Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp

Communication increases collaborative corruption☆

Mathilde H. Tønnesen a, *, Christian T. Elbæk a, Stefan Pfattheicher b, Panagiotis Mitkidis a
a
Department of Management, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University, 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark
b
Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Despite being a pivotal aspect of human cooperation, only a few studies within the field of collaborative
Communication dishonesty have included communication between participants, and none have yet experimentally compared this
Dishonesty to non-communicative contexts. As a result, the impact of communication on unethical collaborations remains
Collaboration
unclear. To address this gap, we conducted two well-powered studies (Ntotal = 1187), closely replicating and
Commitment
Replication
extending seminal research by Weisel and Shalvi (2015), introducing communication as a manipulated variable
within a dyadic cheating task. Across both studies, we found evidence that communication increases the
magnitude of cheating—even when coordination on the task is not allowed. Importantly, the effect of commu­
nication was linked to a stronger experienced collaboration among the communicating dyads, highlighting that
communication is not only key to everyday ethically sound collaborations, but also to corrupt collaborations.

1. Introduction
Humans are a cooperative species, whose amicable ability to
collaborate is regarded as one of the most fundamental factors in their
evolution (Bowles & Gintis, 2011) and morality (Tomasello, 2016), and
still constitute an important pillar of modern societal life. However,
despite the clear benefits of collaboration, research in behavioral ethics
and collaborative corruption has shown that collaborative settings in­
crease the magnitude of economic dishonesty compared to instances
where individuals behave independently (e.g. Beck et al., 2020; Conrads
et al., 2013; Gerlach et al., 2019; Gross et al., 2018; Kocher et al., 2018;
Weisel & Shalvi, 2015, see also; Leib et al., 2021; Zickfeld et al., 2022 for
recent review and meta-analyses). Thus, human collaborative ten­
dencies might, paradoxically, also play a key role in shaping corrupt
behaviors.
The field of collaborative corruption has provided valuable insights
into the interplay between cooperation and (un)ethical behaviors.
Weisel and Shalvi (2015) was among the first to show that participants
collaborating in a dyadic die rolling game, cheated more than in­
dividuals playing the game alone. Similar results have been observed in
different decision contexts; for instance, dishonesty increases (1) when
participants make decisions individually but report simultaneously (e.g.,
Kocher et al., 2018), (2) when the group makes one joint decision (e.g.,
Beck et al., 2020; Korbel, 2017) or (3) when each group member makes a
decision and reports one after each other (e.g., Gross et al., 2018; Wouda
et al., 2017).
When working in collaborative settings, dishonesty can be conta­
gious and spread among group members (Gross et al., 2018) and the
impact of collaboration on corrupt behaviors has been related to various
factors, including diffusion of responsibility and moral justifications
(Conrads et al., 2013; Kocher et al., 2018), perceived similarity (Irlen­
busch et al., 2020), commitment (Zickfeld et al., 2022), parochial
altruism (Cadsby et al., 2016; Shalvi & De Dreu, 2014), exposure to
dishonest descriptive norms (Gross & De Dreu, 2020; Soraperra et al.,
2017) and conformity (Jamaluddin et al., 2020). Conversely, commit­
ting to an honesty oath (Beck et al., 2020; Zickfeld et al., 2023),
increasing the salience of negative externalities (Castillo et al., 2022),
and being monitored (Mitkidis et al., 2023; Schild et al., 2019) have
been found to decrease dishonesty.
Despite having greatly advanced our understanding of the role of
collaboration in corrupt and fraudulent behaviors, many studies within
the field are based on sequential decision-making with limited interac­
tion between participants. However, true joint decision-making often
involves some interaction, wherein group members engage in commu­
nication about possible courses of action (Beck et al., 2020). Conse­
quently, a central element integral to collaborations outside the
laboratory is often absent in these studies: verbal communication.
Verbal communication refers to communication through the use of

☆
This paper has been recommended for acceptance by Dr. Joris Lammers.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: mtt@mgmt.au.dk (M.H. Tønnesen), chel@mgmt.au.dk (C.T. Elbæk), sp@psy.au.dk (S. Pfattheicher), pm@mgmt.au.dk (P. Mitkidis).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104603
Received 12 December 2023; Received in revised form 20 February 2024; Accepted 22 February 2024
Available online 28 February 2024
0022-1031/© 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
M.H. Tønnesen et al.
language (words) in written and oral form and differs from nonverbal
communication (e.g., gestures and facial expressions (Buck & VanLear,
2002)). Verbal communication is perhaps the most pervasive form of
human communication (De Saussure & Rocci, 2016) and is essential for
coordinating behaviors to achieve common goals (Tomasello, 2008) and
for fostering commitment among individuals (Kerr & Kaufman-
Gilliland, 1994). Furthermore, both oral and written communication
have been found to increase collaboration in various games, such as
ultimatum games (Roth, 1995; Zultan, 2012), trust games (Charness &
Dufwenberg, 2006), and dictator games (Andreoni & Rao, 2011). Yet,
despite its evident importance and although collaborative dishonesty
has been defined as “joint unethical acts” (Shalvi et al., 2016, p. 134),
experimental paradigms employed to study collaborative dishonesty
frequently only allow minimal opportunities for joint decisions.1
Theoretically, verbal communication can both foster and hinder
dishonesty. It provides a platform for coordination and justifications
that may ease dishonest acts (Kocher et al., 2018). However, as repu­
tational concerns increase in more social settings (De Cremer & Barker,
2003), it also amplifies reputational risks, potentially deterring
dishonesty. Moreover, directly discussing the opportunity of behaving
dishonestly may enhance ethical considerations by making the unethical
aspect of dishonesty more salient and less ambiguous, in turn potentially
mitigating dishonesty. Indeed, research have indicated that increasing
the salience of unethical aspects of behavior or moral awareness reduces
dishonesty (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Sturm, 2017). This disparity raises a
central question: How does the introduction of communication influence
collaborative dishonesty? More broadly, does the inclusion of commu­
nication lead to an increase in dishonest behavior, and if so, what are the
underlying mechanisms?
In response to these inquires, we present two well-powered experi­
mental studies that directly investigate the role of communication in
fostering collaborative dishonesty (Fig. 1). First, we examined a scenario
where individuals had the opportunity to engage in dishonesty for
monetary gains. In this context, we compared a non-communicative
setting to a setting where participants were allowed to communicate
and further related this to levels of collaboration by directly measuring
participants experience of collaborating with their partner (Study 1,
Fig. 1a).
Then, because communication plays a key role in fostering
commitment to others (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994), we reasoned
that being able to communicate in itself (without coordination and jus­
tifications) would increase dishonesty through feelings of commitment
to one’s partner. Indeed, feeling committed to others may constitute a
crucial motivation for engaging in dishonesty (Zickfeld et al., 2022). It
has been found that this tendency increases as people become better
acquainted with each other (Beck et al., 2020) and when the dishonesty
benefits the group or other individuals (Cadsby et al., 2016; Erat &
Gneezy, 2012). Therefore, in a second study (Study 2, Fig. 1b) we
manipulated the content of participants conversation varying whether
participants were allowed to coordinate and discuss the task. In doing
so, we examined how different communicative settings would impact
collaborative dishonest behavior.
By including and manipulating communication, this paper advances
the current literature on behavioral ethics in several ways. Firstly,
whereas the majority of past work on collaborative dishonesty have
restricted participant’s ability to communicate and engage in joint de­
cisions with their partner, this paper introduces this important aspect.
This significantly broadens the applicability of findings to real-world
scenarios, such as large corporate scandals, where communication
plays a central role in coordinating such actions. Secondly, while a few
1
While communication within the joint action literature has been described
as a joint action in and of itself (e.g., Moore, 2018; Tomasello, 2008), we focus
on communication as a means of collaboration, serving as an important channel
through which people can collaborate more effectively.
2
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603
studies have allowed communication between participants (e.g., Beck
et al., 2020; Kocher et al., 2018), the present paper is the first to directly
test the impact of communication in collaborative corrupt behaviors.
Thirdly, by varying the kind of social communicative exchanges, our
findings illuminate the conditions that exacerbate challenges related to
collaborative dishonesty, shedding light on why and how communication
might facilitate such behaviors. Lastly, by relating dishonesty to expe­
rienced collaboration, we contribute knowledge into the experiential
nature of behaviors that arise in the settings used to study corrupt col­
laborations, thereby providing new and important insights into the de­
gree and nature of collaboration captured in collaborative dishonesty
studies.
2. Study 1: Does communication corrupt?
The importance of verbal communication in human social behavior
is clear. First, the origin of verbal communication is one of the most
essential cornerstones in human evolution (Nowak, 2000). Second, it
serves as a primary channel through which we transmit socially shared
knowledge (Mesoudi, 2011) and establish joint intentions and goals to
effectively coordinate our behaviors to achieve a common goal (Toma­
sello, 2008), which is crucial for cooperation (Mitkidis et al., 2013).
Therefore, we reasoned that verbal communication would also be
instrumental when people collude on deceiving others for collective or
monetary gain.
Few studies on collaborative corruption have included communica­
tion between participants. In one study, participants in groups of three
were given the opportunity to chat with each other via a chat box during
a die-roll game. This finding suggests that communication could facili­
tate dishonesty in group settings by allowing participants to coordinate
their actions and justify deceitful behavior (Kocher et al., 2018). Simi­
larly, another study, in which participants were able to engage in joint
decision-making in face-to-face interactions, found further evidence that
groups act more dishonest, because they are more readily exposed to
justifications for dishonesty (Beck et al., 2020). While such studies
provide important insights into how communication can facilitate
corrupt collaborations, these studies do not provide direct evidence that
communication increases dishonesty. In fact, although a recent meta-
analysis indicates that communication is linked to increased dishon­
esty (Zickfeld et al., 2022), no studies have systematically isolated the
effect of communication by comparing it to non-communicative con­
texts. Consequently, the extent to which communication influences
collaborative dishonesty remains largely understudied.
Considering this, we closely replicated and extended the work by
Weisel and Shalvi (2015), which has played a central role in establishing
the corruptive role of collaboration. In the original study, participants
engaged in a private die roll game either individually or in pairs, in
which they could cheat for monetary gains by misreporting the result of
their die rolls. Specifically, in the authors’ aligned incentives treatment,
participants playing in dyads would receive the same payoff based on
the number of doubles they reported. Participants playing alone instead
rolled the die twice and reported the results of their die rolls. Notably,
compared to individual players, pairs exhibited significantly greater
levels of cheating (indicated by higher numbers of reported doubles
above chance level), underscoring the facilitative role of collaboration in
dishonest behavior. Nevertheless, the interaction in the pairs was
confined to receiving feedback on the partner’s die-roll on a computer,
minimizing the salience of collaboration. While participants might still
be able to communicate their intention and willingness to engage in
dishonesty through their reporting behavior, participants could not
directly discuss the task and explicitly coordinate on how to proceed
during the game. We therefore extended Weisel and Shalvi (2015)
original aligned paradigm to enhance the conditions for collaboration by
manipulating whether participants in the dyadic conditions could
communicate with each other or not. In doing so, we aimed to investi­
gate the interplay of communication and collaborative dishonesty.
M.H. Tønnesen et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603

Fig. 1. Experimental design in Study 1 (a) and Study 2 (b). In Study 1 participants were randomly assigned to either an individual condition, a no-communication
condition, or a communication condition. After a practice round, participants would begin phase 2, consisting of 10 trials of a die-roll task adapted from previous
work by Weisel and Shalvi (2015). After completing the trials, participants indicated their subjective level of experienced collaboration in the dyadic conditions.
Study 2 followed a similar procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to a no-communication condition, an unrestricted communication condition (reflecting
the communication condition in Study 1) or a restricted communication condition, wherein participants were not allowed to talk about the task and instead were
given specific topics to discuss.

Building on Weisel and Shalvi (2015), we hypothesized that dyads
(both those that could communicate and those that could not) would
report more doubles compared to individuals (H1). Additionally, we
expected that permitting communication would allow participants to
align their goals and more easily coordinate on which numbers to report.
We therefore further hypothesized that dyads who were able to
communicate would report a higher number of doubles compared to
dyads that could not communicate (H2).
Furthermore, because communication is important to collaboration
and joint decision-making (Beck et al., 2020; Zultan, 2012), constituting
a channel to effectively coordinate behavior and exchange justifications
(Kocher et al., 2018), we reasoned that the effect of communication on
number of reported doubles would depend on the experience of
collaborating with the other player. Thus, by allowing participants to
communicate, we increase the conditions for collaboration and goal
coordination, which may also increase coordinated dishonesty. To test
this, we therefore measured the subjectively perceived collaboration
within both dyadic conditions, hypothesizing that the effect of
communication on dishonest reporting would be mediated by an
increased experience of collaborating with the other player (H3).2
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
A total of 430 participants from Prolific completed the study. Seven
participants failed the attention check placed in the end of the study in a
measure of the personality trait Honesty-Humility (see Supplementary
Material; SM section 2.4.2.), and two participants were missing a partner
after we removed the participants who failed the attention check.
Following our pre-registration, these participants were excluded from
the herein presented analyses, leaving a final sample size of N = 421
(161 dyads and 99 individual players; 47.5% women, 50.6% men, Mage
= 40.32, SDage = 12.57). Results including all participants are reported
in SM (see section 2.5.).
Due to the magnitude of the effect size in the original study (d =
0.94), which yielded a rather small sample size estimate (34 participants
[12 dyads and 22 individual players]) in an a priori power analysis (d =
0.94, 1-β = 0.80, α = 0.05, allocation ratio N1/N2 = 1.8, two-tailed
Mann-Whitney U test), we determined our sample size based on the
smallest effect size of interest.
We follow Simonsohn (2015), and define a small effect as the effect
that would give the original study a power of 33% (d33%). Based on this,
we estimated the minimum sample size of 53 dyads (n = 106) in each
dyadic condition and 95 participants in the individual condition (d33% =
0.44, α = 0.05, 1-β = 0.80, allocation ratio N1/N2 = 1.8, one-tailed

2
We changed the wording of this hypothesis from the pre-registration. In the
pre-registration we termed the collaboration items as “joint goal” items. This
was subsequently changed to “sense of collaboration.”

3
M.H. Tønnesen et al.
Mann-Whitney U test3). Additionally, due to more financial resources
than originally estimated, we continued recruiting until our resources
were depleted.4 A one-way ANOVA sensitivity power analysis (α = 0.05,
1-β = 0.8) indicated that our sample size (N = 260, dyads n = 161, in­
dividuals n = 99), is sensitive to detect an effect of Cohen’s d = 0.19
(G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007).
2.1.2. Design and procedure
In this study, we report all measures, manipulations and exclusions.
A thorough description of measures and manipulations can be found in
Supplemental Material. Study 1 was conducted online using Qualtrics
and the add-on application SMARTRIQS (Molnar, 2020), which allows
for real-time interaction between participants on the Qualtrics platform.
To study the impact of communication on cheating behavior and
experienced collaboration, the study used a between-subjects design, in
which participants were randomly assigned to either of three conditions;
(1) Communication (n = 164; 82 dyads), (2) No-communication (n =
158; 79 dyads) or (3) Individual (n = 99).5
Following the protocol of Weisel and Shalvi (2015) participants in
the No-communication condition engaged in 10 trials of the dyadic die
roll game, on a computer. We used 10 trials, instead of 20 as in Weisel
and Shalvi (2015). We did this to reduce fatigue among participants
since the study took place in an online setup, and the finding that
behavior in collaborative cheating paradigms typically stabilizes around
the 10th round in sequential cheating paradigms (Zickfeld et al., 2022).
Participants were given a base payment for taking part in the study and
were informed that they would be able to earn an additional bonus,
which was determined by random selection of one of the 10 die-rolls.
After having provided informed consent, participants began Phase 1
of the experiment, which consisted of thorough instructions of the rules
of the die-roll game, including the payment structure and procedure.
Participants were made aware that they would be rolling a die on an
external website (www.random.org) and report their outcome of this
die-roll in an allotted text box. We used a reputable external website to
ensure that the die-rolls remained truly private to the participants in line
with the original study. Because the die rolls were truly private, par­
ticipants could inflate their profit by misreporting the actual outcome of
their die rolls. Following Weisel and Shalvi (2015) aligned incentives
condition, participants were informed that their payment was based on
the reported outcomes and that they would only receive money, if both
Player A and B reported the same number. In this case, participants
would earn their reported number in Experimental Currency Units
(ECU’s), in which 1 ECU = £0.30. That is, if both participants reported a
1, they would both earn £0.30 in that round, while they would earn £1.8
if they both reported a six.
After reading the instructions and filling out a payment scheme to
ensure that participants understood the payment structure, participants
were paired with another anonymous player, and then randomly
assigned either the role of Player A or Player B. Dyads then engaged in a
practice round of the dyadic die-roll task. First, Player A would be asked
to go to the external website, click on “roll die” and then report their
outcome. This information was sent to Player B, who would then go to
3
We calculated the power analysis on a one-tailed test in the pre-registration
for Study 1. A two-tailed power analysis revealed a sample of 67 dyads and 121
individual players.
4
Our funding was specifically earmarked for the respective study by the
funder.
5
To get a similar allocation ratio as the original study and thus avoid over-
sampling in the Individual condition compared to the dyadic conditions, the
allocation to the Individual condition was set to stop at 100 participants. After
this point, participants were randomly allocated to one of the two dyadic
conditions. Additional correlation analyses showed no significant association
between time-of-participation and individual characteristics, such as age (r =
− 0.05, p = .757), gender (r = 0.06, p = .757) and Honesty-Humility (r = − 0.01,
p = .768).
4
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603
the external website, roll the die, and report their respective outcome.
After this, participants were shown a table explaining the outcome of the
round. After the practice round (Phase 1), participants began Phase 2,
which followed the same procedure (see SM section 2.1.).
Dyads in the Communication condition underwent the same pro­
cedure as in the no-communication condition. However, in this condi­
tion Player A and B additionally had the possibility to chat with each
other using an online chat. Participants were instructed that they had 2
min to discuss and exchange information of their choice, except for
sensitive personal information. They could end the chat at any point, but
the chat would automatically close after 2 min. Participants could chat
after the practice round, before beginning the 10 trials, as well as after
every round of the 10 trials. In the Individual condition, participants
engaged in the die roll task by playing both the role of A and B as in
Weisel and Shalvi (2015).
To account for the possible extra time in between trials introduced by
the chats in the Communication condition, participants in the individual
and No-communication conditions answered a set of filler questions
after each trial. These filler items were in the form of mundane episodic
recall questions, such as “What did you have for dinner yesterday?” or
“What is your favorite hobby?”. We chose these writing tasks to simulate
the interactive chats as much as possible and to minimize the risk of
inducing unintended confounds in the experimental setup. After the 10
trials, one round was randomly selected as payoff for Phase 2 and
showed to the participants.
2.1.3. Measures
After having completed both experimental phases, participants were
asked a set of questions related to their experience throughout the
experiment. Because shared goals and intentions are central concepts
within the joint actions literature (Bratman, 1992; Butterfill, 2012;
Tuomela, 2020) we measured participants’ experienced collaboration
and having a shared goal, by including three items measuring the degree
to which participants experienced (1) that they were collaborating with
the other player, (2) that they had a shared goal to obtain a certain result
together during the game, and (3) that they had a shared intention with
the other player to report a certain outcome during the game. To
examine personality differences related to dishonesty, we included the
Honesty-Humility subscale of 10 items from the HEXACO personality
inventory (Lee & Ashton, 2004). This scale has, repeatedly, been found
to correlate with higher honesty and trustworthiness in previous work
(Ashton & Lee, 2007; Heck et al., 2018; Ścigała et al., 2020; Thielmann
& Hilbig, 2015). At the end of the survey, participants were asked a
range of socio-demographic questions, including gender, age, education,
household income, and number of people in the household.
2.1.4. Analysis
In line with the original study (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), we calculated
(1) the percentage of reported doubles (i.e., identical die-rolls by Player
A and B) in each condition, (2) the mean reported number of doubles in
each condition, and (3) the percentage of (totally) brazen B and A
players (i.e., dyads who always report a double) across conditions. The
number of reported doubles was calculated based on the number of
times participants were shown feedback for an equal outcome across the
10 trials in Phase 2.
We also followed the same analytical strategy as in Weisel and Shalvi
(2015). First, we used a Wilcoxon-signed rank test to test for differences
in percentage of reported doubles with the expected percentage
assuming honesty (16.7%)6 in each condition. However, as the present
study included three conditions (vs. two in Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), we
deviated from the original study’s Mann-Whitney U test and instead
used a Kruskal-Wallis test to test for differences in mean reported
6
The probability of rolling a double is 1/6, leading to an expected number of
doubles of 1.67 (16.7%) over 10 trials.
M.H. Tønnesen et al.
number of doubles between the conditions. Multiple comparisons were
tested using Dunn’s test. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) was calculated using
the R package effsize (Torchiano, 2016). We further used a Fisher’s exact
test to analyze whether the proportion of (totally) brazen B players
differed between conditions. This was similarly done for brazen A
players.7
To test whether participants in the dyads affected each other’s
behavior, we modelled a linear-mixed effects model for each player
(Player A and Player B). For Player A we predicted the die-roll reported
starting from round 2 (due to the sequential nature of the study design)
with fixed effects for 1) Player B’s report in the prior round (lagged), 2)
round number, 3) gender, and 4) age.8 As participants interacted in the
practice round prior to the main trials, we also conducted an exploratory
linear mixed effects model using Player B’s report as an unlagged vari­
able. We deviated from the pre-registration and specified a random
intercept for group ID instead of participant ID with a random slope for
round number. Because the analyses involved dyads, we used group ID
to avoid singular fits for participant ID. Similarly for Player B, we pre­
dicted Player B’s reported die-roll with fixed effects for: 1) reported die-
roll of Player A, 2) round number, 3) gender, and 4) age, and the same
random effects structure as for the model on Player A’s behavior.
Exploratory linear mixed effects models were used to investigate the
differences in mean reported doubles predicted by condition and round
number (time), with an expected interaction between condition and
round number (see SM section 2.5.3.). The interaction between condi­
tion and round number is based on previous research finding that
verifying behavior among leaders in collaborative dishonest settings
increased over time, when the leader and subordinate had conflicting
incentives, but not when incentives were disentangled (Karg, 2021).
Mean experienced collaboration and shared goals were calculated for
each condition. The three items were highly correlated (Pearson’s r >
0.50), and were therefore aggregated to create a mean score for each
participant (cf. Mitkidis et al., 2022). We used an independent sample t-
test to test for differences in experienced collaboration between the two
dyadic conditions. We formulated a mediation model using the R-
package mediation (Tingley et al., 2014) to further test whether the effect
of condition on mean reported number of doubles was mediated by
experienced collaboration.9 We hypothesized that communication
would increase participants sense of collaboration by allowing them to
coordinate and make joint decisions, thereby increasing the number of
doubles reported. However, we acknowledge that an alternative direc­
tion for the relationship may be equally viable. Specifically, it is possible
that participants experience increased collaboration due to the shared
success of reporting doubles during the task.
Correlations between number of doubles, experienced collaboration
7
We only pre-registered brazen B players as a main dependent variable.
However, analyses related to brazen A players were pre-registered under
“analysis” in the pre-registration. See SM section 2.5.5 for results. Totally
brazen A players are conceptualized as players who try to maximize their
earnings by consequently reporting a 6, while totally brazen B players are
defined as players who consistently report a double (see Weisel & Shalvi, 2015).
8 3.77, SD = 0.85, W = 1470.50, p = .029), the No-communication (A: M
We included age and gender due to previous research suggesting that
dishonesty differs for gender and age, with males and younger participants
often cheating more than females and older participants (Conrads et al., 2013,
see Gerlach et al., 2019).
9
We deviate from the pre-registration. Instead of using the shared goal item
for the mediation analysis, we changed this to the single item for experienced
collaboration. Because the experimental task in itself provides participants with
a shared goal of getting doubles, the shared goal item was deemed less suitable
for capturing variance between the conditions. Furthermore, in hindsight, the
questions about having shared goals and intentions might not be as intuitive for
the participants as question about the degree they experienced they were
collaborating with their partner. The experienced collaboration item thus may
more accurately capture the participants’ experience of the collaboration dur­
ing the task. We therefore chose to focus on the experienced collaboration item.
5
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603
(overall aggregate and individual items) and Honesty-Humility were
analyzed using Pearson’s correlations (see SM section 2.5.1. for a cor­
relation matrix).
Chatlogs in the Communication condition were cleaned10 and
analyzed based on word frequencies in terms of top 30 words written in
the chats to get insights into the most commonly used words in the social
exchanges (See SM section 2.5.8. for results).11 All analyses were con­
ducted in the statistical environment R (version 4.2.2. R Core Team,
2022).
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Number of reported doubles
Overall, the pattern of the results replicates the findings of Weisel
and Shalvi (2015), although with lower levels of cheating.12 Participants
and dyads across all conditions reported significantly more doubles than
what would be expected when assuming honesty. Dyads in the No-
communication condition reported 44.6% doubles over the 10 trials,
which is significantly higher than the expected 1.67 number of doubles
(16.7%) when assuming honesty (W = 295.00, p < .001; r (rank biserial)
= − 0.81, 95% CI [− 0.88; − 0.71]). Dyads in the Communication con­
dition reported 60.5% doubles on average (W = 151.00, p < .001; r (rank
biserial) = − 0.91, 95% CI [− 0.95; − 0.86]), while participants in the
Individual condition reported 32.8% doubles on average (W = 1136.00,
p < .001, r (rank biserial) = − 0.54, 95% CI [− 0.68; − 0.36]).
Next, an independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test showed significant
differences in the mean reported number of doubles across conditions
(χ 2 (2) = 29.76, p < .001, Hedges’ g = 0.108, 95% CI(g) [0.05; 0.20],
Fig. 2). In line with the original study, dyads reported significantly more
doubles compared to individuals (Individual (M = 3.28, Median = 2.00,
SD = 2.70) vs. No communication (M = 4.46, Median = 4.00, SD = 3.01),
z = 2.69, adj. p = .022, d = 0.41; Individual vs Communication (M =
6.05, Median = 6.00, SD = 3.50), z = 5.45, adj. p < .001, d = 0.88), with
medium to large effects, thus supporting H1. Moreover, dyads that had
the opportunity to communicate with each other reported significantly
higher numbers of doubles compared to dyads that could not commu­
nicate (z = 2.59, adj. p = .029), with a medium effect of d = 0.49), thus
supporting H2.
An exploratory mixed effects model predicting number of reported
doubles based on condition and number of rounds did not find cheating
increased over the course of the 10 rounds of the task (OR = 1.02, 95%
CI [0.95, 1.07], p = .416; see also Supplemental Material section 3.2.7
for full model results). Furthermore, a correlation analysis indicated that
the number of reported doubles was negatively correlated with the
personality measure of Honesty-Humility (r = − 0.14, 95% CI [− 0.23,
− 0.02], p = .027).
Overall, Wilcoxon-signed rank tests revealed that dishonesty was not
only related to an inflated number of doubles but also to the magnitude
of reports (i.e., higher numbers yielding greater monetary outcomes).
Both A and B players reported significantly higher numbers than one
would expect when assuming honesty (3.5).13 Both A and B players in
the Individual (A: M = 3.81, SD = 0.84, W = 1439.00, p = .004; B: M =
= 3.78, SD = 0.81, W = 810,50, p = .007; B: M = 3.76, SD = 0.62, W =
719.00, p < .001), and the Communication condition (A: M = 4.17, SD
= 1.09, W = 678.50, p < .001; B: M = 4.26, SD = 0.99, W = 408.00, p <
10
E.g., automatic generated text in the chat logs, such as “<br>” and “***
Player A has joined the task ***” was removed from the chat logs.
11
The most often used words (e.g., time, roll, 6), refer to the task at hand,
indicating that the participants were coordinating on the task (whether it being
coordination on dishonesty or dishonesty).
12
In Weisel and Shalvi (2015) dyads in the aligned incentives treatment re­
ported 81.5% doubles on average.
13
As (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6)/6 = 3.5
M.H. Tønnesen et al.
Fig. 2. Differences in mean number of reported doubles between conditions. Pairwise comparison using Dunn’s test; adj. p = Bonferroni. 1) Individual vs. No
communication, z = 2.69, adj. p = .022, d = 0.41; 2) Individual vs Communication, z = 5.45, adj. p < .001, d = 0.88; 3) No communication vs Communication, z =
2.59, adj. p = .029 d = 0.49.
.001), reported significantly higher numbers than expected. There was
no difference between conditions for A players (χ2 (2) = 4.592, p = .10),
while B players reported higher numbers in the communication condi­
tion (Individual: p < .01; No-communication: p = .010).
Furthermore, the proportion of brazen A and B players,14 were
higher in the Communication condition (14% A players, p = .009) and
30.5% B players, p < .001, see SM section 2.5.5.). The full description
and analyses for personality measures, differences in magnitude of
dishonesty, brazen players and linear mixed effects models predicting
reports based on partners’ behavior are presented in SM (section 2.5.1.,
2.5.4–2.5.6.).
2.2.2. Experienced collaboration
Overall, independent-samples t-tests revealed that dyads in the
Communication condition experienced a higher level of collaboration
compared to the dyads who did not communicate (t(319.27), − 2.85, p =
.005, d = 0.32, see Table 1). This was primarily driven by an increased
level of experienced collaboration with the other player, captured by a
single item (i.e., experienced collaboration). Namely, communication
14
Totally brazen A players are conceptualized as players who tries to maxi­
mize their earning by consequently reporting a 6, while totally brazen B players
are defined as players who consistently report a double (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015).
6
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603
had a medium to large effect of d = 0.57 on experienced collaboration,
while there was no significant differences between conditions for the
single items measuring experience of joint goals and shared intention.
Lastly, the effect of communication on number of reported doubles
was partly mediated by experienced collaboration, thereby supporting
H3. The regression coefficient between Communication and number of
reported doubles and the coefficient between experienced collaboration
and number of reported doubles was significant (Fig. 3.). The boot­
strapped unstandardized indirect effect was ACME = 0.704, and the
95% confidence interval ranged from 0.40 to 1.07 (p < .001; 1000
simulations). The effect of communication remained significant (ADE =
0.889, 95% CI [0.187; 1.59], p < .008).
3. Study 2: Does mere communication without task-related
exchanges promote collaborative dishonesty?
Overall, Study 1 provides evidence suggesting that communication is
associated with increased experiences of collaboration, leading to
greater magnitudes of dishonesty. However, the main underlying
mechanism for this effect remains unclear. We therefore aimed at
isolating different potential mechanisms, by investigating whether
communication could corrupt irrespective of the possibility to coordi­
nate and share justifications for dishonesty (e.g., Kocher et al., 2018)
through an increased feeling of being committed with one’s co-
M.H. Tønnesen et al.
Table 1
Mean differences in experienced collaboration in dyadic conditions.
No Communication
M SD
Overall collaboration 4.28 1.75
Experienced collaboration 3.76 2.18
Shared goal 5.07 1.95
Shared intention 4.02 2.25
Fig. 3. Mediation model of experienced collaboration on the effect of
communication on number of reported doubles.
conspirator. We did this by varying whether participants in the
communicative settings were allowed to discuss and coordinate on the
task.
Overall, Study 2 aimed to replicate the finding that (unrestricted)
communication increases dishonesty (H1, Study 1 H2). Since commu­
nication may facilitate a sense of commitment, we further expected that
dyads that were restricted from task-relevant communication would
report a higher number of doubles compared to pairs that were not able
to communicate at all (H2). Similarly to Study 1, we expected that the
effect of communication would be mediated by an increased experience
of collaborating with the other player (H3).
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
We recruited a total of 796 participants from Prolific. Eleven par­
ticipants failed an attention check, and eleven participants were missing
a partner after we removed the participants who failed the attention
check and were subsequently removed from the analyses. Four dyads in
the Restricted communication condition did not comply with the rules of
their conditions and discussed coordinating their rolls in the die-roll
game, leaving a final sample size of N = 766 (n = 383 dyads; 49.35%
women, 49.61% men, mean age = 41.04, SD = 12.85). Identification
and exclusion plan as well as results including participants who failed
attention checks are reported in the SM (section 3.1.2.).
Based on the effect size of communication (vs. no-communication) in
Study 1, a Mann-Whitney U a priori power analysis yielded a required
sample size of 56 dyads in each condition (d = 0.49, 1-β = 0.80, α =
0.05).15 Additionally, due to more financial resources than originally
estimated, we continued recruiting until our resources were depleted. A
one-way ANOVA sensitivity power analysis (α = 0.05, 1-β = 0.8) indi­
cated that our sample size (N = 383 dyads), is sensitive to detect an
effect of Cohen’s d = 0.16 (G*Power 3.1).
3.1.2. Design and procedure
In this study, we report all measures, manipulations and exclusions.
15
The pre-registration was based on a one-tailed t-test a priori power analysis.
To be conservative we ran a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test a priori power
analysis, indicating a required sample size of 70 dyads in each condition.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603
Communication
M SD t p d
(df) (95% CI)
4.86 1.91 − 2.85 0.005 0.32
(319.27) (− 0.98, − 0.18)
4.98 2.09 − 5.14 <0.001 0.57
(317.86) (− 1.69–0.75)
5.30 2.15 − 1.03 0.304 0.12
(318.78) (− 0.68, 0.21)
4.30 2.47 − 1.09 0.278 0.12
(318.92) (− 0.80, 0.23)
A thorough description of measures and manipulations can be found in
Supplemental Material. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions; 1) No-communication (n = 260; 130 dyads); 2) Un­
restricted communication (n = 256; 128 dyads); and 3) Restricted
communication (n = 250; 125 dyads). As in Study 1, the experiment was
programmed in Qualtrics using the SMARTRIQS application (Molnar,
2020). The experimental setup was identical to Study 1, except for
exclusion of the Individual condition, and the new Restricted commu­
nication condition. In the Restricted communication condition, partici­
pants were given the opportunity to chat together using an online chat
function after each round, but, importantly, they were instructed to not
chat about the die-roll task. Instead, participants in this condition were
given specific neutral topics to discuss. To reduce variance between
conditions, we based the topics on the filler items in the No-
communication condition (e.g., What is your favorite hobby?).
3.1.3. Measures
We used the same items as in Study 1 to capture participants’
experienced collaboration with the other player and also included a
measure of participants’ sense of commitment (Michael et al., 2016b).
Inspired by Michael et al. (2016a), we included three items in terms of 1)
how likely the participants think it is that they would help the other
participant if they were to collaborate again (Likert-type scale from 1 =
very unlikely to 7 = very likely), 2) how likely they think it is that the
other participant would help them if they were to collaborate again (1 =
very unlikely to 7 = very likely), and 3) how obligated they feel to help
the other participant (from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much). The items
were used based on the prediction that if participants felt a sense of
commitment with their partner, they would be more likely to help (and
expect help from) their partner. Following Study 1, the Honesty-
Humility subscale (Lee & Ashton, 2004) and socio-demographic mea­
sures were also included.
3.1.4. Analysis
We replicated all analyses from Study 1. Inspired by (Zultan, 2012),
we further conducted an exploratory analysis testing differences in
proportion of coordination on Nash equilibrium under money-
maximization (i.e., Player A reports a 6 and Player B matches Player
A’s report)16 over the 10 trials between conditions using Chi-square
tests. In addition to analyses for experienced collaboration included in
Study 1, mean differences in commitment between conditions were
analyzed using a one-way ANOVA. This was followed by separate
mediation analyses for the unrestricted and restricted communication
conditions testing whether the effect of the two communication condi­
tions on number of reported doubles was mediated by experienced
16
The Nash equilibrium is a game theoretic concept and refers to situations,
where no player obtains a higher utility by changing their strategy, if the other
players stick to their strategy (Kreps, 1989). In a dyadic die roll setting, this
would equate to situations, where Player A reports a 6, and Player B matches
the report of Player A.
7
M.H. Tønnesen et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603

collaboration. We further ran a similar exploratory mediation analysis
for sense of commitment. Similar to Study 1, the chatlogs in both
communication conditions were cleaned and analyzed based on word
frequencies in terms of top 30 words written in the chats (see SM section
3.2.8.).
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Number of reported doubles
Overall, Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1. Dyads across all
conditions reported significantly more doubles than what would be
expected assuming honesty. Dyads in the No-communication condition
reported the least doubles with an average of 34% of reported doubles
on average (W = 1711.00, p < .001; r (rank biserial) = − 0.60, 95% CI
[− 0.71, − 0.46]). This was followed by dyads in the Restricted
communication condition with 43.6% reported doubles on average (W
= 819.00, p < .001; r (rank biserial) = − 0.79, 95% CI [− 0.86, − 0.70]).
Dyads in the Unrestricted communication condition reported the highest
number of doubles, with dyads reporting 51.6% doubles on average (W
= 534.00, p < .001; r (rank biserial) = − 0.87, 95% CI [− 0.91, − 0.81]).
An Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis test revealed significant
differences in the mean reported number of doubles across conditions
(χ 2 (2) = 18.93, p < .001, Hedges’ g = 0.05, 95% CI(g) [0.01–0.10],
Fig. 4). In line with Study 1 and in support of H1, communication
increased collaborative cheating: dyads in the Unrestricted condition
(mirroring the communication condition in Study 1) reported signifi­
cantly more doubles on average (M = 5.16, Median = 4.50, SD = 3.27)
compared to dyads that were not able to communicate (M = 3.38, Me­
dian = 3.00, SD = 2.62, z = 4.33, adj. p < .001), with a medium to large
effect of d = 0.59. Furthermore, dyads that were able to communicate,
but not about the task (i.e., Restricted communication condition), re­
ported significantly more doubles (M = 4.36, Median = 3.00, SD = 3.06)
than non-communicative dyads (z = 2.46, adj. p = .041, d = \0.34) with
a small effect of d = 0.34, supporting H2.
There was no significant difference between the two communication
conditions (z = − 1.84, adj, p = .198, d = 0.25). However, an exploratory
chi-square analysis revealed that there was a higher proportion of co­
ordination on the Nash equilibrium under money maximization in the
Unrestricted condition (20.47%) compared to both the No-
communication (8.14%; χ2(1) = 71.362, p < .001) and the Restricted
communication condition (11.62%; χ2(1) = 29.157, p < .001), indi­
cating higher levels of coordination between participants on maximizing
their payment, when task-related communication was allowed.
Similar to Study 1, an exploratory mixed effects model predicting
number of reported doubles by condition and round number revealed no
significant effect of round (odds ratio = 1.02, 95% CI [0.99, 1.05], p =
.127, see SM section 3.2.3.). Results for magnitude of cheating, pro­
portion of brazen players, and linear mixed effects models predicting

Fig. 4. Differences in number of reported doubles between conditions. Pairwise comparison using Dunn’s test; adj. p = Bonferroni. 1) No communication (M =
3.38, SD = 2.62) vs. Unrestricted communication (M = 5.16, SD = 3.27), z = 4.33, adj. p < .001, d = 0.59; 2) No-communication vs Restricted communication (M =
4.36, SD = 3.06), z = 2.46, adj. p = .041, d = 0.34; 3) Unrestricted communication vs Restricted communication, z = − 1.84, adj, p = .198, d = 0.25.

8
M.H. Tønnesen et al.
reports based on partners behavior, are also presented in SM (section
3.2.4. – 3.2.6.).
3.2.2. Experienced collaboration and sense of commitment
A one-way ANOVA revealed that the overall experienced collabo­
ration (aggregated measure) differed significantly across groups (F
(2,763) = 10.28, p < .001, η2 = 0.026, see Table 2 for an overview of
ANOVA results, means and variances of the different conditions).17
Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed that dyads in the Unrestricted commu­
nication condition reported significantly higher levels of experienced
collaboration compared to the No-communication condition (t(513) =
− 3.55, p < .001, 95% CI [0.19, 0.96], d = 0.31) and the Restricted
communication condition, (t(503) = 4.17, p < .001, 95% CI [− 1.07,
0.32], d = 0.37). There was no significant difference between the No-
communication and Restricted communication condition (t(503) =
0.78, p = .718, 95% CI [− 0.52, 0.26], d = 0.07).
In line with Study 1, this was primarily driven by a higher level of
experienced collaboration on the single item measure. Both the Unre­
stricted (t(513) = − 6.54, p < .001, 95% CI [0.78, 1.66], d = 0.58) and
Restricted condition (t(505) = − 2.93, p = .010, 95% CI [0.11, 1.00], d =
0.26) had a higher average experienced collaboration compared to the
No-communication. Participants in the Unrestricted condition similarly
scored higher than the participants in the Restricted condition (t(505) =
2.93, p < .001, 95% CI [− 1.11, 0.22], d = 0.31).
There were no significant differences in experience of shared goal
between the No-communication and the Unrestricted communication (t
(514) = − 1.91, p = .145, 95% CI [− 0.09, 0.82], d = 0.17) and the
Restricted communication condition (t(505) = 2.25, p = .061, 95% CI
[− 0.90, 0.02], d = 0.20). Dyads in the Unrestricted condition, however,
scored higher on experiences a shared goal compared to dyads in the
Restricted communication conditions (t(501) = 4.10, p < .001, 95% CI
[− 1.27, − 0.35], d = 0.37). Furthermore, participants in the Restricted
condition reported lower levels of shared intentions compared to both
the Unrestricted (t(503) = 3.12, p = .004, 95% CI [− 1.11, − 0.17], d =
0.28) and No-communication condition (t(506) = 2.54, p = .038, 95% CI
[− 0.96, − 0.02], d = 0.22). There was no significant difference between
the Unrestricted and No-communication condition (t(507) = − 0.73, p =
.741, 95% CI [− 0.32, 0.62], d = 0.06).
When investigating the effect of the condition on feelings of
commitment, a one-way ANOVA revealed an overall effect (F(2,763) =
7.23, p < .001, eta2 = 0.019, see Table 2 for overview of means and
variances of the different conditions). Again, participants in the Unre­
stricted communication condition scored higher in overall commitment
compared to participants in the No-communication condition (t(508) =
− 3.88, p < .001, 95% CI [0.23, 0.97], d = 0.34), but not compared to the
Restricted communication condition(t(503) = 2.07, p = .082, 95% CI
[− 0.71, 0.03], d = 0.18). There was no difference between the No-
communication and Restricted communication condition (t(496) =
− 0.164, p = .238, 95% CI [− 0.12, 0.63], d = 0.15).
When asked how likely it was that they would help their co-player
again, this was higher for participants in the Unrestricted condition
compared to the No-communication condition (t(513) = − 2.40, p =
.045, 95% CI [0.01, 0.85], d = 0.21). There was no significant differ­
ences between the No-communication and Restricted condition (t(506)
= − 0.99, p = .585, 95% CI [− 0.25, 0.60], d = 0.09) and between the two
communication condition (t(503)4 = 1.37, p = .350, 95% CI [− 0.68,
0.17], d = 0.12). Similarly, participants in the Unrestricted condition
scored higher when asked how likely they thought it was that their co-
player would help them, compared to the No-communication (t(512)
= − 4.31, p < .001, 95% CI [0.34, 1.16], d = 0.38) and Restricted
communication condition (t(503) = 2.80, p = .012, 95% CI [− 0.92,
− 0.09], d = 0.25). There was no significant difference between the No-
17
See also Table S15 in SM section 3.2.7. for an overview of results and
pairwise comparisons.
9
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603
communication and Restriction communication condition (t(503) =
− 1.38, p = .355, 95% CI [− 0.17, 0.66], d = 0.12).
Concerning the obligation question, participants in the Unrestricted
condition reported higher level of being obligated to help their co-player
than participants in the No communication condition (t(512) = − 3.37, p
= .003, 95% CI [0.18, 1.04], d = 0.30). There were no differences be­
tween the No communication and Restricted communication condition
(t(507) = − 1.89, p = .145, 95% CI [− 0.09, 0.78], d = 0.17) and the two
communication conditions (t(503) = 1.40, p = .328, 95% CI [− 0.70,
0.17], d = 0.13).
In line with Study 1, we found a significant partial mediation effect of
experienced collaboration on the effect of Unrestricted communication,
supporting H3. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was
ACME = 0.472 and the 95% confidence interval ranged from 0.28 to
0.70. The direct effect of Unrestricted communication was ADE = 1.287
(95% CI [0.80; 1.77]). The effect of Restricted communication was
likewise partly mediated by experienced collaboration. The mediation
analysis revealed a significant bootstrapped unstandardized indirect
effect of ACME = 0.089 (95% CI [0.16; 0.19]). The direct effect of
Restricted communication was ADE = 0.869 (95% CI [0.40; 1.37]). All
mediation analyses used 1000 simulations to bootstrap.
We performed similar exploratory analyses for commitment. There
was a significant indirect effect of Unrestricted communication through
commitment (ACME = 0.351, 95% CI [0.17; 0.57]), with a significant
direct effect of ADE = 1.416 (95% CI [0.97; 1.88]). Thus, the effect of
Unrestricted communication was partly mediated by commitment. The
effect of Restricted communication was, however, not mediated by
commitment. The indirect effect was not statistically significant (ACME
= 0.069, 95% CI [− 0.01; 0.16]) (see SM Fig. S4 section 3.2.7. for
overview of mediations for experienced collaboration and
commitment).
4. General discussion
Instead of deterring dishonesty, our results suggest that including
communication facilitates dishonesty in collaborative settings. Overall,
Study 1 successfully replicated the core findings of Weisel and Shalvi
(2015), finding that participants engaged in a dyadic die roll paradigm
cheated more for monetary gains compared to when people played
alone. Study 1 offered further compelling evidence indicating that
communication between participants increases the magnitude of
cheating beyond the original study’s non-communicative settings.
Importantly, this effect was linked to a stronger experienced collabo­
ration among the communicating dyads, highlighting that communica­
tion is not only key to everyday ethically sound collaborations, but also
to corrupt collaborations. Study 2 replicated this finding, showing that
communication significantly increases collaborative cheating compared
to non-communicative contexts, even when coordination is restricted.
Both commitment and experienced collaboration mediated the effect of
unrestricted communication on dishonesty. However, when dyads could
chat but were not allowed to coordinate on the task, dishonesty was only
mediated by the experience of collaborating and not a sense of
commitment.
Study 2’s findings illuminate the role of communication in collabo­
rative dishonesty. Similar to the presumptions of prior research (Beck
et al., 2020; Kocher et al., 2018), the ability to communicate about the
task, potentially enabling coordination and justification exchange,
resulted in the highest levels of dishonesty. Interestingly, this was not
significantly different from dyads who were not allowed to discuss the
task. This suggests that discussing everyday topics alone might increase
collaborative dishonest behavior, regardless of coordination and justi­
fication exchange. This effect was partly linked to experienced collab­
oration, but not significantly connected to commitment.
However, despite the non-significant difference in number of re­
ported doubles between the two communicative settings in Study 2, the
results also indicate that restricting the communication to non-task
M.H. Tønnesen et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603

Table 2
Differences in mean experienced collaboration and commitment across conditions.
No communication Unrestricted communication Restricted communication ANOVA

M SD M SD M SD F(df) p Eta2

Overall collaboration 3.78 1.81 4.36 1.88 3.65 1.92 10.28 <0.001 0.026
(2763)
Experienced collaboration 3.29 2.08 4.51 2.15 3.84 2.17 21.12 <0.001 0.052
(2763)
Shared goal 4.39 2.18 4.76 2.17 3.95 2.27 8.52 0.001 0.022
(2763)
Shared intention 3.67 2.17 3.82 2.40 3.18 2.22 5.53 0.004 0.014
(2763)
Overall commitment 4.07 1.66 4.66 1.83 4.32 1.86 7.23 <0.001 0.019
(2.76)
Likelihood of helping Person X 4.65 1.99 5.07 2.07 4.82 2.05 2.88 0.057 0.007
(2763)
Belief that Person X would help 4.17 1.93 4.92 2.02 4.39 2.05 9.43 0.001 0.024
(2763)
Feeling of obligation to help 3.38 2.00 3.99 2.11 3.72 2.14 5.59 0.004 0.014
(2763)

F statistic based on one-way ANOVA. Overall collaboration is based on an aggregated measure of the three items. Overall Commitment is likewise based on an
aggregate measure of three items. NC = No communication, UC = Unrestricted communication, RC = Restricted communication, M = mean, SD = standard deviation,
df = degrees of freedom.

related topics reduces the magnitude of the cheating in terms of coor­
dination on obtaining a maximum payoff. This is in line with previous
research studying the differential effect of task-related and non-task-
related communication in collaboration. For instance, Zultan (2012)
found that removing strategic communication by excluding game-
related discussion led to similar levels of offers in the ultimatum
game, while the responders were more willing to accept lower offers
when communication was restricted. However, there was a slightly
higher proportion of equal splits between participants when communi­
cation was not restricted, indicating higher coordination on a mutually
beneficial outcome for the participants (Zultan, 2012). Together with
the study by Zultan (2012), our study suggests that behavior under
different communicative settings may be related to different mecha­
nisms. While we did not find a significant effect of commitment when
communication was restricted, other mechanisms, such as prosocial
concerns for the other person may be at play. Thus, rather than looking
at a unified explanation for the effect of communication, more research
into the differential mechanisms is important, both when it comes to
ethical and unethical collaborations, respectively.
4.1. Limitations
Besides certain differences between the present studies and the
original study of Weisel and Shalvi (2015),18 some general limitations
deserve consideration. The first is related to the inherent nature of
experimental studies prioritizing high internal validity at the expense of
external validity. Transitioning from die roll tasks to real-life cases of
collaborative dishonesty outside the lab is indeed a substantial leap.
Some studies have found that dishonesty in the lab correlate positively
with real-world dishonesty (e.g., Dai et al., 2018; Schild et al., 2021).
However, because communication between individuals has often been a
necessary prerequisite for corruption to evolve in many major fraud
scandals, including communication into collaborative paradigms is a
step towards increasing the generalizability towards real-world unethi­
cal collaborations.
Secondly, another issue pertains to the demand-effects associated
with the die roll task. Cheating paradigms often provide participants
with ambiguous instructions that may indicate an expectation for
cheating, potentially influencing their behavior (for similar concerns,
see Frollová et al., 2021; Heyman et al., 2020; Karg, 2021). Neverthe­
less, this does not diminish the actual dishonesty of misreporting in the
present studies. Furthermore, people differ in how (dis)honest they are
(Thielmann et al., 2023) and several studies have shown that behavior in
cheating paradigms is also related to basic personality traits, such as the
Honesty-Humility trait (e.g., Pfattheicher et al., 2019; Ścigała et al.,
2020; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2015). If dishonesty in cheating paradigms
were only due to demand effects, it would arguably be unlikely that
interindividual differences would be linked to basic personality traits.19
Indeed, in line with previous research, dishonesty was negatively
correlated with the trait of Honesty-Humility in the present study.
Thirdly, as previous research has shown that coordinating in a die
roll task increases trust and social bonds (Karg et al., 2023), the direction
of the mediations in the present studies may be reversed. More research
that disentangles the relationship between communication, collabora­
tion, and dishonesty is needed. Lastly, our commitment items were
focused on future help, which may not fully capture the commitment
fostered by communication. Instead, the effect could be related to
relationship building. The restricted communication topics constituted
different forms of self-disclosure (i.e., the sharing og personal informa­
tion; Cozby, 1973), that allowed the participants to get to know each
other. In fact, previous research has indicated that people become more
generous towards others the more they know about them (Bohnet &
Frey, 1999; Charness & Gneezy, 2008). Further research into the role of
such social exchanges in collaborative dishonest behaviors is warranted.
In conclusion, this paper highlights two key directions for future
research. First, it emphasizes the role of communication in shaping
collaborative dishonest behaviors, urging future investigation into its
various mechanisms. Although Study 2 offers initial insights into such
mechanisms, future studies should differentiate between the exchange
of justifications, coordination, commitment, and other factors such as
relationship building to understand how communication influences
collaborative dishonesty. Specifically, it is crucial to further develop
strong measures and manipulations to help differentiate between rele­
vant mechanisms. This also relates to measures of experienced collab­
oration and commitment in these settings.
Additionally, exploring situations where communication not only
facilitates but rather hinders collaborative dishonesty is pivotal. How
strategic (unrestricted) communication may alter the beliefs and

18 19
A description of deviances from the original study is provided in SM (section We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insightful
2.3.). point.

10
M.H. Tønnesen et al.
preferences for (dis)honesty of players in these settings is especially
important. That is, under which circumstances may strategic commu­
nication be more effectful in either persuading others to act dishonestly,
or more importantly, when may it serve as an important tool to talk
someone out of dishonesty? Furthermore, the reduced coordination
when communication was restricted to non-task related topics warrants
further examination.
Another interesting avenue is to study the impact of communication
in a more real-word context, where individuals can perceive both their
own and other’s reputations as being even more at stake. For instance,
research has suggested that reducing distance and anonymity may
decrease dishonesty (Conrads & Lotz, 2015). Conversely, face-to-face
communication may increase the effect of communication. Indeed,
face-to-face communication has previously been related to stronger ef­
fects than those observed when using written communication (Brosig,
Weimann, & Ockenfels, 2003; Zultan, 2012). Thus, studying the impact
of communication in face-to-face interactions in the lab would provide
important knowledge on how communication impact dishonesty when
anonymity is reduced. As collaborative endeavors rarely happen
without prior interaction and communication, future research investi­
gating how these behaviors unfold in already established social groups
(e.g., employees or friends), would further help move the field of
collaborative dishonesty closer to real-life corrupt collaborations.
Although few studies have included friends (e.g., Okano & Goto, 2023),
we are not aware of studies investigating these behaviors among col­
leagues in organizations.
Second, given that our results reveal different levels of experienced
collaboration between conditions, future research should consider var­
iations in collaboration. Investigating how different levels of collabo­
ration are related to distinct forms of corrupt behaviors, will offer
important insights for mitigation strategies aimed at hindering corrup­
tion and corporate fraud. Indeed, some collaborations may be initiated
by private, self-directed goals, other may be based on the goal of the
group (Tuomela, 2020), potentially giving rise to different forms of
corrupt collaborations. Finally, if we want to study people colluding on
deceiving others together, it is essential understand the circumstances for
this type of collaboration and to develop experimental designs that can
captures the nuances of collaboration. Our assertion is that the inte­
gration of communication serves as the initial stride in advancing our
understanding of the collective dimension inherent in collaborative
dishonesty.
Open science practices
All materials, data, and analyses codes for Studies 1 and 2 are pub­
licly accessible at the OSF [https://osf.io/gwn3r/]. The hypotheses,
exclusion criteria, sampling, and analysis plan were pre-registered.
The preregistration for Study 1 can be found at https://doi.org/10
.17605/OSF.IO/NP96H.
The preregistration for Study 2 can be found at https://doi.org/10
.17605/OSF.IO/SJYFD. In these studies, we report all measures, ma­
nipulations and exclusions.
The studies were approved by the Ethical Committee of the Institu­
tional Review Board at the authors’ institution (BSS-2022-073).
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Mathilde H. Tønnesen: Writing – review & editing, Writing –
original draft, Visualization, Software, Project administration, Method­
ology, Investigation, Funding acquisition, Formal analysis, Data cura­
tion, Conceptualization. Christian T. Elbæk: Writing – review &
editing, Methodology, Formal analysis, Conceptualization. Stefan
Pfattheicher: Writing – review & editing, Supervision, Methodology,
Conceptualization. Panagiotis Mitkidis: Writing – review & editing,
Supervision, Methodology, Conceptualization.
11
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603
Declaration of Competing interest
The authors declare no competing interest.
Data availability
All data is openly available at the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/gwn3r/?
view_only=3de67cf4bd0a451f87aa38e065c13516)
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the Centre for Integrative Business Psy­
chology, Aarhus University, for providing funding for this research.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104603.
References
Andreoni, J., & Rao, J. M. (2011). The power of asking: How communication affects
selfishness, empathy, and altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 95(7–8), 513–520.
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7-8:p:513-520.
Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the
HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11
(2), 150–166. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868306294907
Beck, T., Bühren, C., Frank, B., & Khachatryan, E. (2020). Can honesty oaths, peer
interaction, or monitoring mitigate lying? Journal of Business Ethics, 163(3),
467–484. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-4030-z
Bohnet, I., & Frey, B. S. (1999). Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator
Games. Comment. American Economic Review, 89(1), 335–339. https://doi.org/
10.1257/aer.89.1.335
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2011). A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution.
Princeton University Press.
Bratman, M. E. (1992). Shared cooperative activity. The Philosophical Review, 101(2),
327–341. https://doi.org/10.2307/2185537
Brosig, J., Weimann, J., & Ockenfels, A. (2003). The Effect of Communication Media on
Cooperation. German Economic Review, 4(2), 217–241. https://doi.org/10.1111/
1468-0475.00080
Buck, R., & VanLear, C. A. (2002). Verbal and nonverbal communication: Distinguishing
symbolic, spontaneous, and pseudo-spontaneous nonverbal behavior. Journal of
Communication, 52(3), 522–541. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2002.
tb02560.x
Butterfill, S. (2012). Joint action and development. The Philosophical Quarterly, 62(246),
23–47. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00005.x
Cadsby, C. B., Du, N., & Song, F. (2016). In-group favoritism and moral decision-making.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 128, 59–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jebo.2016.05.008
Castillo, G., Choo, L., & Grimm, V. (2022). Are groups always more dishonest than
individuals? The case of salient negative externalities. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 198, 598–611. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.04.014
Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and partnership. Econometrica, 74(6),
1579–1601. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4123084.
Charness, G., & Gneezy, U. (2008). What’s in a name? Anonymity and social distance in
dictator and ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(1),
29–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.001
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R. M., & Walkowitz, G. (2013). Lying and team
incentives. Journal of Economic Psychology, 34, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
joep.2012.10.011
Conrads, J., & Lotz, S. (2015). The effect of communication channels on dishonest
behavior. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 58, 88–93. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.006
Cozby, P. C. (1973). Self-disclosure: A literature review. Psychological Bulletin, 79, 73–91.
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0033950
Dai, Z., Galeotti, F., & Villeval, M. C. (2018). Cheating in the lab predicts fraud in the
field: An experiment in public transportation. Management Science, 64(3),
1081–1100. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2616
De Cremer, D., & Barker, M. (2003). Accountability and cooperation in social dilemmas:
The influence of others’ reputational concerns. Current Psychology, 22(2), 155–163.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-003-1006-6
De Saussure, L., & Rocci, A. (2016). Verbal communication: An introduction. In Verbal
communication (Handbook of Communication Sciences, vol. 3) (pp. 3–20).
Erat, S., & Gneezy, U. (2012). White lies. Management Science, 58(4), 723–733. https://
doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior
Research Methods, 39(2), 175–191. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146
M.H. Tønnesen et al.
Frollová, N., Vranka, M., & Houdek, P. (2021). A qualitative study of perception of a
dishonesty experiment. Journal of Economic Methodology, 28(3), 274–290. https://
doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.1936598
Gerlach, P., Teodorescu, K., & Hertwig, R. (2019). The truth about lies: A meta-analysis
on dishonest behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 145(1), 1–44. https://doi.org/10.1037/
bul0000174
Gross, J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2020). Rule following mitigates collaborative cheating
and facilitates the spreading of honesty within groups [article]. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220927195
Gross, J., Leib, M., Offerman, T., & Shalvi, S. (2018). Ethical free riding: When honest
people find dishonest partners. Psychological Science, 29(12), 1956–1968. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0956797618796480
Heck, D. W., Thielmann, I., Moshagen, M., & Hilbig, B. E. (2018). Who lies? A large-scale
reanalysis linking basic personality traits to unethical decision making. Judgment and
Decision making, 13, 356–371.
Heyman, T., Vankrunkelsven, H., Voorspoels, W., White, A., Storms, G., & Verheyen, S.
(2020). When cheating is an honest mistake: A critical evaluation of the matrix task as a
measure of dishonesty (p. 6). Collabra: Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1525/
collabra.294
Irlenbusch, B., Mussweiler, T., Saxler, D. J., Shalvi, S., & Weiss, A. (2020). Similarity
increases collaborative cheating [article]. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 178, 148–173. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.022
Jamaluddin, S. F., Adi, S. P., & Lufityanto, G. (2020). Social influences on cheating in
collectivistic culture: Collaboration but not competition. Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice.
Karg, S. T. (2021). Partners in Crime: Investigating influence factors and outcomes of
ocllaborative corruption. Aarhus University.
Karg, S. T., Kim, M., Mitkidis, P., & Young, L. (2023). Collaborative cheating in
hierarchical teams: Effects of incentive structure and leader behavior on subordinate
behavior and perceptions of leaders. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 49(8),
1166–1183. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672221090859
Kerr, N. L., & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. M. (1994). Communication, commitment, and
cooperation in social dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66,
513–529. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.66.3.513
Kocher, M. G., Schudy, S., & Spantig, L. (2018). I lie? We lie! Why? Experimental
evidence on a dishonesty shift in groups [article]. Management Science, 64(9),
3995–4008. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2800
Korbel, V. (2017). Do we lie in groups? An experimental evidence. Applied Economics
Letters, 24(15), 1107–1111. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1259734
Kreps, D. M. (1989). Nash Equilibrium. In J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, & P. Newman (Eds.),
Game theory (pp. 167–177). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-
1-349-20181-5_19.
Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2004). Psychometric properties of the HEXACO personality
inventory. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39(2), 329–358. https://doi.org/
10.1207/s15327906mbr3902_8
Leib, M., Köbis, N., Soraperra, I., Weisel, O., & Shalvi, S. (2021). Collaborative
dishonesty: A meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 147(12), 1241–1268.
https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000349
Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of
self-concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 45(6), 633–644. https://
doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633
Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural evolution: How darwinian theory can explain human culture
and synthesize the social sciences. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/
9780226520452.001.0001
Michael, J., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2016a). Observing joint action: Coordination
creates commitment. Cognition, 157, 106–113. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cognition.2016.08.024
Michael, J., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2016b). The sense of commitment: A minimal
approach [hypothesis and theory]. Frontiers in Psychology, 6. https://doi.org/
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01968
Mitkidis, P., Chrysochou, P., Obolevich, V., & Mitkidis, K. (2022). Effectiveness of
environmental health and loss framing on household pharmaceutical take-back
schemes. Waste Management, 143, 61–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
wasman.2022.02.017
Mitkidis, P., Perkovic, S., Nichols, A., Elbæk, C. T., Gerlach, P., & Ariely, D. (2023).
Morality in minimally deceptive environments. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Applied. https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000476. No Pagination Specified-No
Pagination Specified.
Mitkidis, P., Sørensen, J., Nielbo, K. L., Andersen, M., & Lienard, P. (2013). Collective-
goal ascription increases cooperation in humans. PLoS One, 8(5), Article e64776.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0064776
Molnar, A. (2020). How to implement real-time interaction between participants in
online surveys: A practical guide to SMARTRIQS. The Quantitative Methods for
Psychology, 16(4), 334–354. https://doi.org/10.20982/tqmp.16.4.p334 (IN FILE)
12
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 112 (2024) 104603
Moore, R. (2018). Gricean communication, joint action, and the evolution of
cooperation. Topoi, 37(2), 329–341. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9372-5
Nowak, M. A. (2000). Evolutionary biology of language. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 355(1403), 1615–1622. https://
doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2000.0723
Okano, Y., & Goto, E. (2023). Groups versus individuals, partial lying, and social image
concern in a dice-rolling experiment. The Japanese Economic Review.. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s42973-023-00139-0
Pfattheicher, S., Schindler, S., & Nockur, L. (2019). On the impact of honesty-humility
and a cue of being watched on cheating behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 71,
159–174. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2018.06.004
R Core Team. (2022). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. Vienna,
Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. https://www.R-project.org/.
Roth, A. E. (1995). Bargaining experiments. Handbook of Experimental Economics, 1,
253–348.
Schild, C., Heck, D. W., Ścigała, K. A., & Zettler, I. (2019). Revisiting REVISE: (re)testing
unique and combined effects of REminding, VIsibility, and SElf-engagement
manipulations on cheating behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 75(Part A).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.04.001
Schild, C., Lilleholt, L., & Zettler, I. (2021). Behavior in cheating paradigms is linked to
overall approval rates of crowdworkers. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 34(2),
157–166. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2195
Ścigała, K. A., Schild, C., & Zettler, I. (2020). Dishonesty as a signal of trustworthiness:
Honesty-humility and trustworthy dishonesty. Royal Society Open Science, 7(10),
Article 200685. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.200685
Shalvi, S., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2014). Oxytocin promotes group-serving dishonesty.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(15), 5503–5507. https://doi.
org/10.1073/pnas.1400724111
Shalvi, S., Weisel, O., Kochavi-Gamliel, S., & Leib, M. (2016). Corrupt collaboration: A
behavioral ethics approach. In J.-W. V. Prooijen, & P. A. M. V. Lange (Eds.), Cheating,
corruption, and concealment: The roots of dishonesty (pp. 134–148). Cambridge
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316225608.009.
Simonsohn, U. (2015). Small telescopes: Detectability and the evaluation of replication
results. Psychological Science, 26(5), 559–569. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0956797614567341
Soraperra, I., Weisel, O., Zultan, R. I., Kochavi, S., Leib, M., Shalev, H., & Shalvi, S.
(2017). The bad consequences of teamwork. Economics Letters, 160, 12–15. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.011
Sturm, R. E. (2017). Decreasing unethical decisions: The role of morality-based
individual differences. Journal of Business Ethics, 142(1), 37–57. https://doi.org/
10.1007/s10551-015-2787-x
Thielmann, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2015). The traits one can trust:dissecting reciprocity and
kindness as determinants of trustworthy behavior. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 41(11), 1523–1536. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215600530
Thielmann, I., Hilbig, B. E., Klein, S. A., Seidl, A., & Heck, D. W. (2023). Cheating to
benefit others? On the relation between honesty-humility and prosocial lies. Journal
of Personality, n/a(n/a). https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12835
Tingley, D., Yamamoto, T., Hirose, K., Keele, L., & Imai, K. (2014). Mediation: R package
for causal mediation analysis. Journal of Statistical Software, 59(5), 1–38. https://doi.
org/10.18637/jss.v059.i05
Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of human communication. MIT Press.
Tomasello, M. (2016). A Natural History of Human Morality. Harvard University Press.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1g13jjn.
Torchiano, M. (2016). Effsize - A package for efficient effect size computation. https://doi.
org/10.5281/zenodo.196082
Tuomela, R. (2020). We-thinking, we-mode, and group agents. Social Ontology,
Normativity and Law, 11.
Weisel, O., & Shalvi, S. (2015). The collaborative roots of corruption. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 112(34), 10651–10656. https://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1423035112
Wouda, J., Bijlstra, G., Frankenhuis, W. E., & Wigboldus, D. H. J. (2017). The
collaborative roots of corruption? A replication of Weisel & Shalvi (2015). Collabra:
Psychology, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.97
Zickfeld, J., Karg, S. T., Engen, S. S., Gonzalez, A. S. R., Michael, J., & Mitkidis, P. (2022).
Committed dishonesty: A systematic meta-analysis of the effect of social commitment on
dishonest behavior.
Zickfeld, J. H., Ścigała, K. A., Weiss, A., Michael, J., & Mitkidis, P. (2023). Commitment
to honesty oaths decreases dishonesty, but commitment to another individual does
not affect dishonesty. Communications Psychology, 1(1), 27. https://doi.org/10.1038/
s44271-023-00028-7
Zultan, R. I. (2012). Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(3), 425–434. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
joep.2011.12.009