Leeza Moot Memorial of Petitioner

MOOT COURT MEMORIAL
Submitted to – Miss Harleen Kaur ma’am

Assistant Professor of Law Department
Kalinga University , RAIPUR
Submitted By
Leeza Pal
Semester - 6th sem
Date of Submission – 30 April 2023
Signature of Student Signature of Faculty

TEAM Code – K.U. 11
MOOT COURT MEMORIAL, KALINGA UNIVERSITY, LLB-6th SEM, BATCH 2020-2023
IN THE HON’BLE DISTRICT COURT AT JALANDHAR (PUNJAB)
Petition filed Under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
IN THE MATTER OF
SUNITA .............................................................................................................. PETITIONER
V.
MAHESH ......................................................................................................... RESPONDENT
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON THE BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

INDEX
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ 5-8
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...................................................................................... 9
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... 10-11
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .................................................................................................... 12
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ......................................................................................... 13-14
BODY OF PLEADINGS .................................................................................................. 15-40
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

BY SUNITA, IS MAINTAINABLE IN THE EYES OF LAW? ..................................... 15-20
SUBMISSION-A THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE THE RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL

RIGHTS ARISE ....................................................................................................................... 15-17
SUBMISSION-B THAT THERE IS A WITHDRAWAL OF CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP ON

THE PART OF MAHESH ......................................................................................................17-18
SUBMISSION-C THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE EXCUSE OR REASONABLE CAUSE

ADDUCED BY MAHESH FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP…18-19
SUBMISSION-D THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON MAHESH AS HE HAS

WITHDRAWN UNREASONABLY FROM SUNITA’S SOCIETY .......................................... 19-20
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE MARRIAGE OF SUNITA AND MAHESH IS VALID AS

PER THE PROVISIONS OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955? .......................... 21-26
SUBMISSION-A THAT SUNITA AND MAHESH ARE HINDUS BY RELIGION AND SECTION
2(1)(A) APPLIES TO THEM ................................................................................................... 21-22
2
COUNSEL ON THE BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
SUBMISSION-B THAT THE MARRIAGE SOLEMNIZED BETWEEN SUNITA AND MAHESH

IN THE ANAND KARAJ CEREMONY IS AN ESSENTIAL CUSTOM OF RAVIDASSIA
COMMUNITY1 AND CUSTOMARY RITES AND CEREMONIES NEED TO BE PERFORMED
FOR THE MARRIAGE TO BE RENDERED AS VALID ...................................................... 22-23
SUBMISSION-C THE PARTIES IN THE PRESENT CASE ARE SHUDRAS/DALITS AND THUS
HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSUMMATE THEIR MARRIAGE ACCORDING TO
CEREMONIES OBSERVED IN THEIR CASTE ...................................................................... 23-24
SUBMISSION-D THE IMPERATIVES UNDER ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE INDIAN

CONSTITUTION RENDER THE CONSUMMATION OF MARRIAGE AMONG THE PARTIESAS
VALID IN THE PRESENT CASE............................................................................................ 24-25
SUBMISSION-E THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS REGISTERED IN THE

YEAR 2007 UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 AS THE
ANAND MARRIAGE ACT, 1909 DOES NOT APPLY ON HINDUS AND IT DID NOT HAVE THE
PROVISION FOR REGISTRATION BACK THEN; ALSO IT DOES NOT AFFECT ANYTHING
CONTAINED IN THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT ........................................................................ 26
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE NON-CONTEST BY THE WIFE OF DIVORCE PETITION

FILED BY THE HUSBAND IN A FOREIGN COURT IMPLIES THAT SHE HAD
CONCEDED TO THE JURIDICTION OF THE FOREIGN COURT? .......................... 27-33
SUBMISSION-A THAT RESIDENT PROOF IS REQUIRED FOR THE FILING OF PETITION

IN FOREIGN COURT ............................................................................................................ 27-28
SUBMISSION-B THAT FOREIGN JUDGEMENT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE AS THE PARTIES

WERE NOT RESIDENTS OF NEW YORK ............................................................................. 28-29
SUBMISSION-C THAT NEW YORK IS NOT THE RECIPROCATING TERRITORY 29-30
).
3
SUBMISSION-D THAT THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 APPLIES ON THE SIKH
COUPLE ................................................................................................................................. 30-31
SUBMISSION-E THAT IRRETRIEVABLY BROKEN DOWN OF MARRIAGE IS NO GROUND

FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE UNDER THE LAW.................................................. 31-32
SUBMISSION-F THAT NON-CONTEST BY THE WIFE DOES NOT IMPLIES THAT SHE HAD
CONCEDED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE FOREIGN COURT ........................................ 32
SUBMISSION-G THAT SUFFICIENT CAUSE IS THERE FOR NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE

THE FOREIGN COURT ...............................................................................................................33
ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF RES-JUDICATA UNDER SECTION 11 OF

THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 IS APPLICABLE TO THE PROCEEDINGS
BEING INITIATED IN DISTRICT COURT, JALANDHAR? ........................................ 34-40
SUBMISSION-A THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE ESSENTIALS OF RESTITUTION OF

CONJUGAL RIGHTS ARE FULFILLED ................................................................................34-36
SUBMISSION-B THAT SEC. 11 OF THE CPC, 1908 WILL NOT OPERATE AS A BAR TO THE
PROCEEDINING INITIATED BY SUNITA ........................................................................... 36-37
SUBMISSION-C THAT JUDGEMENT OF NEW YORK TRIAL COURT IS BEYOND MERIT

.................................................................................................................................................. 38-39
SUBMISSION-D THAT PETITIONER BY ACCEPTING THE MAINTENANCE DID NOT

CONSENT TO THE DECREE OF THE NEW YORK TRIAL COURT ................................... 39-40
PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. 41
4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950
1. LIST OF STATUTES REFERRED

i. Anand Karaj Act, 1909
ii. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
iii. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
iv. International Comity Of Courts
v. The Anand Marriage (Amendment) Act, 2012
vi. The Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908
2. LIST OF JOURNALS REFERRED

i. All India Reporters
ii. Indian Law Reporters
iii. Supreme Court Cases
3. LIST OF CASES REFERRED
CASE PAGE NO.

ATMARAM V. NARBADA, 1980 RAJ. 35. 20
BALASUBRAMANIYAM V. SURUTTAYAN, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 756. 23
BHAURAO V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1564. 23
BHAWAN KOER V. BOSE (1904) 31 CAL. 11 23
BITTOO V. RAMDAS, 1983 ALL. 371 20
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA LTD. V. RAM NARAIN, AIR 1955 SC 36 27
COMMR. HRE MADRAS V. SRI LAKSHMINDRA, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282. 25
DARSHAN GUPTA V. RADHIKA GUPTA, (2013) 9 SCC 1 31
DEEP KAHAR, 1962 PUNJ. 183 18
G.P. SRIVASTAVA V. R.K. RAIZADA, (2000) 3 SCC 54 33
5
GAUR GOPAL ROY V. SIPRA ROY, AIR 978 CAL. 163 27

GAYA V. BHAGWATI, 1966 M.P. 212. 18
GEETA MULLICK V. BROJO GOPAL MULLICK 32
GULAM ABBAS V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 25
2198.
GULLIPILLI SOWRIA RAJ V. BANDARU PAVANI, A.I.R. 2009 S.C. 23
1085.
GURBAX SINGH V. HARMINDER KAUR,(2010)14 SCC 301 31
GURDAYAL SINGH V. RAJAH OF FARIDKOT 27
HARPREET SINGH SEKHON V. RAJWANT KAUR, (2013) SCC 38
ONLINE P&H 4357
HARPREET SINGH SEKHON V. RAJWANT KAUR, 2013 SCC ONLINE 39
P&H 4357 : ILR (2014) 1 P&H 657 : ILR (2014) 1 P&H 876
JYOTHI V. PRATHAP, 1987 KANT. 24. 20
KEMPT V. KEMPT, (1953) 2 ALL E.R. 518. 19
KRISHNA V. SOM NATH, (1996) DMC 667 (P&H). 31
M. ISMAIL FARUQUI V. UNION OF INDIA, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 605. 25
MARGARET PALAI V. SAVITRI PALAI, A.I.R. 2010 ORI. 45. 24
MIRCHULAL V. SMT. DEVI BAI, A.I.R. 1977 RAJ. 113. 18
MOINA KHOSLA V. AMARDEEP KHOSLA, A.I.R 1986 DEL. 399. 27
PANDU V. HARI, A.I.R 1936 NAG. 85 33
POWELL V. POWELL, 92 L.J.P. 6. 17
PRAMILABALA V. RABINDRANATH, A.I.R. 1977 ORISSA 132 18
RAMESH CHANDRA V. PREMLATHA, A.I.R. 1979 M.P. 15. 19
RUSSEL V. RUSSEL, (1835) SOL. JO. 16. 19
SANJAY V. EVELINE JOBE, A.I.R. 1993 M.P. 54. 24
SARLA RANI V. BHUSHANLAL, A.I.R 1976 J&K 12 33
SHYAMLAL V. SARASWATI, 1967 M.P. 204. 17
SMITH V. SMITH, (1939) 4 ALL E.R. 533 17
6
SMT. SATYA V. TEJA SINGH, (1975) 2 S.C.R.1971 25

SONDUR GOPAL V. SONDUR RAJINI, (2013) 7 SCC 426 38
SUNANDA V. GUNDOPANT 1961 ILR BOM 296 33
SURINDER V. GURDEEP, 1973 P &H 134. 18
SUSHILA BAI V. PREM NARAYAN, A.I.R. 1976 M.P. 225. 19
UPENDRA NATH V. LALL A.I.R 1940 P.C. 222 34
V. BHAGAT V. D. BHAGAT, (1994) 1 SCC 337 : (1994) 42 (1) BLJR 1 31
VENUGOPAL V. LAXMI, 1936 MAD. 288. 17
VISHNU DUTT SHARMA VS. MANJU SHARMA (2009) 6 SCC 379 31
WELDON V. WELDON, (1883) 99 P.D. 52. 17
WILKIES V. WILKIES, (1943) 1 ALL E.R. 433 17
Y. NARASIMHA RAO AND ORS V. Y. VENKATA LAKSHMI AND 30
ANR, 1991 SCR (2) 821
Y. NARASIMHA RAO V. Y VENKATA LAKSHMI, (1991) 3 SCC 451 : 28
1991 SCC (CRI) 626.
YUDHISHTER SINGH V. SARITA A.I.R 2002 RAJ 382. 40
4. LIST OF BOOKS REFERRED
C.K. Takwani, Civil Procedure with Limitation Act, 1963 (Eastern Book Company, 8th
Edition)
D.D. Basu, Commentary On The Constitution Of India, Wadhwa, India, 2007, 8th Edition,
Volume I And II
Dr. Avtar Singh, Code of Civil Procedure (Central Law Publications, 20th Edition)
Dr. Basant K. Sharma, Hindu Law (Central Law Publications, 9th Edition)
Dr. Paras Diwan, Modern Hindu Law (Allahbad Law Agency, 22nd Edition)
7
Dr. Rega Surya Rao, Lectures on Family Laws (Asia Law House, 2nd Edition)
Dr. S.N. Misra, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Law Publications, 20th
Edition)
Dr. S.R. Myneni, Hindu Law (Asia Law House, 7nd Edition)
Dr. U.P.D. Kesari, Modern Hindu Law (Central Law Publications, 15th Edition)
H.M. Seervai, Constitution Law Of India, Universal Publications, India, 2004, 4th Edition,
Volume I,II And III
Ludo Rocher, Studies in Hindu Law and Dharmasastras (Anthem South Asian Normative
Traditions Studies, 3rd Edition)
M.P. Jain, India Constitutional Law, Lexis Nexis, India, 2010, 6th Edition
R.K. Agarwal, Hindu Law (Central Law Agency,23rd Edition)
Sir. Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Mulla Hindu Law ( Lexis Nexis, 21st Edition)
Sir. Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Mulla The Code Of Civil Procedure Abridged ( Lexis Nexis,
16st Edition)
V.N. Shukla, Constitution Law Of India, Eastern Book Company, India, 2008, 11th Edition
5. LIST OF WEBSITES REFERRED
1. www.indiakanoon.org
2. www.lexisnexisacademic.com
3. www.manupatra.com
4. www.ncaer.org
5. www.undp.org.in
6. www.vakilno1.com
8
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
In the present matter, the Petitioner humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble District
Court of Jalandhar by the way of petition of restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 reads as:
Section 9: Restitution of Conjugal Rights

When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society
of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district court, for restitution of
conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition
and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution
of conjugal rights accordingly.
Explanation- Where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal
from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has
withdrawn from the society.
9
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
(¶1) Sunita and Mahesh (a major in Indian Army), both resident of Jalandhar (Punjab) are Hindus
by religion and belong to the Ravidassia community. They got married in 2007 and got their
marriage registered as per the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and obtained a marriage
certificate.
(¶2) In 2008, a child was born from this union. In the same year, Mahesh after taking retirement
went to England for higher studies for 2 years. In April 2010, he went to Canada and called his
wife and the child. In January 2011, a second child was born in Canada. In February 2011, he went
to New York and in March, 2011, his wife along with the children left for Punjab.
(¶3) After moving to New York, Mahesh severed all his ties from her and developed an extra-
marital affair with a woman named Elizabeth Prescott. When in January 2012, Sunita wrote a letter
to Mahesh expressing her willingness to join him, Mahesh in reply showed his interest in getting
their marriage dissolved.
(¶4) In April 2012, Mahesh filed a petition for divorce in Trial Court of New York on the ground
of irretrievably broken down marriage. In July 2012, the Trial Court granted him divorce decree
as Sunita had not contest the proceeding because she was having no means to go to New York.
The Court ordered Mahesh to pay Rs.50,000 per month maintenance to wife and children.
(¶5) Since, Mahesh failed to pay maintenance, Sunita approached the Trial Court of New York
and prayed for legal aid, proceedings were initiated and warrants of arrest were issued against
Mahesh. She claimed that the ex-parte divorce decree is not binding on her and it was illegal. She
asserted that she is the actual victim and according to the Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955, the wife has adultery, cruelty and desertion as a ground of divorce.
(¶6) In April 2013, she also filed a petition for the restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in the District Court of Jalandhar. Mahesh appeared in the Court
and did not file any written statement in the reply of petition drafted by Sunita and asserted that
Sunita is bound by the decree of Trial Court, New York as she did not contest the same and
10
by not raising any objection she is deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the Foreign Court
in trying the petition and thus making the decree nisi-absolute by the Foreign Court. Further, by
accepting maintenance, Sunita , again in effect accepted the judgement of the Foreign Court and
thus estopped from filing the petition under section 11 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908.
11
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

BY SUNITA, IS MAINTAINABLE IN THE EYES OF LAW?

PER THE PROVISIONS OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955?

FILED BY THE HUSBAND IN A FOREIGN COURT IMPLY THAT SHE HAD
CONCEDED TO THE JURIDICTION OF THE FOREIGN COURT?

BEING INITIATED IN DISTRICT COURT, JALANDHAR?
12
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

In the present case, the restitution of conjugal rights arise and should be granted to Sunita so as to
resume her married life with Mahesh and save her marriage; as there was no reasonable excuse to
withdraw from the society of Sunita and there is enough evidence to support the truth of the
statements and no legal ground to Mahesh for not granting restitution; also there was a withdrawal
of the conjugal relationship on the part of Mahesh; as well as there is no reasonable excuse or
reasonable cause adduced by Mahesh so as to justify the withdrawal from conjugal relationship
and the burden of proof solely lies on Mahesh as he has unreasonably withdrawn from Sunita’s
society and there exists no cogent evidence to prove otherwise. Hence, the petition is maintainable.

PER THE PROVISIONS OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955?
The marriage of Sunita and Mahesh is valid as per the provisions of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
as this Act applies to any person who is a Hindu by religion, according to section 2(1)(a) and
section 2(1)(b) governs the matters of ‘Hindus’ which include Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs; so
despite of the ceremony belonging to Sikh religion, it would be deemed to be practiced by Hindus;
Anand Karaj ceremony is an essential ceremony which needs to be undergone in the matters of
marriage as a custom of the Ravidassia community, also by the reason that they are Shudras/Dalits,
they have rights to go through customary rites and ceremonies of Anand Karaj as the Act empowers
the practice of these castes according to the region they belong to. The constitutional imperative
under Article 25(1) of the Constitution of Indiagrants them the freedom to observe the religious
ceremony and since the parties are not Sikh and there was no amendment
13
regarding the registration of marriage at the time of consummation of marriage of the parties, the
marriage would be governed by Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

FILED BY THE HUSBAND IN A FOREIGN COURT IMPLY THAT SHE HAD
CONCEDED TO THE JURIDICTION OF THE FOREIGN COURT?
Since both the husband and wife were not the residents of India, the essentials of section 19 of the
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are not being fulfilled neither the wife visited New York and could
not contest the proceedings as she had no means to go to New York. Since there was sufficient
cause as the wife did not have the means to reach the New York Trial Court and her husband also
denied to come there Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, also, the New York Trial
Court is not the competent court in the cause of Sunita and Mahesh and the judgement is not
conclusive according to the section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, New York is not
reciprocating territory of India under section 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Also, the
irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for the divorce under section 13(1) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

BEING INITIATED IN DISTRICT COURT, JALANDHAR?
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the aggrieved party needs to file a
petition to the district court and on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such
petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, the judge may
decree Restitution of Conjugal Rights in his favour. Sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, ‘Res
Judicata’ aims to prevent multiplicity of the proceedings and accords finality to an issue, which
directly and substantially had arisen in the former suit between the same parties or their privies,
decided and became final so that parties are not vexed twice over; vexatious litigation would be
put to an end and the valuable time of the court is saved.
14
BODY OF PLEADINGS

It is most humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that after marriage, the husband is entitled to
the society of his wife and the wife to the society of her husband. A cause of action, therefore,
arises when one of the parties to the marriage withdraws from the society of the other. Section 9
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,2 deals with the subject of the restitution of conjugal rights. The
foundation of the right is the fundamental rule of matrimonial law that one spouse is entitled to
society and comfort–consortium–of the other spouse, also, to promote stability in marriage and
where either spouse has abandoned or withdrawn from the society of the other without reasonable
excuse or just cause the court should grant a decree for restitution.
In the present case, the restitution of conjugal rights arise and should be granted to Sunita so as to
resume her married life with Mahesh and save her marriage; also there was a withdrawal of the
conjugal relationship on the part of Mahesh; as well as there is no reasonable excuse or reasonable
cause adduced by Mahesh so as to justify the withdrawal from conjugal relationship and the burden
of proof solely lies on Mahesh as he has unreasonably withdrawn from Sunita’s society and there
exists no cogent evidence to prove otherwise.
SUBMISSION-A
THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE THE RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS ARISE.
(¶1) It is most humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that in the present case, the marriage among
the parties was solemnized in the year 2007 and both the husband and wife (herein, Sunita and
Mahesh) stayed together till the year 2011 and then Mahesh sent Sunita back to India
2
Section – 9 Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Restitution of conjugal rights.- When either the husband or the wifehas,
without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to
the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements
made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree
restitution of conjugal rights accordingly.
15
and on her insistence to cohabit, Sunita was denied expressly by a letter.3It can be very well
established that Mahesh, has withdrawn from the society of Sunita without giving a proper reason
and filing for the divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. Thus under the section 9 of
the Act, it can be established:
• That Mahesh, has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of Sunita.
• That petitioner has enough evidence in the form of Mahesh’s letter of refusal to cohabit
and filing divorce on insufficient grounds to adduce the truth of statements in the petition.
• There is no legal ground available to Mahesh, as to why the application should not be
granted.4
(¶2) In the interest of the institution of marriage, some safeguard should be provided against the
hasty separation5 as in this case, so as to effectuate the intention of section 9 to provide an
opportunity for re-approachment and reconciliation between the two spouses.6 The counselhumbly
contends before this Hon’ble Court to put into motion a compromise between the spouses;for this
very cause, Sunita, has by the way of petition, reached out to the court to institute proceedings for
directing Mahesh to give back the conjugal society which has been unreasonably withdrawn by
him.
(¶3) In Sushila Bai v. Prem Narayan7 the M.P. High Court held that in order to sustain a petition
for restitution of conjugal rights, it is necessary to establish that the respondent has withdrawn
from the society of the petitioner. By the virtue of this submission, it is already apparent that
Mahesh has withdrawn from the conjugal society by moving to New York in the year 2011 and
subsequently filing for divorce.8 Now Sunita, desiring the company of her spouse, Mahesh, is
asking this Hon’ble Court for the assistance to restore him back so as to lead a conjugal life. It is
3
¶2 of the Moot Proposition.
4
A.M. Bhattacharjee, Matrimonial Laws and the Constitution, 17, (Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1996).
5
Paras Diwan, Family Law, 113, (Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad, 1998).
6
Ibid.
7
A.I.R. 1976 M.P. 225.
8
16
needless to say, that the petitioner is the aggrieved party here who desires to live with her
spouse.9
SUBMISSION-B
THAT THERE IS A WITHDRAWAL OF CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP ON THE PART OF

MAHESH.
(¶4) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that married persons are bound to live
together and if either of them withdraws from the society of the other without lawful excuse, the
Court may compel the parties to return to cohabitation.10 Although, the reasons of the withdrawal
must be grave and weighty. According to the case of Shyamlal v. Saraswati,11 it has been held that
any act of commission or omission amounting to reasonable cause must be something grave and
weighty or grave and convincing. The ‘withdrawal’ involves a mental process besides physical
separation, as it is the mental condition of the spouse which also at stake when either of the spouse
withdraws from the society of the other without reasonable excuse.
(¶5) The words, ‘withdrawal from the society of the other’ means withdrawing by one spouse not
from the company of the other but from the conjugal relationship. In short, it is withdrawal from
the totality of conjugal relationship, such as refusal to stay together, refusal to give company and
comfort, etc.12In withdrawal from society, there is an element of desertion; sometimes it can be
less than desertion, it is a total repudiation of cohabitation.13 The basis of the petition filed by
Sunita is that there was a lawful wedlock between the parties but Mahesh is not cohabitating and
has refused to cohabit with her. As Mahesh has withdrawn totally from cohabitation, the cause of
action has arisen to Sunita.14 It has also been established in the case of Venugopal v. Laxmi15that
the consummation of marriage is not essential to file for the restitution of the conjugal rights, so
9
R.K. Agarwal, Hindu Law, 64, (25thedn.,Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 2016).
10
Weldon v. Weldon, (1883) 99 P.D. 52.
11
1967 M.P. 204.
12
Powell v. Powell 92 L.J.P. 6.
13
Dr. Paras Diwan, Modern Hindu Law, 191 (23rdedn., Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad, 2016).
14
Smith v. Smith, (1939) 4 All E.R. 533; Wilkies v. Wilkies, (1943) 1 All E.R. 433.
15
1936 Mad. 288.
17
even if the marriage between Sunita and Mahesh is not rendered as a valid marriage, the restitution
is to be granted.
(¶6)It is often quoted that “a wife’s first duty to her husband is to submit herself obediently to his
authority and remain under his roof and protection.”16Also, according to the ordinary custom of
the Hindu society, the wife is expected to perform the marital obligation at her husband’s residence
it is the duty of the husband to maintain his wife.17 It is the obligation of the wife to stay under the
roof of the husband and the protection of her husband.18 Also, the word ‘society’ in section 9 has
the same meaning as ‘cohabitation’ which is living together as husband and wife and fulfilling the
matrimonial duties.
SUBMISSION-C
THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE EXCUSE OR REASONABLE CAUSE ADDUCED BY

MAHESH FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP.
(¶7) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that there was no reasonable or just excuse
while Mahesh left Sunita and when the ‘reasonable or just excuse’ is assessed in the eyes of law it
is the conduct of the spouse which for one reason or the another falls short of cruelty or any other
matrimonial offence justifying the withdrawal from the society depending upon whether the
conduct complained is of a grave or weighty character or not.19 It must, in all probabilities, involve
an enquiry into the facts. In Pramilabala v. Rabindranath,20it was held that when no fault is found
on the part of either of the spouses, they cannot be rendered liable for unreasonable withdrawal
from the society of either of them.
(¶8) It will amount to reasonable excuse or reasonable cause when:
• There exists a ground on which, the respondent can claim any matrimonial relief.21
16
Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Mulla Hindu Law (21stedn., LexisNexis, Gurgaon, 2014).
17
Mulla, Hindu Law, S. 555.
18
Gaya v. Bhagwati, 1966 M.P. 212.
19
Ramesh Chandra v. Prem Latha, A.I.R. 1979 M.P. 15.
20
A.I.R. 1977 Orissa 132; Mirchulal v. Smt. Devi Bai
21
Deep Kahar, 1962 Punj. 183; Surinder v. Gurdeep, 1973 P & H 134.
18
• If the petitioner is guilty of any matrimonial misconduct, not amounting to ground for a
matrimonial relief, yet sufficiently weighty and grave.
• If the petitioner is guilty of such act, omission or conduct which makes it impossible for
the respondent to live with him. The reason here should also be grave and weighty.
In a long line of English cases like Russel v. Russel22 and Kempt v. Kempt,23it has been observed
that persistent undue familiarity with the person of opposite sex can be a reasonable excuse but
when this undue familiarity changes and takes the shape of an extra-marital affair, the
repercussions are troublesome to either of the spouse who does so. In the present case, where in
the year 2011, Mahesh went to New York and sent back Sunita and had an extra-marital affair with
Elizabeth Prescott and in the furtherance of which he filed for the divorce on insufficient grounds24
can be taken into account which cannot amount as reasonable cause or excuse.
SUBMISSION-D
THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON MAHESH AS HE HAS WITHDRAWN

UNREASONABLY FROM SUNITA’S SOCIETY.
(¶9) According to the facts of this case, it is crystal clear that Mahesh has withdrawn from the
conjugal relationship and consortium of Sunita without reasonable excuse, leaving back two
children born out of wedlock, in the years 2008 and 2011 respectively.25 Also, Sunita expressed
her desire to come to Mahesh by the medium of a letter when he sent her back and got involved in
an extra-marital affair in New York26 and subsequently after it, he filed for the divorce on grounds
of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, which do not exist at all (enumerated in further
submissions). In the light of these facts, it can be rightly said that there was unreasonable
withdrawal by Mahesh.
(¶10) Explanation to section 9 lays down, “Where a question arises whether there has been
reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall
22
(1835) Sol. Jo. 16.
23
(1953) 2 All E.R. 518.
24
25
26
¶3 and ¶4 of the Moot Proposition.
19
be on the person who has withdrawn from the society. This means two things: (i) Initial burden to
prove that the respondent has withdrawn from the society of the petitioner is on the petitioner as
laid down in the case of Bittoo v. Ramdas27and (ii) Once that burden is discharged (as in the present
case), it is for the respondent to prove that there exists a reasonable excuse for the withdrawal as
prescribed in the case of Atmaram v. Narbada28 where the explanation was emphasized in showing
that the case of respondent was such that the burden of proving the reasonable excuse had to be
there.
20
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE MARRIAGE OF SUNITA AND MAHESH IS VALID AS PER

THE PROVISIONS OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955?
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the marriage of Sunita and Mahesh,
who belong to the Ravidassia community of the Hindu religion,which was solemnized by Anand
Karaj ceremony is valid as per the provisions of The Hindu Marriage Act, 195529 as this Act applies
to any person who is a Hindu by religion, according to section 2(1)(a)30 and section 2(1)(b)31
governs the matters of ‘Hindus’ which include Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs; so despite of the
ceremony belonging to Sikh religion, it would be deemed to be practiced by Hindus; Anand Karaj
ceremony is an essential ceremony which needs to be undergone in the matters of marriage as a
custom of the Ravidassia community, also by the reason that they are Shudras/Dalits, they have
rights to go through customary rites and ceremonies of Anand Karaj as the Act empowers the
practice of these castes according to the region they belong to. The constitutional imperative under
Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India32 grants them the freedom to observe the religious
ceremony and since the parties are not Sikh and there was no amendment regarding the registration
of marriage at the time of consummation of marriage of the parties, the marriage would be
governed by Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
SUBMISSION-A
THAT SUNITA AND MAHESH ARE HINDUS BY RELIGION AND SECTION 2(1)(A)
APPLIES TO THEM.
(¶1) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that both husband and wife are Hindus
by religion and thus the application of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is valid in their case of
marriage according to section 2(1)(a). A person who is a Hindu in any of its forms (herein the
29
30
Section – 2, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Application of Act.- (1) This Act applies,- (a) to any person who is a
Hindu by religion in any of of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the
Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj.
31
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, and.
32
Article 25, The Constitution of India, 1950: Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and
propagation of religion (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
21
Ravidasa community33) or developments is eligible to the application of the Act. The Supreme
Court of India, while interpreting and relying upon the preamble of the Act in the case of Gullipilli
Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani34that it can only apply to the marriage of Hindus. Further, the
Ravidassia community which has been born out of Sikhism, forms an integral part of the Hindu
community. In a judgement of Calcutta High Court,35 it was categorically laid down that the Hindu
religion is marvelously catholic and elastic. Its theology is marked by eclecticism and tolerance
and almost unlimited freedom of professing it. Amongst different castes and sections it exhibits
wide diversity of practice.
(¶2) The word ‘Hindu’ in the Act does not denote to any particular or specific religion or
community, under the Hindu Marriage Act, the scope of ‘Hindu’ has a wide meaning and
connotation. During the last hundred years, it has been a nomenclature used to refer
comprehensively to various categories of people for the purposes of personal law. It applies to
various religious sects and bodies which at various periods and in circumstances developed out of
or split off from the Hindu system. Section 2(1)(b) of the Act states that even the Buddhists, Jains
or Sikhs are not Hindus by religion but the Act applies to them in the same manner in which it
applies to Hindus, so a ceremony (herein, Anand Karaj) though not practiced by Hindus, would be
deemed to be practiced by them as ‘Sikhs’ come within the meaning of ‘Hindus’. Also, according
to section 5 of the Act, a marriage can be solemnized between two Hindus on the fulfillment of
certain conditions.
SUBMISSION-B
THAT THE MARRIAGE SOLEMNIZED BETWEEN SUNITA AND MAHESH IN THE

ANAND KARAJ CEREMONY IS AN ESSENTIAL CUSTOM OF RAVIDASSIA
COMMUNITY36 AND CUSTOMARY RITES AND CEREMONIES NEED TO BE
PERFORMED FOR THE MARRIAGE TO BE RENDERED AS VALID.
33
Adams, C. J., Classification of religions: Geographical, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2007.
34
A.I.R. 2009 S.C. 1085.
35
Bhawan Koer v. Bose (1904) 31 Cal. 11, p. 15.
36
Paramjit Judge, Mapping Social Exclusion in India: Caste, Religion and Borderlands, 179-182, (Cambridge
University Press).
22
(¶3) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that it is a settled law that for the
solemnization of marriage under the Act, various conditions need to be fulfilled. Section 5 must
be read with section 7, which deals with the marriage ceremonies. It is pertinent to note that the
customary rites and ceremonies of either party as laid down in s. 7(1),37 should be performed while
the solemnization of marriage. The customary rites and ceremonies of at least one party must be
purported to for the solemnization of a Hindu marriage.
(¶4) The admixture of religion and ethics with legal percepts is naturally congruent under the
Hindu Law, so no hard line of logical demarcation between secular and religious matters is there
and religious and legal percepts are viewed on a very thin line. The smritikarsas appertaining to
achara (rituals) and not to vyavahara (law proper) conform to the norm that marriage is primarily
a sacrament (sanskara).38 Though, later developments have shown that the marriage is a sacrament
as well as a contract according to the various provisions of the law.
(¶5) The word ‘solemnize’ means to celebrate the marriage with proper ceremonies and in due
form. In a Supreme Court ruling of Bhaurao v. State of Maharashtra39it was stated that unless
the marriage is celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and due form, it cannot be
considered to be solemnized. Such ceremonies may be essentially fulfilled which include the
customary law of one of the parties, also where such ceremonies include saptapadi (taking seven
steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire), that ceremony must be
observed.
SUBMISSION-C
THE PARTIES IN THE PRESENT CASE ARE SHUDRAS/DALITS AND THUS HAVE THE
RIGHT TO CONSUMMATE THEIR MARRIAGE ACCORDING TO CEREMONIES
OBSERVED IN THEIR CASTE.
37
Section 7, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage.-(1) A Hindu marriage may be
solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto.
38
Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Mulla Hindu Law, 864, (21stedn., LexisNexis, Gurgaon, 2014).
39
A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1564.
23
(¶6) It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the rule relating to the ceremonies under section
7 of the Act proceeds on the principle that marriage being one of the sanskarasfor a Hindu male
or female, whether belonging to twice-born castes or a shudra,40must be performed with the
necessary religious rites and at the same time, recognizes the position that the customary rites and
ceremonies vary in different parts of the country and also among different castes and communities.
It has been held in the case of Margaret Palai v. Savitri Palai,41 when neither rites nor ceremonies
are proved, such marriage will not be construed as a valid Hindu marriage.
(¶7) Persons belonging to different communities and different castes of Hindus have, in some
places in India, different views respecting ceremonial observances and a different estimate of what
are generally regarded as the essential rites and ceremonies which must accompany the
performance of marriage. It is both reasonable and just, therefore, that the question of requisite
ceremonies must be adjusted in accordance with the custom and usage followed by them or either
of them. Members of scheduled castes in Maharashtra converted to Buddhism are Hindus
according to s. 2 and the customary form of marriage adopted by them results in valid marriage.42
(¶8) The presumption of the valid marriage applies to the question whether the formal requisites
of a valid marriage ceremony were satisfied. According to the case of Bala Subramaniyam v.
Suruttayan,43 the formalities and customs of a valid marriage are also presumed to have been
performed if a presumption of marriage arises on long period of cohabitation.
SUBMISSION-D
THE IMPERATIVES UNDER ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

RENDER THE CONSUMMATION OF MARRIAGE AMONG THE PARTIES AS VALID IN
THE PRESENT CASE.
40
Mulla, Hindu Law, S. 623: Who are Shudras, Subrao v. Radha, (1928) 52 Bom. 497, p. 501.
41
A.I.R. 2010 Ori. 45.
42
Sanjay v. Eveline Jobe, A.I.R. 1993 M.P. 54.
43
A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 756.
24
(¶9) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Article 25(1) of the Indian
Constitution guarantees to every person, not only the citizens of India, “the right to profess,
practice and propagate religion freely”. The consummation of marriage according to the Anand
Karaj ceremony is the religious practice of the aforementioned parties and the state cannot interfere
in deciding the matter relating to it as involves belief and faith of the petitioner. Article 25 seeks
to protect religion and religious practices from state interference as India has no preferred state
religion, all religions are treated alike and enjoy equal constitutional protection without any favour
or discrimination. In M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India,44 it was held that the State guarantees
freedom in matters of faith emphasizing that there is no religion of the State itself.
(¶10) Further, the Supreme Court has also stated in the case of Commr. HRE Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra45that the guarantee under the Constitution of India protects the acts done in the
pursuance of the religion. It has also been laid down that a person can exhibit his belief in such
outwardly act as he thinks proper.46 The protection under article 25 and 26 extends to guarantee
for rituals and observances and ceremonies which form an integral part of religion47as in this case
the parties belonging to the Ravidassia community of Hindu religion have under gone marriage
under the ceremony of Anand Karaj. In the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh48it was
held that the State cannot interfere with customary rights to perform their religious ceremonies and
functions.
(¶11) Explanation-II attached to the Article 25 of the Indian Constitution states that the expression
‘Hindu’ shall also include Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs and thus re-iterating the contention raised
above that the ceremony of Sikhs as practiced by Hindus in the present case would be deemed to
be as practiced by Hindus only.
44
A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 605.
45
A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282.
46
Sri Lakshmana Yatendrulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1414.
47
N. Adithyan v. Travancore Dewaswom Board, (2002) 8 S.C.C. 106.
48
A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2198.
25
SUBMISSION-E
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS REGISTERED IN THE YEAR 2007
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 AS THE ANAND
MARRIAGE ACT, 1909 DOES NOT APPLY ON HINDUS AND IT DID NOT HAVE THE
PROVISION FOR REGISTRATION BACK THEN; ALSO IT DOES NOT AFFECT
ANYTHING CONTAINED IN THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT.
(¶12) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the registration of marriage as per the
provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was done in the year 2007, as per the facts of the case. It
is contended that the Anand Marriage Act, 190949 cannot apply to Hindus and since Sunita and
Mahesh are not Sikhs by religion, they would not be governed by the Act. Also, the Amendment
bill of 2012 which has got the then President’s assent, states that the provisions for the registration
of a marriage among Sikhs solemnized according to the Anand Karaj form of marriage, it also
explicably states that the registration does not affect anything contained in the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955.50 So, the parties to marriage (herein, Sunita and Mahesh) have rightly got their marriage
registered under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 as it allows the governance of the marriage among
the Hindus as stated in the s. 2 of the Act.
49
Section 3, Anand Marriage Act, 1909: Exemption of certain marriages from Act. - Nothing in this Act shall
apply to – (a) any marriage between persons not professing the Sikh religion, or.
50
After section 5 of the Principal Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely: — “6. (1) For the
purposes of facilitation of proof of marriage ceremony (commonly known as Anand Karaj) customary among the
Sikhs the State Government shall, without prejudice to anything contained in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or any
other law for the time being in force, make rules providing that the parties to any such marriage.
26
ISSUE 3: WHETHER NON-CONTEST BY THE WIFE OF DIVORCE PETITION FILED

BY THE HUSBAND IN A FOREIGN COURT IMPLIES THAT SHE HAD CONCEDED
TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE FOREIGN COURT?
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the ex-parte divorce granted by the
Trial Court of New York on the ground of irretrievably broken down of marriage is no ground of
divorce under Hindu Law, besides this no valid ground mentioned in the divorce petition by the
respondent. Further, the counsel would like to contend that the Trial Court of New York had no
jurisdiction to deliver judgement under Sec.13 of Civil Procedure Code and neither respondent nor
petitioner was the resident of New York.
SUBMISSION-A
THAT RESIDENT PROOF IS REQUIRED FOR THE FILING OF PETITION IN FOREIGN

COURT.
(¶1) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that first essential for the filing of
petition in the court that the parties should be the resident of the jurisdiction of same court, while
in the present case the petitioner and respondent both were the resident of Jalandhar.51
(¶2) In Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh52, residence does not mean a temporary residence for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce but habitual residence or residence which is intended to be permanent for
future as well. Supreme Court pointed out: there must be the factum and there must be the animus,
the intention must be a present intention to reside forever in the country where the residence has
been taken up.53 In the case of Gurdayal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkot, ex-parte decree passed
against the respondent by the foreign court when he neither resided at Faridkot nor was he
domiciled there, the decree passed by the Faridkot court in was an absolute nullity and outside the
jurisdiction.54
51 ¶1 of the Moot Proposition.

52
(1975) 2 S.C.R.1971
53
Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Ram Narain, AIR 1955 SC 36; Gaur Gopal Roy v. Sipra Roy, AIR 978 Cal. 163;
Moina Khosla v. Amardeep Khosla, A.I.R 1986 Del. 399.
54
http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/fore.htm
27
In the present case the parties are the resident of India. The plaintiff never refused to settle with
defendant in New York. She also wrote letter to join Mahesh in New York.55Therefore the Foreign
Court has no jurisdiction to deliver judgement.
SUBMISSION-B
THAT FOREIGN JUDGEMENT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE AS THE PARTIES WERE NOT

RESIDENTS OF NEW YORK.
(¶3) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the petition can be presented only
before the District Court or High Court for the dissolution of marriage by the husband. 56 In the
present case the petition filed by the husband in the Trial Court of New York57, which was outside
the jurisdiction of the Court and does not lie under the Sec.13 of Civil Procedure Code. In Y.
Narasimha Rao v. Y Venkata Lakshmi58, it was held that “the jurisdiction assumed by the Foreign
Court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the
matrimonial law under which the parties are married”
(¶4) Sec. 19 of Civil Procedure Code Court to which petition shall be presented - Every petition
under this Act shall be presented to the district court within the local limits of whose ordinary
original civil jurisdiction—
(i) the marriage was solemnised, or

(ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or
(iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or
(iiia) in case the wife is the petitioner, where she is residing on the date of presentation of the
petition, or
(iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the
respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not

56
Sec. 10 Indian Divorce Act, 1869
58
(1991) 3 SCC 451 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 626.
28
been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would
naturally have heard of him if he were alive.
(¶5) The decree in the present case dissolving the marriage passed by the foreign court is without
jurisdiction according to the Hindu Marriage Act as neither the marriage was celebrated nor the
parties last resided together nor the respondent resided within the jurisdiction of "that Court. The
decree was also held to be passed on a ground which was not available under the Hindu Marriage
Act which was applicable to the marriage. Hence the decision that has been passed, which indeed
is a violation of the principles of natural justice and would come within the exceptions envisaged
by clause (b) and (d) of Sec. 13 CPC.
(¶6) Sec. 13 of C.P.C When foreign judgement not conclusive- A foreign judgement shall be
conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between
parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title except-
(a) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction;
(b) where it has not been given on the merits of the case;
(c) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of
international law or a refusal to recognise the law of [India] in cases in which such law is
applicable;
(d) where the proceedings in which the judgement was obtained are opposed to natural justice;
(e) where it has been obtained by fraud;
(f) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in [India].
SUBMISSION-C
THAT NEW YORK IS NOT THE RECIPROCATING TERRITORY

(¶7) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the decree granted by the New
York Court can’t be executed in India as if it had been passed by the District Court because it is
not the reciprocating territory of India.
"Reciprocating Territory" is defined in explanation 1 to Sec. 44A of Civil Procedure Code as: "Any
country or territory outside India which the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, declare as a reciprocating territory." The List of Reciprocating Territories under
the Civil Laws in India are United Kingdom, Singapore, Bangladesh, UAE, Malaysia,
29
Trinidad & Tobago, New Zealand, the Cook Islands (including Niue) and the Trust Territories of
Western Samoa, Hong Kong, Papua and New Guinea, Fiji, Aden.59
(¶8) Similarly in the case of Y. Narasimha Rao And Ors v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi And Anr60, the
appellant and his wife were last resided together in the jurisdiction of the court of New Orleans,
but he filed petition for the dissolution of marriage in the Circuit Court St. Louis Country, Missouri,
USA. Court held that the decree dissolving the marriage passed by the foreign court is without
jurisdiction according to the Hindu Marriage Act neither the marriage was celebrated nor the
parties last resided together nor respondent resided within the jurisdiction of that Court.
SUBMISSION-D
THAT THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 APPLIES ON THE SIKH COUPLE.
(¶9) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 applies
to Hindus, Buddhists, Jains or Sikh by religion.61It extends to Hindus domiciled outside the
territory of India.62 In the present case Sunita and Mahesh are governed by the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1995 in the matter of marriage and divorce.
(¶10) By virtue of Sec. 2 of the Anand Marriage Act, 1909 which envisages that all marriages
which may be or may have been duly solemnized according to the Sikh marriage ceremony called
Anand shall be, and shall be deemed to have been with effect from the date of the solemnization
of each respectively, good and valid in law. Therefore, for the purpose of divorce, provisions of
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are applicable to the parties especially when the wife has been a resident
of India and is shown to have never gone to USA.63
59
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/396480/International+Courts+Tribunals/Contribution+Of+Ip+In+Growth+Of+Fd
is+In+India
60
1991 SCR (2) 821
61
Sec. 2, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
62
Sec. 1(b) Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
63
Harpreet Singh Sekhon v. Rajwant Kaur, 2013 SCC OnLine P&H 4357 : ILR (2014) 1 P&H 657 : ILR (2014) 1
P&H 876
30
SUBMISSION-E
THAT IRRETRIEVABLY BROKEN DOWN OF MARRIAGE IS NO GROUND FOR

DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE UNDER THE LAW.
(¶11) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that irretrievably broken down of
marriage is no ground for the dissolution of marriage under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Sec. 13(1)
of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lays down nine fault grounds of divorce such as adultery, desertion,
cruelty, insanity, venereal disease, leprosy, venereal diseases, conversion and renunciation of
world which are available for both husband and wife. Marriage cannot be dissolved on a ground
not specified in the Act.64 Krishna v. Som Nath65, divorce on the basis of irretrievable breakdown
is not enough itself.
(¶12) In Gurbax Singh v. Harminder Kaur66, held that “we cannot persuade ourselves to grant a
decree of divorce, on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage for the simple reason that
the breakdown is only from the side of the husband as the wife consistently maintained that she
was intensely concerned with her future relationship with her husband and that her greatest and
paramount desire was to rejoin her husband and to live with him normally in a matrimonial
relationship, once again. Since the respondent does not consent to the severance of matrimonial
ties, it may not be possible for us to accede the prayer.” Court has made it clear that to declare a
marriage as irretrievably broken, mere living separate is not sufficient; there should be break down
from both the sides.67
(¶13) No divorce can be granted on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage if the party
seeking divorce on this ground is himself or herself at fault. The decree of divorce on the ground
that the marriage has irretrievably broken down can be granted in those cases where both
64
Rajender v. Anita, 1993 Del.135; A. v. M., Bom 70.
65
(1996) DMC 667 (P&H). See also, V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337 : (1994) 42 (1) BLJR 1
66
(2010)14 SCC 301; Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Manju Sharma (2009) 6 SCC 379 https://www.livelaw.in/comment-
on-darshan-gupta-v-radhika-gupta/
67
Darshan Gupta v. Radhika Gupta, (2013) 9 SCC 1 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 130
31
the parties have leveled such allegations against each other that the marriage appears to be
practically dead and the parties cannot live together.68
(¶14) In Geeta Mullick v. Brojo Gopal Mullick69, the Calcutta High Court held: “In our considered
opinion, the marriage between the parties cannot be dissolved by the trial Court or even by the
High Court only on the ground of marriage having been irretrievably broken down, in the absence
of one or more grounds as contemplated under Sec. 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.”
(¶15) Sec. 13(f) of Civil Procedure Code thereof provides that the foreign judgement is not
conclusive where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India. Therefore
the decree passed by the Trial Court of New York is against the law of India because no law
provides divorce merely on the ground of the irretrievably broken down of marriage.
SUBMISSION-F
THAT NON-CONTEST BY THE WIFE DOES NOT IMPLIES THAT SHE HAD CONCEDED
TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE FOREIGN COURT.
(¶16) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Sunita came back to Punjab
(India) in March 2011 along with her children70 and could not contest the proceedings because she
had no means to go to New York. Meanwhile the trial court of New York delivered ex-parte
judgement in favour of respondent.71
(¶17) Harpreet Singh Sekhon v. Rajwant Kaur72, respondent had not submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court or consented to its passing, it cannot be recognized by the courts in this country and is
therefore, unenforceable. The non-contest by the petitioner does not implies that she had conceded
to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Court because there is a valid reason which is the sufficient cause
i.e. no means to go to New York.
6868LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA (REPORT NO. 217), p13

69
Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law & Usage pg 293 Revised by Justice Ranganath Misra (16th ed. New Delhi:
Bharat Law House, 2008),
71¶4 of the Moot Proposition.
72
2013 SCC OnLine P&H 4357 : ILR (2014) 1 P&H 657 : ILR (2014) 1 P&H 876
32
SUBMISSION-G
THAT SUFFICIENT CAUSE IS THERE FOR NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE

FOREIGN COURT.
(¶18) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that according to Order IX Rule 13,
CPC "Setting Aside decree ex parte against defendant : In any case in which a decree is passed ex
parte against a defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order
to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was
prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the
Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs,
payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the
suit:
(¶19) It was stated by the SC in the case of G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada73, that “if sufficient
cause is made out for non- appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex parte
proceedings initiated against him, he cannot be penalized for his previous negligence which had
been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier.” Court expect for good reasons, however, a court
will not direct the party to appear in person.74 Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant can
be granted when the he proves the sufficient cause for non-appearance before the court.75
(¶20) In the present case the petitioner could not contest the proceedings because she having no
means to go to the court and was not in a position to remain present before the court at New York.
Attending the proceedings in New York requires money to stay there and expenses of the court
which was hard for the petitioner to arrange as she had been living apart from her husband
unintentionally for the period of 1 year and 4 months before the proceedings in Trial Court of New
York.
73
(2000) 3 SCC 54 at p. 57: A.I.R 2000 SC 1221 at p. 1222
74
Sarla Rani v. Bhushanlal, A.I.R 1976 J&K 12; Pandu v. Hari, A.I.R 1936 Nag. 85
75
Sunanda v. Gundopant 1961 ILR Bom 296, A.I.R 1961 Bom 225.
33
ISSUE 4. WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF RES-JUDICATA UNDER SEC. 11 OF THE

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 IS APPLICABLE TO THE PROCEEDINGS BEING
INITIATED IN DISTRICT COURT, JALANDHAR?
(¶1) It is most humbly submitted this Hon’ble court that the proceeding initiated in the Jalandhar
District Court by the aggrieved petitioner is not bound by the principle of Res judiacata under Sec.
11 of the CPC, 1908. In April 2013, Sunita filed a petition under Sec. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 for Restitution of Conjugal Rights in the District Court, Jalandhar. Whenever one spouse
leaves the other spouse without giving any reasonable ground, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 gives
the remedy in the form of Sec. 9 under the Restitution of Conjugal Rights. The Sec. 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act reads that when either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse,
withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply for Restitution of Conjugal
Rights.
SUBMISSION-A
THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE ESSENTIALS OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL

RIGHTS ARE FULFILLED.
(¶2) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the aggrieved party needs to file a
petition to the district court and on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such
petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, the judge may
decree Restitution of Conjugal Rights in his favour.
(¶3) There are three essential conditions that need to be fulfilled for the application of Sec. 9 of
Hindu Marriage Act, that is about Restitution of Conjugal Rights, which is why Sunita initiated
the proceedings in this district court of Jalandhar-
Firstly, one party must have withdrawn from the society of the other;
Secondly, the withdrawal must be without any reasonable reason,
And thirdly, the aggrieved party applies for the Restitution of Conjugal Rights.
34
(¶4) Once these conditions are fulfilled, the district court may decree of Restitution of Conjugal
Rights to bring about cohabitation between the estranged parties. If the aggrieved party is unable
to convince the district court and it founds that the petitioner is guilty then the decree of Restitution
of Conjugal Rights is not granted. An added advantage from this is that if the parties are not
following the decree for cohabitation after the passing of the decree, continuously for one year, it
becomes a ground for divorce under Sec. 13.
(¶5) There are certain reasonable grounds on which petition for Restitution of Conjugal Rights can
be rejected-
First, if the Respondent has a ground on which he or she can claim any matrimonial relief;
Second, if the petitioner is guilty of any matrimonial misconduct;
Third, if the petitioner is guilty of such act, omission or conduct which makes it impossible
for the Respondent to live with him.
(¶6) That none of these grounds for rejection of Restitution of Conjugal Rights can be figured in
this matter. At not one instance the aggrieved petitioners can be tagged for matrimonial
misconduct. In fact it is Sunita, the aggrieved wife who is trying every bit to save this marriage
and not be deserted by the Respondent, who had clearly told Sunita to get away from his life and
even had developed an extra marital affair with a lady named Elizabeth Prescott.76
(¶7) Burden of proof under Sec.9 Hindu Marriage Act operates at two levels. Firstly, burden of
proof is on the aggrieved/petitioner who needs to prove that the respondent has withdrawn from
his society. Once that burden is discharged by the petitioner, it falls on the respondent to prove
that there exists a reasonable excuse for the withdrawal.
(¶8) In February 2011, the respondent went to New York. Thereafter he asked Sunita to go back
to India. In March 2011, Sunita along with her children came back to Punjab (India). After moving
to New York, Mahesh severed all his contacts with Sunita. It clearly establishes the fact that the
respondent was willing to desert his wife and had withdrawn Sunita from his life. It was upon the
respondent to prove that he withdrew Sunita from his life because he had reasonable
35
and acceptable reasons for doing so. Indulging himself in an extra-marital affair with Elizabeth
Prescott shows how low the respondent thinks about the social institution of marriage and has
apparently insulted this divine sacrament. Respondent has failed to suffice reasonable excuse of
why Restitution of Conjugal Rights mentioned under Sec. 9 of Hindu Marriage Act should not
apply on him.
SUBMISSION-B
THAT SEC. 11 OF THE CPC, 1908 WILL NOT OPERATE AS A BAR TO THE
PROCEEDINING INITIATED BY SUNITA.
(¶9) It is most humbly submitted this Hon’ble court that Sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, ‘Res
Judicata’ aims to prevent multiplicity of the proceedings and accords finality to an issue, which
directly and substantially had arisen in the former suit between the same parties or their privies,
decided and became final so that parties are not vexed twice over; vexatious litigation would be
put to an end and the valuable time of the court is saved.
(¶10) That to constitute a bar of Res Judicata, viz.,

(1) the matter must be directly and substantially in issue in the two suits;
(2) the prior suit must have been between the same parties or persons claiming under them;
(3) such parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit;
subject to the provisions contained in Explanation VIII, added by the Amendment Act, 1976, the
court which determined the earlier suit must be competent to try the later suit or the suit in
which such issue is subsequently raised, the New York Court was not competent;
(¶11) The question directly and substantially is in issue in subsequent suit should have been heard
and finally decided in earlier suit. Decree was void ab initio, therefore here lies no scope for
application of Res Judicata on the proceeding initiated by Sunita in the district court of Jalandhar.
As per Sec. 44-A, Civil Procedure Code, the decree from a foreign court may be executed in India
as if it had been passed by the District Court. “Reciprocating territory” means any country or
territory outside India which the Central Government may, by notification in the
36
Official Gazette, declare to be a reciprocating territory for the purposes of this Sec. US does not
lie in the list and is not the reciprocating territory.
(¶12) The important words in the provision of Sec. 11, Civil Procedure Code are- “has been heard
and finally decided”. Arguendo, even if we assume that there existed the competency of New
York Court, Sunita, the aggrieved petitioner could never be heard before the final adjudication
arrived, wherein the trial court of New York granted a divorce decree in favour of Mahesh because
Sunita could not contest these proceedings, she having no means to go to New York. The bar of
Res Judicata applies only if the matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit has been
heard and finally decided by a court competent to try such suit. That as per the abovementioned
facts the application of the judicial mind was never applied and thus the adjudication cannot be
misconstrued as a final one.
(¶13) The rule of constructive Res Judicata would also not apply to a point which the court may or
may not decide in its discretion. In order that the rule of ‘might and ought’ may apply it is not only
necessary that the defendant could have raised defence in reply to the former suit, but it must also
be shown that he was bound to do so. The petitioner in this matter was not bound by any obligation
to respond to the incompetent court.
(¶14) The court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with jurisdiction by applying
principles of Res Judicata. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law
and in this case the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law. It was pointed out by Lord
Russel of Killowen in Upendra Nath v. Lall77, that there could be Res Judicata in regard to the
question of lack of jurisdiction of the civil court to try a matter but a court which declines
jurisdiction cannot bind the parties by the reasons for declining jurisdiction; such reasons are not
decision, and are certainly not decision by a court of competent jurisdiction. In this matter, the
petitioner submits that the foreign court did not have the jurisdiction to try the divorce issue
between Sunita and the respondent, and felt short of the competency.
77
A.I.R 1940 P.C. 222
37
SUBMISSION-C
THAT JUDGEMENT OF NEW YORK TRIAL COURT IS BEYOND MERIT.
(¶15) The judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sondur Gopal v. Sondur Rajini78
in support of the submission that even if the defendant has obtained the domicile in UK, the divorce
proceedings filed by the defendant before the UK Court is not maintainable in view of the fact that
the plaintiff and the defendant were admittedly married in Mumbai and were governed by the
provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
(¶16) That decree of divorce by New York Trial Court lacks merit of law. That the decree of
divorce of the New York trial court has to be tested on the anvil of Sec. 13 Civil Procedure Code
which provides as to when a foreign judgement shall not be conclusive. In so far the present case
is concerned, Sec.13 (b) and Sec.13 (c) Civil Procedure Code are attracted to the facts of the present
case, viz., (b) Where it has not been given on the merits of the case;(c) Where it appears on the
face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to
recognise the law of India in cases in which such law is applicable.
(¶17) That New York trial court had passed decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable
breaking of marriage. Under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, divorce has been dealt under Sec. 13 and
‘irretrievable breaking of marriage’ is no ground under that provision. So not only the court was
incompetent but the adjudication itself was beyond Indian laws.
(¶17) That in the matter Harpreet Singh Sekhon v. Rajwant Kaur79, the husband obtained decree
of Divorce dated 23.05.2005 passed by Circuit Court of Cook County, USA. Wife filed suit for
declaring the said Divorce Decree to be illegal etc. before District Judge, Family Court, Faridabad.
Husband contested the suit through his father and GPA. District Judge declared the Divorce Decree
to be null and void. Appeal filed-held that judgement of the Court of Cook County, Illinois does
not give any reason in support of the decision which indeed is a violation of
78
(2013) 7 SCC 426
79
(2013) SCC OnLine P&H 4357
38
the principles of natural justice and would come within the exceptions envisaged by clause (b) and
(d) of Sec. 13 Civil Procedure Code — Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not one of the
grounds recognised by the Hindu Marriage Act for the dissolution of marriage-the decree of
divorce passed by the foreign court on a ground unavailable under the Hindu Marriage Act
unsustainable, moreover the judgement was an ex parte judgement and it failed to comply with
principles of natural justice.
SUBMISSION-D
THAT PETITIONER BY ACCEPTING THE MAINTENANCE DID NOT CONSENT TO THE

DECREE OF THE NEW YORK TRIAL COURT.
(¶18) It is most humbly submitted this Hon’ble court that despite the acceptance of maintenance,
Res Judicata doesn’t exist. The object of the maintenance proceedings is not to punish a person for
his past neglect, but to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can provide support to those
who are unable to support themselves and who have a moral claim to support.
(¶19) That Sec.125 Criminal Procedure Code -The phrase “unable to maintain herself’ would mean
that means available to the deserted wife while she was living with her husband and would not
take within itself the efforts made by the wife after desertion to survive somehow. Maintenance
and divorce are different things altogether, while she is wife, she can claim it. The grounds for
refusal of maintenance to wife can be only when clauses 4 and 5 of Criminal Procedure Code come
into play, but in this matter it is not at all so.
(¶20) That Hindu is under an obligation to maintain his wife, his minor sons, unmarried daughters
and aged Parents. The obligation is personal. It arises from the very nature of the relationship and
exists whether he possesses any property or not. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956
gives statutory form to that obligation. The right of a Hindu wife for maintenance is an incident of
the status of matrimony. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act substantially reiterates that right
and lays down the general rule that a Hindu wife whether married either before or after the
commencement of the Act is entitled to be maintained by
39
her husband during her life time. The rule laid down in this Sec. is subject to the exceptions
stated in Sub-Sec. (3) which lays down that she cannot claim separate residence and maintenance
if she is unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion.
(¶21) That husband cannot ask his wife that he does not like her company, but she can or should
stay with other members of the family in matrimonial home. Such an attitude is cruelty in itself on
the part of the husband; Yudhishter Singh v. Sarita80
80
A.I.R 2002 Raj 382.
40
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly requested that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. That the petition of conjugal rights filed by Sunita under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 is maintainable in the eyes of law;
2. The marriage of Sunita and Mahesh is valid as per the provisions of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955;
3. That the non-contest by the wife of divorce petition filed by husband in Foreign Court
does not imply that she had conceded to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Court;
4. And, that the principle of Res Judicata under Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code,
1908 is not applicable to the proceedings being initiated in District Court, Jalandhar.
And pass any such order, other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience.
And for this, Petitioner as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.
41

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Leeza Moot Memorial of Petitioner

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MOOT COURT MEMORIAL

Submitted to – Miss Harleen Kaur ma’am

Signature of Student Signature of Faculty

IN THE HON’BLE DISTRICT COURT AT JALANDHAR (PUNJAB)

Petition filed Under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

SUNITA .............................................................................................................. PETITIONER

MAHESH ......................................................................................................... RESPONDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON THE BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ 5-8

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...................................................................................... 9

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... 10-11

STATEMENT OF ISSUES .................................................................................................... 12

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ......................................................................................... 13-14

BODY OF PLEADINGS .................................................................................................. 15-40

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

SUBMISSION-A THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE THE RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL

SUBMISSION-B THAT THERE IS A WITHDRAWAL OF CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP ON

SUBMISSION-C THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE EXCUSE OR REASONABLE CAUSE

SUBMISSION-D THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON MAHESH AS HE HAS

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE MARRIAGE OF SUNITA AND MAHESH IS VALID AS

SUBMISSION-B THAT THE MARRIAGE SOLEMNIZED BETWEEN SUNITA AND MAHESH

SUBMISSION-D THE IMPERATIVES UNDER ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE INDIAN

SUBMISSION-E THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS REGISTERED IN THE

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE NON-CONTEST BY THE WIFE OF DIVORCE PETITION

SUBMISSION-A THAT RESIDENT PROOF IS REQUIRED FOR THE FILING OF PETITION

SUBMISSION-B THAT FOREIGN JUDGEMENT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE AS THE PARTIES

SUBMISSION-C THAT NEW YORK IS NOT THE RECIPROCATING TERRITORY 29-30

SUBMISSION-E THAT IRRETRIEVABLY BROKEN DOWN OF MARRIAGE IS NO GROUND

SUBMISSION-G THAT SUFFICIENT CAUSE IS THERE FOR NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF RES-JUDICATA UNDER SECTION 11 OF

SUBMISSION-A THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE ESSENTIALS OF RESTITUTION OF

SUBMISSION-C THAT JUDGEMENT OF NEW YORK TRIAL COURT IS BEYOND MERIT

SUBMISSION-D THAT PETITIONER BY ACCEPTING THE MAINTENANCE DID NOT

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

1. LIST OF STATUTES REFERRED

2. LIST OF JOURNALS REFERRED

3. LIST OF CASES REFERRED

CASE PAGE NO.

GAUR GOPAL ROY V. SIPRA ROY, AIR 978 CAL. 163 27

SMT. SATYA V. TEJA SINGH, (1975) 2 S.C.R.1971 25

4. LIST OF BOOKS REFERRED

R.K. Agarwal, Hindu Law (Central Law Agency,23rd Edition)

5. LIST OF WEBSITES REFERRED

Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 reads as:

Section 9: Restitution of Conjugal Rights

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE MARRIAGE OF SUNITA AND MAHESH IS VALID AS

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE NON-CONTEST BY THE WIFE OF DIVORCE PETITION

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF RES-JUDICATA UNDER SECTION 11 OF

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE MARRIAGE OF SUNITA AND MAHESH IS VALID AS

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE NON-CONTEST BY THE WIFE OF DIVORCE PETITION

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF RES-JUDICATA UNDER SECTION 11 OF

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE THE RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS ARISE.

THAT THERE IS A WITHDRAWAL OF CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP ON THE PART OF

THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE EXCUSE OR REASONABLE CAUSE ADDUCED BY

(¶8) It will amount to reasonable excuse or reasonable cause when:

THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON MAHESH AS HE HAS WITHDRAWN

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE MARRIAGE OF SUNITA AND MAHESH IS VALID AS PER

THAT THE MARRIAGE SOLEMNIZED BETWEEN SUNITA AND MAHESH IN THE

THE IMPERATIVES UNDER ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

ISSUE 3: WHETHER NON-CONTEST BY THE WIFE OF DIVORCE PETITION FILED

THAT RESIDENT PROOF IS REQUIRED FOR THE FILING OF PETITION IN FOREIGN