Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LE, Chapter 4
LE, Chapter 4
WAGE DETERMINATION
1
Wage Determination under PC Product and Labor Markets
5
6
Wage Determination and Monopsonistic Exploitation
Here we will examine the case of a firm that has
monopolistic power in the product market and
monopsonistic power in the input market.
Suppose that the firm is the only buyer of the input (a
monopsonist).
The supply of labor has a positive slope: as the
monopsonist expands the use of labor he/she must pay a
higher wage.
The supply of labor shows the average expenditure or
price that the monopsonist must pay at different levels of
employment.
Its slope is dw/dL which is greater than zero ( dw/dL > 0).
7
8
Multiplying the price of input by the level of employment gives
the total expenditure of the monopsonist for the input (TEL = w.
L).
14
Labor Union Facing PM Firms
In this model it is assumed that the firm has neither a
monopoly nor a monopsony power.
The labor force, however, is unionized and behaves like a
monopolist in the labor market.
As in the case of bilateral monopoly, the supply curve
shows the marginal cost of the labor union.
The market demand for labor DL is the aggregate VMPL
curve, which is derived from the summation of individual
firms demand curves.
The curve is also the AR for the labor union (ARS), from
which the marginal revenue (MRS) can be derived using the
usual method.
15
Wage rate in the market depends only on the goals of the
labor union.
Three most commonly pursued goals by unions.
1. The maximization of the total gains/profit to the union
as a whole.
2. The maximization of employment. The highest level of
employment is defined by the intersection of the
demand for and the supply of labor.
3. The maximization of the total wage bill. If the union
aims at maximization of wage receipts.
16
Labor Unions and the Union Wage Advantage
There are two major types of unions: industrial unions and
trade unions (trade unions are also known as craft unions).
Industrial unions attempt to organize all of the workers in
an industry, regardless of the type of work that is done.
Trade unions attempt to organize all of the workers
performing a particular type of job, regardless of the
industry in which the worker operates.
In each unionized firm, workers are organized into shops,
groups of workers performing similar tasks. Each shop
votes on which union will serve as their bargaining agent
for collective bargaining purposes.
Each shop is represented by only one union in negotiations
with the employer. 17
Under a collective bargaining agreement, unions negotiate
a wage with the employer.
An effective union negotiates a wage that is above the
equilibrium wage.
18
Unions are able to convince the government to pass laws that give
unions some control over labor supply.
Since unions control the process of licensing, this gives unions
substantial ability to control labor supply in some industries.
19
As is the case with a collective bargaining agreement, a supply
restriction results in a higher wage (w') and a reduced level of
employment (L').
The difference, though, is that there are no unemployed workers in
this market since the supply restriction prevents these additional
workers from ever appearing in this market.
Measuring the Union Wage Advantage
The pure union wage advantage is the percentage by which the union
wage (Wu) exceeds the nonunion wage that would exist without the
union (Wn).
where
A is the pure union wage advantage,
Wu is the union wage and
Wn is the nonunion wage. 20
The measured union wage advantage may overstate or
understate the pure advantage depending on which of the
following effects are dominant.
The Spillover Effect – refers to the decline in nonunion wages
that results from displaced union workers supplying their
services in nonunion labor markets.
Because the spillover effect depresses observed nonunion wages, the
measured union wage advantage is larger than the pure wage
advantage causing the union wage advantage to be overstated.
The Threat Effect – refers to an increase in nonunion wages
that a nonunion employer offers as a response to the threat of
unionization.
This is because nonunion employers will feel increasingly threatened
with unionization when workers in union firms obtain wage increases.
21
The Product Market Effect – a union pay increase, through
its effect on costs and prices, shifts demand to firms in the
non-union sector.
The added demand for nonunion output is translated into added
demand for nonunion labor, which could have a pay-raising
influence.
The Superior-Worker Effect – the higher wages paid by
union firms will cause workers to queue up for these “good”
union jobs.
the availability of many job seekers, unionized employers will
carefully screen these prospective workers for those having the
greatest ability, the most motivation, the least need for costly
supervision, and other worker traits contributing to high
productivity.
22
Minimum Wage Laws
Most of the increases in the minimum wage over time have been
designed to restore the real minimum to its past higher real values.
The introduction of a minimum wage law that covers all employees
into a perfectly competitive labor market will be expected to result in
a reduction in employment.
23
An increase in the minimum wage need not result in
increased employment.
As long as the workers who lose their jobs in the covered sector
are able to shift to work in non-covered firms.
In general, the theories suggest that a minimum wage law
(or union) will result in:
unemployment and economic inefficiency if the labor
market is perfectly competitive and there is complete
coverage, and
economic inefficiency if the labor market is perfectly
competitive and there is a non-covered sector.
24
Theories of wage
(Reading Assignment)
25
!!!THAKS!!!
………በቃ………….
26