebbe duchessa di Milano, e
caspita è tal leccarderìa da stuzzicare il palato d’ogni cristiano.
«Per diventare signora di quella città ella non abbisogna di farsi
moglie o piuttosto schiava d’un suo proprio prigioniero!... (e
piegandosi verso di lui, proseguì con tuono di voce più basso ed
accentato) «Tenga il Visconte rinchiuso nella torre della Rocca dov’è
stato sin ora, faccia intendere le sue volontà al Carmagnola, e lasci
poi operare da esso lui e da noi soldati. Buone parole a tutti, una
tagliata alle gabelle, dar bando ai guelfi sanguisughe dei poveri
cittadini, e noi saremmo accolti a larghe braccia dal popolo milanese.
«Oh se fosse al mondo il signor Facino!...
«A quest’ora era cosa fatta. Ma non disperiamo (disse Macaruffo
animandosi in volto), il matrimonio non è finora celebrato, nè forse
concluso. La volpe ghibellina può ancora cogliere in falso, vi

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