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Contents

List of tables

1 Introduction
2 China and international order
3 The Gulf monarchies: Domestic, regional, and international
security dynamics
4 China’s relations with Saudi Arabia
5 China’s relations with Oman
6 China’s relations with the United Arab Emirates
7 Conclusion

Bibliography
Index

7
Tables

2.1 China’s oil consumption and production

3.1 Ruling families of Gulf monarchies
3.2 GCC states by population, GDP/capita, and United Nations
Human Development Index Ranking
3.3 Other Arab League states by population, GDP/capita, and
United Nations Human Development Index Ranking
3.4 GCC oil reserves and production
3.5 Chinese imports and exports as percentage of GCC states’
total trade
4.1 Value of China’s trade with Iran and the combined GCC
member states
4.2 Sino-Saudi bilateral trade value, 2000–2016
4.3 China’s oil production and consumption projections
5.1 Sino-Omani bilateral trade value, 2000–2016
6.1 Sino-Emirati bilateral trade value, 2000–2016

8
1 Introduction

This book analyzes and explains the growth in China’s relations

with the Gulf monarchies, a group of six states that comprise the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).1 It is a relationship that has seen
significant growth in recent years and has developed from a set of
largely commercial relationships to multifaceted ones, involving a
wide range of mutual interests, and can be characterized as
dense interdependence. Writing in 2008, Alterman and Garver
described China’s role in the Middle East as “simple” and
“shallow”, describing its regional policy as being guided by its
need for energy, “with other commercial, military and diplomatic
interests playing a subsidiary role.”2 Since then, however, these
subsidiary interests have become significant features in the Sino-
GCC relationship. There are over 4000 Chinese companies
operating in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) alone,3 servicing
construction and infrastructure projects across the Arabian
Peninsula. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese expatriates live and
work in GCC states. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
has been using GCC ports for rest and replenishment in its
ongoing naval escort to protect Chinese shipping in the Gulf of
Aden. Diplomatic interactions between China and each GCC state
are frequent and at a high level; every Chinese head of state has
visited at least one GCC member since 1989, and every GCC
member except Oman has sent a head of state to China on a
state visit. Soft power tools also come into play, with religious,
educational, and cultural exchanges featuring heavily. And trade,
of course, is substantial. In 2000, Sino-GCC trade was valued at
$9.9 billion. By 2016 it had reached $114 billion.4 One optimistic
projection forecasts it to reach $350 billion by 2023.5 Collectively,
the GCC is China’s eighth largest export destination and its eighth
largest source of imports.6 Importantly, the states that rank higher
than the GCC are all, except Germany, Pacific countries,

9
indicating a set of relationships with important geostrategic
implications that have not yet been adequately analyzed.
The significance of Sino-GCC relations has deepened with the
announcement of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In
September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech at
Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan, when he announced a
cooperative initiative in which China and Central Asia would build
what he called the Silk Road Economic Belt.7 The next month,
speaking at the Indonesian Parliament, he proposed deeper
China-ASEAN ties and a multilateral construction of a 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road.8 In November 2013, during the Third
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), he formally announced the BRI to
connect China to states as far away as East Africa and the
Mediterranean through a series of infrastructure construction
projects. In the period since, Chinese political, business, and
military leaders have been working toward what has been
described as “the largest programme of economic diplomacy
since the U.S.-led Marshall Plan.”9 The actual shape of the BRI
was articulated by Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli at an Asia-Europe
Meeting in Chongqing in 2015, when he announced six economic
corridors connecting Eurasia through cooperative infrastructure
projects:

• China-Mongolia-Russia
• New Eurasian Land Bridge
• China-Central and West Asia
• China-Indochina Peninsula
• China-Pakistan
• China-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India10

Each of these economic corridors serves a different geopolitical

objective for China, and taken together indicate an ambitious plan
to increase China’s presence throughout Eurasia, potentially
connecting China to over 4 billion people in over 60 emerging
market countries, representing 65% of global land trade and 30%
of global maritime trade.11 Wu Jianmin, former president of
China’s Foreign Affairs University and a member of the Ministry of

10
Foreign Affairs’ Foreign Policy Advisory Committee, has described
it as “the most significant and far-reaching initiative that China has
ever put forward.”12 It is President Xi’s signature foreign policy
initiative, and its centrality to China’s international ambition was
emphasized when the CCP’s constitution was amended during its
19th National Congress in October 2017 with the pledge to
“pursue the Belt and Road initiative.”13 By enshrining it in the
constitution, the CCP has linked its long-term foreign policy
agenda to the success of the BRI.
The states of the GCC are a crucial hub in the BRI. Their
geostrategic location links China to Middle Eastern, African, and
European markets, and their vast hydrocarbon reserves are an
important factor in driving the development projects that comprise
the Belt and Road. Sino-GCC cooperation can therefore be
expected to expand as China’s footprint expands across the
Indian Ocean. At the same time, BRI cooperation builds upon
bilateral relationships that China and the Gulf monarchies have
been developing over decades. From the Gulf side, each of the
GCC states have undertaken ambitious national development
plans that require substantial international investment in order to
fund the infrastructure projects that are intended to ease the
transition to post-hydrocarbon economies. Leaders in the GCC
and in China have all emphasized the complementarity of these
national development programs and the BRI, offering
opportunities for further coordination.
The outlook is not completely rosy, however. One serious
concern for China is the rupture between the GCC (specifically
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, as well as Egypt, a grouping that
refers to itself as the Anti-Terror Quartet) and Qatar. Qatar’s
relationship with its neighbors has long been difficult; as recently
as 2014 Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain recalled their
ambassadors from Doha in a dispute over Qatar’s support for
Islamist groups throughout the Middle East in the wake of the
Arab Spring. The events of the summer of 2017, however, are
unprecedented. One important difference is that during the 2014
dispute, Washington was pushing for reconciliation; as Gause
notes, “U.S. interests in the region are better served when these
states sing from the same hymnal – the American hymnal.”14 In
the 2017 dispute, Washington’s response has been unclear, with

11
President Trump expressing support for the Saudi side while the
State Department and Department of Defense calling for
mediation, emphasizing the strategic importance of America’s
relationship with Qatar.15 This lack of focused U.S. leadership has
contributed to an environment where the Anti-Terror Quartet has
pursued a more aggressive approach in its attempts to bring
Qatar in line. The continued viability of the GCC as an
international organization is uncertain at the time of writing. There
has been talk of a permanent expulsion of Qatar from the GCC,
with the organization going ahead with the other five members.16
Until the last moment it was uncertain whether its annual summit
would be held in Kuwait in December 2017.17 When
representatives from the GCC did convene, only Qatar and Kuwait
had heads of state present, indicating a reduced view of the
efficacy of the organization that was underscored when Saudi
Arabia and the UAE announced the formation of a new economic
and military partnership hours before the summit began. The
second day of the summit was cancelled, and the future of the
GCC as a viable organization seems less certain that at any time
since its inception in 1981.
For China, this would represent a serious complication for its
regional policy. It maintains robust bilateral relations with each of
the GCC member states but has also coordinated policy with them
as a group through the China-GCC Strategic Dialogue, a
multilateral mechanism in place since 2010. At the 2014 round,
the two sides announced plans to elevate the China-GCC
relationship to a strategic partnership, which is the second-highest
level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations, in which China
and the partner states coordinate policy on regional and
international affairs of mutual interest.18 There has also been a
China-GCC free trade agreement (FTA) under negotiation since
2004. While talks stalled in 2006, the creation of the China-GCC
Strategic Dialogue revived momentum.19 At the 2014 Strategic
Dialogue, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi indicated that the FTA
is an important element of a broader relationship, describing it as
“a driving force to boost pragmatic cooperation in all fields.”20
When President Xi paid a state visit to Riyadh in January 2016, he
emphasized China’s commitment to a quick completion of
negotiations, with the expectation that they would be concluded by

12
the end of 2016.21 They were not, and with the future of the GCC
unclear, it is unlikely that the FTA talks will resume until
addressing the bigger question of how to manage a multilateral
relationship with an organization that must first address internal
tensions.
Another point of concern comes from the GCC’s side. Chinese
leaders describe the BRI as an inclusive, cooperative
development initiative, open to all, and devoid of strategic
calculations. As such, the PRC is intensifying its relations with
states with interests that diverge from those of the GCC, or at
least from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, its two most powerful
members. Iran and Turkey are both major partners in the BRI, and
both have posed threats to the Gulf status quo. Deepening
Chinese ties to Iran are especially a cause of concern for GCC
leaders, who perceive Iranian strategic gains as a threat to their
own position in the Middle East regional order.22 Despite the
PRC’s insistence that the BRI does not have a political agenda,
there are strategic concerns for states along the Belt and Road.
While leaders in the GCC have voiced support for the BRI and
interest in participation, they certainly have reservations about
how it benefits Tehran economically, diplomatically, and
strategically.
This book therefore begins with a question: what motivates
China’s leadership to pursue these denser relationships with the
Gulf monarchies? Is the motivation strategic, a response to
international political considerations? Is it economic, and based on
domestic political considerations? Or is it a combination of the
two? The motivations of GCC leaders in developing closer ties to
China must also be addressed. Are they hedging their bets,
concerned about the USA’s apparent frustrations with its
involvement in the Middle East? Or do they see their futures as
being linked with a rising Asia, and with China as a global power?
The following chapters provide answers to these questions.
China’s relations with the Middle East have been the subject of
a relatively small body of literature. Early histories of China’s
Middle East foreign policy include Shichor’s classic overview of
relations from 1949 to 1977,23 Behbehani’s set of three case
studies between 1955 to 1975,24 and Abidi’s Iran-centered
book.25 Shichor’s monograph26 on China-Saudi relations

13
precluded the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
two states, providing an excellent account of the conditions that
helped this previously hostile relationship transition into one
characterized by a level of dense interdependence. Two
significant China-Middle East books were published in the early
1990s from Harris27 and Calabrese.28 Importantly, all of these
books deal with Cold War era relations, a period when between
China and the Gulf monarchies were very different than they are
now, and when all of these states projected considerably less
influence on international politics. Bin Huwaidin’s book,29
published in 2002, is unique as the first major treatment of the
relationship in the post-Cold War era, and also as the first book to
focus deeply on the Gulf region rather than the broader Middle
East. Since then, there have been other treatments, including
Davidson’s on East Asia-Gulf relations,30 Olimat’s trio of books on
China-Middle East relations,31 and Al-Tamimi’s book on Sino-
Saudi relations.32
This book offers an original framework of analysis to understand
how China’s relations with the Gulf monarchies have changed. It
is a work of international relations, but draws upon ideas from
comparative politics, security studies, and international political
economy. The task of this book, explaining how these far-flung
states have transitioned from mutual indifference to multifaceted
interdependence, requires historical narrative as well as analysis.
This approach allows for another set of stories to be told,
describing how the states in question have changed in their
orientations in the international system. The end of the Cold War
dramatically altered the Gulf’s distribution of power, with the USA
creating the security architecture that has allowed China to
develop a robust regional presence. The Gulf monarchies and
China have taken advantage of this American security umbrella to
strengthen their positions in the liberal order. At a time when the
USA’s commitment to maintaining its global leadership appears to
be wavering, the relationships that have developed during the
unipolar moment may indicate the shape that an emerging
international order could take.

14
Key themes
In explaining how China’s position in the Gulf and its relations with
the GCC member states have changed, this book offers three
case studies that chart the progression of bilateral relations
between China and Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE. These
three states have been chosen because they share many similar
general characteristics, both in terms of their domestic and
international political orientations, as well as in the growth in their
relations with the PRC. Yet, within the different factors that
comprise their relations with China, different values are placed on
certain variables, such as the weighted value of energy trade, or
infrastructure development projects, political and diplomatic
interactions, or security cooperation. As such, it is possible to
generalize about which factors are driving the relationships, both
bilateral and as a group. This is an important element of
determining the motivation for expanding PRC-GCC relations, as
it underscores the dense interdependence that is being developed
between these states, indicating an importance beyond the oil-for-
trade narrative that is often used to analyze China’s presence in
the Gulf.
Each case is designed with structured, focused comparison,
systematically collecting the same information for each state.
Each begins with a brief analysis of the domestic and systemic
political variables that shape the international politics of the state
in question. The domestic variables examined are the sources of
and challenges to regime stability inherent in their rentier state
model. The international variables are the states’ responses to
regional security threats, and the role of external actors in
providing security. After analyzing each of these variables, the
case study discusses how they explain the value each state
places on its relationship with the PRC.
The next section of each case study develops a historical
analysis to trace the process of the evolution of the relationship
between the PRC and the state in question. This has been used in
two other studies on China-Gulf states but applied differently.
Huwaidin uses three periods as a framework for his study: the
PRC’s early involvement in regional affairs (1949–1970), a period
of pragmatic regional policy (1971–1989), and a period of “new

15
interest” in the region (1990–1999).33 Wu frames his study from
1958 to 2011 and discusses six phases: a focus on Iraq (1958–
1967); a focus on revolutionary movements in the Gulf (1967–
1971); opposition to Soviet expansionism (1971–1979); a focus on
Iran and Iraq (1979–1990); a focus on Iran (1990–2001); and a
focus on Saudi Arabia and Iran (2001–2011).34 Neither of these
approaches works for the purpose of this book. The periods of
time chosen in Huwaidin’s book seem arbitrary and are generically
described. Furthermore, his neorealist approach, focusing on the
systemic pressures that drove Chinese policy in the region,
cannot give adequate weight to major events both within and
outside of China that shaped its approach to foreign policy. The
“early involvement” period, for example, encompasses the state-
building period for the PRC, the Korean War, the Taiwan Straits
crises, the Great Leap Forward, the Sino-Indian war, the USA-
Vietnam war, and the Cultural Revolution. To focus on the
systemic pressures that drove policy choices misses out on a
tremendous wealth of intervening variables at the unit level. Wu’s
more specific phases do a better job of explaining the PRC’s
regional involvement but have a larger Iran-Iraq focus; the GCC
member states are less important to his analysis. His framework
also does not take unit-level concerns into consideration.
Therefore, for the purposes of this book, the historical analysis
presents an original framework for explaining the evolution of
PRC-GCC relations, analyzing five distinct periods: indifference
(1949–1965); hostility (1965–1971); transition (1971–1990);
interdependence (1990–2012); and the Belt and Road era (2013-
present).35 As will be described in the case studies, each of these
periods indicate a different Chinese approach to the Gulf
monarchies, reflecting either a reaction to systemic pressures,
domestic pressures, or a combination of the two. Also, it will
demonstrate that the intensity of interactions between China and
the Gulf monarchies increased from each period to the next. This
allows for a fuller account of the motivation for increased Chinese
regional presence than would be found in a strictly structural
approach. The interdependence sections of the case studies are
divided into five subsections, each representing a distinct feature
of interdependence: diplomatic and political interactions; trade and
investment; infrastructure and construction projects; people-to-
people exchanges, including religious, educational, and culture;

16
and military and security cooperation. These types of interactions
were chosen to give an account of the breadth and depth of
contemporary China-GCC relations. 2012 was chosen as a cut-off
date for the interdependence period because of the 2013 roll-out
of the BRI, which represents an important year for Chinese
international politics and one that is having a significant impact
upon PRC-GCC relations. The Belt and Road era sections of the
case studies present evidence of even greater levels of
cooperation, as the GCC states national development programs
are being coordinated with the BRI, as the Gulf states and China
graft pre-existing cooperation patterns upon these new initiatives.
Two documents inform the shape of BRI cooperation: The Vision
and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road (hereafter Vision and Actions), and
the PRC’s Arab Policy Paper. Released in March 2015, Vision and
Actions provides a framework for understanding how China
intends to develop BRI partnerships, using a set of five
cooperation priorities: policy coordination, facilities connectivity,
unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people to people
bonds.36 The Arab Policy Paper narrows this further, introducing
the 1+2+3 cooperation pattern for developing ties with Arab
states, where 1 represents energy cooperation as the core, 2
represents infrastructure construction and trade and investment
facilitation, and 3 represents nuclear energy, space satellite, and
new energy.37 Using these two documents, we can analyze
China’s cooperation with the GCC states in the early days of this
BRI era to understand how the relationships are taking shape
under this initiative.
The case studies illustrate the importance of systemic forces in
shaping the China-GCC relationship. The bipolar Cold War
system shaped leaders’ preferences and perceptions on both
sides, explaining to a degree why China and the Gulf monarchies
kept their distance until Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon
recalibrated Sino-US relations. The end of the Cold War marks
another change, as U.S. preponderance in the Gulf created a
regional security architecture that allowed non-regional states like
China to increase their regional presences without the burden of
contributing to the maintenance of the regional status quo. Under
this U.S. security umbrella, China has developed deep and
multifaceted ties with all six GCC states, as well as with Iran and

17
Iraq, the other two states in the Gulf. U.S. leaders have
complained of free-riding;38 Chinese observers complain that “the
current turmoil in the Middle East is to a large extent due to the
wrong policies by the West. Calling China a free rider under such
a situation is bizarre and unacceptable.”39 It is more constructive
to see the PRC’s approach to the Gulf as strategic hedging rather
than freeriding. Hedging is an approach common to second-tier
powers that want to avoid antagonizing the dominant power, while
at the same time expanding its economic and military regional
capabilities.40 This is an apt description of Chinese statecraft in
the Gulf, developing stronger ties with all regional actors, under
the relative stability of the U.S. security umbrella. Goh defines
strategic hedging as “a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or
planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot
decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing,
bandwagoning, or neutrality.”41 To balance against or bandwagon
with any one regional actor would be detrimental to China’s
economic interests, and neutrality is inconsistent with China’s
expanding BRI ambitions. Hedging allows the PRC to continue
building a significant regional presence at a lower cost than a
more active military engagement.
Given this focus on systemic pressures in shaping an interest-
based foreign policy, realist thought informs the theoretical
approach to this book. Liberal and constructivist theories both
offer valuable insights into the international political behavior of
the states in question, but in the end, realism does a better job of
explaining how these relationships have developed, and
neoclassical realist theory does a better job than other forms of
realism. Neoclassical realism is a relatively recent addition to IR
theory, first described by Gideon Rose in his 1998 article
“Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, and since
developed into a major addition to realist theory.42 Schweller
describes it as problem-focused research program that

(1) seeks to clarify and extend the logic of basic (classical and
structural) realist propositions, (2) employs the case-study
method to test general theories, explain cases, and generate
hypothesis, (3) incorporates first, second, and third image
variables,43 (4) addresses important questions about foreign

18
 policy and national behavior, and (5) has produced a body of
cumulative knowledge.44

Neoclassical realism therefore can be seen as an attempt to build

upon classical works of realism, placing them in a rigorous, post-
Waltzian theoretical framework. Neoclassical realism is explicit in
incorporating both external and internal political considerations in
explaining a state’s foreign policy, arguing that “the scope and
ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost
by its place in the international system and specifically by its
relative material power capabilities.”45 However, these power
capabilities have an indirect and complex effect on foreign policy
decisions because “systemic pressures must be translated
through intervening variables at the unit level.”46 In analyzing how
the structure shapes unit-level choices, important intervening
variables are decision-makers’ perceptions, the domestic structure
of the state, the state’s relation to the surrounding society, the
strength of a country’s state apparatus, and the state’s relative
power. The result is a middle ground between structural realism
and constructivism, in which a preferred method is to begin at the
systemic level but then trace how relative power of a state
translates into that state’s international behavior. This provides a
“coherent logic that incorporates ideas and domestic politics in the
way we would expect structural realism to do so.”47 This logic
underlying neoclassical realism tells us that domestic politics and
ideas are variables that affect material power, but decision-makers
must consider the system before those variables or else risk
adverse results; “when domestic politics and ideas interfere
substantially in foreign policy decision-making, the system
punishes states.”48 States that are punished by the system are
typically those that allow domestic politics and ideas to play an
outsized role in shaping foreign policy.49 This is relevant to this
study, because as the following chapters demonstrate, the foreign
policy decisions made by the states in question are highly
motivated by domestic political concerns.
Neoclassical realism has a focus on building theories of how
states make foreign policy decisions within the international
system, rather than structural realism’s description of the system
itself.50 As such, it examines questions largely outside the realm

19
of structural realism’s focus, incorporating structural realism’s
insights on systemic forces at play in international politics, while
focusing instead on questions of how states conduct foreign
policy. According to Zakaria, an account of foreign policy – not an
account of the international system – “should include systemic,
domestic and other influences, specifying what aspects of the
policy can be explained by what factors.”51 This is one of the
unique strengths of neoclassical realism, and stands in opposition
to structural realism, or at least Waltz’s version of it. For Waltz,
neorealism is a theory of international politics, a spare attempt at
explaining how external forces influence the behavior of states.
He distinguishes between theories of international politics and
theories of foreign policy – foreign policy is made at the national
level and international politics happen at the international level.
Therefore, “an international-political theory can explain states’
behavior only when external pressures dominate the internal
disposition of states, which seldom happens. When they do not, a
theory of international politics needs help.”52 Neorealism’s focus is
not on how or why the decision makers in a state choose certain
policy options; it is on how the structure itself influences states’
options.
In describing the international structure of his system theory,
Waltz described a three-part definition of structure.53 First is the
ordering principle. International systems are anarchic and
decentralized, yet within this anarchy patterns of behavior become
evident as states respond to the structural constraints imposed
upon them by the system. Second is the specification of functions
of differentiated units. The units, states in this case, “are alike in
the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform
them. The differences are of capability, not of function.”54 Thus
interactions between, say, China and Somalia can be described
by Waltz’s theory, as both are states, even though as states they
are widely divergent in how they function. His theory, focused on
the structure, is able to contend with any type of state, which he
assumes are

unitary actors who, at minimum, seek their own preservation

and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. States, or
those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to
use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view.55

20
The nature of state, or its internal composition, has no effect on
the structure of the system. Third is the distribution of capabilities
across units. While the units are functionally undifferentiated in
terms of the tasks they perform as independent states, their
greater or lesser ability to perform these tasks is what
distinguishes their position within the structure. The structure
changes only when the distribution of capabilities changes.
It is this very narrowness, what Waltz chooses to keep and what
he chooses to leave out, that makes his theory of international
politics troublesome for the purposes of this dissertation. Many
who have accepted his foundational idea of the importance of
structure still have difficulty accepting that what happens within
the states cannot be factored into an account of how states
interact with each other. A state’s internal interests and behavior
cannot be accounted for, and ultimately, a theory of international
politics will be hamstrung if this is the case. Keohane, while
praising Waltz’s work as “more systematic and logically more
coherent than that of its Classical Realist predecessors”56 finds it
lacking in that there is little in Waltz’s theory that can predict
change in the structure; it only tells us that change is related to a
change in the differentiation of capabilities. For Ruggie, this is a
significant problem with Waltz’s theory, as “in any social system,
structural change itself ultimately has no source other than unit-
level processes. By banishing these from the domain of systemic
theory, Waltz also exogenises the ultimate source of systemic
change.”57 Hollis and Smith also take issue with Waltz’s structural
approach to analyzing international politics, stating,

Whatever the type of change, domestic factors surely matter. It

is, in short, hard to see how change can possibly be traced to
its causes unless those causes lie in decisions taken within
units, which, therefore, had better be included as contributing
elements of the international system. But then we need to
know what goes on inside the units.58

Keohane also takes issue with the absence of domestic politics

and decision-making, claiming, “Sensible Realists are highly
cognizant of the role of domestic politics and of actor choices
within the constraints and incentives provided by the system.”59

21
Snyder makes the case for including unit level actors within the
states, claiming,

Theoretically, Realism must be recaptured from those who look

only at politics between societies, ignoring what goes on within
societies. Realists are right in stressing power, interests, and
coalition making as the central elements in a theory of politics,
but recent exponents of Realism in international relations have
been wrong in looking exclusively to states as the irreducible
atoms whose power and interests are to be assessed.60

Clearly, there is a strong case to be made for including unit-level

considerations in international political analysis. In the case of the
states involved in this study, the external systemic pressures
contribute significantly to international political behavior, but it
cannot be said that they “dominate the internal disposition of
states”; variables at the unit level play a key role as well.
Neorealism, used by Bin Huwaidin to explain Sino-Gulf monarchy
relations, is therefore the wrong theoretical tool for this job. By
incorporating a broader range of political considerations,
neoclassical realism can explain more fully how and why the
foreign policy establishments of the states in this study make the
decisions they do. The following two chapters expand on this,
analyzing the international political behavior of China and the
GCC member states from a neoclassical approach.

22
Structure of the book
Chapter 2 focuses on China’s international political orientation in
order to understand the importance of Sino-GCC relations from a
Chinese perspective. Using neoclassical realism, it explains that
the PRC’s international political behavior is based on a
combination of systemic and unit-level considerations. Its relations
with the GCC must therefore address both international political
interests while at the same time contribute to domestic stability
within China through economic growth and development.
Chapter 3 examines the Sino-GCC relationship from the Gulf
monarchies’ side. Again, the neoclassical realist approach
highlights the importance of both international and domestic
political considerations in understanding and explaining the
international political choices for the GCC states, and how their
relationships with China meet their interests.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are case studies on China’s relationships
with Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE. These three cases were
chosen to demonstrate the different interests met for China in its
relations with the member states of the GCC. While all three are
important sources of oil imports for China, the relations with
individual states clearly demonstrates that each addresses at
least one significant Chinese interest beyond energy. Oman’s
geostrategic location, with its Indian Ocean ports, has been
important in China’s ongoing naval escort force in the Gulf of
Aden, indicating a potentially larger role as the BRI develops and
China’s maritime interests in the Indian Ocean further increase.
The UAE, with its business-friendly environment and the Jebel Ali
Free Zone in Dubai, represents a stable regional hub for China to
safely expand its commercial interests not only in the GCC, but
also throughout the Middle East. The relationship with Saudi
Arabia addresses several Chinese interest areas, and is the most
important Arab state for China. Politically and economically, Saudi
Arabia plays a central role in the Middle East, making it a vital
partner as China expands its regional role. Saudi centrality in
international Islam also is important for China, with its large
Muslim population and concerns about political Islam in Xinjiang.
Chapter 7 concludes with a brief analysis of China’s relations
with Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar during the BRI period. There is

23
some variation in how their relationships with China developed in
relation to the other three Arab monarchies, but not enough to
warrant the same depth of analysis as presented in the case
studies above. Instead, this chapter focuses on contemporary
relations in this new era of China’s regional presence.
With China’s emergence as a global power, it is increasingly
important to understand the motivation behind its international
political decisions. The GCC, with its geostrategic importance and
central role in global energy markets, makes for a fascinating case
with which to analyze the implications of China’s rise. The Sino-
GCC relationship is economic on a structural level, as economic
belts of investment and development deepen ties beyond trade. It
is also a strategic relationship, with political and military elements.
This book therefore provides a detailed examination of Chinese
foreign policy while at the same time presents original analysis of
a regional relationship that requires a fresh look.

24
Another random document with
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Roger the ranger:
A story of border life among the Indians
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
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you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Roger the ranger: A story of border life among the Indians

Author: Eliza F. Pollard

Release date: August 5, 2022 [eBook #68694]

Language: English

Original publication: United Kingdom: S. W. Partridge & Co, 1893

Credits: Roger Frank, Al Haines and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ROGER THE

RANGER: A STORY OF BORDER LIFE AMONG THE INDIANS ***
ROGER THE RANGER
“HE THREW THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF HIS BODY UPON ME AND
STRUCK ME DOWN.”
 ROGER THE RANGER
A STORY OF BORDER LIFE AMONG THE INDIANS

BY
E. F. POLLARD

AUTHOR OF “THE GREEN MOUNTAIN BOYS,” “TRUE UNTO DEATH,” ETC.

Publishers
PARTRIDGE
London
MADE IN GREAT BRITAIN
CONTENTS
 I ESAU
II PARTED
III BAD NEWS
IV “MY OWN FAMILIAR FRIEND!”
V A HERO
VI A BRAVE HEART
VII THROUGH STORM AND TEMPEST
VIII BY LAND
IX TRUE MEN
X A NEW FRIENDSHIP
XI DIPLOMACY
XII A TERRIBLE DISASTER
XIII BRAVELY DONE
XIV SILENT INFLUENCE
XV LOST
XVI FRIENDSHIPS
XVII THROUGH THE FOREST
XVIII NADJII
XIX THE ATTACK
XX “LIGHTEN OUR DARKNESS”
XXI AT THE HELM
XXII HOME NEWS
XXIII A CONFESSION
XXIV THE PRODIGAL
XXV TO THE FORE
XXVI THE CHILD
XXVII TWO HEROES
XXVIII AT LAST
XXIX ON THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM
XXX THE VANQUISHED
XXXI WEARY WAITING
XXXII ON THE BATTLE-FIELD
XXXIII A LONG JOURNEY
XXXIV CONCLUSION
 ROGER THE RANGER:
A Story of Border Life among the Indians

CHAPTER I
ESAU
“It is of no use, Father Nat; we have gone over the same ground
again and again. I shall never settle down as a New England farmer,
and there are other reasons why I should go forth from among you.
Mother, you have Marcus; he will stand you in good stead: he has
almost reached man’s estate, and he is old for his years; he will be a
better son to you than I have ever been. Don’t, Loïs, my darling;” and
the speaker, a tall, handsome man of four- or five-and-twenty, in the
picturesque dress of the New England hunter, sought to unclasp
from round his neck the clinging hands of a young girl, down whose
face the tears were flowing fast.
“You are my firstborn, and like Esau you are selling your birthright,
and surely even as he did you will lose the blessing,” exclaimed his
mother, wringing her hands.
Martha Langlade was still a handsome woman, not yet fifty years
of age, her brow unwrinkled, no silver thread visible in the bands of
her soft brown hair, smoothed back under a snowy cap, round which
was tied a broad black ribbon, token of her widowhood.
“Then even as Esau I shall be a great hunter before the Lord,”
answered her son. “I am not leaving you comfortless, mother; you
have the children and Loïs and Marcus;” and turning towards a youth
standing beside Martha, he held out his hand to him, saying,
“Marcus, you must take my place.”
“I am too young, Charles; think better of it and stay with us,” he
replied.
The young man’s features worked; there was a moment’s
hesitation, then he shook his head, stooped and kissed again his
sister’s upturned face, and, pushing her gently towards a grey-
headed man who had stood a silent spectator of the scene, said
huskily,—
“Take care of her, take care of them all, Father Nat.”
“A man has no right to shift his burdens upon other men’s
shoulders. You will live to rue this day, Charles Langlade,” was the
stern answer.
“I trust not,” said the young man; “but this I know, go forth I must!
Farewell, mother; farewell, Father Nat; farewell, all of you. If troubles
threaten you I will come to your aid. Farewell;” and turning away, he
strode rapidly across the greensward in front of the house, bounded
over the paling, and, dashing down the hill-side, entered the forest,
and so disappeared. As they lost sight of the tall lithe figure, fully
accoutred in his hunting garb, his blanket rolled round him, his gun
and ammunition slung across his shoulders, Martha and the two little
girls who were clinging to her wept aloud.
“Don’t, mother dear,” said Loïs, throwing one arm round Martha’s
neck and kissing her.
“Ah, Loïs, I never thought he’d do it—never! It is your poor father’s
fault, taking the lads amongst the heathen. I told him no good would
come of it,” and her sobs redoubled.
Father Nat had kept silence since his last words to Charles
Langlade; he seemed oppressed with a weight of care. He had never
really believed in the oft-threatened desertion, and now the blow had
fallen he was for the time stunned; but he roused himself, gave vent
to a long deep sigh, then, laying his hand kindly on Martha’s arm,
said,—
“It’s no use fretting; what is to be will be. Come, mother, be brave.
Don’t ye grieve over much; remember the little ones. We’ve done all
we could to hold him back. It seems almost as if the Spirit
constrained him. And ye know it is not well to fight against the will of
God.”
“The will of God!” exclaimed Martha angrily, wiping her eyes and
checking her sobs. “Call it rather the machinations of the Evil One!
How can you dare say it is the will of God that a son of mine, my
eldest born, should choose to go and live amongst those cannibals,
forsaking his father’s house and taking to himself a wife from
amongst the idolaters? I never thought to hear you say such a thing,
Father Nat! I’m minded you’ll think differently when your Roger goes
off after him.”
“My Roger will never do that,” said Father Nat. “I know the two
lads love each other dearly—it’s in the blood—as I loved your
husband, and as it has ever been from generation to generation,
since the first Charles Langlade saved the life of a Roger Boscowen
from the Red Indians, and the two joining hands established
themselves together on this then waste land.”
“That proves what I say,” answered Martha doggedly; “or would
you sooner see our homesteads burnt and ruin threatening us? Have
you forgotten the prophecy of the Indian woman, the first who died
under the shelter of your ancestor’s roof? ‘When Langlade and
Boscowen part, then shall the land be riven.’”
“Nay, nay,” said Nathaniel uneasily. “The lads will love each other
still, though they be parted; but Roger will never do as Charles has
done—he will never bring my grey hairs with sorrow to the grave. He
is my only son.”
“Tut, tut! What is to prevent him, if, as you say of Charles, it
should happen to be the ‘will of God’?”
She spoke bitterly—such an unusual thing for Martha that Father
Nat looked at her with surprise, and Loïs exclaimed,—
“Oh, mother! surely you do not mean it!” and the girl’s fair face
flushed and her lips quivered.
“I mean no harm,” said Martha; “but what more natural? They’ve
been like brothers all their lives.”
“But because Charles has gone astray there is no need for Roger
to do the same,” said Loïs gently. “It was not kindly spoken, mother,
and yet I know you love Roger dearly.”
“Ay, surely she does,” said Nat; “who better, save myself, and his
dead mother? Come, Martha woman, shake hands; we be too old
friends to quarrel! Making my heart sore will not heal yours.”
“Forgive me, Nat,” said Martha, bursting into tears. “You are right,
my heart is very sore. He was such a bonnie boy; and to think I’ve
lost him, for truly it is worse than if he were dead!”
 “Nay, nay,” answered Father Nat; “while there is life there is hope.
Cheer up, mother; who knows? he may come back to us a better
and a wiser man.”
“God grant it!” said Martha tearfully, her eyes turning wistfully
towards the dark forest, which seemed to have swallowed up her
son.
“You’d best come and have supper with me, Martha,” said Father
Nat. “It’s near upon eight o’clock,” and he looked at the sky, crimson
with the glow of the setting sun. On one side lay the dark forest, and
far away the long line of hills encompassing the valley; a broad
shining river flashed like a line of silver through the plain, where
nestled the two villages of East and West Marsh. On the slope of a
hill-side overlooking the whole country stood two houses, built
exactly alike, separated from each other originally by a light garden
fence, which in the course of years had changed into a thick
shrubbery. The “Marshwoods” they were called, and had been so
named by the first Langlade and Boscowen who had penetrated with
a few followers across the borderland of New England, far away from
human habitations, and had struck root on this virgin soil. No one
had disputed the land with them, save the Red Indian. Log huts had
given place in time to these two homesteads, in front of one of which
the scene we have just described had taken place.
Built of the great trees hewn down in the primeval forest, neither
storm nor tempest had done them injury. Time had rather beautified
than marred their outward seeming. The shingled roofs were thickly
overgrown with greeny yellow lichen; the woodwork of the dormer
windows, carved balconies, and deep projecting porches had grown
dark with age, thus showing off to greater advantage the wealth of
creepers which clambered in luxurious profusion from basement to
roof. Great clusters of purple and white clematis mingled with the
crimson flowers of the dark-leaved pomegranate. Over the porches,
stretching up to the casement windows, as if courting soft maiden
hands to gather them, clusters of white and pink roses vied with
each other in perfume and beauty.
Both houses were so exactly alike! The same spirit seemed to
have devised, the same hand to have carried out the work, and yet
the founders were of a different people and a different race.
 The Langlades were descended from a certain Chevalier de
Langlade who had fought in the great wars under Turenne, and
when the armies were disbanded the then French Minister, Colbert,
had bestowed upon his regiment, as a reward for its services, all the
lands lying on the shores of the great Lake of St. Lawrence
—“Canada,” as the Indians called it; “New France,” the colonists
baptised it, when as far back as 1535 a French explorer, Jacques
Cartier, ascended the St. Lawrence.
In 1608 the brave and tender-hearted Samuel Champlain laid the
foundations of the City of Quebec, standing proudly on her rock
overlooking land and sea. France was then virtually mistress of
North America, from Hudson’s Bay to the Gulf of Mexico, by right of
precedence. Therefore these warriors, when they landed on the
shores of the St. Lawrence, felt that they were not wholly aliens from
their beloved country, for which they had fought and bled. Ceasing to
be soldiers, they became great hunters. Most of them belonged to
the Reformed Church, and though Henry IV. had renounced his faith
to become King of France, he so far favoured his former co-
religionists as to decree that New France was to welcome the
Calvinists, and that they were to be allowed to worship after their
own fashion; but Cardinal Richelieu, who by the Revocation of the
Edict of Nantes drove the Huguenots out of France, thus depriving
her of the most industrious of her population, extended his spirit of
intolerance even to New France, and decreed that the Calvinistic
worship was no longer to be tolerated there. The result was that
many influential families left Canada, seeking a new home. Amongst
these was a Charles Langlade, with the young wife he had but lately
wedded. It was a perfect exodus, for he was much beloved and had
many followers. They went south, past the great Lake Champlain,
into the dense forests of the west. The Indians swarmed along their
path, and daily, hourly, the exiles were exposed to the danger of the
tomahawks of the savages.
One memorable day the French Canadians suddenly came upon
a group of Englishmen defending themselves as best they could
against an overwhelming number of redskins. Charles Langlade
fired, at what proved to be the Indian chief, as with raised arm he
was in the act of bringing his tomahawk down on the head of a tall,
largely built man, whose rugged features and great strength marked
him out from his companions. This man was Roger Boscowen. Their
chief slain, the Indians fled. Then Charles Langlade and Roger
Boscowen, who had thus seemingly met by chance, joined hands,
and a great and strong affection grew up between them, so that they
cast in their lots together. Roger Boscowen had but lately landed
upon the shores of New England; he too had left his Lincolnshire
fens, with other well-to-do, God-fearing yeomen, for conscience’
sake, to find a country where they might glorify God. They were not
“broken men,”—adventurers or criminals driven from their fatherland
by earthly want,—but men who were constrained by their fear of God
and their zeal for godly worship.
They had no dreams of gold-fields, but were resolute and
industrious, quiet and stern, recognising from the first that nothing
was to be expected from the land but by labour. So the
representatives of the two races united, and marched onward
together along the wavy line of the New England border, until they
reached a spot which seemed to possess all the most essential
qualifications for a new colony. Forest land, deep hills and dales,
pastures sloping down to a broad shining river which watered all the
land, lay stretched out before them; and here they pitched their tents,
and in time multiplied and prospered, upholding from generation to
generation the characteristics of their Puritan and Huguenot
forefathers—namely, piety and simplicity of life. The “Marshes” had
become one of the largest and most prosperous of the border
settlements.
Thus it was that the Langlades and Boscowens were alike proud
of their descent, and strove ever to prove themselves worthy in all
things of those who had gone before and were called “Fathers of the
land.”
That an eldest son should have gone astray and have forsaken
his ancestral home was therefore a bitter sorrow. Alpha and Omega
had been added to the name of Marshwood to distinguish the
homesteads. The Langlades owned Alpha, the Boscowens Omega.
As son succeeded father the tie which bound the heads of the two
houses together was never once broken; no word of dissension ever
arose between them. Younger sons and daughters went forth into
the busy world; some were lost sight of, others returned from time to
time with a curious longing to see once more the home of their race,
and were made welcome and treated hospitably; but, up to the
present time, the eldest son of either branch had never deserted his
post.
The present generation was less fortunate in their domestic
relations than their predecessors. Nathaniel Boscowen lost his wife
when his only son Roger was still a child, and Louis Langlade died in
the prime of life from an accident he met with while hunting. With his
dying breath he commended his wife and children to the care of his
life-long companion and friend Nathaniel, who became forthwith
“Father Nat,” not only in the settlement, but amongst the Indians,
who came to barter the skins of wild beasts for English goods. He
was still a man in the prime of life, and he strove nobly to fulfil his
charge; but Louis Langlade himself had early inspired his son and
Roger with a love for hunting and the wild Indian life, and after a time
Nat found it impossible to exercise any control over Charles. He
would disappear for days together, and at last announced his
intention of dwelling entirely with the Indians and taking a wife from
amongst them.
Up to the very last no one believed he would really carry out the
threat, and when he did the blow, as we have seen, fell heavily upon
them all.
In answer to Father Nat’s invitation to supper, Martha said,—
“Yes, I shall be glad to come; at least I shall not see his empty
chair at my own table. Come, children; we will go and see after the
men’s supper, and then betake ourselves to Omega Marsh.”
Marcus followed his mother, and so Nathaniel and Loïs were left
standing alone in the porch. For a time they both kept silence;
suddenly Father Nat asked,—
“Do you know where Roger is, Loïs? He has been absent since
dawn.”
“No, I do not,” she answered. “But he will come home; have no
fear, Father Nat,” and she turned her young face towards him, bright,
notwithstanding the shadow resting on lips and brow. She was barely
eighteen, tall and slim, but with those delicately rounded limbs which
denote perfect health and strength; her features were regular, her
large grey eyes fringed with long lashes, the tips of which curling up
caught the sunlight, even as did the rich golden hair which, waving
back behind the small ears, fell in two long thick plaits below her
waist. She, like her mother, wore a black gown, a large white bibbed
apron, and sleeves turned back to the elbow, with facings of linen,
scarcely whiter than the rounded arms thus exposed to view.
“I believe he will,” said Father Nat, in answer to her assertion; “but
he will never be content, never be satisfied again.”
“We will trust he may, in time,” answered Loïs. “Why look ahead,
dear Father Nat?”
“You are right, lass. ‘Sufficient unto the day.’ There’s the gong for
supper; come, the mother will follow.”
Even as he spoke Martha and her children joined them, and
together they passed through the wicket gate which alone separated
the two gardens.
The meal was, according to the good old custom, taken in
common, masters and servants sitting at the same board. When the
master entered the great kitchen, some ten or twelve men and
women employed on the home farm were standing about in groups
awaiting Nat’s appearance, and naturally discussing the great event
of the day. Doffing his broad wideawake, he bade them “Good-
evening,” as did also Martha and her children. The salutation was
heartily returned, and then he took his place at the head of the long
table, upon which great joints of cold viands and huge pasties were
already exciting the appetites of those about to partake thereof.
When they were all gathered round the board, Father Nat raised his
hand to enforce silence, and in a solemn voice called upon God to
bless the fruits of the earth. When he had finished his prayer, before
uttering the usual “Amen” he paused; evidently some strong emotion
checked his power of speech, but all present felt he had something
more to say, and waited respectfully.
“My friends,” he said at last, with a slight quiver in his manly voice,
“you all know that one we love has gone out from amongst us, to our
great sorrow. I commend him to your prayers. May the God of his
fathers watch over him, and guide his footsteps in the right way.
Amen.”
 “Amen,” repeated all present, and then they seated themselves
and the meal began, but not gaily as usual, the cloud which rested
on the master overshadowing them all.
 CHAPTER II
PARTED
The sun was setting, and the rays of crimson light tinged the
topmost branches of the forest trees, but scarcely could be said to
penetrate through the closely interlaced branches. The long grass
and thick undergrowth made walking difficult, whilst the tightly
entwined boughs of the trees formed a thick, leafy canopy, perfectly
impenetrable, added to which parasitic plants twined up the huge
trunks in luxuriant wildness.
After he had, so to speak, fled from his home and his people,
Charles Langlade walked straight before him through the forest. He
was a handsome man, his mouth firm set, his nose rather large, and
his chin prominent, cleft in the middle. His eyes were grey, like those
of his sister Loïs, and his eyebrows marked. He wore, what was
unusual among the hunters, his hair rather long. Altogether his
appearance was remarkable; there was something about him which
reminded one of the heroes of old, knights and crusaders. Suddenly
he stopped, and passed his hand across his brow as if trying to
remember.
“It has unnerved me,” he said aloud. “I shall lose my way if I don’t
take care.”
As he spoke he stretched out his hand, and, passing it lightly over
the trunk of the nearest tree, knew instantly by the feel of the bark
the direction he was in, whether north or south, east or west.
Satisfied, he strode forward, stopping from time to time to make sure
he was on the right track.
This following a trail is perfectly simple to the Indian and the
Canadian hunter. They read every mark and sign in the wood as
clearly as if they were written; the moss, the lichen, tell their tale. No
foot-print, however light, can escape their notice; they know whether
it be a white or red man’s foot, whether it be of to-day or yesterday.